The Emerging Politics of

Antarctica

This book examines the post-Cold War challenges facing Antarctic

governance. It seeks to understand the interests of new players in Antarctic
affairs such as China, India, Korea and Malaysia, and how other key players
such as Russia and the USA or claimant states such as New Zealand or
France are coping in the new global order.
Antarctica is the world's fifth largest continent and its territories are
claimed by seven different states. Since 1961 Antarctica has been managed
under the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), a regime which, according to its
critics, by the terms of its membership effectively excludes most of the
nations of the world. This book examines the post-Cold War challenges
facing Antarctic governance, and is organized thematically into three
sections:
• Part I considers the role of Antarctic politics in the current post-Cold
War, post-colonial era and the impact this new political environment is
having on the ATS.
• Part II looks at the competing foreign policy objectives of a
representative range of countries with Antarctic activities.
• Part III examines issues that have the potential to destabilize the order
of the ATS, such as unrestricted tourism and new advances in science
and technology.
The Emerging Politics of Antarctica will be of interest to students and
scholars of international politics, polar studies and foreign policy studies.
Anne-Marie Brady is an Associate Professor in Political Science
specializing in Chinese and Polar politics at the University of Canterbury,
New Zealand.
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From cold war through cold peace to partnership?
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Sites of insecurity and political agency
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 Edited by William Bain

46 Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India

The search for ontological security
Catrina Kinnvall

47 Culture and International Relations

Narratives, natives and tourists
Julie Reeves

48 Global Civil Society

Contested futures
Edited by Gideon Baker and David Chandler

49 Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy

Pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes
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50 International Cooperation and Arctic Governance

Regime effectiveness and northern region building
Edited by Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Hønneland

51 Human Security
Concepts and implications
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy

52 International Relations and Security in the Digital Age

Edited by Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello
53 State-Building
Theory and practice
Edited by Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson

54 Violence and Non-Violence in Africa

Edited by Pal Ahluwalia, Louise Bethlehem and Ruth Ginio

55 Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations

Edited by Larry Crump and S. Javed Maswood

56 Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance

Paradigms of power and persuasion
Edited by Helen James

57 War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World

The changing balance of power in the 21st century
Edited by Chandra Chari

58 Economic Globalisation as Religious War

Tragic convergence
Michael McKinley

59 Globalization, Prostitution and Sex-traffcking

Corporeal politics
Elina Penttinen

60 Peacebuilding
Women in international perspective
Elisabeth Porter
61 Ethics, Liberalism and Realism in International Relations
Mark D. Gismondi

62 Law and Legalization in Transnational Relations

Edited by Christian Brütsch and
Dirk Lehmkuhl

63 Fighting Terrorism and Drugs

Europe and international police cooperation
Jörg Friedrichs

64 Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide

The holocaust and historical representation
David B. MacDonald

65 Globalisation, Public Opinion and the State

Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia
Edited by Takashi Inoguchi and Ian Marsh

66 Urbicide
The politics of urban destruction
Martin Coward

67 Transnational Activism in the UN and the EU

A comparative study
Jutta Joachim and Birgit Locher

68 Gender Inclusive
Essays on violence, men and feminist international relations
 Adam Jones

69 Capitalism, Democracy and the Prevention of War and Poverty

Edited by Peter Graeff and Guido Mehlkop

70 Environmental Change and Foreign Policy

Theory and practice
Edited by Paul G. Harris

71 Climate Change and Foreign Policy

Case studies from East to West
Edited by Paul G. Harris

72 Securitizations of Citizenship
Edited by Peter Nyers

73 The Power of Ideology

From the Roman Empire to Al-Qaeda
Alex Roberto Hybel

74 The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration

Digging moats and sinking boats
Scott D. Watson

75 Mediation in the Asia-Pacifc Region

Transforming conficts and building peace
Edited by Dale Bagshaw and Elisabeth Porter

76 United Nations Reform

Heading North or South?
 Spencer Zifcak

77 New Norms and Knowledge in World Politics

Protecting people, intellectual property and the environment
Preslava Stoeva

78 Power, Resistance and Confict in the Contemporary World

Social movements, networks and hierarchies
Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson

79 World-Regional Social Policy and Global Governance

New research and policy agendas in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin
America
Edited by Bob Deacon, Maria Cristina Macovei, Luk Van Langenhove
and Nicola Yeates

80 International Relations Theory and Philosophy

Interpretive dialogues
Edited by Cerwyn Moore and Chris Farrands

81 Superpower Rivalry and Confict

The long shadow of the Cold War on the twenty-frst century
Edited by Chandra Chari

82 Coping and Conformity in World Politics

Hugh C. Dyer

83 Defning and Defying Organized Crime

Discourse, perception and reality
Edited by Felia Allum, Francesca Longo, Daniela Irrera and Panos A.
 Kostakos

84 Federalism in Asia
India, Pakistan and Malaysia
Harihar Bhattacharyya

85 The World Bank and HIV/AIDS

Setting a global agenda
Sophie Harman

86 The “War on Terror” and the Growth of Executive Power?

A comparative analysis
Edited by John E. Owens and Riccardo Pelizzo

87 The Contested Politics of Mobility

Borderzones and irregularity
Edited by Vicki Squires

88 Human Security, Law and the Prevention of Terrorism

Andrej Zwitter

89 Multilayered Migration Governance

The promise of partnership
Edited by Rahel Kunz, Sandra Lavenex and Marion Panizzon

90 Role Theory in International Relations

Approaches and analyses
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91 Issue Salience in International Relations

 Edited by Kai Oppermann and Henrike Viehrig

92 Corporate Risk and National Security Redefned

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93 Interrogating Democracy in World Politics

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94 Globalizing Resistance against War

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95 The Politics of Self-Determination

Beyond the decolonisation process
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96 Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect

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97 Anglo-American Relations
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98 The Emerging Politics of Antarctica

Edited by Anne-Marie Brady
The Emerging Politics of
Antarctica

Edited by Anne-Marie Brady

First published 2013
by Routledge
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business.
© 2013 Anne-Marie Brady for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors their
contribution.
The right of Anne-Marie Brady to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the
authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or
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are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
The emerging politics of Antarctica / edited by Anne- Marie Brady.
p. cm. — (Routledge advances in international relations and global
politics)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Antarctica-Politics and government. 2. Antarctica-Foreign relations.
I. Brady, Anne-Marie, 1966—
JS8499.3.A2E64 2012
341.409989-dc23

2012025431
ISBN: 978-0-415-53139-9 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-07831-0 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents

Notes on contributors
Acknowledgements
Introduction Conflict or cooperation? The emerging politics of
Antarctica
ANNE-MARIE BRADY

PART I
Antarctic politics in the current world order

1 The Antarctic Treaty System

MARCUS HAWARD

PART II
Antarctica and competing foreign policy objectives

2 China's Antarctic interests

ANNE-MARIE BRADY

3 India and Antarctica

SANJAY CHATURVEDI

4 Cool Korea
ANNE-MARIE BRADY AND KIM SEUNGRYEOL

5 The Malaysian journey to the Antarctic

B. A. HAMZAH

6 United States foreign policy interests in Antarctica

CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER

7 Russia, the post-Soviet world, and Antarctica

IRINA GAN
8 New Zealand's Antarctica
ANNE-MARIE BRADY

9 The French Connection

CHAVELLI SULIKOWSKI

PART III
Burning issues on the Antarctic ice

10 Rallying around a flag?

AANT ELZINGA

11 Titanic Part II?

JANE VERBITSKY

12 Biological prospecting in the Antarctic

JULIA JABOUR

Index
Contributors

Anne-Marie Brady is an Associate Professor in Political Science at the

University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, New Zealand. In 2008, as part
of the University of Canterbury's Post-graduate Certificate in Antarctic
Studies, she spent two weeks living in a polar tent facing Mt Erebus and
Mt Terror. She is the founding and executive editor of The Polar Journal
and has published extensively on China's domestic and foreign policy.
Sanjay Chaturvedi is Professor of Political Science at the Centre for the
Study of Geopolitics, Panjab University, India. He specializes in the
theory and practices of Geopolitics with special reference to the Polar
Regions and the Indian Ocean Region. A member of Indian delegations
to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings since 2007, he has visited
Antarctica as a lecturer aboard a tourist cruise ship.
Aant Elzinga is Professor Emeritus at the University of Gothenburg in
Sweden. He has a background in physics (Canada) and then studied
history and philosophy of science (London, UK) before turning to the
politics of science, with particular reference to the cases of Antarctica
and climatology. Elzinga is a founding member of the SCAR history
group.
Irina Gan graduated with a PhD from the University of Tasmania,
Australia in 2009. Her thesis was entitled “Red Antarctic. Soviet interests
in the South Polar region prior to the Antarctic Treaty: 1946–1958”. She
participated in the 53rd Russian Antarctic Expedition in 2008 and in
Australian Antarctic resupply voyages in 2006 and 2009. She has
published several papers in the Polar Record and is a member of the
SCAR history group.
B.A. Hamzah is a Professor of International Politics at the Centre for
Media and Information Warfare Studies, Universiti Teknologi Mara
 (UiTM).
Marcus Haward is an Associate Professor in the School of Government at
the University of Tasmania and is a member of the Antarctic Climate and
Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre. He has been a member of
Australian delegations to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and
the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources.
Julia Jabour is a Senior Lecturer and Program Leader in Ocean and
Antarctic Policy at the Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies,
University of Tasmania. Her doctoral research investigated the changing
nature of sovereignty in the Arctic and Antarctic in response to global
environmental interdependence, and she has been writing and lecturing
on Antarctic law and policy for nearly 20 years. Julia has visited
Antarctica five times and has twice attended Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings.
Christopher C. Joyner was Professor of International Law and Politics at
Georgetown University and a well-known specialist on Antarctic politics
and law until his sudden death in 2011. He was a founding editor of The
Polar Journal and his contribution to this volume was originally
published in its first issue.
Kim Seungryeol graduated with an MA in Political Science at the
University of Canterbury, New Zealand in 2011. His thesis topic was:
“Korea's Polar Strategy”.
Chavelli Sulikowski is a joint doctoral student at the University of
Tasmania and the L'Institut Universitaire Européen de la Mer (the
European Institute for Marine Studies — IUEM) at the University of
Western Brittany. Chavelli's key areas of research are in the fields of
Antarctic law and policy, with a particular interest in the dynamics of
international cooperation within the Antarctic Treaty System.
Jane Verbitsky is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, AUT
University, Auckland, New Zealand. Jane teaches papers in New Zealand
politics, conflict resolution, regional studies and international relations.
Her research interests lie primarily in the refugee/human rights/security
nexus, justice institutions and processes, and peace education and conflict
resolution fields.
Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to the encouragement and support I have received from

my many colleagues in the polar feld who have helped this book project
come into fruition. I would like to especially thank Professor Bryan Storey
of Gateway Antarctica at the University of Canterbury; the many
participants of the Symposium; and the ten other authors in the volume. I
dedicate this book with love to my husband Z.J. and our three children:
Francesca, Silas and Matteo who through my studies have now become
passionate followers of polar affairs.
Introduction
Conflict or cooperation? The
emerging politics of Antarctica
Anne-Marie Brady

The Emerging Politics of Antarctica follows Harold Lasswell's classic

definition of political science in being concerned with the question of “who
gets what, when, and how?”1 A further question is required to be asked in
the case of Antarctic politics as to “where are these gains located?” In
Antarctica, as in life, location is very important: those who come first get
first choice, those who have might demand more and can do more with what
they acquire, while those who come last or are weaker get the crumbs.
Antarctica is the world's fifth largest continent, with a wealth of valuable
resources. It is governed by no one country, though its territories are claimed
by seven different states. Since 1961 Antarctica has been managed under the
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), a regime which, according to its critics, by
the terms of its membership effectively excludes most of the nations of the
world. In international law, it is sovereignty, not population numbers, which
matters most. The Treaty puts aside, but does not deny the existing Antarctic
claims or any future ones. Forty-nine states have signed the Antarctic Treaty
but currently only twenty-eight of them have a say in the governance of the
continent. “Consultative” status is conferred by a nation having a scientific
programme in Antarctica, which effectively privileges those countries with
the resources to achieve this.
The Antarctic Treaty was a product of the Cold War and the rivalry
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now that the Cold War has
ended, with China and India on the rise and Russia unable to maintain the
same level of Antarctic investment as the former Soviet Union, does the ATS
fit the needs of the emerging world order? The chart below reveals the
Antarctic spend of some of the key players; while the budgets of traditional
players such as the United States have remained static, Russia's has declined
from its days when as the USSR it rivalled the USA; China, India, and Korea
have made major increases in their investment and reach in Antarctic
activities and Australia has also increased its spend.
The change in budgets reflects relative declines and rises in hard power.
China, India, and the Republic of Korea are looking for ways to assert
international influence and build national pride; their relatively strong
economies permit them to invest more in Antarctic affairs and all are also
active in the Arctic. Australia, riding on the back of a commodities boom, is
determined to protect its

Comparative Antarctic spend (US$m)

interests in Antarctica; it claims 42 per cent of Antarctic territory, the largest

Antarctic claim. China and India have both built new bases on the territory
Australia claims.
Budgets are not the only way to measure power and influence in
Antarctica. Research output is a key indicator of a nation's level of influence
and engagement in Antarctica. This is for two reasons: (1) engaging in
scientific research in Antarctica is the institutional fig leaf justifying a state's
participation in Antarctic governance; and (2) knowledge, as always, is
power, and states which can come up with scientific evidence to back up any
policy changes they wish to promote are likely to be more influential. In a
2008 study surveying the scientific output of Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties (ATCPs) from 1980 to 2004, Dastidar and Ramachandran ranked the
USA number one, the UK second, Australia third, meanwhile Russia was
ninth in the ranking, India was ranked fourteen, China came in at nineteen,
and South Korea at twenty-five.2 A 2012 study by Dudeney and Walton
which built on Dastidar and Ramachandran's research ranked the UK, New
Zealand, and Australia, followed by Chile and the USA, as the top
performers for producing the working papers which lead to policy changes
in Antarctica. In terms of academic research, according to Dudeney and
Walton's 2012 study, the claimant states, the USA, and Russia continue to be
the main producers of cutting edge Antarctic research. The authors say that
this means that “at present the Treaty remains effectively a select club
dominated by the claimant nations and the Cold War warriors (USA and
Russia)”.3
In the 1950s the main preoccupation of the dominant Antarctic partners
was the prevention of the threat of armed conflict spreading to Antarctica.
What are the key priorities of nations engaged with Antarctica today? Does
the ATS in its present form suit those priorities? Will the ATS in its current
form be able to last another fifty years? Will the emergence of new state and
non-state actors with interests in Antarctica upset the current system? Who
are the dominant players in Antarctica today? Does Antarctic governance
need to democratise?
Although Antarctic affairs are highly politicised and frequently
contentious, much of the debates and analysis of what goes on has been
conducted by politicians, activists, lawyers, geographers, historians, and
scientists. In contrast, currently only a handful of political scientists
worldwide are actively engaged in research on Antarctic politics. For an area
of such strategic importance this is a surprising anomaly.
Political scientists are concerned with the study of political power and the
production, distribution, and use of resources. Politics is, in the words of
Andrew heywood, “inextricably linked to the phenomena of conflict and
cooperation”.4 “The politics” of Antarctica, where conflict – and cooperation
— over resources is at the heart of the current system of governance, would
appear to be a subfield ripe for exploration. Yet remarkably the 2007
Encyclopedia of the Antarctic, which has close to 500 entries, has no section
on Antarctic politics or governance — though it has room for other social
science perspectives.5 What work that has been done on Antarctic politics in
the past is mostly scattered in papers in academic journals or gathered
together in a few classic books such as the work of editors Olav Schramm
Stokke and Davor vidas, Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and
Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995 or Chris C. Joyner's sole-authored Governing the
Frozen Continent: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection,
Columbia, SC: University of Southern California, 1998. The post-Cold War
challenges facing Antarctic governance require a much greater investment in
new political science-based research especially to understand the interests of
the new and rising players in Antarctic affairs such as China, India, Korea,
Pakistan, and Malaysia and how other key players such as Russia or
claimant states such as New Zealand or France are coping in this new global
order. The Emerging Politics of Antarctica includes the work of both
established and emerging polar political science experts and policy analysts,
as well as that of political scientists who write on Antarctica from the
perspective of another area of expertise such as the politics of resources.
The Emerging Politics of Antarctica is organised thematically into three
sections. The first section considers the part Antarctic politics plays in the
current post-Cold War, post-colonial, era and the impact this new political
environment is having on the ATS. The second section looks at the
competing foreign policy objectives of a representative range of countries
with Antarctic activities: four rising players in the Antarctic, China, India,
South Korea, and Malaysia; the post-Cold War challenges of Antarctic
involvement for the former Soviet states; and the interests of claimant states
such as France and New Zealand. The third and final section examines
“burning issues on the ice”, issues that have the potential to destabilise the
order of the ATS such as unbridled tourism and new advances in science and
technology. Many of the chapters in this book originated in a Symposium on
Antarctic Politics held in June 2010 at the University of Canterbury, in
Christchurch, New Zealand. Two further chapters were incorporated into the
book project in order to broaden the range of perspectives. The Symposium
brought together scholars and policymakers from Australia, China, Estonia,
India, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States.
This book has tried hard to replicate the diversity of perspectives we heard in
the Symposium.
Part I of the book examines the relevance of the ATS under present day
conditions. Marcus Haward evaluates the idealism of the Treaty provisions
against the realpolitik of Antarctic nations' national interests. He argues that
the Treaty has been highly successful and effective when assessed against its
core provisions of managing disputes over territorial claims and sovereignty
in Antarctica and ensuring that Antarctica should be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes. However, he notes that this does not mean that interests,
values, and practices within the ATS have remained static or unchallenged.
Haward is essentially positive in evaluating how the ATS has responded to
challenges from both within the system and without in the last fifty years
and is cautiously optimistic about its continued viability.
And yet, the second section of the book illustrates how — despite the
idealism of the Treaty rhetoric and the positive evaluation of some analysts
— Antarctic politics in the past, as today, has frequently involved a clash
between national interests. This continually pits those who gained rights
earlier against those who came later, and effectively enables the bigger and
more established powers to dominate. Demonstrating a prime example of
this problem, in the first chapter in this section Anne-Marie Brady's chapter
discusses China's Antarctic interests. In the 1950s in the lead-up to the
signing of the Antarctic Treaty, the USA expressly vetoed what it called
“Red China” from working in Antarctica. The People's Republic of China
did not sign the Antarctic Treaty until 1983, but by this date it was in a quasi
alliance with the USA against the Soviet Union. Its Antarctic involvement
built up slowly but steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, in the
last ten years China has moved into a new phase in its Antarctic engagement.
Beijing has dramatically increased Chinese scientific activities on the frozen
continent and increased public awareness of those activities by sending high
level Chinese media teams to cover them. China is critical of some of the
inherent inequities of Antarctic governance, though at present it is only
fghting its own battles such as when it responded to environmental concerns
over China's base at Dome Argus (built in the 2008–2009 austral summer).
China is keen to make up for lost time by taking a larger stake in Antarctic
affairs. Some commentators fear that China's rise in Antarctica will displace
the interests of existing powers. Brady draws connections between China's
expanded Antarctic programme and ongoing discussions on China's foreign
and domestic policies both within China and beyond.
The second chapter in this section, by Sanjay Chaturvedi, looks at the
Antarctic interests of another emerging power, India. Chaturvedi argues that
when it comes to Antarctica, as well as with other areas important to Delhi,
India's foreign policy today can be characterised by unprecedented
pragmatism, at the same time as cautious idealism. This pragmatism is part
of a growing realisation that as a rising power in Asia and beyond, India's
world view and self-image are due for reassessment. The chapter critically
examines both the potential and the promise of what Chaturvedi refers to as
India's “post-colonial” engagement with Antarctica and the ATS. He locates
this analysis within wider assessments on how “post-colonial engagement”
with Antarctica might play out for other nations.
The third chapter, by Anne-Marie Brady and Kim Seungryeol, examines
the Antarctic interests of another emerging power, the Republic of Korea
(ROK), with reference to its Arctic activities. The ROK's initial engagement
in Antarctica was through the activities of its fishing feet in the Southern
Ocean, starting from 1978. At the time South Korea was a developing
economy with only limited economic interests in Antarctica and limited
resources to exploit the possibilities there. The ROK joined the Antarctic
Treaty in 1986 (soon after so too did the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea) and was admitted as a Consultative Party to the treaty after it set up a
base on the Antarctic peninsular. It was a modest commitment to Antarctic
engagement, from a country that had only modest resources. However, like
China, in the last decade, reflecting the tremendous economic and social
progress the ROK has made, Seoul has significantly ungraded its polar
ambitions. Since 2008, under the government of Lee Myungbak, South
Korean foreign policy is going global. Like many politicians worldwide,
current Korean leaders regard engaging in high level polar activities as a
way of demonstrating that the ROK is interested in taking on more of a
leading role internationally. Moreover, the Lee government wants the ROK
to engage in more high tech science and the polar regions are a unique
laboratory for many fields of research. The ROK wants to have a say in any
future new regime in the polar regions; there is a potential that the ROK's
ambitions and its strategic interests in the polar regions may challenge the
norms of the current ATS in the future, as well as in the Arctic.
 In the fourth chapter in this section B.A. Hamzah outlines the dramatic
shift in Malaysia's policy approach to Antarctica. Malaysia went from being
an outspoken critic of the ATS, seeking to create a broad international front
of nations who opposed the exclusiveness of the ATS “club”, to joining that
“club” itself in 2011 and pursuing its own interests there. Hamzah argues
that the shift reflects in part a new emphasis in Malaysia's overall foreign
policy of taking a less hostile attitude to the Western powers. The retirement
of former PM Mahathir bin Mohamad in 2002 is also a factor in this shift, as
too were the early efforts of New Zealand to help Malaysia establish an
Antarctic science programme. As a thriving petro-economy, Malaysia now
has more resources to invest in Antarctic endeavours than when it raised its
ideological objections to the Antarctic Treaty at the United Nations from
1982 to 2005. It will be interesting to see how Malaysia negotiates its former
status as a watchdog on Antarctic governance issues now that it has joined
the Treaty and is seeking to become a Consultative Party of the Treaty.
The fifth chapter in this section is by Christopher C. Joyner, who sadly
passed away suddenly in 2011. Professor Joyner's chapter outlines the
United States' Antarctic interests. The United States has the largest
investment in Antarctic activities by far, easily outshadowing the spend of its
nearest rivals by several hundred million dollars. Yet, in 2011 the crisis over
the lack of a US icebreaker suitable for supporting its operations in the
Antarctic revealed that the USA is not as strong as it once was, and as
spending has been capped since 2008, its budgets are not keeping up with
inflation. The United States Antarctic Program was eventually able to rent a
Russian icebreaker for the 2011 austral summer, but it is a temporary
solution. The USA needs its own icebreaker for its Antarctic operations, but
it is questionable as to whether or not in a time of economic downturn in the
country, that the US government will be able to come up with the funds.
Joyner examines contemporary US national interests in the Antarctic and
explores whether possible developments by other Antarctic Treaty parties
might undermine the ability of the United States to attain its national interest
objectives in the region. He argues that the Antarctic Treaty remains
indispensable as a mechanism for the successful pursuit of the USA's core
interests in the region. The USA regards itself as a leader in Antarctic
matters and expects to continue to be one in the future.
The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 irrevocably altered the balance
of power in Antarctic affairs, from an essential binary system to a unipolar
one. US spending in Antarctica is now at least three times that of its former
rival Russia which inherited much of the USSR's Antarctic programme. The
United States Antarctic Program sends the highest number of personnel to
Antarctica, around 2500 per annum; its nearest competitors send a fifth of
that number. Though rising powers such as China, India, and South Korea
are rapidly expanding their Antarctic budgets and research programmes, it
will be a long time before any other power can equal the USA — at least on
their own. However, in 2003 Asian Antarctic players broke new ground in
Antarctic affairs by setting up the Asian Forum for Polar Science (AFOPS).
This organisation aims to coordinate research and policies among the five
member countries: India, Japan, China, Korea, and Malaysia. The European
Union is, similarly, increasingly working more as a bloc in dealing with
Antarctic affairs. Greater coordination and cooperation among national
programmes may well prove to be the best way to enable weaker countries
to participate in Antarctic affairs, thereby making Antarctic governance
more democratic.
In the sixth chapter in this section Irina Gan pieces together the Antarctic
interests of Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Having had
thirty-five years of close collaboration within the Soviet Antarctic
expedition, these former Soviet states are now developing their own
Antarctic policies. Russia has managed not only to maintain infrastructure
and research, but to actually consolidate and broaden its presence in
Antarctica. Today, Russia among all the other former Soviet states is in the
strongest position in Antarctica. The other new states manage much smaller
interests in Antarctic affairs. What little activities they had, have now been
severely affected by the global economic crisis.
In the seventh chapter in this section Anne-Marie Brady looks at the
strategic interests of another state with a strong Antarctic connection, the
smallest of the seven claimant states in the ATS, New Zealand. Brady argues
that New Zealand's “Antarctic propinquity” (to borrow a term much used by
Jack Child when describing the Antarctic interests of Southern Cone states)
gives it a special sense of connection to the continent that other nations
might find hard to understand or accept. Brady profiles the various bodies
involved in maintaining and negotiating New Zealand's Antarctic presence
and voice on Antarctic affairs. She then discusses New Zealand's core
interests in the Antarctic continent that help to shape its Antarctic policy,
attitude towards the ATS, and maintenance of its claimant rights. Historically
New Zealand has taken a relatively mild stance on its claimant status and the
government continues to take great pains to avoid offending other Antarctic
players, at the same time as maintaining its claim to Antarctic heritage.
The final chapter in this section, by Chavelli Sulikowski, examines the
nature and extent of France's involvement in Antarctica and the ATS. France
has an extensive history of involvement in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean
region, it is a claimant to continental Antarctic territory and sub-Antarctic
islands, and is an original signatory to the 1959 Treaty. Sulikowski identifies
the influences driving and shaping France's contemporary Antarctic and sub-
Antarctic policies and how these play out in France's diplomacy at the ATS.
France is an active Treaty member — most notably through its membership
and participation in major ATS institutions such as the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and the
Committee on Environmental Protection (CeP) – and had a crucial role in
bringing about a moratorium on mineral extraction in Antarctica.
Whether or not to mine the riches of Antarctica was a hot topic of the
1980s and early 1990s and there are signs it may well heat up again.
However, at present the issue can be regarded as at “lukewarm” in terms of
urgency; in contrast, other concerns are getting close to “red hot”. The final
section of the book examines some of these “burning issues”. Despite
popular impressions of Antarctica being a land of snow and ice, Antarctica
is, at the same time, tinder dry, and fires are an ever present danger.
Similarly, the issues Antarctic governance must now face up to are also
“tinder dry” issues such as how to make Antarctica more accessible to a
greater number of nations, how to deal with non-state actors in Antarctica,
how to regulate tourism, and how to deal with the challenge of
bioprospecting.
In the first chapter in this section Aant elzinga argues for a greater
internationalisation of Antarctic science programmes as a means to bring
about greater democracy in access to Antarctica for developing states.
Elzinga reminds us that the Antarctic Treaty was established primarily as a
means to balance the interests of the USA and USSR in Antarctica by
limiting Antarctic engagement to science. The idealistic goal of this
arrangement was that political interests could be sublimated into science and
that national rivalries could be constructively translated into competition
(and cooperation) in research. Unfortunately for the developing world and
smaller, less powerful, countries, these terms have set the price tag of
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party membership too high. As noted earlier,
this inherent inequity in the terms of membership has been at the root of
historical opposition by some developing countries to the ATS as a means
for governing Antarctica. In the chapter Elzinga compares multilateral
collaboration in other fields such as astronomy or physics where
participating nations do not primarily rally around their own flag. He
suggests that in Antarctica a similar model could be followed. Rather than
Antarctic research being led by national programmes as at present,
international participation in Antarctic research could be greatly enhanced if
there were scientific stations managed under the banner of a collective
supra-national frame such as the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat. In recent years
two Antarctic claimant states, New Zealand and Australia, have made small
steps to increase the participation of two developing countries with an
interest in Antarctica, Malaysia and Indonesia, by inviting them to share
facilities at their base. The 2007–2008 International Polar year had a small
programme to enable scientists in other developing countries to join in the
Antarctic research of established Antarctic players. However, these small
steps are still too slight to make any real progression in the challenge of how
to enhance the involvement of the approximately6 147 sovereign states in the
world that are not signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, yet have a right to
benefit from what can be gained from Antarctica.
In the second chapter in this section jane verbitsky looks at another
burning issue, the environmental risks posed by rapidly increasing Antarctic
tourism and the politics of regulating this activity. Although scientific
research is promoted in the Antarctic Treaty as the primary activity on the
continent, tourists now overwhelmingly outnumber scientists there. Tourism
could now be said to be both the main source of human activity and the key
utiliser of resources in the territory, yet there are very little means to regulate
it. This rapid increase in tourism presents considerable challenges for the
ATS and the Consultative Parties to the Treaty. These include sovereignty,
resource protection, governance, regime compliance, and the problem of
how to manage the activities of commercial operators based in countries
which are non-signatories. Verbitsky examines how the ATS has responded
thus far to the problems caused by increasing tourist numbers, and argues
strongly for a new multilateral tourism convention on Antarctic travel.
 As the various chapters in this book aptly illustrate, though Antarctica is
formally owned by no one state, matters of sovereignty and ownership of
resources are a source of much of the bones of contention. In the final
chapter of the book julia jabour explores Antarctic bioprospecting, which is
currently unregulated in the ATS, looking at it from an ethical point of view.
Jabour uses Antarctic bioprospecting as a case study to re-examine the
fundamental question as to whether the Antarctic is global commons and
whether its resources should be considered the common heritage of
humankind. Jabour argues that exclusive reward from bioprospecting is as
legitimate as exclusive reward from fishing for the states party to the
relevant instruments of the ATS. If sample collection is all that actually
occurs in the Antarctic, then reporting the findings will suffice in terms of
obligations owed to all humankind under the provisions that require
scientific results and observations from Antarctica be shared (Treaty
Preamble and Article III). Jabour asserts that the prospect of a challenge by
developing countries based on commons arguments is remote, and that the
supremacy of the ATCPs goes unchallenged today, fifty years into their
governance of Antarctica.
It certainly would be difficult to significantly change Antarctica's unique
and in the eyes of its critics, antiquated, governance system under the current
global order. To return to the questions initially posed at the beginning of
this preface it would seem that many of our authors fear that the ATS is not
coping well with the needs of the emerging world order and its power
imbalance certainly reflects the realities of that order. Furthermore, despite
the idealistic rhetoric of the Antarctic Treaty and the faith of its adherents,
the key priority of most nations engaged with Antarctica today appears to be
much as it was in an earlier era, the desire to maintain access to current and
future resources there. The ATS in its present form suits the needs of the
established Antarctic players, but still appears unable to meet the needs of
less established states. And yet for all its failings, no other instrument of
governance is available to deal with all the issues involved in governing the
Antarctic continent and Southern Ocean. So far the rise of new actors with
interests in Antarctica has not upset the current system as they are still
working with it as it stands. Antarctic governance clearly needs to
democratise, but efforts to achieve this have so far been too little, and too
late.
 The unspoken aim of the Antarctic Treaty was to remove “the politics” —
conflict over resources — from the Antarctic continent, leaving it to the
scientists and, in recent years, increasingly to the tourists. Yet politics is an
intrinsic part of human society and the multiple chapters in this volume
illustrate some of the many ways in which politics continue to affect
Antarctica today. It is my hope that this volume will inspire still further
research on the multiple dimensions of Antarctic politics and, increasingly,
from as global a perspective as possible. Only by encouraging all affected
parties to speak openly about interests and sources of conflict can we hope to
bring about true peace and cooperation there.

Notes
1 Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How?, New
York: Meridian Books, 1958.
2 Prabir G. Dastidar and S. Ramachandran, “Intellectual structure of
Antarctic science: a 25 years analysis”, Scientometrics, Vol. 77, No. 3
(2008), pp. 389–414.
3 John R. Dudeney and David W. H. Walton, “Leadership in politics and
science within the Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Research (2012), 31, 11075,
DOI: 10.3402/polar. v31i0.11075.
4 Andrew heywood, Politics, New york: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 4.
5 Beau Riffenburgh, ed., Encyclopedia of the Antarctic, London:
Routledge, 2007.
6 “Approximately” because what constitutes a sovereign state is
debatable in international law.
Part I
Antarctic politics in the current
world order
1 The Antarctic Treaty System

Challenges, coordination, and congruity

Haward Marcus

Introduction
The Antarctic is a place of superlatives related to its physical environment
— the coldest, highest, driest continent — but its governing arrangements
are also in their own way impressive. The Antarctic Treaty1 is a remarkable
instrument, providing a framework of peaceful collaboration and scientific
endeavour as well as demilitarising an entire continent. It also provides a
formula to address territorial claims and interests. The treaty and its key
subordinate and complementary instruments form the Antarctic Treaty
System (ATS).2 Interaction within and without the ‘system’ centres on and
has affected power relations, conflict, and questions of resource allocation.3
Such interactions have led to external challenges to and internally generated
critiques of the ATS. They have also raised issues of coordination within the
ATS and the extent to which values within the system provide or reflect
current international norms.
This chapter considers the politics of Antarctica through the examination
of the development and evolution of the ATS, utilising definitions that
consider politics as centring on the articulation of, and management of
conflicts over, interests. Interests are never uncontested, nor are they always
clearly articulated or separable. I have chosen to explore the politics of
Antarctica by identifying and examining challenges, both internal and
external, to the ATS; considering the ways in which interests, ideas, and
actions are coordinated; and exploring the level of congruity between the
ATS and other instruments, institutions, and regimes. This framework, and
drawing on the insights made by other contributors to this volume, provides
a means to assess the performance of the ATS in the politics of Antarctica.

The politics of Antarctica

Politics is clearly a contested concept. Otto von Bismark famously likened
the political process to the making of sausages: “the less people know about
how sausages and laws are made, the better they'll sleep at night”.4 The
inference is one should not look too closely nor enquire too deeply into the
political process. While there is much to commend in a focus on outputs,
focusing on the process of decision-making is a key to understanding
politics. Bernard Crick saw politics “as the activity by which differing
interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in
power [and] where politics proves successful in ensuring reasonable
stability and order”.5 A working definition of politics includes considering
power relations, conflict management, and resource allocation,6 or, as
Harold Lasswell noted, “who gets what, when and how”.7 Politics is
managing conflicts or mediating differences over policy preferences or
interests. Discussion, debate, and differences of opinion are the signs of a
healthy system. Progress is made when ideas are debated, new approaches
put forward and tested, even if the initial action or initiative is met with
resistance or opposition.
As noted also in other contributions to this volume, politics in the form of
disputes and differences over territorial claims and sovereignty in
Antarctica (geopolitics8) was an impetus for the Antarctic Conference that
led to the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. These differences and
disputes — what was termed the “Antarctic Problem”9 — provided the first
major challenge for Antarctic states.10 It not only involved overlapping
territorial claims and disputed sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula (“the
ABC dispute” between Argentina, Britain, Chile)11 but reflected broader
differences between claimant and non-claimant states. A solution to the
Antarctic Problem also needed to accommodate the interests of the cold war
superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, both
active in the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year (IGY).12

Science and international collaboration — the international

polar years
Increased impetus for Antarctic exploration and scientific research occurred
in the period following the end of the Second World War. This period,
dominated by cold war tension between two superpowers — the United
States of America and the Soviet Union — did not exclude Antarctica. The
USA's expeditions High Jump 1946–47 and Deep Freeze 1955–56
reinvigorated Antarctic science and debates over Antarctica's geopolitics in
the post-war period. Increased interest in Antarctica led, as Elzinga13
records, to the development of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic
Research (SCAR). SCAR14 was constituted in 1958.
The IGY in 1957–58 followed earlier “International Polar Years”, the
first in 1882–83,15 and the second established fifty years later in 1932–33,
with the third in 2007–09.16 The first International Polar Year (IPY)
occurred after seven years of development. This first IPY saw 12
expeditions to the Arctic and three to Antarctica, involving 12 countries.
The second IPY, established 50 years later in 1932–33, involved 44
countries and encouraged the development of further international
collaboration on polar science, although this collaboration was halted
during the Second World War, with a concomitant reduction in Antarctic
activity.17
Developments in science and technology, and the transfer of technology
developed during the cataclysm of the Second World War into peaceful
purposes encouraged international collaboration on polar science. Proposals
for a further multi-national polar science programme to take advantage of
favourable solar conditions, focusing on an emerging area of space
research, led to the establishment of the IGY, with a 25-rather than 50-year
interval from the second IPY. The focus of polar research was conditioned,
too, by concerns over the consequences of emergent areas of space
research, the “missile gap” and concerns over the relative strengths of
science and technology in the West as opposed to the Soviet Union.18
 The success of the IGY also ensured that the primary value of scientific
research was reiterated during the Antarctic conference and embedded in
the Antarctic Treaty, with science seen as “the currency” of the ATS.19
While science was promoted, geopolitics was not forgotten in the IGY; the
Soviet Union established research stations in each of the claimant states'
territories during the International Geophysical Year in 1957–58, while the
United States established the Amundsen–Scott station at the south
geographic pole, effectively within each claimant's territorial claim.20
The broadening and deepening of multi-national scientific collaboration
continued, with the third IPY occurring in 2007–09. The 2007–09 IPY was
established through the International Polar Year Joint Committee of the
International Council for Science (ICSU) and the World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO). The IPY focused on research on the atmosphere, ice,
land, oceans, people, and space, within six broad themes,21 involving 63
nations, 400 projects, and approximately 50,000 scientists working in both
polar regions.22 The 2007–09 IPY emphasised education and outreach,
linking the IPY science to education programmes. While the 2007–09 IPY
may not have had the same geopolitical context as IGY – the era of Sputnik
and the beginning of the global space race – it nonetheless continued the
pattern of major scientific collaboration in Antarctica that had been initiated
by the IGY.

From science to diplomacy – the Antarctic Treaty

The successful international collaboration during the IGY gave great
impetus to the negotiation of the Antarctic treaty, yet the form of the treaty,
or its membership, were not a given as a result of the successes of the IGY.
The agreement not to pursue territorial claims during the IGY, what was
termed the “Standstill Proposal”,23 was to be important in the subsequent
treaty conference. Most significantly the IGY included the establishment of
major scientific research programmes, stations, and facilities in the
Antarctic by both the USA and USSR. The involvement of the Soviet
Union in the IGY was significant but its participation in the Antarctic
Conference raised some concerns, with Australia's Foreign Minister playing
a major role in ensuring Soviet participation in the conference and support
for the Treaty.24
 The parties to the Antarctic conference had to grapple with the Antarctic
Problem. The standstill proposal enabled the collaboration and linkages
between claimant states25 and others essential to the success of the IGY to
occur, yet other options were being proposed prior to the Antarctic
conference.26 Prior to the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1958–59
New Zealand Prime Minister Nash did indicate he favoured
internationalisation of the Antarctic, a position at odds with other claimants
and the USA, and indeed at odds with sections of his government. The
Chilean standstill initiative provided a modus vivendi to resolve the
differences between claimants and others, and the base of Article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty, widely accepted as the lynchpin of the treaty and the ATS.
The Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959 by the 12 nations that had been
active in Antarctica during the IGY. Formal negotiations in Washington
lasted 18 months from June 1958 and included 60 preparatory meetings and
a formal diplomatic Conference on Antarctica. The conference opened on
15 October 1959 and ended with the Antarctic Treaty open for signature on
1 December 1959. The Antarctic Treaty applies to the area south of 60°
South Latitude and:
• stipulates that Antarctica should be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes — military activities, such as the establishment of military
bases or weapons testing, are specifically prohibited;
• guarantees freedom to conduct scientific research;
• promotes international scientific cooperation and requires that the
results of research be made freely available;
• sets aside the potential for sovereignty disputes between Treaty parties
by providing that no activities will enhance or diminish previously
asserted positions with respect to territorial claims, provides that no
new or enlarged claims can be made, and makes rules relating to
jurisdiction;
• prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste;
• provides for inspection to ensure compliance with the Treaty — a
world-first weapons inspection system;
• requires advance notice of expeditions; and
• provides for the parties to discuss measures to further the Treaty.27
The twin pillars of peace and science, embodied in Articles I and II of the
Treaty, are central to the operation of the treaty system.
Article I:
1 Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall
be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such
as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the
carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any
type of weapons.
2 The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel
or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes.
Article II: Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and
cooperation toward that end, as applied during the International
Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the
present Treaty.28
The commitments to peace and science have been buttressed by the solution
to the Antarctic Problem that provides a means to prohibit any further
territorial claims, while not derogating any existing claims, or interests in
Antarctica. This elegant solution, embodied in the wording of Article IV of
the treaty, has provided the basis for interaction over the following half
century. This Article has often been misrepresented, so it is important to
include it in full:
Article IV:
1 Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously
asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it
may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its
nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
 prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards
(c)
its recognition or non-recognition of any other State's rights
of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica.
2 No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in
force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights
of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be
asserted while the present Treaty is in force.29
Articles I, II, and IV and the statement in the Preamble to the Treaty that
Antarctica shall not become the scene or object of international discord,
provide the basis for political interaction within the ATS. Peaceful use was
enhanced by the inherent tensions of the cold war and science provided an
important impetus for the negotiations that led to the Antarctic Treaty most
notably through the IGY. The success of the Antarctic component of the
IGY itself showed that the Antarctic states including the superpowers could
work together, setting aside differences related to claims or sovereignty.
Science is the basis for achievement of Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Party (ATCP) status that in turn enables parties to take part in decision-
making in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM). Science
remains a salient feature of the ATS and its value has increased with current
major research programmes being undertaken by ATCPs. Current multi-
national programmes are addressing key uncertainties identified by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change affecting projection of future
sea level rise: the behaviour of the great Antarctic ice sheets.30 Other
research includes ice core drilling to provide paleo-climate records (through
analysis of air trapped in bubbles in the ice) back to 600,000 years before
the present.31
A focus on science was reinforced by the Antarctic Treaty containing
specific commitments to peaceful activity, demilitarisation, the banning of
nuclear activity, and creating an inspection regime to help ensure
compliance. The inspection regime has retained its central role, it is a
matter taken seriously by the ATCPs and has helped ensure best practice in
operational matters is shared among parties. The provision of the inspection
regime where, in theory, inspections by other ATCPs can be made
anywhere, anytime has provided an important model for, and contribution
to, other international arms control instruments such as the Chemical
Weapons Treaty.32

Interaction within the Antarctic Treaty System

At one level it could be argued that the Antarctic Treaty's commitment to
avoiding discord, embodying consensus, and managing territorial claims
has removed much of what would be seen as traditional politics. Although
the system has been seen as sui generis33 (the ATS managed for many years
without much of the machinery associated with international instruments)34
politics is central to the Antarctic.
Claimant states, their interests protected by the provisions of Article IV
of the treaty, have been able to balance these interests and their Treaty
commitments through what has been termed bifocalism.35 Bifocalism refers
to the “productively ambiguous” formulation of the question of
sovereignty36 allowing claimant states to act on the basis of territoriality
while non-claimants act under Article IV on the basis of their status as
consultative parties.37 Bifocalism serves a number of purposes, and allows
claimant and non-claimants to pursue their respective interest through the
system. It provides a means for geopolitical interests to be managed within
the framework of international collaboration established by the Antarctic
Treaty and given effect by the number of non-claimant states acceding to
the Treaty. Importantly, bifocalism buttressed by Article IV of the Antarctic
Treaty, is the basis for the commitment of the claimant states to the goals
and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty.
This view is challenged by the post-colonial critique of the ATS, as
elaborated by Chaturvedi in this volume.38 The post-colonial view holds
that “the ATS continues to be hostage to a regressive, and of late
increasingly assertive, legacy of the imperial-colonial era”.39 The heroic
era, and the activities and actions undertaken during it to support territorial
acquisition, was driven in large part by the motives of the imperial era. At
the same time, however, the heroic era, as noted above, can be viewed as
much a part of the enlightenment project, driven by science and scientific
discovery. The post-colonial critique is a useful, although in my view
limited, framing of the politics of Antarctica. This critique40 is not
supported by much of the evidence of the claimant states' commitment to
the Antarctic Treaty and their work in the ongoing evolution of the ATS,
including support for states to accede to the Treaty.
The claimant states' position has altered significantly within the ATCMs
over the 50 years from 1961 from a majority (seven of 12 to a minority
seven of 28). They remain, however, influential parties, with a number of
examples illustrating the role of claimants as advocates within the ATS and
particularly in the ATCM in addressing emerging issues and topics, as
shown in Brady's consideration of “New Zealand's Antarctica” and
Sulikowski's examination of France's roles in the Antarctic Treaty
System.41 Australia and France spearheaded the overturning of the
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
(CRAMRA) in favour of a more explicit environmental protection
regime.42 Criticisms of the overtly inward-looking nature of the ATCPs is
countered by their support for the broadening of participation within the
ATCMs, through inclusion by observers from the United Nations
specialised agencies and non-governmental groups such as IAATO and
ASOC.43 Malaysia — a major critic of the ATS in the 1980s (see following
and Hamzah in this volume) — has been invited to observe ATCMs and has
been supported in developing its Antarctic science programmes44 by
ATCPs, including the claimant states of New Zealand and Australia.
Claimant states “carried their weight” in the ATS in terms of contributions
to the work in and between the ATCMs. Recently New Zealand hosted a
meeting of experts on the management of marine-based tourism in the
Antarctic Treaty area and Norway hosted a meeting of experts on climate
change.45 These examples of engagement with the Antarctic agenda are in
the states' national interest and are examples of bifocalism in action.

Challenges
The ATS, and the Antarctic Treaty, have been subjected to challenge.
Challenges have been mounted internally by ATCPs, most notably in the
debate and overturing of CRAMRA. Equally important was the external
challenge led by Malaysia that was initiated in the early 1980s. Malaysia
urged Antarctica to be considered common heritage, a concept drawn from
the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. As noted below the
interaction between the ATS and both the United Nations and the Law of
the Sea Convention has shaped challenges to the system.
The CRAMRA story has formed a significant literature in relation to the
operation and politics of the ATS.46 It is accepted that this challenge
provided major pressure on the ATS, yet this pressure was released with
recognition by the ATCPs of the wide-ranging support for a more explicit
commitment to environmental protection. This shift was spearheaded by
international and national activity by non-governmental groups that
provided a further set of challenges to the ATCPs. Non-governmental
groups and their supporters, Australia and the United States, argued for
more open access to the ATCM, and for observer status within the system.
One outcome of the minerals debate, and the broader discussions over the
Question of Antarctica (see following and Hamzah in this volume) in the
1980s was to broaden participation of non-ATCPs in key forums such as the
ATCMs. The negotiation of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty addressed this challenge and, consequently, re-shaped the
politics of Antarctica. In establishing a comprehensive environmental
regime, and the Committee on Environmental Protection, the treaty parties
encouraged the development of a focus on environmental impacts, based on
multi-disciplinary approaches to Antarctic science. In addition the ATCPs
continued their engagement with non-governmental organisations and other
international organisations.
The minerals “debate” highlighted the ability of the ATCPs to resolve
both internal and external challenges to the system. While the nature of
decision-making within the ATS mediates any substantial rifts between
parties, an example from within the Commission for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) indicates the way in which
parties can manage internal challenges. At the 21st meeting of the
Commission in 2002 Australia tabled a proposal to list toothfish on
Appendix II of the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES). Despite having the support of key non-
governmental groups, this proposal raised strong opposition within
CCAMLR. Only New Zealand supported Australia, with 75 paragraphs of
the report of CCAMLR XXI recording opposition to Australia's proposal.47
Australia, accepting the failure to gain consensus, withdrew its original
proposal at a subsequent CITES meeting. In its place, a compromise
proposed by Chile to encourage closer use of CCAMLR measures in
regulating illegal and unreported and unregulated catch of toothfish was
adopted by CITES.
An interesting example of politics within the ATS relates to the
intersection between the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) and the
Antarctic Treaty.48 This example also transcends the simple dichotomy of
internal challenge and internal critique. It was provisions within the LOSC,
most notably that of the “common heritage of mankind” that was one of the
drivers of Malaysia's long-standing (though evolving) challenge to the
Antarctic Treaty and ATS. As is well recognised, however, “the LOSC does
not directly address Antarctica but covers the maritime areas within the
Treaty Area”.49 A number of commentators have noted that the Antarctic
was not mentioned in the deliberations of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, while the Antarctic Treaty does not
derogate from any rights under the law of the sea.50 These factors, together
with the provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, have meant that
the declaration of maritime zones by Antarctic claimants has been
controversial. On 1 November 1979 Australia proclaimed a 200-mile
Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) including the waters of the external
territories such as the AAT,51 but “one month later a new proclamation was
made exempting the waters around the AAT”.52
While all claimant states have declared maritime zones of their Antarctic
territories these zones vary in type and on the basis of their establishment.53
This is another example of bifocalism, where enforcement of laws related to
these zones is made against nationals and vessels fagged to the respective
claimant state, not against foreign nationals or vessels. Commentators have
noted that a number of questions arise in relation to maritime zones,
including the question of determining baselines. Some have even
questioned whether coastal states exist in Antarctica given the provisions of
the Antarctic Treaty, and the prohibitions on extending or altering a
claimant's territory under the provisions of Article IV of the treaty.54
The LOSC provides coastal states with the ability to claim an extended
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coastline under certain
circumstances. This includes providing scientific data to support the claim
for an extended area, and for these data to be submitted for assessment by
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an expert
body established under the LOSC. Given the status of territorial claims in
the Antarctic, the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf by
claimant states was controversial and posed a challenge to the ATCPs. All
claimant states have addressed this issue. Australia was the first to lodge its
data on its claims to an extended continental shelf, but requested that the
CLCS not examine the data associated with the AAT.55 The delimitation of
the Antarctic continental shelf utilised a range of provisions available to
Australia under Article 76 of the LOSC, including the “sediment thickness
formula”, and as a result has provided significant scientific data for further
research.56 One important outcome from the sediment cores drilled offshore
from the AAT as part of the scientific research programme to delimit the
continental shelf was to give important data on the paleo-climate record
used in climate reconstructions as part of Australian research on global
climate change.57
New Zealand took advantage of an alternative practice available to all
parties to the LOSC in relation to the delimitation of its extended
continental shelf, by lodging a partial submission to the CLCS. It lodged
data related to the mainland of New Zealand and its islands but did not
address the question of the continental shelf off the Ross Dependency (the
official name for the New Zealand Antarctic territory). The United
Kingdom and France have likewise made partial submissions. Norway has
followed Australia and submitted data for an extended continental shelf off
its Antarctic territory, but asked the CLCS not to examine this material.58
Chile has indicated that it will consider the issue in relation to its Antarctic
claim. Argentina submitted a claim for a continental shelf that included
areas claimed by the United Kingdom. Argentina has objected to the
announcements made by the United Kingdom, which in turn has opposed
Argentina's claim.59 These claims reflect ongoing disputes over the
sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas located outside the Antarctic
treaty area.
The most substantial external critique of the Antarctic Treaty and the
ATS has been that initiated by Malaysia within the context of the United
Nations General Assembly on the matter referred to as the Question of
Antarctica, first raised as an item for debate in 1983. Malaysia argued that
the central contention was that Antarctica should be designated as the
common heritage of mankind, to protect the interests of developing nations.
It also claimed that the Antarctic Treaty was flawed because the Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) decision-making process excluded
non-consultative parties and the views of the wider international
community, and that it was one of the final reminders of a colonialist order
not least because of the existence of seven claimant states including
Australia and the continued participation of South Africa.60 Malaysia also
indicated a concern over the ability of the ATS to protect the Antarctic
environment.61 This element of Malaysia's critique anticipated the internal
challenge within the ATS in the latter part of the decade to the robustness of
the treaty system over mineral exploitation. This period saw the ATS
undergo fundamental reform, with the ATCPs simultaneously addressing
the challenges of environmental management and the scientific imperatives
that go with it and opening up the ATCM to broader-based interests, while
maintaining control over the system and its processes.

Coordination
The centrality of consensus decision-making within the ATS has a major
impact on the functioning of the system. Gaining agreement or coordination
within ATS forums is central to the development of system-based outcomes.
The corollary to this, and an effect of consensus decision-making is that a
single consultative party can effectively veto any initiative. Coordination
also involves, increasingly, a number of extra-system instruments and
institutions. There is an extensive array of instruments that can apply to
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, and thus intersect with the ATS. These
instruments include the Law of the Sea Convention, MARPOL 73/78, the
Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the London [Dumping]
Convention/Protocol, the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS
or the Bonn Convention), the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
(World Heritage Convention), and the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).62
 Coordination with some instruments has been accomplished easily, for
example the MARPOL and SOLAS conventions have guided ATCPs in
their practice and the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals
(CMS or the Bonn Convention) forms the basis for the Agreement for the
Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP). Interaction with other
instruments has, however, been more challenging. Whaling, for example,
was specifically excluded from coverage by the Antarctic Treaty and
subsequently from CCAMLR. The Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary,
established in 1994, includes much of the CCAMLR Area. The northern
boundary of this Sanctuary follows the 40°S parallel of latitude except in
the Indian Ocean sector where it joins the southern boundary of that
sanctuary at 55°S, and around South America and into the South Pacific
where the boundary is at 60°S.63
Current controversy extends over Japan's scientific whaling programme
research involving the lethal take of whales that occurs within the Antarctic
Treaty Area (and in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary). This has
provided an interesting challenge for CCAMLR's ecosystem-based
approach to management. It took many years for the scientific committees
of the International Whaling Commission and CCAMLR to meet, yet each
recognised the importance of the southern ocean ecosystem. Whaling has
been quarantined from debate within the ATCM with the result that the
operational aspects of Japan's whaling programme (for example questions
over the response to, and consequences of, the fire on the factory vessel the
Nishin Maru raised by New Zealand in 2007) have not been able to be
discussed, despite such incidents being of concern to many parties. Treaty
parties have clearly accepted that discussions on whaling would be
problematic and create unnecessary tension and stress the accommodations
made through bifocalism.
The parties to the ATS have also resisted direct coordination with other
instruments. As noted above attempts to link the management of toothfish
species, and the CCAMLR catch documentation scheme, to the
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) were strongly opposed. Although ATCPs have utilised the
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage (World Heritage Convention) to nominate and manage areas on
sub-Antarctic Islands, they have resisted the extension of this instrument to
Antarctica. Debates on biological prospecting, “the study of genetic
materials and determination of commercially important genetic codes and
the harvesting of in situ organisms for extraction of biochemicals”,64 within
the ATCM have resisted linking this matter to programmes and practices
with the United Nations Environment Programme.

Congruity
The ATS has provided important opportunities where initiatives from within
the system have been taken up by other regional and international
organisations. There are a number of examples that draw on the definition
of politics used in this paper: ensuring reasonable stability and order. Quite
apart from the Antarctic Treaty providing a model for the Moon Treaty (the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies 1979) the treaty provides, as noted above, a model
inspection regime for arms control and limitation instruments. The latter are
good examples of the way in which the treaty can address issues of power
politics. In relation to resource allocation, CCAMLR pioneered a
precautionary ecosystem-based approach to marine living resources
management. This innovative approach has since been incorporated more
widely into other international instruments and management
organisations.65
The development of international instruments to address conservation of
albatross and petrel species from initiatives within the ATS is a further
example of its work being congruous with emerging international norms
and expectations. That this issue was first addressed in the ATS, more
specifically in CCAMLR, is no surprise as the majority of Southern
Hemisphere albatross and petrel species occur in the CCAMLR Convention
Area.66 The issue of incidental mortality associated with fishing operations
was first raised at the Third Meeting of the CCAMLR in 1984. By the
beginning of the next decade the issue of incidental catches of albatross
received considerable attention. From this the matter of incidental catches
of albatrosses and petrels was addressed by relevant pelagic tuna fisheries
management organisations. In turn the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) supported the development of an International Plan of
Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries.67
 There is a specific resource allocation issue in the Southern Ocean related
to the problems of illegal unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing. While
“freedom to fish” is seen by many states as one of the traditional freedoms
of the high seas, this freedom, since the development and codification of the
law of the sea, has become increasingly fettered. IUU is defined as fishing
that ignores the provisions of the law of the sea or regulations and
arrangements from responsible management bodies. The concept developed
in CCAMLR to describe fishing that took place outside the relevant
conservation measures set up to protect and manage fish stocks in the
CCAMLR region. Concerns raised in CCAMLR meetings led to the matter
being raised at the FAO's Committee on Fisheries, and in turn to the
development of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing.
Initiatives to tackle IUU fishing are good examples of congruity; but it is
worth noting that the initiative from within the ATS builds upon the LOSC
and, together with complementary actions outside the ATS, has created a
new regime for high seas fisheries.68 This regime builds on the experiences
of CCAMLR and includes commitments to regional fisheries organisations,
a strong scientific base for decisions on catch allocation, the introduction of
ecosystem approaches to management, and the use of trade and market-
based management tools.

Conclusion
As the foundation stone of the regime governing the Antarctic, the
Antarctic Treaty has been highly successful and effective when assessed
against its core provisions: that the continent be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and that freedom to conduct scientific research is
guaranteed and international scientific cooperation is promoted. This
chapter argues that the success of the Antarctic Treaty is built on the
provisions of Article IV of the treaty and the concept of bifocalism,
providing opportunities for claimant states to support the ATS and pursue
their interests within this framework. It is also a truism that any assessment
is conditioned by the position the assessor takes.
There is some concern over the ATCPs' failure to effectively engage with
non-parties or other international institutions or instruments. Chaturvedi is
concerned that the accommodation provided by Article IV is under
potential threat from actions by “assertive” claimant states.69 These are
interesting criticisms. The ATCPs have been unwilling to engage in certain
topics, even when congruous to their interests. Topics such as whaling
remain quarantined from discussion in the ATS. Emergent issues, too, have
shown that challenges remain. IUU fishing poses ongoing challenges to the
effectiveness of CCAMLR's conservation measures. Biological prospecting
has yet to be addressed in an effective manner. Actions by claimant states in
relation to the delimitation of continental shelf have shown the success to
date of a nuanced approach to this issue but at the same time it may rekindle
the ABC issue, a focal point in the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty.
The basis of the success of the Antarctic Treaty — the outstanding
feature of Article IV that balanced claimant and non-claimant interests —
was reinforced by the exhortation that the parties agree that Antarctica
“continue[s] forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall
not become the scene or object of international discord”.70 This chapter has
explicitly posed a question in relation to an assessment of the Antarctic
Treaty over the half century from its signing. This question, while centred
on the treaty, also allows for an exploration of the broader politics of
Antarctica. The commitments to peace through demilitarisation, the
banning of nuclear activity, and the establishment of an inspection regime
are major achievements. The provisions of the Antarctic Treaty have
opened up a politics of Antarctica that centres on consensus and
collaboration, yet at the same time addresses, effectively, the national
interests that had given rise to the Antarctic Problem.

