Arab J Sci Eng (2012) 37:1083–1088

DOI 10.1007/s13369-012-0236-z

R E S E A R C H A RT I C L E - M E C H A N I C A L E N G I N E E R I N G

Z. A. Majid · R. Mohsin

Failure Investigation of Natural Gas Pipeline

Received: 28 August 2009 / Accepted: 7 October 2010 / Published online: 24 April 2012
© King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals 2012

Abstract A study was carried out to investigate the probable cause or events that might have led to the failure
of two parallel natural gas pipes, API 5L X42 carbon steel (NPS 8) and the SDR 17, 125 mm medium density
polyethylene pipes. These two pipes were laid side by side in the same trench with a water pipe. The investi-
gation was performed by analyzing the existing design and construction data, visual inspection of failed pipes,
and pipe material analysis. Investigation from the relevant pipes data suggests that the leaked water pipe was
the first to fail. The leaked water pipe created high pressure water jetting that mixed with the backfilling soil to
form water–sand–soil slurry with high erosive properties. The impact of this erosive slurry upon the NPS 8 pipe
had caused serious losses of pipe coating materials. This phenomenon explains the rapid thinning of the steel
pipe body which later led to its failure. Evidence from the metallurgical study using photomicrograph showed
that the morphology of the steel material was consistent and did not show any evidence of micro fractures.
Keywords Pipeline · Erosion · Slurry erosion · Natural gas pipe

1 Introduction

Degradation of piping material not only disrupts the continuity of natural gas supply but also could pose a
threat to life and buildings in terms of loss of lives and destruction of buildings. Cases of natural gas piping
failure have been proven to be catastrophic as demonstrated in cases of pipe rupture as reported by the National
Transportation Safety Board, USA [1–6]. Other examples of cases involving failure of pipes carrying highly
Z. A. Majid (B) · R. Mohsin
Gas Technology Centre (GASTEG), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), 81310 Skudai, Johor, Malaysia
E-mail: zulmajid@petroleum.utm.my; zulmajid64@gmail.com

R. Mohsin
E-mail: rahmat@petroleum.utm.my

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combustible fuel such as natural gas are the failure of high pressure natural gas transmission pipeline in north-
ern part of Pakistan (API 5L X60) and a T-shape section of natural gas pipe (API 5L X52) network near gas
extraction plant in northern Mexico. In both cases, the material degradation caused by corrosion was the main
factor that contributed to the failure of the pipes [7,8]. Similar cases but involving pipes carrying fuel oil in
Kuwait (API 5L X52) and the API 5L X46 in Brazil have failed because of delayed cracking and transverse
cracking, respectively [9,10].
Erosion, or erosive wear, is the loss of material from a solid surface due to relative motion in contact with
a fluid that contains solid particles. A leak of high pressure water pipe in a mixture of soil and sand can create
erosive slurry impact on nearby pipes. Slurry erosion is usually formed by the interaction of solid particles
suspended in liquid with a surface that experiences losses of mass by repeated impacts of particles [11]. This
type of erosion has been reported as one of the main sources of failure of many engineering equipment such as
slurry equipment and hydraulic components [12–14]. This erosive slurry impact causes metal loss [11] or metal
thinning and eventually leads to metal failure. This event could trigger much disastrous incident involving fire
and explosion which could cause losses in terms of life and economics [1–6]. Studies by Majid et al. [15]
and Hasan et al. [16] have shown that the combination of water jetting and soil could form highly erosive
slurry capable of eroding pipe-wall surface which might lead to its failure. Both studies analysed failed pipe
specimens, background information and computer simulation without any experimental analysis.
In this paper are the findings, probable cause(s) of failure and theoretical evidence for conclusive remarks
concerning the failure of similar natural gas pipes, presented by incorporating the theoretical reconstruction
of worst case scenario

2 Investigation Methods

To produce conclusive results, various aspects have been studied to look upon possible factors that might have
contributed towards the failure of the pipes. The methods of investigations were directed into three important
aspects. First, the background information which provide design and construction data to estimate the sequence
of events and operational conditions that might have led to the failures of the pipes. It was followed by inspect-
ing the recorded photos and physical arrangement of actual failed pipes sections, conducted to simulate the
actual positioning of pipes. The third aspect focused upon the metallurgical and physical analysis of pipes
sections at the failure point and its surrounding area.

