Third World Quarterly

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Religion and social stability: China’s religious

policies in the Age of Reform

Changgang Guo & Fengmei Zhang

To cite this article: Changgang Guo & Fengmei Zhang (2015) Religion and social stability:
China’s religious policies in the Age of Reform, Third World Quarterly, 36:11, 2183-2195, DOI:
10.1080/01436597.2015.1067862

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1067862

Published online: 11 Dec 2015.

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Third World Quarterly, 2015
Vol. 36, No. 11, 2183–2195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1067862

Religion and social stability: China’s

religious policies in the Age of Reform
Changgang Guoa and Fengmei Zhangb*
a
Center for Global Studies, Shanghai University, China; bSchool of Foreign Studies, Anhui Polytechnic
University, China
(Received 9 May 2015; final version received 28 June 2015)

Under a strongly entrenched and powerful regime since the Han

Dynasty, China has formed a unique ‘state-lead, church-follow’ model,
in which the secular regime always incorporates religious affairs into
its national administration. The Chinese Communist Party’s religious
policy has largely remained an inheritance of the practice dating back
to ancient times. In response to the great ‘religious awakening’ in the
age of reform, especially the political risks that religion was seen to
pose after the downfall of the USSR and the disintegration of the
Communist bloc in Eastern Europe, the Party proposed a policy of
‘management of religious affairs according to law’. This ‘self-centred’
policy is being challenged, yet is crucial to social and political stability.
Keywords: China; China’s religious policy; Document 19; religious
persecution; church–state relations

在自汉朝以来建立的强大政权统治之下，中国形成一种独特的“政
主教从”模式，即，世俗政权总是把宗教事务纳入其行政管理之
中。中共的宗教政策很大程度上是这种古代宗教模式的继承。为
了回应改革开放以后的“宗教大觉醒”，尤其是宗教在苏联和东欧解
体后带来的政治风险，中共提出“依法管理宗教事务”，这种“以自
我为中心”的宗教政策虽然受到挑战，但是对社会政治稳定却至关
重要。

China’s religious policy is often criticised by the USA for its alleged excessive
restrictions on religious freedom. Some conservatives even claim that there is sev-
ere religious persecution in China. Since 1999 China has been styled a ‘Country of
Particular Concern’ by the International Religious Freedom Report released by the
US State Department. As former US senator Jesse Helmes said in 2001, ‘There is
no religious freedom in China today, there is only religious persecution’.1
However, foreigners visiting China are often amazed at what they see:
incense is burnt in temples with devout worshippers falling down on their knees.

*Corresponding author. Email: zhangfengmei@ahpu.edu.cn

© 2015 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com

2184 C. Guo and F. Zhang

It therefore appears strange that Chinese people are always referred to as

atheistic. Gospel tracts are disseminated publicly on the street, and the Bible is
discussed openly on the metro. Observers wonder why these believers are not
arrested.
Apparently there is a huge gap between opinion and truth, which requires
unbiased observation and analysis. Since the 1970s a global religious revival
has been growing. In the wave of globalisation, especially under the policy of
reform and opening up, China has opened its doors. There has been a rapid
growth in and proliferation of religion, which some might call a ‘religious
awakening’. However, economic development, as the focus of reform and open-
ing up (the so-called centring on ‘economic construction’), has been the main
path that China has chosen to integrate itself into globalisation.
But there has always been a challenge, even crisis (or ‘contingency’) behind
this direction, namely, stability, both political and social. Religion is unfortu-
nately seen by some as a politically and socially challenging variable that poses
a threat to stability. The ruling belief of the Chinese government, in the form of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is that ‘economic development’ is a must;
without development China has no way forward. But ‘stability’ is also neces-
sary. Without stability there can be no comprehensive development and, if
development cannot assure stability, it is meaningless. The CCP’s religious pol-
icy after reform and opening up can be said to be based on the historical tradi-
tions adopted by each dynasty, but it is also in line with the themes of
‘development’ and ‘stability’, even though challenges continue to exist.