Notes
1 Antarctic Treaty (1959), 402 UNTS 7. Entered into force 23 June
1961.
2 The ATS includes the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals (CCAS) 1972; the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (1980) 19 ILM 841. Entered into force 7
April 1982; the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty (1991) 30 ILM 1455. Entered into force 15 January 1998; as
well as the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), the
 Antarctic Treaty Secretariat and the CCAMLR Commission and
Secretariat. The Agreement for the Conservation of Albatrosses and
Petrels (ACAP), entered into force 1 February 2004, is an instrument
of the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS or the
Bonn Convention) originated from discussion within CCAMLR.
While not directly linked to the Antarctic Treaty ACAP has an
observer at and does provide a report to the ATCM.
3 This form of politics is as significant as “geopolitics”; see below.
4 Otto von Bismark, www.ThinkExist.com (accessed 7 August 2010).
5 B. Crick, In Defence of Politics rev. edn., Harmondsworth, Penguin,
1964, p. 21.
6 A. Mason, “Politics and the State”, Political Studies 38 (1990), pp.
575–587.
7 H. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How, New York,
Peter Smith, 1950 [1936].
8 Brady, Chaturvedi, Elzinga, and Jabour in this volume each address
different aspects of the influence of geopolitics on the Antarctic Treaty
and Treaty System. Geopolitics clearly shaped state interests in the
negotiation of the Treaty, but has continued to influence engagement
within the system to the present, as discussed in the contributions in
Part II of this book.
9 E. W. H. Christie, The Antarctic Problem: A Historical and Political
Study, London, Allen and Unwin, 1951. The Antarctic Problem was
one of a number of territorial issues in the immediate post-Second
World War period. For example the period also saw the Jerusalem,
Trieste, and Berlin “Problems” in international diplomacy; see H. R.
Hall, International Regime Formation and Leadership: The Origins of
the Antarctic Treaty, PhD Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1994.
10 Hall, note 10.
11 The ABC dispute also involved long-standing interactions between the
“southern cone” states; see J. K. Moore, Diplomacy, Public Opinion
and the “Fractalization” of US Antarctic Policy, 1946–1959, PhD
Thesis, University of Tasmania, 2006.
12 This international effort occurred at the height of the cold war and
rising superpower tensions that were to reach a zenith with the Cuban
Missile Crisis of October 1962.
13 Chapter 10, this volume.
14 Originally termed the Special Committee on Antarctic Research.
15 The first IPY involved 12 expeditions to the Arctic and 3 to Antarctica,
involving 12 countries.
16 The second IPY involved 44 countries. The third IPY, 50 years after
the IGY in 2007–09, was expected to provide a significant impetus to
Antarctic science, although it was unlikely to have the same impact as
earlier programmes. See D. W. H. Walton, “Editorial-International
Polar Year”, Antarctic Science, 19(1) (2007), p. 1. See also J. Jabour
and M. Haward, “Antarctic Science, Politics and IPY Legacies”, in
Legacies and Change in Polar Sciences: Historical, Legal and
Political Reflections on the International Polar Year, J. M. Shadian
and M. Tennberg (eds), Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009, pp.
101–124.
17 With the possible exception of the UK's Operation Tabarin in the
Antarctic Peninsula, which had obvious geopolitical motivations.
18 P. Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century, New York, Berkley
Books/Penguin Group, 2007.
19 R. A. Herr and H. R. Hall, “Science as Currency and the Currency of
Science”, in Antarctica: Policies and Policy Development, J. Handmer
(ed.), Canberra, CRES Resource and Environmental Studies No. 1,
CRES, ANU, 1989, pp. 13–24.
20 Norway does not define either the southern or the northern limits of its
claim.
21 These themes were: Theme 1: To determine the present environmental
status of the polar regions; Theme 2: To quantify, and understand, past
and present natural environmental and social change in the polar
regions; and to improve projections of future change; Theme 3: To
advance our understanding on all scales of the links and interactions
between polar regions and the rest of the globe, and of the processes
 controlling these links; Theme 4: To investigate the frontiers of science
in the polar regions; Theme 5: To use the unique vantage point of the
polar regions to develop and enhance observatories from the interior of
the Earth to the Sun and the cosmos beyond; and Theme 6: To
investigate the cultural, historical, and social processes that shape the
sustainability of circumpolar human societies, and to identify their
unique contributions to global cultural diversity and citizenship.
22 J. Shadian and M. Tennberg, “Introduction”, in Legacies and Change
in Polar Sciences: Historical, Legal and Political Reflections on the
International Polar Year, J. M. Shadian and M. Tennberg (eds),
Farnham, Ashgate, 2009, pp. 1–6.
23 R. Hall, “Casey and the Negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty”, in The
Antarctic: Past, Present and Future, J. Jabour-Green and M. Haward
(eds), Hobart, Antarctic CRC Research Report No. 28, 2001, pp. 27–
33.
24 Ibid.
25 The Antarctic “claimant states” are Australia, France, New Zealand,
Chile, Argentina, United Kingdom, and Norway.
26 Hall, note 24.
27 A. Bergin and M. Haward, Frozen Assets: Securing Australia's
Antarctic Future, Strategic Insight No. 34, Canberra, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute Canberra, April 2007, p. 3.
28 Antarctic Treaty, note 1, Articles I and II.
29 Ibid., Article IV.
30 Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre,
Position Analysis: Polar Ice Sheet and Climate Change: Global
Impacts, Hobart, ACE CRC, 2009.
31 See Bergin and Haward, note 18. M. Haward, “Climate Change:
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, Science, Law and Policy”, in
Climate Change and the Oceans: Gauging the Legal and Policy Tides,
R. Warner and C. Schofeld (eds), Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012.
32 C. Moraitis, “Presentation at ‘Treaty Territory Seminar’”, Tasmanian
Museum and Art Gallery, Hobart, June 2006.
33 See, for example, P. W. Quigg, A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of
Antarctica, New York, New Press, 1983.
34 It was not until 2004 that a permanent Antarctic Treaty Secretariat was
established.
35 G. D. Triggs, International Law and Australian Sovereignty in
Antarctica, Sydney, Legal Books, 1986. For claimants the ATS remains
important; the first goal of the Australian Antarctic Program is to
maintain the Antarctic Treaty System and enhance Australia's
influence within the system.
36 C. C. Joyner, “The Role of Domestic Politics in Making United States
Antarctic Policy”, in Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and
Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, O. S. Stokke and D. Vidas
(eds), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 441.
37 Ibid.
38 Chaturvedi, Chapter 3 this volume.
39 Ibid.
40 See also K. Dodds, “Post Colonial Antarctica: An Emerging
Engagement”, Polar Record, 42(220) (2006), pp. 59–70. As will be
clear, I disagree, respectively, with the position advanced by my friend
and colleague Sanjay Chaturvedi in this volume.
41 See respective chapters in this volume.
42 Australia and France did face criticism and very strong opposition
from other claimants, particularly New Zealand and the United
Kingdom.
43 IAATO — the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators;
ASOC — the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition.
44 Malaysia acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in October 2011.
45 These meetings were held in December 2009 and in April 2010,
respectively. See www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_meetings.aspx?lang=e
 (accessed 3 December 2010).
46 See, among others, discussion in O. S. Stokke and D. Vidas (eds).
Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the
Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1996.
47 CCAMLR, Report of The Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission,
Hobart, Australia 21 October-1 November 2002.
48 M. Haward, “The Law of the Sea Convention and the Antarctic Treaty
System: Constraints or Complementarity”, in Maritime Boundary
Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, S.-Y. Hong
and J. van Dyke (eds), Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp.
231–251.
49 M. Haward, D. R. Rothwell, J. Jabour et al., “Australia's Antarctic
Agenda”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60(3) (2006), pp.
439–456.
50 M. Haward, note 49.
51 M. Haward et al., note 50.
52 S. Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries, Wollongong Papers in
Marine Affairs No. 4, Wollongong, Centre for Maritime Policy,
University of Wollongong, 1995, p. 191.
53 P. Vigni, “Antarctic Maritime Claims: ‘Frozen Sovereignty’ and the
Law of the Sea”, in The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime
Delimitation and Jurisdiction, A. G. Oude Elferink and D. R. Rothwell
(eds), The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001, pp. 85–104.
54 C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea, Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1992.
55 J. Jabour, “High Latitude Diplomacy: Australia's Antarctic Extended
Continental Shelf”, Marine Policy 30(2) (2006), pp. 197–198.
56 M. Haward, note 49.
57 Ibid.
58 M. Haward and A. Bergin, “Vision not Vigilantism: Reply to Dodds
and Hemmings”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 56(4)
(2010), pp. 612–616.
59 The Guardian, 24 April 2009.
60 R. Tepper and M. Haward, “The Development of Malaysia's Position
on Antarctica: 1982–2004”, Polar Record, 41(217) (2005), pp. 113–
124.
61 Z. A. Sulong, “Question of Antarctica: Address by Permanent
Representative to the United Nations Tan Sri Zainal Abidin Sulong on
the ‘Question of Antarctica’ on November 28th, 1983”, Foreign
Affairs Malaysia 16(4) (1983), p. 446.
62 M. Haward, “Governance and Management of The Southern Ocean:
Approaching Assessments of Regime Effectiveness”, paper presented
at International Studies Association (ISA) Conference 2008, San
Francisco, 26–30 March 2008.
http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa08/index.php (accessed
9 August 2012).
63 International Whaling Commission, “Whale Sanctuaries”,
www.iwcoffce.org/conservation/sanctuaries.htm (accessed 3 August
2010).
64 Netherlands, Belgium, and France, “Biological Prospecting in the
Antarctic Treaty Area — Scoping for a Regulatory Framework”,
Working Paper 36, ATCM XXX, 2007.
65 M. Haward, et al., note 50.
66 H. R Hall and M. Haward, “Enhancing Compliance with International
Legislation and Agreements Mitigating Seabird Mortality on
Longlines”, Marine Ornithology, 28 (2001), pp. 183–190.
67 Ibid.
68 C. Joyner, “The International Ocean Regime at the New Millennium:
A Survey of the Contemporary Legal Order”, Ocean and Coastal
Management, 43 (2000), pp. 163–203.
69 Chaturvedi, Chapter 3, this volume.
70 Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty.
Part II
Antarctica and competing
foreign policy objectives
2 China's Antarctic interests

Anne-Marie Brady

China is entering a new phase in its engagement with Antarctica. During

China's most recent two Five-Year Plans (2006–2010 and 2011–2015) the
Chinese government significantly increased its expenditure on Antarctic
affairs from around US$20 million in 2003, to the current figure of around
US$55 million per annum, as well as investing in major new purchases such
as a US$300 million new icebreaker. China's increased spend is being used
to upgrade and extend China's Antarctic presence and, ultimately, to
increase China's Antarctic influence. In 2005 Chinese Antarctic scientists
successfully reached Dome A, one of the last great unexplored territories of
Antarctica. In the 2008–2009 austral summer, a Chinese construction team
began building a new base there, while other teams worked to upgrade
China's other two Antarctic stations. China is setting up a new polar
research and logistics base in Shanghai and, by 2014, they will be able to
use a new icebreaker and ice-capable planes, enabling Chinese researchers
to fly in to Antarctica, rather than go by boat. There is even talk of China
setting up a fourth Antarctic base.1
China was initially excluded from joining the Antarctic Treaty for
political reasons and was not able to join until 1983. However, China's
increased activities in Antarctica (as well as the Arctic) refect the country's
growing economic and political power and international ambitions. In the
past, China's polar programmes were restricted by a lack of available funds
and of scientists with polar expertise. However, since 2010, China has been
the world's second largest economy. The current global economic downturn
only accentuates China's economic importance. China now has a growing
pool of experienced polar scientists to draw on and a network of polar
research centres nationwide.
In order to better understand what this change in China's Antarctic
engagement means for other states, this chapter first surveys the range of
China's Antarctic capacities and interests. I will then examine the following
questions: Will China's increased investment in and engagement with
Antarctic affairs impinge on the interests of other Antarctic Treaty nations
or those who have not yet joined the Treaty but have expressed an interest
in the continent? Is China interested in challenging the status quo in the
balance of power in Antarctic governance or is it merely protecting its own
interests? The chapter places China's Antarctic involvement within the
context of its evolving domestic and foreign policy. It is based on a critical
review of contemporary Chinese social science writing on Antarctica,
articles in key Chinese government media outlets, interviews and
correspondence with Chinese and non-Chinese Antarctic specialists, and a
review of relevant secondary sources on Chinese foreign and domestic
policy.2

China's Antarctic organisations

China has a range of government organisations which participate in
Antarctic policymaking and the international governance of Antarctica. The
State Oceanic Administration (SOA) is the main government body engaged
in maintaining China's Antarctic (and Arctic) interests. Since 2008 SOA has
been under the direct leadership of the powerful Ministry of Land and
Natural Resources (Guojia ziyuanbu). Other government ministries dealing
with specifc aspects of China's Antarctic affairs such as the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs (Department of Treaties and Law), Fisheries, and Transport,
also participate in China's Antarctic policymaking and China's national
delegations to Antarctic governance meetings. The Chinese Advisory
Committee for Polar Research (Zhongguo jidi kaocha gongzuo zixun
weiyuanhui) is led by China's State Oceanic Administration, but has cross-
agency functions to advise all Chinese government departments with polar
interests. The committee is charged with advising the Chinese leadership
and bureaucracy on polar matters, organising scholarly conferences on polar
themes, and evaluating China's polar research programme and its outcomes.
Within the State Oceanic Administration is located the China Arctic and
Antarctic Administration (CAA), Guojia haiyangju jidi kaocha bangongshi.
CAA has around 40 personnel. It coordinates China's Antarctic research
nationwide, facilitates cooperation with other countries, and deals with
administrative matters regarding China's polar expeditions as well as its
membership in Antarctic Treaty organisations and committees. CAA also
supervises the Polar Research Institute of China (Zhongguo jidi yanjiu
zhongxin), which is located in Shanghai and is the logistics base for China's
polar expeditions. The Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) is China's
leading national organisation for polar-related research. In order to cope
with China's expanding polar interests the PRIC has steadily expanded in
the last few years to a total of 154 personnel; and it is still expanding. In
2012 PRIC advertised for 47 new staff members.3 PRIC main tasks are: (1)
leading China's polar research; (2) organising China's polar expeditions; (3)
arranging the logistics for the expeditions, which includes managing
China's polar bases, and maintaining the Chinese icebreaker, Xue Long (Ice
Dragon); and (4) data management and reporting on China's polar research.
Xue Long can carry approximately 250 personnel on polar expeditions. It
was purchased second hand from Ukraine and was upgraded in 2006. Xue
Long was originally designed as an Arctic cargo boat, which limits its
usefulness to China's polar programme. China's annual Antarctic
expeditions are called “Chinare”, followed by the number of that
expedition. In 2012 China completed Chinare 28, the 28th expedition of the
China polar programme. Apart from the PRIC, China's scientific
researchers engaged in Antarctic research are spread out over a wide range
of tertiary institutions and research centres all over the country.
The international linkages stemming from China's engagement in
Antarctica have proven very useful over time for improving China's
relations with a wide range of countries. Beginning in the 1980s and
carrying on up to the present day, China has developed an extensive
programme of international collaborations including with Canada, Chile,
France, Germany, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Romania,
Russia, the UK, and the USA. China's Antarctic links have not only been
proftable from a scientific point of view, they have also been a useful
platform for track-two diplomacy. Antarctica is governed in the name of
science, and it is through scientific activities there that countries can
legitimately be involved in decision-making about the continent's
governance and management of its resources. Thus, it is only natural that
Antarctic diplomacy is also frequently conducted via scientific cooperation.
As has been the case with other nations, these scientific exchanges almost
always continue regardless of other disagreements between the cooperating
countries; hence, whatever their scientific merit, they can serve as a useful
confidence-building exercise among nations.

China's Antarctic presence

China's first Antarctic base, Changcheng zhan (Great Wall Station), was
established on King George Island in Western Antarctica in 1984. This
station is at 62°S Lat., which is outside the polar circle. At the time, China
did not have the capabilities to build on the Antarctic continent. In summer,
the base can house up to 80 people, while in winter it houses up to 40;
however, in recent years its activities have been considerably scaled down.4
In the 2011–2012 season only 17 scientists went to work at the base in the
summer season and two were left behind to winter over. In the summer 15
support staff worked on the station and ten in the winter.5 China's second
base, Zhongshan zhan (Zhongshan Station), was set up in 1989 on the
eastern sector of the Larseman Hills close to a Russian base, Progress II.
According to a senior Chinese Antarctic affairs official, after China set up
this continental base, “[I]t was entitled to become a negotiating country of
the Antarctic Treaty, having a say in decisions relating to Antarc-tica.”6
Zhongshan Station is named after the father of modern China, Sun Zhong-
shan (Sun Yat-sen). In summer, this base can house up to 60 personnel,
while in winter it can house 25. In the 2011–2012 season it hosted only six
scientists in the summer and seven in the winter. They were supported by
28 logistics personnel in the summer, and ten in the winter.7 In the 2011–
2012 season at both Changcheng and Zhongshan Stations the numbers of
support personnel significantly outnumbered those conducting science.
During the 2006–2010 Five-Year Plan, Zhongshan Station was upgraded
and fitted with new research facilities and living quarters, doubling in size
from its original 2,700 square metres to 5,800 square metres.
 It should be noted that China, like all the major powers and many of the
rising states, is increasingly interested in the Arctic and this builds on and
adds to its Antarctic expertise and experience. In 1999 China launched its
first ever Arctic expedition in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, followed by a
second trek in 2003. In 2004, China set up a compact new polar research
site, the tiny Arctic Yellow River Station (Beiji Huanghe zhan), at Ny-
Ålesund, a hub for international arctic research in Norway.8 Chinese Arctic
scientific teams now visit the base annually. In 2012 China negotiated with
Iceland to set up a second Arctic base, on farmland close to the Icelandic
port town Akureyri.
China's third Antarctic base, Kunlun Station on Dome A, was officially
opened in February 2009. The early phase of the base cost 250 million
renminbi (US$37 million).9 The station currently has a floor space of 236
square metres and during the current Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) it will be
expanded to 500 square metres. At present the station can accommodate
from 15 to 20 personnel. In the 2011–2012 season eight scientists worked at
Kunlun Station.10 Kunlun Station can be used for deep ice core drilling,
glaciology, astronomy, atmospheric science, weather observation, and
studying the geology of the Gamburtsev mountain range that lies beneath
the ice cap. Initially, the base will be a summer-only station, although in the
long run it will be developed as an all-year base. The base is currently only
open for two weeks a year, as it takes one month via traverse from
Zhongshan Base to Kunlun and back again.
The choice of name for the station is significant. Although Kunlun is an
actual place in China, it also has mythical associations deeply rooted in
Chinese culture. According to tradition, Kunlun Mountain is a Daoist
paradise, a place where communication between humans and gods is
possible. The actual location of the Kunlun Range, on the northern
boundary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, marks the outer limits of the
old Chinese empire. The new base name was selected by a committee of
Chinese polar experts, from over 3,000 possibilities sent by members of the
Chinese public. “Kunlun” was chosen as it is both the name of an actual
mountain in China, and has “deep cultural associations in China”.11 Kunlun
Base in Antarctica offers China unprecedented visibility for astronomical
research12 — dialogue with the “gods”.
China in Antarctica: the early years
China could well have been one of the founding signatories to the Antarctic
Treaty if had not been for Cold War politics. The groundwork for putting
together the Antarctic Treaty was forged during the 1957–1958
International Geophysical Year, which launched a programme of
international collaboration on polar research. The People's Republic of
China (PRC) expressed an interest in being involved in the IGY, but it was
explicitly excluded from participating in both activities due to unresolved
issues over diplomatic recognition of the new state and the USA's
objections to the participation of “Red China”.13 China began to develop its
own “Antarctic strategy” as early as the mid-1960s.14However, China's own
domestic turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s was a further factor in Beijing not
following up its initial expression of interest in polar affairs. In the late
1970s as part of the strategic triangle forged between the USA and its allies
against the Soviet Union, Antarctic programmes in Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States helped China to develop polar expertise by inviting
Chinese scientists to join their expeditions and offering doctoral
scholarships to Chinese students. Thanks in no small part to such help, in
1983 China acceded to the Antarctic Treaty and it launched its own
expedition to the Antarctic continent in 1984. China became a consultative
party to the Treaty in 1985, and joined the Scientific Committee for
Antarctic Research (SCAR) in 1986. At the time it joined the Treaty, China
had 35 scientists working in various international expedition teams on the
Antarctic continent. Having the PRC join the Antarctic Treaty was not just
advantageous for Beijing; it was also a coup for Treaty members because it
kept China from lending its support to the anti-Treaty movement led by
Malaysia.15
Scientific activities are the main means to influence norms and garner
prestige and legitimacy in Antarctic governance. Hence in the period from
1989 to 2004 China steadily focused on improving the quality of its
Antarctic science and gradually increased its Antarctic spend. In the 1990s,
China's Antarctic strategy was adjusted to a consolidating, rather than
expansionist, phase. China shifted its priorities into building a meaningful
scientific research programme in Antarc¬tica. However, expanding
Antarctic research to anything like US or UK levels was hampered by a
lack of funds; and this slowed the pace of China's Antarctic efforts for a
number of years. Nonetheless, steady progress was made in this period, in
tandem with China's slow but steady economic growth.

China's steps up its Antarctic activities

At precisely 3:16 a.m. (Beijing time) on 18 January 2005, a team of
Chinese polar explorers “conquered” the peak of Dome A (also known as
Dome Argus). Dome A was the last geologically signifcant unexplored
territory of Antarctica.16 It is located in East Antarctica, on Australia's 42
per cent territorial claim. The expedition was China's fourth attempt to
reach the dome (the first was in 1996); it had taken close to ten years to
achieve the goal.17 China's successful expedition to Dome A marks the
beginning of a new phase in its Antarctic engagement. Later in the same
year, a Chinese expedition spent 130 days exploring the Grove Mountains,
some 400 kilometres from Zhongshan Station. Like other explorers before
them, the Chinese expedition recorded its presence by naming the various
points of geological signifcance they observed, with names such as Gui
shan (Turtle Mountain), She shan (Snake Mountain), and Xi Hu (Western
Lake), refecting Chinese tradition and history.18 As a result of these two
successes, Chinese scientists can now claim to be polar explorers. This new
status is symbolised by the right to name Antarctic locations and is
understood in Chinese sources as signiflying an important shift in China's
political standing in Antarctic affairs.19
Also in 2005, Zhang Zhanhai, formerly director of the Polar Research
Institute in Shanghai, was elected to a two-year term as vice president of
SCAR, an important “eyes and ears” role and a first for China.20 That was
also the year when two China-based scholars, Li Shenggui and Pan Min,
urged Chinese social scientists to pay greater attention to researching
Antarctic issues. They stated that up until this point China had focused
attention on the “hard” sciences while neglecting the important role of
social science in exploring and articulating China's Antarctic agenda. The
authors asserted that this “neglect has been restricting China's voice, rights
and interests” in international Antarctic affairs and infuencing the country's
international status, making it too passive.21 Since the authors' rallying cry,
there has indeed been a steady increase in Chinese social science publishing
on Antarctica, compared with the output of previous years. This new
emphasis is directly encouraged by senior government leaders, and the
outcomes are now being utilised in China's policymaking on Antarctic
issues.22
In the last ten years China has been taking an ever more active role in
Antarctic affairs and greatly expanding its presence there. In 2004 Wei
Wenliang, a Vice Director in the China Arctic and Antarctic Administration,
boasted that China's scientific achievements in Antarctica meant that China
“will soon catch up the developed countries”.23 Certainly in terms of budget
increases in Antarctic activities, in a very short time, China has made rapid
progress. In the period from 1983 to 2003, China spent 900 million yuan
(around US$110 million) on its annual Antarctic research.24 Yet in 2005–
2008, China spent 500 million yuan (in 2010 figures around US$60 million)
just to upgrade its existing Antarctic bases.25 Meanwhile China's annual
expenditure for Antarctic activities in the period from 2005 to 2010 was
around 300 million yuan (in 2010 figures US$44 million). This is more than
twice what was spent on an annual basis in the previous Five-Year Plan.26
Pursuant to the 11th Five-Year Plan, from 2006 to 2010, China spent around
500 million yuan (in 2004 figures US$64 million) to: refurbish Zhongshan
and Changcheng Stations; set up Kunlun Zhan (Kunlun Station) at Dome A
over two austral summers, 2008–2010; reft the icebreaker Xue Long; and
establish a dedicated berth for the icebreaker and warehouse space in
Shanghai.27
In the current polar Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) by my calculations28
China will spend approximately 350 million yuan (in 2012 figures US$55
million) per annum in Antarctica. This figure includes the cost of annual
expeditions to Antarctica, the running costs of PRIC and CAA, and
dedicated research funds available for Antarctic research. This figure
excludes other research funds available to China's Antarctica researchers
and one-off expenditures such as the new icebreaker. China's increased
Antarctic spend can be tracked by the increase in amounts spent on
Antarctic expeditions: in the 2005–2010 period China had 50 million yuan
to spend (US$7 million), while in 2011 it spent 100 million yuan (US$15
million). China's investment in new Antarctic facilities in the next five
years will be substantial: a second icebreaker, a Basler ice-capable plane,
helicopters, a new polar campus in Shanghai and so on. China's one (and
signifcant) weakness of its increased polar spend is that the funds available
for its Antarctic research do not yet match the capacity and promise of the
new hardware.
According to a statement by Chen Lianzeng, the Deputy Head of the
China Arctic and Antarctic Administration, in June 2011, the overall goal of
China's latest five-year polar plan is to increase China's “status and
influence” in polar affairs in order to better protect China's “polar rights”.29
I will leave my thoughts on the Arctic aspect of Chen's quote for further
publication. But what impact might Chen's comments mean in the context
of Antarctic governance? Though Antarctic governance is ruled by
consensus there are dominant players: those who have greater physical
presence (the USA and in the Cold War years the Soviet Union); those who
publish the most policy papers (the UK, Australia, New Zealand); those
who are the most politically active on ATS committees or on new
challenges to Antarctic governance (New Zealand, France, and Australia
over the issue of mining in Antarctica); and those who form informal blocs
of like-minded states (Australia, New Zealand, the UK, USA, and Chile).30
China's stated desire to acquire greater “status and influence” in Antarctic
affairs might be established through a range of means, which include
increasing its physical presence in Antarctica, holding leadership positions
in Antarctic bodies, engaging in leading Antarctic research, taking a
leadership role on important issues such as environmental management, and
making a major investment in Antarctic capacity. In the following section I
will evaluate China's current progress on these aspects.

China's Antarctic ambitions versus current abilities

So far, China's main achievement in terms of gaining increased status and
influence in Antarctic affairs has been the kudos associated with its
budgetary increases and increased physical presence there. China now has
three bases and sends a reasonable number of its researchers to Antarctica.
It now also has the technology to send data back to China-based
researchers, avoiding the need for many personnel to go there at all. Yet
when it comes to high-profile research, China is still a long way behind
other countries in terms of both its contribution of policy papers to
Antarctic decision-making bodies and citation rates for its Antarctic
research. We can expect this to change over time, as Chinese scientists take
advantage of their improved research facilities and resources. However,
research outputs take a lot longer to develop than new infrastructure — and
China is currently making major investments in hardware and
comparatively small investments into research.
With few exceptions, China is also not yet stepping up to take on more
leadership roles within any of the various Antarctic governance bodies with
the Antarctic Treaty System commensurate with its increased level of
investment there. This is quite probably due to acute shortages of senior
personnel with the requisite high-level English (the common language of
Antarctic governance meetings) language skills, as well as scientific and
policymaking expertise. It may also be due to China's post-1989 cautious
foreign policy strategy (see more below). China will need to invest in better
foreign-language training for its highlevel Antarctic representatives if it
wants to increase its status and influence in Antarctic governance by means
of greater participation in the various committees of Antarctic governance.
In a 2004 study comparing Antarctic research output of various countries
China's was ranked lower than Italy or South Africa's scientific
contribution.31China's early Antarctic research was “symbolic”, meaning
that it mostly served political ends, rather than scientific ones, thus the low
ranking for its Antarctic science in this study confirms this.32 Eight years
later a 2012 study which used the numbers of scientific working papers and
information papers submitted by various ATCPs as a measure for the level
of influence the various states might have in Antarctic governance showed
that the impact factor of Chinese Antarctic research has not only not
improved, in terms of ranking it has been overtaken by much smaller
states.33 Like many states engaged in Antarctica, China's Antarctic
programme is not just about answering scientific questions; it is as much, if
not more, about maintaining China's national interests.34 As Chinese polar
scholar Guo Peiqing notes, regardless of the scientific signifcance of
research in Antarctica, engaging in this research and launching expeditions
are ways for China (and other nations) to maintain a political presence on
the continent.35 However, if China really does need to improve its “status
and influence” in Antarctic affairs, it will have to shift the focus of its spend
and activities from “presence” to high-level scientific research.
 Coming up with high-impact research takes time, expertise, and
sometimes a bit of good luck. Although China's Antarctic science is not yet
as high-profile or widely cited as its Antarctic policymakers would no doubt
wish, the new initiatives of the last decade do have the potential to take
China's research to a new level. The ice underneath Dome A is over 3,000
metres thick; and researchers predict that through drilling for ice cores
China could push back current knowledge about the earth's climate record
to up to 1.5 million years ago. Dome A is also a prime location for engaging
in deep space research. China is also very active in meteorite collection, and
the Gamburtsev Mountains, which are close to China's Zhongshan station,
are a good location for this research. China will be in charge of all research
efforts at Dome A, working in collaboration with teams of international
researchers. The research outcomes could well be ground-breaking, giving
China an unprecedented opportunity to jump ahead in its efforts to garner
international recognition for Chinese Antarctic scientific research and thus
gain greater status and influence there.
Although China is not yet meeting its goal of increasing influence and
status in Antarctica, its various projects toward that goal are very useful in
the domestic context. China's Antarctic programme is heavily promoted to
Chinese-language audiences as part of ongoing political education efforts.
The stress on China's Antarctic triumphs boosts government legitimacy and
distracts the population from more pressing issues such as unemployment
and social inequity. Hence, in addition to their scientific duties, leading
Chinese Antarctic scientists are given the task of promoting their research
in thousands of talks to Chinese youth. The stated aim of these talks is to
teach Chinese youth to “love science” and “love their country”.36 PRIC has
a ten million renminbi (US$1.5 million) budget for these activities.37
The Chinese media is also heavily involved in this endeavour. The
Chinese government requires the domestic media to “guide public opinion”
(zhidao yulun) on certain issues.38 China's Antarctic expeditions have
always been incorporated into the government's ongoing mass persuasion
activities. The first Chinese Antarctic expedition was commemorated with a
television documentary announcing, “Antarctica Here We Come!” (Nanji
women lai le!).39 Watching this documentary one gets a strong sense to
what extent national pride, then as now, plays in China's desire to work in
Antarctica. China's increased engagement in Antarctica has been matched
by a big push to promote Chinese public awareness of China's Antarctic
activities as well as on the political issues surrounding Antarctica (and the
Arctic) and the government's strategy for dealing with them. A CCTV
(China Central Television) camera crew was part of China's 17-man team to
conquer Dome A in 2005 and provided live coverage of the successful
expedition. China's polar bureaucrats are well aware of the need to convince
the government and Chinese public about the importance of China's polar
programme; in order to attract the funding they need to sustain its recent
growth.40

The Taiwan factor in China's Antarctic activities

As it is in many other aspects of Chinese diplomacy, Taiwan has been a
factor in China's involvement in Antarctica. In the 1950s, the USA was
allied with Taiwan (as the ROC) and supported it in its efforts to lock the
PRC out of international organisations. It was US opposition to
“unrecognised Communist regimes” that helped bar China from being an
early Treaty signatory.41 China joined the Antarctic Treaty in 1983 in a
period when the PRC was taking over the China seat from the ROC in a
wide range of international organisations. For Chinese political leaders,
joining the Antarctic Treaty was initially more about the PRC's need for
international recognition and status than about pursuing serious science.
The political side to China's Antarctic science was adumbrated early on,
when from 1988 the PRC made use of its Antarctic activities to invite
Taiwanese and Hong Kong scientists to participate in joint projects.42 Such
exchanges continue up to the present day. In early 2009 at the end of the
2008–2009 austral summer, the Xue Long made a “courtesy” call to Taiwan,
before returning to the Chinese Mainland. During the 2009–2010 austral
summer, three Taiwanese scientists participated in China's annual Antarctic
exploration. These activities are all part of current cross-Taiwan Strait
bridge¬building efforts.
In 2005 Taiwanese legal scholar Li Ming-juinn wrote that as a sovereign
state, the ROC is entitled to apply to join the Antarctic Treaty and may try
to do so in future.43 Taiwanese scientists have been engaged in Antarctic
research for many years, so the ROC could conceivably apply to be a
consultative party in the Treaty. Thus far, the ROC has made no formal
attempts to join the Antarctic Treaty. But in 2006, Taiwan applied to
become an observer at the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).44 There are no Taiwan boats fishing
legally in the Southern Ocean (though some may have been involved in
illegal fishing in the past). However, CCAMLR signatory countries were
lukewarm on the issue of Taiwan becoming an observer. They did not want
to offend China because of the “One China” principle the PRC insists on.
China acceded to CCAMLR in 2006 and became a full consultative
member in October 2007.45 Previously, PRC boats had been involved in
illegal fishing activities in the Southern Ocean.46 As a result, countries such
as New Zealand and Australia, whose territories border on the Southern
Ocean, were keen for the PRC to join CCAMLR and come under its
jurisdiction.47 It is signifcant that China's membership in CCAMLR does
not include Hong Kong. This is probably because the former colony is the
main base of multinational fishing company Pacific Andes, which through
its own activities and those of its subsidiaries is heavily implicated in the
illegal fishing of the highly endangered Pat-agonian Toothfish.48 When it
joined CCAMLR, China declared that its membership would not include
Hong Kong.49 This is perfectly legal according to the Hong Kong Special
Autonomous Region's unique status in the Chinese polity, which permits
Hong Kong to establish and maintain a separate international legal
personality from the PRC's.50 However, the fact that Beijing has not made
more efforts to urge Hong Kong to sign up with CCAMLR shows that
China is not as serious about dealing with illegal fishing issues in the
Southern Ocean as its membership might imply.
It appears Taiwan's interest in obtaining observer status in CCAMLR was
the main impetus to China's decision to join. This is a familiar pattern that
has occurred in countless international organisations. The lack of
cooperation from the Chinese government in August 2007, when four
Chinese vessels were caught fishing illegally in the Southern Ocean, was a
symptom of this situation. During this incident, in contravention of the
norms of CCAMLR, the Chinese government refused permission for
Australian fisheries offcers to board the four vessels and inspect them.51
However, since that low point, Beijing has in fact been fairly cooperative in
bringing Mainland Chinese illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean under
control, although the problem of Hong Kong remains unresolved. Chinese
scholars have even been studying the Australian approach to illegal fishing
control and the lessons China can learn from it.52 China now has a fishing
quota from CCAMLR to fish for krill in the Southern Ocean and its
scientists are assisting in research efforts to monitor fish stocks there.53
When it comes to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, it appears that as with
other international organisations, it is still better to have China inside the
tent than out.

Chinese scholars' critique of the Antarctic Treaty System

In the past, China was quiescent on the political status quo in Antarctica
and the management of resources there. However, an underlying theme of
the current phase of China's engagement in Antarctica is dissatisfaction
with the existing order and a different set of views on resource extraction
than those of many other Antarctic stakeholders. These alternative
perspectives are mostly still being expressed publicly through Chinese-
language publications, both scholarly and journalistic. So far, there is a
clear disjunction between official statements and policy debates in Chinese.
Although Chinese officials may have expressed concerns about the status
quo in Antarctica in conversation, the requirements of governance
necessitate that Beijing work within the existing structures and follow the
current policies of the ATS. However, these scholarly debates should not be
ignored. They refect the fact that China has concerns about some aspects of
the Treaty and is allowing Chinese scholars to explore various options. In
the China context, where social science is closely supervised within
parameters set by the CCP, situations with this kind of disjunct between
official foreign policy and scholarly discourse should be regarded as “watch
this space”. In the following section I will summarise some of the
contemporary critiques of Antarctic governance espoused by leading
Chinese polar social scientists, whose work informs polar policymaking in
China.
In Chinese-language sources, leading Chinese Antarctic specialists are
extremely critical of the ATS. Some describe it as a “rich man's club” (furen
de julebu)54 or a zone for “collective hegemony” (jiti baquan),55 and assert
that in the past China has been a “second class citizen” (er deng gongmin)
within the Treaty.56 Despite being an Antarctic Treaty partner since 1983,
Chinese scholars portray China as on the outer rim of the ATS power
structure. In theory, Antarctica is owned by no one and open to all nations.
But economic limitations effectively exclude most of the developing world
and many middle-income countries, and the best Antarctic locations for
research bases and resource exploitation were long ago taken by earlier
Antarctic powers. Moreover, as Dudeney and Walton's 2012 paper
indicates, policy debates in Antarctica are dominated by the countries who
submit working papers to ATS meetings and China is producing very little
of these.57 Because of this, China, like many other ATCPs, can only resist
new initiatives, not set the agenda.
In a 2005 article discussing the political future of Antarctica, Yan Qide
and Hu Lingtai asserted that the Antarctic Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties (ATCPs), and Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings
(ATCMs) were still the best means to manage Antarctica. But they noted
that the question of who actually owns Antarctica remained unresolved and
is an issue that will not go away.58 The official position of the China Arctic
and Antarctic Administration is that is that Antarctica's sovereignty is not
determined.59
Some social scientists have advocated that the UN should have an
increased role in Antarctica, but Guo Peiqing asserts that the UN is
“powerless” in Antarctica and is not the right body to resolve any
disputes.60 Guo is one of many voices urging China to take a much more
active role in Antarctica, both to defend its existing interests and to keep up
with the activities of other Antarctic nations. According to Guo, the impact
of ever-increasing numbers of tourists visiting Antarctica, as well as the
perceived weakness of measures to deal with breaches of environment
protocols, are among several reasons why Antarctica needs to be governed
by a set of international laws covering all nations, not just signatories to the
ATS.61
In the course of this research, I spoke with numerous Chinese polar
scientists and policymakers. Many regard the tougher environmental
protections required for Antarctic activities and the setting up of Antarctic
Specially Managed Areas as a ruse to maintain the assets of more-
established powers there.62 An article in the semi-offcial periodical
Liaowang noted that these changes in the environmental regulations “had
made the struggle over resources in Antarctica all the more complicated,
more covert, and more extreme”.63 The article noted that the skirmish over
Antarctic resources was being waged through scientific, diplomatic, and
legal measures, rather than through force, and said mineral exploration is
continuing, disguised as scientific activity. The article asserts that the
current ATS is unfair to developing countries that lack the resources to
engage in scientific research. Engaging in Antarctic scientific research is
the means by which a non-claimant nation attains a governance role in
Antarctica.
However, China's central critique of the ATS revolves around the issue of
the distribution of resources. Deciding who can control polar resources is a
matter of global political and economic importance. As an energy-hungry
nation, China is extremely interested in the resources of Antarctica (and the
Arctic) and any possibilities for their exploitation. The notion of
“resources” has a broad meaning in the Antarctic context. It could include
minerals, meteorites, the intellectual property of Antarctic bioprospecting,
locations for scientific bases, marine living resources, and access to the
continent for Antarctic tourism. Chinese-language polar social science
discussions are dominated by debates about Antarctic resources and how
China might gain its share; and mostly they are referring to access to
mineral resources.64 Such discussions are virtually taboo in the scholarly
research of more-established Antarctic powers. Nowadays (it was not
always the case), scholars in those countries tend to focus on preserving the
environmental heritage of Antarctica and the Southern Oceans. Yet, as Guo
Peiqing rightly points out, “No nation or Antarctic researcher has ever
negated the possibility that Antarctic resources could be utilized.”65 Zhu
Jiangang, Yan Qide, and Ling Xiao-liang assert that the main reason various
nations are engaged in Antarctic research is to fnd a way to get access to the
riches there.66 Numerous newspaper reports in Chinese have alleged that
some countries are already prospecting in Antarctica, under the cover of
scientific research.67
These days Chinese foreign policy is dominated by the quest to acquire
more resources.68 In Chinese-language debates, social and hard science
scholars, government offcials, and journalistic commentators all appear to
agree that the exploitation of Antarctica is only a matter of time and that
China should prepare itself. China's preparations include ramping up its
scientific research as well as investing in relevant social science research. A
section on the website managed by the Polar Research Institute of China to
publicise Chinese polar science features a series of maps outlining Antarctic
resources, including oil reserves off the coast of Antarctica.69 It does not
breach the Antarctic Treaty to create such a map, but it does send a signal of
interest which other states avoid. The focus of the maps on oil reserves in
the seas surrounding the Antarctic coastline puts a new light on China's
strident and antagonistic response in 2007 to the UK and six other Antarctic
sovereignty claimants setting in place the paperwork for future claims to
sea-bed rights in Antarctica to the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf. China does not recognise territorial claims in Antarctica
and regards the sovereignty status of Antarctica as unresolved. Hence in
2007 Beijing accused the UK of using the International Law of the Sea to
gain non-sovereignty-related rights in Antarctica.70
The China Arctic and Antarctic Administration's Antarctic oil map and
other resource-related maps were produced as part of a wider government-
sponsored research project on China's marine resources, the 908 Project.
The existence of the maps implies that China is likely preparing for the
eventuality that global oil shortages may lead to a change in the current ban
on oil extraction in Antarctica. Currently there are many technical
challenges involved in oil exploitation in the seas off Antarctica. However,
in 2012 China signed an agreement with Iceland to cooperate in Arctic oil
exploration;71 if it is possible to overcome the hurdles of oil extraction in
the Arctic, then Antarctic oil extraction one day would also be technically
feasible — though currently it is banned under the Protocol on Environment
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. The ban on mining can only be changed
by consensus, but who can predict how states might vote in the future?
According to the International Energy Agency, global peak crude oil
production was reached in 2006.72 In the years to come, China is certainly
not going to be the only country interested in revisiting the question of
Antarctic mining.
Beijing needs to develop the specialist knowledge that will enable
China's representatives at Antarctic forums to defend its interests during
any future change in Antarctic governance. Previously China did not have
the economic and technical ability to exploit such resources, so the ban on
mineral exploitation suited its interests. However, according to a 2006 paper
written by PRIC-based policy analysts, China aims to be poised to take
advantage of any opportunities to exploit the resources of Antarctica —
with trained personnel and infrastructure in place.73 China's interest in
Antarctic resources is inevitably going to cause tension with other nations.

China's increased engagement in Antarctica and current

foreign policy
China's efforts to increase its engagement and presence in Antarctica are in
tune with recent debates among some Chinese foreign policy scholars who
want Beijing to engage in a more active foreign policy overall. In 1989,
after the Chinese government was shunned on the international scene
following the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, Party senior
leader Deng Xiaoping set a new strategy for Chinese foreign policy of
“hiding our strength, biding our time, and doing what we can” (tao guang,
yang hui, you suo zuo wei). China's overall foreign policy strategy of the
1990s was to consolidate and keep a low profile. However, beginning in
1999 after the US bombing of Kosovo, Chinese foreign policy moved to an
“active defensive position”.74 This meant that China would become
proactive in both political and economic affairs in order to combat
perceived strong attacks from the West on both fronts. In the early 2000s, as
China's economic and political power grew, Chinese scholars debated the
relevance of Deng Xiaoping's 1989 maxim. In 2008 the Chinese foreign
policy line was adjusted to focus on the more proactive “do what we can”
(you suo zuo wei) aspect of Deng's foreign policy rule.75 Beijing is on the
brink of moving from a defensive to a more proactive approach in its
overall foreign policy. Its expanded activities in Antarctica and stated desire
for more “status and infuence” to defend “polar rights” refect this.
China's resurgence is often viewed negatively by Western analysts as the
“China Threat”. Some commentators fear China as a rising power because
of the nature of its political system, which is at odds with the dominant
liberal democratic model of the current leading global powers. Journalistic
comment is frequently similarly negative. A 2007 article on the BBC
website made the (spurious) connection between China's announcement that
it was going to construct a new inland base in Antarctica and the
controversial announcement that the UK and Chile planned to claim the
parts of the Antarctic sea bed that relate to their territorial claims on the
continent.76 Online commentary about China's Antarctic interests reveals
comment after comment tinged by hostility and suspi-cion.77 A 2011 report
by an Australian researcher which highlighted the potential threat China's
increased Antarctic interests posed to Australia's Antarctic claim was
widely cited in the international media.78 Since the events of 1989, the
Chinese government has suffered from an international image problem.
From the point of view of China's foreign critics, the recent drive to expand
activities in the Antarctic only increases that negative perception.
Will China's increased engagement in Antarctica threaten the governance
structure there? The Antarctic Treaty sets out to manage Antarctica in the
interests of peace and science; and all disputes are meant to be resolved by
consensus.79 As noted, the requirements of governance in Antarctica
necessitate that Beijing work within the existing governance structures and
follow the current policies of the ATS. The only alternative to this is leaving
the Treaty, a step China is unlikely to take. So inevitably, China's increased
engagement in Antarctic affairs will require cooperating with the other
Antarctic states and gaining a consensus for any policy change. So far the
Chinese government's current behavior in the various forums of the ATS is
similar to its behavior in many other multilateral organizations and
international regimes: it may not like the current order but it prefers to work
within that order to bring about the change it ultimately seeks.
This is why, while recent Chinese-language scholarly and media analysis
of the ATS have been openly critical, in international meetings Beijing has
continued its offcial acquiescence to the status quo in Antarctic
management. Where China has expressed an alternative point of view, it has
only been with regard to defending its own interests. At the 2007 ATCM in
New Delhi, China was very assertive. It rejected attempts by Australia and
other concerned nations to issue a resolution criticising illegal fshing in
Antarctic waters. China's delegate stated that IUU fshing could not be
discussed at the ATCM.80 The fnal report of the meeting diplomatically
recorded these conficts: “consensus could not be reached”.81
 However, at the next ATCM in 2008 in Kiev, China's delegates were in a
more cooperative frame of mind, keen for approval of their plans to build a
base at Dome A. The only objection they raised was to wording in the
feedback on China's plan that it “met requirements in most respects”. It
appears that on this question, China wanted unqualifed support for its new
base.82 This debate was not recorded in the fnal report, refecting the
Antarctic tradition that stresses consensus at all costs.83 According to the
formal records of the Kiev meeting, China took a very low profile,
providing only factual information on its activities in Antarctica and not
contributing to debates on sensitive issues such as bio-prospecting or
regulating tourism.84

Conclusion
China's increased Antarctic engagement is part of “China's rise” in the
global community. When any shift of power occurs, there is sure to be some
tension; there may even be open confict. China is emerging from being a
medium power to becoming a major power in the global system. It is even,
in some parts of the world, becoming a dominant force. However, when it
comes to Antarctica, despite its signifcant increases in spending, China is
still only a medium power and, in terms of setting the policy agenda, it is as
yet a minor power. The balance of power in Antarctica would have to shift
enormously for China to challenge US physical dominance there (if this is
in fact a goal) and the dominance of states such as Australia, the UK, and
New Zealand in setting the policy agenda.
China's emergence as a new leading player on the world stage — in
Antarctica as elsewhere — is not (yet) about challenging existing powers.
Rather, Beijing's behaviour to date in Antarctica refects the Chinese
government's ongoing efforts to act in ways commensurate with the
country's new global status and to use its increased fnancial resources to
extend its international infuence and protect its national interests. National
pride is also a big factor in China's increased engagement. As a country
which was once great, and is returning to a prominent position on the world
stage, China has a lot to prove. Antarctica is a site where China can
demonstrate its regained strength to domestic audiences, as well as
international ones.
 China's behaviour in Antarctic affairs provides us with many clues to
better understand Beijing's attitude to the international system and to help
answer the debates over whether or not the government is a “reluctant
stakeholder” in current international arrangements and whether China will
continue to support current international norms and institutions as it
becomes more dominant. In China's Antarctic affairs there is a clear
disjunction between offcial statements and policy debates in Chinese.
Although Chinese offcials may be unhappy with the status quo in
Antarctica, the requirements of governance there necessitate that Beijing
work within the existing structures and follow the current policies of the
ATS. However, the scholarly policy debates should not be ignored. They
refect the fact that China wants change in some aspect of the international
order and it is exploring its options.
Despite the carping about the ATS in Chinese-language debates, China
does beneft from the way that Antarctic governance is currently managed.
There is very little oversight of states' behaviour there — technically any
state can inspect other countries' Antarctic bases but few devote the
resources to do this with any seriousness. Moreover, most states ignore the
legal requirement to make fully public all their Antarctic activities and
capabilities, while some ATCPs are engaging in very low-level Antarctic
research. Technically this should make them unsuitable to be consultative
states on the Treaty. This virtually non-accountable governance
environment is as amenable to China's interests in Antarctica as it is to
many other states. This situation is no doubt an important factor why, in a
situation where there is at present no possibility of changing the
international governance arrangements, China is publicly accepting of
them, meanwhile still continuing to pursue its own interests. The Chinese
government's current behaviour at the various forums of the ATS is similar
to its behaviour in many other multilateral organisations and international
regimes: it takes such benefts as it can from the existing order.

Notes
1. www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010–09/27/content_11351836.htm.
2. This paper expands on, and updates, information which was first
published as “China's Rise in Antarctica?” Asian Survey, 2010.
3. www.oiegg.com/viewthread.php?tid=1083149.
4. “Report of 21st Chinese National Antarctic Research Expedition,
2004–05”, Beijing: Chinese Advisory Committee for Polar Research,
2005.
5. www.scar.org/about/nationalreports/china/China_2011–12.pdf.
6. Wang Qian, “Twenty Years of Antarctic Research”, 3 November 2004,
china.org.cn, http://china.org.cn/English/2004/Nov/111106.htm.
7. www.scar.org/about/nationalreports/china/China_2011–12.pdf.
8. Polar Research Institute of China, “Zhongguo beiji zhan Huang He
jieshao” [An introduction to China's Arctic Yellow River Station],
Shanghai, 2006, www.pric.gov.cn/newinfo.asp?
sortid=4&subid=39&id=465.
9. Jane Qiu, “China Builds Inland Antarctic Base”, Nature (6 January
2009), www.nature.com/news/2009/090106/full/457134a.html.
10. www.scar.org/about/nationalreports/china/China_2011–12.pdf.
11. “Wo guo shouge nanji neidi kaocha zhan mingming Kunlun” [Our
nation's first continental station is named Kunlun], 16 October 2008,
Xinlang keji, http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2008–10–
16/09512513402.shtml.
12. Jane Qiu, “China Builds Inland Antarctic Base”.
13. Dian Olsen Berger, Deep Freeze: The United States, the International
Geophysical Year, and the Origins of Antarctica's Age of Science,
Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2006, pp. 38, 373.
14. Wang Qian, “Twenty Years of Antarctic Research”.
15. Wei-chin Lee, “China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet So Near”, Asian
Survey 30:6 (June 1990), p. 585. On China's first decades of Antarctic
research, see also Zou Keyuan, “China's Interests in and Policy toward
Antarctica”, in Bruce Davis and China's Antarctic interestsRichard
 Herr (eds), Asia in Antarctica, Canberra: Australian National
University Center for Resource and Environmental Studies, 1994.
16. Guan Xiaofeng, “Explorers Conquer ‘Inaccessible Pole’”, China
Daily, 18 January 2005.
17. “The Draft Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation for the
Construction and Operation of Chinese Dome A Station in
Antarctica”, Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) 6(a),
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Kiev, 2008.
18. Yu Dawei, “Nanji ‘sanji tiao’” [Triple jump in Antarctica], Caijing
[Finance], 16, 4 August 2008.
19. “‘Kongzi’, ‘Kangxi’, ‘Cao Xueqin’, deng you wangcheng wei nanji
zhongwen diming” [Confucius, Kang Xi, and Cao Xueqin, et al.
become Chinese Antarctic place names], Xinhua News Agency, 29
March 2006.
20. “Zhang Zhanhai churen nanji yanjiu kexue weiyuanhui” [Zhang
Zhanhai takes up a post at SCAR], Zhongguo haiyang bao [China
Ocean News], 1429, 20 March 2007,
www.soa.gov.cn/hyjww/jdsy/2007/03/20/1174381011512817.htm.
21. Li Shenggui and Pan Min, “Zhongguo nanji ruankexue yanjiu de yiyi,
xianzhuang yu zhanwang” [The signifcance, status quo, and prospect
of Antarctic soft science research], Jidi yanjiu [Chinese Journal of
Polar Research] 17:3 (September 2005), pp. 214–231.
22. Discussions at the Polar Research Institute in December 2009. See also
Zhang Jian-song, “Zhuanjia chengying zhengzhi nanji ziyuan
fenzheng, qi guo you guafen lingtu yaoqiu” [Experts call for facing up
to the struggle over Antarctic resources, seven countries put in a
request to carve up the territory], Liaowang [Outlook], 18 June 2007,
at http://news.sohu.com/20070618/n250625161.shtml.
23. Wei Wenliang of CAA quoted in, “China to Build 3rd Station in
Antarctica”, China Daily, 14 October 2004,
www.china.org.cn/english/scitech/109394.htm.
24. Wang Qian, “Twenty Years of Antarctic Research”.
25. Ibid.
26. The previous amount was “roughly 20 million” per annum. See “China
Takes Bold Steps into Antarctic's Forbidding Interior”, Science 306
(29 October 2004), p. 803;
www.ldeo.columbia.edu/~xyuan/xbt/NewsInScience.pdf.
27. Ibid.
28. Based on interviews and information available online.
29. http://news.hexun.com/2011–06–21/130754620.html.
30. Interview with Trevor Hughes, former head of NZ's Antarctic Policy
Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2 February 2009.
31. Prabir G. Dastidar and Olle Persson, “Mapping the Global Structure of
Antarctic Research Vis-à-vis Antarctic Treaty System”, Current
Science 89:9 (2004), pp. 1552–1554.
32. Zou Keyuan, “China's Interests in and Policy toward Antarctica”, p.
97.
33. John R. Dudeney and David W. H. Walton, “Leadership in Politics and
Science within the Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Research (2012), 31 11075
DOI: 10.3402/polar. v31i0.11075.
34. Yu Dawei, “Nanji ‘sanji tiao’”.
35. Guo Peiqing, “Nanji ziyuan yu qi ziyuan zhengzhi”, p. 70.
36. State Bureau of Survey and Mapping, “Zhongguo nanji cehui kexue
kaocha 22 nian chengjiu yu gongxian” [22 years of achievements of
China's Antarctic mapping], 2007,
www.sbsm.gov.cn/article/ztzl/jdch/jdch/200711/20071100027867.shtm
l.
37. Huigen Yang, “Developing China's Polar Research Capacity”, 6 March
2008,
www.sciencepoles.org/articles/article_detail/huigen_yang_developing_
chinas_polar_research_capacity/.
38. See Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and
Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefeld, 2008, p. 79.
 See the flm here:
39. http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMTkyNjAwNjQ=.html.
40. “Interview of Dr Huigen Yang, Director of PRIC and Leader of
Chinare”, www.
www.sciencepoles.org/articles/article_detail/interview_of_dr_huigen_
yang_director_of_the_polar_research_institute_of_chi/.
41. Dian Olson Belanger, Deep Freeze, pp. 38, 373.
42. China Arctic and Antarctic Administration, “Guoji jiaoliu yu hezuo”
[International exchange and cooperation], Beijing, 2008,
www.chinare.gov.cn/caa/gb_article. php?modid=06001.
43. Li Ming-juinn, “The Possibility of Taiwan's Participation in the
Antarctic Treaty”, Taiwan haiyang fa xuebao [Taiwan Ocean Law
Review] 4:1 (June 2005), pp. 73–99.
44. CCAMLR manages marine living resources in the seas around
Antarctica. It is part of the body of international law governing
Antarctica. A total of 32 nations have signed the convention.
45. CCAMLR, meeting notes, 2007,
www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/cr/07/i02.pdf.
46. Megha Bahree, “Blue Waters, Gray Areas”, Forbes, 12 November
2007; email, Antarctic Policy Unit (APU), New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (NZ MFAT), 14 September 2007,
APU/CHN, Part 3.
47. Email, APU, NZ MFAT, 18 July 2006, APU/CHN, Part 1.
48. Coalition of Legal Toothfsh Operators, “The Alphabet Boats: A Case
Study of Tooth-fsh Poaching in the Southern Ocean”, Hobart,
Tasmania, Australia, 2007,
www.colto.org/background_why_case_study.htm.
49. Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, “Port Visits of Vessels on
CCAMLR's IUU's [Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated] Vessels Lists:
Lessons on Port State Performance”, Washington, DC, 2009, p. 6,
www.krillcount.jp/CCAMLR2009/CCAMLR%20Ports%20performan
ce%20paper092709%20FINAL.pdf.
 See Roda Mushkat, One Country, Two International Legal
50. Personalities: The Case of Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1997.
51. Email, APU, NZ MFAT, 14 September 2007, APU/CHN, Part 3.
However, the following article demonstrates that some in the Chinese
fshing sector were sympathetic to requests to control IUU fshing: Lin
Zhifeng and Zhang Mei, “Nanji haiyang shengwu ziyuan yanghu
gongyue dui woguo nan dayang yuye de yingxiang” [The effect of
CCAMLR on Chinese distant water fsheries in the Southern Ocean],
Haiyang yuye [Ocean Fishing] 28:1 (2006). The 2007 contretemps is
more likely to be related to different branches of the Chinese
government having conficting interests over the issue of IUU.
52. Yuan Hua, Tang Jianhua, and Huang Shuolin, “Aodaliya kongzhi IUU
bulao de guojia cuoshi ji qi dui woguo yuye guanli de qishi” [Analyses
on Australian national action to deter IUU fshing and its illumination
for China's fsheries management], Shanghai shuichan daxue xuebao
[Shanghai Fisheries University Journal] 17:3 (2008).
53. www.imr.no/nyhetsarkiv/2011/januar/norsk-
kinesisk_krillsamarbeid_i_sorishavet/en.
54. Guo Peiqing, “Jidi zhengduo weihe xiaoyan zai qi” [Polar confict:
Why the smell of gunsmoke has returned], Liaowang 45 (November
2007);
http://gbl.chinabroadcast.cn/18904/2007/11/05/2165@1829761.htm.
55. Guo Peiqing, “Nanji bainian de zhengduo” [A hundred years of
fghting over Antarctica], 1 August 2007, Huanqiu [Global].
56. Yu, “Nanji ‘sanji tiao’”.
57. John R. Dudeney and David W. H. Walton, “Leadership in Politics and
Science within the Antarctic Treaty”.
58. Yan Qide and Hu Lingtai, “Nanji zhou zhengzhi qianjing qianxi”
[Analysing the political future of Antarctica], Jidi yanjiu 17:3
(September 2005), pp. 157–164.
59. www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/nk/733765.htm.
60. Guo Peiqing, “Lianheguo ‘wu quan’ guanxia de nanjizhou” [The
United Nations is powerless in the Antarctic Peninsula], Haiyang
shijie [Oceanic World] 12 (December 2006), pp. 34–37.
61. Guo Peiqing, “Nanji luyou guanli zhidu xingcheng milu” [An outline
of Antarctic tourism management], Zhonggong qingdao shiwei
dangxiao qingdao xingzheng xueyuan xuebao [Qingdao Party School
Journal] 6 (2006), pp. 45–48.
62. Discussions with Chinese polar offcials and scholars in Wuhan,
Shanghai, and Qingdao, December 2009, and Christchurch, January
2010.
63. Zhang Jiansong, “Zhuanjia chengying zhengzhi nanji ziyuan
fenzheng”.
64. See, for example, Yan Qide, “Nanji ziyuan yu guoji fenzheng” [The
international struggle for Antarctic resources], Kexue [Science] 43:4
(1991), pp. 261–272; Zhu Jiangang, Yan Qide, and Ling Xiaoliang,
“Nanji ziyuan fenzheng ji woguo de xiangy-ing duice” [The dispute of
Antarctic resources and our countermeasures], Jidi yanjiu 18:3 (2006),
pp. 17–22; Zou Keyuan, “Guifan weilai nanji kuanwu ziyuan kaifa
liyong de falu yuanze” [The legal principles behind standardizing the
future use of Antarctic mineral resources], Haiyang kaifa yu guanli
[Oceanic opening up and management] 3 (1994); Zou Keyuan, Nanji
kuanwu ziyuan yu guoji fa [Antarctic mineral resources and
international law], Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1996.
65. Guo Peiqing, “Nanji ziyuan yu qi ziyuan Zhengzhi” [Antarctic
resources and the politics of their management], Haiyang shijie 3
(2007), p. 71.
66. Zhu et al., “Nanji ziyuan fenzheng ji woguo de xiangying duice”, p.
215.
67. See, for example, “Beiji bingrong dui Zhongguo yiweizhe shenme”
[What the melting of the North Pole means for China], cippe.net, 28
July 2008, http://news.cippe.net/news/10054.htm (this website collates
news for the Chinese petroleum industry); “Yingguo shuaixian
daoxiang nanji zhi zheng” [UK fres the first shot in Antarctic confict],
Xinhua, 22 October 2007.
68. See David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China's Global Hunt for Energy”,
Foreign Affairs 84:5 (September/October 2005), pp. 25–38.
69. http://908.chinare.org.cn:8088/njyq/.
70. “Yingguo shuaixian daoxiang nanji zhi zheng.”
71. www.fnancialpost.com/related/topics/China+Iceland+reach+deal+expl
oration+arctic+region/6495951/story.html.
72. “Is ‘Peak Oil’ Behind Us?,” New York Times, 14 November 2010.
73. Zhu et al., “Nanji ziyuan fenzheng ji woguo de xiangying duice”, p.
220.
74. Chen Junhong (ed.), Jiaqiang he gaijin sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo xuexi
duben [A reader of strengthening and reforming political thought
work], Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1999, p.
169.
75. “Xianggang wenhui bao: Zhongguo junshi ‘geng you zuo wei’” (Hong
Kong's Wen Wei Po newspaper: The Chinese military is “doing more
of what it can”), 4 January 2009,
www.chinanews.com.cn/hb/news/2009/01–04/1512366.shtml.
76. “China Bolsters Antarctic Posts”, 6 November 2007, BBC; see also
“China to Finish Interior Antarctic Station in 2009”, Reuters, 20 April
2008.
77. See, for example, Nature News,
www.nature.com/news/2009/090106/full/457134a.html; The Register,
www.theregister.co.uk/2006/03/30/china_antarctica/; Socialist
Courier, http://socialist-courier.blogspot.com/2007/11/chinese-in-
antarctica.html.
78. www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/06/08/Australia-must-re-assert-its-
infuence-in-Antarctica.aspx. China's People's Daily mentions the
report, without going into much detail:
http://news.cntv.cn/20110811/112276.shtml.
79. Antarctic Treaty, 1959, www.ats.aq/devAS/info_measures_list.aspx?
lang=e.
80. Interview with Trevor Hughes, New Zealand delegate to the 30th
ATCM, Wellington, 2 February 2009.
81. “Antarctic Treaty: Final Report of the Thirtieth Consultative Meeting”,
New Delhi (30 April–11 May 2007), p. 21.
82. Interview with Trevor Hughes.
83. Ibid.
84. An electronic version of this report is available on the ATS site, at
www.ats.aq/docu-ments/atcm_fr_images/ATCM31_fr001_e.pdf.
3 India and Antarctica

Towards post-colonial engagement?

Sanjay Chaturvedi

“India remains committed to scientific research and technical cooperation in

the Polar Regions. Antarctica being a common heritage of mankind and the
foremost symbol of peaceful use and cooperation needs to be protected for
poster-ity.”1 This is how India's then External Affairs Minister, Pranab
Mukherjee, chose to describe India's engagement with Antarctica at the
closing session of the XXX Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting
(ATCM), hosted by India in New Delhi, on 11 May 2007. The reference to
‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ might have prompted a mixed response.
On the one hand, it might have revived, with some measure of anxiety, the
memory of India's attempt to raise the ‘Antarctic Question’ at UN General
Assembly in the mid-1950s. On the other hand, it might have sounded
rather reassuring to those who still believe that India would (and should) act
as a major catalyst for critical post-colonial engagement with the southern
polar region, leading to a greater democratization of the Antarctic Treaty
System (ATS), including its knowledge-power interface, in the best interests
of entire humankind.
I have argued elsewhere2 that India's foreign policy today is characterized
by unprecedented pragmatism as well as cautious idealism. The realism is
rather visible in the growing appreciation in the corridors of power that as a
rising power in Asia and beyond, India's world view and self-image are due
for a thorough revision. The normative thrust relates to a critical
reassessment of the country's geopolitical location on the globe, especially
with regard to the Indian Ocean Region facing Antarctica. The much
overdue process of decolonizing the geographical imaginations inherited
from the colonial era as well as the Cold War can neither be arrested nor
reversed. However, according to some analysts, despite apparent change in
India's geopolitical vision, the foreign policy elite remains overwhelmed by
the demands posed by India's immediate challenges, especially those
emanating from its near neighbours. Conspicuous by its absence is a grand
strategy that could provide the nation's multiple policy strands a cohesive
form, consistency and orientation.3 Since India lacks a strategic culture,
institutionalization of the country's foreign policymaking has not been
possible.4 The link between the absence of institutionalization of India's
foreign policy and the absence of coherent Antarctic policy, even after three
decades of substantial scientific engagement with the Southern Polar
Region, calls for some serious thinking.
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) today finds itself at the crossroads
while gearing up to meet the challenge and dilemmas posed by the forces of
globalization as well as the ‘rise of Asia’ in the era of climate change and
scarcities.5 Correspondingly, the ethical, geopolitical and legal dimensions
of the so-called ‘Antarctic exceptionalism’ are now exposed to critical
scrutiny. Undoubtedly the normative considerations flowing from the
imperative of protecting and conserving polar attributes through Antarctic-
specific instruments of governance (i.e. the ATS) remain compelling in their
own right. These considerations also furnish a fair amount of legitimacy to
the trinity of knowledge-expertise-capacity (and related claims) of a group
of Antarctic Treaty powers to govern the Antarctic. However, the
geopolitics of exceptionalism, having remained instrumental all these
decades as a spatial-geographical strategy for deciding and dictating the
inside/outside of the Antarctic governance (both in terms of issue-areas and
membership) is now increasingly being questioned by the growing
penetration of Antarctica by the forces of globalization6
Whereas the old world order of Cold War ideological geopolitics has col-
lapsed, the new world order is yet to be born.7 Despite the uncertainties
associated with the state of geopolitical transition in the international
system, a period described by some as interregnum,8 there is no denying the
fact that Asia is ‘rising’. As the global geopolitical tectonic plates shift in
the course of the ‘Asian Century’,9 the two polar regions will also be
impacted in various ways. In my view it is worth exploring the extent to
which the rise of Asia, especially China and India, in global geopolitics is
also fnding its due place and the weight in the governance and management
of Antarctica, and in providing new interpretations and understandings of
its guiding values and norms. Whether the physical and scientific presence
of the Asian newcomers on Antarctica since the early 1980s is duly
matched by their geopolitical influence within the ATS deserves scrutiny.
My key intention in this chapter is to further broaden and deepen the
discus-sion on post-colonial engagement with Antarctica. Whereas my
overall focus remains on India's geopolitical engagement with the southern
polar region, I am particularly interested in exploring the overall prospects
of a post-colonial engagement with the Antarctic, where India remains a
major, but not the only, Asian Antarctic Treaty member that deserves
attention. The chapter begins with a brief refection on what does the term
‘post-colonial’ imply in the case of the Antarctic. The discussion then turns
to a brief comment on India's engagement with the ‘Question of Antarctica’
in the United Nations during the 1950s. This is followed by a section that
maps out the continuity and change in the geopolitical trajectory of India's
role in the ATS as a consultative member. I do so against the backdrop of a
persisting (perhaps even widening) mismatch between Asia's growing
physical-scientific presence on Antarctica and the knowledge-power-driven
geopolitical influence within the ATS, especially at the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings (ATCMs). After a brief discussion of the Indian
Ocean dimension of India's Antarctic engagement I conclude with the
argument that India, along with China, Korea and Malaysia, will have to
proactively engage with the increasingly complex and crowded agenda of
the ATCMs, especially the issue-areas of biological prospecting and climate
change, and failure to do so might result in wide-ranging implications for
both the ATS and the role that India is expected to play as a rising and
responsible power in world affairs.

