Case Law Analysis

Title

Before

In the Supreme Court of India

Narayan … Appellant

v.

Babasaheb and others … Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 3486 of 2016, decided on April 5, 2016

(2016) 6 Supreme Court Cases 725: (2016) 3 Supreme Court Cases (Civ) 483:
2016 SCC OnLine SC 292

Bench & Quorum

Before – MADAN B. LOKUR AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.

Division Bench

Page 1 of 9
Procedural History of the case

➢ The appellant before this court is the defendant no.1 in the suit. Respondents
no.1 to 5 are the plaintiffs and the respondent no.6 is Defendant no.2. For
the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred as they are before the
trial court.

➢ The plaintiffs father was the original owner of the suit schedule property
which is ancestral property. He died in the year 1972 leaving behind his
children and the widow i.e. the defendant no.2. The defendant no.2
becomes the natural guardian to her children.

➢ The trial court, concluded that under Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 (for short "the 1956 Act") the sale made by the de
facto guardian of the minor is void ab initio and the sale deeds are not
binding on the plaintiffs and accordingly decreed the suit holding that the
plaintiffs are entitled to partition and separate possession of their share.

➢ Aggrieved by the said impugned judgment and decree, the defendant no.1
has filed appeal in year 1991 under the District Judge, Parbhani. The
defendant no.1 raised the issue that the suit was barred by limitation as per
Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short "the Act") and as on the
date of filing of the suit, except the 2nd plaintiff, all other plaintiffs were
majors and hence the suit ought to have been instituted within three years
as envisaged by Article 60 of the Act.

Page 2 of 9
 ➢ The appellate court concluded that Article 60 of the Act is not applicable to
the facts of the case as the defendant no.2 is not the guardian appointed by
the Court. Therefore, Article 109 of the Act, which prescribed 12 years is
applicable where the alienation made by the father of the ancestral property
by the Hindus who are governed by the Mitakshara law and hence the suit
filed in the year 1989 is well within limitation.

➢ The defendant no.1 by way of Second Appeal in year 2004 approached the
High Court of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad. The High Court has
dismissed the appeal holding that Article 109 of the Act applies to the
alienation made by the mother and Article 60 the Act does not apply to the
facts of the and the suit is well within limitation.

➢ Against the said order, the present appeal is filed before this court.

Facts of the case

➢ The plaintiffs/Respondents no.1 to no.5 filed a Civil Suit in year 1989

against the defendant no.1 (appellant herein) and defendant no.2
(Respondent no.6). The suit was filed seeking the relief of partition and for
a declaration that the sale deeds dated 20-1-1982 and 28-11-1988 executed
by Defendant no.2 in favour of Defendant no.1 are not binding and to set
aside the same and also for recovery of possession of the suit schedule
property and for mesne profits.

Page 3 of 9
 ➢ The plaintiffs are real brothers and sisters (siblings) and Defendant no. 2 is
their mother and the Appellant is the purchaser of property in whose favour
the impugned sale deeds were executed. The Plaintiffs father was the
original owner of the disputed property which was ancestral property and
he died in the year 1972, leaving behind the plaintiffs and Defendant no. 2.
The Plaintiff claimed that their mother had a loose character and after the
death of their father she left the matrimonial home and married a man named
Begaji.

➢ The plaintiff alleged that respondent no. 2 had illegally sold the property for
a meagre sum of Rs 6,000 although the nearby lands were selling for Rs
15,000 per acre. Despite being a major at the time of the second sale deed's
execution, the first plaintiff was listed as a minor.

➢ The Trial Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs and held that plaintiffs and
defendant no. 2 is entitle to their respective shares of the contested property,
and plaintiffs are also entitled to mesne profits. After that, the Appellant
appealed the impugned decision to the first Appellate Court, where he
asserted that the suit was time-barred in accordance with Article 60 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Additionally, the High Court in the second appeal
rejected Defendant No. 2's claim.

Issues

➢ The bench sought to decide that the whether the suit filed in 1989 for setting
aside the sale deed made in 1982 is governed under which article of the
limitation act 1963 and whether the same is within limitation or not.

Page 4 of 9
Arguments

➢ Behalf of appellant/defendant no.1 – they alleged that sale deed dated year
1982 is barred by limitation of acticle 60 of Act and the limitation is of 3
years. It is argued that the courts below have erroneously applied Article
109 . Furthermore, Article 109 only applies in situations where alienation is
made the father ; in the present case, the alienation was made by mother.
The party further argued that the courts below erred in applying a provision
that is specifically written to address alienation committed by the father to
alienation committed by the mother. This goes against the established
principles of statutory interpretation, according to him.