China’s religious policy in previous eras

The prominent religious historian Daniel Bays points out that ‘looking back
over a thousand years of Chinese history, one finds little new about today’s pat-
tern of relations between the state and religion in China. Government registra-
tion and monitoring of religious activities, although irregularly exercised, has
been a constant reality of organized religious life in both traditional and modern
times.’2 Since the management of religion has been deeply rooted in Chinese
culture, it is little wonder that today’s government also prefers this means of
ruling.
The state’s suspicion of and interference in religion is not only a short-term
policy driven by Marxist ideology and measured in terms of decades. It is also
a long-established practice measured in centuries or even millennia, one
rehearsed countless times by emperors and their bureaucrats long before the
actions of today’s cadres.3
China was governed by an autocratic monarchy from the time that the First
Emperor of the Qin Dynasty unified the whole country in 221 BCE. Later, in
134 BCE Confucianism was taken as the orthodox ideology in the Western Han
Dynasty through the ‘Ban the hundred schools of thought except Confucianism’
movement. Even before Buddhism entered China during the reign of Emperor
Mingdi in the Eastern Han Dynasty (around the first century of the common
era), this political culture of an autocratic monarchy united with orthodox
Confucianism remained in place, never to be shaken in the following two mil-
lennia. With such a strong regime, China failed to form religious organisations
 Third World Quarterly 2185

comparable to the Christian church in mediaeval Europe. Religion in China thus

did not have the power to challenge the secular monarchy. Furthermore, with
various religions coexisting, each with its own sphere of influence and interests,
it was difficult to form a joint force. The prominent Chinese scholar, Zhuo
Xinping, believes that this church–state model is different from the US–Western
concept of the ‘separation of church and state’ and belongs to a particular ‘state-
lead, church-follow’ mode with Chinese characteristics.4 The state is always
dominant and the church never acquires a freedom detached from the secular
regime in the Western sense. The statement by the Buddhist leader Shi Dao-an
in the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317–420 CE) that ‘Buddhism cannot exist without
depending on the emperor’ well illustrates this master–slave relationship.
As the monarchy was unthreatened, with various foreign religions increas-
ingly entering China it was reasonable to incorporate religious affairs into the
national administration. A religious management bureaucracy (mainly for
Buddhism) had been set up as early as the Wei and Jin dynasties (220–581 CE).
From then on the system was further refined. Specific institutions were put in
charge of different religions. In the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368), the ‘Xuan
Zheng Division’ specialised in managing Buddhist affairs, the ‘Ji Xian Division’
in Daoist affairs, the ‘Chong Fu Division’ in the Cross Monastery (Christianity)
and the ‘Hui Hui Ha Di Division’ in Islamic affairs.
One way to manage religious issues is to appoint religious leaders; this
began in the Tang Dynasty (618–917 CE). With the influx of a large number of
Arabs and Persians, the Tang government set up the ‘Fan Corners’ in
Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Quanzhou, among others, where foreigners lived
and did business. ‘Fan Corner’ residents recommended a respected Muslim
elder, who was approved by the emperor to be their leader. He wore Chinese
official robes, and enjoyed equal treatment with Chinese officials. The
appointment of the leader of ‘Fan Corner’ was the start of the tradition that the
government would pick religious leaders.
Besides appointing religious leaders the central government also took control
of religious sites and the religious population. Until the late Qing Dynasty
(1644–1911), the construction of temples, churches, monasteries and mosques
was managed by the ‘Department of Rites’. It should be noted that the imple-
mentation of this policy may be questioned. According to CK Yang, privately
built temples were common in ancient times.5 Nevertheless, getting official
approval for building new religious sites has always been routine in Chinese his-
tory. Starting in the Tang Dynasty the government controlled the number of
believers through the ‘Dudie system’.6 Dudie was a certificate exempting believ-
ers from taxation and corvée (gratuitous) labour. Privately converted believers
without a Dudie would be sent back to secular life. Wandering believers had to
bring their Dudie for official examination and the Dudie had to be handed in
when the believer died.
Just as with other administrative arrangements, the comprehensive religious
management system made it unlikely that religion would challenge the
monarchy; its status could only be subordinate. All the same, an unrivalled rul-
ing monarchy does not necessarily imply brutal repression of religion or even
persecution. In fact, the powerful monarchy in a way provided protection for the
2186 C. Guo and F. Zhang