Decolonization of Antarctica: conceptualizations and

contestations
In an important article on ‘post-colonial Antarctica’ Klaus Dodds10 raised a
number of issues that demand further critical attention of all those who
perceive a link (at times rather fuzzy) between the established claims
related to the authority-legitimacy effectiveness of the ATS and the need for
further ‘democratization’ of this regime in terms of both norms/values and
practices of governance. The first and foremost issue in the context of post-
colonial engagement with the southern polar region concerns the discursive
suspension of disputed territorial claims and counter-claims of sovereignty
on Antarctica (a continent larger than India and China combined) in Article
IV of the Antarctic Treaty. As Dodds put it,

The colonial map was effectively ‘frozen’ for the duration of the
Treaty – a ‘holding pattern’ was established. A short section of the
Antarctic Treaty (Article IV) was carefully drafted to ensure that
transition. But it also facilitated a form of historical amnesia, which
ensured that Treaty members would neither challenge nor substantiate
those territorial claims.11

The manner in which the symbolic-territoriality of the imperial-colonial

claims/rights in the challenging natural environment of the ‘white
continent’ has been defended, despite occasional questioning over half a
century – in a world that has witnessed various waves of decolonization and
the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa – invites attention to the
pivotal role played by the subtle but signifcant geographies of domination.
These have been negotiated through a science-diplomacy, conducted
through certain privileged languages, and sustained through the principle of
consensus dictated by the knowledge-power nexus. A carefully chosen
politics of ambiguity is also at play and suggests a rather para-doxical
situation where the ethically regressive colonial legacy enshrined in Article
IV of the Antarctic Treaty has come to be largely perceived as a geopolitical
guarantee against the unravelling of delicately maintained politico-legal
equilibrium and consequently of the entire political architecture of
governance. In short, this reveals how an apparently progressive legal
regime such as the ATS continues to be a hostage to the regressive, and of
late increasingly assertive, legacy of the imperial-colonial era. The
contradiction between the norms enshrined in the preamble to the Antarctic
Treaty (“Recognizing that it is in the best interest of all mankind that
Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord”,
emphasis given) and the indefinite geopolitical accommodation secured
through Article IV of the Treaty in the context of the Cold War (“Nothing
contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as a renunciation by any
Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica”) appears to have become increasingly
recalcitrant.
It is useful to be reminded that it was Walter Nash, then a leader of the
opposition party in New Zealand, who proposed the most radical
decolonization of Antarctica in January 1956.12 He went to the extent of
suggesting that New Zealand should consider abandoning its claim and
Antarctica should belong to the entire world. There was a stiff opposition to
his proposal from both within New Zealand and other claimant states. Nash
later on signed the Antarctic Treaty as Prime Minister of New Zealand.
Today, as Anne-Marie Brady points out in her contribution to this
collection, New Zealand “has a strong interest and a vital need to maintain
its foothold in Antarctica” and believes that “the current ATS is the most
effective and effcient means to maintain its interests in Antarctica”13 in
general, and the Ross Dependency in particular. New Zealand, given the
obvious geographical proximity to Antarctica, perceives a vital stake in the
security and stability of the southern polar regions and remains “fully
committed to maintaining its strategic interests there at almost any cost”.14
Among various pertinent issues raised by Dodds,15 that will continue to
generate scholarly debate for a long time, the one that interests me the most
for the purposes of this chapter relates to what he calls “the production of a
genuinely post-colonial engagement with Antarctica”16 against the
backdrop of hopes raised by the interventions by India and more recently
Malaysia to call “into question the ability and capacity of the ATCPs to
manage and know Antarctica”.17 With Malaysia having recently acceded to
the ATS are we not about to witness yet another round of the Antarctic
regime “co-opting the post-colonial critics?”18 Is the post-colonial
engagement with the ‘Question of Antarctica’ on a steep decline, if not
already over?
 The issue of “co-opting the post-colonial critics” deserves further
discussion and this is where some critical introspection on the part of the
so-called ‘co-opted’ countries is the need of the hour. Before proceeding
further on this issue, it is important to note the first exception to the rule
applied in the case of the Netherlands. One might wonder whether with the
entry of the Netherlands as an ATCP in 1990, the criterion of ‘substantial
scientific interest’ was ‘substituted’ by demonstration of cooperation with
some of the existing Antarctic Treaty parties and their programmes? Up
until then,

In contrast to the obligations of the acceding states to carry out

‘substantial scientific research activity’ in Antarctica, understood to
mean the establishment of Antarctic station or the dispatch of scientific
expedition (Article IX), the original signatories were not obliged to do
so.19

Is co-optation simply a matter of an opponent or a critic joining, as a

result of allurement or persuasion, a regime which is marked by
asymmetries in terms of scientific-political capacities and agenda setting?
How does one map the degree or the extent of co-optation? Is co-optation of
former critics as new members by the long-standing regimes a regressive or
a progressive step in terms of the legitimacy of that regime? What about its
effectiveness, principle of consensus and assurances against co-optation?
Does it matter whether the consensus is a genuinely negotiated one or
imposed from above? How important is the collaborative approach to
critiquing/questioning the geographies of domination? To what extent are
the actors that have been co-opted, or perceived by some as being co-opted,
responsible themselves for the lack of much-needed capacity, continuity and
consistency in their national Antarctic programmes? Is co-optation
inevitable and/or irreversible?
Dodds20 is at his persuasive best when he says that social scientists are
yet to devote a more serious and systematic attention to how various,
allegedly objective and neutral scientific discourses and practices have
contributed to the colonization of Antarctica and its knowledge-production.
We need to further explore how the consolidation of certain forms of
geopolitical power has been achieved (even challenged) through what
David Livingstone has described as the ‘hidden geographies’ of
research/field stations, ‘national’ expeditions, research ships, laboratories,
etc.21

The IGY (1957–58) and the Indian intervention in the UN

In a recent influential article Adrian Howkins22 has critically examined at
some length the rise and fall of the Indian intervention on the ‘Antarctic
Question’ in February 1956 on the floor of the UN General Assembly.
India's permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Arthur S. Lall,
under instructions from Krishna Menon (one of the leading figures in
India's foreign policy during the 1950s) conveyed India's preference for
some kind of a trusteeship for Antarctica.23 Ambassador Lall requested, on
19 February 1956, that the ‘Question of Antarctica’ be included on the
provisional agenda of the Assembly. The explanatory memorandum read in
part:

Modern science is likely to reveal many possibilities for the peaceful

utilization of a region hitherto regarded as unproductive. At the same
time, the influence of Antarctica on climate and related conditions
throughout the world, while obviously considerable, requires further
study. Any disturbance of the equilibrium of natural forces in this area
might lead to incalculable consequences for the world as a whole
involving the deterioration of the conditions for human and other
forms of animal and plant life. In view of these facts and bearing in
mind the size of the area, its international importance and the growing
interest in it, the Government of India considers that in order to
strengthen peace, it would be appropriate and timely for all nations to
agree and to affirm that the area will be utilized entirely for peaceful
purposes and for the general welfare.24

Besides questioning the European-colonial imprint of territorial claims on

Antarctica, the Indian intervention also expressed serious concerns over the
strategic fall-out of overlapping claims on the Antarctic Peninsula and, to
quote Howkins, “raised fears that nuclear weapon testing in Antarctica
could adversely disrupt global atmospheric systems and stop the
monsoon”.25
 On 14 November 1956, the withdrawal of India's proposal was
announced at the organizational meeting of the eleventh General Assembly.
According to the offcial transcript sent to London by the British delegation,
Mr Krishna Menon had explained that the Indian delegation had decided to
withdraw the item in view of the heavy and urgent agenda of the UN
General Assembly with regard to the Middle East and Hungary. It was
further clarified that the decision to withdraw the item should not be
interpreted as India abandoning the issue or undermining its importance.26
On 15 July 1958, Ambassador Lall reiterated the Indian offcial position
that the UN should have a chance to comment and offer suggestions on
possible participation of non-signatory governments in any regime provided
by the proposed Antarctic Treaty. Apparently, the Indian bid to introduce an
alternative imagination of the space and resources of Antarctica at the UN
had failed to forestall the growing alliance among a handful of state actors
with diverse national positions on the sovereignty issue but identical
geopolitical interest in maintaining the status quo with regard to the
colonial-imperial legacies. However, as Adrian Howkins has forcefully
argued, the Indian intervention did leave “a tangible impact upon the history
of Antarctica in the second half of the 1950s”.27 There was much more at
stake in the Indian intervention at the UN on the ‘Question of Antarctica’
than simply questioning the colonial legacy of claims and counterclaims.
The very fact that the most resolute resistance to the Indian proposal,
especially its underlying principle of trusteeship, came from the two
developing, ‘post-colonial’, South American states (i.e. Argentina and
Chile), with overlapping claims on the Antarctic Peninsula, implied, among
other things, that there would be a perennial constraint on the alternative
‘post-colonial’ visualization and representation of Antarctic geopolitics in
‘South-South’ terms. As Howkins puts it so aptly,

Latin American opposition to the Indian proposal fragmented a

potential anti-imperial alliance in Antarctica. Argentina and Chile,
both of which had initially presented their claims to Antarctica in anti-
imperialist language, were co-opted into the post-colonial project of
the Antarctic Treaty System, leaving other ‘third world’ nations frmly
on the outside.28
 The rise and fall of short, but critical, post-colonial Indian engagement at
the UN needs to be recalled with reference to the fact that Indian scientists
did take considerable interest in the IGY. Even though India did not show
interest in its Antarctica programme, the IGY provided the newly
independent country with an opportunity to “join the world club of science
as an equal, modernize its existing institutions, support basic sciences
unapologetically, and prepare ground for new initiatives directed towards
nation-building and national prestige”.29The IGY exposure no doubt
enormously helped India's space programme but “accentuated the
dependence of Indian science on the West for assessment and
encouragement”30 at the same time.
In India's first meaningful engagement with Antarctica in the UN during
the 1950s, India's first Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs
Jawaharlal Nehru had played a key role. As a key architect of India's
foreign policy, Nehru was of the view that India's foreign policy and
diplomacy should go beyond enlightened national interest and address
larger issues of global concern.31 The normative-pragmatic interface of
India's foreign policy was duly refected in Nehru's address to the Indian
Parliament in May 1958 on the issue of Antarctica:

We are not challenging anybody's rights there [in Antarctica]. But it

has become important, more specially because of the possible
experimentation of [sic] atomic weapons and the like, that the matter
should be considered by the UN … the fact that Antarctica contains
very important minerals – especially atomic energy minerals – is one
of the reasons why this area is attractive to various countries. We
thought it would be desirable to have a discussion about this in the
UN.32

In hindsight one could argue that the Indian stand at the UN, under the
personal supervision of Nehru, fell quite short of a direct questioning of the
colonial claims and rights but challenged in a signifcant manner the self-
assigned authority and legitimacy of a handful of Antarctica powers to
conceptualize and construct the nature-science-sovereignty interface for
peaceful utilizations of Antarctica. For Howkins, “This represented a subtle
challenge to one of the British Empire's justification for its sovereignty in
Antarctica: environmental stewardship through good management”.33 In
other words, what India had questioned in a forceful manner was not only
how a particular perception of ‘nature’ (one to be approached and explored
through the natural science spectrum of the IGY) in the Antarctic was made
pivotal to the justification for retaining territorial claims and rights but also
how in turn adventure, science and power were ‘naturalized’. As Sally Eden
has pointed out, “elaborating how nature is constructed should help us to
appreciate better the diversity of ‘natures’ and ‘environments’ that we carry
in our heads, in our policies and institutional structures”.34
The manner in which ‘nature’ was constructed in the Antarctic-specific
context with the help of collaborative IGY science and geopolitical
contestations were enveloped within the territorial-jurisdiction scope of the
Antarctica Treaty (i.e. south of 60 degrees south) pre-empted to some extent
the scope for any critical enquiry into how the ‘Antarctic scientific
community’ will accumulate and validate knowledge and the related
framing of the ‘white’ continent as ‘global knowledge commons’. I will
return to this point towards the end of this chapter.
When the Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959, the newly set-up foreign
policy institutions of India, overwhelmingly influenced by the personalized
style of foreign policy and charisma of Nehru, 35 chose not to react. Arthur
S. Lall, in a personal communication to Peter J. Beck,36 is reported to have
said that India was reasonably satisfied with the objectives of the Treaty, as
it felt that most concerns that India had expressed in the United Nations in
1956 and 1958 stood covered. Lall did subsequently criticize the Antarctic
Treaty on the grounds that,

it tended to foster the idea that general international agreement can

best be negotiated by a small group of countries, and in this respect the
manner in which it was made is somewhat out of step with the
requirements of an interdependent and shrinking world.37

The issue of India's accession to the Antarctic Treaty was raised perhaps
in some quarters after the Treaty came into force in 1961. The matter was
not pursued in view of India's strong criticism of the apartheid in South
Africa.38 For India's foreign and defence policy the 1960s and 1970s were
most challenging and the three wars that India fought (including the 1962
war with China) kept India's attention diverted from matters Antarctic. In
the corridors of power in New Delhi “insuffcient attention was paid to the
development of institutions for the conduct of foreign policy”39 and India's
geopolitical orientation remained largely continental and focused on the
Himalayan frontiers and borderlands. Both the Indian Ocean and Antarctica
became rather peripheral to India's world view and strategic concerns. Some
Indian scientists did however participate in their individual capacity with
Australian (1960–61) and Soviet (1971–73) Antarctic expeditions.

India enters the ATS: 1980s

It is useful to recall that India's scientific-geopolitical engagement with the
Ant-arctic during the early 1980s began at a time when the southern polar
region was going through a major discursive transformation, especially with
respect to its actual and imagined resource endowment, with far-reaching
implications for the following norm enshrined in the preamble to the
Antarctic Treaty: “… it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall
continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not
become the scene or object of international discord”. Despite the success
achieved by the major Antarctic powers in keeping the issue of Antarctica
off the agenda of discussions related to ‘common heritage of mankind’
during UNCLOS III, the implications of both the principle and the
negotiations were enormous, as the events that unfolded during the 1980s
would reveal. Here was a direct and substantial challenge to Antarctic
exceptionalism, which was also marked on the one hand by a rather limited
number of Antarctic Treaty memberships and growing interest in the
resource potential of the Antarctic on the other.
The first Indian expedition to Antarctica landed on the Queen Maud Land
on 9 January 1982, with Dr S. Z. Qasim as the leader of the expedition. In
an inter-view given about twenty years later Qasim said in retrospect,

When the first expedition to Antarctica was finalised, the scenario in

the world about Antarctica was very different from what it is today.
Antarctica was a monopoly of the rich and the developed countries at
that time. And the only developing countries which had their presence
in Antarctica were Argentina and Chile, because of their proximity to
the icy continent. India's entry into Antarctica broke this monopoly.
 India was the first Asian country and one of the foremost developing
countries to have its entry into Antarc-tica. Soon after India's entry
many developing countries like Brazil, China and South Korea made
efforts to land in Antarctica and build stations there. The main
rationale behind our Antarctic programme was geopolitical and the
other one was to open a new science for India, namely, the polar
science which was non-existent before the first expedition landed in
Antarctica.40

The decision to set up the Department of Ocean Development, directly

under the Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi in July 1981 (more recently
reorganized, expanded and renamed as the Ministry of Earth Sciences), in
the wake of UNCLOS III, was facilitated by the fact that the Indian
Parliament too was positive towards India's involvement in Antarctic
research. The same year China also set up the National Antarctic
Expedition Committee to coordinate the national Antarctic research
programme and facilitate international cooperation. We may note in
passing, as pointed out by some analysts,

Mrs. Gandhi continued the personalized approach of her father, and

made the dubious contribution of undermining the weak foreign policy
institutions she had inherited. It was during her time that the office of
the Prime Minister (PMO) became a source of enormous power.41

According to the Department of Ocean Development Annual Report for the

year 1982–83:

The possibility of sending a scientific expedition which combines the

deep sea exploration and the study of living and non-living resources in
the Indian Ocean and the Antarctic region (an area which is divided
from our country only by a few islands and a continuous stretch of
water of the Indian Ocean) has been under consideration for some
time. After looking into the various implications of such a project, the
Department of Ocean Development decided that it would be useful
from a scientific point of view to send a scientific expedition as, it
would add to our knowledge of factors relating to Indian Ocean and
the monsoon phenomenon on which the economy of the country is
 critically dependent. In addition, there may also be several other
advantages in the evaluation of several aspects of life in the ice-bound
regions which are akin to areas on our northern frontiers. It would
also help in taking concrete steps for environmental protection in the
surrounding ocean areas as well as in other linked surroundings…. A
study of the Antarctic waters, apart from the immense scientific
interest it provides would also be of much economic value.42

On 13 July 1983, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs gave its

consent in favour of India joining the Antarctic Treaty and seeking
Consultative Status. As noted earlier, India acceded to the Treaty on 19
August 1983 and within a month was accorded Consultative Status, much
to the delight of the then ATCPs. India acceded to CCAMLR on 17 July
1985 and became a member of SCAR on 5 October 1985. It participated in
the CRAMRA negotiations from January 1984 onwards, signed the fnal Act
of the Convention on 2 June 1988 and was very much a part of the ATCMs
that witnessed the loss and restoration of consensus on the minerals issue.
India ratifed the Madrid Protocol in 1997
India's ‘intentions’ were indeed a matter of speculation among the major
Antarctic powers when New Delhi decided in favour of acceding to the
Antarctic Treaty. Peter J. Beck wrote at the close of 1983: “of course it
might be argued that India intends to exploit entry in order to destroy the
Antarctic club from within or to exacerbate the existing internal divisions.
Only time will tell.”43 In 1986, Beck offered his revised assessment of
India's motives in his later work as follows:

In the event, even if there are signs of concern about certain aspects,
such as the practice of secrecy, India has emerged as an effective
participant in the system and as a supporter of its retention. India's
advocacy on behalf of the treaty system has served to disarm the
impact of criticism from the developing world.44

That national prestige was a key driver behind India's Antarctic

engagement was evident when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told Lok
Sabha, the lower house of Indian Parliament, on 19 February 1982, that by
pursuing “this advanced work India has now joined a select band of
country”.45 The remaining key considerations that influenced India's
decision to accede to the Antarctic Treaty were conveyed by the
Government of India to the Indian Parliament on 17 August 1983 along the
following lines: (a) through exchange of information with other members of
the Treaty India will be in a much better position to enhance its analytical
capabilities; (b) India will be in a position to effectively project its own
views as well as the views of the nonaligned countries; (c) “it would be able
to participate in the ongoing discussions on the resources of Antarctica and
ensure that any regime that might be set up there would be in harmony with
its overall policies and objectives”.46 That there was an important geo-
economic rationale behind India's interest in the Antarctic was also
highlighted in the foreword written by Indira Gandhi to the scientific Report
of the First Indian Expedition to Antarctica, dated 4 August 1993.47 It said
in part: “The number of tasks completed and the amount of scientific data
generated clearly showed that with dedication and pioneering spirit Indian
scientists can accomplish more than what is initially expected. It also
proved India's capability to undertake Antarctic explorations of high order
leading to long-term gains to our national economy.”48
It is important to pause at this point and note that at the time of its
accession to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983, India appeared fully conscious of
her broader and deeper obligation vis-à-vis the developing countries. While
articulating full support for the retention of the political architecture of
Antarctic governance it expressed concern over the need for wider
participation of international com-munity in the ATS. In November 1984,
the Indian delegate expressed this concern in the UN General Assembly in
the following manner.

The Antarctic Treaty System … is an evolving institution whose

structural and organizational framework is conceived in a flexible
manner … which is gradually evolving further, taking into account the
legitimate concerns of all…. It would be unrealistic and
counterproductive to think of a new regime in the present situation….
The Antarctic Treaty System is an open system … and should be
broadened by the accession of more States. The evolving Treaty System
should be made more open and responsive to the viewpoints of all
States.49
In retrospect it is quite reasonable to assume that India's decision to join the
Antarctic Treaty might have been seen as unsettling by some in the Global
South and even perceived as seriously undermining the bid made by
Malaysia under the leadership of Mahathir bin Mohamad in the UN on the
‘Question of Antarctica’. Some keen analysts did express their concern in
the early 1990s that, “India may fnd it rather hard to reconcile its
membership of the Antarctic Treaty System with the views of the United
Nations and the non-aligned movement, in which it still plays a leading
role.”50 Dr S. Z. Qasim, who besides leading the first Indian expedition to
Antarctica was the Secretary of the newly set up Department of Ocean
Development, when India acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, was quick to
point out that, “India's accession did not imply any change in its basic stand
either regarding territorial claims or regarding the treatment of the natural
resources of Antarctica as the common heritage of mankind.”51 Equally
reassuring did Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sound when she proclaimed
that, “India will not do nor allow others to take any step which would be
considered detrimental to the interests of [the] developing countries.”52 As
far as the then ATCPs were concerned, India's accession, and China's
accession soon there-after,53 was nothing short of a diplomatic coup and a
big boost to the authority and legitimacy of the ATS. As Peter J. Beck54
argued with remarkable insight, one of the paramount considerations on the
part of the ATCPs was the likely effect of a new membership on delicately
as well as zealously maintained geopolitical equilibrium and the overall
stability of the Antarctic regime, even if some expressed anxieties over
issues such as over-stretch and over-expansion.
At a time when the ATS was under a Malaysia-led attack in the UN on
account of its alleged exclusive nature and scope, the then ATCPs were
quick to grasp the ‘strategic’ advantage of expanding the inner circle of
membership in 1983 by letting India, China and Brazil in. The simultaneous
admission of two major players from Asia and South America as
consultative parties would not only take some wind out of the sails of
Malaysia in the UN on the ‘Question of Antarctica’ but also strengthen the
treaty system. The very thought of India, an advocate of an active UN role
in Antarctic governance during the mid-1950s and now a leading member
of the non-aligned movement, joining the ATS must have appeared most
reassuring to many in the ATS, especially those anxious about India's
intentions and objectives behind a more direct Antarctic engagement. No
surprise therefore,

the addition of India represented a considerable coup for the treaty

powers since it reduced the chances of India either leading or
supporting the anti-treaty campaign initiated by Malaysia. Conversely,
India perceived membership to be advantageous, since it would enable
a more effective way of presenting Indian and Third World interests in
Antarctica.55

In the light of the discussion so far, it is to state the obvious perhaps that
India's accession to the Antarctic Treaty in August 1983, against the
backdrop of the intricate mineral resource diplomacy, and subsequent grant
of consultative status within six weeks in September 1983 accorded a
unique geopolitical complexion to India's Antarctic engagement as one of
the insiders. All it had taken for India to ‘meet’ the criterion of ‘substantial
scientific interest’, right in the middle of ongoing minerals negotiations,
was the dispatch of two scientific expeditions and the setting-up of a
permanent research station called Dakshin Gangotri; imaginatively, but
purposefully, named after the mythical source of the sacred river Ganges in
the Himalayas. India's participation in the ATS is therefore likely to remain
hostage to widespread perception that India was co-opted into the ATS and
the criterion of ‘substantial scientific interest’ was deliberately
compromised by the Antarctic Treaty powers due to geopolitical
expediency. This obviously raises the expectations in the ATS and
elsewhere with regard to the nature, scope and stature of India's Antarctic
science profile. Second, the overall value of India's presence in the ATS
continues to be judged in terms of the extent and effcacy of India's claim to
represent the interests of developing countries in the governance and
management of Antarctica as the ‘common heritage of mankind’. And this
raises the expectations in terms of a proactive intervention by India in
Antarctic policy matters, especially in the ATCMs.

India and polar science: emerging bipolar perspectives

India built its second permanent station, Maitri (meaning friendship) during
1988–89. The National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research
(NCAOR), under the Ministry of Earth Sciences, is the nodal agency
(located in Goa) to undertake, organize and coordinate the Indian polar
science programme and the logistics support for Antarctica scientific
research. The mission mandate of the NCAOR is

To plan, promote, co-ordinate and execute the entire gamut of polar

science and logistic activities of the country in order to ensure a
perceptible and influential presence of India in Antarctica and to
uphold our strategic interests in the global framework of nations in the
southern continent and the surrounding oceans.56

India currently has a budget of US$33 million for its Antarctic

programme. The Indian Antarctica research programme is concentrated in
the felds of, but not limited to, atmospheric sciences, meteorology and
climate change, biology and environmental science, earth science,
glaciology and engineering and communication. India's first ever scientific
expedition to the South Pole, covering a total distance of 4,680 km, was
successfully accomplished during November and December 2010.57 Widely
reported in the Indian media the expedition was also aimed at enhancing
India's scientific-logistic profile on Antarctica.
India's scientific interest in the Arctic is growing and the possibility of
her applying for observer status in the Arctic Council in the near future
cannot be ruled out. For the time being India's interest in the Arctic is
dictated by scientific studies related to polar ice, climate and weather. In the
context of climate change, India's future interest and involvement in the
Arctic are likely to be driven by resource geopolitics and energy security
considerations as well. According to some analysts, as a strong supporter of
global nuclear disarmament, India is concerned about the growing
militarization of the Arctic seas by the littorals, particularly the deployment
of nuclear submarines, and could actively promote the idea of a Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone for the Arctic region.58
In July 2008, the then Union Minister of Science and Technology and
Earth Sciences Kapil Sibal inaugurated India's first permanent research
station in the Arctic region, located at the old school building in the
Norwegian town of Ny-Ålesund, once famous as a coal mining settlement.
Situated on Svalbard (Spitsbergen), midway between Novaja Zemlja and
Greenland, and called Himadri, the research base is equipped with state of
the art facilities that are used for conducting year-round scientific research
in contemporary felds of Arctic science with special emphasis on climate
change. Current areas of research in Ny-Ålesund include marine science,
aurora physics, biology, glaciology, geology, environmental science,
geodetic studies, rocket probe studies, atmospheric physics, terrestrial
studies, climate change monitoring, among others. The Himadri base
station is managed by the National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean
Research (NCAOR). A high-level delegation led by Prithviraj Chavan, the
then Minister of Earth Sciences, visited Svalbard, Norway on 6 June 2010
to review scientific activities being carried out in the Arctic region by the
Indian scientists from Himadri.

The Indian Ocean dimension of India's Antarctic engagement

In a message to the first expedition team Indira Gandhi said in part, “The
Indian Ocean links India to Antarctica. The entire area is of deep interest to
us, and ocean studies are of vital importance.”59 After nearly a decade-long
strategic low profile and invisibility,60 the Indian Ocean is once again
becoming an area of
geostrategic rivalry among a number of major powers and littoral
states.61 The social construction of the Indian Ocean-space as a force-feld
or battlefeld is being currently reinforced by the great base race in the
region. The ‘Indian-oceanic arc of militarization’ stretches from Egypt to
Indonesia and Australia. A number of military-naval infrastructure projects
are being undertaken by India, Pakistan, Myanmar and Malaysia, among
others. The strategic dynamism behind this power projection refects the
new economic prosperity and confidence of some of these states, increased
importance of mobility and connectivity in the era of globalization, strategic
natural resource endowment of the region (especially oil and gas) and the
‘rise’ of India.62 According to some analysts, the identity and coherence of
the Indian Ocean as a geostrategic region are likely to be deepened due to
new naval bases being established in the area.63
On 30 June 2007, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, while delivering ‘The Admiral
A. K. Chatterjee Memorial Lecture’, entitled ‘International Relations and
Maritime Affairs: Strategic Imperatives’, highlighted the importance of
Antarctica to India in the context of India's maritime diplomacy:

Because it is so far away and a subject of much romanticism, the

importance of Antarctica as a major maritime interest of India is very
often underestimated by policy-makers. In actual fact, not only is
Antarctica vitally important for the environment, it is a treasure house
of potential mineral resources, including petroleum. Moreover, it is an
enormous marine storehouse of the foundation of the human food
chain, thanks to its abundant holdings of krill. Finally, and this is of
the most immediate and continuing importance to India: Antarctica
determines, in signifcant measure, the Indian monsoon – upon which
our agriculture, and hence our economy, depends. In this context, we
were privileged to host the 30th Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Mechanism meeting in New Delhi recently and we continue to be
actively engaged in international cooperative activities on preserving
Antarctica as a unique and common heritage of mankind.
It would, by now, be obvious that the primary area of Indian
maritime interest ranges from the Persian Gulf in the north, to
Antarctica in the South, and from the Cape of Good Hope and the East
Coast of Africa in the west, to the Straits of Malacca and the
archipelagos of Malaysia and Indonesia in the east. It would be equally
obvious that as India's economy and her international role grow, the
area of this benign but active engagement will also grow.… Our
maritime diplomacy, like our broader diplomatic effort, radiates out in
expanding circles of engagement, starting with India's immediate
maritime neighbourhood. As a mature and responsible maritime
power, we are contributing actively to capacity building and
operational coordination to address threats from non-state actors,
disaster relief, and support to UN peacekeeping and rescue and
extrication missions.64

There are two specific references to Antarctica in the above quotation that
demand and deserve critical reflection. The first relates to Antarctica as a
spaceof strategic value to India's maritime interests and maritime
diplomacy. And the second relates to the visualization of the southern polar
region as the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and site of India's benign but
active engagement
The Indian Ocean dimension of Antarctic geopolitics in general is also
likely to be reinforced by the growing geostrategic importance of the Indian
Ocean to the United States of America, described by Joyner and Theis as
the “chief archi-tect of law and policy for the Antarctic”.65
The dominant social construction and visualization of the Indian Ocean
space both as a site of geo-economic rivalries and as a battlefeld for naval
power projection is central to the argument advanced by Robert Kaplan that
“Like a microcosm of the world at large, the greater Indian Ocean region is
developing into an area of both ferociously guarded sovereignty (with fast-
growing economies and militaries) and astonishing interdependence (with
its pipelines and land and sea routes).”66 Kaplan also talks about the relative
decline of Western power and anticipates that “the Indian Ocean is where
the rivalry between the United States and China in the Pacifc interlocks
with the regional rivalry between India and China”.67 Whereas it is diffcult
to predict the impact of unfolding dynamics of Indian Ocean geopolitics
and geostrategy on the future of international cooperation in Antarctic
governance, the boundary between the Southern Ocean and the Indian
Ocean will become increasingly blurred, especially against the backdrop of
climate change being increasingly perceived by some of the major Antarctic
powers as some kind of a ‘threat-multiplier’.68
The 2009 SCAR Climate Change and the Environment Report (cited
hereaf-ter as the ACCE Report)69 provides a comprehensive assessment of
the implications of Antarctic climate change on the rest of the world. It
points out that a reduction in sea ice would lead to the likely decline of
certain species such as Adelie penguins on a warmer Antarctic Peninsula;
seals, albatross and penguins producing fewer young, and a reduction in
krill. Even though sea ice is increasing in certain regions of Antarctica due
to changes in large-scale atmospherics, the continental sea ice is decreasing
in other parts of the continent. On the Antarctic Peninsula nearly 87 per
cent of glaciers are decreasing and the ones that are increasing are doing so
only due to increased regional precipitation. By 2100 the West Antarctic ice
sheet may discharge enough ice to raise sea levels up to 1.4 m (+) with a
signifcant challenge for Antarctica and for coastal populations across the
globe. Jan-Gunnar Winther of the Norwegian Polar Institute has pointed out
that, “the impacts of climate change in the polar regions over the next 100
years will exceed the impact forecasts for many other regions and will
produce feedback with signifcant global consequences”.70 The Indian
Ocean region is likely to be affected in a profound manner by some of the
above-mentioned impacts of climate change. I will return to the Indian
Ocean theme briefy in the concluding section of this chapter.

“Antarctica as the common heritage of mankind”: the Indian

Antarctic dilemma
Hosting the XXX Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) in New
Delhi, in May 2007, was a landmark in India's Antarctic engagement and
programme. The then External Affairs Minister of India, Mr Pranab
Mukherjee, in his closing address delivered on 11 May 2007, was quick to
acknowledge that “The Treaty has certainly grown in stature and strength in
the last forty-eight years with newer entrants joining its fold.” The 1991
Madrid Protocol was hailed by him “as a testimony of farsightedness and a
global vision of mentors of the Antarctic Treaty” especially in the light of
the fourth assessment report of the IPCC.

The path shown by the Antarctic Treaty System by forging ties in

collaborative research and enforcing a strict regime of environmental
protection through a detailed consultative process, is not only unique
to the Treaty but needs to be followed in other areas as well.
… India remains committed to scientific research and technical
cooperation in the Polar Regions. Antarctica being a common heritage
of mankind and the foremost symbol of peaceful use and cooperation
needs to be protected for posterity.
(emphasis given)

The emphasis supplied to the quotation above is intended to highlight on

the one hand India's frm commitment to the ATS as a model of cooperation
that is worthy of emulation in other areas as well. On the other hand, it is
worth noting that India continues to perceive Antarctica as a ‘unique’ but
‘common’ heritage of mankind but largely within the framework of the
ATS. Quite conspicuous by its absence however is any intermediary
reference to the interests and stake of developing countries from Afro-Asia
bordering the Indian Ocean in emerging issue-areas such as bioprospecting.
Neither India nor China has presented so far either a working paper or an
information paper on this important issue at the ATCMs. Apparently the
normative edge of India's Antarctic engagement (quite pronounced during
the 1980s) has somewhat withered away over the years even in terms of
rhetoric. Maybe some explanation lies in the more fundamental shift in
India's overall foreign policy, as a rising power in the international system,
from ethical-normative to realist-pragmatic, as observed by a number of
ana-lysts.71 C. Raja Mohan would argue that,

Since the 1990s, India could no longer sustain the presumed idealism
of its foreign policy. India had to come to terms with the painful reality
that its relative standing in the world had substantially declined during
the Cold War. Much like Deng Xiaoping who prescribed pragmatism
for China, the Indian leaders began to emphasize practical ways to
achieve power and prosperity for India.72

However, as far as Antarctica is concerned, in comparison to China, Indian

off-cial pronouncements continue to place more emphasis on the ‘scientific’
and much less on ‘political’ dimensions of its engagement.
The Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations sent notes to the
Divi-sion for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (between 13 July 2005
and 31 August 2009) in response to submissions made by Australia,
Argentina and Norway to the Commission on the Limits of Continental
Shelf. The note sent in response to the Australian submission73 stated:

India recalls the principles and objectives shared by the Antarctic

Treaty and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
[Convention] and the importance of harmony between the Antarctic
Treaty and the Convention and the continuing cooperation, security
and stability in the Antarctic area. India while referring to Article IV of
the Treaty, wishes to inform that it does not recognize any State's right
or claim to territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic area and
consequently over the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the continent of Antarctica.74
The note further said,

Acknowledging with appreciation Australia's request to the

Commission for not taking any action on the portion of its submission
relating to the areas of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to Antarctica,
India requests the Commission not to take any action accordingly.75

The notes sent by India in response to the extended continental shelf

claims were the first and so far the only vivid and emphatic expression of
India's non-recognition of the territorial claims and counter-claims on
Antarctica after joining the ATS.

Conclusion
With Malaysia having acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 2011 the number
and presence of the Asian countries in the ATS is likely to further increase.
Accord-ing to B. A. Hamzah, “The signing of the Treaty [by Malaysia] will
close a chapter in the North-South divide on the question of Antarctica at
the United Nations.”76 Hopefully Malaysia's active engagement with the
ATS and effective participation in the ATCMs will further contribute to the
democratization of Antarctic governance.
Asia's rise in the international system, and its implications for the
Antarctic, can legitimately be approached and analysed in the light of the
“forthcoming era of shortages in five vital areas governing economic
activity: food, commodities, energy/oil, water, and clean environment”.77
According to the Food and Agri -culture Organization, global food
production will need to increase by more than 40 per cent in 2030 and by 70
per cent in 2070. Whereas India is just above self-suffciency, China, Japan
and Korea remain net importers of food. If the scenarios offered by the
IPCC turn out to be correct, global warming and climate change will further
aggravate these problems. Given such realities, some observers of polar
resource geopolitics might be tempted to argue that the resource endowment
of Antarctica is likely to be further politicized by some of the rising Asian
powers and might even ‘threaten’ the moratorium on mining under the
Madrid Protocol. In my view, there is no reason or evidence thus far to
suggest that some of the leading Asian member states in the ATS will
behave as the ‘spoilers’.
Writing in 1990, Wei-chin Lee argued that,

Despite allegations that China is not serious about its scientific

mission, it is indeed interested in Antarctic affairs. No matter what
China's motivation – self-interest or global commitment – the PRC
apparently believes that a seat at the Consultative Party sessions
[ATCMs] will provide a better opportunity for it to infuence Antarctic
developments.78

However, the question as to whether China's interest in Antarctic affairs

(and for that matter India's interest in Antarctic affairs) has been
persuasively demonstrated through a proactive approach to infuence the
agenda and the outcome of dialogue and deliberations at the ATCMs
deserves critical refection. Writing twenty-two years on from that statement,
in her chapter in this volume AnneMarie Brady notes,

China still has a very long way to go before it can catch up with the
other established Antarctic powers, let alone overtake them. Increases
in budgets alone will not be enough for China to match the Antarctic
activities of many other nations. It will take decades to build up the
requisite talent pool of senior scientists and social scientists who can
engage in internationally competitive polar research and garner the
language skills that will enable them to freely participate in
international efforts.79

What Brady has to say about China is quite apt perhaps for other Asian
member countries in the ATS and their ‘national’ Antarctic pursuits as well.
Maybe the challenge for Asian countries in the ATS is to pool their
strengths and efforts at the service of the collective spirit behind the
Antarctic Treaty, especially its Preamble, that calls for international
cooperation, collaboration and complimentarity.
I would like to argue that India (and perhaps China too) would continue
to perceive a vital stake in further enhancing the authority and effciency of
the ATS, though not without feeling the tension arising out of the growing
realiza-tion to further ‘democratize’ the ATS (which calls for a greater
proactive partici-pation of and contribution by the Asian countries to
knowledge-production and Antarctic governance) and apparently unsettling
effects emanating from the questioning of existing asymmetries of power
and capacity in the Antarctic regime. Far more problematic and
questionable in my view is the reasoning, abetted by the growing climate of
fear around terrorism and various global risks, that imagines a ‘new great
game’ between India and China in and around the Indian Ocean and fears
the prospects of a spillover in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. Those
who harbor such anxieties and fear might derive solace from the ‘realist’
argument that, “The Indian navy's attempt to come up with its own strategy
and doctrine, though welcome in many respects, has little meaning in the
absence of a national security strategy from the Indian government.”80
India's commitment to Antarctic science is frm and obvious and is likely
to further expand in future. India is all set to acquire a 500 crore polar
research vessel (PRV) by 2013. The Cabinet Committee on Economic
Affairs has approved the acquisition of an ice-breaker class cum supply
vessel for Antarc-tica, the Arctic and the Indian Ocean. However, the task
of securing science as the first order value in the Antarctic in the wake of
changing resource-science interface, however, is going to be rather diffcult.
The role of science and the sci-entists in the case of Antarctic
bioprospecting is going to oscillate between the appeal of fundamental
science and the imperatives of commercial-corporate interests. As Alan D.
Hemmings notes,

Here, for the first time, science wears two hats, its traditional Antarctic
bonnet, and the hard-hat of commercial self-interest. Some formal
mechanisms to avoid confict of interest seem called for, and some
deliberate mechanism to ensure that the interests of science as
exploiter are not laundered through its standing as privileged
participant in the ATS. As in so many other areas, the maintenance of a
viable Antarctic Treaty System will require us to periodically update it
and not blithely assume that mechanisms established half a century
ago will suffce.81

The challenge of bioprospecting before the ATCPs is hugely complex,

involves intricate but critically important issues of equity and public good,
and demands an early and effective intervention from India. Even a cursory
look at the list of working/information papers submitted on tourism,
bioprospecting and more recently climate change by India and other Asian
countries suggests that these countries are yet to develop and articulate their
perspectives and concerns on these issue-areas. And this in my view is a
matter of concern, which further underlines the need for introspection by
these countries and timely joint collaborative interventions in order to
ensure that the views of developing countries from Afro-Asia are
adequately represented in the ATS.
The future of India's geopolitical infuence in the ATS will no doubt
continue to be intimately related to the nature, scope and quality of India's
‘substantial sci-entifc interest’ in the southern polar region. India's plans to
set up its new research station, named Bharati, on the Larsemann Hills
(69°S, 76°E) in the Prydz Bay region of East Antarctica (on the ‘Australian
Antarctic Territory’) are progressing as per schedule. The new research base
is expected to be operational by 2012 and will be able to accommodate
about twenty-five scientists/technicians. The huge task of positioning the
required infrastructure for building the research base Bharati was
accomplished in December 2009 by the 29th Indian scientific expedition to
Antarctica. In view of the geopolitical connotations of the new Indian
station, certain sections of the Australian media have expressed their
concern as follows: “Australia is losing control of its Antarctic territory as
an energy-hungry world prepares to move in.”82
Antarctic science, with an obvious “Eurocentric” tilt has always been a
cur-rency of geopolitical clout in the ATS83 and is bound to acquire new
complexities in the context of bioprospecting and climate change.84 Many
issues raised in a seminar study on ‘Asia in Antarctica’85 published in the
mid-1990s are still relevant today and need further critical engagement. A
lot more needs to be achieved in my view in terms of building, articulating
and exercising the necessary geopolitical capacity of the Asian states,
including India, to infuence the governance and management of
increasingly diverse, and growingly commercial, human activities in the
Antarctic. The recent, more or less unrecorded, assertion on the part of the
claimant states86 in relation to the extended continental shelf in the
Antarctic Treaty area, was discussed and realized on the ‘margins’ of the
ATS rather than through the ‘mainstream’ channels of Antarctic diplomacy
such as the ATCM. This is yet another reason perhaps as to why the
ATCMs, as a critical site of post-colonial engagement, demand and deserve
a far more proactive Asian assertion and cooperation.
I would like to conclude with a brief reference to David P. Fidler's work
where he has examined the implications of an Asian century for
international law around the concept of a “Concert of Asia”.87 According to
him Asian countries need to understand that Asia's ascendance to power and
prominence creates both opportunities and burdens and the only way in
which they can maximize the former and manage the latter effectively is
“through a strategic approach to global governance”. He further envisions a
framework created by the Concert of Asia through which Asian countries
can “build on existing cooperative mechanisms to make Asia a laboratory
of global governance in the 21st century”. What the Asian nations can and
should do is to “create a new legal and governance order unlike anything
seen before in international relations”.88 The question is not whether but
when the spirit underlying the ‘Concert of Asia’ will be realized in the
domain of Antarctic governance. The sooner this collective post-colonial
engagement with the Antarctic is achieved the better I believe it would be
for all those who remain committed to the principle that Antarctica shall
forever be governed for peaceful purposes in the best interests of
humankind and shall never become the site of international discord.
I am not suggesting here some kind of an inward-looking Asian Antarctic
geopolitics, based on a ‘block mentality’. Far from it; what I do wish to
argue is that it is important for the Asian member states, including India, to
realize that along with high-quality polar science, the capacity to
meaningfully contribute to agenda setting and policymaking is critically
important for turning the norms and promises into meaningful dialogues
and practices in the ATS. The ATCMs, in short, demand and deserve more
serious attention, ‘burden sharing’ along with ‘beneft sharing’, and a greater
involvement on the part of all those who are committed to the principles,
norms and values enshrined in the Antarctic Treaty and would like to see
the ATCMs respond to the emerging complex challenges in an effective,
proactive and transparent manner in the best interests of mankind.
Let me conclude by briefy revisiting some of the points I raised at the
outset in this chapter. If the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is at the
crossroads today, which I believe it is, so too is India's foreign policy.
India's rise to power and the quest for strategic autonomy at the same time,
in an international geopolitical economy, which is both unipolar and
multipolar, has led to a visibly tense debate between the realist-pragmatic
and moral-normative traditions/trends/tenets in India's foreign policy.
According to one critical perspective,

In its foreign policy India can and must play its role as conscience-
keeper of the world. The realist or pragmatic school of foreign policy
that holds sway in India today scoffs at any suggestion that morality
has a role in world affairs…. Half a century ago, a comparatively weak
India had a stronger voice in the world because there was a certain
morality and therefore a welcome boldness in India's foreign policy….
Today regrettably, India is being seen as a camp follower. Perceptions
do matter perhaps more than reality. As a junior partner, India will not
make it to the high table. Leadership implies not just economic and
military strength, but also ideas that inspire and motivate.89

While still lacking a coherent policy on the southern polar region, India's
future Antarctic engagement will no doubt be infuenced to some extent by
the emerg-ing trends in India's foreign policy. With India choosing to
pursue an independ-ent foreign policy, that remains frmly anchored in
normative moorings and the resolve to retain the autonomy to judge each
issue-area in international/global affairs on its own merit, the prospects of a
genuine post-colonial engagement and further democratization of the
Antarctic governance through an able, open, inclusive and adaptive
‘Concert of Asia’ in the ATS remain alive despite certain trends and
challenges to the contrary.

Notes
1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not
refect in any way the views of the Indian delegation to Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meetings. Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India. 2007. ‘Address by External Affairs Minister,
Shri Pranab Mukherjee, at the closing session of the XXX Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting’, New Delhi, 11 May. [Accessed 10
November 2010], http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=550312696.
2 Sanjay Chaturvedi, ‘India's Quest for Strategic Space in the “New”
International Order: Locations, (Re)Orientations and Opportunities’, in
Purnendra Jain, Felix Patri-keeff and Gerry Groot (eds), Asia-Pacifc
and New International Order, New York: Nova Science Publishers,
2006.
3 Harsh V. Pant, ‘A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy’,
Orbis(2009), pp. 250–264.
4 Ibid. Also, Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's
Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Sage, 2009.
5 Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift
of Global Power to the East, New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Also see
Jorgen Ørstrøm Møller, How Asia Can Shape the World: From the Era
of Plenty to Era of Scarcities, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2010.
6 See Alan D. Hemmings, ‘Globalization's Cold Genius and the Ending
of Antarctic Isolation’, in Lorne K. Kriwoken, Julia Jabour and Alan
D. Hemmings (eds), Looking South: Australia's Antarctic Agenda,
Sydney: The Federation Press, 2008.
7 Sanjay Chaturvedi and Joe Painter, ‘Whose World? Whose Order?
Spatiality, Geo-politics and the Limits of the New World Order’,
Cooperation and Confict (Sage) vol. 42 (2007), pp. 375–395.
8 Georg Sørensen, ‘What Kind of World Order? The International
System in the New Millennium’, Cooperation and Confict (Sage) vol.
41 (2006), pp. 343–363.
9 See Surjit Mansingh, ‘Rising China and Emergent India in the 21st
Century: Friends or Rivals?’ Korean Journal of Defense Analysis vol.
19 (2007), pp. 117–142; David Scott, ‘The 21st Century as Whose
Century?’ Journal of World-Systems Research vol 5 (2008), pp. 96–
118; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power
and the Second Nuclear Age, New York: HarperCollins, 1999.
10 Klaus Dodds, ‘Post-colonial Antarctica: An Emerging Engagement’,
Polar Recordvol. 42 (2006), pp. 59–70.
11 Ibid., p. 61.
12 Ibid., p. 68.
13 Anne-Marie Brady's chapter on New Zealand in this volume (Chapter
8).
14 Ibid.
15 Dodds, ‘Post-colonial Antarctica’, p. 69.
16 Ibid., pp. 59–70.
17 Ibid., p. 68.
18 Ibid., p. 65 (emphasis given).
19 Sanjay Chaturvedi, The Polar Regions: A Political Geography,
Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, p. 112.
20 Dodds, ‘Post-colonial Antarctica’, pp. 59–70.
21 David N. Livingstone, Putting Science in its Place, Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 2003.
22 Adrian Howkins, ‘Defending Polar Empire: Opposition to India's
Proposal to Raise the “Antarctic Question” at the United Nations in
1956’, Polar Record vol. 44 (2008), pp. 35–44.
23 Sanjay Chaturvedi, Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis,
New Delhi: Segment Books, 1990.
24 UN 1956, General Assembly, 11th Session, Peaceful Utilisation of
Antarctica. Doc. A/3118/Add. I: 13 September 1956; Doc.
A/3118/Add. II: 17 October 1956; Chaturvedi, Dawning of Antarctica.
25 Howkins, ‘Defending Polar Empire’.
26 Ibid., p. 42.
27 Ibid., pp. 35–36.
28 Ibid., pp. 35–44.
29 Rajesh Kochhar, ‘Science as a Symbol of New Nationhood: India and
the International Geophysical Year’, Current Science vol. 94 (2008),
pp. 813–816.
30 Ibid.
31 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p. 336.
32 Cited in Anita Dey, ‘India in Antarctica: Perspectives, Programmes
and Achievements’, International Studies vol. 29 (1992), pp. 173–185
(emphasis given).
33 Howkins, ‘Defending Polar Empire’, p. 40.
34 Sally Eden, ‘Environmental Issues: Nature versus the Environment?’
Progress in Human Geography vol. 25 (2001), p. 82.
35 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy.
36 Peter J. Beck, ‘India in Antarctica, Science-and-Politics-on Ice’,
Nature vol. 306 (1983), pp. 106–107.
37 Cited in Dey, ‘India in Antarctica’, p. 175.
38 Ibid., pp. 173–185.
39 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p. 260.
40 ‘Interview with S. Z. Qasim’, Dream: Monthly Newsletter of Vigyan
Prasar, September, vol. 4, no. 2 (2002) p. 22. [Accessed 21 July 2012]
www.vigyanprasar.gov.in/dream/sept2002/english.pdf.
41 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p. 262.
42 Annual Report 1982–83, Department of Ocean Development,
Government of India, New Delhi (emphasis given). [Accessed 10
February 2011], www.dod.nic.in/ann82–83.pdf.
43 Peter J. Beck, ‘Antarctica's Indian Summer’, Contemporary Review
vol. 243, no. 1415 (1983), p. 299.
44 Peter J. Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, Beckenham,
Kent: Croom Helm, 1986, p. 196.
45 Cited in Dey, ‘India in Antarctica’, p. 177.
46 Ibid.
47 scientific Report of the First Indian Expedition to Antarctica, Technical
Publication 1, Department of Ocean Development, Government of
India, New Delhi. [Accessed 8 January 2011],
 http://dspace.ncaor.org:8080/dspace/bitstream/123456789/126/3/INTR
ODUCTION.pdf
48 Ibid.
49 Cited in Dey, ‘India in Antarctica’, p. 178 (emphasis given).
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Anne-Marie Brady, Chapter 2 in this volume.
54 Beck, International Politics of Antarctica.
55 Ibid., p. 198.
56 See the offcial website of the National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean
Research (NCAOR), Goa. [Accessed 21 July 2012] http://ncaor.nic.in/.
57 Ibid.
58 Vijay Sakhuja, ‘China Breaking into the Arctic Ice’, Issue Brief, Indian
Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 2010.
59 Cited in Dey, ‘India in Antarctica’, p. 177.
60 See Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin, ‘Neglected No
Longer: The Indian Ocean at the Forefront of World Geopolitics and
Global Geostrategy’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region vol. 6, no. 1
(2010), pp. 26–51.
61 Donald Berlin, ‘The “Great Base Race” in the Indian Ocean Littoral:
Confict Prevention or Stimulation’, Contemporary South Asia vol. 13
(2004), pp. 239–255.
62 Ibid.
63 Harsh V. Pant, ‘India and the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch
Between Ambitions and Capabilities’, Pacifc Affairs vol. 82, no. 2
(2009), pp. 279–297.
64 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2007.
‘International Relations and Maritime Affairs.’ The Admiral A. K.
Chatterjee Memorial Lecture by the External Affairs Minister Shri
 Pranab Mukherjee (emphasis given). [Accessed 10 November 2010],
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=550312961.
65 C. Joyner and Ethel R. Theis, Eagle Over the Ice, Hanover, NH:
University of South Carolina Press, 1997, p. 1.
66 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage for the Twenty-First Century’,
Foreign Affairs vol. 88 (2009), pp. 16–29.
67 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of
American Power, New York: Random House, 2010, p. 9.
68 Sanjay Chaturvedi and Timothy Doyle, ‘Geopolitics of Climate
Change and Australia's Reengagement with Asia: Discourses of Fear
and Cartographic Anxieties’, Aus-tralian Journal of Political Science
vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 95–115.
69 ACCE, ‘Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment: A
Contribution to the Inter-national Polar Year 2007–2008’, Cambridge:
SCAR, 2008.
70 Cited in ATCM, ‘Report from Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on
Implications of Climate Change for Antarctic Management and
Governance: Co-Chairs’ Executive Summary with Advice for
Actions’. XXXIII Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, 3–14 May.
Punta del Este, Uruguay. WP 63 (2010), p. 9.
71 See Harsh V. Pant (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World,
London, New York, New Delhi: Routledge, 2009.
72 C. Raja Mohan, ‘India's New Foreign Policy Strategy’. Paper
presented at a seminar in Beijing, organized by China Reform Forum
and the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-national Peace, Beijing, 26
May 2006, p. 4.
73 For a discussion on the Australian Antarctic submission see Andrew
Serdy, ‘Towards Certainty of Seabed Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical
Miles from the Territorial Sea Baseline: Australia's Submission to the
Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf ’, Ocean Development
and International Law, vol. 36 (2005), pp. 201–217.
74 Republic of India: Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations:
‘Notifcation Regarding the Submission Made by Australia to the
 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ’, 13 July 2005
(emphasis given). [Accessed 21 July 2012]
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. See
Karen N. Scott, ‘Managing Sovereignty and Jurisdictional Disputes in
the Antarctic: The Next Fifty Years’, Yearbook of International
Environmental Law vol. 20 (2009).
75 Ibid.
76 B. A. Hamzah, ‘Malaysia and the Southern Ocean: Revisiting the
Question of Antarc-tica’, Ocean Development and International Law
vol. 41 (2010), p. 186.
77 Jorgen Ørstrøm Møller, ‘Asia Redraws the Map of Progress’, The
Futurist, September–October 2010, p. 17. [Accessed 21 July 2012]
www.realdaniadebat.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Erhvervsforum/9.%
20november%202011/Jørgen%20Ørstrøm%20
artikel%20Futurist%202010.pdf.
78 Wei-chin Lee, ‘China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet So Near’, Asian
Survey vol. 30 (1990), p. 585.
79 Anne-Marie Brady, Chapter 2 this volume.
80 Pant, ‘India and the Indian Ocean’.
81 Alan D. Hemmings, ‘Does Bioprospecting Risk Moral Hazard for
Science in the Ant-arctic Treaty System?’ Ethics in Science and
Environmental Politics vol. 10 (2010), p. 11.
82 Andrew Darby, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July 2007.
83 See Bruce Davis, ‘Science, Environment and Development: Conficting
or Com-plementary Aspects of Asian Antarctic Programs’, in R. A.
Herr and B. W. Davis (eds), Asia in Antarctica, Canberra: Centre for
Resources and Environmental Studies, The Australian National
University, 1994.
84 Duncan French and Karen Scott, ‘Implications of Climate Change for
the Polar Regions: Too Much, Too Little, Too Late?’ Melbourne
Journal of International Law vol. 10, no. 2 (2009), pp. 631–654.
85 R. A. Herr and B. W. Davis (eds), Asia in Antarctica, Canberra: Centre
for Resources and Environmental Studies, The Australian National
University, 1994.
86 Alan D. Hemmings and Tim Stephens, ‘Australia's Extended
Continental Shelf: What Implications for Antarctica?’ Public Law
Review vol. 20 (2009), pp. 9–16; Klaus Dodds and Alan D.
Hemmings, ‘Frontier Vigilantism? Australia and Contemporary
Representations of Australian Antarctic Territory’, Australian Journal
of Politics and History 55 (2009), pp. 513–528; Donald Rothwell,
Polar Regions and the Development of International Law, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
87 David P. Fidler, ‘The Asian Century: Implications for International
Law’, Singapore Year Book of International Law vol. 9 (2005), pp. 19–
35.
88 Ibid., p. 20.
89 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p. 298.
4 Cool Korea

Korea's growing Antarctic interests

Anne-Marie Brady and Kim Seungryeol

From 2004 to 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK)'s budget for polar
research increased an incredible five times over, from US$10 million to the
current amount of US$50 million. Korea currently has strong geostrategic,
scientific, environmental, economic, and political interests in Antarctica, as
well as the Arctic. However, for the first twenty-five years of its
involvement in the Antarctic continent, the ROK's research programme and
activities in Antarctica were very modest, focusing on fishing, seismic
activity, and weather observations. Yet in a very short time the dramatic
increase in the ROK's polar budget has brought it from being a minor to a
medium player in Antarctica. Korea is currently the fifteenth largest
economy in the world and is looking at ways to expand its global influence.
Since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008 Seoul
has adopted a “global Korea” and “climate diplomacy” foreign policy
which is aimed at increasing the ROK's global influence, commensurate
with its economic importance.1 Its increased engagement in Antarctica
refects that global strategy.
 This chapter outlines Korea's current interests in Antarctica. It examines
the reasons behind Korea's increased involvement in and commitment to
Antarctica; profles the various bodies involved in maintaining and
negotiating Korea's Antarctic presence and voice on Antarctic affairs; and
discusses Korea's core interests in the Antarctic continent that help to shape
its Antarctic policy.

Korea's Antarctic organisations

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) became the 33rd signatory to the
Antarctic Treaty in November 1986. Three months later, in January 1987,
the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) also signed up to the
Treaty. It is likely Pyongyang acceded to the Antarctic Treaty more as a
result of the rivalry between the two Koreas for international recognition,
than due to any demonstrable engagement with Antarctic affairs (though
recently boats listed as being registered in the DPRK have been involved in
illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean2). At the time that the two Koreas
joined the Antarctic Treaty, neither was a member of the United Nations
and both were striving for international status. A further factor for both
Koreas in signing up to the Treaty was that the 1980s was the decade when
Antarctic Treaty signatories were debating a possible minerals extraction
regime for Antarctica, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Minerals Resource Activities (CRAMRA). In these years there was a rush
of nations with no previous Antarctic activities to sign up to the Treaty:
Uruguay (1980); Italy, Papua New Guinea, Peru (1981); Spain (1982); the
People's Republic of China, India (1983); Cuba, Finland, Hungary, Sweden
(1984); Austria, Ecuador, Greece (1987); Canada (1988); Colombia (1989).
However, only consultative partners to the Treaty, those who had been
recognised as having a genuine scientific interest in Antarctica, were
allowed to have a say in the new minerals regime or other governance
issues. Of the eighteen countries that signed up to the Treaty in the 1980s,
only nine were admitted to consultative status. South Korea was among
these few, being accepted as a consultative party to the Treaty in October
1989, the same year the CRAMRA agreement was dealt a deathblow by the
decision of the Australian and French governments not to ratify the
agreement. Yet South Korea had other interests in the Antarctic region
which went beyond the rivalries of the unfnished Korean civil war or the
negotiations over CRAMRA, through their fishing interests in the Southern
Ocean. South Korean scientists first began studying Antarctic issues in
1978, the same year that government-subsidised South Korean boats first
entered the Southern Ocean to fsh for krill. The Korean government's
subsidies to Korean krill boats ended the year the ROK joined the Treaty.3
In 1988 Korea's first Antarctic station, King Sejong Station (Sejong Giji),
was completed on the Barton Peninsula of King George Island.4 The base
was named after Sejong the Great (1397–1450), renowned for his efforts to
end Korea's cultural dependence on China by creating the Korean alphabet,
and for promoting many new developments in the area of science. Initially
it was planned to have King Sejong Station used by both South and North
Korean scientists,5 but subsequent political developments have put that plan
on hold so far.
Also in 1988 the Ministry of Science and Technology set up an Antarctic
Science Research Team and sent the first overwintering group of scientists
to the new base.6 In October 1988 Seoul held the First International
Antarctic Science Symposium, inviting forty scholars from ten leading
countries in Antarctic research to share their findings with Korean
specialists.7 The following year, on the basis of these scientific activities,
South Korea was accepted as a consultant party to the Antarctic Treaty.8 In
1990 it joined the scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR).9 In
1995 the 19th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) was held in
Seoul. The Korean government invited sixteen non-consultative nations
including North Korea and Cuba.10 At the time it was making great efforts
to improve its relations with communist and former communist states
through its “Nordpolitik” policy. The ATCM became a vehicle for this goal.
Korea's Antarctic research programme is conducted by several
government ministries and government-supported research institutes with
overlapping interests. Korea is active in both Antarctica and the Arctic. A
key body among Korea's various governmental organisations working on
polar affairs is the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), an autonomous
organisation of the Korea Ocean Research & Development Institute
(KORDI).11 KOPRI was founded in 1987, initially as the Polar Research
Laboratory of the KORDI.12 After being raised to the status of a polar
research institute in 2003, it became an autonomous institute affliated to
KORDI in 2004.13 KOPRI falls under the auspices of the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology (MEST). The objective of KOPRI is to
contribute to the nation's political and economic interests in the Arctic and
Antarctica, and improve the nation's international status by continuously
conducting research in the polar regions.14 KOPRI focuses on five main
tasks: (1) to research basic and applied science in the polar regions; (2) to
operate South Korea's Arctic and Antarctic stations, and support research
programmes there; (3) to collaborate with foreign polar research institutes;
(4) to foster polar research programmes with domestic academic and
corporate partners; and (5) to raise awareness of the importance of the polar
regions among the Korean public.15
There are four ministries involved in polar affairs: the Ministry of Land,
Transportation and Maritime Affairs (MLTM); the Ministry of Education,
Science and Technology (MEST); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MOFAT); and the Ministry of Environment (MOE). MLTM is in charge of
establishing Korea's basic plan for Antarctic research activity every five
years and the annual plan for cooperation with the other relevant ministries
and KOPRI. The five-year plan for polar research must be endorsed by the
National Commission of Science and Technology. MTLM also supports
setting up new infrastructure such as Korea's new icebreaker and second
Antarctic base with its research and development funds.
MEST has an important role in Korea's Antarctic programme in funding
Korea's scientific research in Antarctica and promoting awareness about
Antarctica in Korea through KOPRI.16 Korea's Ministry of Environment is
responsible for establishing domestic law related to Antarctic activities and
environmental protection in the region.17 It also has the task of ensuring all
Korean activities in Antarctica are in accordance with international and
domestic environmental laws.18 The ministry evaluates the operation and
maintenance of the King Sejong Station.19 KOPRI organises government
inspection teams of the base, in coordination with the relevant ministries. In
2008 Korea set up its own Antarctic Special Protected Area close to King
Sejong Station.20
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) represents the
Republic of Korea in the Antarctic system by regularly participating in
ATCM. MLTM and Ministry of Environment staff also take part in these
meetings; as do KOPRI staff. MOFAT staff research Antarctic current
affairs, producing regular policy papers to negotiate the ROK's Antarctic
presence and voice on Antarctic affairs.21 The Ministry also works with the
Ministry of Environment to establish Korea's domestic laws for Antarctic
activity and environmental protection in line with the requirements of the
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.22 MOFAT
also represents the ROK at annual meetings to discuss the Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) with
the objective of enhancing Korean fishing companies' rights and interests as
well as joining the international effort to protect Antarctic marine living
resources.23 The Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
(MFFAFF) and the National Fisheries Research and Development Institute
(NFRDI) attend meetings of CCAMLR alongside MOFAT officials.
MOFAT also promotes the ROK's bilateral strategic cooperation with other
nations in polar scientific research and resource development.24
Korea currently spends US$50 million on polar activities, with US$30
million devoted to Antarctica. The table below outlines how the Korean
government's spend on Antarctic affairs is divided.
As noted, Korea's budget for polar research increased by over 400 per
cent in a very short time: from US$9 million in 2004, to US$50 million in
2010.25 Polar spending suffered a minor blip in 2008 when the government
cut back spending by 10 per cent after the global financial crisis; however,
it has now recovered and is likely to continue to rise. The budget for the
icebreaker and the new base came out of a separate one-off budget line
from MTLM.
A number of major Korean corporations have been heavily involved in
Korea's Antarctic endeavours. Hyundai Corporation has taken part in
Korea's Antarctic activities from the earliest days, constructing Korea's first
Antarctic base.26 Lee Myung-bak, the current president of the ROK under
whose leadership Korea's Antarctic programme has greatly strengthened,
was formerly CEO of Hyundai for twenty-seven years. Samsung Heavy
Industries and STX Offshore and Shipbuilding designed Korea's new
icebreaker Araon,27 and Hanjin Heavy Industry built the icebreaker.28
 The Korean Supporters Association for Polar Research (KOSAP) was
founded in 2005 as an NGO aimed at supporting Korea's polar activities.29
It has a webpage and publishes a popular magazine to provide information
on the polar regions. It also helps educational institutions to develop
teaching materials on

Table 4.1 Korea's Antarctic budget (2010)

Activities Agency Funds (unit: millions of
won)
KOPRI annual funds Korea Polar Research 21,277
Institute
Contract-based Ministry of Land, 19,104
Transport and Maritime
Affairs
projects within Ministry of Education 40
and Science
Technology
ministries Ministry of 213
Environment
Korean Meteorological 714
Administration
Rural Development 50
Administration
Contract-based Public Institutions 1,311
projects with other Universities 40
agencies Private Enterprise 100
Total 42,709
(US$30,465,807)
Source: Annual Report 2010, Korea Polar Research Institute, Issue Paper, 2010.

the polar regions.30 Funded by its members and sponsoring businesses,

KOSAP supports not only KOPRI but other research institutes and
researchers engaged in the polar regions.31 It operates a scholarship to train
polar research professionals and provides aid for research institutes to
launch polar projects.32
The absence of a central organisation of polar affairs hinders Seoul from
pursuing its scientific, economic, and political interests in Antarctica in a
more integrated way. The ROK's scattered Antarctic organisations with
different aims seem to have an insufficient understanding of the real
potential and diverse values of Antarctica and sometimes of the nuances of
ATS agreements. The lack of experience of many of the personnel in the
various government agencies which deal with Antarctic matters and their
frequent rotation into other roles make them heavily depend on KOPRI for
advice. However, KOPRI is more of a scientific research institute by nature
than an integrated policy-making organisation. Most members of KOPRI
are scientists who do not have specialised knowledge of Seoul's varied
strategic interests in Antarctica. Although KOPRI has a Department of
Strategy and Policy, the Department does not represent the integrated vision
of the ROK's Antarctic enterprise. It usually makes its own plans on the
research activities and operation of its polar infrastructure. KOPRI lacks
staff from a social and political science background to engage in policy
work. Although KOPRI leadership realised years ago the importance and
necessity of multidisciplinary approaches to Antarctica, there have been
very few changes in the way Korea carries out its Antarctic research.