3 Investigation Findings and Discussion

3.1 Review of Background Information

Upon the discovery of the incident and its specific location, a team was sent to excavate the site. It was discov-
ered that there were three pipes; a NPS 8 and a MDPE natural gas pipes, and a 6 in. asbestos water pipe lying
parallel to each other, with all three indicating signs of serious damage or leakage. An electrical cable lying
parallel to the pipes slightly at a higher elevation indicates no apparent sign of damage. The NPS 8 and MDPE
pipe was carrying 1,800 and 345 kPa natural gas, respectively, prior to shut down. The 6 in. asbestos pipe was
transporting water with an estimating flowing pressure of 1,000 kPa. Figure 1 shows the relative positions of
NPS 8, MDPE and asbestos pipe immediately after the excavation.
The failed 8 in. natural gas pipe is made of carbon steel manufactured with stringent specification of API 5L
X42. It was buried around 1.3 m below the ground at about 195 mm laterally from the underground water pipe.
The water pipe was buried at a slightly higher elevation, at 1.2 m below the surface. Roughly with a similar
distance between the steel and the water pipes is the location of MDPE gas pipe (Fig. 2). The thicknesses of
the NPS 8 pipe, MDPE and asbestos pipe were 5.6, 11.4 and 10 mm, respectively.

3.2 Visual Inspection

Visual inspections were carried out on both the photos and on the two pipe samples provided (Fig. 2). As
received, the exposed part of the steel pipe (with the coatings eroded) is already heavily oxidized. Photo
records taken at incident site show that the original condition of the exposed part immediately after the inci-
dent, was found to be free from coating materials, clean, smooth and shiny (Fig. 3). The eroded part was found

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Fig. 1 Relative positions of NPS 8, MDPE and asbestos pipe immediately after the excavation

Fig. 2 Damaged NPS 8 (left) and MDPE (right) pipes sections

Fig. 3 NPS 8 pipe condition immediately after incident. a Exposed condition of NPS 8 pipe, b close-up view

to be smooth and free from rust. The size of the eroded section was around 50 × 30 cm (Fig. 3). The absence
of scratch marks or dents in the vicinity of the eroded part seems to support the statements of site engineers
that no third party work was being observed on and around the location of incident.
The failed specimen of NPS 8 gas pipe was inspected externally and internally and photo-documented.
The examination of the gas pipe revealed the following:
1. The NPS 8 gas pipe has a hole on the surface facing the water pipe (Fig. 3a) measuring at 11 mm × 9 mm
as shown in Fig. 4.
2. The NPS 8 Pipe surface facing directly to the leaked water pipe has experienced complete loss of its
coating materials and exhibited clean and shiny surface as shown in Fig. 3.
3. No significant scale or deposit was noted on the inside of the pipe indicating that no internal corrosion
has occurred as depicted by Fig. 3.
Initial assessment suggests that the 6 in. asbestos water pipe with 10 mm wall thickness was the first to
fail. The flowing water pressure in the pipe was reported to be around 1,000 kPa. The leak could have caused
a high pressure water jet in which, with the presence of the surrounding soil and sand materials, could have

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Fig. 4 Size of the hole found on NPS 8 gas pipe