diversified development of institutionalised religion. This is often ignored or

misunderstood by scholars studying Chinese religion.
As the monarchy did not represent any particular religion, it ensured peaceful
coexistence among various religions, avoiding the constant religious persecution
or religious wars common to European history. Under the long-established reli-
gious management system every religion found its place in social life and the
managing institutions maintained a general balance and cooperation among
them, resulting in a unique harmonious existence of various religions. It is
known that China has accepted a variety of foreign religions. Apart from indige-
nous Daoism, other religions like Buddhism, Nestorianism, Manichaeism,
Judaism, Islam, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism were all brought to China
from outside. A variety of religions did not just get on well together; they
learned from each other and formed a ‘confluence’ of various teachings.
As the rulers generally treated different religions equally, a strong atmo-
sphere of religious tolerance was created. This eventually led to the Jewish
community in Kaifeng, which came to China around the time the North Song
Dynasty (960–1127) lost its identity in the Qing Dynasty. As the Jews did not
suffer persecution and discrimination by other religions, there was no need to
maintain their religious identity so zealously; they mingled with the local people
over time.7
In the case of Christianity, Chinese emperors in the late Ming and early Qing
Dynasties used to be very respectful towards the missionaries but, after the Pope
prohibited Chinese Christians from worshiping their ancestors, causing the ‘Rites
Controversy’,8 Emperor Kangxi was offended and commanded all missionaries to
leave the country. However, before the controversy, Kangxi had spoken very
highly of the Roman Catholic Church and even wrote poems to praise it. Some
missionaries even fancied that Kangxi might become a Catholic. But when
Roman Catholics endangered political and imperial interests, the emperor chose
without hesitation to ban the church. This started the nightmare for Christianity.
And its entanglement with imperialism after the Opium War singled it out for
special treatment from the authorities as a tool of Western colonialism.
As reflected by the ‘Rites Controversy’, conflicts between ‘church’ and state
are usually caused for political reasons. Another example relates to Buddhism.
Four emperors once determined to wipe out Buddhism and each time they
struck a major blow at the religion in the heyday of its development. The
primary reason for these crackdowns was that the emperors believed that
Buddhism had developed too fast in previous dynasties, greatly affecting the
national economy since, its adherents were considered ‘unproductive’. Further-
more, Buddhist temples owned a great deal of property; some of the monks and
nuns were corrupt and degenerate, causing adverse effects on society.
To summarise, the purpose of managing religion by the ancient Chinese
rulers was to maintain their governance and social stability, which has little to
do with religion itself. This is still the case in contemporary China.

Contemporary China’s religious policy

The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 opened a new period
in the history of the Chinese nation. Compared with previous leaders, who were
 Third World Quarterly 2187

either religious believers or who tended to favour a particular religion, the CCP
claimed to be an ‘atheist’ party and took Marxism as its guiding principle. This
policy gave many Westerners the impression that the CCP was irreconcilable
with religion. Furthermore, in the late 1950s the CCP’s guiding ideology
became even more ‘leftist’, emphasising the ideological difference between
Marxism and religion and dealing with religious issues as a political struggle,
which further deepened the impression that the CCP was against religion.
The Cultural Revolution ended nearly 40 years ago. If one still looks at
China from the former perspective, it will be very difficult to understand the
religious revival and prosperity in the country today. The rapid growth of vari-
ous religions is, to some extent, related to the post-Mao era’s religious policy.
Certainly there are other factors that have contributed to this religious awaken-
ing, such as the global religious revival since the 1970s.9 However, given
China’s unique situation, the most important factor is the change in China’s
religious policy. Otherwise, no matter how religion might thrive in the
globalised world, China can still be considered ‘exceptional’. In many ways the
policy change in religion is equivalent to that in the economic field. Without
reform and opening up, China cannot integrate into the world. So it is with
religion.
After the Cultural Revolution the CCP started to restore its former religious
policy. In 1981 Deng Xiaoping presided over the ‘Resolutions on a number of
historical issues after the founding of new China’ and made the following state-
ments: ‘[We must] continue to implement the policy of religious freedom. To
stick to the Four Cardinal Principles does not require religious believers to
abandon their religious beliefs, but just asks them not to speak against Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and not to interfere in politics and educa-
tion’.10 Under this guidance in March 1981 the CCP Central Committee released
‘The basic viewpoint and policy on the religious question in our country’s social-
ist period’, also referred to as ‘Document 19’.11 This document criticised such
misconceptions as ‘Religion will die’, ‘Eradicate religion by force’ and especially
the prohibition of normal religious activities and treating religious believers as
enemies. It admitted the existence of religion in the socialist period for a longer
period of time, thus emphasising that ‘respect for and protection of religious free-
dom is the Party’s basic policy on religious issues’. The document also frankly
acknowledged that the CCP was atheist but ‘underst[ood]- two things’. First, it
understood that people’s ideological and mental problems cannot be addressed
with simple brute-force methods; second, it understood that the differences
between the masses of believers and non-believers were ‘relatively minor differ-
ences’, while their ‘fundamental interests in politics and economies’ were consis-
tent. Thus, promoting the unity of all people (believers and non-believers) and
their efforts to build a modern socialist country was the Party’s basic task; reli-
gious differences were relatively secondary. In 1982, in keeping with Document
19, ‘protecting religious freedom’ was incorporated into the fourth edition of the
Constitution.
Document 19 is regarded as a milestone in the history of the CCP. It ‘pro-
vided the ideological justification for the restoration of religious life following
the Cultural Revolution, and for the protection of freedom of individual religious
belief enshrined in the revised Constitution of 1982’.12 It is a significant
2188 C. Guo and F. Zhang