Korea's Antarctic presence

As noted, the ROK set up its first base on the Barton Peninsula of King
George Island, 120 km off the coast of Antarctica. During the peak summer
season King Sejong Station can house ninety personnel, while during the
winter personnel numbers drop to eighteen. The station is located just
outside the latitudinal boundaries of Antarctica, which puts some
limitations on its usefulness as a base for cutting-edge Antarctic research.
scientific research is the basic currency of Antarctic politics, so without a
strong research output South Korea won't be taken seriously as an Antarctic
player. While Korea's Antarctic budget increases mean it is a medium
player in terms of spend; Korean Antarctic science contributions still tend
to replicate the work of other national programmes. Having a rapid
increasing budget at a time when other more traditional players in the
Antarctic, such as New Zealand, the UK, the USA, and Italy are cutting
back on theirs, makes Korea an attractive partner for international
collaboration, but it will take a few more years' work before there is a pay-
off from this budget in terms of top-level science.
In 2003, Seoul announced plans to build a new 10,000 ton icebreaker, the
Araon, which would be used as a multi-purpose vessel for transportation,
research, and housing.33Araoncost US$1 billion and was completed in
2009.34 In 2006 the Korean government announced it was setting up a
second Antarctic base.35 The ROK is only the ninth state in Antarctica
operating more than one base. In 2011 the Korean government announced it
had decided on a location for the new base, Terra Nova Bay, in the Victoria
Land of the Ross Ice Shelf area. Jang Bogo Station will be in operation by
2014. In January 2012 a government delegation visited there to officially
announce the construction site.36 Construction will start in the 2012/2013
austral summer. The total budget for the new station is 106,675 million won
(US$90.7 million). Jang Bogo (?–846 ad) was a powerful maritime leader
from the Unified Silla era of Korean history. The new station will apply the
latest in renewable energy technologies to reduce its carbon footprint in
Antarctica. Thirty per cent of its energy needs will be provided by wind and
solar power.

Political influences on Korea's Antarctic policy

There have been seven different Korean governments in power since the
ROK began engaging in Antarctic affairs. Although the basic themes
underlying Korean Antarctic policy have remained unchanged, the political
colour of each administration has been refected in its polar policy,
intertwined with Korea's internal and external social and political
circumstances. Throughout the years since the ROK joined the ATS, the
ROK's Antarctic enterprise has frequently been politicised in domestic
politics in order to strengthen the position of each government.
President Park Chung-hee (1963–1979) had an uncomfortable
relationship with the US government in the early period of his presidency.
This uncomfortable diplomatic relationship affected the US response to
Korea's deep sea fishery in the northern oceans. In the 1970s increasing
restrictions were imposed on South Korean vessels fishing in the northern
oceans by the USA as well as the Soviet Union. Seoul began turning its
fishing attention to the Antarctic Ocean and Korean boats were sent there,
subsidised by the government. After Park's assassination, President Chun
seized power through a military coup.37 President Chun Doo-hwan's (1980–
1988) Antarctic policy was focused on joining the Antarctic Treaty, in order
to demonstrate South Korea's increased national strength to both internal
and external observers. His successor President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993)
came to power at the end of the Cold War era. In this period Seoul's
Antarctic policy served as a non-political tool to establish diplomatic links
with the Soviet Union and China, and to indirectly put North Korea under
pressure to open up, what was known as the “Nordpolitik” policy.
Under the Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) administration Seoul's Antarctic
policy was shaped by the concept of “segyehwa” or “globalisation”. Due to
bilateral and multilateral pressures, South Korea has suffered from trade
barriers being imposed against its relatively closed economy.38 In response,
“segyehwa” was promoted as a survival strategy for Korea to become an
influential nation in the world. In particular, the Kim government noted the
importance of a nation's ability to have a say on global agendas.39
Witnessing many other emerging nations fail to join the ranks of developed
nations because of their weak voice in the international arena despite their
rapid economic development, the Kim government's “segyehwa” took the
initiative by addressing global environmental issues. In support of the
“segyehwa” policy which focused on securing Korea's global influence by
being a leading nation on global environmental preservation, in 1995 Seoul
criticised the weak environmental regulations of the Antarctic Treaty
System and urged other consultative members to follow its initiative in
establishing domestic Antarctic environment laws.40
President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) took Office when the ROK was
still recovering from the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997. The
top priority of the Kim administration was to repay the debt from the IMF
as soon as possible by boosting Korean exports and tightening the
government's expenditure in the areas which were not expected to produce
immediate results benefcial to the Korean economy. As a result Korea's
Antarctic programme became neglected. Since the Kim administration
emphasised applied science, KORDI failed to secure enough research funds
to construct an Antarctic continental station and build an icebreaker.41 Even
after repaying the loan from the IMF in full, the government's priority was
not Antarctic affairs; it was focused on improving its relationship with
North Korea. It was not until 2002 that the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and
Fisheries announced the “Polar Research Long-term Development Plan”
whereby US$70 million would be spent to construct a second station in the
Antarctic Continent in 2006.42 However, funding diffculties meant that this
plan was delayed for a few more years.
President Kim's successor, President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008),
increased Korea's investment in, and commitment to, Antarctic affairs in
order to win back popular support after the death of a Korean researcher in
Antarctica in 2003. The publicity about the poor researching conditions of
the King Sejong Station and the government's lack of commitment to
Antarctic research (at the time it had a budget for Antarctic activities of
only US$10 million), led to public pressure for the Korean government to
step up its investment. The Roh government (facing an election) announced
that it was going to make the Polar Research Institute in KORDI an
independent affliated organisation and increase the size of the new
icebreaker from 5,000 to 10,000 tons.43 In addition, with public ratings
hitting rock bottom, on 28 June 2007, the Roh government announced that
within the year it was going to decide the location for where Korea's second
Antarctic continental base would be built, and vowed to complete the
construction of the base by 2011.44 President Roh's response to public
pressure sparked off Korea's rapid increase in spending on Antarctic affairs
and the current administration under Lee Myung-bak (2008–) has continued
this initiative. Lee has also been seeking to popularise Korea's activities in
Antarctica in order to win public support and justify Korea's on-going
efforts there. Since President Lee took Office the South Korean government
has regarded global environment issues as its most important agenda and
attempted to use environmentalism as a force for economic growth.45 The
Lee government has been actively seeking creative and original solutions to
global climate change and its effects through its green growth policy and
climate change diplomacy.46
The Lee government has been actively promoting its so-called “climate
change diplomacy”,47 and its increasing Antarctic research on climate
change is meant to justify the leading role of South Korea in international
negotiations by providing a symbolic and theoretical background in
addressing global climate change. In this sense, Antarctica has become of
great value to the Lee government. The Korean government is investing in
the development of environmental technology in order to overcome global
climate change and pursue long-term economic growth.48 The government
hopes the new technology will help to create new jobs and export
markets.49 Since Korea is poor in natural resources, the Lee government has
also been investing its environmental technology and capital in developing
nations which are rich in natural resources, so as to secure permanent
energy sources.50 In addition, as part of its “climate change diplomacy”,
South Korea has volunteered to play a bridging role between developed and
developing nations in dealing with legal obligations on climate change.51
Research has shown that due to negative international perceptions of
South Korea, the products of Korean firms are valued lower than firms in
other countries.52 A nation's positive image enhances the competitiveness of
its products.53 While Korea's transnational corporations such as Samsung,
Hyundai, and LG have already independently secured a positive global
image, the images of its small and medium enterprises and their products
(90 per cent of Korean workers are employed by such companies) are
directly related to international perceptions of the ROK. In January 2009
President Lee launched the Presidential Council on National Branding, with
the goal of reducing the so-called “Korea Discount” through Korea's re-
branding.54 It is believed that the high level of South Korean science and
technology — as evidenced by Korean scientists' achievements in Antarctic
research — will enhance the nation's brand image, and this will ultimately
contribute to the credibility of the nation's small and medium enterprises.

Korea's political interests in Antarctica

Despite different agendas and motivations in Antarctic policy among the
various administrations since Korea has been a signatory to the Treaty, a
number of aims have been consistently pursued.55 One of these aims is to
maintain and negotiate the ROK's Antarctic presence and voice on
Antarctic affairs. With a strong awareness of the huge potential geopolitical
and economic value of Antarctica, but at the same time being conscious of
the great uncertainty regarding future developments in the region, Seoul has
attempted to win vested rights there and to increase its rights to maximise
its national interest in the future development of Antarctica. All of the
ROK's Antarctic activities including scientific research, international
academic conferences, and diplomatic efforts to address environmental
issues, have been carried out with the theme of securing a vested interest
there. The ultimate goal of Korea's polar research is to be able to take a
leadership role in any future new legal order in the polar regions. South
Korea is aware of the importance of producing high-quality research
outputs in order to maintain its vested right in any new regime in the
Antarctic or the Arctic.
A further objective in the ROK's Antarctic policies is to exercise more
influence in the international political arena. As noted, the ROK's
international status has never been commensurate with its economic power.
In order to improve its national prestige in the world community, in recent
years Korea has hosted international sporting events and international
summit meetings such as the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and the
G20 Summit. Seoul views its Antarctic enterprise as an investment to help
foster international perceptions of Korea as a first-class nation and enhance
its international status. Seoul, like other rising states, seeks to improve its
international political status by actively participating in global organisations
such as the Antarctic Treaty System. Antarctica is one of the arenas where
South Korea expects to faunt its national strength,56 its contribution to the
world community, and exercise its global leadership.57 Antarctica is an
arena where Seoul is able to play a leading role in the international
community by means of its advanced science and technology; which is a
non-political means for influence.58
Korea has strong Antarctic linkages with a number of countries which
help to improve bilateral connections in other aspects. It works on scientific
projects with Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Russia, the UK, Norway,
Chile, France, New Zealand, and the USA. It has also offered berths on its
icebreaker to countries with whom it is not yet collaborating on Antarctic
projects. In 2004 the ROK took the lead in organising the Asian Forum for
Polar Sciences (AFOPS). China and Japan were the other initial participants
in this group. Malaysia and India joined AFOPS in 2006. The ROK
proposed AFOPS with the goal of establishing a mutual-assistance system
for Asian polar programmes and as a counter-measure to the regional
grouping phenomenon of European and Central and South American
Antarctic states.59 The Director-General of KOPRI was elected to be the
AFOPS chairman for the first two years.60 AFOPS aims to provide a
foundation for cooperative research activities among member countries, to
present Asian achievements toward international polar kcommunities, and
to encourage non-polar Asian countries' involvement in polar research.61
AFOPS has five Working Groups: Earth Science, Life Science, Planetary
Science, Engineering and Logistics, and Public Relations and Data
Management with representatives from all the member countries.62

Korea's Antarctic science

The ROK's current six major scientific research areas in the polar regions
are geology, biology, oceanography, paleocryology, cosmology, and
information science. The main accomplishments of South Korea's polar
research are classifed into four fields: securing continent-based fundamental
technology, studying polar environmental change, securing practical polar
application technology, and establishing an advanced polar research
infrastructure.63 These accomplishments have taken years for the ROK to
build up. Below we will highlight a few of the ROK's current key Antarctic
research projects.
Korean scientists have been developing technology to investigate the
polar paleoclimate and paleoocean, examining the record of past climate
change in order to forecast trends for the future.64 The first objective of this
research is to establish the paleoclimate and paleoocean record of the polar
regions by using the sediment of polar ocean and land, and to understand
the main factors that caused paleoclimate change. The second objective is
to understand the correlations between global climate change and regional
climate change by comparing the paleoclimate change of the mid-latitudes,
including the Korean peninsula, with that of the polar regions.65
Korean scientists are verifying geological evolution and tectonics of the
South Shetland Arc-Trench system in the Northern Antarctic Peninsula
Region since the late Palaeozoic.66 Korean researchers who have been
studying the tectonic evolution processes and the structure of the
lithosphere beneath West Antarctica describe the Antarctic continent and its
neighbouring waters as a “storeroom” of the history of Earth.67
Korean scientists are investigating the characteristics of living organisms
in the polar regions and their adaptive mechanisms in extreme
temperatures.68 They have also been observing the distribution and numbers
of the indicator organisms so that they can develop barometers to monitor
and predict changes in the eco-system.69 The ROK has established a polar
observation network with the objective of developing polar ocean
observation and hydro-acoustic observation equipment.70 Other researchers
will explore the hydrothermal system in Antarctica.71
In 2006 South Korea was ranked the first in emission increase rates for
green-house gases among OECD states.72 Working under the assumption
that a much stricter global standard on greenhouse gas emission will be set
in the near future, the government has been keen to find new ways of
reducing and isolating carbon dioxide. Since the Southern Ocean absorbs
most of the greenhouse gases produced by humankind, Korean scientists
have been assessing the greenhouse gas disposal capacity of the Southern
Ocean to see if it could absorb still more.73
The ROK has a strong interest in biological research in Antarctica. Polar
living organisms have unique physical characteristics with possible
commercial applications. Hence ROK scientists are currently investigating
the properties of a variety of polar organisms and plant genetic resources,
hoping to develop future biomaterials such as low temperature enzymes,
cosmetic ingredients, and metabolism activators.74 ROK scientists are also
attempting to replicate polar living organisms and establish the means to
utilise these creatures for commercial purposes.75 The specifc objective of
this research is to secure and culture low temperature polar microalgae,
marine algae, microorganisms, marine creatures, land creatures, and
freshwater creatures; to select highly cultivable polar creatures and establish
a mass cultivation system; to establish a polar creature bank and theme park
in Korea; and to support the applied research for commercialising these
polar living creatures.76
The ROK participated in an IPY (International Polar Year) glacier
programme, the International Trans Antarctic scientific Expedition (ITASE)
to explore Antarctic glaciers and develop basic technology for glacial
studies.77 From Korea's perspective the objectives of this research were to
train professionals in glacial environment exploration and develop domestic
glacial research infrastructure;78 to develop the analysis technology of
environmental tracer or climate proxies to restore the global climate
system;79 and to explore, drill, and study the glaciers nearby to Korea's
newest base.80
South Korea has developed its own Antarctic meteorite collection
programme and organised the Meteorite
Classifcation/Distribution/Research Committee that consists of members
from KOPRI, Seoul National University, and the University of California at
Los Angeles.81 It has registered its five Antarctic meteorites in international
organisations (TIL06001-TIL06005).82 With the establishment of an
infrastructure to manage and study meteorites, Korea has entered the stage
of doing research on the formation of the solar system and universe in
preparation for the coming era of space exploration.83 It has also become
the fifth leading nation in Antarctic meteorite research.84

Korea's economic interests in Antarctica

The ROK's economic interests in Antarctica include current, prospective,
and purely speculative aspects and activities. Korean scientists are cautious
to avoid using terms such as “resources development” or “resources
exploration” to discuss their projects in Antarctica. However, much of their
current research is focused on locating economically exploitable resources
and making more accurate maps of Antarctic resource distribution. In the
following section we will discuss the ROK's current, prospective, and
speculative economic gains from its Antarctic investment.
The ROK's initial interest in the Antarctic region began when the
Fisheries Agency subsidised a fishing company to catch krill off the coasts
of Enderby Land and Wilkes Land from 1978 to 1979.85 Seoul is very
interested in exploiting polar marine products. Polar marine products
surpass the total production of marine products from all the other waters in
the world.86 Korean boats currently catch krill and Patagonian toothfish in
the Southern Ocean. Korea's annual catch of krill is about 100,000 tons,
which are made into processed food and farming feed.87 According to
Korean fgures there are 5,000 million to 7,500 million tons of krill,
Patagonian toothfish, and squid in the Southern Ocean.88 There are plans to
expand the Korean krill catch in the Southern Ocean still further. South
Korean researchers believe that krill is a food resource that will not run
out.89 KOPRI has been researching the volume and distribution of krill in
the waters around the South Shetland Islands, which has been one of the
main krill fsheries.90 ROK scientists have been conducting marine acoustic
surveys using a science fishery detector and general oceanographic
investigations in order to find out the physical, chemical, and biological
traits of the krill's living environment.91 As the volume of the krill
signifcantly fuctuates every year due to the changing marine environment,
Korean scientists have been conducting research on the causes of this
environmental change so as to effectively manage krill resources.92
Considering the quantity and nutritional value of krill, Korean researchers
believe that it is a food resource that will not run out and expect a great
economic effect once Korea fnishes establishing the infrastructure on which
to begin fishing in earnest.93 Yet recent reports by NGOs predict that the
Ross Sea and other Southern Ocean fishing stocks may be nearing
exhaustion.94 New Zealand and the United States are proposing that the
Ross Sea become a Marine Protected Area; though traditional fishing areas
will be excluded.95 The Korean government has not yet stated its views on
this new initiative.96
The ROK has a strong interest in the potential of Antarctic mineral
resources. ROK scientists have already discovered that an enormous
amount of methane hydrate, which Korea could use for 300 years at the
same rate as its current use of natural gas, is buried around the King Sejong
Station.97 ROK scientists have discovered a gas hydrate sedimentary layer
in the Northern waters of Antarctica.98 Based upon its accumulated
experience in Antarctica, South Korea is now conducting research on gas
hydrate development in the Arctic.99
Scientific research on mineral resources in Antarctica is permitted under
the terms of the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic
Treaty (commonly known as the Madrid Protocol); though mineral
exploitation is banned. Many Korean polar specialists interviewed for this
research believe that in 2048 the Madrid Protocol will expire and a new
minerals exploitation regime will be set up. In fact the Protocol on
Environmental Protection won't necessarily expire at this date, but it will be
open for renegotiation from 2048 if a signatory country requested it.100 One
leading Antarctic specialist, Dr Jang Soon Keun, also told us he thought
sovereignty claims over the Antarctic would eventually disappear.101 The
seven claimant states in Antarctica would certainly take a different view on
that topic. These different understandings by Korean polar specialists on
Antarctic legal issues should be noted and acknowledged by other Antarctic
states, not simply dismissed as “ignorant”. With peak oil having been
reached in 2006, world public opinion on oil extraction in Antarctica may
well be very different to how it was in 1991.
South Korea has had three major achievements in its research on polar
submarine geological features. The first achievement is that it has obtained
high resolution data on the Antarctic submarine strata.102 This high
resolution data has enabled the ROK to select potential areas blessed with
submarine resources.103 Antarctica holds fifty-five billion barrels of
petroleum and 221 trillion m3 of natural gas. Second, South Korea has
collected surface deposits from the Northeast continent through
gravitational drilling cores.104 It has analysed the organic compounds of the
surface deposits and accessed the probabilities of submarine resources. The
third accomplishment is the establishment of a database for polar submarine
geological features and completion of a resource map.105 The ROK will use
this information to draw up a broad submarine resource map of Antarctica
and choose areas to enter that are in the best strategic interests of Korea to
prepare for the point of time when Antarctica and its submarine resources
will start to be developed.106 Of course, this all depends on whether or not
the regime banning mineral extraction in Antarctica will change. South
Korea also expects that the development of underground and underwater
exploration equipment used for its Antarctic research will contribute to its
location-based services and defence-related industries.107
A further economic benefit Seoul hopes to garner from its polar science
activities is the accumulation of fundamental technology through which to
transform the Korean economy from a traditional manufacturing-based one
into a knowledge economy. The ROK government is developing a
knowledge economy with cutting-edge science at its core, based on the
assumption that increased innovation and improvements in productivity will
come from its scientific investments.108 Seoul has dramatically increased
investment in scientific areas from which it could develop fundamental
technologies and South Korea's Antarctic research has a key place in this
new strategy. Biotechnology is one of the areas that the current
administration is concentrating its efforts on as a future growth engine.109
Moreover, Korea's polar exploration, as one of the key disciplines in its big
science plan, is expected to stimulate growth in many scientific and
industrial sectors.110 There are five disciplines in Seoul's big science plan:
space, aviation, ocean, nuclear fusion, and polar exploration.111 Big science
is a systemic scientific field where each discipline interacts with, and
reinforces, one another. If successful, big science will give birth to a raft of
new industries.112
Among Korea's many polar science disciplines, biology is the most
connected to industrial development.113 Although like other nations
engaged in Antarctica, Seoul is reluctant to explicitly promote the industrial
application of its findings, it has been actively conducting biotech research
in Antarctica.114 Seoul views the polar regions as a repository of future life
engineering.115 Scientists have been conducting research on cold region life
engineering, cellular antifreezing substance, cold-active breakdown
enzymes, and cold-active genetic replicas, and hopes to apply the findings
to industrial use.116 For example, ROK scientists have been attempting to
secure biomedical cryopreservation technology.117 They have extracted
anti-freeze protein from polar organisms, in order to utilise this in
pharmaceutical and medical industries for preventing the destruction of
cells when preserving sperm, stem cells, and blood.118 Scientists are also
planning to develop cold region medicine and human physiology-related
technology through research that will be conducted at Korea's Antarctic
continental station.119 Another key industry that South Korea's polar
biotech will benefit is the cosmetic industry. As Antarctica is exposed to
strong ultra-violet radiation ROK scientists are extracting ultra-violet
radiation-resistant substances from Antarctic organisms for utilisation in the
cosmetic industry.120 Seoul is hoping to solve issues of food shortage,
disease, and energy shortages by utilising undeveloped Antarctic biological
resources.121
South Korea is also establishing an environmental infrastructure for
analysing and forecasting climate change based on its polar climate
research.122 As climate change affects the whole planet, the environmental
changes in the polar regions affect the climate and environment in the
middle and low latitudes. Therefore, South Korea seeks to understand
global atmospheric circulations, the course of typhoons, and Asian
monsoon climate change from its polar climate research.123 KOPRI's
research on the ocean and atmospheric circulation in the polar regions will
enhance Korea's climate or weather-related industries who aim to prevent
natural disasters and reduce damage by providing short-term and long-term
forecasts of climate change.124 For example, the active volcano Mt
Baekdoo, located on the boundary of China and North Korea, is likely to
explode in the next few years. The estimated damage and restoration period
can be established by the knowledge of the paleoclimate gained from
Antarctic glaciers.125
In addition to reducing loss of life and property damage, as a 2009 report
from Samsung's Economic Research Unit notes, information about climate,
weather, oceans, and polar ecosystems will benefit a variety of Korean
businesses such as tourism, industries, disaster, and weather information
services for agriculture and fishing, and maritime information services for
safety in the seaways.126 Since climate and weather have a great effect on
many industries, “Industrial Weather Information” has recently been
commercialised.127 The climate and weather information gained from polar
climate research enables businesses to adjust output of their products in
order to maximise their profts.128
The ROK aviation and electronics industry will likely benefit from
Korean scientists' space observation in the polar regions.129 The polar
regions are the optimum places for the operation of a polar satellite tracking
system as well as for space research.130 KOPRI scientists have been
observing the polar upper atmosphere in order to predict space weather
hindrances that affect communications and the orbit of satellites and to
prevent damage from electromagnetic waves.131 The ROK plans to
experiment with the equipment and technologies needed for the space
industry in the polar regions, as preliminary polar research is necessary in
order to develop an advanced space industry.132 Korea's new continental
Antarctic station will have the facilities to enable scientists to develop anti-
freezing liquid and long-distance satellite communication technology, and
to test the performance of telecommunication and semiconductor
materials.133
Seoul is seeking to develop Korean construction technology and
contribute to its construction industry through the construction of the
second permanent base in Antarctica.134 Constructing and operating the
continental base structures will enhance Korea's structural matter
technology to prevent fuid, liquid, and solid matter from being destroyed in
low temperatures.135 Many new technologies have been tested in
preparation for the construction of the continental base, such as the effect of
having permafrost under building structures.136 South Korea's new base will
be environmentally friendly.137 Korea is planning to build a wind power
plant and structures to utilise solar energy for the base,138 which will
contribute to the technological development of Korea's domestic energy
industry.139 The accumulated technology of permafrost and extreme-cold
engineering, and experience of operating construction equipment in an
intense cold land will help raise the quality of Korea's wind-resistant
building design and heat-conservation materials, which will ultimately lead
to the technological development of South Korea's construction and its
related industries.140
For many years South Korea has been the top ranking nation for
commercial shipping construction. Constructing an icebreaker domestically
was suggested in order to boost Korea's shipbuilding industry and other
related industries. Considering the global environment in which polar
research and commercial activities in those regions is increasing, the market
for polar sailing vessels and relevant structures has increased.141 Hence
Seoul decided to seize the momentum, believing that the domestic
construction of its first multi-purpose vessel would increase the
competitiveness of its shipbuilding and other domestic industries.
 South Korea expects economic benefits in three areas from designing and
building the Araon. First, in terms of its shipbuilding industry, it is
confident in winning more contracts for icebreaking vessels. Although the
demand for special ships is not great in the overseas market, Seoul
estimates it could gain US$300 million sales for three years by obtaining an
order for an icebreaker.142 Second, shipbuilding-related industries such as
the steel industry, paint industry, and in terior design businesses are likely to
benefit from building an ice-capable vessel.143 To illustrate, the body of an
icebreaker must be built with high performance thick steel plate that is
strong enough to endure minus 60 to 70 degrees Celsius.144 Weld zones
should also be able to endure the same external environment, which will
lead to the development of construction technology. Likewise, the
development of special paint and advanced construction technology are
required to minimise the damage done to the body parts that often bump
against the ice.145 The construction of icebreaking vessels may also have a
follow-on effect on Korean companies winning a contract for the
construction of steel buildings and offshore plants for other states in the
polar regions.146

Conclusion
The ROK government's motivations behind its dramatic increase in
spending and activities in Antarctica are various and complex. First of all,
ROK polar policy has been determined and shaped by the level of its
scientific research in the regions. The ROK has been busy catching up with
the scientific level of leading polar research nations in recent years. It has
set a variety of scientific goals and has carried out research in many
different polar scientific areas. As its research has become more and more
fruitful, the scientific gap between leading nations and itself has been
narrowed, and meanwhile its presence as a research nation in the regions
has been strengthened with the passage of time, Seoul has been embodying
its strategic polar interests into more concrete economic and political
policies.
A core justifcation for the ROK's involvement in the polar regions has
been a belief in the unlimited economic potential of the Antarctica and
Arctic. Seoul is interested in locating energy resources such as crude
petroleum and methane hydrate, and marine products such as Antarctic
krill. The ROK's research and presence in the polar regions is accelerating
the shift of its economy from manu-facturing to technology and knowledge-
based industries, and helping to enhance its national brand image so that it
can boost the exports of its small and medium businesses. The ROK is
working hard to maximise connections between its polar research and
domestic industries.
Seoul is seeking more concrete and practical ways to relate its Antarctic
enterprise to industrial development. One aspect of Korea's Antarctic
biological research has been to apply some of its findings to Korea's
pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries. There are many other domestic
industries that the ROK attempts to boost through its Antarctic research
including the aviation and electronics industries from space observation in
the polar regions; disaster and weather information services for agriculture
and fishing; and maritime information services for safe seaways, by
providing climate and weather information.
Like other Antarctic players, the ROK is active in Antarctica because it
desires to win vested rights there and increase its right to maximise its
national interest in the future development of Antarctica. Antarctica is
understood as one of the international political arenas where a nation can
exercise leadership. Seoul views its participation in the Antarctic Treaty
System as a stepping stone to taking on leadership roles internationally and
playing a more vital role in the world community.
Unlike previous administrations, the Antarctic policy of the current Lee
Myung-bak government is not clearly divided into domestic and
international purposes. Since his national vision is “green growth”, Korea's
Antarctic policy serves this vision and combines domestic and international
political elements. Korea's Antarctic research serves as a theoretical basis to
foster Korea's green technology and green industry. ROK scientists'
research on climate change in Antarctica will assist the development of
climate change adaptation technology and climate change reduction
technology. The Lee government has been attempting to standardise its
newly developed environmental technology and legal support system for
the adaptation of this technology in other parts of the world. Second, the
ROK's presence in Antarctica and efforts to study climate change have
entitled Seoul to continue to have a leading role in shaping a new global
structure through “climate change diplomacy”. In this sense, ROK's
Antarctic research could be interpreted as a symbolic gesture of Seoul's
effort and willingness to lead a global environment-oriented civilisation.
A further political objective for the Lee government's Antarctic enterprise
is to promote the image of “Global Korea” to both internal and external
observers. The government has emphasised its bridging role between
developing and developed nations in dealing with global economic and
environmental issues. The government is also showcasing Korea's scientific
achievements to international audiences. The ROK's Antarctic and Arctic
involvement is helping to imprint a positive new image worldwide of itself
as a globally mature nation that is truly “cool Korea”.

Notes
1 The chapter draws on the research in Kim Seungryeol, “Korea's Polar
Strategy”, MA Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2011. Scott Snyder,
“Lee Myung-bak's Foreign Policy: A 250-Day Assessment”, Asia
Foundation Report, 2008, http://asia-
foundation.org/resources/pdfs/SnyderLMBForeignPolicyKJDA.pdf.
2 DPRK registration has been used as a fag of convenience by a Spanish
company Vidal Armadores, engaged in illegal fishing for Patagonian
toothfish, which are managed under the Convention on Antarctic
Marine and Living Resources (CAMLR), one of the agreements within
the ATS. The company has previously registered boats in countries
such as Sierra Leone and Panama which are also not members of
CAMLR. See Kate Wilson and Mar Carbra, “Spain hands out millions
in aid despite fishing company's record”, 5 October 2011, The Cutting
Edge, www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?
article=52852&pageid=89&pagename=Featuress.
3 “The krill catch in the Antarctic Ocean is going to stop”, Mail
Kyungje, 13 October 1987.
4 KOPRI, The 20 Year History of the King Sejong Station, Incheon:
KOPRI, 2008, pp. 79–80.
5 “The science circle actively cooperates with the communist blocs”,
Kyunghyang, 13 January 1989.
6 www.kopri.re.kr/eBook/antarcticnearth/antarcticnearth_politics/antarct
icnearth_politics_history/antarcticnearth_politics_history.cms.
7 KOPRI, The 20 Year History of the King Sejong Station, p. 155.
8 www.kopri.re.kr/www/about/kopri_history/kopri_history.cms.
9 Ibid.
10 “ATCM is scheduled to be held in Seoul in May”, Dong-A Daily, 23
March 1995.
11 Phone interview with Lee Jinyong, Team Leader, Office of Research &
Management, KORDI, 26 March 2010.
12 www.kopri.re.kr/www/about/kopri_history/kopri_history.cms.
13 Ibid.
14 Interview with Jin Dong Min, Director, Department of Strategy and
Policy Development, KOPRI, 19 February 2010.
15 www.kopri.re.kr/www/about/kopri_vision/kopri_vision.cms.
16 See, for example, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the
first, second and third year investigation report on the environment
around King Sejong Station in 1988, 1989, and 1990; also the first,
second and third year research reports on the property and preservation
of Antarctic environment in 1994, 1995, and 1996.
17 See Ministry of Environment, “The Current Situation of Environment-
related Laws and International Treaties”, Seoul, 2008.
18 The Office of Global Environment in the Ministry of Environment is
responsible for making Antarctic management plans and issuing
official documents to relevant departments and institutes.
19 See, for example, Office of Global Environment, Ministry of
Environment, “The Early Environmental Assessment on the
Renovation of the King Sejong Station in Antarctica”, Seoul, 10
October 2007.
20 Office of Global Environment, Ministry of Environment, “The Plan on
the Participation in the International Workshop for the Appointment of
Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA)”, Seoul, 17 April 2008.
21 Kim Chan-woo, Officer of Environment and Science, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The Environmental Diplomacy for
Tomorrow”, Hwankung Daily, 6 July 2007.
22 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Announcement No. 2003–
11”, Seoul, 26 April 2003.
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The General Outlook of
Antarctica”, Seoul, 2008.
24 See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Diplomacy
Journal for January 2009, Seoul, 2009.
25 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp.
26 Oh Ki-se, “Antarctic Exploration”, Sea Explores of Korea, 29 May
2001, www.sekva.or.kr/ttboard/ttboard.cgi?
act=view&code=4&bname=OBM00JD&page=5.
27 Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Land, Transport and
Maritime Affairs, “Araon, the Icebreaker, is Ready to be Built”, Seoul,
2008.
28 Phone interview with Jang Soon Keun, Research Adviser, Division of
Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 13 May 2010.
29 http://kosap.or.kr.
30 http://kosap.or.kr/business5.html.
31 Phone interview with Shin Sunglan, Secretary of KOSAP, 26 March
2010.
32 Ibid.
33 “Araon, the Icebreaker, is Ready to be Built.”
34 www.kopri.re.kr/www/koprizone/notice/userBbs/bbsView.do?
bbs_cd_n=13&bbs_seq_n=448.
35 www.kopri.re.kr/infra/continental/continental_about/continental_about
.cms.
36 “Korea breaks ground on second research base in Antarctica”, Choson
Ilbo, 12 January 2012,
 http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/01/18/20120118011
16.html.
37 “The end of the reinvestigation on the 5.18 incident, tomorrow under
indictment”, Chosun Daily, 22 January 1996.
38 Cabinet Office, 2003,
http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.do?
id=000845&pageFlag=.
39 “The policy direction in the 21st century”, Kyunghyang, 18 November
1994.
40 “Kong Nomyung, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered his
opening speech in the Seoul ATCM”, Kyunghyang, 16 May 1995.
41 “It's urgent to enter into the Antarctic continent”, Han Kyurye, 12 July
2000.
42 “The second Antarctic base is going to be built”, Dong-A Daily, 25
June 2002.
43 “Building a 10,000 ton icebreaker”, Seoul Shinmoon, 9 February 2004.
44 “Too aggressive to build an Antarctic base”, Segye Daily, 30 June
2007.
45 Phone interview with Kim Woohyun, Expert Advisor, Division of
Climate Change Response, Green Growth Committee, 27 October
2010.
46 Phone interview with Shin Yunsung, Ambassador of Climate Change,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 October 2010.
47 Ibid.
48 Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science: Polar Research as a Big
Science”, Science and Technology Policy Institute, Future Horizon
Summer 2010, 2010, pp. 4–5.
49 Phone interview with Kim Hyunok, Deputy Director, Division of
Climate Change Response, Green Growth Committee, 28 October
2010.
50 Phone interview with Kim Woohyun, Expert Advisor, Division of
Climate Change Response, Green Growth Committee, 27 October
2010.
51 Phone interview with Shin Yunsung, Ambassador of Climate Change,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 October 2010.
52 Suh Jung-won, “Korea Discount: Diagnosis and Remedy”, Korean
Securities Association, Asia-Pacifc-Journal-of-Financial-Studies, Vol.
36, No. 4, 2007, pp. 621–655.
53 Yu Jae-woong, National Image: Theory, Strategy and Programme,
Seoul: Communication Books, 2008, pp. 46–50.
54 Uh Yundae, Chairman of PCNB, “The Korean national brand value
underestimated by 30%”, The Asia Economy, 17 March 2009.
55 The following section is based on a phone interview with Yang
Heecheol, Principal Researcher of Ocean Policy Research Division,
KORDI, 18 May 2010.
56 Phone interview with Jang Soon Keun, Research Adviser, Division of
Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 13 May 2010.
57 Phone interview with Yang Heecheol, Principal Researcher of Ocean
Policy Research Division, KORDI, 18 May 2010.
58 Phone interview with Park Sunghwa, Director for Planning and
Management, PCNB, 11 May 2010.
59 Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs,
http://blog.naver.com/mltm_ocean?
Redirect=Log&logNo=60095328924.
60 AFOPS, “AFOPS Short History for COMNAP-EXCOM”, 2004,
http://afops.org/documents.html.
61 http://afops.org/terms%20of%20reference.html.
62 Ibid.
63 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp.
64 Kim Jung-chan, “Korea's Research on Paleoclimate and Paleoocean:
The General Outlook and Future Research Direction”, Jijilhakhoiji,
 Vol. 44, No. 1, February 2008, pp. 1–4.
65 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp.
66 Choe MoonYoung, Geological Evolution and Processes of Antarctica,
Ahnsan: KORDI, 2001, pp. 26–30.
67 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp.
68 Ibid.
69 Kim Yeadong, Annual Report of Environmental Monitoring on Human
Impacts at the King Sejong Station, Ahnsan: KORDI, 1998, pp. 129–
140.
70 See, for example, Park Byung-kwon, Research on Natural
Environments and Resources of Antarctica, Ahnsan: KORDI, 1992.
71 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp.
72 Kim Chan-woo, 21st Century Environmental Diplomacy, Seoul:
Sangsang Communication, 2006, p. 96.
73 Kang Yung-chul, Oceanographic Studies on Antarctic Marine Living
Resources and Ecosystems, Ahnsan: KORDI, 2002, pp. 10–11.
74 Lee Yun-ho, Research on the Development of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, Ahnsan: KORDI, 2000, pp. 87–92, pp. 307–342.
75 Goryungjinongupyungooso, 2008 Experimental Research,
Pyungchang: Rural Development Administration, 2008, pp. 232–235.
76 Phone interview with Lee Yoo Kyung, Director, Division of Polar Life
Sciences, KOPRI, 4 April 2010.
77 Hong Sung-min, “Glacier Exploration on the Antarctic Continent”,
Gwahakgwa Gisool, No. 452, 2006, pp. 50–53.
78 Phone interview with Jin Young Keun, Principal Researcher, Division
of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 17 August 2010.
79 Lee Joohan, “GPR Investigation of Glacier on Livingstone Island,
Antarctica”, 2005 Thesis Collection of the Korean Society of Earth
and Exploration Geophysicists, 2005, pp. 151–154.
80 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp.
81 Ibid.
82 See Han Jang-mi, “The Changing Temperature of the O-Chondrites
Collected in Korea's First and Second Antarctic Meteor Expeditions”,
The Journal of the Geological Society of Korea, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2009,
pp. 157–171.
83 See Kim Kyung-ja, “Development of New Technique to Trace Active
Landscape Change Using Multiple Cosmogonic Nuclides”, The
Journal of Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources,
2008, pp. 15–36.
84 “The first exploration of Antarctic meteors by the domestic academic
circle”, Yunhap News, 29 October 2009.
85 Chang Soonkun, Captain of the 8th Winter Research, “The Antarctic
Continent and Korea's Antarctic Research”, Gwahak Sasang, No. 34,
2000, pp. 184–199.
86 Lee Hong Kum, President of KOPRI, “Pay more attention to Araon to
be a leading polar research country”, Dong-A Daily, 14 September
2009.
87 www.kopri.re.kr/eBook/antarcticnearth/antarcticnearth_ecosystem/anta
rcticnearth_ecosystem_resource/antarcticnearth_ecosystem_resource.c
ms.
88 Chung Hosung, Principal Researcher, Division of Polar Life Science,
KOPRI, “2005 Experience of Antarctica”, 2006,
http://cafe.naver.com/poletopole2.cafe?
iframe_url=/ArticleRead.nhn%3Farticleid=1701.
89 Phone interview with Yang Eun Jin, Principal Researcher, Division of
Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 13 May 2010. See also Kim Doo-
nam, “Distribution of Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus Eleginoides)
by Bottom Longliner in the Southeastern Atlantic Ocean”, Journal of
the Korean Society of Fisheries Technology, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2008.
90 See for example, Kang Donhyug, “Acoustic Estimate of the Krill
(Euphausia Superba) Density Between South Shetland Islands and
South Orkney Islands, Antarctica During 2002/2003 Austral Summer,”
KORDI, Ocean and Polar Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2005, pp. 75–86.
91 Shin Hyung-chul, Research on the Development of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources, Ahnsan: KORDI, 2007, pp. 166–179.
92 Ibid., pp. 228–239, p. 430.
93 Phone interview with Yang Eun Jin, Senior Research Scientist,
Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 13 May 2010.
94 www.pacifcecologist.org/archive/20/pe20-remote-fishery.pdf;
http://lastocean.word-press.com/2011/08/04/the-last-pristine-ocean-
the-ross-sea/.
95 www.stuff.co.nz/environment/5768227/NZ-to-veto-total-protection-of-
Ross-Sea.
96 Jin Dong Min, email communication, 2 February 2012.
97 Lee Hong Kum, President of KOPRI, “Antarctica, a natural proving
ground full of resources”, The Newsis, 5 March 2008.
98 Hong Jong Kuk, “Distribution of Gas Hydrates off Northern Antarctic
Peninsula”, 2007 Spring Meeting of the Korean Society for New and
Renewable Energy, Seoul, 2007, Seoul: KSNRE, 2007, pp. 524–527.
99 Kim Bo-yung, “A Study on the Climate Change and the Policy of
Natural Gas Exploitation on the Arctic Region”, Journal of the Korean
Resource Economics Association, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2009, pp. 787–815.
100www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/treaty/update_1991
.php.
101Phone interview with Jang Soon Keun, Research Adviser, Division of
Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 13 May 2010.
102Jin Young-keun, “Interpretation of Gravity, Magnetic and High-
resolution (3.5 kHz) Seismic Data in the Powell Basin, Antarctica”,
Korean Society of Earth and Exploration Geophysicists, Jigu Mooli,
Vol. 7, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1–10.
103Phone interview with Jin Young Keun, Principal Research Scientist,
Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 17 August 2010.
104Phone interview with Jang Soon Keun, Research Advisor, Division of
Polar Earth-System Sciences, of KOPRI, 13 May 2010.
105www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp.
106Hong Jong Kuk, “Distribution of Gas Hydrates”.
107Phone interview with Jin Young Keun, Principal Research Scientist,
Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 17 August 2010.
108Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 577 Initiative, Seoul,
2008.
109High-tech Information Analysis Institute, New Growth Force
Industries and Business Strategy, Seoul: Jinhan MNB, 2009, p.
110 Lee Won-hee, “The Big Sciences and Technologies We Should Note”,
Samsung Economic Research Institute, CEO Information, No. 719,
2009, p. 14.
111 Phone interview with Ha Taejung, Captain of Technology Fusion
Research Team, New Growth Engines Research Centre, Science and
Technology Policy Institute, 23 June 2010.
112 Lee Won-hee, “The Big Sciences and Technologies We Should Note”,
p. 14.
113 Phone interview with Kim Seong Joong, Director, Polar Climate
Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010.
114 Phone interview with Lee Yoo Kyung, Director, Polar Life Sciences,
KOPRI, 4 August 2010.
115 Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science”.
116 “Antarctica and science and technology in the 21st century”, KORDI,
2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm.
117 Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science”.
118 Phone interview with Lee Yoo Kyung, Director, Division of Polar Life
Sciences, KOPRI, 4 August 2010.
119 “Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”,
KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm.
120Phone interview with Kim Seoung Joong, Director, Division of Polar
Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010.
121Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science”.
122Phone interview with Ha Taejung, Captain of Technology Fusion
Research Team, New Growth Engines Research Centre, Science and
Technology Policy Institute, 23 June 2010.
123Phone interview with Kim Seong Joong, Director, Division of Polar
Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010.
124Phone interview with Lee Sang Hoon, Principal Scientist, Polar
Climate Research, KOPRI, 17 August 2010.
125Phone interview with Jung Hyunhee, Principal Researcher, Division of
the Basic Research in Science and Engineering, NRF, 21 June 2010.
126Lee Won-hee, “The Big Sciences and Technologies We Should Note”.
127Phone interview with Lee Bang Yong, Principal Researcher, Division
of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 6 August 2010.
128Phone interview with Lee Sang Hoon, Principal Scientist, Division of
Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 17 August 2010.
129Lee Won-hee, “The Big Sciences and Technologies We Should Note”,
p. 4.
130Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science”.
131Phone interview with Lee Bang Yong, Principal Research Scientist,
Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 6 August 2010.
132Ibid.
133“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”,
KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm.
134Phone interview with Kim Seong Joong, Director, Division of Polar
Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010.
135Phone interview with Lee Sang Hoon, Principal Research Scientist,
Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 17 August 2010.
136Phone interview with Yu Don Yun, Principal Specialist, Department of
Antarctic Continental Station Construction, KOPRI, 25 August 2010.
137Interview with Jin Dong Min, Director, Department of Strategy and
Policy, KOPRI, 19 February 2010.
138Phone interview with Yu Don Yun, Principal Specialist, Department of
Antarctic Continental Station Construction, KOPRI, 25 August 2010.
139Phone interview with Kim Seong Joong, Director, Division of Polar
Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010.
140“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”,
KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm.
141“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”,
KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm.
142“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”,
KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm.
143Phone interview with Lee Chanu, Leader of Ship Operation Team,
KOPRI, 25 August 2010.
144www.kopri.re.kr/infra/araon/araon_about/araon_about_icebreaker/arao
n_about_ice-breaker.cms.
145Phone interview with Lee Chanu, Leader of Ship Operation Team,
KOPRI, 25 August 2010.
146Ibid.
5 The Malaysian journey to the
Antarctic

A glimpse at public policy dynamics

B.A. Hamzah1

The story of Malaysia's historic antagonism towards the Antarctic Treaty

System is well documented. One has only to flip through the pages of The
Polar Record2 and the minutes of meetings of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) from 1982 to 2005 to have a feel for the debates on the
Question of Antarctica which ensued from Malaysia's critique of Antarctica.
However, hidden from the public domain are the internal bureaucratic
dynamics that changed the course of Malaysian policy and led to it
eventually signing the Antarctic Treaty in 2011. This dramatic policy shift
began when the Government of New Zealand kindly opened its Scott Base to
Malaysian scientists in the late 1990s. Ten months after the Malaysian
Cabinet gave the green light to do so, Malaysia deposited the instruments of
accession at Washington, DC on 31 October 2011. The shift in policy
approach on Antarctic affairs from a diplomatic initiative to scientific
engagement has coincided with Malaysia's new emphasis in its foreign
policy of taking a less hostile attitude to the Western powers.3 This chapter
explores the internal dynamics behind Malaysia's dramatic policy shift and
the impact and implications of this new policy for Malaysia and the
Antarctic Treaty states.
Malaysia's Antarctic policy evolution
The Malaysian journey to the Antarctic started with a stormy beginning in
New York in 1982 when Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed Mahathir
(henceforth Mahathir) addressed the UNGA meeting and informed the
august assembly that the United Nations should get involved in the
governance of Antarctica, which, in his opinion, had become the privileged
territory of the few. Mahathir argued that the resources of Antarctica should
benefit all of humankind. He objected to proposals to exploit the mineral
resources of the Antarctic and he was concerned about the adverse impact on
the global environment from unregulated mining activities there. He called
for the setting up of an oversight mechanism in the United Nations to
oversee the activities of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).
Malaysia's involvement with Antarctica involves three overlapping
phases.4 The first phase (1982–1998) was mainly political and diplomatic in
nature and most of the activities took the form of debates under the auspices
of the Question of Antarctica agenda in the UNGA. Mahathir's policy on
Antarctica — which he cleverly sold to like-minded countries from the
South as non-transparent, anti-colonial, and opposed to the perpetuation of
political dominance of a few privileged powers — depended on diplomatic
support from the Third World. Mahathir also invoked the popular concept of
the Common Heritage of Mankind (advocated by the Maltese Ambassador
Arvid Pardo) at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), and requested the United Nations to recognise its applicability
to the resources over Antarctica. However, the signatory states of the ATS
refused to acknowledge the relevance of such a concept on a territory
governed by a multilateral Treaty system.
Malaysia's Antarctic policy was singlehandedly driven by Mahathir
(Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003) from day one. Mahathir conceived the
idea and, with the support of Malaysian diplomats at the United Nations, he
mobilised the South-South countries for this enterprise. Antarctica became a
convenient diplomatic tool for Mahathir to malign the members of the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party (ATCP) for their “exclusivity” (in
reference to the dominance of an exclusive group of countries managing the
affairs of Antarctica) at the United Nations General Assembly.
 At the UNGA (1982–1990) Mahathir criticised the attempts by the Treaty
parties to produce a framework regulation for mining of minerals on the
Antarctic continent. Malaysia and other international environmental
organisations (such as Greenpeace) separately placed pressure on the ATS
not to adopt the proposed mining convention, which was in the final stages
of signature by 1998. The proposed Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resources Activities (CRAMRA) would have been carried out but for the
decision by Australia and France not to ratify CRAMRA. The coming into
force of the Madrid Protocol (which replaced CRAMRA) in 1991 had a
significant influence on Malaysia's policy. Malaysia had made it known
during the discussions on “The Question of Antarctica” at the UNGA that it
was not in favour of mineral mining or exploitation, beyond research, in
Antarctica. Malaysia welcomed the ATS decision to ban mining for fifty
years under the Madrid Protocol.
The second phase of Malaysia's Antarctic involvement began in 1998
when Malaysian scientists took up the New Zealand government's offer of
the use of Scott Base to conduct Antarctic research. It received further
impetus in 2002 when Mahathir took his Cabinet members to visit
Antarctica, also at the invitation of New Zealand. Prime Minister Mahathir
had come under much pressure from the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties at the UN to change his outlook towards the Treaty System. New
Zealand's offer reflected a new tack on the part of a key Antarctic player.
However, as Mahathir began to change his thinking on Antarctica, he was
concerned that his policy shift might lead to loss of face with the Third
World countries that had previously supported him on the Antarctic issue.
There was a risk Mahathir's credentials as an exponent of the South would
be put into question if he were to cave in to the ATS pressure. Back home in
Kuala Lumpur, Mahathir had to deal with his own diplomats in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs whom he had sent out to many capitals to champion his
policy on Antarctica. Faced with their passive resistance after 1998, he was
in a dilemma: how to exit gracefully from the UNGA over the Question of
Antarctica without antagonising his own “foot soldiers” and without losing
face and support from the Third World. Mahathir knew that his crusade
against the ATS had not made much headway beyond a successful exercise
in public relations and promoting some transparency in the ATS governance
system. He also knew that his Antarctica policy put Malaysia at odds with
the ATS,5 many of whom are Malaysia's close trading and defence partners.
For example, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are all
members of the 1971 Five Power Defence Arrangement that includes
Malaysia.
Malaysia put up a strong diplomatic face at the UNGA from 1982 to
2005; right up until a graceful exit strategy could be found. The decision of
India to join the ATS in 1983 and China in 1986 together with the
involvement of the United Nations institutions like the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP)6 and the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) in the work programmes of the ATS would make the
eventual exit strategy less painful. Nonetheless, these actions were not
enough to convince Malaysian diplomats of a withdrawal policy.
After he changed his Antarctic strategy, Mahathir had to come up with a
strategy to convince his diplomats that the withdrawal from a combative
policy at the UNGA would not harm Malaysia's foreign policy and that the
migration of strong supporters like India and China to the ATS had made the
Question of Antarctica redundant. Hence around the time that Wellington
invited Malaysian scientists to Scott Base (1996–1998), Mahathir adopted a
dual or parallel policy: (1) partner with ATS members like New Zealand,
Australia, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Argentina on the ice; and (2)
allow the Question of Antarctica to remain on the UNGA agenda until it was
“suspended” in 2005.7 Although this dual policy was not popular with
Mahathir's foreign affairs bureaucrats,8 it was not openly challenged until
after he had left office.
Although by 1998 Mahathir had started to distance himself from
pressuring the ATCP countries, he was unable to disengage from the UNGA
process for diplomatic reasons. He was evidently worried that his supporters
from the South and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) would accuse him
of betrayal if he were to throw in the towel and formally withdraw the
Malaysian support at the UNGA on “The Question of Antarctica”. As a
trading nation with strong South-South credentials and a member of the
NAM, Malaysia could not afford to lose their support at the United Nations.
When Mahathir spoke at the UNGA in September 1982, it was a clarion
call for the ATCP to be more inclusive and more transparent in its
governance system. When the ATS began to admit India (1983), China
(1983) and South Korea (1986), Mahathir had lost legitimate ground to be
critical of the ATCP's exclusiveness. As indicated earlier, the events in 1998
and 2002 when he visited the continent provided strong evidence of a shift in
Malaysia's policy towards Antarctica. As early as 2000, Mahathir had seen
the value of Malaysia's participation in scientific research there. To his
credit, even after he stepped down as prime minister in 2003 he retained an
interest in the situation in Antarctica. In 2004, he called on the government
to accede to the Treaty.
The third stage came in after Mahathir left office in 2003 and includes a
non-active period under Abdullah Badawi as prime minister. It was during
Prime Minister Najib Razak's watch (from 2009) that some within Malaysia
began to push for Malaysia's formal application to become a Treaty
signatory. However, the internal process to get the Cabinet to approve
accession to the Treaty was fraught with resistance from some overzealous
bureaucrats (known locally as the Little Napoleons). These bureaucrats
attempted to delay Malaysia's signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty right up
until the very last day.
In September 2005, “The Question of Antarctica” was removed from the
active Agenda of the UNGA by consensus vide Resolution 60/47 without
any protest from Malaysia. By this time, Malaysia had begun to send signals
to the international community that it would soon accede to the 1959 Treaty.
The statement from the Foreign Minister of Malaysia in Pakistan in May
2007 had raised hope among the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)
states and Malaysian scientists that Malaysia would eventually sign the
Treaty.
There were unilateral statements from senior governmental officials that
Malaysia would one day sign the 1959 Treaty. On 5 May 2009, for example,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tabled a position paper at the intra-agency
meeting concerning accession to the Antarctic Treaty. This paper has
provided further proof of a policy shift in Malaysia; that it was shifting
“from criticisms of and confrontation, to that of engagement and cooperation
with the ATCP”.9
Due to bureaucratic resistance and the government no longer prioritising
Antarctic affairs as it had done under Mahathir, it was not until 2011 that a
series of meetings were held to discuss the active participation of Malaysia
in the ATS.10 The process was difficult, with the representatives of the AG
Chambers, for example, insisting on national legislation before acceding to
the Treaty. Some officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not
happy with the policy shift that in their opinion lacked a graceful exit
strategy. Unfortunately, no one ever defined the criteria for a graceful exit.
The opposition sounded like sour grapes and it appears to me that many of
them were unhappy with the decision to embrace the Treaty, which they had
had to champion at the UNGA and other international forums for some
twenty-three years (1982–2005).
The Government of Malaysia took cognisance of the contribution of its
Antarctic scientists as the primary reason for acceding to the Treaty. The
Malaysian scientists made a strong impression on the government by their
contribution. The following events made it easier for the government to
support the new policy of engagement with the Antarctic Treaty System.11
First, the decision of the ATCP in 2002 to invite Malaysia to observe its
meeting was seen as a special privilege and a conciliatory gesture. Malaysia
was aware that the ATCP went out of its way to bring Malaysia on board as
the 1959 Treaty has no provision that would permit the participation of a
non-state party in meetings organised by the ATS. Second, four years later at
Hobart in 2006, South Korea in its capacity as Chair of the Asian Forum for
Polar Sciences (AFoPS) invited Malaysia to join Japan, China and South
Korea in AFoPS. Malaysian scientists were elated by the confidence of their
Asian peers. Malaysian scientists have established a strong rapport with their
Asian counterparts, especially South Korea, and saw this as an opportunity
to deepen scientific cooperation with them. Third, encouraged by the
positive contribution of their scientists to polar science, Malaysia welcomed
the rare opportunity to be a full member of the scientific Committee of
Antarctic Research (SCAR) from 2008, even though it had not yet acceded
to the Antarctic Treaty. SCAR is a non-governmental organisation created in
1958 to: initiate, promote and coordinate international scientific activity in
the Antarctic; to review scientific matters pertaining to the integrity of the
Antarctic environment, including the conservation of its terrestrial and
marine ecosystems; and to provide scientific and technological advice to the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) and other organisations,
both governmental and non-governmental. Although its recommendations
are advisory, SCAR usually addresses issues before they are considered at
ATCMs. The appointment of a Malaysian scientist to SCAR has put
Malaysia on the polar scientific map. Fourth, apart from SCAR, which
advises the ATCM, Malaysian scientists also earned respect from their peers
when they were invited to sit on the programme dealing with Evolution and
Bio-diversity in the Antarctic (EBA), the steering committee on Climate
Change System (AGCS) as well as becoming a member of an action group
on katabatic wind studies in the Ross Sea, also known as the Modelling &
Observational Studies of Antarctic Katabatics (MOSAK).

Policy coordination
During his watch, Mahathir had a firm grip on Antarctic policy. Mahathir
relied on officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to champion his
policy, mainly at the UNGA. Malaysian diplomats were also active at the
meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of Islamic
Conference (OIC) seeking their support for the agenda at the UNGA on the
Question of Antarctica.
After Mahathir left office in 2003, Antarctic policy was mainly driven by
the Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM), which was established in 1995
by an Act of Parliament (Academy Sciences Act, 1994). ASM is answerable
to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI).12 MOSTI
has sought assistance from the highest levels of political power in Malaysia
in order to fast-track political acceptance of the new Antarctic policy. For
example, at the request of the ASM, with blessing from the prime minister,
MOSTI arranged with the High Commissioner of New Zealand in Kuala
Lumpur for the Malaysian king to visit Scott Base and McMurdo station on
20–24 November 2011. This working visit was arranged by New Zealand at
the request of the National Task Force of the Academy of Sciences
Malaysia. The United States of America also provided logistics support for
the visit. The Cabinet gave approval for His Majesty to visit the Antarctic on
12 January 2011, subject to Malaysia's accession of the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty and the submission of a joint Cabinet paper by MOSTI and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Minister of MOSTI, the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the
National Task Force on Antarctica Research accompanied His Majesty to
Antarctica on 20–24 November 2011. The current Minister of MOSTI, Dr
Maximus Ongkili, and his senior staff have been very supportive of ASM's
initiative of using science to re-engage with the ATS. It was partly through
his personal effort and intervention that the Cabinet gave the green light for
Malaysia to accede to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. MOSTI is also working
closely with the AG Chambers, the Prime Minister's Department and the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to provide a legal
infrastructure for the establishment of a National Polar Science Agency to
undertake research both in the Antarctic and in the Arctic. The Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment oversees environmental matters and
policies for Malaysia. Once ratified, the 1991 Madrid Protocol, for example,
will come under the purview of MORE and not MOSTI.
Malaysia's interest in the Arctic is very recent. It has to do mainly with
opportunities which could result from the reduction in ice coverage in the
Arctic. This Arctic shrinkage could make some waterways (e.g. the
Northwestern Passages) in the Arctic navigable in the summer. The opening
of this passage could reduce vessel traffic from Europe to Asia and this
would have a positive impact on vessel traffic congestion in the Strait of
Malacca. Beyond this navigational issue, Malaysia has scientific interests,
which include establishing the impact of the warming of the Arctic waters on
global climate change. A Malaysian scientist, teamed up with a scientist
from the Korean Polar Research Institute, went on a familiarisation visit to
Ny-Ålesund in July 2007. Professor Siti Aisyah Alias from UM and Dr Hii
Yi Siang of UNiSZA visited also Horsund Base in August 2010. This team
has collaborated with a scientist from the Department of Biodiversity,
Institute of Nature Conservation at the Polish Academy of Sciences, Krakow
on a joint project “Studies of Arctic fungi and bacteria as indicator for
nutrients and hydrocarbons contamination at Horsund, Spitsbergen”.
The ASM has established a Task Force on Antarctic Research comprising
members from MOSTI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AG Chambers and
relevant universities. The implementing agency for polar research is the
National Antarctic Research Centre, which has established the Malaysian
Antarctic Research Programme at the University of Malaya. The Director of
the Malaysian Antarctic Research Programme (MARP) is also Deputy
Chairman of the Task Force on Antarctic Research at ASM. The chart on
page 102 illustrates the organisational structure for Antarctic policymaking
in Malaysia.13
 By January 2013 or so, once the national legislation to give effect to
Malaysia's accession of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 1991 Protocol is
in place, Malaysia is likely to adopt an Act of Parliament to establish a
statutory body to oversee research in polar science. Once this National
Agency on Polar Science is formally established, it will assume all
responsibilities for scientific and public policy research on Antarctica and
the Arctic. While the terms of reference for

the proposed National Polar Agency have not been made public, in all
likelihood, this Agency will supplant the work of the Task Force on
Antarctica Research at the ASM. The proposed National Agency on Polar
Science, which will be answerable to MOSTI, will become the new focal
point for all Malaysian scientific activities in the Antarctic and the Arctic.
Malaysia's Antarctic current budget is small, only US$85,000 per annum.
Due to the bureaucratic wrangling which delayed Malaysia from signing the
Treaty, the funds, which had originally been set aside for establishing an
Antarctic base, are no longer available. The current approach is to secure
berths with a number of national programmes on the continent willing to
cooperate with Malaysia on a fee basis.

Malaysia's Antarctic Research Programme

The National Antarctic Research Centre (NARC) in conjunction with the
Malaysian Antarctic Research Programme (MARP) is required to submit a
progress report annually to the Task Force on Antarctica Research, ASM.
The last report was in 2011. From these NARC Reports, it is possible to
divide the areas of research conducted by Malaysian scientists in Antarctica
into two areas: biological sciences and physical sciences. According to the
Deputy Director of MARP,14 Professor Dr Siti Aisyah Alias, Malaysian
scientists are actively involved in the following projects: ten in biological
sciences and eight in physical sciences.
The ten biological science research projects are quite diverse. They fall
under four groups: bacteria, fungi, algae and benthic, and include the
following:

adaptive mechanisms of Antarctic, tropical and temperate microalgae to

UVR and temperature stress;
nitrogen cycling in Antarctic ecosystems: ecology, physiology and
biodiversity;
the diversity and metabolic abilities of polar bacteria in ecologically
distinct environments;
biodiversity, adaptation and characterisation of the Antarctic;
bioremediation of xenobiotics using Antarctic microbes;
studies on psychrophiles from Antarctica and the Arctic with special
reference to their anti-microbial and enzyme activities;
the effects of isolation on the genetic biodiversity of shallow coastal
benthic communities in Antarctica;
the effects of cultural euthrophication on the benthic primary
production of tropical, temperate and polar ecosystems;
the human impact on the evolution and diversity of Antarctic flora with
special reference to invasive species; and
the biodiversity of the benthic invertebrate faunas from the Antarctic
marine ecosystem.
Under the physical sciences heading, the following projects are ongoing:

modelling and observational studies of Antarctic Katabatic (MOSAK);

polar ice monitoring and parameter retrieval with microwave remote
sensing;
geochemical study of rock weathering in the polar regions;
profiling hydrocarbons deposition, vertical transport and mobilisation in
Antarctica;
radiochemical and chemical changing in glaciers and sediments in polar
regions: implications for the past and present global oceanography
cycles;
geological and geophysical investigations in Antarctica;
polar-equatorial-polar geo-space ionospheric, magnetic storms and
water vapour characterisation for the advancement of space weather;
and
profiling hydrocarbons and nutrient deposition in Antarctica.