(a) MDPE (b)

pipe

MDPE
pipe NPS 8 NPS 8
pipe pipe

Fig. 5 MDPE directly ‘in the line of fire’ of the NPS 8 gas jet. a Actual, b repositioned

produced highly abrasive slurry. This slurry could have impacted upon the NPS 8 first causing the erosion of
the coating materials and then the thinning of the steel pipe body. After sufficient pipe material was removed,
the remaining pipe strength will no longer be able to withstand the high internal pipe pressure. This eventually
led to the steel pipe rupture and enlargement of leak section.
The high pressure jet of leaked water from the water pipe had earlier caused the displacement of the sup-
porting soil materials underneath the MDPE causing it to move downwards. When the steel gas pipe leaked,
more material was displaced causing the MDPE pipe to drop even further until it was low enough to be in the
firing zone from the high pressure gas jet (Fig. 5).
Visual inspection of the photos of the incident and on the physical damaged pipe sections led to an early
conclusion that the most probable source of damage to MDPE is caused by the impact of the gas jetting
originating from the carbon steel pipe (NPS 8) leak. This is most evident from the final location of the MDPE
pipe relative to the NPS 8 pipe leak, supported by apparent erosion pattern on the MDPE pipe damaged area
(Fig. 5).
In this particular study the breadth of analysis is somewhat restricted to the extent of limited information
supplied by the gas utility company. No relevant information was available on the status and operation variables
of the asbestos water pipe besides the flowing pressure and pipe diameter.

3.3 Dimensional Mapping

Dimensional mapping was conducted on the two half circles, where the hole is separated about 50 mm apart.
This activity provides detail physical measurement around the selected perimeter of specimen at various
circumferential locations as shown in Fig. 6.
Physical measurement results are illustrated in Fig. 7a and b for specimens A and B, respectively. The
results indicated that the pipe wall thickness decreased substantially and the maximum decreased thickness
area lies in the middle of jet stream approaching the ruptured hole.

3.4 Microstructural Examination

Examination of the microstructure at the failure region and base metal location clearly indicated no significant
differences between observed sample 1 and sample 2 which mainly consists of the typical ferrite and pearlite
structure in carbon steels lattices of an API 5L X42 grade. No evidence of any micro fractures was observed.

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B A
Hole
location

Sample 1

Sample 2

B A
50
mm
Fig. 6 Schematic of steel gas pipe showing procedures of dimensional mapping and specimen preparation

Fig. 7 Results of dimensional mapping of NPS 8 gas pipe. a Results of dimensional mapping for section A-A (50 mm away
from hole), b results of dimensional mapping for section B-B (half-way through the hole). The red line represents the original
pie thickness

The microstructures are shown in Fig. 8a–d for respective sample 1 and sample 2 (as marked in Fig. 6). These
findings fully support earlier hypotheses that the pipe failed due to the erosion of pipe surface and not due to
microstructural defects.

4 Conclusions

The investigation revealed that the existing evidence deduced from the physical data and experimental work
provided a clear proof of the root cause of the pipe failure, namely that the failure was due to the initial leak
of the asbestos water pipe. The water jet mixed with sand-soil formed an erosive substance. The mixture had
severely impacted upon the pipe surface causing rapid losses of pipe coating materials. This phenomenon
explains the rapid thinning of the steel pipe body which later led to its failure. The possibility of material
defect on the NPS 8 can be ruled out as the metallurgical study had indicated material uniformity.

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Fig. 8 Microstructures of the pipe taken from specimen 1 (microstructure a) and specimen 2 (microstructures b, c and d). Note
also there is no evidence of microstructure changes

Acknowledgements Authors are most grateful and wish to thank Prof. Dr. Zulkefli Yaacob, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Ourdjini,
Assoc. Prof. Zulkafli Hassan, Assoc. Prof. Mohd. For Mohamad, Mr. Fadli Omar, Mr. Firdaus Mohd Lazim and the team mem-
ber of Gas Technology Center (GASTEG) Pipeline Failure Group for their significant contributions in conducting experiments
and preparation of the manuscript. Gas Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. is also highly acknowledged for providing financial and technical
assistance.

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