correction to mistakes made in Cultural Revolution and brings the CCP’s policy
back to a normal condition. Since then all levels of previously interrupted
religious administration have been recovered; churches have been reopened and
the religious population has grown rapidly.
If the trend in the 1980s was to ‘put things right’, in the 1990s new chal-
lenges came to the fore. The CCP was concerned about the security implications
of religion as a result of its role in the disintegration of Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe. In April 1990 Chen Yun, an old revolutionary, wrote to Presi-
dent Jiang Zemin that ‘Religion is a favorite trick often employed by class ene-
mies, home and abroad, to win over the masses, especially young people. It is
also a painful lesson that some communist countries lose power’.13 Jiang Zemin
forwarded this letter to several other leaders, noting that it deserved great atten-
tion and vigilance. Measures had to be taken to address this warning. On 5
February 1991 the central government released ‘On further improving the work
of a number of religious issues’, the so-called Document 6, proposing that ‘We
should not just fully and correctly implement the policy of religious freedom,
but also strengthen the management of religious affairs according to the law
under the new international and domestic situation’.14 Specific measures taken
for this ‘management according to the law’ included registration: ‘All religious
activities should be registered, and the registered religious sites and activities are
protected by the law’.15 Hence the division between the registered church (also
called the official church) and the unregistered church (also called house church
or underground church).16 Foreign concerns primarily focus on the latter church.
In addition to ‘management according to the law’, the CCP also proposed
‘adaptation of religion to socialism’,17 which meant that religious believers were
free to keep their theism but that politically they should ‘love the motherland,
embrace the socialist system, support the leadership of the CCP, comply with
national laws, regulations and policies, and subordinate themselves to, and serve
the best interests of the nation’.18
In fact, both ‘management according to the law’ and ‘adaption to socialism’
are measures taken under pressure from a harsh international situation, namely,
to ‘resist foreign hostile forces’ use of religion to infiltrate’. ‘Religious infiltra-
tion’ refers to any activity or propaganda ‘that may overthrow the regime and
socialist system, undermine unification of the nation, control religious organiza-
tions and religious affairs, as well as illegally establish and develop religious
organizations and strongholds of activity’, not to the ‘friendly exchange of
religion’.19 It is essentially a political concern.
In the 21st century, with the rapid growth of religious believers and their
impact on society deepened, the CCP began to further adjust their policy on reli-
gion. Since the enactment of Document 19 in 1982, the number of religious
believers has grown steadily. Although exact data have been controversial, the
rapid growth of religious believers is not in doubt. Take Christianity as an
example. At the founding of New China Christians numbered around 0.7 million
but, according to a survey by the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 2008,
Christians now comprise around 23.05 million, accounting for 1.8% of the total
population. The report also noted that in recent years the growth trend has
accelerated in most parts of the country. From a nationwide perspective those
who have converted to Christianity since 1993 account for 73.4% of the total.
 Third World Quarterly 2189