One local scientist (from Universiti Putra Malaysia) is working on

bacteria biodegradation and bioremediation of hydrocarbons in the
Antarctic.15 The scientist is waiting for the green light from the ASM to
patent the methods or processes of this unique remediation process using
bacteria isolated from Antarctica. According to one study,16 the returns from
the four patents will be more than what the Government of Malaysia has
spent on supporting scientists to the ice.
The achievements of Malaysia on its policy on Antarctica must be
evaluated at two levels. The first level has to do with the research and
benefits accrued from Malaysia's scientific programme on Antarctica and the
second level concerns the political and diplomatic dividends from its policy
at the UNGA, i.e. on the Question of Antarctica. According to Professor
Azizan Abu Samah, currently Head of MARP at University Malaya, it is
difficult to quantify the work of Malaysian scientists in the Antarctic, as they
are ongoing and one cannot ascribe an economic value to research activities
that have not resulted in any form of commercialisation. Besides scientific
research activities, the work of scientists at MARP also involves public
relations and raising public awareness of the importance of Antarctica to
global climate change, arms control and as an area free from nuclear
weapons. Malaysian scientists are working closely with the world's leading
scientists in the fields of global warming, atmospheric sciences and
biodiversity to advance knowledge in polar science.17
At the local level, in terms of public awareness, MARP has organised
many workshops, talks and seminars on Antarctica including the Malaysian
International Seminar on Antarctica (MISA) series. The Fifth MISA seminar
was held in Kuala Lumpur in June 2011 and drew a large crowd of scientists
as it was held together with the 22nd Pacific Science Congress. In 2008
MARP sent two university students to Antarctica. Not all these activities can
be quantified; nonetheless, they are important to the nation.
At the international level, apart from seminars, MARP has sponsored one
Indonesian scientist to Antarctica and it has taken in postgraduate students
from India, Jordan and Iraq.18 Besides this, there is also a student exchange
programme. For example, in 2010 a student from the University of Brest of
Belorussia spent four months with MARP working on Antarctica algae.
MARP has also introduced a Visiting Professor Exchange Programme. In
2010, for example, MARP hosted two scientists from BAS. Ten foreign
scientists participated in MARP's Visiting Scientist/Professor Research
programme (2008–2009); they were nationals of India, the UK, Australia,
Taiwan and South Korea. Apart from the Visiting Research Programme,
which brings in foreign experts, fifty postgraduate students (including ten
from overseas) have registered with the NARC.19
To undertake research in Antarctica, the NARC has also established
strong networking relationship with scientists from the following states and
organisations:

Antarctica New Zealand (Antarctica NZ)

Australian Antarctic Division (AAD)
British Antarctic Survey (BAS)
Instituto Antarctico Chileno (INACH)
Instituto Antarctico Equatoriano (INAE) of Ecuador
Korean Polar Research Institute (KOPRI)
South Africa National Antarctic Programme (SANAP)
Alfred Wegener Institute of Polar and Marine Research (AWI) of
Germany
Polish Antarctic Research
 Scottish Association for Marine Science (ASM)
Instituto Antarctico Argentina or the Argentina Institute of National
Antarctic Programme.

Malaysian scientists are also working closely with their counterparts in

Japan and China.
The political dividends arising from the Question on Antarctica Agenda
are discussed elsewhere;20 the detail of what Malaysia has achieved from
“twenty criticisms” is discussed in the Tepper and Haward paper21 and in the
work of Peter Beck. From Malaysia's foreign policy perspectives, its biggest
achievement from the Antarctic policy is the ability to raise the level of
awareness of the international community of the exclusiveness of the ATS.
Mahathir was able to capitalise on the “Question of Antarctica” Agenda to
promote a sense consciousness among the South countries to rally around
him to put pressure on the ATS to open up and to be more transparent in its
activities in Antarctica.
In the process, Mahathir was able to strengthen his credentials as a
champion of the South. This point was important for Mahathir who had just
assumed the premiership of Malaysia. The Antarctic policy was a personal
triumph for Mahathir. Beyond the personal triumph, it is possible to argue
that the decision of the ATS to admit India, China and South Korea as
members resulted from the pressure that Malaysia placed on the former vide
its Question of Antarctica Agenda.
The ATS decision to invite the International Maritime Organisation and
the United Nations Environment Programme to participate in their
programmes is perceived by Malaysian diplomats as resulting from the
Question of Antarctica agenda, which they were asked to champion at the
UNGA.
Although Malaysia cannot claim full credit for the ATCP decision to
shelve the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities (CRAMRA) in 1988, the fact that it happened five years after the
Question of Antarctica Agenda was debated at the UNGA shows some
positive linkages between the two activities. Likewise, the ATCP decision to
adopt the 1991 Madrid Protocol was arguably an acknowledgement of the
official stand of Malaysia and other international NGOs on the question of
banning mining activities on the continent and the need to preserve the
Antarctic in its pristine condition and for scientific research. In my view, the
decision of the leading ATS party members like New Zealand, Australia and
the UK to give recognition to Malaysian scientists by inviting them to sit on
important committees like SCAR and encouraging them to actively
participate in their research programmes has further emboldened Malaysia to
adopt a more participatory approach towards the ATS programme.
The Task Force on Antarctica Research has not dealt in any great length
on how Malaysia could achieve economic benefits from its involvement on
Antarctica along the lines of New Zealand as described by Anne-Marie
Brady in her chapter in this volume (Chapter 8). Malaysia is opposed to any
form of mining in Antarctica and this policy is irrevocable. Malaysia has an
indirect economic interest that could result from its research activities on
Antarctica. For example, it could benefit from its scientific discoveries from
using a microbe isolated from Antarctica to biodegrade and bioremediate
hydrocarbons in cold weather.
Unlike South Korea and Japan, for example, which have demonstrated an
entrenched capacity in distant fishing, the fishing industry in Malaysia is still
in its infancy and its fshermen have limited regional reach. Even in its own
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Malaysia has permitted foreign fshermen,
from Thailand, for example, to exploit the surplus fshery resources.

Conclusion
Kuala Lumpur's signing of the 1959 Treaty marks the beginning of a new era
for Malaysia's scientific research leadership. It also signifies a shift in
Malaysia's foreign policy focus from an aggressive diplomatic approach on
the question of Antarctica to a more pragmatic scientific relationship with
the international community working on the continent. Unlike the past,
scientists are now driving Malaysia's Antarctic strategy. Malaysia's shift on
Antarctic policy signals a new policy of international engagement in
response to changing global political dynamics and a new emphasis on
science and technology. It augurs well with Malaysia's long-term
commitment to the global community on the conservation of the frozen
continent to be exclusively used for peaceful purposes.
The outlook for Malaysia's scientific engagement in the Antarctic is
bright. Once the Parliament passes the proposed Antarctica Act and a
National Agency on Polar Science is established, it will be much easier to
manage research and other activities on Antarctica. Malaysia is keen on
bioprospecting for anti-microbial and novel chemicals. Tourism will also
feature strongly in Malaysia's programme.
Malaysia's scientific relations with the ATCP are expected to be smooth.
Malaysia will continue to attend the ATCM meetings as it has done since
2002, subject, of course, to invitation from the host state. Its active
participation in SCAR will give it some advantages when it applies for
ATCP status in due course. It is unlikely that Malaysian scientists will
engage in any further political polemics over the governance of the
continent. Malaysia will need to deepen contacts with New Zealand,
Australia, the UK, the USA, China, Japan, South Korea and India in order to
strengthen its Antarctic programme.
While Malaysia's relations with the ATS are expected to be cordial,
Malaysia needs to regain the confidence of the Third World countries that
supported its initiative on Antarctica at the UNGA. Though Malaysia may
emulate the “silent policy” adopted by India and China, Malaysia should
also help sponsor scientists from these countries to participate in polar
science research either by inviting them to join the activities on the ground
or by giving them training at the NARC. In Antarctica Malaysia should be
able to capitalise on the good relations it has established with Argentina,
Ecuador, Chile and South Africa. The loose caucus that Malaysia was able to
lead at the United Nations included those from the OIC, ASEAN and the
Non-aligned Movement. Without their votes at the United Nations General
Assembly debates on the Agenda on “The Question of Antarctica” (1982–
2005), the Malaysian initiative would have been defeated. Hence, the
challenge to Malaysia in the immediate future is how to re-engage with the
South countries who must have felt betrayed by Malaysia's policy to
abandon or jettison “The Question of Antarctica” at the UNGA. Malaysia
cannot abandon the South countries, as in the future, it may need their
support at the United Nations and other international forums.
The signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the proposed ratification of
the 1991 Protocol will further reinforce Malaysia's credentials on preserving
Antarctica as a nuclear weapon-free zone and the promotion of sustainable
development. The fragility of the world climate and the vulnerability of
Antarctica to the global processes on environment and climate change are
global issues of importance to Malaysia.
By depositing the instruments of accession of the Antarctic Treaty on 31
October 2011, Malaysia has made a 180 degree turn in its Antarctic policy
— from being intransigent to seeking engagement — for very good geo-
political and geo-scientific reasons. While the decision to embrace the ATS
is unilateral, Malaysia acknowledges scientific, educational as well as
logistical support mainly from New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom,
India, South Africa, Argentina and Ecuador. While the South countries gave
Malaysia political and moral support at the United Nations and other
international forums that discussed the “Question of Antarctica”, it was the
support and encouragement from some members of the ATCP that assured
Malaysia a place in Antarctica.
The membership of the Treaty gives Malaysia a locus standi in the ATS,
which it can use to promote, among other things, the interests of countries
from the South, the OIC and ASEAN. Yet, on its own Malaysia's
membership is unlikely to change the two-tier decision-making structure in
the ATS. Nevertheless, for Malaysia, the membership of the Treaty will put
an end to its current ad hoc arrangement. It will also close a chapter on its
ambivalent relationship with the ATS and signify a new era of permanent
engagement in geo-science and geo-politics on the Antarctic continent.

Notes
1. Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University of
Malaysia and member of the National Task Force on Antarctica
Research, The Academy of Sciences, Malaysia (ASM). The author
wishes to graciously acknowledge assistance from the Academy of
Sciences Malaysia. This author has benefited from discussion with Tan
Sri Salleh Mohd Nor, Chairman of the National Task Force on
Antarctica Research at the ASM and Professor Azizan Abu Samah,
Director of MARP and Deputy Chairman of the National Task Force on
Antarctica Research, ASM. The funding of this paper comes partly
from the Long Range Research Grant Scheme (LRGS) established by
the Ministry of Higher Education (2011) to support research on
Malaysia's participation in the Antarctica Treaty System. The author
also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Associate Professor Anne-
 Marie Brady of the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, for reading
the earlier manuscript and suggesting suitable changes. The author is
solely responsible for the paper.
2. See a series of articles by Peter Beck from 1983 to 2005, in particular
Peter Beck, “Twenty Years On: The UN and the Question of
Antarctica?” Polar Record 40 (2004) and also the article by Rohan
Tepper and Marcus Haward, “The Development of Malaysia's Position
on Antarctica: 1982–2004”, Polar Record 41 (2005). See also B. A.
Hamzah, “Malaysia and the Southern Ocean: Revisiting the Question of
Antarctica”, Ocean Development and International Law 41 (2010) and
B. A. Hamzah, “Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty: A Geo-
political Interpretation”, The Polar Journal 1(2) (December 2011).
3. B. A. Hamzah, “The Charm Offensive”, Malaysian Business, 16–30
June 2010.
4. See Hamzah, “Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty”.
5. See observations by Andrew Jackson, “Cooperation Characterises
Antarctica Future”, 4th Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica
(MISA 4), Petaling Jaya, 1–3 April 2009.
6"6 See Donald Rothwell, “UNEP and the Antarctic Treaty System”,
.
Environmental Policy and Law 29(1) (1999).
7. Discussion with Professor Azizan Abu Samah in August 2010. See also
Azizan A. Samah and Nasaruddin Abdul Rahman, “Sustaining
Malaysia's Interest in Antarctica”, Proceedings of International
Symposium on Asian Collaboration in IPY 2007–2008, Tokyo: Nippon
Institute of Polar Research, 2007. See also Peter Beck, “The United
Nations and Antarctica, 2005: The End of the Question of Antarctica”,
Polar Record 42 (2006) and B. A Hamzah and Azizan Abu Samah,
“Claiming Antarctica for scientific Research”, The Edge, 22 December
2008.
8. Author's observations at various meetings of the National Task Force on
Antarctica Research, 2010–2011 and it is also the view of many
diplomats and bureaucrats in Malaysia that the author talked to.
9. Ganeson Sivagurunathan, “An Overview of Malaysia's Foreign Policy
on Antarctica”, paper presented at the Inter-Agency Meeting
 Concerning Accession to the Antarctic Meeting and Related
Conventions/Protocol, Wismaputra, 5 November 2009.
10. See Hamzah, “Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty”, for a
discussion on some of the meetings in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MOSTI and the ASM.
11. Discussion with Professor Azizan Abu Samah of MARP at various
times (2010–2012). The most recent interview was conducted on 27
January 2012. Professor Azizan Abu Samah represents Malaysia at
SCAR, AFoPS and MOSAK.
12. The Minister met up with the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of
the National Task Force on Antarctica Research and the author on
various occasions to discuss the way forward in 2011.
13. Not all the twenty public universities have an active an Antarctic
programme, nonetheless, are all entitled to draw on the fund provided
by the government for research on the Antarctica. The universities with
active research programmes in Antarctica research are UM, USM,
UKM, UPM, UiTM, UNIMAS, UTAR, UNiSZA and UTM.
14. Discussion with Professor Dr Siti Aisyah Alias at MARP, Universiti
Malaya on 2–3 February 2012.
15. The matter was discussed at the National Task Force on Antarctica
Research Meeting on 7 November 2006. This research on bacteria
bioremediation was conducted in collaboration with a scientist from
Instituto Antarctico Argentino.
16. Anurdin AbdulGhani, “Analisa Kos-Faedah Penyertaan Sistem Triti
Antartika” (ATS), 2010. This document is available at the Secretariat of
the National Taskforce on Antarctica Research, ASM. (In English, “The
Cost-benefit Analysis of joining the ATS”.)
17. Professor Azizan Abu Samah is working with Dr John Turner from
BAS (British Antarctic Survey) on the Antarctic wind field; Professor
Phang Siew Moi with Professor Andrew McMinn (AAD) and Professor
John Beardall of the Monash University on sea ice algae and the effect
of ultraviolet ray and temperature on algae; Professor Siti Aisyah Alias
has teamed up with Dr Peter Convey from BAS and Professor Bryan
 Storey from New Zealand Antarctic Gateway on biodiversity and the
ecology of Antarctic fungi.
18. See NARC Report, “Pencapaian Pusat Penyelidikan”, National
Antarctic Research Centre (NARC), University Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
(2009).
19. Author's discussion with Professor Azizan Abu Samah on 27 January
2012. The affiliation with MARP's counterparts is published in
“Pencapaian Pusat Penyelidikan”, National Antarctic Research Centre
(NARC), University Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (2009). This progress
report was submitted to the ASM and MOSTI to justify funding and to
inform them of the NARC activities and programmes including its
achievements.
20. See Hamzah, “Malaysia and the Southern Ocean: Revisiting the
Question of Antarctica”, Hamzah, “Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty”. See also the articles by Peter Beck in Polar Record; the article
by Rohan Tepper and Marcus Haward, “The Development of
Malaysia's Position on Antarctica: 1982–2004”, Polar Record 41
(2005). See also Report of a Study Group under Sir Anthony Parsons,
Antarctica: The Next Decade, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
(1987). Parsons has alluded to the need to take heed of “an outside
challenge to the continuation of the Treaty … led by Malaysia”. But to
the best of the author's knowledge Malaysia has never made public its
achievements at the UNGA.
21. Tepper and Haward, op. cit.
6 United States foreign policy
interests in Antarctica

Christopher C. Joyner

The United States has salient national interests in Antarctica and its
circumpolar oceans. This is clearly highlighted by the leading role the
United States has assumed in the conduct of scientifc research on and
around the continent – research that provides valuable insights essential to
the understanding of the planet. Moreover, US interest in Antarctic science
has been matched by the evolution in recent decades of important political,
security, economic and environmental interests there, expressly as they
relate to maintaining the viability of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty1 and the
associated agreements that comprise the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS),2
the indispensable regime framework through which the United States
pursues and achieves those interests.
This study aims to examine US national interests in the Antarctic as they
relate to contemporary American foreign policy objectives in the region.
Appreciating this, over the past decade certain issues involving the
Antarctic Treaty parties have surfaced that could pose fundamental
challenges to US national interests in the Antarctic. At the same time, these
challenges might generate political pressures that could adversely impact on
legal components of the ATS, including the core treaty itself. Signifcantly,
such developments might negatively affect fundamental US interests in the
polar south and thereby exacerbate political tensions between the United
States and other Antarctic Treaty parties, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties.3 This realization points up the central puzzle of this study: What are
the dimensions of contemporary US national interests in the Antarctic and
what possible developments by other Antarctic Treaty parties might
undermine the ability of the United States to attain its national interest
objectives in the region? The study now turns to address these questions.

United States’ interests and challenges in the Antarctic

US policy in the Antarctic traditionally and currently has embraced certain
primary national interest priorities, within which other secondary interests
are incorporated. Three agencies in the US Government are responsible for
securing and executing policies upholding these Antarctic interests: the
Offce of Ocean and Polar Affairs, which is part of the Bureau of Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientifc Affairs (OES) in the
Department of State;4 the National Science Foundation (NSF );5 and the
United States Antarctic Program (USAP).6
Diplomatic matters involving US interests in the Antarctic primarily
accrue to the OES. These responsibilities include negotiation of multilateral
Antarctic agreements and participation in international fora dealing with
polar issues. Spe-cifcally, OES strives to promote protection of the
Antarctic marine environment from pollution and other manmade threats
through its role in the International Maritime Organization and special fora
associated with the Antarctic Treaty System.7
The Office of Polar Programs in NSF is chiefy responsible for managing
funding for basic research and its operational support in the Antarctic.
Within NSF is the USAP. This agency fosters cooperative research with
other nations and develops measures to protect the Antarctic environment
and ensure prudent use of resources there.8

The Antarctic Treaty

As offcially articulated, during the past ffty years, the United States has
embraced four general national interests in its Antarctic policy as related to
the Antarctic Treaty System. These are: (1) to maintain the Antarctic as a
region of international cooperation that is reserved exclusively for peaceful
purposes; (2) to preserve and undertake unique opportunities for scientifc
research in order to better comprehend both Antarctica's and the Earth's
geophysical and environmental systems; (3) to protect the relatively pristine
environment of Antarctica and its associated ecosystems; and (4) to ensure
the conservation and sustainable management of living resources in the
southern circumpolar ocean.9

International cooperation and peaceful purposes

Paramount among US national interests in the circumpolar south is to
maintain the Antarctic Treaty as an instrument of international cooperation
and ensure that the continent does not become an area or object of
international discord.10 In the American view, the Antarctic should be
reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, in which great importance is
placed an ‘active and infuential US pres-ence in Antarctica designed to
support the range of US antarctic [sic] interests’.11 Implicit in this
overarching objective is the US interest in preserving its position of non-
recognition of claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.12
The Antarctic Treaty, negotiated in 1959 in the spirit of the highly
successful 1957/58 scientifc research programme known as the
International Geophysical Year (IGY), was opened for signature on 1
December of that year and entered into force on 23 June 1961. The United
States’ head of delegation, Ambassador Herman Phleger, was selected as
permanent chairman of the negotiating Confer-ence on Antarctica.13 The
United States became the ffth state to ratify the treaty, and the Senate gave
its advice and consent by a vote of sixty-six to twenty-one on 10 August
1960, but only after heated discussion on its merits. The treaty was praised
in the Senate as ‘containing all the provisions which the US believed were
required for the protection of its national interest and as setting a precedent
in the feld of disarmament, prohibition of nuclear explosions, and the law of
space’.14
Fifty years on, this accord has proved to be an extraordinary and unique
mul-tilateral legal agreement. The treaty text is simple, uncomplicated and
concise. It consists of 2,364 words gracefully set out in a preamble and
fourteen articles. Despite this brevity — and the complicating fact that
seven of the original treaty parties assert national claims to territory on the
continent — what the Treaty pro-vides for in those legal provisions is
impressive indeed.
The United States played a critical role in the diplomatic development of
each provision in the 1959 treaty text. Not only was the United States the
chief sup-porter of the treaty text, it was also the principal architect of it as
well. The Eisenhower administration believed that such an agreement
would well serve US national interests, and it was this perception that
prompted the United States government to assume a leading role during the
summer of 1959 in negotiating the treaty instrument. In this regard, the
United States first elaborated its national interests in Antarctica in a March
1958 policy statement, which subsequently became prominently integrated
throughout provisions in the fnal treaty text.15
The Antarctic Treaty formally guarantees opportunities for free access
without restriction on the continent and for scientifc research rights that had
characterized the highly successful IGY experience.16 Largely through US
efforts, the negotiated treaty text establishes a legal framework for all
participating governments to collaborate closely in order to achieve the
shared ambition of preserving scientifc research in the region, as well as for
the mutual exchange of plans, information and personnel.17 While the
Treaty agrees in its famous Article IV to disagree on the legal status of the
national claims to the continent (i.e. it does not recognize, affrm, dispute or
negate those claims),18 it does declare that no new claims may be asserted
while the treaty is in force.19 All these provisions serve US national
interests by promoting international cooperation in scientifc research,
freedom of access and peaceful uses of the Antarctic region without the
complicating impediment of national sovereignty.
The treaty further declares that Antarctica can be used only for peaceful
purposes. Consequently, both the establishment of military bases and the
conduct of military activities in the region are prohibited.20 Moreover, all
areas and stations within the Treaty area are made subject to unannounced,
onsite inspection, including aerial observation, by Contracting Treaty
Parties for possible violations of the agreement, the reports from which are
to be shared with all parties.21 Importantly, nuclear explosions and the
disposal of radioactive wastes are pro-hibited south of 60o South Latitude,22
making this area the largest nuclear freezone in the world.23 These
provisions are critical for ensuring US national interests in upholding
compliance with the Treaty's requirement for the peaceful use of Antarctica
and environmental protection on the continent.
In sum, these provisions are vital ingredients that contribute to making
pres-ervation of the Antarctic Treaty a salient national priority for the
United States. The treaty and its subsequently elaborated regime system of
instruments fundamentally contributes to making US scientifc activities
more possible throughout the continent and its circumpolar waters; the
treaty fundamentally contributes to demilitarizing and denuclearizing one-
tenth of the earth's surface; the treaty serves as the political and legal
lubricant that permits claimant and nonclaimant governments to coexist and
cooperate in their activities in the Antarctic region; and, under the umbrella
of the emergent Antarctic Treaty System, parties to the agreement have
cooperatively worked to negotiate a constellation of agreements that strive
to protect, preserve and conserve the Antarctic environment and the living
resources in the circumpolar marine ecosystem.24

Sovereignty and claims to Antarctica

How the issue of sovereignty on the continent is treated and applied by the
seven claimant states remains a constant, albeit undeclared, concern of the
United States. The United States has never made a claim to the continent,
nor does it recognize the legitimacy of the claims already asserted there,
even though for seventy years it has been the most active government in
terms of manned physical presence and support for scientifc research on
and around the continent.25 The United States does, however, reserve the
right to make a claim in the future if circumstances so warrant.26 That said,
a fundamental interest of the United States remains the goal of sustaining
the Antarctic Treaty to facilitate international cooperation in order to
preclude the continent from becoming a region of international competition
and confict.
In the view of US Department of State policymakers, key to attaining this
objective is the ability to preserve the ‘agree to disagree’ legal status of the
claims to Antarctica in Article IV. The critical issue here is whether national
claims made to the continent can generate the qualities of sovereign control
and ownership. Do the claimed sectors on Antarctica actually qualify as
territories internationally recognized as suffciently sovereign to generate
legal rules for managing civil and public affairs on the continent and
regulating offshore activities? Under international law, a state refers to a
specifc territory with recognized borders that is occupied by a population
under an organized government and which, in its foreign affairs, possesses
the qualities of sovereignty and independence.27 Clearly, the claimed
sectors have never qualifed as states. On the other hand, might they qualify
as sovereign territories owned and administered by governments of the
claimant states?
The offcial position of the United States is that ice-covered land areas
within the Antarctic sector claims do not entail lawfully owned sovereign
territories by their claimant governments and thus do not qualify as valid
entitlements of sovereignty or national ownership.28 This conclusion is
grounded in the belief that the claimant governments have fallen short of
fully demonstrating fulflment of the requisite condition of effective
occupation, the critical criterion for determining sovereign ownership of
territory. Put simply, the sector areas must be occupied by a population that
has permanently settled the claimed territory, a government must be in place
to administer civil affairs and there must be inter-nationally recognized
borders separating the claims. In the view of the United States (and 184
other members of the United Nations), none of these qualifcations has been
fulflled by any of the claimant states on the Antarctic continent. That said, it
must be realized that national law does apply to the Antarctic, in particular
to nationals of treaty parties visiting the continent and to the management of
national research stations on and around the continent. For the United
States, this is true of both civil and criminal law as they relate to activities
by US citizens, both in research stations and working on US vessels or in
feld camps in the polar south.29

Offshore continental shelf claims

This ambiguity of the sovereignty situation is codifed by Article IV in the
Treaty, which allows all parties to agree to disagree over the legal status of
the claims. Moreover, paragraph 2 of Article IV asserts clearly that, ‘No
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.’ This begs a
critical consideration; namely, might outer continental shelf claims offshore
Antarctica implied in a claimant state's submission to the UN Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) legally take the form of a
‘new’ or an ‘enlarged’ claim? Might it be considered an extension of the old
claim referred to in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty? Or if it merely
ratifes the already existent claim, does that status change if the offshore
claim is acted upon though national legislation by the claimant
government? These conundrums have thus far escaped legal resolution or
consensus agreement by the ATCPs, and consequently could pose serious
impediments in the future to the Treaty's ongoing success.
In terms of current policy considerations, the United States should be
concerned about the potential for confict between claimant and nonclaimant
governments over access to possible hydrocarbon resources offshore the
continent, although it has made no offcial statements in this regard. At the
regulatory heart of this potential rush to secure access to as yet
undiscovered south polar hydro-carbons lies Article 76 of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indeed, Article 76
provides the procedural conduit by which coastal states can gain legitimacy
for making sovereignty claims over vast areas of submarine continental
shelf areas offshore their coasts — areas that might hold enormous reserves
of hydrocarbon resources.30
To this end, Antarctic claimant states have made either full or partial
submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
as provided for in Article 76, concerning the possibility of asserting
continental shelf claims offshore their claimed Antarctic territories.
Australia was the first claimant to make a submission to the CLCS and did
so in November 2004.31 The submission by New Zealand was fled with the
CLCS in April 2006, although it excluded a prospective outer continental
shelf claim offshore its claimed sector in Antarctica.32 Argentina made its
submission with the CLCS in April 2009, which included a map and
geographical coordinating for outer continental shelf limits overlapping the
Antarctic Peninsula.33 Norway fled a partial submission to the CLCS in
May 2009, in which Dronning Maud Land was included.34 Chile made its
submission in the form of a ‘Preliminary Information’ statement to the
CLCS in May 2009.35 The United Kingdom made two public
communications concerning its outer continental shelf claims in the
Antarctic, one in a Note of 9 May 2008 to the UN Secretary General that
indicated the United Kingdom would be making in 2009 ‘a partial
submission’ that ‘will not include areas of the continental shelf areas
appurtenant to Antarctica, for which a submission may be made later … ’.36
Although France has not formulated any specifc outer continental shelf
claim offshore its clamed territory in Antarctica (Adélie Land), it did note
in a ‘partial submission’ to the UN Secretary General in February 2009 that
such an offshore zone might well exist, for which a submission may later be
made.37The problem with all these submissions is that the United States
does not recognize the validity of sovereign territory on the continent from
which such offshore jurisdictional claims might be asserted. The critical
point for US national interests in preserving the Antarctic Treaty would
come if a claimant government were to act to effect its offshore claims
through the proclamation of executive decrees or adoption of national
legislation to that end.
US policymakers are well aware that these potential continental shelf
claims, if legislatively acted upon by claimant governments, coupled with
the onset of mineral and hydrocarbon resource development, could be
damaging to multilateral cooperation underpinning the Antarctic Treaty.
This was demonstrated in April 2009 in the Ministerial Declaration on the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty, issued at the beginning of the
32nd Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meeting. In that document, the
United States strongly supported two important paragraphs38 to which the
Consultative Parties pledged to ‘Reaffrm the importance they attach to the
contribution made by the Treaty, and by Article IV in particular, to ensuring
the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica.’39 The ATCPs also
pledged to ‘Reaffrm their commitment to Article 7 of the Environmental
Protocol, which prohibits any activity relating to mineral resources, other
than scientifc research.’40 In effect, no drilling or mining activ-ities could
take place with the Antarctic Treaty area for ffty years after the Protocol
entered into force, or in 2048.41 The declaration was designed by the United
States to have the ATCPs formally reiterate support for the basic tenets of
the Treaty System, especially key elements such as Article IV of the Treaty
and Article 7 of the Environmental Protection Protocol.42 These twin aims
were emphasized because the United States in particular wanted to
underscore their adherence as being fundamental to the continuing health of
the Antarctic Treaty regime in light of the claimants’ offshore claims
submissions.

Scientifc research and cooperation

A second major national interest for the United States in Antarctica
concerns sci-entifc research. The United States government strives to
undertake opportunities for cooperative scientifc research to understand
Antarctica and other global physical and environmental systems. To this
end, the United States pursues unique opportunities that Antarctica offers as
a laboratory for basic scientifc research — research that provides insights
essential to the understanding of our planet.43
This national interest has been defned to include the conduct of US
scientifc research in major disciplines and year-round occupation of four
permanent US research stations, Amundsen—Scott Station at the
geographical South Pole, Palmer Station on Anvers Island, Siple Station
near the earth's magnetic pole and Willard Research Station near the
geographical South Pole. (A ffth station, Byrd Station in Marie Byrd Land,
is a summer station.)44 Of particular scientifc and strategic importance to
the United States is the Amundsen—Scott South Pole Station. It is located
on the summit of the polar ice cap and at the point of intersection of the
territorial claims that the United States does not recognize. As a
consequence, the United States occupies the apex of Antarctica, a
symbolically critical location where all the claims (save for Norway's)
converge on the continent.45 The United States also fnances the presence of
two scientifc research vessels in the Antarctic, the ARSV Laurence M.
Gould and the RVIB Nathaniel B. Palmer.46

Global climate change

With regard to this overarching scientifc research interest, four problematic
issues are percolating in current US Antarctic policy considerations. First,
there is the aim of increasing research on global climate change in the polar
south. Antarctica is covered by two ice sheets. The larger East Antarctic ice
sheet covers the majority of the continent, while the West Antarctic ice
sheet has signifcant ice shelves foating in the ocean. Taken together, they
contain 90 per cent of Earth's ice and 70 per cent of its freshwater. If this ice
were to melt completely, the world sea level would rise an estimated
seventy metres or over 200 feet.47
Of all the world's regions, the Antarctic Peninsula is particularly sensitive
to small rises in the annual average temperature, which has increased there
by nearly 3° Centigrade since the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated. This is
about ten times faster than the average for the rest of the world, which
makes the peninsula area worthy of serious scientifc scrutiny. The rapid
disintegration of the Larson Ice Shelf in 2002, the collapse of the Wilkins
Ice Shelf in 2008 and the calving since 1995 of giant icebergs the size of the
US states of Delaware, Rhode Island and Connecticut all graphically
demonstrate the impacts that warming waters are having around
Antarctica's perimeter ice shelves.48 In addition, a British Antarctic Survey
report indicated that within the last ffty years, 87 per cent of the 244
glaciers studied on the Antarctic Peninsula retreated due to climate change,
and 40 per cent of the sea ice off the West Antarctic Peninsula has
disappeared in the last twenty-five years.49 In the peninsula area, these
climate changes have disrupted local penguin colonies and even compelled
some of them to migrate south. The remaining 96 per cent of the continent,
however, shows no notable signs of either temperature rise or loss of ice,
circumstances largely attributable to the cooling effects of the ozone hole
over East Antarctica.50
How might the ATCPs deal most effectively with global climate
disruption in the Antarctic? The answer US offcials often suggest lies in
mobilizing more extensive scientifc research efforts through the Antarctic
Treaty's Scientifc Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) to better
understand the nature of the climate change problem and to publicize its
impacts on the continent, circumpolar waters and the indigenous wildlife,
especially in the peninsula region.51 A recent report by SCAR on climate
change in the Antarctic focuses on variations in the geology of the region
over the last ffty years, discusses the consequences of climate change for
the Antarctic biosphere, and reveals how current math-ematical models
project future impacts on the Antarctic ice mass and indigenous wildlife
from human interference through the release of greenhouse gases and
chlorofuorcarbons into the atmosphere.52 Ways and means must be devised
to achieve closer coordination and collaboration in the ATCPs’ efforts to
tackle the serious effects of climate change on marine resources in the
Southern Ocean, including Antarctic krill — the critical prey species in the
Antarctic marine ecosystem. Global climate disruption has intensifed the
urgency of these concerns as rising temperatures continue to melt sea ice,
thus destroying key habitat and nursery areas for Antarctic krill. Less sea
ice means fewer Antarctic krill, and fewer krill means less food for
penguins, seals, whales, fnfsh and squid in the region.53

Biological prospecting
A second scientifc research-related issue now seems of little concern to the
United States, but that situation could change. This is the nascent onset of
biological prospecting — bioprospecting — in the Antarctic.54 Nearly 200
research organizations and companies, many of which are American-based,
are engaged in preliminary research on living resources for commercial
purposes in the Antarctic.55 Several complications seem apparent should
bioprospecting become a pervasive activity in the Antarctic. For example,
do claimant states possess the legal authority to regulate access of
commercial bioprospectors? Would this ‘authority’ give claimant states the
right of refusal to a prospective bioprospector? Who retains how much of
the profts, if any, that are derived from bioprospecting research? The
companies? The claimant states? The ATCPs? The international
community? Important to remember is that the United States still refrains
from acceding to the framework 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity56
for similar reasons, driven by concern that American pharmaceutical frms
would be obligated to transfer biotech information to the host country
where the research was conducted. Would claimant states enjoy that same
right under an Antarctic bioprospecting regime? Finally, regarding the
freedom of scientifc research within the Antarctic Treaty area, should a
distinction be made between basic scientifc research, applied scientifc
research and commercial use of resources within the context of beneft-
sharing? These critical considerations have yet to confront the United States
or other ATCPs, mainly because bioprospecting efforts in Antarctica are in
such an embryonic stage of development. Nonetheless, this does not
preclude the possibility of conficts arising between governments in the
Antarctic. Consequently, prudence would seem to dictate that the United
States should remain actively engaged in monitoring the escalation of
bioprospecting activities in the Antarctic and what implications they might
hold for generating confict among the ATCPs.

Environmental protection
A third key US national interest is to protect the pristine environment of
Antarctica and its associated ecosystems. The United States’ intentions to
fulfl these environmental protection priorities on the continent are clearly
seen in that government's salient role among the Consultative Parties over
the past five decades to strongly support the negotiation of two major
agreements in the Antarctic Treaty System, namely the Agreed Measures on
the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora57 and the Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.58 At the 3rd ATCM in
Brussels in 1964, the United States assumed a leading role in negotiating
the Agreed Measures.59 The main aim of this recom-mendation was to
ensure that it contained mandates to protect Antarctica's indi-genous fauna
and fora from man's increasing activities on the continent, foster
collaborative scientifc research and encourage the ‘rational use’ of
Antarctic animal and plant life.60 For the United States, implementing
legislation for the Agreed Measures was adopted as the Antarctic
Conservation Act of 1978 (PL 95–541).61 For US nationals, these
regulations govern the taking of fauna and fora, entry into protected areas
and provide for a permit system that permits investigators to apply to
collect specimens and enter protected areas for compel-ling scientifc
purposes.
The core instrument designed to protect the Antarctic environment is the
1991 Environmental Protection Protocol. The protocol serves as a
framework instrument that sets out broad principles to protect Antarctica's
environment. The protocol's main objective is the ‘comprehensive
protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated
ecosystems’.62 In addition, the same provision designates Antarctica as a
‘natural reserve, devoted to peace and science’.63 Central to realizing this
precept is Article 3, which asserts that protection of the Antarctic
environment as a wilderness with aesthetic and scientifc value shall be a
‘fundamental consideration’ of activities conducted in the area. Perhaps
most signifcantly, Article 7 mandates that ‘Any activity relating to mineral
resources, other than scientifc research, shall be prohibited.’ This
effectively prohibits any mining or drilling activities for mineral or
hydrocarbon resources on or around the continent for at least ffty years after
the protocol enters into force (i.e. in 2048). Moreover, the Article 7 ban on
mining may not be repealed unless a future agreement establishes a binding
regulatory frame-work for such activity.64 Environmental assessments are
required for all activities, including tourism,65 and a special Committee for
Environmental Pro-tection was created to recommend policies for
protecting the continent.66 Finally, member states should be prepared for
emergency response actions in the area67 and arbitration arrangements
should be made to resolve international disputes regarding the Antarctic
environment.68
Implementation of the environmental protocol is provided by its six
annexes. Annex I deals with the need to conduct environmental impact
assessments before activities are conducted in the Antarctic, with the
intention of producing comprehensive environmental evaluations of
proposed activities.69 Annex II incorporates and updates the 1964 Agreed
Measures on the Protection of Antarctic Fauna and Flora.70 Requirements
for waste disposal, waste removal, incineration and waste management in
the Antarctic is the focus of Annex III71 while Annex IV provides binding
measures for protecting the circumpolar ocean's environment from marine
pollution.72 Annex V concerns protection and management of particular
areas on the continent, namely specially protected and specially managed
areas, as well as historic sites and monuments.73 Finally, Annex VI, which
is not yet in force, deals with liability in the event of environmental
emergencies.74 This annex sets up a regime that mandates an operator that
fails to take prompt and effective response action to environmental
emergencies arising from its activities will be liable to pay the costs of
response action taken by other parties. In drafting and negotiating all these
annexes, the United States delegation played a key role, with the aim of
articulating and activating strong environmental protection policies for the
Antarctic continent.
Prior to US ratifcation of the Protocol in April 1997, the US Senate
deemed it to be a non-self-executing agreement. Consequently, special
legislation would be needed to implement its provisions into US national
law.75 This was accomplished by adopting the Antarctic Science, Tourism
and Conservation Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–227), which amended the
Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978.76
The US government also assumed a pivotal role in orchestrating the
negotiations from 1982 to 1988 for drafting the Antarctic Convention on the
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA).77 This
ambition came largely through the efforts of R. Tucker Scully, head of the
US delegation. In Mr Scully's view, the rationale for such a minerals treaty
was not that it sought to encourage mineral exploitation on or around the
continent. Rather, CRAMRA was to be the framework agreement that
would fll the practical need to have a very strict regulatory regime in place
should mining or drilling ever go forward in the Antarctic.78 In sum,
creating a minerals treaty did not guarantee that mining or drilling would
necessarily go forward, but it would ensure that a regulatory regime would
be available to regulate such activities if they ever become feasible within
the Antarctic Treaty area. Regardless, concerns by environmentalists
infuenced Australia and France — claimant ATCPs whose participation was
needed for CRAMRA to enter into force — and they refused to participate
after the draft text was opened for signature. That circumstance rendered
the minerals agreement moribund, since all claimant governments had to
ratify CRAMRA for it to enter into force.

Conservation of marine living resources

A fourth broad US national interest is to ensure the conservation and
sustainable management of the living resources in the oceans surrounding
Antarctica. To this end, American offcials in the Department of State's OES,
the Marine Mammals Commission and the National Science Foundation
assumed notably active roles in drafting two key instruments, the
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals79 and the Convention
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).80
The Seals Convention was negotiated in 1972 to dissuade governments,
especially the Soviet Union, from authorizing commercial seal hunting in
the Antarctic. Accordingly, this instrument sets limits on harvesting seals,
protects fully some species of seals and limits the method, season and areas
for seal hunting in the area south of 60o South Latitude. It also affrms that
parties must exchange information and provide annual reports to the
contracting parties and to the Scientifc Committee on Antarctic Research.

Unlawful fshing
The United States and other ATCPs realized in the late 1970s that fshing
feets from certain states, namely the Soviet Union, Japan and Poland, were
increasingly engaged in harvesting krill in the circumpolar marine
environment. Krill is the critical prey species in the Antarctic marine
ecosystem, on which whales, seals, squid, penguins and other fauna feed.
Unlimited krill catches in the Southern Ocean, however, could dangerously
deplete their biomass and thus produce deleterious impacts on populations
of those other marine life dependent upon krill for food. Consequently, the
United States assumed an active role in negotiating a special agreement,
CCAMLR, designed to conserve and regulate the harvesting of krill and
other marine life (excluding whales and seals, whose conservation was
treated by separate conventions) in the oceans around Antarctica. The
convention's cardinal objective is the ‘conservation of Antarctic marine
living resources’. Importantly, to this end CCAMLR obligates parties that
conservation of Antarctic marine living resources and decisions about their
rational use must be based on an ecosystem approach to resource
management. In contrast to other fsheries agreements that concern only the
status of one commercial target species, CCAMLR requires that
consideration be given to all species in the ecosystem and to conserving
ecological relationships. That is, CCAMLR seeks to maintain ‘the
ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related
populations of Antarctic marine living resources’81 as well as to prevent
decreases in the size of any harvested population ‘to levels below those
which ensure its stable recruitment’.82 The precautionary approach is
subsequently stipulated by a directive which avers that ‘of changes or
minimization of the risk of changes in the marine ecosystem which are not
potentially reversible over two or three decades’ must be prevented.83
Again, the United States played a central role in getting this instrument
negotiated, drafted and implemented. With regard to conservation and
management of Antarctic living marine resources, important for the United
States is the critical interest of ensuring access for American fshers in the
Southern Ocean.84 In this regard, the United States government remains
seriously concerned about the need of preventing and discouraging illegal,
unregulated and unreported (IUU) fshing vessels within the CCAMLR
area,85 as well as watching the rise of the Chinese fshing feet as it
increasingly enters the Southern Ocean in the coming years.86

Whaling in Antarctic waters

Another issue concerning Antarctic living marine resources is the political
tension between Australia and Japan — both original Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties — arising over Japanese lethal whaling in waters
offshore the Australian Antarctic Territory. Australia's steadfast antiwhaling
position over the past twenty years concentrated on Japanese efforts in the
Southern Ocean and boiled over into Australia's Federal Court in 2004. In
May 2010 these tensions prompted a case being brought by Australia
against Japan's ‘scientifc research whaling’ before the International Court of
Justice.87
While the United States has voiced no offcial position on this dispute, US
policy traditionally refects strong support in favour of the moratorium
against whaling, as well as serious suspicion about the legitimacy of
Japanese ‘scientifc whaling research’ used to justify its continued catch
operations in the Southern Ocean.88 The impetus for this position stems
from strong political pressure in the United States applied by its Humane
Society, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Federation organizations. Even
so, the United States did take the lead in putting together a new proposal in
June 2010 at the International Whaling Commission meeting in Morocco.
This proposal would have lifted the blanket ban on commercial whaling,
but would reduce by half the number of whales caught each year by Japan,
Iceland and Norway and add further regulations on commercial whaling.
Nevertheless, this policy of lifting the whaling ban was opposed by
Australia and the other nonwhaling ATCP governments. Consequently, the
agenda item was deferred with the effect that no vote was taken on the
proposal to reform the IWC.89

Regulation of tourism
Finally, with regard to protecting the Antarctic environment the United
States has been a leading advocate of adopting strong measures for
regulating tourist vessels in the region. In the 2008–09 season, more than
36,000 shipborne tourists visited the polar south, a ninefold increase since
1994.90 Given this escalation in visitors, it is not unreasonable to presume
that the more vessels that make more voyages carrying more passengers
through the Antarctic, the greater likelihood there is for serious accidents to
occur on their voyages. The recent past bears out this reality. During the
2008–09 season, two ships became grounded. In early December 2008, the
MV Ushuaia ran aground while entering Wilhemina Bay near Cape Anna
in the northwest Antarctic Peninsula. This acci-dent resulted in hull damage
to the vessel, an unknown amount of fuel being spilled and evacuation of its
crew and passengers.91 In February 2009, the Ocean Nova became
grounded, reportedly driven by high winds, onto the Western Ant-arctic
Peninsula.92 In addition, several other incidents involving tourist vessels in
the Antarctic have occurred in recent years. The M/S Explorer, a
commercial tourist ship, sank in November 2007. Although all passengers
and crew were rescued safely, an unknown amount of fuel was spilled.93
Two other cruise ships, the M/V Lybov Orlova94 and the M/V Nordkapp,95
ran aground at Deception Island in the South Shetland Islands in November
2006 and January 2007 respectively. The cruise ship M/S Fram lost power
on 30 December 2007 off the Antarctic Peninsula and drifted into an
iceberg.96 The Nisshin Maru, a Japanese whaling vessel, suffered an
onboard explosion and caught fre in February 2007, which killed one
person and left the ship powerless for several days.97
The United States assumes a major interest in Antarctic tourism since
more than one-third of all tourists visiting Antarctica by ship are American
citizens and almost half of all Antarctic tourist expeditions are subject to
US regulation because they are organized in or proceed from the United
States. The Department of State through the OES makes determinations
with respect to whether particular tour operators are subject to US
regulations;98 the US Environmental Protection Agency reviews
environmental impact assessments submitted by such operators;99 and the
National Science Foundation issues permits to tour operators related to
waste management on their voyages.100
At the 30th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) at New Delhi
in 2007, the United States proposed and the meeting adopted a resolution
recommending that countries discourage or decline to authorize tour
operators that use vessels carrying more than 500 passengers from making
any landings in Antarctica, and limiting the number of vessels conducting
or passengers participating in landings at any one time.101 The United
States has actively assisted in establishing visitor guidelines for landing
sites, and led efforts in 2008 at the 31st ATCM at Kyiv to begin systematic
assessment of the possible cumulative impact of tourism on these landing
sites.102 At the 32nd ATCM in Baltimore in 2009, the US proposed
requiring Antarctic Treaty parties to ensure that their Antarctic tour
operators bar ships with more than 500 passengers from landing sites,
restrict landings to one vessel at a time per site and limit passengers on
shore to 100 at a time.103 It would also mandate a minimum of one guide
for every twenty tourists while ashore, according to the documents. This US
proposal, however, did not contain any specifc enforcement mechanism or
penalties for limiting tourist operations.104 This resolution was augmented
in May 2010 at the 33rd ATCM in Punta del Este by a third resolution that
was adopted that increased the number of sites subject to Site Guidelines.105

Conclusion
The international peace and political stability established in Antarctica by
the Antarctic Treaty parties remains indispensable for successful pursuit by
the United States of its core interests in the region and has become an
important objective in its own right. For all these reasons, maintenance of
health of the Treaty continues to be an important foreign policy and national
security objective of the United States. It may seem ironic to apply a
national security yard-stick, with its military connotations, to an area that is
effectively a demilitarized and nuclear-free zone. However, the potential for
international discord and confict over Antarctica territorial claims which
would exist absent the Treaty today seems greater than was the case in
1959.
More than any other ACTP government, the United States considers
itself to be a vital player in Antarctic affairs such that it substantially
benefts from effective operation of the Antarctic Treaty. As much as any
other ATCP government, the United States views its policies as being
politically prudent for the effective multilateral operation of the Antarctic
Treaty. This leadership role is founded upon the active and infuential
presence in Antarctica that is maintained by the United States through its
diplomatic and scientifc activities. This presence accords the United States
a decisive role in the Treaty's activities-based decision system and in
maintaining the political and legal balance that makes the Treaty function
effectively. Hence, continued leadership by the United States in Antarctic
matters, including serious diplomatic efforts to head off challenges to the
Treaty before they fester and become politically disruptive, should continue
to well serve US national interests in the Antarctic well into the twenty-first
century.

Notes
1 The Antarctic Treaty, done 1 December 1959, entered into force 23
June 1961. 12 UST 794, TIAS No. 4780, 402 UNTS 71. On the
evolution of US national interests in Antarctica, see Christopher C.
Joyner and Ethel R. Theis, Eagle Over the Ice: The US in the Antarctic
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1998).
2 See Christopher C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The
Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1998).
3 Seven states make national claims to portions of Antarctica: Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United
Kingdom. These seven, plus Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet
Union and the United States, were the original states negotiating the
Treaty in 1959. By 2012 ffty states had become Treaty parties. Of
those, the original twelve and sixteen others hold the status of
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), which are the
participant decision making governments that negotiate and adopt
 policies under the Treaty. The acceding ATCPs are: Brazil, Bulgaria,
China, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, Republic of Korea, the
Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and Uruguay. The
twenty non Consultative Parties are Austria, Belarus, Canada,
Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Korea (DPRK), Denmark, Estonia,
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Monaco, Papua New Guinea, Portugal,
Romania, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela.
4 4 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientifc
Affairs, www.state.gov/g/oes/ (last visited 14 January 2011).
5 Offce of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation,
www.nsf.gov/dir/index.jsp?org=OPP (last visited 14 January 2011).
6 United States Antarctic Program, www.usap.gov/ (last visited 14
January 2011).
7 Offce of Polar Affairs, US Department of State,
www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/index.htm (last visited 14 January
2011).
8 Offce of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation,
www.nsf.gov/dir/index.jsp?org=OPP (last visited 14 January 2011).
9 Presidential Decision Directive NSC 26 of 9 June 1994 (classifed),
cited in US National Science Foundation, Chapter II United States
Antarctic Policy, Antarctica, www.nsf.gov/pubs/1996/nstc96rp/toc.htm
(last visited 26 August 2010). See also Statement of President Richard
Nixon on US policy in Antarctica in October 1970, available at
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA Quest), Live
from Antarctica: US Policy for Antarctica,
http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/antarctica/back-ground/NSF/facts/fact06.html
(last visited 25 August 2010).
10 Background interview with OES offcial, US Department of State, 23
March 2010.
11 Ronald Reagan, President’s memorandum regarding Antarctica,
Memorandum 6646, 5 February 1982, at
http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/antarctica/background/NSF/president.html
(last visited 14 January 2011).
 Testimony of R. Tucker Scully, Director of the Offce of Oceans
12 Affairs, Department of State, before the Subcommittee on Basic
Research, Committee on Science, US House of Representatives, 23
July 1997, http://commdocs.house.gov/commit-
tees/science/hsy071002.000/hsy071002_0.HTM (last visited 14
January 2011).
13 See Christopher C. Joyner, ‘US-Soviet Cooperative Diplomacy: The
Case of Ant-arctica’, in Nish Jamgotch (ed.), United States-Soviet
Cooperation: An Untold Story (New York: Praeger Publications,
1989), pp. 39–61.
14 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Antarctic Treaty:
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2nd
sess., 14 June 1960, p. 45.
15 Four American national interest objectives were set out in this 1958
statement: (1) to prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes;
(2) to provide for freedom of scientifc investigation; (3) to establish an
orderly joint administration of Antarctica by the countries directly
concerned; (4) to preserve Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.
Department of State, ‘Statement of US Policy on Antarctica’, NSC
5804/1, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1958–1960, vol. 2
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), p. 485. These interests have largely
been carried over into US foreign policy objectives since then.
16 Antarctic Treaty, Article II.
17 Ibid., Article III.
18 Ibid., Article IV.
19 Ibid., Article IV (2).
20 Ibid., Article I.
21 Ibid., Article VII.
22 Ibid., Article V.
23 The area of the Antarctic region is 20.327 million sq. km or 7.84829
million sq. miles. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook
 (Southern Ocean), www.cia.gov/library/publications/the world
factbook/geos/countrytemplate_oo.html (last visited 24 August 2010).
24 See Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons, pp. 54–82.
25 See the discussion in Joyner and Thesis, Eagle Over the Ice, pp. 37–
40.
26 EnglishInfo, Antarctic Territorial Claims, at Information about
Antarctic Territorial Claims,
http://english.turkcebilgi.com/Antarctic+territorial+claims (last visited
14 January 2011). Russia asserts the same legal position of non
recognition, coupled with its reserved right to make a future claim on
the continent.
27. 27 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, done
26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934, Article 1,
www.taiwandocuments.org/montevideo01.htm (last visited 12 January
2011).
28 Oliver Lissitzyn, 1959, ‘The American Position on Outer Space and
Antarctica’, American Journal of International Law, 53, pp. 126, 128.
‘The United States neither asserts a claim nor recognizes the claims of
others. At the same time, the United States has maintained a basis of
claim, deriving originally from early US expeditions of exploration
and discovery in Antarctica.’ National Science Foundation, United
States Antarctic Policy, Antarctica, op. cit., Chapter II, para. B.
29 US law, including particular criminal offences such as murder by or
against US nationals, may apply to areas not under the jurisdiction of
other states, inclusive of Antarctica. Some US laws directly apply to
the continent. For example, the Antarctic Conservation Act, 16 USC
section 2401 et seq., provides civil and criminal penalties for several
activities, unless authorized by regulation or statute: the taking of
native mammals or birds; the introduction of non indigenous plants
and animals; entering into specially protected or scientifc areas; the
discharge or disposal of pollutants; and the importation into the United
States of certain objects from Antarctica. Violation of the Antarctic
Conservation Act carries penalties of up to $10,000 in fnes and one
year in prison. The Departments of Treasury, Commerce,
 Transportation and Interior share enforcement responsibilities. Public
Law 95–541, the US Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, requires that
expeditions from the United States to Antarctica notify in advance the
Offce of Oceans and Polar Affairs in the Department of State, which
reports such plans to other states as required by Article III (b) in the
Antarctic Treaty. CIA World Factbook, Government, Legal System,
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ay.html
(last visited 14 January 2011).
30 The importance of Article 76 in development of hydrocarbon
exploration in polar regions was dramatically triggered by Russian
activities in the Arctic in 2007. See Christopher C. Joyner, 2009, ‘The
Legal Regime for the Arctic’, Journal of Trans national Law & Policy,
18(2), pp. 198–199.
31 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Outer
limits of the con-tinental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by Australia,
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submis-
sions_fles/submission_aus.htm and Executive Summary
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_fles/aus04/Documents/a
us_doc_es_web_delivery.pdf (last visited 14 January 2011).
32 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Outer
limits of the con-tinental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by New
Zealand, www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/sub-
missions_fles/submission_nzl.htm (last visited 13 January 2011).
33 See Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, Argentine Submission,
Executive Summary,
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_fles/arg25_09/arg2009e
_summary_eng.pdf, pp. 11–16, 22 (last visited 13 January 2011).
34 Continental Shelf Submission of Norway with respect to Bouvetoya
and Dronning Maud Land (Executive Summary),
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_fles/nor30_09/nor2009_
executivesummary.pdf (last visited 13 January 2011).
35 Continental Shelf Preliminary Information of Chile,
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_fles/preliminary/chl2009
preliminaryinformation.pdf (last visited 13 January 2011).
36 United Kingdom, Note No. 168/08 (9 May 2008),
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_fles/gbr08/gbr_nv_9may
2008.pdf.; Submission by United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, 11 May 2009,
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_fles/submission_gbr_45
_2009.htm (last visited 14 January 2011).
37 Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, Note No. HR/cl
No. 69, February 2009,
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_fles/fra09/fra_note_feb2
009e.pdf (last visited 13 January 2011).
38 Personal correspondence to the author from the US Department of
State, 18 May 2009) (on fle with the author).
39 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting XXXII, Washington Ministerial
Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty, in
Report of the 23nd Antarctic treaty consultative Party Meeting,
Appendix 1 (17 April 2009), para. 3 (emphasis added).
40 Ibid., para. 5 (emphasis added).
41 Environmental Protection Protocol, op. cit., Articles 7 and 24.
42 Personal correspondence from the US Department of State, op. cit.
43 See generally, The US National Science Foundation, Antarctica,
www.nsf.gov/pubs/1996/nstc96rp/toc.htm (last visited 24 August
2010).
44 Peter Rejcek, ‘Byrd History’, The Antarctic Sun, 12 June 2009,
http://antarcticsun.usap.gov/features/contentHandler.cfm?id=1793 (last
visited 14 January 2011).
45 This point is repeatedly made during US Congressional Hearings for
funding American scientifc activities in the Antarctic. See, e.g. US
Department of State, Appendix II: Antarctica: Funding of the United
States Antarctic Program, including South Pole Station, Memorandum
for Andrew D. Sens (9 March 1996), in ibid. and Statement of Norman
 Augustine, Chairman, United States Antarctic Program External Panel,
the National Science Foundation, Arlington, Virginia, in US House of
Representatives Committee on Science, Hearings on the United States
and the Antarctica in the 21st Century, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (12
March 1997). Norway's claim has no terminal points to avoid
misinterpretation that it accepts the validity of the sector principle.
46 United States Antarctic Program, Vessels and Operations,
www.usap.gov/vesselS-cienceAndOperations/ (last visited 13 January
2011).
47 Jane G. Ferrigno, Alison J. Cook, Amy M. Mathie et al., Coastal
Change and Glaciological Map of the Palmer Land Area, Antarctica:
1947–2009 (US Geological Survey, British Antarctic Survey, Scott
Polar Research Institute, 2009), http://pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2600-c/
(last visited 14 January 2011).
48 See, e.g. Holly Hartman, ‘Icebergs Ahoy: Monster Bergs on the
Loose’, Infoplease, www.infoplease.com/spot/kidsiceberg1.html (last
visited 13 January 2011).
49 British Antarctic Survey, ‘Antarctic Peninsula Glaciers in Widespread
Retreat’, 21 April 2005,
www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2005_04/bas-apg041805.php (last
visited 13 January 2011).
50 See Gary Braasch, ‘Antarctica: Ice Under Fire’, 16 July 2007,
www.worldviewof-globalwarming.org/pages/antarctica.html 2007 (last
visited 24 August 2010); Greenpeace, ‘Antarctica and Climate
Change’, 9 May 2009,
www.greenpeace.org/international/campaigns/oceans/polar-
seas/antarctic/antarctica-climate-change/ (last visited 25 August 2010)
and Joel M. Carter, ‘Quick Facts about Climate Change in Antarctica’,
22 September 2007, http://people.cornellcollege.edu/JCarter09/Quick-
Facts.html (last visited 24 August 2010).
51 See US Antarctic Program, 2009–2010 Season,
www.nsf.gov/od/opp/antarct/treaty/opp10001/big_print_0910/bigprint
0910_1.jsp and Scientifc Committee on Antarctic Research,
www.scar.org/ (last visited 14 January 2011).
 See J. Turner, R. Bindschadler, P. Convey et al. (eds), Antarctic
52
Climate Change and the Environment: A Contribution to the
International Polar Year 2007–2008 (SCAR, 25 November 2009),
www.scar.org/publications/occasionals/ACCE_25_Nov_2009.pdf (last
visited 25 August 2010) and SCAR’s Antarctic Climatic Change and
the Environment (ACCE) Review Report. Information Paper 5, Doc.
ATCM 13, CEP, 32nd ACTP, Baltimore (6–17 April 2009),
www.scar.org/treaty/atcmxxxii/Atcm32_ip005_e.pdf (last visited 24
August 2009).
53 Greenpeace, ‘Krill: The Food that Keeps Antarctica Alive is Under
Threat’ (2 May 2009),
www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/oceans/polar-
seas/antarctic/krill-antarctica-foodchain-under-threat/; Antarctica Krill
Conservation Product, Global Climate Change, Antarctica and Krill,
www.asoc.org/Portals/0/AKCP%20Krill-Climate%20Factsheet.pdf
(last visited 23 August 2010).
54 See Alan D. Hemmings and Michele Rogan Finnemore, ‘Access,
Obligations, and Benefts: Regulating Bioprospecting in the Antarctic’,
in Michael I. Jeffery, Jeremy Firestone and Karen Bubna-Litic (eds),
Biodiversity Conservation, Law and Liveli hoods: Bridging the North
South Divide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.
529–551 and A. Guyomard, ‘Bioprospecting in Antarctica: A New
Challenge for the Antarctic Treaty System’, in Francesco Francioni
and Tullio Scovazzi (eds), Biotechnology and International Law
(Oxford: Hart, 2006), pp. 147–170.
55 Belgium, ‘An update on biological prospecting in Antarctica,
including the development of the Antarctic Biological Prospecting
Database’, Doc. WP 11 ATCM XXXI (2008), pp. 8–9,
www.bioprospector.org/bioprospector/Resources/actm/Atcm31_wp011
_e.pdf (last visited 24 August 2010).
56 Convention on Biological Diversity, done at Rio de Janeiro 5 June
1992, entered into force 29 December 1993, 1760 UNTS. The United
States is the only non party in the international community.
57 Recommendation III–VIII, approved (1964), 17 UST 996, TIAS No.
6058 (1965), as modifed in 24 UST 992, TIAS No. 7692 (1973). The
 Agreed Measures were superseded by Annex II to the 1991 Protocol
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty when the Protocol
entered into force in 1998.
58 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Doc. XI
ATSCM/2, 21 June 1991, adopted 4 October 1991, entered into force
14 January 1998. [Herein after Environmental Protection Protocol.]
59 In presenting its views on the House Resolution 7749, the US
Department of State mentioned this fact. See House Committee on
Science and Technology, Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, report to
accompany HR 7749, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 18 May 1978, p. 11.
60 Signifcantly, the Agreed Measures document was incorporated into the
Environmental Protection Protocol as its Annex II. See Note 70 infra.
61 Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, 16 USC §§ 2401–2413, 28
October 1978, as amended 1996.
62 Environmental Protection Protocol, Article 2.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., Article 25(5).
65 Ibid., Article 80.
66 Ibid., Article 11.
67 Ibid., Article 15.
68 Ibid., Articles 18–20.
69 British Antarctic Survey, Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty, Annex I to the Protocol on Environmental Protection
to the Antarctic Treaty Environmental Impact Assessment,
www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolit-
ical/treaty/update_1991.php (last visited 14 January 2011).
70 Ibid., Annex II to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora.
71 Ibid., Annex III to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty: Waste Disposal and Management.
72 Ibid., Annex IV to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty: Prevention of Marine Pollution.
73 Ibid., Annex V to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty: Area Protection and Management.
74 Ibid., Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty: Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies.
75. 75 The Antarctic Conservation Act, Public Law 95-541 (as amended
by Public Law 104-227), authorises US regulations for compliance.
See http://nsf.gov/od/opp/antarct/aca/aca.jsp (last visited 14 January
2011). See the publication Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (Public
Law 95-541), with Regulations, Descriptions and Maps of Special
Areas, Permit Application Form, Agreed Measures for the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, and Protocol on Environmental
Protection (NSF 01–151 at nsf01151/stArticlejsp).
76 110 Stat. 3035, PL 104-227 (2 October 1996), 104th Cong., An Act to
Implement the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty.
77 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities, done 2 June 1988 in Wellington, New Zealand, opened for
signature 25 November 1988, Doc. AMR/SCM/88/78 of 2 June 1988,
reprinted in (1988) 28 ILM 859. For discussion, see Christopher C.
Joyner, October 1987, ‘The Antarctic Minerals Negotiating Process’,
American Journal of International Law 81(4), pp. 888-905.
78 See Christopher C. Joyner, January 1988, ‘The Evolving Antarctic
Minerals Regime’, Ocean Development and International Law, 19(1),
pp. 73-95.
79 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, done in London 1
June 1972, entered into force 11 March 1978. 29 UST 441, TIAS No.
8826.
80 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, done in Canberra on 20 May 1980, entered into force 7
April 1982, 1329 UNTS 47.
81 CCAMLR, Article II(b).
82 Ibid., Article II(a).
83 Ibid., Article II(c).
84 Background interview with OES offcial, US Department of State, 23
March 2010.
85 See Christopher C. Joyner and Lindsay Aylesworth, 2008, ‘Managing
IUU Fishing in the Southern Ocean: The Plight of the Patagonian
Toothfsh’, Ocean Yearbook of International Law, 22, pp. 241–290.
86 Background interview with OES offcial, US Department of State, 23
March 2010.
87 International Court of Justice, ‘Australia Institutes Proceedings
Against Japan for Alleged Breach of International Obligations
Concerning Whaling’, Press Release No. 2010/16 (1 June 2010),
www.icj-cij.org/docket/fles/148/15953.pdf (last visited 13 January
2011).
88 America.gov, ‘US Protest Japan’s Announced Return to Whaling in the
Antarctic’, 26 November 2006, www.america.gov/st/washfle-
english/2006/November/20061120171913lcnirellep0.9033319.html
(last visited 13 January 2011).
89 See IWS Quotas, Submitted by Denmark and the USA, IWC/62/26,
Agenda Item 3,
www.iwcoffce.org/_documents/commission/IWC62docs/62-26.pdf
(last visited 13 January 2011).
90 International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators, ‘2009-2010
Tourism Summary’, 1 May 2010,
http://image.zenn.net/REPLACE/CLIENT/1000037/1000116/applicati
on/pdf/tourism_summary_byexpedition2.pdfr (last visited 26 August
2010).
91 Antarctica and Southern Ocean Coalition, ‘MV Ushuaia Runs
Aground’, The Ant-arctica Blog, 5 December 2008,
http://antarcticablog.blogspot.com/2008/12/mv-ushuaia-runs-
aground.html (last visited 13 January 2011).
92 Gene Sloan, ‘Another Expedition Cruise Ship Runs Aground in
Antarctica’, USATo-day, Travel, 17 February 2009,
 http://travel.usatoday.com/cruises/legacy/item.aspx?
type=blog&ak=62974821.blog (last visited 13 January 2011).
93 Monte Reel, ‘Cruise Ship Sinks off Antarctica’, Washington Post, 24
November 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2007/11/24/ST2007112400367.html (last visited 13
January 2011).
94 ‘IMO Backing Antarctic Ship Review’, The Maritime Executive, 10
April 2008, www.maritime-executive.com/article/2008-04-10-imo-
backing-antarctic-ship-review/ (last visited 13 January 2011).
95 ‘Cruise Ship M/V Nordkapp Run [sic] Aground in Antarctica’, 31
January 2007, www.cruisingtalk.com/ms-nordkapp/6444-cruise-ship-
m-v-nordkapp-run-aground-antarctica.html (last visited 13 January
2011).
96 Carolyn Spencer Brown, ‘Bad News for Fram Passengers in
Antarctica’, Cruise News Archive, 29 December 2007,
www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?ID=2339 (last visited 13
January 2011).
97 Michael Perry, ‘Japanese Whaling Ship on Fire off Antarctica’,
Reuters, 15 February 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKSYD30495820070215 (last visited
13 January 2011).
98 US Department of State, Antarctic Tourism,
www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/antartic-tourism/ (last visited 13
January 2011).
99 US Department of State, ATME paper #5, US Policy on Private
Expeditions to Ant-arctica and Current US Framework for Regulation
of Antarctic Tourism,
www.state.gov/documents/organization/78214.pdf (last visited 13
January 2011).
100Ibid., Attachment B, US Framework for Regulation of Antarctic
Tourism www. state.gov/documents/organization/78214.pdf (last
visited 13 January 2011).
101Resolution 4 (2007), ATCM XXX, CEP X (11 May 2007, New Delhi).
102Resolution 2 (2008), ATCM XXXI, CEP XI (June 2008, Kyiv).
103United States, Proposal to Make Binding Certain Limitations on
Landing of Persons from Passenger Vessels, ATCM 11, WP, 17,
Attachment: Draft Measure on Landing of Persons from Passenger
Vessels in the Antarctic Treaty Area,
www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_meetings_meeting.aspx?lang=e (last visited 13
January 2011).
104Resolution 4 (2009), ATCM XXXII, CEP XII (17 April 2009,
Baltimore).
105Resolution 1 (2010), ATCM XXXIII, CEP XIII (14 May 2010),
www.ats.aq/devAS/info_measures_listitem.aspx?lang=e&id=471 (last
visited 23 August 2010).
7 Russia, the post-Soviet world,
and Antarctica

Irina Gan

Introduction1
From the time of the USSR's first venture into the Antarctic, when the Slava
whaling feet set sail for the Southern Ocean in 1946, the people of the
USSR were encouraged by the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) to look upon Antarctica as a new frontier to be conquered by the
victorious socialist motherland. Not only was the motherland to profit from
the newly initiated whale harvesting operations, a more important benefit
was the geopolitical advantage of resuming a presence in the South Polar
region after a 125-year hiatus since Captain Bellinghausen's Russian
Antarctic expedition. Notably, a scientific group attached to the feet was to
provide systematic hydrographic, meteorological, biological, and other
technical data for any potential expanded future Antarctic operations.
For nine years prior to the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of
1957–1958, investigations conducted in the Southern ocean by the Slava
whaling feet (with a total contingent of up to 800 men and women) were to
contribute towards building a substantial basis for further and more
comprehensive research proposed by the Soviet participants in this
international scientific endeavour. The first Soviet Antarctic Expedition
(SAE), after leaving the USSR for Antarctica in late 1955 in preparation for
the IGY, carried out operations in collaboration with the Slava. The Soviet
Government looked upon its activities in the South Polar region as one of
the essential components (the others being its nuclear and space
programmes) of its superpower status and generously supported wide-
ranging Antarctic research within the framework of the IGY. The scale and
capacity of the Soviet Antarctic programme was such that it rivalled that of
its Cold War opponent, the USA, with the result that by the end of the IGY
it had firmly established itself on the Antarctic continent. In 1959, it
became one of the twelve original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty (AT)2
with long-term plans to expand its presence in the South Polar region.
Logistic support for Soviet Antarctic research was sourced from USSR-
wide plants and factories; scientific programmes were formulated by a
range of research institutions, with the majority of Soviet republics
participating in these Antarctic programmes. There were, however, two
exceptions: expedition members from the Estonian Soviet Socialist
Republic (SSR) and the Tajik SSR worked on programmes put together by
Estonian and Tajik institutions respectively, as they had specific research
interests and experience. Estonia, with its abundance of lakes, chose to
investigate the lakes found in the Antarctic oases and conducted upper
atmospheric research; Tajikistan's experience with alpine areas was useful
in research conducted in the Antarctic highlands.3
In the early 1990s, however, Soviet Antarctic activities were brought to a
halt: December of 1991 saw the once monolithic USSR split up into fifteen
separate political and economic entities. This resulted in a dramatic
reduction of funds available for continuation of any sort of presence in the
South Polar region. Lev Savatyugin, head of the Polar Geography
Department in the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in St Petersburg
(AARI) asserts that there was a very real threat that all research on the icy
continent would cease and that the entire Antarctic infrastructure, which
had been developed over many years, would have to be totally forsaken.4
Fortunately for the Institute, this threat did not eventuate.
The following chapter examines this difficult period of the emerging
Antarctic policy of the newly formed nations after the disintegration of the
USSR: it looks at the republics that have maintained or developed an
interest in the Antarctic, the strength of that interest, and their approaches to
achieve a practical implementation of their policy.