➢ Behalf of respondant/plaintiff – On the other hand, the learned

counsel representing the respondent-plaintiffs has argued that Article 60
only applies in situations where the guardian has exclusive possession of a
minor's property rather than joint family property. He added that the
plaintiffs' case directly falls under Article 110 of the Act and as such the suit
filed by the plaintiffs is well within the limitation period and seeks dismissal
of the appeal. Further, the residuary clause has no application as it will only
apply when there is no other article provided under the Act, the party said.

Laws applied

The relevant laws are as follows –

Page 5 of 9
 ➢ The limitation Act, 1963 – article 60,109,110 and 113 and S.7
➢ The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,1956 – S. 8,11

Judgment

➢ The bench sought to rule that Article 109 is inapplicable to the facts of the
case when a quondam minor plaintiff seeks possession of property and
challenges the transfer of an immovable property made by his guardian in
violation of Section 8(1)(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,
1956. Such a minor plaintiff may file a lawsuit only within the time period
specified under Article 60 of the Act.

➢ Since there was only a 3-year statute of limitations, the bench further
inquired as to what the restriction reckoning date was in the case of several
plaintiffs. When one of several parties who are jointly entitled to institute a
lawsuit or make an application for the execution of a judgement and a
discharge can be granted without their consent, Section 7 of the Act makes
it clear that time will run against all of them; however, when no such
discharge can be granted, time will not run against them until one of them
becomes qualified to grant discharge.

➢ However, the bench noted that since the plaintiffs in the present case are not
the managers of the joint family, even though they were majors as of the
date the lawsuit was filed, they will not be covered by Explanation 2 of
Section 7 of the Act of 1963. As a result, the lawsuit was filed well within

Page 6 of 9
 the 3-year timeframe allowed by Article 60 of the Act following the day the
plaintiff reached majority. As so, the appeal is denied.

Rationale

➢ Thus, in applying Article 109 of the Act, the High Court and even the Trial
Court erred. The court held that Both the High Court and the trial court made
mistakes in applying Article 109 of the Act, which makes it clear that father-
made alienation is governed by Mitakshara law. The explanation 2 of
Section 7 of the Act states that the manager of a Hindu undivided family
shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the consent of
other family members only if he is in management of the joint family
property in this case, which is governed by Mithakshara Law.

Critical analysis

➢ It is accepted interpretational theory that a person's annoyance and suffering

will not be the deciding criteria for interpreting the provision. It was to be
interpreted in the same way as the Latin proverb dulo lex sed lex, which
means the law is hard but it is law and there cannot be any deviation from
the terms of the law, which states that the provision was to be understood in
the same way when a simple reading of it made it very apparent and
unambiguously gave a meaning. Furthermore, if no such right exists under
the substantive law, the Limitation Act neither grants a right nor imposes an

Page 7 of 9
 obligation to initiate a lawsuit. It just stipulates a deadline for bringing the
lawsuit.

➢ Hence, the limitation to file the present suit is governed by Article 60 of the
Act and the limitation is 3 years from the date of attaining majority.

➢ Further question the was when there are several plaintiffs, what is the
reckoning date of limitation. Section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes it
clear that when one of the several persons jointly entitled to institute suit is
under any disability and a discharge cannot be given without concurrence
of such person, time will not run against all of them until one of them
becomes capable of giving discharge.

➢ The first plaintiff in the current case was 20 years old, the second plaintiff
was still a minor, and Plaintiffs 3, 4, and 5, who are married daughters, were
29, 27, and 25 years old at the time the suit was instituted in 1989,
accordingly.

➢ As per Explanation II of Section 7, the manager of a Hindu undivided family

governed by Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a
discharge without concurrence of other members of family only if he is in
management of the joint family property.

➢ Despite being majors as of the date the lawsuit was filed, Plaintiffs 3 to 5 in
this case do not fall under Explanation II of Section 7 of the Limitation Act
because they are not the manager or karta of the joint family. There is no
evidence to support a different finding about the age of the first plaintiff,

Page 8 of 9
who was 20 years old as of the day the lawsuit was instituted. In light of
this, the lawsuit was filed well inside the three-year statute of limitations
beginning on the date the plaintiff attained majority, as specified in Article
60 of the Act.

Submitted by –
Chirayu Sharma
BA.LL.B Sec.A
191301092

Page 9 of 9