Recent converts account for 52.9% of Christians in southern China, over 60%
in most other areas and in northeast China as many as 90.5%.20 This exhaustive
two-year investigation was deemed authoritative in Chinese academia, but has
been underreported or ignored in the West. The 2010 survey by the Pew Forum
believed that Christians in China numbered around 67 million, accounting for
5% of the total population.21 The sociologist Yang Fenggang has proposed that,
based on an 8% annual growth rate, the Christian population will reach 160
million in 2025 and 247 million in 2030, thus cause China to surpass the USA
as the world’s largest Christian country.22 In his well-known 2005 book Jesus in
Beijing David Aikman suggested that Christians were around 80 million now in
China, and that in the next 30 years a third of the population would convert to
Christianity.23
Not just the numbers but the overall structure of the community is also quietly
changing. Although the constitution of ‘women, elderly, uneducated’ has not
fundamentally changed, the fact that more and more people who are ‘young,
well-educated and with higher social status’ are joining the church is highly
impressive. The urban elite church, church for migrant workers, Christian entre-
preneurs and cultural Christians are also popular nowadays.24 Another observation
worth mentioning is that world religions like Christianity and Islam have a strong
sense of community; believers’ self-awareness and religious identity are being
strengthened in this globalised world. Some religious organisations keep in close
touch with foreigners, which poses new challenges for the government. In this
situation the CCP has started to emphasise the positive role of religion in building
a harmonious society. In 2006 the CCP issued ‘Decisions on major issues of
building a socialist harmonious society’, calling for religious believers to play a
positive role in promoting social harmony. In 2007 the National People’s
Congress (NPC) report summarised the Party’s religious work in one sentence: ‘to
fully implement the Party’s basic policy on religion, and to play a positive role of
religious believers in promoting economic and social development.’ On 1 January
2008 the front page of the official party newspaper, the People’s Daily, featured a
large photo of Hu Jintao, former head of the CCP, warmly shaking hands at the
New Year’s tea party with one of China’s principal Christian leaders, Liu Bainian.
Although Liu is head of the Three-Self Patriotic church, not a Vatican-approved
bishop with loyalty to Rome, the move was regarded as ‘a series of recent signals
that Chinese rulers are seeking to get along better with the increasing numbers of
Chinese who find solace and inspiration in religion’. The reason for the party
deciding that religion can be useful in encouraging social harmony may be
because ‘it urges its followers to hew to a moral code’.25
In short, the CCP’s religious policy has undergone significant changes.
Social progress brought about by ‘Reform and Opening Up’ has made CCP
members and religious believers more open-minded and practical than before.
Though still nominally a Marxist party, yet one influenced by the ancient
Chinese wisdom of ‘Seeking common ground while reserving differences’,
being ‘harmonious but different’, the CCP can be tolerant of the existence of a
variety of religions. As with the emperors in ancient times, as long as religious
organisations do not endanger political and social stability, they have sufficient
room to enjoy freedom. ‘Politically united, religiously respected’ has become a
fundamental viewpoint for the CCP in dealing with religious issues.
2190 C. Guo and F. Zhang

Misunderstandings and truth

The CCP’s contemporary religious policy is still deeply misunderstood,
however. Some conservatives in the USA still hold a deep-rooted prejudice
about China’s religious issues. Among other things, they believe that serious
religious persecution is still prevalent in the country, with Christians being
arrested, beaten, tortured and fined; nothing, in their view, has changed since
with the Cultural Revolution.26 Nina Shea regarded China as ‘the greatest
persecutor’;27 Michael Horowitz said that ‘there are more documented cases of
Christians in prison or in some form of detention in China than in any other
country.’28 Freedom House claimed in 2002 that it had acquired ‘seven never-
seen-before, top-secret government documents detailing an official crackdown
against large, unregistered Christian churches and other religious groups nation-
wide’.29 In its 2012 report China Aid warned that ‘China is to wipe out house
churches’.30
As to the reasons for the ‘persecution’, these above sources believed that the
only reason for such unspeakable brutality was that Christians were ‘practising
their faith’. Michael Horowitz thought that ‘30–50 million Chinese believers
who risk and receive torture and persecution [are suffering] for “merely” seeking
to worship’.31 US Representative Frank Wolf said that Catholic priests and bish-
ops were imprisoned in China today ‘simply for offering holy communion’.
Protestant pastors were being thrown in jail ‘for having house church ser-
vices’.32 Paul Marshall and Nina Shea claimed that believers who refused to
join the patriotic churches were ‘not extremists who perversely refuse all
government contact and legitimate control. They simply want to choose their
own churches, and pastors, and to worship freely according to the dictates of
conscience. For this they will worship in caves, baptize at night in ice-rimmed
rivers, and live underground. They are willing to endure crippling fines,
imprisonment, labor camps, beatings, torture and death.’33 The persecuted
church was not just sympathised with, but idealised by Paul Marshal and Nina
Shea as ‘the last nationwide stronghold of independent thought and expression
in China’.34
Part of the reason for this biased understanding of China, namely romanti-
cisation of the underground church and demonisation of the Chinese govern-
ment, is, as Daniel Bays puts it, that these observers really ‘don’t know much
about China’.35 Their discourse is more a matter of ‘dispensing emotion than
facts’.36 Their anger at the Chinese government derives partly from memories of
American missionaries being driven out of China as the CCP took power and
the subsequent tragedies of the Cultural Revolution, partly from stories told by
Chinese dissidents who fled to the USA after the Tiananmen movement in
1989. A significant number of those dissidents who settled in exile overseas
have converted to Christianity, and some have become pastors.37 Moreover, they
have often spoken very negatively about China’s alleged lack of religious
freedom.38
These days more and more scholars are trying to discard this biased
‘persecution mythology’ and to look at China in a more balanced way. Werner
Burklin, who was born in China as the son of missionaries, said that ‘much has
been written about persecution in China. Some of it was correct, but much of it
was not.’39 Based on his more than 70 visits to the country, Werner has said that
 Third World Quarterly 2191

