Constitution of India provides protection against the retrospectivity of criminal
law or ex post facto laws to its citizens under the Article 20 clause 1. Under the Article 20 (1) it is stated that, “No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.” The first of the clause means that no person shall be convicted for an act that is considered to be an offence under a law enacted in future if the act is innocent at the time of its commission. The second part provides the citizens protection against greater penalty that might have been inflicted under the in force at the time of commission of the offence. In Nirbhaya Rape Case of 2012, as the culprits were of minor age (below 18 years), they were not convicted because of the absence of law regarding trial and punishment for minors if they involve in criminal offences. At the time commission of the offence, no person below 18 years of age can be convicted for any offence. Later in 2013 an amendment was introduced regarding the same commonly known as ‘Anti Rape Bill’ under Criminal Law (Amendment Act), 2013 that if children between the age 16 to 18 years undertake gruesome and violent activities of murder and rape, they should be tried and punished as adults. Further, the instance of Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v State of Gujarat1 dismissed the contentions of the appellants who had looked to apply the arrangement of recently added arrangement connected with share demise under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code to the supposed episode that happened preceding the date of addition. In the said case, the supposed occurrence had occurred in August 1986 and Section 304-B was authorized in November 1986. The Court held that utilization of Section 304-B reflectively would bring about the refusal of the assurance given under Article 21(1) of the Constitution. In the case of Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand2, the High Court held that for determining the age of a juvenile, provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 1 Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 298: 1991 SCC (Cri) 959: AIR 1991 SC 2173 2 Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551: 2005 SCC (Cri) 742: 2005 SCC OnLine SC 211: 2005 Cri LJ 3091: AIR 2005 SC 2731 would apply instead of the 2000 act. Section 20 of the Act says that “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act came into force”. It means that the proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court are relatable to the proceedings commenced before the 2000 Act came into force along with the cases pending at the time of the introduction of the 2000 Act. Basically. The Section 20 of the Act defines that in cases where a person is ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 then the pending case shall continue in the court as if the 2000 Act has not been introduced. In the case of West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. V. State of Madras3 used the expression “law in force” according to Article 20(1) which provides that no person shall be convicted for any offence except for the violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act considered as an offence.
3 West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. V. State of Madras, (1963) 2 SCR 747: (1964) 1 MLJ (SC) 126: AIR 1962 SC 1753