The Commonwealth of Independent States

After the breakup of the USSR, twelve of the former fifteen Soviet Socialist
Republics agreed to create an organization known as the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). The long-latent desire of the three Baltic
republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to pursue full independence and to
develop closer ties with Western Europe resulted in their decision to choose
their own political destiny separately from the others.
In August 2005, Turkmen President Niyazov called for the country's ties
with the CIS to be altered due to his policy of permanent neutrality —
Turkmenistan withdrew from full membership, while remaining an
associate member. Three years later, on 18 August 2008 (immediately
following the Russia-Georgia conflict in South Ossetia), the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia informed the CIS Executive Committee of its
intention to completely withdraw from the CIS. The decision came into
effect on 18 August 2009.5 Consequently, at present, there are eleven CIS
members: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan including one associate
member, Turkmenistan.
The former USSR's assets were to be distributed among the initial twelve
members of the CIS according to a formula whereby each member received
a certain percentage of the assets, while the Russian Federation agreed to
assume all debts.6 The Russian Federation, where all the previous Soviet
government institutions were located, also agreed to assume the rights and
obligations ensuing from all international agreements and treaties signed by
the USSR, including the AT. The Soviet government institution responsible
for the Antarctic, the Chief Administration of the Hydro Meteorological
Service, was based in Moscow; the coordinator of Soviet Antarctic science,
the SAE, a department attached to one of the world's oldest and largest
institutions researching the polar regions, the AARI (which marked the
ninetieth anniversary of its foundation in March 2010), was based in
Leningrad.7
 As for dividing the Antarctic assets among the former republics, Valery
Lukin, the head of the now renamed Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE),
explained that the network of Soviet bases was an indivisible whole and
could not therefore be redistributed in any way; hence, the Russian
Federation assumed responsibility for the totality of Antarctic
infrastructure. Nonetheless, he did suggest that a continuation of scientific
collaboration with members of the CIS was possible: cooperative research
could be conducted by sharing Russia's Antarctic facilities.8 In fact, up until
1996, a number of individuals from other former Soviet republics took part
in the work of the RAE.
The newly acquired independence and developing political propensities
of the former Soviet Republics, however, manifested themselves in a
variety of attitudes of CIS members towards formulating their own
Antarctic policies and their relationship with the Russian Federation.
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia have chosen to further integrate their
economies by forming a Customs Union, which came into effect on 1
January 2010 leading to the creation of a Common Economic Space, which
came into effect on 1 January 2012. These two agreements will facilitate the
free flow of capital and labour within the new entity, allowing personnel
from the member countries to become fully fledged participants in the
RAE.
Not all CIS members have displayed an interest in the Antarctic; the
following section will deal only with those that have: Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. It will also mention a non-
CIS member, the former SSR of Estonia. They are discussed according to
the present extent of their Antarctic operations.

Russia
At the outset, it must be noted that the Russian Federation has more than an
academic interest in the Polar regions, the North Polar region in particular.
Russia's vast northern coastline directly borders the Arctic Ocean, making it
a ‘polar state’, with all the strategic, economic, political, and scientific
repercussions that this implies. According to the Russian Government, the
total area of the Russian Arctic (including territorial seas) exceeds six
million square kilometres. Although its population is less than 1 per cent of
the total population of the RF, its resources account for approximately 20
per cent of Russia's GDP and 22 per cent of its export earnings. The
Russian Arctic holds a unique position in questions of national security and
economic development.9
No other former Soviet Republics border the Arctic and are therefore not
‘polar states’. Consequently, their interest in the North Polar region is
related neither to matters of national security nor to a direct economic
interest. The fact that, for the Russian Federation, the Arctic continues to
play a substantial role in its economy, strategic planning, scientific research,
and geopolitical manoeuvring means that the majority of experienced polar
scientists, personnel, polar research institutions, and the logistic capacity for
operating in polar environments have remained within Russian borders. Its
status as a ‘polar state’ and the resources associated with its polar activities
provide Russia with the potential capability of continuing operations not
only in the polar North, but in the South Polar region as well. The South
Polar region is seen by the Russian Government as one of the essential
components of foreign policy of countries seeking to play an active role in
contemporary world politics, just as the Soviet Government had in the past.
By maintaining an active presence in the region and asserting their intention
to participate in decisions on the future of the continent, nations display
their ability to determine the future of the planet as a whole.10 The USSR
had already established an active presence in the Antarctic — it was now up
to the Russian Federation to maintain this achievement and continue
operations on the icy continent in order to uphold its own geopolitical
interests and status as a world power.
The first President of the independent Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin,
addressed this question on 7 August 1992. In view of the substantial role
that Russia had played in the discovery and exploration of the Antarctic, the
importance to Russia's economic interests of its scientific research in the
region as well as the international obligations of the Russian Federation as a
party to the AT of 1959, he issued Decree Number 824 ‘Concerning the
RAE’.11 The Decree declared that the former SAE be reorganized and
named the RAE; that the committee of Hydrometeorology and
Environmental Monitoring, a department of the Ministry of Ecology and
Natural Resources, assume responsibility for the RAE; and that the
responsible Ministry, together with the Ministry of Science, the Russian
Academy of Sciences, and other interested institutions formulate a
programme for Antarctic research up until the year 2000.
For these institutions, which had run the Antarctic programme in Soviet
times, formulating a programme was not too onerous a task; the difficulty
lay in the government providing reliable funding for the programme when
the country was in such dire economic straits. Erratic and insufficient
funding, inflation, and non-payment of salaries to RAE staff led to a strike
that lasted four months (15 May–25 September 1992) with many expedition
members pulling out at the last minute.12 In the mid-1990s, the situation
became critical: no funds were available to repair the expedition's vessel
and bases could not be resupplied. Russkaia, Leningradskaia, and
Molodezhanaya stations were abandoned; work at Vostok station came to a
standstill; research projects were abandoned due to a dramatic cut in
personnel at the stations.13 Maintaining even a greatly diminished presence,
let alone conducting research, became almost impossible. Headlines in
Russian newspapers reflected the disastrous state of Antarctic affairs:
‘Russian Antarctic programme under threat of being shut down’; ‘Akademik
Fedorov unable to reach Antarctica due to lack of fuel’; ‘It's easy to leave,
but difficult to return’, ‘Antarctica is drifting away from Russia’.
On 28 August 1997, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin attempted to
stabilize the deteriorating situation. He issued Decree Number 1113 of the
Government of the Russian Federation ‘Concerning the activities of the
RAE’, which defined the ‘minimal allowable’ operations of the RAE that
were essential to continue research in the Antarctic, taking account of the
‘current economic circumstances and Russia's geopolitical interests’ in the
South Polar region.14 The ‘current economic circumstances’, however, had
not improved. There was a further reduction in operations until 1999, when
the Finance Ministry eventually managed to allocate sufficient funding for
the expedition to leave on schedule, the first time it was able to do so since
1991.
Improving economic conditions and the election of a new president in
2001 seemed to bode well for the RAE: the Russian Government appointed
by President Vladimir Putin once again turned its attention to the South
Polar region. Decree Number 685 of 24 September 2001 ‘Concerning the
measures to be taken to ensure the Russian Federation's interests in the
Antarctic and the activities of the RAE in 2002–2005’, outlined the Russian
Government's more confident Antarctic policy. The aims were now to
increase the efficiency of high-priority Antarctic scientific research;
consolidate the Russian Federation's presence in the Antarctic; fulfil
multifaceted environmental protection obligations in line with the Madrid
Protocol; and, notably, to update and modernize the RAE's logistics and
infrastructure and ensure the operational health and safety of expedition
members.15 A major project in the modernization of infrastructure was the
adoption in 2003 of the Hydrometeorological Service's plans for
constructing a new icebreaker for use by the RAE. Notwithstanding the
optimism of Decree Number 685, by 2004 the personnel at Russian stations
were reduced by 30 per cent16 and the building of the new vessel was taking
longer than anticipated, with the Akademik Tryoshnikov to become fully
operational by the end of 2012.
The year 2005 marked the end of the period covered by Decree Number
685; consequently, on 10 March 2005 the government turned its attention to
the outlook for the Russian Federation's activities in the Antarctic for the
next five-year period, 2006–2010. It noted that the future operations of the
RAE, due to the increasing interest of other countries in the Antarctic, could
no longer remain the ‘minimal allowable’. The approaching International
Polar Year (IPY) of 2007–2008 and other international obligations required
that operations for the period 2006–2010 be upgraded to ‘optimal’. The
government also noted that the multifaceted nature of Antarctic operations
required a more effective coordination between the Academy of Sciences
and the federal departments involved in work relating to the AT.17
A politically symbolic, and some would say ostentatious, demonstration
of Russia's upgrading of interest in the South Polar region was the
expedition of prominent Russian officials to the South Pole in January 2007
immediately prior to the commencement of the IPY. This undertaking was
organized by the Russian Association of Members of Polar Expeditions and
led by the special representative of the President of Russia responsible for
international cooperation in the Arctic and the Antarctic and the IPY, Artur
Chilingarov. It also included the president of the World Meteorological
Organization and head of the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and
Environmental Monitoring of the Russian Federation, Alexandr Bedritsky;
the director of the Russian Federal Security Service, Nikolai Patrushev; his
deputy Vladimir Pronichev; and St Petersburg journalist Vladimir
Strugatsky.18 This high-profile group few from Moscow to Punta Arenas
(Chile), continued on to King George Island and then to the Patriot Hills on
the Antarctic continent. On reaching the Patriot Hills, they transferred to a
Federal Security Service Mi8 helicopter for the final 1,000-kilometre fight
to the South Pole, where the Americans at Amundsen–Scott base invited
them for coffee, after which the Russian fag was planted at the point of
convergence of all the world meridians.
Strugatsky declared that such a high-profile expedition was undertaken to
once again emphasize the huge importance that Russia, as a leading polar
state, places in the research conducted in the coldest and harshest continent.
He explained that the directors of the Federal Security Service were
exhibiting a greater interest in the polar regions due largely to the fact that
Russia directly faces the Arctic Ocean where her northern borders lie.
Patrushev was quoted as saying that

the prestige of our country depends, among other things, on how

actively Russia participates in polar research. We hope that by
participating in the extensive scientific programmes of the IPY, Russia
will extend its presence in the Arctic and Antarctic.19

In order for the ‘extended presence’ to conform to international

obligations, on 24 April 2008, the Russian Government introduced draft
legislation regulating the activities of Russian national and legal entities in
the Antarctic with the aim of ensuring that these activities correspond to
international norms and standards in line with the AT. At the same meeting,
the government considered the forecasts of overseas analysts regarding the
continuing competition of the leading countries for economic and political
influence in the Antarctic, ‘the escalating discussions about territorial
claims by certain countries’, and decided to devise and implement a
strategy for Russia's activities in the Antarctic up until the year 2025.20
Two and a half years later, in October 2010, this strategy aiming to
restore Russia's position as a world leader in Antarctic research was finally
adopted. It identifies existing failings, among them: poor progress of all
Antarctic-related disciplines including astrophysics, microbiology, and
biochemistry in comparison with research conducted by other countries;
lack of important marine research; aging Antarctic infrastructure; and poor
personnel training. The strategy aspires to renovate all stations and
construct additional research vessels and airplanes over the next fifteen
years; promote aerospace disciplines; as well as to conduct geological and
geophysical research of the mineral and hydrocarbon resources in
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.21 Ambitious plans indeed, although
their realization remains at the mercy of appropriate funding. Although
definitive budget figures are difficult to obtain from official sources,
according to one online newspaper, approximately US$183 million is
planned to be spent on the Russian Antarctic programme up until 2013.22
Of this amount, about US$800,000 will be spent specifically on scientific
research in 2012 and US$1,130,000 in 2013.23
Currently Russia maintains five all-year-round stations and four field
bases, two of which, Leningradskaia and Russkaia (opened in 1971 and
1980 respectively) were reopened in 2008 as sites for automatic
meteorological and geodesic data collection after being mothballed in
1990–1991. All the stations are established in sectors of Antarctica which
had been claimed by other countries (only the French sector has no Russian
stations):
• Bellingshausen, 82°12'S 58°56'W, is situated in the overlapping
Britain-Argentinean-Chilean sector;
• Novolazarevskaia, 70°46'S 11°50'E, is in the Norwegian sector;
• Mirny 66°33'S 93°01'E, Vostok 78°27'S 106°52'E, Molodezhnaya
67°40'S 45°51'E (field base), Progress, 69°23'S 76°23'E, and
Druzhnaia 4 69°44'S 72°42'E (field base) are located at the Australian
Antarctic Territory (AAT);
• Leningradskaia (field base) 69°30'S 159°23'W is in the New Zealand
sector and
• Russkaia (field base), 74°46'S 136°52'W, is in the unclaimed sector of
Antarctica.
The majority of all-year-round Russian stations are located in the AAT. This
remains a major concern for the Australian Government which fears that
Russian (as well as Chinese and Indian) research stations in its territory
‘would lessen Australia's influence’.24 At the same time, this could be of
benefit to all concerned: Russian–Australian logistic cooperation might be a
logical step towards lessening expensive resupply costs whether by sea or
by air.
The widespread distribution of Russian Antarctic stations allows Russia
not only to conduct scientific observations and research in different areas of
the Antarctic continent, but, according to Lukin, has the potential to
influence the possible extension of national sovereignty of other countries
in the region.25 Both Russia and the USA, the two largest players in the
Antarctic, have a policy of non-recognition of Antarctic sector claims and
can, he argues, ‘effectively occupy’ areas of Antarctica which are valued
due to their scientific, economic, and political importance, irrespective of
claims.26
‘Effective occupation’ is ensured not only by the network of permanent
stations and field bases, but also by regular voyages of the two Russian
vessels the Akademik Fedorov and the Akademik Karpinsky which conduct
oceanographic, geological, and geophysical research in the Antarctic as
well as by conducting fights and traverses in Antarctica.27 Such a position
seems to be a direct continuation of previous Soviet Antarctic policy.28
This position is not inconsistent with Russia's vigorous support of the AT.
Anatoly Laiba from the Russian Polar Marine Geological Prospecting
Expedition believes that maintaining the AT is undoubtedly in the Russian
national interest.29 However, the possibility of a future inability to negotiate
a continuation of the AT and the consequent food of claims to Antarctic
territory should be a scenario for which Russia must be prepared. He
suggests that it would be wise to strengthen Russia's presence in those parts
of Antarctica discovered by the Russian Antarctic Expedition under the
command of Bellingshausen and Lazarev in 1819–1821 by establishing two
new permanent stations or summer field camps in the area of the prime (0°)
meridian in East Antarctica and in Alexander I Land in West Antarctica.30
Laiba echoes the long-held Soviet desire to build a station in an area first
discovered by Russians which was mooted at a meeting of the Academic
Council of the AARI in 1958.31

Ukraine
Ukraine, the next largest former Soviet republic after Russia, had a sizeable
input into the Soviet Antarctic programme as early as 1946. The Soviet
Antarctic whaling flotillas, the Slava, and the Sovetskaia Ukraina were
based in Odessa;32 ice class vessels were built in the shipping yards of
Kherson and Nikolaev; powerful tractors manufactured specifically for
conducting trans-Antarctic traverses, the ‘Kharkovchankas’ were built in
the city of Kharkov; the An 2 and other airplanes used in polar aviation
were developed at the Antonov design bureau in Kiev. Ukrainian research
institutions and scientists were well represented in the SAE. Although not
living in a ‘polar state’, Ukrainian scientists, seamen, and whalers had
accumulated extensive Antarctic experience with the Antarctic whaling
flotillas sailing from Ukrainian Black Sea ports and with the SAE.
Relations between Ukrainian and Russian scientists have always remained
warm and friendly, asserts Valery Litvinov, the head of the Ukraine
Antarctic Centre (UAC), although the difficulties between the Russian and
Ukrainian political leadership has resulted in Ukraine following an
independent course in realizing its Antarctic interests.33 Ukraine became a
signatory to the AT in 1992, one year after declaring independence.
In line with its independence, Ukraine sent a Note to the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, requesting that two former Soviet
Antarctic stations Novolazarevskaia and Progress be transferred to the
Ukrainian Antarctic Expedition (UAE) as part of the redistribution of
former Soviet assets, of which it was to receive 17 per cent. The Russian
side replied that these two stations were worth much more than 17 per cent:
according to the head of the RAE, only a small part of one station was
worth that amount. Instead, he suggested that the UAE share one of the
Russian stations to conduct their operations.34 The two sides failed to reach
an agreement, and the Ukrainian expedition was forced to look elsewhere to
find an outlet for its Antarctic ambitions.
As it happened, in the early 1990s the British Antarctic Survey (BAS)
was looking for a suitable partner to take over operations at its Faraday
station (65°15'S 64°16'W) built in 1953 on the west of the Antarctic
Peninsula on Galindez Island. Apparently, both Ukraine and Estonia
showed an interest in acquiring the station, but the research potential and
Antarctic experience of the former was judged by the British to be more
suitable for operating Faraday.35 As a result, a Memorandum of
Understanding between BAS and UAC was signed in June 1995 and the
station was transferred to Ukraine, which renamed it Akademik Vernandsky.
Work commenced in February 1996 and, during the first ten years,
Ukrainian scientists continued the research and observations which were
previously carried out at Faraday by the BAS, sharing the results of their
observations with the former owner of the station. Currently about fifteen
people work at the station, among them ten scientists, and another ten to
fifteen people participate in marine investigations on the way to and from
Antarctica.36
In 2001, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers decided to adopt a national
programme for scientific research in Antarctica for the years 2002–2010 in
addition to their collaboration with the BAS. The UAC and other state
scientific and educational institutions of Ukraine took part in developing the
programme. The main scientific directions are: oceanography,
hydrometeorology, atmosphere physics, space physics, nuclear physics of
the Earth and atmosphere, biology, and medicine.37
On 9 January 2007 the Ukrainian Parliament ratified a Law ‘Concerning
Antarctic activities’ which specifies Ukrainian interests in the Antarctic and
governs the basic principles of its activities there, bringing the latter in line
with international obligations according to the AT. In May 2008 at a
briefing prior to the opening of the XXXI ATCM in Kiev, the Deputy
Minister of Education and Science, Maksim Striha, indicated that Ukraine's
primary interest in the Antarctic was in fact geopolitical.38
Funding is to be provided through the government and from ‘sources not
forbidden by law’.39 According to the national representative in the SCAR
Standing Committee on Antarctic Geographic Information, Andriy
Fedchuk, after hosting the ATCM in Kiev in 2008 (which was partly
sponsored by the UAC), the government has almost tripled the funds
available for Antarctic operations.40 On 3 November 2010, the Ukrainian
Cabinet of Ministers adopted a national programme for scientific research
in Antarctica until 2020. The current budget, according to Litvinov, is
US$2.5 million per annum, of which 85 per cent is spent on logistics.41

Belarus
Though not as substantial as the Ukrainian, the Belarusian input into the
SAE was nonetheless considerable: from 1956 to 1991 more than a hundred
and ffty specialists from Belarus took part in the SAE.42 There is a dearth of
source material regarding Belarusian Antarctic plans after the collapse of
the USSR. However, the attention devoted to formulating Antarctic policy
is demonstrated by a most comprehensive programme entitled ‘Monitoring
of Polar Regions of the Earth and Support of the Activity of Arctic and
Antarctic Expeditions for the years 2007–2010 and for the period until
2015’, which was ratified by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Belarus in August 2006, two months after President Lukashenko signed a
decree ratifying the AT.43
The Polar regions programme specified that a Republican Centre of Polar
Investigations under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection be created to ensure Belarus's ‘status as an equal participant in
international research and exploitation of the polar regions’ and to establish
a Belarusian Antarctic station.44 In a ‘Short report on scientific and
technical research conducted by the Belarusian Antarctic seasonal
expedition of 2008–2009’, the Belarus Government further outlined
measures to be taken to ensure the Belarus interests in the polar regions: to
develop and strength international cooperation in the sphere of exploration
of polar regions; to expand scientific research; to build Belarusian Antarctic
infrastructure equipped with modern technological equipment and
instrumentation for scientific observation; and to train competent personnel
for the Belarus Antarctic Expedition (BAE).45 Bearing in mind the lack of
experience in conducting independent expeditions, it was deemed necessary
to initially utilize the expertise of the RAE as well as that of Belarusians
with past polar experience.46
A step towards closer cooperation with the RAE occurred in 2007, when
Belarus and the Russian Federation formed the Union of Russia and
Belarus. This enabled members of the BAE to join the RAE on board the
Russian vessel Akademik Fedorov to conduct their own research
programme in the area of the Gora Vechernyaya Russian field base
(67°39'S 46°09'E, Thala Hills, Enderby Land), which is in close proximity
to the Russian Antarctic station Molodezhnaya. Gora Vechernyaya is
considered a potential site for Belarus's Antarctic station, although some
scientists argue that it would be more practical to build a new station and
not take over the old Soviet field base.47
A Belarus–Russian Federation intergovernmental agreement regarding
cooperation in polar regions is under review in the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs in Moscow and Belarus and it is anticipated to be finalized by the
end of 2011. According to BAE Head and Deputy Head of Department of
Hydrometeorology Aleksei Gaidashev, it will provide Belarus with a solid
foothold for its future actions in Antarctica.48
As with other countries, the Global Financial Crisis has affected Belarus's
Antarctic plans: the government has been forced to reduce funding of the
BAE by over 30 per cent, from 15.44 billion Belarusian roubles to 10.37
billion.49 Notwithstanding the cuts, the Belarus Government in May 2011
ratified a new state programme ‘Monitoring the Polar Regions and Support
for Arctic and Antarctic Activities in 2011–2015’. No details of funding for
the programme are available at this stage.

Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan's post-Soviet Antarctic interests were demonstrated in a
somewhat curious manner in December 2008 when the country's Minister
of Environment and Natural Resources, Honorary President and Founder of
Western University in Baku and President of the Aerial and Extreme Sports
Federation of Azerbaijan, Professor Huseyn Bagirov, as a member of a two-
man Azerbaijani team departed for the South Pole ‘in parallel with a group
of four people who travelled to the pole under South Africa's “Peace for
Africa” fag’.50 After spending several days at the Chilean summer base
Arturo Parodi at Patriot Hills (80°20.0′S 81°20.0′W) and conducting
various observations, the team reached the summit of Mount Vinson and
proceeded to the South Pole, where on 26 January 2009 they planted the fag
of Azerbaijan and a bronze gilded plaque with a depiction of the former
President of Azerbaijan (1993–2003) Heydar Aliyev and his saying ‘I am
proud to be an Azeri’, and a depiction of the current President of
Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, on the obverse with the words ‘Azerbaijan, go
forward with Ilham Aliyev!’
 Bagirov, who after this undertaking also led an expedition to the summit
of Mt Kilimanjaro and to the highest peak of the Andes, Aconcagua,
declared that his Antarctic expedition was a means to strengthen
Azerbaijan's position in the international arena. The main aim of the
expedition was to add the names of Azerbaijan's scientists to the record of
research conducted in Antarctica.51 Azerbaijan intends to build its own
research station in Antarctica for studying global climate change and to join
the AT.52
The expedition's activities resulted in the publication of three books:
Antarctic Diary; Antarctic Climate: Global influences; and A Frozen Piece
of Gondwana, which provides information about the mineral resources of
Antarctica, perspectives regarding their exploitation, and ecological
problems.53 Azerbaijan's media reported that the Azerbaijani Antarctic
expedition was the first from among the Islamic, Turkic, and CIS countries
which had reached the South Pole on foot.54 With a reasonably strong
economy based on oil production, an active minister responsible for the
Antarctic, and a supportive President,55 Azerbaijan may be able to acquire
the necessary government funding to achieve its ambition of establishing a
base on the icy continent.

Tajikistan
As mentioned previously, Tajikistan's input into the SAE was not
insignificant: expedition members from the Tajik SSR worked in Antarctica
on programmes formulated by Tajik institutions. Tajikistan declared its
renewed interest in the Antarctic in 2009, when the President of the Tajik
Academy of Sciences Mamadsho Ilolov reported that the government had
allotted funding for Professor Abdulhamid Kayumov to conduct a three-
month research project on an aspect of climate change in association with
the 54th RAE. Professor Kayumov had planted a Tajik fag at the Russian
station Mirny in January of that year. Cooperation with the RAE seems to
be the method adopted by Tajikistan to advance its own Antarctic
programme.56

Kazakhstan
An analogous method has been adopted by Kazakhstan in the same
Antarctic season. The Director of the Kazakhstan Service for
Hydrometeorology, Tursynbek Kudekov, explained Kazakhstan's desire to
become ‘an active member of the Antarctic community’ so that it would not
be left behind and could, in future ‘lay a claim to [Antarctic] resources’.57
He reported that an agreement with the Russian Hydrometeorology Service
would enable two scientists from the Kazakhstan Service, Kadyrbek
Bektursunov and Anton Chirkov, to join the 54th RAE to take ice core
samples from five Russian stations in order to compare them with samples
taken from glaciers in Tajikistan and thus determine the effects of global
warming on local climate and ecosystems.58

Estonia
Prior to gaining independence in 1991, about thirty Estonian scientists and
writers participated in the SAE, where they worked on their own
programmes. In 1985, they formed a Club of Estonian Members of Polar
Expeditions in association with the Maritime Museum in Tallinn. After
independence, Estonia followed its political ambition of greater integration
with Western Europe and did not join the CIS. Over the following decade,
these ambitions also led it to become a signatory to the AT, which Estonia
joined in 2001.
Estonians are proud of the fact that the leader of the first Russian
expedition to the Antarctic (1819–1821), Captain Faddei Bellingshausen,
was born on the Estonian island of Esel (present day Saaremaa).59 Even
before the breakup of the USSR, the scientist Enn Kaupp ran up the
Estonian fag at the Soviet Antarctic station Molodezhnaya in 1988.60 After
the breakup, individual Estonian scientists showed a desire to emulate their
compatriots’ exploits by organizing a privately funded expedition to
Antarctica in 2006 and 2008. An adviser to the Estonian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, oceanologist Mart Saarso formulated plans for building a
base in Victoria Land on an icefree area of the Ross Sea coast.61 Other
enthusiastic Estonian scientists continue to pursue their desire to establish a
presence on the icy continent, but the government is not yet prepared to
provide any funding for such a costly enterprise.62 In this regard, Kaupp
and Tammiksaar's proposal that Estonian research could be carried out in
cooperation with other countries sounds eminently sensible.63

Conclusion
The country with the largest and the most active presence, the Russian
Federation, considers that maintaining the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is
in its own national interest; its parliament has consequently legislated to
strengthen the Russian Federation's adherence to AT conventions. It
remains staunchly opposed to any Antarctic territorial claims. By
maintaining stations in almost all sectors claimed by others, it hopes to
influence the processes of possible extension of national sovereignty of
other countries over these areas. While a steadfast supporter of the AT, the
Russian Federation is preparing for any eventuality: by consolidating and
broadening its long-term presence in Antarctica, it puts itself in a strong
position in case of a future breakdown of the ATS and the inevitable
subsequent territorial claims.
Russia's position would be further bolstered by the support of those
former Soviet republics whose presence in the Antarctic is dependent on
utilizing existing Russian Antarctic infrastructure and logistics. Belarus and
Kazakhstan, while unable to achieve a presence in the South Polar region
independently, will certainly be able to do so with Russian support. The fact
that both are parties to the Customs Union with Russia (they became part of
a Common Economic Space in January 2012),64 will facilitate closer
collaboration. Tajikistan, while interested in the Antarctic, has shown no
intention of joining the Customs Union or Common Economic Space; this
will make future cooperation with the RAE more difficult. It appears that
Kazakhstan intends to become a signatory to the AT, while Tajikistan has
not yet stated its intentions. If the latter somehow manages to continue with
its Antarctic programme, it will most likely choose to participate in the
ATS.
Ukraine, which has ambitions of building its potential as a great sea
power65 and expanding its independent Antarctic operations, is a steadfast
supporter of the ATS. It is open to opportunities for collaboration with other
nations. The Ukrainian Antarctic Centre and other research institutions
involved in Antarctic science have a strong interest in their historical role in
polar activities and are active in conducting as much research as funding
permits. By maintaining a presence on the icy continent, they are at the
same time furthering Ukraine's broader geopolitical interests in the region.
Azerbaijan's pioneering Turkic and Islamic CIS venture to the South Pole
on foot may lead to its securing a toehold on the icy continent in the near
future as well as to the emergence of a new signatory of the AT. For
Estonia, it may be more practical to follow the example of other smaller
nations in finding an established partner to gain access to Antarctic
infrastructure.
Evidently, the breakup of the USSR has had a detrimental effect on the
Antarctic interests of the Russian Federation as well as all the previous
Soviet republics. The Russian strategy of increasing its presence in the
Antarctic and collaboration with willing former republics has the dual aim
of restoring its role as a world leader in polar research and gaining influence
in any potential future negotiations on a new regime for the region. The
influence of those nations with a minimal or nonexistent presence in the
South Polar region will obviously be commensurate with that presence.

Notes
1 Acknowledgements: My sincere gratitude is due to Aant Elzinga,
Professor Emeritus, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; Andriy
Fedchuk, UAC, Ukraine; and Alexander Ovlashenko, Professor, Baltic
International Academy, Latvia, for helpful reviews of my paper. I
would also like to thank Valery Lukin, Head of RAE, Russia, for
making himself available for an interview; Valery Litvinov, Director of
UAC, Ukraine, for his interview and continual willingness to assist
with my requests for information; Gennady Milinevsky, Taras
Shevchenko University, Ukraine, for his suggestions; and Anatoly
Laiba, Russian Polar Marine Geological Prospecting Expedition,
Lomonosovo, for making his paper available to me and sharing his
extensive polar knowledge. Finally, I would like to thank the National
Library of Belarus for assistance in locating recent national Antarctic
publications.
2 More about Soviet IGY efforts in: I. Gan, 2009, ‘The Soviet
preparation for the IGY Antarctic program and the Australian
 response: politics and science’, paper presented at the second SCAR
workshop on the history of Antarctic research entitled
‘Multidimensional exploration of Antarctica around the 1950s’,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 21–22
September 2006. Boletín Antactico Chileno ‘2nd SCAR Workshop on
the History of Antarctic Research’: 60–70, which you could also read
online
www.inach.cl/InachWebNeo/Controls/Neochannels/Neo_CH6231/depl
oy/boletin%20historico.pdf; I. Gan, ‘The reluctant hosts: Soviet
Antarctic expedition ships visit Australia and New Zealand in 1956’,
Polar Record 45(232), 2009, pp. 37–50; I. Gan, ‘Will the Russians
abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 … or will they stay?’ Polar
Record 45(233), 2009, pp. 167–175.
3 V. Lukin, interviewed 5 November 2009, Australia; E. Kaupp and E.
Tammiksaar, ‘Estonia and Antarctica’, Polar Record, 2011,
doi:10.1017/S0032247411000234.
4 L. Savatyugin, Rossiiskaya nauka v Antarktike [Russian science in the
Antarctic], Moscow: Gorodets Press, 2004, p. 151.
5 CIS, www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/databases.xml?
lang=ru&nic=databases&intorg=7 &pid=20.
6 Lukin, interview.
7 Both the Scott Polar Research Institute and the Arctic and Antarctic
Research Institute were founded in 1920.
8 Lukin, interview.
9 K zasedaniyu Pravitelstva RF 24 April 2008 [The sitting of the
Government of the Russian Federation of 24 April 2008], Press
release, www.minfn.ru/ru/official/index.php?id4=6040.
10 Ibid.
11 Ukaz Prezidenta RF nomer 824, 7 August 1992 ‘O RAE’ [Decree of
the President of the Russian Federation Number 824 of 7 August 1992
‘Concerning the RAE’],
http://pravo.levonevsky.org/bazaru09/ukaz/sbor16/text16849.htm.
12 L. Savatyugin, Rossiiskiye issledovaniya v Antarktike. Tom III, 31SAE
— 40 RAE [Russian research in the Antarctic. Vol III, 31 SAE — 40
RAE], St Petersburg: Hydrometeoizdat (Hydrometeorological Service
Press), 2001, p. 186.
13 Ibid., p. 287.
14 Postanovleniye Pravitelstva RF 28 August 1997 nomer 1113 ‘O
deyatelnosti RAE’ [Decree of the Government of the Russian
Federation Number 1113 of 28 August 1997 ‘Concerning the activities
of the Russian Antarctic expedition’],
www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_53041.html.
15 Postanovleniye Pravitelstva RF 24 September 2001 nomer 685 ‘Ob
obespechenii interesov RF v Antarktike’ [Decree of the Government of
the Russian Federation Number 685 of 24 September 2001
‘Concerning the measures to be taken to ensure the Russian
Federation's interests in the Antarctic’],
www.meteo.ru/publish_law/izdan/docs/2–71.htm.
16 Savatyugin, Rossiiskaya nauka v Antarktike [Russian science in the
Antarctic, pp. 151, 87.
17 O perspektivah deyatelnosti RF v Antarktike na 2006–2010 [Outlook
for the Russian Federation's activities in the Antarctic in the years
2006–2010], www.ecoindustry.ru/news/view/1031.html.
18 Chilingarov and Bedritsky were also co-chairs of the Russian
organizing committee for the IPY 2007–2008.
19 V. Strugatsky, ‘Na samom donyshke Zemli’ [At the very bottom of the
world] (St Petersburg, Smena), 12 January 2007,
http://smena.ru/news/2007/01/12/9782/.
20 K zasedaniyu Pravitelstva RF 24 April 2008 [The sitting of the
Government of the Russian Federation of 24 April 2008], Press
release, www.minfn.ru/ru/official/index.php?id4=6040.
21 Strategiya razvitiya deyatelnosti RF v Antarktike na period do 2020 i
na bolee otdalennuyu perspektivu [Strategy for developing RF
activities in the Antarctic till 2020 and beyond], 30 October 2010,
http://lawsforall.ru/index.php?ds=42338.
22 Rossiay zaplatit 60 milliardov za Antarkticheskyuyu zashitu [Russia
will pay 60 billion for protecting its Antarctic interests], 22 October
2010, www.utro.ru/articles/2010/10/22/931415.shtml.
23 http://news.mail.ru/economics/7071298/.
24 ‘PM told to defend Antarctic territory’, The Australian, 21 December
2010, www. theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/pm-told-to-defend-
antarctic-territory/story-fn59niix-1225974139407).
25 V. Lukin, ‘Poisk nevedomogo kontinenta. K 185-letiyu podviga
russkih moryakov’ [‘Quest for the unknown continent. 185th
anniversary of the exploits of Russian sailors’], Vlast, October 2005, p.
81.
26 Ibid., p. 80.
27 Ibid., p. 80.
28 I. Gan, ‘Soviet Antarctic plans after the IGY: changes in policy’, Polar
Record 46(238), 2010, pp. 244–256.
29 A. Laiba, ‘Raiony vozmozhnih Rossiiskih prioritetov v Antarktike’
[‘Regions of possible Russian priorities in the Antarctic’], in: Yu
Kariakin (ed.), Geologiya polyarnyh oblastei Zemli. TOM I (Materialy
42-go tektonicheskogo soveshchaniya, posvyashchennogo
predvaritelnym rezultatam issledovaniy po programme tretiego
mezhdunarodnogo polyarnogo goda) [Geology of the polar regions of
the Earth. Vol I. Proceedings of the 42nd tectonic conference dedicated
to the preliminary research outcomes of the third International Polar
Year], Moscow: GEOS, 2009, p. 348.
30 Ibid., p. 351.
31 Gan, ‘Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 …
or will they stay?’, p. 171.
32 I. Gan, ‘The first practical Soviet steps towards getting a foothold in
the Antarctic: Soviet Antarctic whaling fotilla Slava’, Polar Record
47(1), 2011, pp. 21–28.
33 V. Litvinov, phone interview 29 October 2009.
34 Lukin, interview.
35 Ibid.
36 V. Litvinov, personal communication, July 2011.
37 Postanovleniye Kabinata Ministrov Ukrainy nomer 422, 13 September
2001, ‘Ukrainskie nauchnye issledovaniya v Antarktike v ramkah
gosudarstvennoi programmy issledovaniy Ukrainy v Antarktike na
2002–2010’ [Decree of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Number
422 of 13 September 2001, ‘Ukrainian scientific research in Antarctica
within the framework of the State Antarctic Research Program in the
years 2002–2010’], www.uac.gov.ua/images/intcoop/25IP017_R.doc;
V. Litvinov, phone interview, 29 October 2009.
38 S. Gorchakov and A. Ovlashenko, ‘Morskaya politika Ukrainy: iz
glubin ambitsiy na mel realnosti’ [‘Ukraine's marine politics: from the
depths of ambition to the shallows of reality’], 2010,
http://zvezda.ru/politics/2010/10/05/ukrseapolitics.htm.
39 Verhovnaya Rada Ukrainy prinyala zakon ‘Ob Antarkticheskoy
deyatelnosti’ [Ukrainian Parliament ratifes the law ‘Concerning
Antarctic activities’], http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/175153.
40 A. Fedchuk, personal communication, August 2010.
41 V. Litvinov, personal communication, July 2011.
42 Short report on scientific and technical research conducted by the
Belarusian Antarctic seasonal expedition of 2008–2009 as a part of the
Russian Antarctic expedition no. 54,
www.ats.aq/devAS/..%5Cdocuments%5Cie%5Cbyann09e.pdf.
43 Zakon Respubliki Belarus 19 July 2006 nomer 157–3 ‘O prisoedinenii
k Dogovoru ob Antarktike’ (Decree of the Republic of Belarus of 19
July 2006 Number 157–3 ‘Joining the Antarctic Treaty’]
www.levonevski.net/pravo/razdel2/num1/2d1254.html.
44 Postanovleniye Soveta Ministrov Respubliki Belarus 31 August 2006
nomer 1104 ob utverzhdenii Gosudarstvennoy tselevoi programmy
‘Monitoring polyarnih raionov Zemli i obespechenie deyatelnosti
Arkticheskih i Antarkticheskih expeditsiy na 2007–2010 i na period do
2015’ [Decree of the Council of Ministers of Belarus Number 1104 of
31 August 2006 ‘Monitoring of Polar Regions of the Earth and
 Support of the Activity of Arctic and Antarctic Expeditions for the
years 2007–2010 and for the period till 2015’], www.systema-
by.com/docs/bitb4/dk-gv4ubd.html.
45 Short report on scientific and technical research conducted by the
Belarusian Antarctic seasonal expedition of 2008–2009 as a part of the
Russian Antarctic expedition no. 54,
www.ats.aq/devAS/..%5Cdocuments%5Cie%5Cbyann09e.pdf.
46 Postanovleniye Soveta Ministrov Respubliki Belarus 31 August 2006
nomer 1104 ob utverzhdenii Gosudarstvennoy tselevoi programmy
‘Monitoring polyarnih raionov Zemli i obespechenie deyatelnosti
Arkticheskih i Antarkticheskih expeditsiy na 2007–2010 i na period do
2015’ [Decree of the Council of Ministers of Belarus Number 1104 of
31 August 2006 ‘Monitoring of Polar Regions of the Earth and
Support of the Activity of Arctic and Antarctic Expeditions for the
years 2007–2010 and for the period till 2015’], www.systema-
by.com/docs/bitb4/dk-gv4ubd.html.
47 A. Trofmovich, ‘Belarusi nuzhna polyarnaya stantsiya v Antarktide’
[Belarus needs a polar station in Antarctica] Argumenty i fakty v
Belarusi [Arguments and facts in Belarus], 11 May 2010,
www.aif.by/en/articles/social/item/551-antarktida.html.
48 E. Kazyukin, ‘Antarktida, Gora Vechernyaya’ [‘Antarctica, Gora
Vechernyaya’], Respublika, Gazeta Soveta Ministrov Respubliki
Belarus [The Republic, Gazette of the Council of Ministers of
Belarus], 17 November 2009,
www.respublika.info/4882/science/article35268/.
49 N. Berkli, ‘Pravitelstvo Belorussii urezalo polyarnuyu programme’
[‘The Belarus government cuts its polar programme’], 2009,
www.ej.by/economy/2009–11–
04/pravitelstvo_belarusi_urezalo_polyarnuyu_programmu.html.
50 ‘Azerbaijan Antarkticheskaya expeditsia oboshlas primerno v 300
tysiach dollarov’ [‘The cost of the Azerbaijani Antarctic expedition
was approximately 300 thousand dollars’], www.azeri.ru/papers/news-
azerbaijan/38399/.
51 Ibid.
52 ‘Azerbaijan plans base in Antarctica’,
www.polarconservation.org/news/pco-news-articles/azerbaijan-plans-
base-in-antarctica.
53 ‘Books about first expedition to Antarctica published in Azerbaijan’,
2010, http://en.trend.az/news/sports/1637313.html.
54 ‘The expedition team from Azerbaijan has planted the state fag on the
South Pole’, 2009, www.wu.edu.az/index.php?sid=176&lang=en.
55 ‘Azerbaijan Antarkticheskaya expeditsia oboshlas primerno v 300
tysiach dollarov’ [‘The cost of the Azerbaijani Antarctic expedition
was approximately 300 thousand dollars’], www.azeri.ru/papers/news-
azerbaijan/38399/.
56 V. Kondrashova, ‘Flag Tajikistana rasvivaetsia na prostorah
Antarktidy’ [‘Tajikistan's fag futters over Antarctica's expanses’],
2009, www.2shanbe.tj/publ/1–1–0–800.
57 ‘Kazakhstan toropitsia podelit Antarktidu’ [‘Kazakhstan hastens to
claim its share of Antarctica’], www.antarktis.ru/index.php?
mn=def&mns=1dsy69r96ra8ikksnxtl.
58 ‘Kasakhstanskie meteorologi vernulis iz Antarktidy’ [‘Kazakh
meteorologists have returned from Antarctica’],
http://kazembassy.ru/press_service/news/?newsid=3777.
59 Kaupp and Tammiksaar, ‘Estonia and Antarctica’; A. Juske,
Estonianborn admiral F. Bellingshausen, the discoverer of Antarctica,
Tallinn: Kasmu, 2003; Bellingshausen (1778–1850) was educated in St
Petersburg and served in the Russian Navy all his life. Bellingshausen
was appointed Commander of the port of Kronstadt and military
Governor of Kronstadt, a position he held until his death. A statue was
erected in his honour in St Petersburg on funds subscribed by the
public. In 1968 a Soviet Antarctic station was named after him.
60 M. Rachinskaya, ‘Estonia–Antarctica: ne tak uzh daleko’ [‘Estonia–
Antarctica: not such a great distance’], Molodezh Estonii [The youth of
Estonia], 1 August 2007, www.moles.ee/07/Jul/26/7–1.php.
61 ‘Expeditsiya v Antarktidu sostoitsia’ [‘The (Estonian) expedition to
Antarctica will go ahead’], www.catalogmineralov.ru/news490.html;
 Kaupp and Tammiksaar, ‘Estonia and Antarctica’.
62 Kaupp and Tammiksaar, ‘Estonia and Antarctica’.
63 Ibid.
64 The Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union, which came into
effect on 1 January 2010, offers trade privileges to its members,
including lower exportimport tariffs and reduced prices on many
goods. The Ukrainian and Tajik governments have also expressed an
interest in joining the union.
www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyystan_wants_to_join_russia_belarus_kaza
khstan_customs_union/3553439.html.
65 ‘Kluev: Ukraina mozhet vozraditsia kak velikaya morskaya derzhava’
[‘Kluev: It is possible for Ukraine to become a great sea power’],
http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1235577-klyuev-ukraina-
mozhet-vozroditsya-kak-velikaya-morskaya-derzhava [Andriy Kluev
— Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine. Head of the Governmental
Committee on the Economy Sectors Development].
8 New Zealand's Antarctica

Anne-Marie Brady

New Zealand has important strategic interests in Antarctica that are as much
about geography and the country's geostrategic needs, as they are about
history and the politics of maintaining rights gained in an earlier era. This
chapter outlines the reasons behind New Zealand's involvement in, and
commitment to, Antarctica; profiles the various bodies involved in
maintaining and negotiating New Zealand's Antarctic presence and voice on
Antarctic affairs; and discusses New Zealand's core interests in the
Antarctic continent that help to shape its Antarctic policy.

New Zealand's geographic and historical links to Antarctica

New Zealand has strong geographic and historical links which tie it closely
to Antarctica. There are ancient geological connections between New
Zealand and Antarctica that can be traced back to Gondwanaland.
Fossilised trees found in Antarctica are related to New Zealand's modern-
day beech forests.1 Even today, New Zealand is one of the closest and most
convenient locations to launch an Antarctic expedition into the Antarctic
interior. Unlike most other Antarctic nations, New Zealand's Antarctic
researchers need only to board a plane to visit the Antarctic, and they can
go for short and frequent stays, rather than spend a whole season there.
The geographic environment in Antarctica and any changes which may
occur there are felt very personally by New Zealanders. When New Zealand
weather forecasters talk of a cold Southerly sweeping up the country the
television weather maps show it as coming from the icy Antarctic zone just
to the South of New Zealand. In 2005 and 2006, large icebergs broke off
from the Ronne Ice Shelf and they floated up along the New Zealand
eastern coast, within clear sight of land.2 The largest was over 1 km long.
The same phenomenon occurred in 2009.3 For New Zealanders, more than
the citizens of most other Antarctic nations, the melting of the poles seems
a very real and present threat.
The historical links are equally close, and they are a direct result of New
Zealand's proximity to the Antarctic continent. Many Antarctic expeditions
have been launched from New Zealand or have visited New Zealand after a
visit to the ice and many explorers have also incorporated New Zealanders
into their team. For example early explorers such as Fabian Gottlieb Von
Bellingshausen (Russia), Charles Wilkes (USA), James Clark Ross (UK),
Carstens Borchgrevink (Norway), Robert Falcon Scott (UK), Ernest
Shackleton (UK), Roald Amundsen (Norway), Shirase Nobu (Japan),
Douglas Mawson (Australia), Richard E. Byrd (USA) and New Zealand's
own Edmund Hilary all began their expeditions from New Zealand or
returned there after visiting Antarctica, and almost all employed New
Zealanders in their crew.4 All these connections mean that New Zealanders
have a stronger sense than the citizens of most other Antarctic players that
Antarctica is an intrinsic part of their national history and heritage.
A further important influence on New Zealanders' sense of a close
relationship to Antarctica is the 1979 crash of Air New Zealand fight 901 at
Mt Erebus on Ross Island. The crash of fight 901 has left a deep scar on the
New Zealand psyche regarding Antarctica and, in particular, Mt Erebus.
Flight 901 was a scheduled tourist fight over Antarctica, which had
operated from 1977. A total of 257 people died in the Erebus crash,
including 200 New Zealanders, as well as travellers from Japan, the UK,
United States, Canada, Australia, France and Switzerland. The crash was
New Zealand's largest ever air accident. The public inquiry after the crash,
which extended over three years, raised serious questions about Air New
Zealand's handling of its Antarctic fight and its public response to the
disaster.5 After the crash, both Air New Zealand and Qantas suspended their
Antarctic tourist fights. In November 2009 New Zealanders commemorated
the Erebus crash with memorial ceremonies at Scott Base and in Auckland,
which were extensively covered in the New Zealand media, as were follow-
up stories on Erebus victims.

New Zealand as a claimant state in Antarctica

On his 1841 expedition to Antarctica, the British explorer James Clark Ross
discovered and named the Ross Sea, a deep bay in the Southern Ocean with
convenient access into the Antarctic continent. Once charted, this area
became the launching site for many later expeditions into the Antarctic
hinterland. In 1923, competition for whaling rights led Britain to announce
a claim to the area it called the “Ross Dependency”. Britain handed over the
responsibility for the dependency's “governance” to the Governor-General
of New Zealand.6
New Zealand's legal rights to the Ross Dependency claim are
inextricably linked with its relationship to Britain. The arrangement that
New Zealand would “govern” this uninhabited territory meant that it came
to be understood by the New Zealand Government and people that the Ross
Dependency was a “New Zealand claim”; hence, 1923 is the point from
which the New Zealand Government now dates its Antarctic entitlement.7
Yet from a legal point of view, New Zealand's separate legal rights to
legislate for the Dependency did not occur until much later, when New
Zealand became independent from Britain, both in constitutional and
institutional law.8 This was a long and complicated process and there are
many dates which mark the stages of this transition. However, the one
which most clearly identifies the Ross Dependency as legally a part of the
“Realm of New Zealand” is the 1983 “Letters Patent Constituting the Office
of Governor General of New Zealand”.9 This document defines the
territories under the administration of New Zealand's Governor General, the
representative of the British Crown. This 1983 document updated a similar
“Letters Patent” from 1917 which did not include the Ross Dependency in
“the Realm of New Zealand”.10
At 450,000 square kilometres the Ross Dependency is larger than the
main islands of New Zealand (North, South and Stewart Island) put
together. It is located between latitudes 160 and 170 degrees east to west
and ends at latitude 60 degrees south. Most of the claim consists of ice, the
Ross Ice Shelf. When the claim was made in 1923 there was little
awareness of the actual geography of the Ross Dependency zone. The
drawing up of the Ross Dependency's boundaries was based on the theory
of “sectors”, similar to that adopted in the Arctic, and, to a certain extent,
similar to how some of the boundaries of Africa were drawn up by colonial
powers in an earlier era. The “border lines” of the Dependency slice
through mountain ranges and end at the South Pole. The Ross Dependency
is around 2,500 kilometres from the New Zealand mainland. It is the second
smallest claim of all the Antarctic claimant states, but its actual size does
not represent its value. The Ross Ice Shelf forms one of the most
convenient access points into Antarctica. This is why many Antarctic
explorers launched their expeditions from there and why the USA, long the
leading power in Antarctica, initially set up four bases there, now reduced
to two.
For a long time, successive New Zealand governments were extremely
diff-dent about the Ross Dependency claim. Initially they tended to worry
about the cost of maintaining it, while in the 1950s and early 1970s
internationally minded senior politicians even wanted to give it away,
proposing that Antarctica should be managed by the United Nations or run
as a world park.11 However, in more recent times, such concerns and lofty
altruism have been replaced by a strong awareness of the strategic
advantages New Zealand's Antarctic claim offers. Moreover, since the early
1990s, the failure of the Antarctic Treaty Contracting Parties (ATCPs) to
pass the Convention of the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities (CRAMRA), the negotiations of which New Zealand led for
nearly ten years, resulted in a gradual realisation that collective action in
Antarctica would not always be completely sufficient to protect New
Zealand's national interests.12
Despite being an original signatory to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, New
Zealand continues to maintain its right to sovereignty over the Ross
Dependency. It is entitled to do so under Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty,
which states that the treaty is not “a renunciation by any Contracting Party
of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica”.13 The New Zealand Government is confident that the Antarctic
Treaty has maintained New Zealand's interests well in the last fifty years,
and that it is likely to continue to do so.14 As part of supporting its claim
New Zealand employs an “active permanent presence in the Ross
Dependency”.15 This is demonstrated in multiple ways, including: New
Zealand's continued commitment to the research station Scott Base, despite
tough economic times since the 2008 global economic crisis and the
aftermath of major earthquakes in Christchurch from 2010 to 2011; the
focusing of New Zealand's scientific research activities on the territory of
the Dependency; New Zealand's assumption of international sectoral
responsibility for search and rescue activities, meteorological observations,
and hydrographic surveys in the Ross Sea region; New Zealand's bid for the
management of nineteen environmentally protected areas within the Ross
Dependency; as well as strong government support for Antarctic activities
at an international and national level, involving government departments,
the business community and ordinary New Zealanders. New Zealand
doesn't have the resources to do much more on its own, but it is extremely
proactive about working with other national programmes. This is a useful
means to reduce costs, meanwhile maintaining New Zealand's interests.
New Zealand is cautious about asserting the Ross Dependency claim,
carefully trying to avoid overly forceful actions which might cause friction
within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) or among non-Treaty signatory
countries,16 especially the USA, whom New Zealand is dependent on for
transport to its base. In 2006 New Zealand applied to the UN Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to take over control of 1.7 million sq
km of seabed (outside the Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ) on the
continental shelf around the territory of New Zealand. The application did
not include data on New Zealand's Ross Dependency Antarctic claim, but
the New Zealand Government stated that it reserved the right to do so in
future. The New Zealand position was that this meant that they were
respecting the requirements of the Antarctic Treaty, at the same time as
protecting their rights in the future to make a claim to the Antarctic seabeds
surrounding the Ross Dependency.17

New Zealand's Antarctic organisations

New Zealand's Antarctic involvement is coordinated and overseen by a
number of bodies who work closely together. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade's tiny Antarctic Policy Unit (it has only three personnel)
is tasked with: coordinating policy advice to the New Zealand Government
on Antarctica and the Southern Ocean including the Ross Dependency;
representing New Zealand's interests within the various bodies of the
Antarctic Treaty System; conducting New Zealand's Antarctica-related
diplomacy; providing the Minister of Foreign Affairs with advice on the
implementation of the Antarctica (Environmental Protection) Act 1994,
which includes developing clear procedures for all tourists, tour operators
and non-governmental visitors to Antarctica who depart from New Zealand;
as well as advising the New Zealand Government on the implementation of
the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act of 1981.18 Other New Zealand
government departments with Antarctic interests include the Ministry of
Fisheries, Ministry of Defence, the Treasury, Ministry of Environment,
Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Transport; the Department of
Conservation, Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; New Zealand Defence
Force; Land Information New Zealand; and Maritime New Zealand.
New Zealand government policy on Antarctica is coordinated by the
Officials Antarctic Committee, which is chaired by the Antarctic Policy
Unit. All the above-mentioned government departments with an interest or
role in Antarctica, as well as Antarctica New Zealand, are members of this
body. The Environmental Assessment and Review Panel, a body of
scientific specialists, advises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the
environmental impact of any New Zealand-related Antarctic activity.
Antarctica New Zealand is a Crown entity in charge of developing,
managing and implementing New Zealand government activities in
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, “in particular in the Ross Dependency”
(my emphasis).19 Antarctica New Zealand has a six-person board of
directors and a permanent staff of twenty-five based in Christchurch, New
Zealand. It is also in charge of employing the temporary staff who work on
New Zealand's Antarctic base each season and managing the base. It
coordinates, approves and provides some of the funding for New Zealand's
Antarctic scientific research programme. It kits out researchers and other
visitors going down to Antarctica on New Zealand projects in their
distinctive stylish black and orange Antarctic gear (Antarctica New Zealand
launched the new uniform for all New Zealand personnel in 2008, designed
by New Zealand company Earth Sea Sky). Through its arts, media and
youth programmes the organisation is also in charge of raising public
awareness in New Zealand about the international significance of the
continent and its connection and importance to New Zealand.20 These
activities have helped to develop a strong awareness of New Zealand's
Antarctic heritage among ordinary New Zealanders.
Antarctica New Zealand is based in Christchurch, at the International
Antarctic Campus next to Christchurch International Airport, which is also
the location for the US and Italian Antarctic programme Offices. Over 75
per cent of the world's scientists flying to Antarctica depart from here.21
Christchurch has developed considerable expertise in cold-climate logistics
over the many decades of Antarctic exploration and international scientific
research there. More than fifty local businesses provide Antarctic support
services through the Canterbury Antarctic Business Interest Network
(CABIN).22
New Zealand has a number of research centres dedicated to Antarctic
studies, as well as smaller groups of researchers working on Antarctic
themes at all of New Zealand's eight universities. The University of
Canterbury hosts Gateway Antarctica, a multi-disciplinary research centre
which coordinates the Antarctic research of specialists in the sciences, law,
social sciences, arts and humanities.23 Gateway Antarctica offers
undergraduate and graduate courses in Antarctic Studies, including the
fourteen-week-long Post-Graduate Certificate in Antarctic Studies (which,
uniquely, includes a two-week field trip to Antarctica). Reflecting the
strong interest in Antarctica in New Zealand, these courses are usually
heavily over-subscribed.
The Antarctic Research Centre at Victoria University in Wellington24
focuses on Antarctic science and it is recognised as a world leader of
research into Antarctica's past climate, its influence in global climate
change, and polar scientific drilling technology and operations. The
University of Waikato's Antarctic Research Unit is located within the
School of Science and Engineering. The personnel of this unit have
specialist interests in soil mapping and the human impact on the Antarctic
environment.25 Auckland, Massey,26 Lincoln and Otago universities and the
Auckland University of Technology all have staff engaged in Antarctic
research who collaborate with other New Zealand-based and international
Antarctic researchers covering a wide range of felds.27 Three Crown
Research Institutes: Landcare,28 which engages in environmental research;
GNS Science,29 which specialises in earth sciences; and the National
Institute of Water and Atmosphere (NIWA)30 all engage in Antarctic-related
studies. NIWA's research vessel RV Tangaroa provides logistical support
for New Zealand's hydrographic surveys and other scientific research in the
Southern Ocean.
A number of non-governmental organisations are also involved in
supporting (and sometimes critiquing) New Zealand's Antarctic activities
and engagement with the ATS. Greenpeace New Zealand, the Forest and
Bird Society, and the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition are the most
prominent. All three have a strong interest in environmental issues, while
Greenpeace and the Southern Ocean Coalition have also been involved in
an ongoing effort to stop Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean. The
Antarctic Heritage Trust (New Zealand) is an NGO which receives funding
from the New Zealand Government for its administrative costs.31 The Trust
has been active in promoting the preservation of a number of historic
explorers' huts in the Ross Dependency.32 Such activities help to underline
New Zealand's Antarctic claim, so it is not surprising that the organisation
receives government assistance for its work.