no Christians had to face death in pursuit of Jesus. ‘As long as the rules, regula-
tions, and laws of the land are respected, no one needs to fear death because of
his or her faith.’40 As for those well-known cases of believers who were thought
by some in the USA to have been persecuted in China, Werner believed that it
was not ‘persecution’ but ‘prosecution’ that they had experienced. ‘The state
prosecutes people, including Christians, for breaking the laws of the land. They
don’t persecute them for being followers of Jesus Christ.’41
Prominent Christian scholar Brent Fulton said ‘there may be room for
cautious optimism concerning further policy towards China’s Christians’.42 He
believes that the so-called persecuted Christians were just ‘exceptions not the
rule’. And for these ‘exceptions’ there are usually ‘triggers’ that provoke the
government’s violent response: for instance, foreign involvement (real or per-
ceived) in religious activities; the size and scope of the unofficial group (30–40
people is considered safe); political winds that blow frequently across China;
and the degree of corruption among local officials, who may treat Christians as
an easy target for fines.43 Fulton believes that there is a ‘large and growing gray
area’ between what is legally protected and what is tolerated by the authorities.
In these ‘gray areas’ the government knows what the Christians are doing, but
what it cares about is no longer ideological, as it was during the Cultural
Revolution. Rather, ‘it is the government’s preoccupation with stability above all
else that limits the growth and influence of any group that could possibly threa-
ten the party’s grip on society (particularly if the group in question is perceived
as having foreign ties).’44
There is also a more sober awareness of the house church among those who
understand China. They are clear that the house church is not as perfect as the
radical conservatives thought. Wright Doyle has pointed out that, while house
churches in China are mostly evangelical, and even fundamentalist, sometimes
they are especially ‘vulnerable to a multitude of splits, heresies, some with quite
bizarre teachings’. Like their countrymen, ‘millions of people in these groups
are seeking temporal benefits, such as healing or prosperity, rather than the spiri-
tual salvation offered in the Bible.’45 Daniel Bays worried about the aggressive
behaviour of some house churches: ‘Unregistered churches also need to make
more transparent the foreign contacts that they have, some of which involve
significant amounts of resources. This should ease government concerns about
the likelihood of their becoming anti-state.’46
In addition, Chinese churches in general lack awareness of the need for
social participation, of linking their faith with broader social life. Yang
Fenggang suggested that Chinese Christians ‘focus too much on church life and
the spread of the Gospel, but lack a proper sense of social responsibility.’47 Liu
Peng has claimed that Christianity now ‘has an unprecedented opportunity for
development, but the church has a lot of problems. Apart from the chaos of
internal management, inadequate shepherding, no social service, no international
responsibility, not being melted into mainstream culture, are all great challenges
to the church.’ As he sees it, whether the church can really rise in Chinese soci-
ety depends not on the CCP’s policy, but on whether Christians and the church
can really practise the teachings of the Bible as ‘light’ and ‘salt’:

though church–state relationship greatly affects the development of Christianity,

yet, whether the church can stand firmly in China lies neither in the recognition of
2192 C. Guo and F. Zhang

the government, nor the government’s religious policy, but in the recognition of
Chinese people, Chinese society and Chinese culture. Without the recognition of
mainstream public, mainstream society and mainstream culture, even with the gov-
ernment’s recognition, Christianity is still on the edge.48

This may be the most important problem the church has to face.

Conclusion
The prestigious Chinese archaeologist, Zhang Guangzhi, claims that distinguish-
ing China’s method of development is different or ‘disjunctive’ from Western
development in that China’s transition from barbarism to civilisation was
‘continuous’ since many of China’s social and cultural elements were inherited.
In the case of the church–state relationship, this continuity is also obvious. First,
religious policy, characterised by management and control, like appointing reli-
gious leaders, limiting the construction of religious sites and the population, was
common in many dynasties, with little difference today. Second, religious man-
agement and control is primarily undertaken out of political concerns, regardless
of what faith is involved. Whether we are considering extermination of
Buddhism in the past or the CCP’s concern about house churches at present, all
originated from the rulers’ anxiety that religion might damage the public good
or social stability. As CK Yang put it, ‘the entire system of administrative con-
trol over religion was based on the general purpose of guarding the interests of
ruling power and the state against the possible subversive influence of hetero-
doxy’.49 Third, ‘Chinese-style’ management and control does not necessarily
mean ‘serious religious persecution’; indeed, as long as religion does not pose a
threat to secular power, it can enjoy a considerable amount of freedom, without
unwarranted government interference.
Of course, even though the CCP’s religious policy is not as ‘cruel’ as some
US conservatives imagine, the Party still has strong control over religion, and
this causes many problems in this globalised world. For instance, putting too
much emphasis on politics, asking believers to participate in ‘patriotic educa-
tion’ and to put ‘loving the nation’ ahead of ‘loving the church’ all inevitably
place psychological pressure upon those with a transnational faith. Moreover,
the definition of religion is overly narrow, with only five major religions admit-
ted by law; even the internationally recognised Eastern Orthodox church,
Judaism and Mormonism cannot obtain legal status. This may ‘lead to abuse of
power and religious persecution as the police system has great power to decide
which is legal, which is not’.50 Furthermore, some official churches have
acquired a sort of authority with government support and started to ‘abandon
religion to take on politics’, thus losing their spiritual charisma in the eyes of
believers, resulting in a great expansion of the religious ‘grey market’. Since the
spring of 2014 it has been reported that some churches have been demolished
and some have had crosses removed. Some small house churches have been
forced to close or move the location of their meetings. At the same time the vast
majority of churches are still operating as they were before. It is too early to tell
whether this recent change represents a departure from official policy.
In short, in the era of globalisation the policy of management and control is
being confronted with constant challenges. As a member of the global village
 Third World Quarterly 2193

China can no longer consider its religious affairs simply from a ‘self-centred’
perspective, without regard for the international community’s concerns. Prob-
lems like those discussed in this article are all challenging the CCP’s governing
capability.

Funding
This work was supported by the Project of National Social Science Foundation [grant 11BZJ002]; and the
Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Science Youth Project [grant 12YJC730012].

Notes on contributors
Changgang Guo is Professor of History and Director of the Centre for Global
Studies, Shanghai University. His research interests involve global religious revi-
val, globalisation and pluralism, as well as religion and politics.
Fengmei Zhang is Associate Professor in the School of Foreign Studies, Anhui
Polytechnic University. Her research interests include China’s religious policy,
religion and US diplomacy.