New Zealand's Antarctic presence: Scott Base

New Zealand's permanent Antarctic research station, Scott Base, is located
on Pram Point, at the end of Hutt Point Peninsular, on Ross Island in the
Ross Dependency. It is a short walk from the USA's largest Antarctic
research station, McMurdo. Scott Base was built in 1957, initially as a
depot for the British Trans-Antarctic Expedition and for science activities
associated with the International Geophysical Year. It became a permanent
research station in 1959.
Every year during the austral summer about 35 New Zealand Antarctic
Programme (NZAP) staff are located at Scott Base to help scientific
research teams and other groups with their activities. The NZAP staff
provide food, administration, communications, operations and field training
for all participants in New Zealand's annual Antarctic activities. Since the
late 1950s about 20–30 science projects per year are undertaken from Scott
Base. Around 350 New Zealanders visit Antarctica as part of the New
Zealand Antarctic Programme each year — this is more than the numbers
of Chinese personnel currently visiting Antarctica. During the peak summer
research period the base can house up to 85 people at any one time. A
“winter over” team of about 11 New Zealand personnel carry out scientific
research and engage in ongoing base maintenance activities in preparation
for the next austral summer. Of the New Zealand personnel who visit
Antarctica 46 per cent are scientists, about a third are support personnel,
while the rest are non-scientists such as artists, dignitaries and students.33
New Zealand scientists need only spend a minimum of time in Antarctica,
as planes depart from Christchurch to the Ross Dependency two to three
times a week in the summer season.
The USA provides the bulk of the air transport for New Zealand
personnel going down to the Antarctic. The USA, New Zealand and Italy34
participate in a joint logistics pool to move staff and goods between
Christchurch and the Ross Sea area. The contributions of each country to
the pool are proportional to the weight of cargo and personnel they send.
Every year the USA sends around 4,000 personnel through Christchurch
airport down to its Antarctic programmes in the Ross Dependency area; the
New Zealand personnel quota is less than a tenth of that at 350; and the
Italian programme sends only seventy personnel. Accordingly, for example
during the 2009–2010 season, the USA contributed sixty-five fights, New
Zealand contributed eight fights and the Italian programme contributed four
fights. Two US merchant ships (a tanker and a cargo boat) also travel down
in January each year to deliver fuel and any items too heavy for the planes
to transport. Lacking the USA's massive defence resources to draw on for
its Antarctic transport, New Zealand and Italy put in their fair share to the
pool through other means. A wind farm near Scott Base that became
operational in 2010 feeds power to the two bases and is now recognised as
part of New Zealand's contribution to the logistics pool. New Zealand also
provides cargo handling and covers the Antarctic planes' landing fees at
Christchurch airport. Without the US logistics support it would be
extremely difficult for New Zealand to continue its existing Antarctic
programme but, at the same time, due to the convenience Christchurch
offers the USA as its main extra-Antarctic base for its Antarctic operations,
the USA is also dependent on the cooperation and goodwill of New Zealand
to maintain its core Antarctic objectives.
Scott Base was rebuilt from 1976 to 1977, with further renovations
occurring from 2005 to 2007. In its present form it consists of a series of
eight modern buildings, built from sheet steel and lined with polyurethane
foam. The base is elevated above the ground so that snow can blow
underneath. Scott Base buildings are all painted a distinctive “Scott Base
green”; adding a hint of New Zealand's greenery to the stark Antarctic
landscape. The buildings are joined together by a series of corridors; this
allows personnel to move throughout different parts of the base without
having to go outdoors, as well as enabling sectors to be closed off if there
was a fire. The base is cosy and warm with a relaxed family atmosphere.
The interior is decorated in soothing shades of white and green to match the
exterior, and there is a similar attention to detail in the nutritious home-style
meals served at the base canteen and in the overall base management.
The renovations at Scott Base in recent years have included considerable
efforts to lower the impact of the human presence on the ice. All rubbish is
carefully sorted, and that which can be recycled such as metal, plastics and
batteries are returned to New Zealand. All food scraps, paper and untreated
timber are burnt in a high temperature incinerator. Windows are now
quadruple-glazed, urinals are “waterless” and a new helicopter uses 40 per
cent less fuel.35 Sewage and grey water are treated in a waste water plant
before being discharged into the Ross Sea. The new wind farm now
provides all the energy needs of Scott Base, ending the dependence on
diesel fuel for heating the base and the risk of oil spills in the pristine
Antarctic environment. Antarctica New Zealand has a long-term
commitment to reduce the carbon footprint of the base.

New Zealand's Antarctic policies

New Zealand's Antarctic policies are a combination of the concerns of the
various government departments engaged in overseeing New Zealand's
Antarctic interests. New Zealand has geostrategic interests in Antarctica, as
well as scientific, environmental, economic and political concerns.
New Zealand's Antarctic science
In order to maintain its credibility as a leading Antarctic state it is essential
that New Zealand engages in high quality science there. Antarctic science,
unlike most other areas of scientific discovery in New Zealand, is
strategically important in New Zealand's overall foreign policy goals.
Accordingly, unlike other scientific activities in New Zealand, Antarctic
science is heavily subsidised by the government. If a scientist's project is
accepted in the annual Antarctic science plan of Antarctica New Zealand,
then their transport, clothing, housing and food costs will be covered by
Antarctica New Zealand as part of its annual budget. These are referred to
by Antarctica New Zealand as “shadow costs”.36 Scientists make a small
contribution to these costs in their research budgets, but it by no means
covers the full amount.37 Scientists can apply for the bulk of the funding
costs of their research experiments on the ice through the government's
Foundation for Research Science and Technology budget for Antarctic
science and/or logistics support.38 Approximately NZ$2.4 million per year
is available for Antarctic research through this fund.39 An additional
NZ$4.5 million was available for Antarctic-related science projects during
the 2007–2009 International Polar Year. New Zealand scientists who
receive funding from other sources (such as the Royal Society of New
Zealand Marsden Fund) are also entitled to receive the Antarctica New
Zealand subsidy for “shadow costs”, as long as their project has been
accepted within the annual plan for New Zealand's Antarctic science
activities. The total budget for all of New Zealand's Antarctic activities is
around NZ$21 million (US$17 million), the budget for ANZ covers NZ$13
million of that total.40 In the 2009 budget New Zealand's Antarctic budget
was capped, and it is likely to be kept that way for the next five years due to
the difficulties the New Zealand economy is experiencing as a result of the
global economic crisis and major earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. Other
government programmes have suffered major cutbacks in spending, so the
fact that the Antarctic-related spend has only been “capped” indicates the
value that the New Zealand government places on its Antarctic assets.
In order to make best use of resources and prioritise the scientific
research most relevant to New Zealand, Antarctica New Zealand sets the
agenda for scientists as to what are regarded as the key themes worthy of
exploration in its five-yearly statement on New Zealand's “Antarctic and
Southern Ocean Scientific Strategy”. In 2008 the core government agencies
engaged in Antarctic activities identified New Zealand's strategic science
interest as: focused on the Ross Sea region; investigating global processes
and climate change, biosecurity, as well as bioprospecting and other
economic issues; exploring issues of biodiversity in the marine environment
and managing Antarctic marine resources; and managing the human impact
in Antarctica.41 Other themes were not completely excluded, but scientists
who wished to explore such topics had to relate them back to the core
research agenda.42
New Zealand is reliant on international collaboration to explore its
research activities in Antarctica, so for this reason the core themes of New
Zealand's science strategy are closely linked to the international Scientific
Committee on Antarctic Research's (SCAR) core science programmes.43
The key New Zealand International Polar Year Antarctic activities were the
Antarctic Drilling Project (ANDRILL), the Census of Antarctic Marine Life
(CAML), Winter Sea Ice Growth, and Predicting Bio-complexity in Dry
Valley Ecosystems. New Zealand is a strong supporter of transparency and
access to information in Antarctic research and all the outcomes of New
Zealand's Antarctic research to date are available on an online portal.44 New
Zealand's Antarctic research is well regarded internationally and has a high
rate of citation in international, peer-reviewed journals. In a 2004 survey of
the citation rate of Antarctic nations' scientific output, New Zealand ranked
seventh, ahead of such countries as Japan, Russia and China.45 Over a six-
year period (2003–2009) the scientific output of Antarctica New Zealand-
supported researchers was cited 817 times.46 A 2012 study comparing the
Antarctic research of various countries against their GDP rated New
Zealand as the top performer. New Zealand also rated second in the top
three countries putting forward policy papers to the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings.47 Such papers are the main means to influence
policy-making in the Antarctic Treaty System.

New Zealand's economic interests in Antarctica

New Zealand has numerous economic interests in Antarctica. These
include: tourism; fishing; providing logistics for national and international
Antarctic expeditions; the involvement of New Zealand commercial
companies in Antarctica; and the potential for economic exploitation of the
findings of scientific research done in Antarctica. Antarctic-related
economic activities made a direct contribution to the Canterbury economy
(the region surrounding the city of Christchurch) of around NZ$88 million
(around US$70 million). It is estimated that the New Zealand economy as a
whole earns at least NZ$133 million (around US$105 million) per annum
from its Antarctic involvement.48 Currently boats from the USA, Italy,
Korea, China and Russian Antarctic programmes visit Christchurch's port
of Lyttleton on a regular basis and other Antarctic-related vessels also visit.
As part of its plan to be a logistics and scientific research hub for Antarctic
activities, the Christchurch city council has established Antarctic
collaboration with the US, Italian, British, Australian, Korean, Russian,
German, Canadian, Chinese, Argentine, South African, Chilean and Indian
Antarctic programmes as well as with local body authorities in those
countries engaged in Antarctica.49
New Zealand is particularly keen to exploit the potential economic
benefits of Antarctic scientific research.50 However, so far, the government
is cautious about involving commercial operators on a large scale in the
New Zealand Antarctic programme overall. This is further evidence of the
strategic importance of Antarctica to New Zealand and the government's
desire to maintain political control of New Zealand's activities there.
New Zealand's Antarctic tourism includes the sea tours organised by
New Zealand-based companies to the sub-Antarctic islands south of New
Zealand and to the Ross Dependency. The Antarctic tours of New Zealand-
based companies must include a New Zealand government observer, to
ensure that the proper environmental protocols are followed. New Zealand
is the only Antarctic nation to insist on this.51 This practice serves to
reinforce New Zealand's Antarctic claim as well as ensure its environmental
protocols are followed during tourism activities. New Zealand's Antarctic
tourism also includes New Zealand-based Antarctic tourism which draws
on New Zealand's Antarctic heritage and ongoing connections such as the
International Antarctic Attraction in Christ-church and the Antarctic display
in the Kelly Tarlton Underwater World in Auckland. The Canterbury and
Invercargill museums both have substantial Antarctic displays and there is a
wealth of other Antarctic-related sites in Christ-church, Wellington and
Invercargill; where many Antarctic expeditions were launched from or
famous Antarctic explorers once lived.
Ross Sea and Southern Ocean fishing by New Zealand fishing companies
brings in approximately NZ$20 million (US$15 million) per annum into the
New Zealand economy.52 The depletion of fish in these areas has a flow-on
effect on the availability of fish in New Zealand's adjacent EEZ. Hence the
level of fish stocks in the Ross Sea and Southern Ocean and the rate of
illegal unregulated and unreported fishing there is of direct interest to New
Zealand. New Zealand is a strong advocate of the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), which
manages and monitors fish stocks in the Antarctic seas.

New Zealand's political interests in Antarctica

New Zealand has a strong political interest in maintaining its claim to the
Ross Dependency and its ongoing involvement in international Antarctic
governance. New Zealand is an island state, remote from the rest of the
world, with a population of only 4.3 million. New Zealand has always been
dependent on other states for maintaining its security and access to markets
and it is particularly reliant on multilateral alliances to pursue its foreign
policy goals. Hence it relies on the Antarctic Treaty and the international
collaborations which have stemmed from it to help preserve New Zealand's
claim to the Ross Dependency and further New Zealand's wider interests in
Antarctica. As part of this, New Zealand puts considerable efforts into
gaining leadership positions within the Antarctic Treaty System. Currently
New Zealanders head several key leadership positions in the ATS including:
the Chair of the Committee on Environmental Protection; the Executive
Secretary for and head Office of the Council of Managers of National
Antarctic Programmes, COMNAP (at the campus of the University of
Canterbury in Christchurch); a Vice-Chair of the COMNAP Committee; the
Secretary of SCAR's Evolution and Biodiversity Group; and Co-deputy
Chair of the Standing Committee of Antarctic Data Management
(SCADM).
Whereas some ATCPs such as China and India are critical of the ATS,
New Zealand has a direct political interest in the continuance of the
Antarctic Treaty and its various associated bodies of international law. New
Zealand does not have the resources to defend its Ross Dependency claim,
so it relies heavily on the structures of the Antarctic Treaty and other
international regimes to continue to do so. New Zealand has a stronger
interest than most Antarctic nations in ensuring that Antarctica continues to
be peaceful and free from military conflict. New Zealand is the second
closest nation to Antarctica and any conflict there would likely have a spill-
on effect in New Zealand.

New Zealand's environmental interests in Antarctica

Antarctica has a critical role in global climate change. As a close neighbour
of Antarctica, New Zealand has a direct interest in changes in the Antarctic
environment and how they might affect us. Climate change in Antarctica
will have a direct and immediate effect on New Zealand ecosystems, and
over-fishing of Antarctic seas fish stocks is likely to affect fishing in its
EEZ. At certain times of the year the hole in the Antarctic ozone stretches
from the Antarctic continent to completely cover New Zealand. As a
consequence New Zealand puts a high priority on the conservation of the
“intrinsic and wilderness values” of both the Antarctic and the Southern
Ocean and regards maintaining these as a strategic interest of New
Zealand.53
Like all nations with an early Antarctic involvement, New Zealand wasn't
always conscious of environmental concerns when working in Antarctica.
However, currently New Zealand prides itself on being a leader on
environmental matters in Antarctica. It was the first country to prepare a
comprehensive environmental evaluation under the requirements of the
1999 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. Nowadays,
maintaining high environmental standards in New Zealand's own Antarctic
activities is one way for New Zealand to guarantee its ongoing influence in
Antarctic international fora.54 New Zealand currently chairs the Antarctic
Treaty's Committee for Environmental Protection, which is an important
means to ensure its views on these issues are heard and understood by other
Antarctic nations.

Antarctica in New Zealand foreign policy

New Zealand's Antarctic activities give the nation a level of status and
international profile which would be impossible to achieve without that
connection. New Zealand regards Antarctica as a “national asset” which
gives it much needed leverage in its dealings with other nations.55 For
example, during the period from 1984 to 2006 when US–New Zealand
high-level defence and security-related bilateral relations were in the
doldrums due to New Zealand's declared non-nuclear policy, New Zealand's
interactions with the USA over Antarctic matters continued to be relatively
constructive. However, they may have been a factor in the negative reaction
to the suggestion of New Zealand-Swedish collaborations which Aant
Elzinga describes in his chapter in this volume. Nonetheless, overall, the
positive relations between the two countries in Antarctica meant that when
high-level relations did eventually improve, it was easy to move back to
more normal interactions.
Regardless of any other problems in the bilateral relationship, it is in the
USA's interest to maintain easy access to its facilities at McMurdo and the
Scott-Amundsen South Pole Research Station, as much as it is in New
Zealand's interest to continue cooperating with the USA on Antarctica.
Neither the USA nor New Zealand could afford New Zealand public
opinion to turn against the US use of New Zealand facilities to access its
key Antarctic stations, all of which are located in the Ross Dependency.
However, since 1984 (when New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy was first
announced) the USA has punished New Zealand for its anti-nuclear policy
by banning visits to the country from US military vessels.56 The stalemate
occurred because New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation requires that
visiting foreign ships must declare if they are nuclear powered or carry
nuclear weapons, with which the USA still refuses to comply. For twenty
years the US ban on its naval ships visiting New Zealand had a small, but
significant, impact on the logistics support provided by the US military
which helps move New Zealand scientists to Antarctica. The US ban
included visits to New Zealand of the boats of the US Coast Guard. This
meant that after the ANZUS split,57 when the US Coast Guard icebreakers
travelled to Antarctica to break up the ice in advance of the merchant ships
which bring supplies to McMurdo, the South Pole Scott–Amundsen Base
and New Zealand's Scott Base, they had to avoid the most obvious port of
departure, Christchurch's port Lyttleton, and leave from Hobart, in
Australia. However, the pettiness of this political gesture from the US
defence establishment has now been over-ridden by financial practicalities
and the limitations of US icebreaking capabilities to deal with thick
Antarctic sea ice. Since 2007 the USA has hired either a Swedish or a
Russian icebreaker to clear a channel into McMurdo Sound.
US military planes are excluded from the ban on visiting New Zealand,
so the Christchurch–McMurdo fights provided by the US Air Force, US Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve58 have continued, unaffected by the
controversy over New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy. New Zealand's passing
of its anti-nuclear legislation in 1985 led to the US Government's
suspension of ANZUS obligations to New Zealand. Until that date ANZUS
had joined the three countries in a military alliance which had lasted thirty-
five years. Since 1985 New Zealand has been shut out of many aspects of
military cooperation with the USA. Any joint training exercises require a
presidential waiver.59 However, despite the end of ANZUS and the pressure
it has put on NZ–US military interactions, each year between twenty and
sixty New Zealand Defence Force personnel work alongside the US
military in facilitating the NZ–US joint logistics pool and other Antarctic
activities.60
New Zealand also values its Antarctic connections for the opportunity it
affords New Zealand diplomats in finding common points and opportunities
for collaboration with other nations. The Antarctic Treaty System governs
Antarctica on a consensus basis through the annual Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings (ATCMs). However, like many international
organisations, much of the deal-broking is done behind the scenes before
the meetings among blocs of like-minded countries. New Zealand currently
coordinates closely with the USA and Australia, as well as frequently with
Chile, on Antarctic policy matters. Oddly, given the strong awareness on
the part of both the New Zealand and Australian governments of the need to
forge new regional groupings to reflect the changes in the balance of power
in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, neither have yet applied to join
the Asian Forum for Polar Science (AFOPS). AFOPS coordinates polar
policy and science among China, India, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea
— all Asia-Pacific countries who New Zealand and Australia are linked to
in other forums such as APEC. Joining AFOPS would be an opportunity for
both New Zealand and Australia to forge closer links with some of the most
proactive members of the ATS who have a collective Antarctic budget
which exceeds that of Russia.
New Zealand has extremely close scientific and logistical collaborations
with the US, Australian, British, Chilean, German and Italian Antarctic
national programmes and it is exploring opportunities for collaboration with
the Korean national programme. New Zealand also helped Malaysia
develop an Antarctic research programme by offering beds at Scott Base to
Malaysian scientists. In previous decades Malaysia was one of the leading
international critics arguing for Antarctica to be governed by the United
Nations. New Zealand's initiative in helping Malaysia to take a positive role
in Antarctica illustrates how in the current period, New Zealand manages to
both uphold the Antarctic Treaty and to maintain its own claimant rights.
Separate from these official links, individual Antarctic researchers in
New Zealand have established a wide range of research collaborations with
their counterparts all over the world. These collaborations also help to
strengthen the place of Antarctica in New Zealand's foreign policy while
strengthening the perception (one of the desired goals of Antarctica New
Zealand), that New Zealand is “an intellectual and logistics gateway to
Antarctica”.61

Conclusion
In the current era New Zealand clearly has a strong interest and a vital need
to maintain its foothold in Antarctica, more so than most Antarctic nations.
From New Zealand's perspective the current Antarctic Treaty System is at
present the most effective and efficient means to maintain its ongoing
interests in Antarctica. Nevertheless, if the ATS were to collapse, New
Zealand's continual efforts to establish a wide-ranging pattern of activities,
responsibilities and associations in the territories of the Ross Dependency
would help to uphold its claim. New Zealand would never challenge the
Antarctic status quo, but it is well aware that there are other nations who are
not happy with the way Antarctica is governed and seek major systemic
change of the ATS. New Zealand's interests in Antarctica are complex and
strongly reflect its geographic proximity. Whatever happens in Antarctica
and its surrounding oceans will have a direct impact on New Zealand's
economic, political and environmental security, and New Zealand is fully
committed to maintaining its strategic interests there at almost any cost.

Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the Polar Record (2011),
47, pp. 126–134, under the title “New Zealand's Strategic Interests in
Antarctica”. I am grateful to this publication for permission to
republish. British Antarctic Survey, “Frozen in Time: Fossils from the
Antarctic”, 2009,
www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geography/rock/fossil-
collection.php.
2 “NZ Summer Marked by Icebergs”, The Age, 6 January 2005,
www.theage.com.au/news/World/NZ-summer-marked-by-
icebergs/2005/01/06/1104832218742.html.
3 “Icebergs Bear Down on New Zealand”, NZ Herald, 14 November
2009, www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?
c_id=1objectid=10609311.
4 www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/antarctica-and-nz.
5 R. Moroney, “Erebus: 30 Years On”, Hawkes Bay Today, 28 November
2009, www.hawkesbaytoday.co.nz/local/news/erebus-30-years-
on/3906992/.
6 www.legislation.govt.nz/regulation/imperial/1923/0974/latest/DLM11
95.html.
7 www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Antarctica/1-New- Zealand-and-
Antarctica/index.php.
8 Dame Alison Quentin-Baxter, email communication, 18 November
2009.
9 http://cabinetmanual.cabinetOffice.govt.nz/appendix-a. My analysis of
this point was confirmed in an email communication from Trevor
Hughes, Head of the Antarctic Policy Unit, MFAT, NZ, 18 November
2009.
10 Karen Scott, email communication, 18 November 2009. I am
extremely grateful to Ms Scott for her legal advice in phrasing this
section and other Antarctic international law related aspects within the
paper.
11 See Malcolm Templeton, A Wise Adventure: New Zealand and
Antarctica 1920–1960, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000.
12 Stuart Prior, personal communication, 26 November 2009.
13 www.scar.org/treaty/at_text.html.
14 Antarctica NZ Statement of Intent, 2009–2011, Antarctica New
Zealand, 3 July 2008, p. 7.
15 Ibid.
16 Stuart Prior, “Antarctica: View from a Gateway”, Working Paper, 5/97,
Center for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, p. 7.
17 www.nzherald.co.nz/antarctica/news/article.cfm&l_id=2objectid=1047
0725.
18 www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign- Relations/Antarctica/index.php.
19 Antarctica NZ Statement of Intent, 2009–2011, part 1.
20 www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/.
21 www.ccc.govt.nz/cityleisure/artsculture/antarcticconnections.aspx.
22 www.scoop.co.nz/stories/AK0909/S00427.htm.
23 www.anta.canterbury.ac.nz/.
24 www.victoria.ac.nz/antarctic/people/index.aspx.
25 http://erth.waikato.ac.nz/research/units/antarctic/.
26 www.maths.otago.ac.nz/asog/.
27 See the detailed list of the profiles of New Zealand researchers with
Antarctic interests at www.nzuaa.org/.
28 www.landcareresearch.co.nz/research/ecosystems/penguins/.
29 www.gns.cri.nz/what/earthhist/antarctica/crp.html.
30 www.niwa.co.nz/our- science/coasts/antarctica.
31 Neville Peat, Antarctic Partners: Fifty Years of New Zealand and
United States Cooperation in Antarctica, 1957–2007, Wellington:
Phantom House Books, 2007, p. 42.
32 www.heritage-antarctica.org/AHT/.
33 This section draws on the information in the Antarctica NZ Statement
of Intent, 2009–2011.
34 The Italian Antarctic programme operates Mario Zuchelli Station, a
summer-only base, located at Terra Nova Bay.
35 “Wind Farm to Open at Antarctic Base”, The Press, 16 January 2010,
www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/3234604/Wind-farm-to-open-at-
Antarctic-base.
36 Antarctica NZ Statement of Intent, 2009–2011, p. 20.
37 Bryan Storey, Head of Gateway Antarctica, University of Canterbury,
email communication, 16 November 2009.
38 www.first.govt.nz/funding/research/antarctica.
39 www.first.govt.nz/fles/Antarctica%20Request%20for%20Proposals.pd
f.
40 E. Butler, Antarctica New Zealand, personal communication, 18
November 2009.
41 “New Zealand's Antarctic and Southern Ocean Science Strategy”,
2011, p. 4.
42 “New Zealand's Antarctic and Southern Ocean Science Strategy”,
2011, p. 1.
43 “New Zealand's Antarctic and Southern Ocean Science Strategy”,
2011, pp. 7, 9, 11.
44 http://gcmd.nasa.gov/KeywordSearch/Home.do?
Portal=amd_nzMetadataType=0.
45 P. G. Dastidar, and O. Persson, “Mapping the Global Structure of
Antarctic Research vis-à-vis Antarctic Treaty System”, Current
Science (2004), 89(9), pp. 1552–1554.
46 Antarctica New Zealand Statement of Intent, 2009–2012, p. 31.
47 John R. Dudeney and David W. H. Walton, “Leadership in Politics and
Science within the Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Research (2012), 31,
11075, DOI: 10.3402/polar. v31i0.11075.
48 C. Saunders, P. Dalziel and P. Hayes, “The Contribution of Antarctic-
Related Activities to the Canterbury and New Zealand Economies”,
Agribusiness and Economic Research Unit, Lincoln University, 2007.
49 S. Johnston, Christchurch City Council, personal communication, 1
December 2009.
50 “New Zealand's Antarctic and Southern Ocean Science Strategy”,
2011, p. 6.
51 Peat, Antarctic Partners, p. 97.
52 Antarctica New Zealand Statement of Intent, 2009–2012, p. 7.
53 Antarctica New Zealand Statement of Intent, 2009–2012, p. 8.
54 Antarctica New Zealand Statement of Intent, 2009–2011, p. 13.
55 Prior, “Antarctica: View from a Gateway”, p. 1.
56 “Admiral: US Ships Won't Come Until New Zealand Drops Nuke
Ban”, New Zealand Herald, 3 September 2009,
www.nzherald.co.nz/nuclear-ships-ban/news/article.cfm?
c_id=1500959objectid=10594890.
57 ANZUS: The Australia, New Zealand United States Treaty (1951)
which binds Australia and the US and Australia and NZ to defend each
other in the event of a military attack. Originally a three-way treaty,
NZ–US military relations broke off in 1984 over NZ's anti-nuclear
legislation.
58 www.usap.gov/usapgov/aboutUSAPParticipants/index.cfm?m=1.
59 “Admiral: US Ships Won't Come Until New Zealand Drops Nuke
Ban.”
60 Antarctica FAQ,
www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/antarctica/20070215-
afaq.htm.
61 www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/intl-connections/1018.
9 The French Connection

The role of France in the Antarctic Treaty

System
Chavelli Sulikowski

France an extensive record of positive involvement in the Antarctic region.

It is a claimant to continental Antarctic territory, possesses sub-Antarctic
islands, and is an original signatory to the 1959 Treaty. France occupies a
privileged and well-affirmed position in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean
region.1 An influential and active member of key Antarctic Treaty System
(ATS) institutions, France plays a pivotal role in Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), the Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and the Committee for
Environmental Protection (CEP) established under the Madrid Protocol.2
As a cooperative, multilateral regime, the Antarctic Treaty has proven to
be a successful international instrument for the management of Antarctic
affairs for more than five decades.3 It has evolved into a comprehensive
system of distinct, but complementary, international institutional
arrangements. The Treaty brings together multiple state actors of varying
capacities, and involves all the major world powers. A rich school of
literature already exists on issues relating to Antarctic law and governance
within international environmental law and politics. Numerous studies have
focused on issues relating to regime formation, levels of state participation,
and problems associated with Treaty compliance and enforcement.
However, consideration of how the behaviour of key Treaty member states
has helped shape the evolution of the ATS, has to date, remained a
relatively neglected area of analysis.
France maintains and pursues significant interests in the Antarctic region.
The nature of these interests can be broadly characterised as geopolitical,
economic, scientific, and environmental. France's principal Antarctic
interests are centred around several key areas: first, preservation of France's
Antarctic claim, and enhancement of its regional presence. The political
dynamics of Antarctic affairs are changing – international interest in
Antarctica is on the rise, with an increasing number of nations either
intending to, or already establishing themselves on the continent, on both a
temporary and permanent basis. For claimant states in particular, this raises
several major concerns – most notably, those relating to sovereignty,
resource rights, and environmental management issues. In turn, this has
potential implications for how claimant states, such as France, manage,
articulate, and undertake their Antarctic interests and agenda. France is
therefore especially conscious of the need to strengthen its existing position,
in order to remain at the forefront of Antarctic affairs.4
Second, enhancement of Europe's Antarctic presence is of political and
strategic importance to France. As a dominant European power, promoting
a European Polar dimension significantly strengthens France's regional
position, and improves its capacity to remain actively engaged in Antarctic
affairs.5
Third, France pursues excellence in Antarctic science, and seeks to
remain an international leader in research domains.6 Finally, France places
increasing emphasis on addressing environmental issues in the Antarctic
region, particularly in the face of climate change – a topic that is being
increasingly discussed and debated at the highest political levels
internationally.7
It is important to note that these categories of interests are neither
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive but, rather, frequently occur in varying
combinations, overlap, and interchange in terms of scale and level of
importance. This in turn depends upon both internal or domestic changes
and effects occurring within France, as well as external factors, taking place
both within the regional and international arenas.
 France's behaviour within the ATS can be characterised as influential,
committed, and cooperative. Nevertheless, as this chapter points out, France
reserves the right to assert its national interests when it perceives these
interests to be fundamentally at stake – and has acted accordingly in order
to preserve its interests on a number of occasions. It must be noted,
however, that France recognises, and strongly upholds, the significant value
of the Antarctic Treaty, and on the occasions it has chosen to assert its
interests it has done so within and with respect to the framework of the
Treaty.8
As the complexity and interdependent nature of issues concerning the
Antarctic region widen in scope and magnitude, many Treaty member states
(particularly those with long-standing and well-established interests), are
increasingly engaging in cooperative efforts at a variety of levels. This rise
in cooperative activities has emerged as a growing trend among some
Treaty members. Importantly, it suggests that states are now, more than
ever, prioritising the wider interests of Antarctica – and, to an extent,
implies a general relaxation of the pursuit of purely national interests under
some circumstances.
In light of France's broad range of Antarctic interests, and in order to
accommodate a widening Antarctic agenda, French participation within the
ATS is increasingly characterised by multi-level international cooperation.
This trend is particularly evident since the overturning of the Antarctic
Minerals Regime in the late 1980s, followed by the establishment of the
Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection in 1991.9
In defining a national Antarctic strategy, France, taking both political and
scientific considerations into account, is pursuing several main cooperative
strategies, most notably: the negotiation of both formal and informal
agreements, and the development of bilateral and multilateral partnerships
centred around multi-disciplined scientific collaboration; environmental
management; resource pooling and logistics sharing; and the development
of a coordinated European Polar strategy.

French Antarctic policy organization

Consideration of France's Antarctic interests and agenda can be divided into
three key areas of analysis: first, the organisation of its Antarctic policy at
the domestic level; second, France's management of its key Antarctic
interests within the regional policy framework of the European Union (EU);
and third, its behaviour at the international level through engagement with
the ATS and its associated instruments. It is important to note that France's
national systems of management relating to its Antarctic territory, and the
way in which France coordinates foreign policy, shape its behaviour within
both multi-level regional and international contexts.
At the domestic level, France's Antarctic interests and activities are
primarily managed by two key agencies – the l'Institut Polaire Français
Paul-Emile Victor (the IPEV) and the Terres australes et antarctiques
françaises (the TAAF). Established in 1992, the IPEV is a public interest
group comprised of nine public, or para-public bodies (of which the
Ministry of Research, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the TAAF, and le
Centre national de la recherche scientifique (the CNRS), have the most
instrumental roles).10 The Ministry for Higher Education and Research
provides an essential component for the IPEV budget, which has an annual
budget of €28 million. Of this budget, 90 per cent is allocated to scientific
interests, and includes the provision of technology, logistics, equipment,
and infrastructure – this also includes non-Polar affairs, such as the
chartering of the Marion du Fresne to other regions. Of the IPEV's budget,
9.5 million euro is dedicated to Antarctic affairs (including the salaries of
permanent IPEV personnel, this figure is closer to €10.3 million). The IPEV
is responsible for the selection and implementation of France's Polar
science programmes, as well as those for the French sub-Antarctic
territories.11 Providing financial support for an average of sixty-five
scientific programmes annually, the IPEV organises research missions, and
is responsible for the provision of logistics and infrastructure, as well as the
chartering of the French Polar vessels, the Astrolabe, the Marion du Fresne,
and La Curieuse.12 Importantly, collaboration (at both the national and
international levels) is now a key component of the assessment criteria for
proposals submitted to the IPEV for consideration. This has seen the
cooperative role of the IPEV extend further in recent years, to include
support and coordination of more regional and international scientific and
technological programmes.
 The role of the IPEV extends to include support and coordination of
regional and international scientific and technological programmes. The
IPEV employs around 100 permanent staff, with two-thirds of employees
drawn from the CNRS. Additionally, a number of contractual staff and
civilian volunteers are recruited by the IPEV for the Summer and Winter
Polar campaigns on an annual basis to provide further technological
assistance.
Since the establishment of the IPEV in 1992, France has increasingly
occupied an eminent international position in terms of both the volume, as
well as the quality, of scientific research it undertakes on the Antarctic and
sub-Antarctic regions. Internationally, France is ranked fifth in relation to
the number of published scientific reports produced on the Antarctic. On
average, more than 65 per cent of French research articles are on the sub-
Antarctic and Adélie Land.13 France is an international leader in terms of
the number of published international scientific reports relevant to the sub-
Antarctic region, surpassing the number of publications produced by other
sub-Antarctic island claimant States such as Australia, the UK, and South
Africa.14 In terms of the diversity of the research, more than 30 per cent of
French publications are focused on terrestrial ecology, with geophysics
comprising 16 per cent, and the atmospheric sciences 11 per cent.15
Established under French statutory law in 1955, the TAAF is an overseas
territory16 of France that is independently administered by a Préfet from
headquarters on Réunion Island.17 The TAAF is responsible for the
administration and management of the French sub-Antarctic island
territories of Kerguelen, Crozet, Saint Paul, and Amsterdam18, as well as
Adélie Land, and the Îles Éparses.19 Its principal role is to ensure the
management of ecosystems – including, or in conjunction with, the
management of fisheries.20 Management of maritime issues, such as the
fight against illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing within the
French exclusive economic zones (EEZs), is also an integral area of
responsibility of the TAAF. The implementation of scientific activities and
programmes that take place on the French islands remains the responsibility
of the IPEV.
It is important to note the unique political and legal nature or status of the
TAAF, especially in terms of its relationship to the EU. The TAAF does not
belong to the EU. European Community (EC) law does not apply to the
TAAF, except for the association regime based on Part IV of the Treaty
establishing the European Community (EEC Treaty)21 – “Association of the
overseas countries and territories” (Articles 182–188 of the ECC Treaty).22
As a result, in regard to fisheries management, the TAAF maintains an
autonomous authority over the waters surrounding France's Antarctic and
sub-Antarctic territories, while all other French fisheries are managed under
the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).23
In 2007, the French Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific
and Technologic Choice (OPESCT),24 on the instigation of the Senate
Commission on Economic Affairs, commissioned a report on France's
position concerning international issues surrounding Antarctic research.
Undertaken just prior to the International Polar Year (IPY) 2007/2008, by
French Senator Christian Gaudin, this report intends to provide clarity and
definition to France's current Antarctic programme and priorities,
highlighting the importance of developing bilateral and multilateral
European and international partnerships.25
From a domestic politics perspective, Senator Gaudin's report draws
attention to aspects of France's national Antarctic management
arrangements requiring improvement – specifically, the need to develop a
clearer articulation of the respective powers and responsibilities of the
IPEV and the TAAF. In order to remain a pivotal player in Antarctic
science, both France's organisation of research, and its capacity to engage in
cooperative activities at multiple levels, is essential. Results from Senator
Gaudin's report identify the absence of an “active policy of national
cooperation”, regarding the capacity and extent of interagency coordination
between the IPEV, the TAAF, research laboratories, scientists, and key
funding bodies. Improved coordination processes would promote
coherency, direction, and permanency between both agencies, and
ultimately improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of French
Antarctic policy.
In March 2009, French President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed former
Prime Minister Michel Rocard as French Ambassador for international
negotiations relating to the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This role seeks to
improve the coordination of France's national Polar agenda and policies, so
it may enhance its capacity to pursue its Antarctic agenda and key interests
in the region – most notably, maintaining its regional presence, promoting
the French territories via scientific research, and remaining fully active both
regionally and internationally in the Antarctic sphere. In October 2010,
President Sarkozy appointed Senator Gaudin as the new préfet of the TAAF.
This action can certainly be perceived as an endorsement of Senator
Gaudin's recommendations, and a precursor to improved coordination.
As a member of the EU, France's Antarctic, and especially its sub-
Antarctic policies, must take into consideration regional frameworks and
policies established by the European Commission (EC). This is most clear
in relation to fisheries issues within CCAMLR – where the distribution of
fisheries competencies between the EC and its member states calls for
enhanced policy coherency and coordination.26

France and Antarctica – an historical perspective

France's historical legacy in the Antarctic region dates back to the 1700s.27
The discoveries and territorial claims made by early French explorers, such
as Bouvet de Lozier, Marion du Fresne, Kerguelen de Trémarec, and Bruni
d'Entrecasteaux, ensured that France dominated the first phase of eighteenth
century Antarctic exploration.28
The nineteenth century witnessed a surge of international Antarctic
interest, with many European expeditions undertaking voyages in an
attempt to locate the South magnetic pole. In 1837, Jules Sébastien Cesar
Dumont d'Urville, commissioned by King Louis Philippe, led France in the
international race to locate this pole, seeking also to extend France's sphere
of influence in the region. During this voyage, d'Urville charted and
claimed several islands in the name of France – Louis Philippe Land,
Joinville Land, and Rosamel Island, as well as the Adélie Coast (Terre
Adélie), and Pointe Géologie.29
A desire for ce's increasing interest in the Antarctic region and, to a
considerable extent, determined the strategic and economic importance of
Antarctica to French national interests. Claiming South Pacific territories in
the 1800s prompted France to secure naval routes and nearby territory in
the Southern Ocean region. It was therefore strategically sound for France
to expand its sphere of influence as far south as the Antarctic.30 At this
time, voyages of exploration and discovery began to reflect national
policies to a greater extent.
Following several decades of limited international Antarctic activity, the
Sixth International Geographical Congress in 1895 revived interest in the
region. French Antarctic interest was rekindled with the 1903–1905 and
1908–1910 expeditions of Jean-Baptise Charcot, whose scientific voyages
also sought to reaffirm France's regional presence.31
As states began to realise the potential strategic and economic value of
Antarctica – prompted by increasing international competition for declining
whale stocks, and a growing interest in Southern Ocean fisheries, several
nations set about claiming portions of the continent.32 The partition of
Antarctica commenced in 1908 when the United Kingdom (UK) formally
claimed Antarctic territory, followed by New Zealand in 1923, and France
in 1924 with the annexation of Adélie Land.33 In 1924, Adélie Land, the
Îles Kerguelen, the Îles Crozet, and the Îles St. Paul and Amsterdam, were
placed under French Fisheries Regulations, and were managed by the
French Government of Madagascar.
Antarctic exploration entered a new phase in the late 1940s, as several
nations established permanent occupancy on both the continent and sub-
Antarctic islands. France was among the first nations to establish research
stations in the Antarctic during the 1950s.34 This followed approval by the
French Government of a proposal put forward by explorer and ethnographer
Paul Emile Victor in 1945, for the establishment of an official French
Antarctic research programme, the Expéditions Polaires Françaises (EPF),
which also undertook significant research work in the Arctic.35 Responsible
for the organisation of French Polar research expeditions, the EPF
established bases on France's sub-Antarctic islands, as well as two
continental stations, in preparation for the International Geophysical Year
(IGY) scheduled for 1957–1958.36 On 6 August 1955, the TAAF,
comprising the Îles Kerguelen, the Îles Crozet, the Îles St. Paul and
Amsterdam, and Terre Adélie was established as an overseas territory of
France.
 While demonstrating a strong commitment to science, the establishment
of the French national research stations also highlights the increasing
development of political interests in Antarctica throughout the post-World
War II period. Although stations were established in anticipation of the
upcoming IGY, they also lent legitimacy to existing claims by establishing
occupancy.37 The IGY demonstrated the value of ongoing international
scientific cooperation in the Antarctic, while also providing the opportunity
to put aside sensitive geopolitical issues such as territorial sovereignty
disputes, and the non-recognition of existing Antarctic claims by non-
claimant nations, such as the United States (US) and the Soviet Union.38
Consequently, the IGY provided the “vital impetus” and “ground work” for
the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty.39 Following fifteen months of
preparatory meetings, the Antarctic Treaty was signed on 1 December 1959
in Washington, DC, by representatives of the IGY participating states,40 and
entered into force on 23 June 1961.

France and CCAMLR

The Antarctic Treaty does not deal with the exploitation, ownership, or
management of marine living resources. As Antarctica became the site of
increasing global commercial interest in marine resources in the 1970s, the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) recognised the importance of
establishing a separate, but complementary treaty directly relating to
Antarctic marine living resource management.41 Internationally negotiated
by the ATCPs, this treaty would involve nations with a direct interest in, or
an intention to research or exploit Antarctic marine living resources. In
drafting a regime, the ATCPs sought to agree upon key principles that
ensured the conservation of marine life, while also allowing the rational
harvesting of resources,42 in order to limit the detrimental effects of over-
exploitation on Antarctic ecosystems, and to reduce the chance of
international conflict over resource use.43
With the commencement of formal convention negotiations in Canberra
in early 1978, two issues of major contention became apparent. In the first
instance, there was an issue regarding the prioritisation of values – due to
the refusal of ATCPs to “prohibit” the potential exploitation of a given
resource under a negotiated treaty, the capacity to balance environmental
and geo-biological values with those of a political and economic nature
seemed intrinsically difficult.44 Second, there were considerable tensions
surrounding the notion of territorial sovereignty. Bounded differently from
that of the Antarctic Treaty,45 the proposed Convention Area's zone of
application would impinge upon the sovereignty of several islands lying
north of 60° South in the southern sectors of the Indian, and South Atlantic
Oceans administered, or claimed by Argentina, Australia, France, Norway,
South Africa, and the UK.46
Two special consultative meetings held throughout 1978 failed to resolve
these issues, and produce a draft convention that satisfied all parties.47
France objected to a draft produced at an informal conference in
Washington, DC in September of the same year, based on concerns relating
to sovereignty over its undisputed islands located within the area
encompassed by the draft convention. Barnes notes that the issue of
Antarctic territorial claims and sovereignty rights generated the most
significant pressure on ATCPs in their attempt to establish a convention.48
In spite of the development of revised versions of the “written
understanding” requested by France in order to clarify its sovereign rights
in the 200 nautical mile zone49 around Kerguelen and Crozet islands at a
meeting in Bern in early 1979, a draft acceptable to all parties failed to be
produced.50 Negotiations were further delayed as France requested that
either the boundary of the Convention Area be redrawn without the
inclusion of its islands, or that “explicit language” be used in the text of the
Convention to ensure indisputable French jurisdiction over the waters
surrounding Kerguelen and Crozet islands.51
Despite the fact that other member states claiming islands within the
Convention Area accepted that Article IV of the draft convention
sufficiently protected their sovereignty,52 France requested that a clear
identification and articulation of its rights as a coastal state over the
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Kerguelen and Crozet islands be
included as an annex to the Convention. Several revised draft annex
versions were developed by eight countries (including France), in the lead
up to the 1979 ATCM held in Washington, DC, however, none was totally
acceptable to every state. Following this meeting, an agreed annex version
was offered to delegates to present to their respective governments for
consideration. This Statement was finally agreed upon, and included as the
Chairman's Statement in the Final Act at the diplomatic Conference on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.53
CCAMLR was adopted on 20 May 1980 at a formal conference in
Canberra, and entered into force on 7 April 1982. As indicated above,
France played a decisive and influential role in the negotiation of the
Convention, the development of the Chairman's Statement, and its inclusion
as an annex to the Treaty. It did so by consistently exercising its bargaining
power as a prominent Treaty member and claimant state, over issues
relating to sovereignty rights and territorial jurisdiction within its EEZs.
The Chairman's Statement specifically relates to the application of the
Convention to the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet islands over
which France has jurisdiction, as well as “to waters adjacent to other islands
within the Convention Area of application, over which the existence of
State sovereignty is recognised by all CCAMLR Contracting Parties”.54
States claiming sub-Antarctic islands reserve the right to opt out of
conservation measures that the state finds objectionable, difficult, or
impossible with which to comply. The Statement stipulates that measures
relating to marine living resources in the EEZs of Kerguelen and Crozet
islands developed by France before the Convention enters into force, will
remain effective until altered by France acting within the Commission's
framework. France can agree that the waters adjacent to these islands
should be included in the area of application of any specific conservation
measure under consideration, or indicate that they should be excluded for a
particular conservation measure.55
France has remained an active CCAMLR Commission member since the
Convention's entry into force.56 Most notably, it has played a significant
role in attempting to eliminate the problem of illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing for Patagonian Toothfish in its EEZs, and
pursues collaborative bilateral efforts in this regard.57 Sharing a common
interest in protecting fisheries resources from the persistent problem of IUU
fishing within their neighbouring EEZs, the French and Australian
governments signed the Cooperative Fisheries Surveillance Treaty in
November 2003.58 The Treaty enables the joint surveillance of fishing
vessels, collaboration regarding patrol missions, and enhances information
exchange. Significantly, the Treaty allows for the “hot pursuit” of an illegal
vessel to continue from the territorial sea of one state into the other, on the
proviso that the other state has been notified.59 The Australian National
Interest Analysis (NIA) report on this Treaty highlights that cooperative
action between states sharing similar concerns regarding IUU fishing, is an
effective method to address the issue.60 Paul Murphy of the Australian
Fisheries Management Authority informed the Australian Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties that since the signing of the Treaty, patrol vessels
had been successful in deterring illegal fishing activity in the French and
Australian maritime areas.61 The Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement
of Fisheries Laws between the Government of Australia and the
Government of the French Republic in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the
French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and the McDonald
Islands, was signed in January 2007 by the French and Australian
governments. This agreement builds on the 2003 Treaty, and enables the
apprehension of an illegal vessel by either Australian or French officers by
allowing them to board vessels belonging to either nation in the EEZs of
both states.62
France also demonstrates a strong commitment to reducing incidental
seabird mortality (bycatch) levels within the EEZs surrounding Kerguelen
and Crozet islands, by adopting and implementing a subset of CCAMLR
mitigating measures.63 France reported that in the 2006/2007 season,
albatross bycatch had been reduced to zero, and the level of mortality for
other seabird species decreased from 12,000 birds per annum in the early
2000s, to 1,000 birds by 2008.64 Following France's implementation of a
National Plan of Action (NPOA) to reduce bycatch in its EEZ fisheries,
CCAMLR's Scientific Committee commended France on its efforts to
employ mitigation measures, which resulted in bycatch reductions reported
in Subarea 58.6, and Division 58.5.1 in the 2008 season.65 Furthermore, at
the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee to the Agreement on the
Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP),66 held in Mar del Plata,
Argentina, in April 2010, France, in recognition of its responsibilities under
the Agreement, announced its intention to develop an NPOA for the
critically endangered Amsterdam albatross.67 A decision to develop similar
measures for all species identified as critically endangered occurring within
French territory has also been adopted.68

France, CRAMRA, and the reorientation of the ATS

Prompted by fears of global petroleum resource scarcity, and significant
rises in oil prices during the 1970s,69 international interest in potential
exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources became increasingly apparent.
With this in mind, the ATCPs turned their attention to negotiating a regime
for the regulation of these resources.70 There is no reference to either
minerals, or the question of mining in the Antarctic Treaty, nor had
provision been made under a separate agreement.71
As with the negotiation of both the Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR, the
question of mining raised numerous geopolitical, economic, and
environmental concerns. The minerals negotiations proved especially
challenging and contentious, due to questions relating to sovereignty,
territorial claims, resource ownership, and management rights. These
factors contributed to the increasing tension between claimants, consultative
and non-consultative parties, as well as states without Treaty membership.
Despite complex debates and discussions concerning Antarctic mineral
resources ensuing for seven years, formal negotiations did not commence
until 1982.
The result of a lengthy and complicated negotiating process, the
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
(CRAMRA), was adopted on 2 June 1988 in Wellington, New Zealand, and
opened for signature on 25 November that same year.72 Constituting
another instrumental ATS element, the Convention enabled consultative
parties to develop principles, rules, and institutions for the regulation and
management of potential future mineral resource activities in the region.73
Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) such as the
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), saw the Convention as
essentially a “slippery slope” to future Antarctic mining, and incompatible
with environmental protection principles.74 A campaign against the signing
of CRAMRA gathered strength in both France and Australia.
 Under the leadership of Prime Minister Michel Rocard, France was the
first nation to publicly state its reservations regarding the Convention in
April 1989, before refusing to sign CRAMRA in June the same year.75
Following this, the Australian Government under the leadership of Prime
Minister Bob Hawke, announced on 22 May 1989 that Australia would not
sign the Convention,76 instead, proposing the development of a
comprehensive environmental protection regime that would prohibit
mining, and classify Antarctica as an international wilderness reserve.77 At
this time, international support for CRAMRA began to decline, as other
Treaty parties started to question the legitimacy and potential environmental
implications of the Convention.78 France and Australia's joint opposition to
CRAMRA effectively brought an end to the Convention, as Article 62
requires the signatures of all claimant states in order for it to enter into
force.79
There are two, related explanations for France's support of overturning
CRAMRA. The first is connected to the unprecedented growth of the
environmental movement globally throughout the 1970s and 1980s.80 The
1986 Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union heightened public
environmental awareness worldwide, while controversy over French
nuclear testing in the Pacific throughout the 1970s and 1980s instigated
global anti-nuclearisation movements, and prompted the development of the
green social movement in France.81 Furthermore, both France and Australia
were concerned by a series of major oil spills that occurred in Polar waters
in 1989.82 These incidents provided a strong case for environmentalists by
internationally publicising the significant risks associated with transporting
oil across Polar waters.83
In conjunction with ASOC, eminent French explorer and scientist
Jacques-Yves Cousteau assisted in raising environmental awareness and
influencing public opinion on CRAMRA, via petition movements and
governmental lobbying.84 However, uncertainty surrounds the details
pertaining to the extent of Cousteau's role, due to inconsistent accounts of
what took place at informal meetings between Rocard, Hawke, Cousteau,
and relevant Australian and French government officials throughout 1989.
 The French Bureau of the National Assembly commissioned the
OPESCT to evaluate and report on the economic issues and ecological risks
associated with Antarctic mining in 1989. According to Senator Gaudin, the
results of this report further cemented President Mitterrand's opposition (on
Cousteau's further recommendation) to CRAMRA, in favour of negotiating
a new environmental protection agreement for the Antarctic.85 However,
according to Woolcott,86 although Cousteau “endorsed the [nature reserve]
idea in principle”, he did not rule out the possibility of environmentally safe
mining at some point in the future. This draws into question the extent of
Cousteau's influence on the French Government, and does not exclude the
possibility that Cousteau was in fact approached by the French Government
to stir anti-mining sentiments, and sway public opinion in the pro-
CRAMRA states, due to his widespread international credibility.87
According to Hawke, Cousteau supported the concept of an Antarctic
nature reserve, and agreed to an indefinite ban on mining, at an informal
meeting in Paris on 18 June 1989. Hawke believed his collaboration with
Cousteau fundamentally influenced Rocard's decision to oppose CRAMRA,
and that the immense pressure exerted by the Cousteau Foundation on the
French Government prompted Rocard to reject the Convention publicly.88
The second explanation relates more directly to French domestic politics.
Given the contention surrounding France's environmental credentials
throughout the 1970s (due to nuclear testing in the Pacific), and the 1980s
(due to the bombing of the Greenpeace vessel, Rainbow Warrior, in
Auckland Harbour in July 1985 in an attempt to prevent anti-nuclear
protesting), it is possible that in overturning CRAMRA, France sought to
improve its environmental image internationally.89 Elliott notes that the new
French Socialist Government (formed after the Socialists regained majority
in Parliament in June 1988) under President Mitterrand presented solid
environmental credentials, with the appointment of Minister for the
Environment, Brice Lalonde, a founder of Les Amis de la Terre.90
According to Elliott, as “one of the least conservationist of the Treaty
parties”, France's decision to overturn CRAMRA was an attempt on behalf
of the French Government to reduce the power of the green vote, and was
therefore, couched more in domestic politics rather than environmental
goodwill.91 Supporting this theory, McCulloch adds that a desire “to placate
a growing environmental lobby” partly contributed to France's decision to
refuse signing CRAMRA.92

France and the Madrid Protocol on environmental Protection

Following CRAMRA's demise in 1989–1990, France and Australia placed
the concept of an Antarctic environmental protection regime on the
immediate consultative party agenda, seeking to have their initiative
“adopted as an institutional goal” within the Antarctic regime.93 Given the
strong ongoing support for the minerals regime demonstrated by many of
the powerful contracting parties,94 and considering the hostility both
Australia and France faced in their overturning of CRAMRA, the capacity
to gain consensus on a new environmental protection treaty that prohibited
Antarctic mining seemed a highly ambitious undertaking.
The development of an environmental protection agreement signified a
major turning point in Antarctic affairs. With demonstrated experience in
the development of environmental agreements, it was logical for Australia
to adopt a leadership role in Protocol negotiations. As an influential and
well respected actor both regionally, as well as on the global scale, France
played a pivotal role in encouraging and leading other European nations
throughout both the process of moving towards negotiations, and also
during the actual development of the Protocol. This complementary
approach pursued by France and Australia enabled initial challenges
associated with the concept of an environmental agreement to be overcome,
and ultimately resulted in the realisation of an optimum outcome – the
establishment of comprehensive environmental principles for the Antarctic.
Despite significant initial reservations, ATCPs moved away from the
prospect of mineral exploitation, in favour of institutionalising
environmental protection principles for the Antarctic under a legally
binding agreement. After only four negotiating sessions conducted over a
twelve-month period, ATCPs accepted the French-Australian proposal, and
signed the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection in 1991. Its entry
into force in 1998 confirmed the redundancy of CRAMRA for the
foreseeable future.
 Described as “an extraordinary achievement in international diplomacy”,
the Protocol (including six annexes)95 constitutes an integral part of the
ATS. It provides a comprehensive environmental protection framework,96
by consolidating environmental measures into a single agreement under the
Antarctic Treaty.97 Significantly, the Protocol places “an indefinite ban on
all activities relating to [Antarctic] mining with a review after fifty years”.98
The Protocol is established in Article 11, and defined in Article 12, the
Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP), which provides advice and
recommendations to the ATCPs at Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Meetings.99 The CEP is comprised of Treaty member states that are also
signatories to the Protocol. To date, major issues in the CEP have included:
environmental impact assessments; area protection and management
(including specially protected areas and historic sites); environmental
monitoring and reporting; waste management; prevention of marine
pollution; review of Annex II of the Protocol;100 and prevention of the
introduction of non-indigenous species.
France plays an active role in the CEP, and has made valuable
contributions in a variety of issue areas. Most notable has been its work on
the development of measures aimed at limiting non-native species
introduction and transition between sites. This has been identified as a
priority one issue in the CEP five-year work plan, and an area on which
France has collaborated extensively with both Australia and New
Zealand.101
At the thirty-third ATCM, held in Punta del Este in May 2010, France
proposed amendments to the rules of procedure governing the participation
of experts in the meetings of ATCM bodies. This would enable wider
categories of experts (including those not belonging to international
organisations with a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica), to attend
and participate in meetings, and to have their comments or
recommendations included in the meeting report.102 France's proposal
received initial support; however, informal consultations undertaken by
France indicated that a consensus text could not be agreed upon between
parties at ATCM XXXIII.103
 France has also taken a leadership role in developing site guidelines for
visitors to Antarctica, particularly in relation to the environmental aspects
and impacts of Antarctic tourism. In conjunction with Australia and New
Zealand, it initiated an assessment study on this issue in May 2009.104
France also concentrates its efforts on improving the assessment of
cumulative environmental impacts in Antarctica – particularly in relation to
the activities of tourism operators.105 Based on its work on this issue,
France has encouraged the establishment of a method to centralise tourism
and nongovernmental activity authorisation, in order to facilitate a more
comprehensive understanding of potential cumulative environmental
impacts.106
France's commitment as a CEP member, and the valuable role France has
played in CEP proceedings, was formally recognised with the selection of
French scientist Dr Yves Frenot as Vice Chairman of the CEP in 2005 and
Dr Frenot's election as CEP Chairman at the ATCM in 2010.107

France, international cooperation, and the ATS

Antarctic affairs are fundamentally characterised by a long-standing
network of international cooperation.108 Brought to the fore following the
success of the 1957/1958 IGY, the principle of international cooperation
underpins the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and its related provisions and,
importantly, has played a decisive role in shaping the behaviour of Treaty
member states. Despite a long-standing legacy of international cooperation
in the region, a number of Treaty parties are now, more than ever, engaging
in cooperative activities for a number of reasons.
Nations involved in Antarctic affairs are increasingly demonstrating a
common desire to improve knowledge and understanding of the region.
International cooperation is not only an efficient, but indeed a necessary
step in addressing issues requiring collective solutions, such as
environmental protection, marine resource management, and climate
change. Antarctica is at the centre of international climate change research
– accounting for the highest percentage of research activities undertaken in
the region.109 In addition to the significant environmental concerns
associated with climate change, related geopolitical and economic
considerations are broadening at the global level. As a shared sense of
urgency concerning climate change rises, some member states are
increasingly recognising the critical importance of cooperating to identify
common research priorities, to concentrate efforts in areas of mutual
scientific interest, and to develop effective collaborative programmes.110
As the scale of Polar science programmes and initiatives widens, so too
does the financial cost associated with undertaking necessary research
activities – with some nations spending up to 80 per cent of their total
Antarctic budget on logistics and infrastructure.111 This provides another
major incentive for increased cooperation, particularly in relation to the
sharing of logistics, infrastructure, and Polar vessels. In France's case, the
geographical isolation of its Antarctic bases accentuates the importance of
undertaking cooperative efforts.
Unlike other Antarctic claimant states (with the exception of Norway and
the UK),112 France has maintained a bi-polar agenda – engaging in
activities in both the Antarctic and Arctic regions.113 This necessitates a
significant division of both national funding and resources, and requires a
higher level of coordination between national, regional, and international
agencies. Given Antarctica's geographical distance, and considering it does
not claim territory in the Arctic, France places particular emphasis on
pursuing cooperative initiatives and policies in relation to the Antarctic
region.
As a major, and ongoing contributor to Polar research, France is a leader
in Antarctic science programmes at both regional and international levels,
and places significant emphasis on continuing this trend. At the regional
level, France is a driving force in European Polar affairs – demonstrating a
high level of participation in key European Polar science agencies, and
engaging collaboratively on joint research projects and initiatives at both
bilateral and multilateral levels. Internationally, France is a pivotal player in
Antarctic science. A major participant in multilateral initiatives such as the
IPY, France is also a key contributor to major international Antarctic
organisations and instruments, such as CCAMLR and the CEP. Considering
the significant position science occupies on the French Antarctic agenda,
and given its extensive record of scientific involvement, France perceives
the maintenance of a permanent scientific presence in the Antarctic region
to be of crucial importance to its overall interests in the region.114
Europe is a powerful actor in Antarctic affairs, with European Polar
agencies constituting an “intricate and fertile network”, operating across
extensive Polar regions, and encompassing multi-disciplinary research.115
Accordingly, this network encourages and facilitates high-level research via
“healthy doses” of both cooperation and competition between European
nations.116
The capacity to undertake successful Polar research relies on
international cooperation and collaboration.117 As an increasing number of
states become involved with, and active in Antarctic affairs, France
considers the development of an effective and coordinated Antarctic
strategy at the European level to be an essential step in terms of the future
direction of Polar affairs and, most importantly, fundamental to the
maintenance of France's key interests in the region.
France actively encourages the concept of the establishment of a
centralised European Polar agency in order to: increase funding
opportunities; assist with the financial costs of research, logistics, and
infrastructure; develop regional research networks; and promote the
establishment of an organised cooperative Polar program within EU states.
In this regard, France is particularly interested in strengthening existing bi-
polar cooperation with Germany and Italy, as a means of initiating an
overall European collaborative strategy. According to the French Minister
of Higher Education and Research, François Goulard, the most effective
direction for France to pursue in the future is that of international and, in
particular, European cooperation.118 Broadening the scope of the European
Antarctic dimension would enable a joint maximisation of resources, and
facilitate the development of multinational and coordinated long-term
planning between European countries. An enhanced pan European capacity
would assist France in remaining at the forefront of Antarctic affairs.119
France's joint venture with Italy in the establishment of Concordia
Station (Dome C) – a permanent research station located at the interior of
the continent, but within the Australian Antarctic sector,120 provides a
pertinent example of France's capacity to develop a highly successful
bilateral collaborative partnership. It also serves to highlight the emphasis
France places on enhancing the overall European presence in the Antarctic
region, and its commitment to pursuing excellence in scientific research.
Operated year-round since 2005,121 Concordia is currently the only joint
continental station in full operation.122 It intends to provide a platform for
international cooperation on which to base and support research
programmes with shared objectives, and to ultimately improve the capacity
of the international scientific community in undertaking Antarctic research
projects in a number of domains.123 Dome C provided one of the two sites
selected for deep ice drilling for the European Project for Ice Core Drilling
in Antarctica (EPICA), and has undergone initial site testing for the launch
of an international astronomy programme.
In establishing Concordia, France sought to strengthen collaborative ties
with its key European partners, thereby enhancing not only the overall
Antarctic presence of the EU, but also reaffirming the French presence.
France, Germany, and Italy are all open to the development of a Rome –
Berlin – Paris triangle for Polar research. This would mean German
involvement at Concordia, and the Italians joining the Franco-German base
in Ny-Ålesund on Spitsbergen, in the Arctic. The French – German – Italian
trilateral process was commenced with the signing of an initial agreement
for the development of a tripartite research programme at Concordia –
albeit limited to specific research on tropospheric aerosols and cloud cover.
At the same time, France recognises that this must not be incompatible with
other forms of cooperation.
Having expressed interest in participating scientifically and operationally
at Concordia, and being capable of strengthening the European presence in
Antarctica, Spain represents a good example of a potential third party to be
included at Concordia.124 France, in conjunction with Italy, recognises the
need to develop a two-phase strategy for strengthening their position: first,
increasing emphasis must be placed on pursuing programmes of scientific
excellence that require limited logistical resources; and, second, the
logistical capacity of Concordia must be improved in order to accept larger,
multi-disciplinary projects in the future.125 This would widen the scope of
not only European research ventures, but also provide a gateway to
international research activities.126
 Regionally, France engages in Antarctic affairs through the European
Polar Board (EPB),127 and the European Polar Consortium (EPC).128 While
the EPB is a permanent science and advisory committee, the EPC was a
four-year initiative established to essentially consider how to better
integrate and share resources among European countries active in the Polar
regions.129 The IPEV has been a driving force in both the EPB and EPC,
and provides support to the management and operation of the EPC in
conjunction with the European Science Foundation (ESF). The EPB aims to
identify and prioritise Polar science issues that are of common European
interest, and to enhance Europe's capacity to participate at the global
level.130 In establishing an integrated network for European Polar activities,
the EPB intends to provide a strategic platform upon which to develop a
future European Polar entity. The cooperative capacity of European
research teams was put to the test during the highly successful EPICA
project – a multinational initiative established and supported by the EC's
framework programme, the ESF, as well as individual national Polar
agencies.131
Commenced in 1995, and concluded in 2006 (after a six-year extension
of the project in 2000), EPICA was undertaken in order to complement the
results of the highly successful Greenland Ice Core Project (GRIP). EPICA
aimed to obtain the most extensive chronological climate record possible
from Antarctica, on which to base studies of climate variability in both the
Polar regions. The multilateral project involved obtaining ice cores from
two different sites, Concordia Station (Dome C), and Germany's Kohnen
Station, with research teams and funding support from ten European
countries.132 Drilling at Concordia concluded 21 December 2004, when
after reaching a depth of over three thousand metres, scientists extracted
what is currently, to date, the world's oldest ice core. This extended the
climatic record to over 900,000 years. The IPEV was a partner and major
participant in EPICA and, along with their Italian counterparts, Programma
Nazionale di Richerche in Antartide (PNRA), significantly contributed to
the provision and coordination of logistical support necessary to undertake
deep ice drilling at Concordia.133 Internationally, France stresses two main
priorities. First, developing international partnerships that demonstrate
strong collaborative potential. Second, pursuing a leadership role in
research domains in which it excels internationally.134
 While actively encouraging and engaging in bilateral and trilateral
European partnerships, France also recognises the importance of pursuing
and strengthening wider international networks of cooperation. Specifically,
it is recognising that cooperation with the four countries whose bases are
geographically the most proximal to the French stations (the US, Italy,
Australia, and New Zealand) should be favoured, without necessarily
maintaining a special approach towards these countries. Particular areas of
potential cooperation with Australia are identified: logistics cooperation
(especially since Australia and France both share Hobart, Tasmania, as their
main Antarctic gateway), and astronomical research at Concordia.135
France continues to work with both Australia and Japan on the
Collaborative East Antarctic Marine Census (CEAMARC) in the Dumont
d'Urville Sea.136 France also collaborates extensively with Australia and
Italy in the area of astronomical research, as part of the “Antarctic
Research, a European Network for Astrophysics” (ARENA) project,
undertaken at Dome C.137
Following the success of EPICA, interest in establishing ice core drilling
sites in the eastern Antarctic is increasingly emerging among the
international scientific community. Dome Argus (Dome A) on the Antarctic
Plateau presents significant potential in this area, with a Chinese research
team undertaking sample drilling during the IPY 2007/2008. Given its
extensive logistical experience in supporting ice core drilling activities at
Concordia France has maintained ongoing collaboration with China on this
matter, and is eager to participate in potential future drilling activities at
Dome A.138
International cooperation is essential for the realisation of large-scale
multinational initiatives, such as the International Polar Year (IPY) – a
collaborative multinational initiative focused on enhancing research in the
Polar regions.139 The most recent IPY, in 2007/2008, witnessed an
unprecedented level of international cooperation. According to the EPB
Executive Secretary, Paul Egerton, the IPY facilitates the capacity to
“launch a wave of science diplomacy”, by enabling nations to network, and
develop common strategies and approaches.140 The most recent IPY saw
French researchers involved in almost a quarter of the selected programmes
– including eight projects either led, or co-led by French scientists. This
highlights not only France's capacity to undertake extensive Polar activities,
but also confirms its leadership role, and commitment to excellence in
scientific research.