Notes
1. MacMillan, “A Journalist on the Persecuted Church Beat,” 43.
2. Bays, “A Tradition of State Dominance,” 25.
3. Ibid., 36.
4. Zhuo, Globalized Religion and Contemporary China, 29–30.
5. C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, 188.
6. Readers interested in the Dudie system may refer to Zhao Yifeng, “The Management and Changes of the
Du-die,” 72–87.
7. Guo Changgang, “Core, Clash, and Decline of Civilizations,” 122–127; and Guo Changgang, “On the
Roman Empire’s Policy,” 128–133.
8. Li Tiangang, China’s Rites Controversy, chap. 1.
9. Pew Forum, The Global Religious Landscape.
10. “Resolutions on Several of the Party’s Historical Issues since the Founding of Our Country,” accessed
November 25, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934.htm.
11. “Document 19,” www.mzb.com.cn.
12. Palmer, “China’s Religious Danwei,” 23.
13. CCP Literature Research Center, Selected Literatures of Religious Work, 177.
14. “Document 6,” accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.gsmw.gov.cn/htm/20145/91_417_p5.htm.
15. Ibid.
16. The registration process is a little complicated. Generally speaking, the State Bureau of Religious Affairs
is responsible for the administration of religions. However, to assist the government in its implementa-
tion of its policy, each of the five government-sanctioned religions has organised its own association.
The Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, founded in 1957, is for Chinese Catholicism, while the
National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China
(‘Three-Self’ means self-governance, self-support and self-propagation with the connotation of removing
foreign influences from Chinese churches), founded in 1954, and The China Christian Council (founded
in 1980) are for Chinese Protestantism. These associations and their provincial or county and city
branches take charge of all regular religious activities, training of religious personnel, and the publication
and distribution of holy books. The religious activities of those Christians who do not want to register
with these state-sanctioned associations and who remain loyal to the Vatican are banned, and have led to
the growth of ‘house churches’ or ‘underground churches’.
17. Jiang Zemin put forward the well-known ‘Three Sentences’ at a National United Front Conference in
1993: to fully and correctly implement the Party’s policy of religious freedom; to strengthen the
management of religious affairs according to the law; and to adapt religion to socialism.
18. Jiang, On Religious Issues, 387.
19. Ibid., 211.
20. Qiu and Jin, Annual Report on China’s Religions, 191–192.
2194 C. Guo and F. Zhang

21. Pew Forum, “Methodology for China,” 97.

22. Yang Fenggang, “An Analysis of the Growth of Chinese Christians.”
23. Aikman, Jesus in Beijing.
24. Qiu and Jin, Annual Report on China’s Religions, 192.
25. Cody, “China’s Leader Puts Faith in Religious.”
26. Misunderstandings about the CCP’s religious policy also extend to two highly volatile minority regions,
Tibet and Xinjiang. Religious freedom is believed to be highly repressed in these two areas. First and
foremost, Tibet and Xinjiang involve more ethnic minority issues than those of religion. Muslims are not
confined to Xinjiang, not even Uygurs, but are found all over the country. Tibetan Buddhists are also
found in places other than Tibet. In fact, Both Xinjiang and Tibet present more of a separatist threat.
Among all the minorities in China, these two ethnic groups and regions have distinctive elements that
could contribute to their potential secession; these include ‘a relatively concentrated homeland, strong
ethnic identity based on cultural traditions, languages and religions, complex primordial history with the
Han population and various Chinese rulers, border disputes, internal homogeneity in the demographic
sense, and strong foreign connections’. See Zhu Yuchao and Blachford, “Ethnic Minority Issues in
China’s Foreign Policy,” 247.
27. “State Department Lists 5 Nations as Violators of Religious Freedom,” Washington Times, October 7,
1999, A15.
28. Horowitz, “Continuing Christian Persecution,” 469.
29. Peale, The Love of God in China, 68.
30. Morning Star News, “How China Plans to Wipe out House Churches,” Christianity Today, February 18,
2013. http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2013/february-web-only/how-china-plans-to-wipe-out-house-
churches.html.
31. Horowitz, “Continuing Christian Persecution,” 469.
32. “Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1998,” H3265, Congressional Record, House of
Representatives, May 14, 1998.
33. Marshall and Shea, “China’s Persecuted Churches,” 12.
34. Ibid., 11.
35. Bays, “American Public Discourse,” 1.
36. Ibid., 11.
37. Ibid., 9.
38. Béja, “The Fly in the Ointment?,” 439–453.
39. Burklin, Jesus Never Left China, 76.
40. Ibid., 76.
41. Ibid., 77.
42. Fulton, “Reason for Optimism.”
43. Ibid.
44. Fulton, “The Facts about the Church in China.”
45. Yu and Wright Doyle, China: Ancient Culture, Modern Society, Houston, TX: Strategic Book Publishing,
2009.
46. Bays, A New History of Christianity in China, 203.
47. Wang, “From Yang Fenggang’s Prediction.”
48. Ibid.
49. C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, 192.
50. Interview with Carol Lee Hamrin, Washington, DC, December 8, 2012.

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