Conclusion
France demonstrates a strong commitment to the Antarctic Treaty. It has
significantly contributed to the evolution of the ATS, through its integral
role in major Treaty instruments and institutional processes. Examination of
France's key Antarctic interests and agenda suggests multiple reasons for its
engagement in the region, and points to a number of different factors that
contribute to France's behaviour and decision making within the ATS.
Increasing international interest in the Antarctic, coupled with rising
environmental concerns – most notably climate change – are major factors
generating pressure on Antarctic Treaty parties. This leads, necessarily, to
enhanced and coordinated policy responses from the parties, and re-
evaluations of their Antarctic agenda and policy priorities.
The Antarctic provides a pertinent example of the inextricable nexus
between science and politics – the region is vital not only in terms of its
capacity to provide a vast, living laboratory in which to undertake multi-
disciplinary research, but also provides an arena in which Treaty members
may exercise foreign policy that directly impacts on how activities –
namely scientific research – are undertaken in the region. Although it is
widely recognised that science provides a significant “currency of
influence” in the Antarctic,141 politics and policy remain very much to the
fore, and it is evident that geopolitical interests remain the predominant
drivers in terms of shaping the direction of national Antarctic agenda.142
For France, the “culture of cooperation” embodied in the 1959 Treaty
provides not only the cornerstone of the entire Treaty system, but also a
valuable and efficient method of operation in the Antarctic region. As
pointed out by Senator Gaudin, “in the realm of science, cooperation cannot
be an objective in itself”.143 France recognises that the extent and direction
of its Antarctic involvement in the future will be shaped by its capacity, and
intention to continue pursuing coordinated policies aimed at enhancing
multi-level cooperation – particularly in relation to scientific research – and
by focusing its efforts on establishing partnerships based on the
identification of areas of mutual interest and competencies. This must occur
regionally, through engagement with France's key European partners, as
well as internationally, under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty.
Achievement of this goal will cement France's position as a pivotal player
in Antarctic affairs for the foreseeable future.

Notes
1 Christian Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, Report on France's
Position with Regard to the International Issues Surrounding Polar
Research: The Case of Antarctica, Parliamentary Office for the
Evaluation of Scientific and Technologic Choices, No. 230 (2006–
2007), p. 91.
2 The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) and the
Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP)
are also included under the Antarctic Treaty System.
3 The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in 1959, and entered into force in
1961.
4 Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 6.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 1.
7 Christo Pimpirev, “Editorial”, European Polar Board Newsletter, No.
4 (March 2010), p. 1.
8 France and Australia worked together in opposition to the Convention
on the Regulation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CRAMRA).
While some Treaty parties considered this action to be an attack on the
overall integrity of the ATS, France and Australia argued that their
decision was in no way intended to undermine the ATS, but rather built
upon, and enhanced, the existing institutional capacity of the system to
deal with environmental issues. See Richard Herr, Robert Hall, and
Marcus Haward, “Introduction – Antarctica's Future: Symbols and
Reality”, in Richard Herr, Robert Hall, and Marcus Haward (eds),
Antarctica's Future: Continuity and Change, Hobart: Australian
 Institute of International Affairs, 1990, p. 15. See also, “A Joint
Australia/French Proposal in the Form of a Paper including a Draft
Recommendation for ATCM XV – Comprehensive Measures for the
Protection of the Antarctic Environment and its Dependent and
Associated Ecosystems”, Working Paper 2, submitted by Australia and
France, ATCM XV (Paris, 9–19 October 1989), pp. 3–4.
9 The Madrid Protocol entered into force in 1998.
10 Previously the Institut Français pour la Recherche et la Technologie
(the IFRTP), the IPEV was first established in 1992, following the
merging of the research missions of the TAAF, and Les Expéditions
Polaires Françaises (the EPF).
11 A call for multi-discipline research proposals is extended by the IPEV
to the national scientific community annually. Submitted proposals are
examined and selected by the Conseil des Programmes Scientifiques et
Technologiques (CPST) annually, with proposals selected on the basis
of scientific merit and feasibility.
12 The selection of proposals follows a call for the submission of multi-
discipline scientific research proposals. Proposals are assessed by the
Conseil des Programmes Scientifiques et Technologiques (CPST), on
the basis of both scientific merit and feasibility. See www.institut-
polaire.fr/.
13 Y. Frenot, “Les auteurs francais et les regions polaires dans la presse
scientifique”, Rapport d'Activite 2008, G. Jugie. Brest: IPEV, p. 9.
14 Yves Frenot, personal communication, 19 May 2011.
15 Frenot, “Les auteurs francais et les regions polaires dans la presse
scientifique”, p. 9.
16 France's overseas Territoires (Territories) and Départements
(Departments) are those territories that are administered outside of
Europe. From a legal and administrative point of view, Départements
and Territoires are significantly different. Currently, the TAAF
comprises the only overseas Territoire of France. See Eric Pilloton,
“Le statut des Terres australes et antarctiques françaises”, in Christian
Cointat (ed.), Arctique, Antarctique, Terres Australes: Un enjeu pour
la planète, une responsabilité pour la France, Rapport d'Information
 du Sénat No. 132, Commission des Lois Groupe d'études sur
l'Arctique, l'Antarctique et les Terres Australes (25 September 2007–
2008), pp. 12–13.
17 Prior to 1955, the territories that now constitute the TAAF were
administratively attached to Madagascar. On 6 August 1955, “L'île
Saint-Paul, l'Île Amsterdam, l'Archipel Crozet, l'Archipel Kerguelen,
la Terre Adélie et les Îles Bassas da India, Europa, Glorieuses, Juan de
Nova et Tromelin” were classified as an overseas Territoire of France
(Article 1 of Loi 55–102 of 6 August). Article 2 permits the
administration of the territory from Paris, by a chef du territoire
(referred to as the administrateur supérieur), assisted by a consultative
council (provided for under Article 3). Since 2004, the TAAF has
fallen under the administration of a préfet, supported by a consultative
council comprising representatives of different ministerial
departments. The préfet has a unique role in that the position is not
only representative of the French Government, but also of the French
Territoire – being represented by a chef de district in each of the
French Southern and Antarctic districts. “Le Décret du 21 novembre
1924 rattachant les Îles Saint-Paul et Amsterdam, les archipels
Kerguelen et Crozet et la Terre Adélie au gouvernement de
Madagascar”,
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte=JORFTEXT000000299294; “Loi
nº 55–1052 du 6 Août portant statut des Terres australes et antarctiques
françaises et de l'île de Clipperton”,
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?
cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068136; “Loi nº 2007–224 du 21 février
2007 portant dispositions statutaires et institutionnelles relatives à
l'outre-mer (1), www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?
Texte=JORFTEXT000000641099; Pilloton, “Le statut des Terres
australes et antarctiques françaises”, pp. 14–15.
18 Following a recommendation made by le Comité de l'environnement
polaire in 1995, the Kerguelen, Crozet, Saint Paul, and Amsterdam
archipelagos were classified as a réserve naturelle des Terres australes
françaises (a nature reserve), by the Decree No. 2006–1211 of 3
October 2006. See www.taaf.fr/spip/spip.php?article115; and “Décret
nº 2006–1211 du 3 octobre 2006 portant création de la réserve
 naturelle des Terres australes françaises”, Journal Officiel de la
République Française (Paris, 4 October 2006).
19 Classified as a nature reserve since 1975, l'Archpiel des Glorieuses,
Juan de Nova, Bassas da India, and Europa, are situated in the
Mozambique canal; Tromelin is located in the Indian Ocean. In 2005,
these islands were transferred by decree to come under the
administrative power of the TAAF, under the authority of a préfet.
Since 2007, the Îles Éparses have constituted the fifth district of the
TAAF.
20 Eric Pilloton, “Auditions du Groupe d'études sur l'Arctique,
l'Antarctique et les Terres Australes Françaises”, in Cointat, Arctique,
Antarctique, Terres Australes, p. 27.
21 Often referred to as the Treaty of Rome (1957), before it was renamed
“The Treaty establishing the European Community”, in 1993.
22 “The Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-
European countries and territories which have special relations with
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom”, Part IV –
Association of the overseas countries and territories (Article 182),
“Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community”, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 325
(English Edition), Vol. 45 (24 December 2002), p. 111. Contrary to the
outermost regions (ORs), which constitute an integral part of the EU
(in France's case, the overseas departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe,
French Guyana, and Réunion), the overseas countries and territories
(OCTs) listed in Annex II of the Treaty are those that are not
independent, but linked to a EU member state. OCTs are not part of the
EU, even though they are part of their member state, and are therefore
exempt from the application of European Community law.
23 Formally established in 1983, the CFP is the EU's instrument for the
management of fisheries and aquaculture. The policy underwent
significant reform in 2002. Although EU member states have
transformed a large measure of their respective fisheries competence to
the European Commission (EC), Annex II of the EC Treaty states that
this transfer of competence does not apply with respect to certain
territories of the member states. See Robin R. Churchill, EEC
 Fisheries Law, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987; Robin
R. Churchill and Daniel Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010; and Ellen Hey,
Developments in International Fisheries Law, Cambridge, MA:
Kluwer Law, 1999.
24 OPESCT was established by Act No. 83–609 July 1983, following the
unanimous vote of the French Parliament. See
www.senat.fr/opesct/english.html.
25 A report conducted by Senator Gaudin on the transposition bill for the
Madrid Protocol in 2003 prompted the undertaking of this wider report
on France's Polar affairs in 2007.
26 Erik Molenaar, “CCAMLR and the Southern Ocean Fisheries”, The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 16:3 (2001), p. 490.
27 Alan Gurney, The Race to the White Continent, New York: W.W.
Norton and Company Inc., 2000, p. 35. See also Alfred Van der Essen,
“The Origin of the Antarctic System”, in Francesco Francioni and
Tullio Scovazzi (eds), International Law for Antarctica, The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 18.
28 Ibid.
29 Maria P. Casarini, “Inception of the IGY”, in Francioni and Scovazzi,
International Law for Antarctica, p. 629.
30 Van der Essen, “The Origin of the Antarctic Treaty System”, p. 17.
31 William A. Hoisington, “In the Service of the Third French Republic:
Jean Baptiste Charcot (1867–1936) and the Antarctic”, Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Society 119:3 (August 1975), p. 315.
32 Robert E. Wilson, “National Interests and Claims in the Antarctic”,
Journal of the Arctic Institute of North America 8:16 (Winter 1955), p.
17.
33 France based this claim on d'Urville's first sighting of Adélie Land in
1840, after the British Embassy questioned France's intention to stake
a territorial claim. Following France, Australia (1933), Norway (1939),
Chile (1940), and Argentina (1942 – amended 1946), made claims to
Antarctic territory. Following the exclusion of Adélie Land from the
 British claim of 1933 (under the administration of the Commonwealth
of Australia), Franco-British negotiations further defined France's
claim, with the decree of 1 April 1938 declaring the islands and
territories situated south of 60° S, between 138° and 142° East to be
under the sovereignty of France. See J.F. Da Costa, Souveraineté sur
l'Antarctique, Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence,
1958, p. 14; and Richard Bilder, “The Present Legal and Political
Situation in Antarctica”, in Jonathan Charney (ed.), The New
Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine
Pollution and the Exploitation of Antarctica, Totowa, NJ: Allanheld,
Osmun Publishers, 1982, p. 168.
34 Throughout this period, twelve nations established forty-eight research
stations. See Paul-Emile Victor, “Préface”, in Da Costa, Souveraineté
sur l'Antarctique.
35 The EPF was founded by Victor in 1947. In 1992, the EPF fused with
the research management part of the TAAF to form the Institut
Français pour la Recherche et la Technologie Polaires (IFRTP).
36 Two previous International Polar Years (IPYs) took place in 1882–
1884 and in 1932–1933.
37 Evan Luard, “Who owns the Antarctic”, Foreign Affairs 62 (Summer
1984), pp. 1175–1194.
38 Davor Vidas, “The Antarctic Treaty System in the International
Community: An Overview,” in Olav Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds),
Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the
Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996, p. 37.
39 Christopher Beeby, “The Antarctic Treaty System: Goals, Performance
and Impact”, in Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng (eds), The
Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics, London: Macmillan
Academic and Professional, 1991, p. 8. See also Lorraine Elliott,
International Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic,
Hampshire: Macmillan, p. 30.
40 James Hanessian, “The Antarctic Treaty 1959”, The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 9 (1960), p. 460. Additional states have
 acceded to the Treaty since its entry into force in 1962 – currently
there are forty-six contracting parties to the Treaty – of these, twenty-
eight countries participate as consultative parties, and the remaining
eighteen states have non-consultative status.
41 Recognising the need to protect Antarctic seals from potential over-
exploitation in the future, ATCPs negotiated the Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) in 1972. However, as
Antarctic sealing failed to commercially develop, the Convention
never entered into force. James Barnes, “The Emerging Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: An Attempt
to Meet the New Realities of Resource Exploitation in the Southern
Ocean”, in Charney, The New Nationalism and the Use of Common
Spaces, p. 243.
42 Barnes, “The Emerging Convention”, p. 248.
43 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 82.
44 Ibid.
45 The Antarctic Treaty zone of application covers the area south of 60°
South latitude, including the entire Antarctic continent, ice shelves,
and off-lying islands, but excludes the high seas.
46 The French islands of Kerguelen and Crozet geographically fall within
the Convention Area. See Mathew Howard, “The Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A Five Year
Review”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38
(1989), p. 107; and Barnes, “The Emerging Convention”, p. 265.
47 This is in spite of eight nations, including France, developing draft
agreements for a marine living resources treaty.
48 Barnes, “The Emerging Convention”, p. 243.
49 Pressure upon ATCPs to develop a marine living resources regime was
heightened due to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations that were under way throughout the
1970s. In order to protect the exclusive rights of ATCPs over marine
living resource exploitation in the Antarctic, it was imperative to both
their individual and collective interests that a Treaty covering
 Antarctic marine living resources be developed prior to the signing of
UNCLOS in 1982. Under UNCLOS (which entered into force in
1994), coastal states have sovereign rights in a 200 nautical mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending from the coastline of the
territory. This enables coastal states to exercise jurisdiction over
natural resources, as well as to undertake scientific research and
manage environmental protection in their respective EEZs. See Donald
Rothwell and Tim Stephens, “Illegal Southern Ocean Fishing and
Prompt Release: Balancing Coastal and Flag State Rights and
Interests”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53
(2004), p. 171.
50 Barnes, “The Emerging Convention”, p. 262.
51 Ibid.
52 Australia, Norway, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
53 Hereafter referred to as the Chairman's Statement.
54 Although this Statement specifically refers to the sub-Antarctic islands
over which France has jurisdiction, it also applies to other islands
within the Convention Area – South Georgia Island, the South Orkney
Islands, the South Sandwich Islands (all of which are claimed and
subjected to international dispute between the UK and Argentina),
Bouvet Island (Norway), Prince Edward and Marion Islands (South
Africa), and Heard and McDonald Islands (Australia). See “The
Statement by the Chairman of the Conference on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources,” Text of the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980), p. 23.
55 Ibid.
56 The Commission was established under Article IX of the Convention,
giving effect to the objectives and principles of the Convention set out
in Article II. See www.ccamlr.org.
57 It is necessary at this point to define what is meant by IUU fishing;
which is a term first used by CCAMLR at a 1997 Commission
Meeting. This definition is adapted from the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization's International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Adopted by
 the 24th session of the Committee of Fisheries, Rome, Italy, 26
February – 2 March 2001. Illegal fishing refers to activities conducted
by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a
State, without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its
laws and regulations. Illegal fishing also refers to activities conducted
by vessels flying the flag of States that are Parties to a regional
fisheries management organisation but operate in contravention of the
conservation and management measures adopted by that organisation,
or relevant provisions of the applicable international law. Furthermore,
illegal fishing includes the activities of vessels that are in violation of
national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken
by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management
organisation. Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities which have
not been reported (or have been misreported) to the relevant national
authority; as well as fishing activities undertaken in the area of
competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organisation
which have not been reported (or have been misreported), and are in
contravention of the reporting procedures of that organisation.
Unregulated fishing relates to fishing activities conducted in the area
of application of a regional fisheries management organisation that are
conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of
a State or fishing entity not party to that organisation. Unregulated
fishing also refers to fishing taking place in areas for which there are
no applicable conservation or management measures, and where such
fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State
responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under
international law.
58 Entering into force in February 2005. The full title of this treaty is,
“Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of
the French Republic on Cooperation in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to
the French South and Antarctic Territories (TAAF), Heard Island and
the McDonald Islands.” See “Treaty with France concerning
cooperation in maritime areas in the Southern Ocean”, Report 63:
Treaties tabled on 7 December 2004, Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra: February 2005, p. 6.
59 Under the Law of the Sea Convention, the hot pursuit of a vessel must
be broken off if a vessel enters the territorial waters of a third country
in the process, unless the consent of the coastal state is received. The
French-Australian Treaty provides “an automatic mechanism for such
consent to be received to ensure that hot pursuit may be maintained”.
Ibid.; Gail Lugten, “Net Gain or Net Loss? Australia and Southern
Ocean Fishing”, in Lorne Kriwoken, Julia Jabour, and Alan Hemmings
(eds), Looking South: Australia's Antarctic Agenda, Armadale: The
Federation Press, 2007, p. 105; and Paul Kimpton, “Current Legal
Developments – Australia”, The International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law 19 (2004), pp. 541–542.
60 “Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws between
the Government of Australia and the Government of the French
Republic in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and
Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, done at
Paris 8 January 2007,” National Interest Analysis: Category I Treaty
(February 2010), para 3.
61 Paul Murphy, Transcript of Evidence, Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties – Treaties tabled on 4 and 24 February 2010, Official
Committee Hansard, Canberra: 15 March 2010, p. 17.
62 “Agreement with France on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries
Laws”, Report 111: Review into treaties tabled on 25 November 2009,
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia,
Canberra: February 2010, p. 23. See Eric Pilloton, “la lutte contre la
pêche illicite”, in Christian Cointat, “Arctique, Antarctique, Terres
Australes”, pp. 22–24.
63 Karine Delord, Nicolas Gasco, Henri Weimerskirch, and Cristophe
Barbraud, “Seabird Mortality in the Patagonian Toothfish Longline
Fishery around Crozet and Kerguelen Islands 2001–2003”, CCAMLR
Science 12 (2005), p. 63.
64 Cleo Small, “Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: Their
Duties and Performances in Reducing Bycatch of Albatrosses and
Other Species”, Birdlife International, Cambridge: Birdlife
International, 2005, p. 35.
 “Report of the Twenty-seventh Meeting of the Scientific Committee –
65 Item 5-Incidental Mortality”, Hobart: Scientific Committee of the
Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (SC-CCAMLR-XXVII), 2008, p. 1.
66 Entering into force in 2004, ACAP is currently comprised of thirteen
member countries. Its key objectives are to coordinate international
activities in order to conserve twenty-nine different species of
albatross and petrels, and to mitigate known threats to these species.
67 “Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee”, Mar del
Plata: Advisory Committee to the Agreement on the Conservation of
Albatrosses and Petrels, 13–17 April 2010, 10.18, p. 124.
68 Ibid., p. 19.
69 Two major international events in the 1970s contributed to the rise of
Antarctic mineral resources as an issue of global prominence. First, the
discovery of traces of methane and ethane during the Deep Sea
Drilling Project in 1971–1972 heightened speculation regarding the
existence of hydrocarbons on the continental shelf. Second, the Arab
oil embargo in 1973–1974 caused oil prices to quadruple, and
prompted concerns over the future availability of petroleum resources.
70 It was at the sixth ATCM in Tokyo in 1970 that an interest in Antarctic
minerals was first formally expressed. See Christopher Joyner, “The
Antarctic Minerals Negotiating Process”, The American Journal of
International Law 81:4 (October 1987), p. 888.
71 Donald Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.
336.
72 Christopher Beeby, “The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources and its Future”, in Herr, Hall, and Haward,
Antarctica's Future, p. 47.
73 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 135.
74 ASOC coordinated the anti-CRAMRA campaign in Australia. See
Anthony Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals: The Greening of
White Australia”, Australian Journal of Political Science 26 (1991), p.
 224; Christopher Joyner and Ethel Theis, Eagle Over the Ice: The US
in the Antarctic, Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997, p.
56; and Rodney McCulloch, “Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty – The Antarctic Treaty – Antarctic Minerals
Convention – Wellington Convention – Convention on the Regulation
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities”, Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law 22 (1992), p. 214.
75 McCulloch, “Protocol on Environmental Protection”, p. 216.
76 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 170.
77 Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals”, p. 216; and Gillian
Triggs, “A Comprehensive Environmental Regime for Antarctica: A
New Way Forward”, in Herr, Hall, and Haward, Antarctica's Future, p.
103.
78 Richard Woolcott, “The Continuing International Importance of the
Antarctic Treaty”, in Julia Jabour-Green and Marcus Haward (eds),
The Antarctic: Past, Present and Future, proceedings of the conference
celebrating the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the Antarctic
Treaty 22 June 2001, the University of Tasmania, Australia, Hobart:
Antarctic Cooperative Research Centre, 2002, p. 22. See also Lee
Kimball, “Conservation and Antarctic Policy Making: The Antarctic
Conservation Agenda”, in Herr, Hall, and Haward, Antarctica's Future,
p. 87.
79 To enter into force the Convention also required the ratification of at
least sixteen of the twenty-four ATCPs at the time. In addition to
needing the ratification of the seven Antarctic claimant states, the
Convention also required the ratification of the US and the Soviet
Union to enter into force. See Joyner, “The Effectiveness of
CRAMRA”, in Stokke and Vidas, Governing the Antarctic, p. 162; and
Woolcott, “The Continuing International Importance of the Antarctic
Treaty”, p. 22.
80 Riley E. Dunlap, “The Evolution of Environmental Sociology: A Brief
History and Assessment of the American Experience”, in Michael
Redclift and Graham Woodgate (eds), The International Handbook of
 Environmental Sociology, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing,
1997, p. 29.
81 Neil Carter, The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy,
Second Edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 102.
82 Most prominent among these was when the Exxon Valdez tanker hit a
reef in Alaska, spilling eleven million US gallons (40,000 m3) of crude
oil. A spill from the Argentine ship Bahia Paraiso off the Antarctic
Peninsula also caused alarm when the ship ran aground and spilled
some 600 m3 of light fuel oil. Rocard, “Opening Address”, Paris, 9
October 1989. See also Francisco Vicuna, “The Regime of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources”, in Stokke and Vidas, Governing the
Antarctic, p. 174; and Joyner, “The Effectiveness of CRAMRA”, p.
163.
83 Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals”, p. 224.
84 Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals”, p. 227; “Conservation of
the Antarctic Environment”, document prepared by the Foundation
Cousteau and submitted to Mr François Mitterrand, President of the
French Republic (Paris, 10 June 1989). See also Drew Hutton and
Libby Connors, A History of the Australian Environmental Movement,
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 196.
85 Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 9.
86 Woolcott, “The Continuing International Importance of the Antarctic
Treaty”, p. 23.
87 Interview with Antoine Guichard, Executive Secretary of COMNAP
(October 2003–September 2009), Hobart, 20 April 2008. This
information is based on an undocumented speech presented by Prime
Minister Michel Rocard at “Soirée Polaire à la Tour Eiffel”, an event
hosted by le Cercle Polaire/la société d'Exploitation de la Tour Eiffel
(Paris: 11 February 2008).
88 Ibid.
89 Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals”, p. 226.
90 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 170.
91 Ibid.
92 McCulloch, “Protocol on Environmental Protection”, p. 216.
93 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 172. See “A Joint
Australia/French Proposal” and “Franco-Australia Draft Working
Paper on Possible Components for a Comprehensive Convention for
the Preservation and Protection of Antarctica”, Working Paper 3,
submitted by Australia and France, ATCM XV (Paris, 9–19 October
1989).
94 Joyner, “The Effectiveness of CRAMRA”, p. 153.
95 Including six legally binding Annexes governing: (Annex I)
Environmental Impact Assessment procedures, (Annex II) the
conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora, (Annex III) waste
management and disposal, (Annex IV) marine pollution, (Annex V)
area protection and management, and (Annex VI) liability arising from
environmental emergencies.
96 Article II declares members responsible for the “comprehensive
protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated
ecosystems”, designating the continent a “natural reserve, devoted to
peace and science”.
97 Joyner, “The Effectiveness of CRAMRA”, p. 167.
98 Up until 2048, the Protocol may only be amended by a consensus
agreement of all consultative parties. After this time, a conference may
be convened in order to review the provisions of the Protocol as well
as the mining prohibition. The prohibition on mineral resource
activities cannot be removed unless a binding legal regime on
Antarctic mineral resource activities is in force. See Hutton and
Connors, A History of the Australian Environmental Movement, p.
196.
99 Richard Rowe, “Antarctic Treaty: Past, Present and Future”, in Jabour-
Green and Haward, The Antarctic: Past, Present and Future, p. 12.
100Annex II relates to the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora.
101Committee on Environmental Protection, “Report of the Committee
for Environmental Protection (CEP XII)” – Part I Final Report, Item 8:
 Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora – (a) Quarantine and non-
native species, Committee on Environmental Protection (Baltimore, 6–
9 April 2009), p. 25; and, “Open-ended Intersessional Contact Group
on Non-Native Species (NNS) Report 2009–2010”, Working Paper 9,
submitted by France, ATCM XXXIII (Punta del Este, 3–7 May 2010).
102“Rules Governing the Participation of Experts in Meetings of ATCM
Bodies”, Working Paper 45, submitted by France, ATCM XXXIII
(Punta del Este, 3–7 May 2010).
103“Final Report of the Thirty-third Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Meeting”, Item 5: Operation of the Antarctic Treaty System: General
Matters, Rules governing the participation of experts in meetings of
the ATCM bodies (Punta del Este, 3–7 May 2010), pp. 28–29.
104“Report of the Committee for Environmental Protection” (CEP XIII),
Item 6: Environmental Impact Assessment – (b) Other EIA Matters,
Committee on Environmental Protection, ATCM XXXIII (Punta del
Este, 3–7 May 2010), p. 10.
105A cumulative impact is defined as “the impact of combined past,
present and reasonably foreseeable activities [including activities that]
may occur over time and space”. See “Cumulative Environmental
Impacts in Antarctica, Minimisation and Management”, proceedings of
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
Workshop on Cumulative Impacts in Antarctica (Washington DC, 18–
21 September 1996), p. 3. See also Kees Bastmeijer, The Antarctic
Environmental Protocol and its Domestic Legal Implementation –
International Environmental Law and Policy Series, The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 183; and J. Timothy Ensminger,
Lance N. McCold, and J. Warren Webb, “Environmental Impact
Assessment Under the National Environmental Protocol Act and the
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty”,
Environmental Management 24:1 (July 1999), p. 13.
106Committee on Environmental Protection, “Report of the Committee
for Environmental Protection” (CEP XI), Item 6: Environmental
Impact Assessment – (b) Other EIA matters, Kyiv (2–6 June 2008), p.
19.
107Dr Yves Frenot is the current director of the IPEV.
108Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 103.
109“The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I: An
assessment of current strategic management, polar programme
definition and processes”, Report by the European Polar Consortium
(2007), p. 19, www.europolar.org/assets/files/ESF_polarV1.pdf.
110 See, “Pôles d'excellence: les principaux instituts et organismes
européens”, in Recherche Polaire – Numéro Spécial, RTD Info –
Magazine de la Recherche Européen, Information and Communication
Unit of the European Commission's Research DG (May 2005), p. 25;
and “The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I”, p. 6.
111 “Pôles d'excellence: les principaux instituts et organismes européens”,
p. 23.
112 Norway claims Dronning Maud Land in the Antarctic, and Bouvet
Island and Peter I Island in the sub-Antarctic. The Spitsbergen Treaty
of 9 February 1920 recognises the full and absolute sovereignty of
Norway over the entire Arctic archipelago of Svalbard (Svalbard was
made part of Norway by the Svalbard Act of 1925), although the
exercise of sovereignty is subject to certain stipulations. The Treaty
allows signatory nations the right to settle on the archipelago. The UK
is not considered to be an Arctic state – geographically, politically, or
culturally. However, it is a near neighbour, with established political,
commercial, and scientific interests, and is an observer state to the
Arctic Council. The UK maintains NERC Ny-Ålesund research station
in Svalbard. See Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, pp. 14 and 38.
113 Although France has never claimed sovereignty to Arctic territory, it
has maintained a regional presence through the establishment of
scientific bases (Charles Rabot and Jean Corbel) located on the
Svalbard archipelago. The IPEV, and Germany's Alfred Wegner
Institute (AWI), merged their existing research stations into a shared
facility in 2003 – the AWIPEV Arctic Research base at Ny-Ålesund,
Spitsbergen. See “The Landscape of European Polar Research –
Volume II: European Polar capacity – an overview of research
 infrastructures in the Arctic and Antarctic”, Report by the European
Polar Consortium (2007), p. 7.
114 Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 9.
115 “Pôles d'excellence: les principaux instituts et organismes européens”,
p. 23.
116 Ibid.
117 Comments made by Gérard Jugie at a round table discussion, in
Christian Cointat, “Arctique, Antarctique, Terres Australes”, p. 44.
118 François Goulard, “Closing Speeches (iv)”, in Christian Gaudin,
“French Polar Research”, Report on France's Position with Regard to
the International Issues Surrounding Polar Research: the Case of
Antarctica, Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and
Technologic Choices, No. 230 (2006–2007), p. 201.
119 Ibid.
120The Franco-Italian agreement for Concordia was established on 9
March 1993.
121Concordia opened for routine summer operation in 1997, and
commenced year-round operation in early 2005.
122Some Antarctic stations include facilities (for example, a laboratory
building) that are funded, or partly operated, by one or more other
nations. Currently, Concordia is the only year-round station operated
as an integrated joint venture. See Patrice Godon and Nino Cucinotta,
“Concordia: A new permanent, international research support facility
high on the Antarctic ice cap”, paper presented at ISCORD 2000
(Hobart, January – February 2000), p. 1.
123Concordia was originally established as a summer camp in order to
provide support to the EPICA project. See “Nouvelles initiatives
européens” in Recherche Polaire – Numéro Spécial, RTD Info –
Magazine de la Recherche Européen, Information and Communication
Unit of the European Commission's Research DG (May 2005), p. 32;
and “Investigating Life in Extreme Environments: A European
Perspective”, Report by the European Science Foundation (2007), p.
37.
124Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 109.
125“Investigating Life in Extreme Environments: A European
Perspective”, p. 37.
126“Nouvelles initiatives européens”, p. 32.
127Established in 1995, the EPB is the European Science Foundation's
(ESF) strategic advisory committee on science policy to the Polar
regions. With twenty-five member organisations from twenty
European countries (including two non-EU member states – the
Russian Federation and Switzerland), it enables coordinated European
engagement in Polar science programmes at both the regional and
international levels, and provides advice and recommendations to the
European Commission, as well as relevant international bodies.
128The EPC is a Coordinated Action financed by the EC under framework
RTD programme 6 EUROPOLAR ERA-NET ERAC 517842. It is
comprised of twenty-seven government ministries, national funding
agencies, and national Polar RTD authorities, from nineteen European
countries, and of the ESF/EPB. See http://europolar.esf.org; and “The
Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I”, p. 19;
www.esf.org/research-areas/polar-sciences/about.html.
129“Investigating Life in Extreme Environments: A European
Perspective”, p. 2.
130The European Polar Consortium: Press Release, available at
www.essi.org/docs/EPC.pdf.
131Involving ten European nations, the EPICA programme ran from
January 1996 to December 2000. In January 2001, the project was
extended for another six years, and concluded in December 2006. See
“The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I”, p. 17.
132Kohnen Station, in Dronning Maud Land, was selected as the second
site for drilling. Drilling concluded 17 January 2006 at a depth of
2,774.15 metres. See, “Les Pôles: archives climatiques mondiales”, in
Recherche Polaire – Numéro Spécial, RTD Info – Magazine de la
Recherche Européen, Information and Communication Unit of the
European Commission's Research DG (May 2005), p. 7; and “The
Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I”, p. 10.
133“Plus d'Europe aux hautes latitudes”, in Recherche Polaire – Numéro
Spécial, RTD Info – Magazine de la Recherche Européen, Information
and Communication Unit of the European Commission's Research DG
(May 2005), p. 20.
134Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 122.
135Ibid., p. 111.
136Commenced in 2007 in time for IPY 2007/2008, CEAMARC involved
French and Australian scientists working collaboratively onboard the
Aurora Australis, in order to collect and sort benthic organisms in the
Dumont d'Urville Sea. See “Shedding Light on the Sea Floor”,
Australian Antarctic Magazine, Issue 18 (Hobart, 2010), p. 15; and
“Sorting the Catch”, Australian Antarctic Magazine, Issue 18 (Hobart,
2010), p. 18.
137Commenced in 2006, the ARENA network is a European project
approved by the EC as a Coordination Action of the Research
Infrastructure Programme activity (2006–2009). It brings together
twenty-two research partners, involving seven European nations as
well as Australia. In February 2010, the ARENA network released its
“Vision for European Astronomy and Astrophysics at the Antarctic
Station Concordia/ Dome C in the next decade”. This document
outlines the development of a long-term, future strategic plan for
astronomical research, including the establishment of an astronomical
observatory at Dome C. See http://arena.unice.fr/; Joseph Cheek,
“ARENA: Developing a New European Astronomical Observatory at
Dome C”, SciencePoles – International Polar Foundation (11 May
2010); and “Vision for European Astronomy and Astrophysics at the
Antarctic Station Concordia/Dome C in the next decade 2010–2020”,
ARENA Network Press Release (February 2010),
www.arena.ulg.ac.be/upload/PR ARENA Vision_EN.pdf.
138Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 38.
139The most recent IPY (March 2007–March 2009) was organised
through the International Council for Science (ICSU), and the World
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) continues the legacy of the
previous IPYs. See Jean Pomereau, “Beyond Oslo: Milestones,
 Perspectives, and Priorities for International Polar Research”,
SciencePoles – International Polar Foundation (13 August 2010); and
“Europe and International Polar Year 2007–2008”, European Polar
Board/European Science Foundation Report (February 2007), p. 3.
140Paul Egerton, quoted in “Europe and International Polar Year 2007–
2008”, Report by the European Science Foundation/European Polar
Board (2007/2008), p. 2.
141Richard A. Herr and H. R. Hall, “Science as Currency and the
Currency of Science”, in J. Handmer (ed.), Antarctica: Policies and
Policy Development, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies,
Australian National University, 1989, pp. 13–24.
142“The Landscape of European Polar Research – Vol I”, p. 6.
143Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 108.
Part III
Burning issues on the Antarctic
ice
10 Rallying around a flag?

On the persistent gap in scientific internationalism between

word and deed

Aant Elzinga

The price tag for participation in Antarctic research is steep in terms of

financial and technological investments. Thus there is a basic discrepancy
between the ideal of scientific internationalism and traditionally entrenched
national interests. The history of the Swedish case is used to highlight early
aspects of the gap between word and deed. Recent postcolonial
developments provide incentives for nations that have not participated
before to now probe modifications in the political and organizational
framework of Antarctic research in a new wave of change precipitated by
the end of the Cold War and the sweep of economic globalization that has
brought new forms of collaboration. A question that arises is to what extent
changing conditions associated with the new era may increase the scope of
international participation in Antarctic research, and is it possible that in
future we may see scientific stations under the banner of a collective
supranational framework (such as SCAR or the Antarctic Treaty
Secretariat)?

Waves of change regarding Antarctica and limitations on

internationalism
The current trend of multinational consortia and other forms of partnership
in Antarctica may be seen as a third wave of change. Coalitions have
formed for cost-sharing and joint use of logistic facilities. This also opens
up possibilities for the entry of further countries in Antarctic involvement as
well as broader cooperation in research and development (R&D) more
generally. As Sanjay Chaturvedi elsewhere in this volume suggests, it
comprises a paradigm shift precipitated by the end of the Cold War and the
sweep of economic globalization.
The present wave of change follows upon two earlier historical waves of
change. The first one came after the Second World War and was shaped by
conditions of the Cold War. It left its imprint on the design of the Antarctic
Treaty System (ATS – for details see Marcus Haward's chapter in this
volume). The second wave came in the 1980s when external pressures
mounted, that challenged the colonial nature of the regime. On the one hand
there was the call of Third World nations for a New Economic World Order
that strongly influenced geopolitics in the 1980s, on the other there was the
issue of environmental protection that gained urgency.
As we know the AT regime successfully met the challenge posed by two
alternative regime concepts that emerged, one hinging on the notion of the
Heritage of Mankind, the other on the idea of a World Wilderness Park.1
The changes introduced under pressure from outside as well as responses
within the ATS introduced greater flexibility. Significant were first of all a
rethinking of the science criterion as the entry ticket for non-consultative
party nations that wished to become full members, and second the taking
onboard of the principle of sustainable development in a special form
applicable to the icy continent.
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) that had all
along mantled the role of developing and coordinating international
research and increasingly provided independent advice to Treaty Parties on
scientific and environmental questions, initially through national
government delegations, was now finally, in 1987, granted observer status
and the right to attend Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs)
and to there submit information and working papers; some other Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were also granted observer status.
 Last but not least, remember, by this time Brazil and India (from 1983)
and China (from 1985) were also full Consultative Parties. Thus, some of
the earlier grounds for critique of the regime being a closed club of
predominantly rich nations were weakened.
Today, when Malaysia, the most persistent earlier critic of the ATS, has
accepted the existence of the system and is a member of SCAR, the global
situation has definitely become one characterized by Klaus Dodds as a
world where

there is not a sufficiently strong “coalition of the willing” to

fundamentally challenge a system, and its associated political
architecture, that contains most of the G8, the European Union, and
major countries in the Third World, such as China, Brazil and India. 2

Chaturvedi in the present volume discusses a further number of issues

raised by Dodds (cf. Chapter 3); in a recent paper Shirley Scott, also taking
a point of departure in Dodds' analysis presses further to argue that in its
very constitution the ATS codifies inequitable relationships historically
associated with what she calls a third wave of Antarctic imperialism. She
says that it is therefore misleading to speak of a truly postcolonial discourse
as long as this fundamental structural inequity engendered in the ATS is not
addressed head-on; failing to do so will only continue to gloss over residual
colonialism.3
In the present situation the only realistic avenue for broadening
participation in Antarctica is through incremental steps within the ATS.
Since such participation must hinge on the science criterion it is relevant to
consider how it was introduced as a political tool to restrict membership in
the system. It is also pertinent to note how the original draft statutes of the
Special Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) were watered down to
avoid any ambiguity that went against the political interests of countries
that had claims to Antarctic territories.

The creation of SCAR and its limited mandate

The Special Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR – afterwards called
the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research) was created at a
constitutional meeting in The Hague, the Netherlands in February 1958.
This followed upon an earlier meeting held in Stockholm at the request of
the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU – afterwards called the
International Council for Science) to “examine the merits of further
investigations in Antarctica, covering the entire field of science, and to
make proposals to the ICSU on the best way to achieve such a
programme”.4 Both meetings were convened by Nicolai Herlofsson, a
specialist in cosmic physics at the Royal Institute of Technology in
Stockholm,5 and in both cases invitations were sent with a call for delegates
from all twelve countries expressing a relevant interest by their active
involvement within the framework of the International Geophysical Year
(IGY). After being constituted the delegates present at The Hague meeting
went through the draft of the statutes that had been tabled and revised them.
One paragraph in particular caused considerable discussion. It went as
follows: “The Executive Committee of SCAR is responsible to ICSU for
the administration of the scientific programme defined by SCAR.” The term
“administration” was changed to “co-ordination” and the rest of the text
was carefully sanitized to avoid anything that might imply reference to
“questions of occupancy”. This information appears from the report the
Australian delegate Keith Bullen, seismologist at the University of Sydney,
left to the Australian Academy of Science.6
The changes made in the text of the draft constitution were significant
because the term “administration” might be interpreted to mean that what
research was to be done would not be a matter solely for each individual
nation to decide upon within the compass of its own national programme.
The fear was that the original formulation left the door open for an idea of
central planning, a principle associated with Soviet practices, an anathema
to advocates of the Free World. References to occupied territory, further,
would undoubtedly once again ignite earlier contradictions leading to
fruitless debates about “whose territory?” Given that some territorial claims
overlapped and that the two superpowers had made no claims for
themselves, denied the legitimacy of all existing claims and reserved their
own right to lay claims in the future, the word “occupancy” was apt to
undermine the kind of harmony needed for fostering cooperative research
ventures. Additionally, to refer to one or another nation as “occupying”
territory implies privileging some nations before others, which again goes
against the principle that science is international: explicit or implicit denial
of sovereign claims on the other hand might at worst lead to the claimant's
refusal to allow scientists from other countries to do research in their
“sector”, or the demand that they had to be authorized by the claimant
nation; whichever way, a mixing of science and politics would generate
friction that was bound to spill over into the life of scientific communities
concerned with Antarctic research. So it was found best to stick to a neutral
language.
Bullen was elected vice chairman of the Executive Committee and
played an important role in the conscious and careful delineation of the
boundary between science and politics motivated by questions of ownership
and sovereignty in Antarctica. As he expressed it, “… SCAR needs to be
more than usually thoughtful and careful on such questions … they are
questions of governments, not for scientific bodies”. It was he who
managed to get the clause regarding “administration” struck from the
constitution. Like several other delegates he was keen to keep out any
language that might later be interpreted as giving SCAR powers that would
transcend and impinge on the autonomy of individual countries and their
scientists. Probably not much argument was needed because several other
delegates from claimant countries were equally dubious when it came to
formulations that could imply a dirigisme approach to research cooperation,
one that went beyond voluntary consent and against the sovereign interests
of their home governments. With respect to the definition of tasks of special
committees for research in particular disciplines or fields there was a
discussion of the following formulation: “Special Committees may not act
as arbiter between the adhering groups. Any bilateral or multilateral
negotiations must take place directly between adhering groups (Note by
K.E.B.: It was stated that ‘groups includes countries’)”.7
The significance of the pertinent wording and Bullen's comment is that,
again, no transnational authority, decision-making processes or
organizational arrangements should be allowed that might override the
autonomy of national scientific communities or interfere with the fact that
each of these communities when doing research in Antarctica at the behest
of their own country (or some institution within it) was mandated as such
by none other than its own respective government back home. In diplomatic
terms it was a matter of finding the correct language to seal off any possible
form of transnational “dirigisme” in both nongovernmental and
intergovernmental intercourse; respect for national sovereignty forbids
interference from external powers. The existence of political, economic or
military control of science by one's own government was of course another
matter – the principle of national autonomy prevailed and the principle of
full-fledged scientific autonomy did not count here.
The common view for a long time has been that the IGY (1957/58)
represented scientific internationalism in a pure form. It was held that
politics was set to one side and science was in command. The discussion
involving SCAR's original draft constitution and how it was sanitized in a
conscious effort to manage the boundary between science and politics
suggests that far from being kept at bay, politics was sublimated in science.
Recent scholarship that makes use of previously secret Cold War archival
material, now available after the collapse of the Soviet Union, tends to
confirm this interpretation. The earlier picture is gradually being revised.8 It
is now found that there was plenty of politics at work in the course of
various events during the IGY. Political rivalry between nations during the
development of the IGY translated into scientific cooperation and
competition. The two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, were at
loggerheads with each other and initially the USA wanted to apply the
Truman Doctrine of Containment to keep the USSR out of Antarctica.
When this failed, scientific internationalism with free trade in research
information became the preferred strategy, since it entailed an open-handed
approach allowing for each country to have insight into what the others
were doing.9
The superpowers were not the only ones to use science, apart from its
capacity to advance knowledge, also for power and prestige. For the
countries concerned the mounting of stations became the means whereby
they not only pursued research but, symbolically, they also manifested their
interest in Antarctica at a political level. This is evident in the jockeying
that went on in the siting of research bases. From the outset the USA was
bent on placing a research base at the geographical South Pole.
Symbolically this was a strong political statement since it is where all
territorial claims converge. A base at this location gives its occupant a
toehold in every sector. The USSR for its part as part of its plan for the IGY
also wanted to locate a base at the South Pole, but was thwarted by the prior
move of the USA and, not to be outdone, that country's scientists took on
the challenge of establishing a base at the Pole of Inaccessibility furthest
away from all continental coastlines. This was another political statement
signifying superpower prowess.
Australian and some other countries' concern with Soviet activities in
East Antarctica also had a bearing on the siting strategy for stations in that
region. One of the reasons a Belgian latecomer participating in the
Antarctic leg of the IGY in 1958 was welcomed in the West was because it
added a “friendly nation” station on that part of the map. Afterwards, in the
Netherlands the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, an anti-communist
hardliner during the Cold War years (and president of the NATO Council in
1958) argued that his country should encourage and support the Belgian
enterprise financially and scientifically after the termination of the IGY in
order to prevent the King Baudouin station from being abandoned, which it
was feared might lead to “the Russians” taking it over.10 As it turned out
Luns was unsuccessful in his bid – but the Soviets did not move in either.11
There are many other examples of the play of politics in the preparations
for and subsequent development of the IGY.12 Elsewhere I have argued
how, since Antarctica is too cold to colonize by traditional means, the
placement of research stations may be seen as a surrogate expression of
colonialism.13 The production of scientific knowledge became an important
currency in the realm of governance. This is the essence of the science
criterion inscribed in the Antarctic Treaty that was shaped in 1959 at the
end of a conference attended by the same twelve nations that had been
invited to both the Stockholm conference in 1957 and the constitutional
meeting of SCAR in February 1958. Further nations that wanted to join the
original twelve as full members of the AT had to qualify themselves by
displaying substantial research in Antarctica. The interpretation of what this
meant was the prerogative of the consultative parties to the Treaty, a circle
of nations that grew only slowly during the first twenty years of the treaty's
existence. In practice the science criterion defined the dividing line between
those to be included, and those excluded. In other words science set the
premises for a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion in a unique international
management regime established outside the jurisdiction of the United
Nations. Legitimacy derived from a successful collective dedication of
Antarctica as a zone of peace and science.
Sweden and the “science question” in the Antarctic Treaty
A forgotten example of the constraints politics posed in the Antarctic Treaty
is the case of Sweden. Its scientists had considerable involvement in
Antarctica prior to the IGY, but since they missed out on the IGY's
Antarctic leg, that nation was never considered as a potential candidate to
be invited to the Washington negotiations. Although the Swedes largely had
themselves to blame for this, in the purported world of “disembodied”
science free of politics the situation is difficult to understand. Why were
some nations that had a previous record of good Antarctic science but for
some reason did not participate in the Antarctic leg of the IGY a priori
excluded from the AT?
Swedish polar efforts during the IGY were concentrated on Svalbard.
Nevertheless it was Swedish scientists who, partly on the basis of an
excellent earlier track record of Antarctic research, were asked to convene –
in September 1957 at Saltsjöbaden, outside Stockholm – the strategically
important meeting where the possible interest in setting up a new
international coordinating body for Antarctic research was probed. The
secretary who did much of the work of organizing this meeting was the
glaciologist Valter Schytt who also had a hand in formulating the draft
constitution. He also became the first secretary of SCAR in February
1958.14
Ambassador Bo Johnson Teutenberg, who in the early 1980s dedicated
himself to bringing Sweden back onto the road to Antarctica, has in
retrospect vented a tone of disappointment when looking back into the past.
In his speech at the workshop on the Antarctic Treaty System held at
Beardsmore Glacier in the Transatlantic Mountains, 12 January 1985 he
indicated that if Swedish politicians had been more alert in 1959 perhaps
Sweden might have found itself inside, rather than outside, the ATS from
the outset. He noted that Swedish scientific involvement in Antarctica
during the years preceding the Antarctic Treaty was such that the
international scientific parties decided to meet in Stockholm in 1957 for
discussions concerning scientific cooperation in Antarctica.15 Further,
perhaps, a more decided Swedish policy in the period preceding the
important Washington conference could have brought Sweden, with its
long-standing Antarctic and polar scientific interests, displayed by several
substantial activities, such as expeditions, into the Treaty System from its
very beginning in “some capacity or another”16; government support in
1959 to scientists to help them promote their specific interests could
perhaps have led Swedish scientific activities in another and more positive
direction as regards Antarctica and polar research in general. The
government position at the time, on the other hand, was obviously that
Sweden did not want to become a non-consultative member of the Antarctic
Treaty, particularly considering its long-standing traditional activities in
Antarctica. So the whole thing was dropped – for twenty-five years.17
When Swedish politicians in the early 1980s awakened to the fact that
important minerals negotiations concerning Antarctica were going on they
also shared the widely held (false) belief18 that the door to the “club” might
close in 1991. Therefore they moved quickly to join in the second wave of
change. The experience first encountered, when gearing up to place a
station in an area of the Ross Dependency in cooperation with New
Zealanders, is also telling for what it says about how the realpolitik, then
emanating from Washington, was still out of tune with the principle of
scientific internationalism. This story, reflecting the continuation of limits
placed on well-conceived plans for research cooperation, is taken up below.
First, however, some further words on the Swedish case in 1959 to verify
the historical grounds for Teutenberg's critical remarks and to consider what
reason his political colleagues of an earlier generation might have had not
to press the case for a Swedish presence in the Antarctic Treaty at the very
outset.
Swedish accomplishments in Antarctic research were widely recognized
in the late 1950s. It was not only Otto Nordenkjöld's historic expedition
1901–03 with two successive overwinterings at Snow Hill Island and the
loss of his expedition vessel Antarctic that stood out as a high point, nor the
rich cache of results that despite all the dramatic circumstances filled six
thick scientific volumes published in German over the years 1904–20.
There was also, fresh in mind, the Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic
Expedition of 1949–52, the results of which had already appeared in several
internationally renowned publications. Valter Schytt's recovery, analysis and
interpretation of a 100-metre ice core from the ice shelf by Maudheim
station off Dronning Maud Land (DML) was an important first. So was
Gordon de Q. Robin's work with dynamite explosives in a long chain of
snow pits for seismic soundings on a traverse across part of DML, leading
to a classic paper showing the first long profle of mountainous terrain
underneath an Antarctic ice sheet. Several other young researchers also
gained invaluable Antarctic experience.19 Schytt's pioneering glaciological
studies were well known, for example, to the specialists in the USA who
were preparing that country's glaciological programme for the IGY, since
they sought out his comments and constructive criticism on a draft of that
programme in 1956.20
The driving force behind the Maudheim expedition was the Swedish
geographer and leading international glaciologist, Hans Ahlmann, who
spent a long time planning and successfully negotiated the political
conditions and scientific composition of the tripartite enterprise.21 Fifteen
persons, researchers and support staff, collaborated fruitfully in a number of
different projects on the basis of a clear division of labour and associated
national responsibilities. Afterwards it was cited as the first truly
international expedition to the continent and an exemplar with influence on
the plans for the IGY.22
Valter Schytt became secretary of SCAR at its constitutional meeting, a
function that, at the next meeting, in St Petersburg in the summer of 1958,
was taken over by Gordon de Q. Robin since Schytt was absent on an
expedition to Spitsbergen. Subsequently Schytt asked to resign from the
position due to health problems contracted on that expedition, following
this the secretariat was permanently transferred from Stockholm to
Cambridge where it was housed at the Scott Polar Research Institute
(SPRI).
Teutenberg obviously had reason for his disappointment with what
happened in 1959. He indicated that Sweden had itself to blame, given the
lack of political will in higher echelons, but he offered no explanation. My
thesis is that Prime Minister Tage Erlander, like his labour movement
colleague Prime Minister Walter Nash in New Zealand, was a dedicated
internationalist with a great deal of faith in the United Nations. Like Nash
he probably favoured international control of Antarctica, but unlike Nash,
his country was far away from the icy continent and his government did not
have a “Ross Dependency” to be concerned about. Therefore he was never
confronted with the latter's problem of what Christopher Beeby has referred
to as having to give up a position of “purity”.23
In his position as Prime Minister since 1946 (until 1969) Erlander had a
powerful influence over the political life of his country. Also, the Secretary
General of the United Nations since 1953 (until 1961) was Dag
Hammarskjöld, a Swede who dedicated his life to that organization as a
dynamic leader and succeeded in enhancing its authority. Furthermore, Otto
Nordensjköld's Antarctic expedition, discoveries and mapping of several
areas in the Peninsula never led to a claim, nor did Swedish governments
ever present one. Argentina, on the other hand, on the basis of having one
of its citizens (José Maria Sobral) on Nordenskjöld's scientific team and
moreover sending a rescue vessel to bring them all back to civilization
(after the loss of Nordenkjöld's vessel Antarctic), did use these exploits as
one argument to boost its territorial claim. Given all the circumstances it is
understandable that Swedish politicians were reserved regarding a possible
Antarctic management regime outside the UN system. Contrariwise
negotiators creating what became the ATS probably, notwithstanding
Sweden's exceptional historical scientific record, were not inclined to
entertain special treatment regarding a nation that in Antarctic affairs had a
record of deferring to the UN. Indicators reflecting Sweden's contrarian
stance were strong.
In February 1956 the government of India made a proposal to put the
“Question of Antarctica” on the agenda of the UN General Assembly later
that year.24 This move may have been prompted by New Zealand Prime
Minister Walter Nash's suggestion in January of a UN trusteeship for the
continent. Although India, after opposition in Chile and Argentina as well
as lack of support from the UK and the USA, finally withdrew the proposal,
it is interesting to note that prominent among the nations that indicated an
interest in it one finds Sweden.25
In a now classical essay appearing shortly after the IGY, the expert on
international law, John Hanessian, expressed the following view:

India's motive, evidently, was its desire to secure international agreement

for the development of Antarctic resources for peaceful purposes, for
non-militarization of the area, the banning of nuclear weapons testing in
 Antarctica, and the reference of further disputes in the area to the
International Court.26

The perspective summarized here tallied well with that of Sweden's

ambassador in India in 1956, Alva Myrdal, a leading social democrat who
actively supported Sweden's foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment
and was a member of the Womens International League for Peace and
Freedom (WILPF). This latter organization – an NGO founded in 1915 and
taking its present name in 1919 when it moved its headquarters to Geneva
to be near the seat of the League of Nations – had on several occasions in
its history petitioned to turn Antarctica into a United Nations trusteeship (or
some other mode of political internationalization).27 The negotiators in
Washington took on board important elements in the Indian proposal but
not the alternative mode of governance associated with it and the thinking
of the women's international peace movement.

The second wave of change – the principle of mutual benefit

During the 1970s only one country was added to the original twelve
signatories as a Consultative Party, Poland. An earlier attempt by Poland to
join in 1961 on the basis of research activities prior to IGY was
unsuccessful, and Poland was put on hold until 1977 after setting up
Arctowski station on easily accessible King George Island.
In the decade that followed, from 1980 to 1990, fourteen further
countries were added as full members, with Brazil and India (1983) and
China (1985) representing an important breakthrough that defused the Third
World opposition of non-aligned nations led by Malaysia that challenged
the political legitimacy of the ATS. This development led to several
changes in the system, with greater transparency and willingness to adapt to
the new geopolitical situation while still upholding the constitutional
inequity fundamentally inscribed in the system.28 How the Netherlands
became a full member in 1990 thanks to a less rigid interpretation of the
science criterion is often taken as another turning point in cooperative
efforts. What is forgotten in citing this example, however, is that even here
it was the principle of mutual benefit that played in, not only in the fact that
the ATS could now embrace a small but leading scientific nation excelling
in marine research, but also regarding the arrangement between the
Netherlands and Poland. It was the economic crisis in Poland culminating
in 1989 – before the collapse of the former USSR and the end of the Cold
War – that had created a situation where the Poles sorely needed hard
(dollar) currency. Renting out part of their Arctowski station to the Dutch
was propitious, while for the Dutch in turn it afforded a window of
opportunity that helped them into the ATS.
Coming back to the Swedish story, earlier policy had changed and by the
early 1980s that country too wanted to become a full member of the ATS,
fearing that the door might close in 1991. Like many other nations the
Swedes had economic motives prompted by the minerals negotiations and
in addition they had high quality technology suited for cold climate and
polar conditions for which there might be a market (the Hägglund
Bandvagn all-terrain carrier, for example). A massive expedition in the
Arctic in 1980 (Ymer-80) on the occasion of the centennial of A. E.
Nordenskiöld's Vega expedition through the North-East Passage had
demonstrated that in several scientific fields there was now a very capable
new generation of researchers with strong polar interests.
Politically and scientifically Sweden was now ready to rise once more to
the Antarctic challenge. When this was decided things happened rapidly. In
1984 Sweden acceded to the AT and joined the Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources (CCAMLR). The same year
saw the creation of a Polar Research Secretariat, a public agency headed by
Anders Karlqvist as Director General. A general agreement on bilateral
scientific cooperation already existed at the highest political level between
the Swedish and New Zealand governments and now Karlqvist introduced a
creative interpretation of it in terms of exchange also within polar research.
His vision was that Sweden would base its presence in Antarctica on access
by air, an idea that turned out to be a bit premature at the time – however
nowadays it is a fact. Access to the McMurdo base via Christchurch
naturally appeared as an attractive option, an analogue to the entry of Italy
that went that route in the establishment of its Terra Nova Bay station in
1985. Sweden proposed a cooperative agreement with New Zealand that
would enable Swedish scientists to develop a base in the Ross Sea area;
Karlqvist had in mind Cap Adare as a suitable site.29 In 1986 for the first
time the national Science Bill for 1987 identified polar research as a priority
area and earmarked 30 million SEK (about US$5 million). Everything was
going smoothly until it turned out that the USA blocked the possibility of
Swedes joining their New Zealand colleagues on the Christchurch—
McMurdo air-route that had been running since Deep Freeze 1955.30 The
Americans apparently saw no benefit for their part.
Failing in his first agreement, Karlqvist soon – more or less
serendipitously – found another route, one to the opposite end of the
continent, namely Dronning Maud Land via the German Neumayer station.
This would bring Swedish scientists back to the traditional haunts of the
Maudheim expedition. The key collabor ator was Gotthilf Hempel, the head
of the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) in Bremerhaven. He saw his chance
to get Sweden to ally with Germany in order to strengthen activities on
DML where AWI had established a foothold with its Georg Neumayer
station. Thus, the first Swedish Antarctic Research Programme
(SWEDARP) expedition was made possible in 1987/88.
The Germans had invested a lot of money into building a state-of-the art
research vessel, the Polarstern, and were keen to accommodate British,
Austrian, New Zealand and other researchers on Polarstern expeditions.
Hempel actually managed to reorganize his own expedition so that the
Swedes were given a place on board for the aforementioned austral
summer. Important too was the promise that in the following year a
Swedish expedition vessel would be able to take along equipment AWI
researchers needed. Thus even here both parties stood to benefit.31 Hempel
could please his political paymasters by cutting costs, and Karlqvist was
able to send a reconnaissance team led by Olle Melander to find a suitable
place for a summer station.
By January 1988 the Swedes had placed two joined fibreglass modules
on a small nunatak in the Sharfenbergbotnen (botnen = cirque) valley in the
Heimefront Range32 several hundred kilometres from the nearest coast and
called it Svea. For the 1988/89 season, leasing a Swedish vessel, Stena
Arctica, the biggest Swedish expedition ever to Antarctica took place.
Fieldwork concentrated in two geographical areas, Western DML and the
Antarctic Peninsula. Roughly two degrees south of the of the Maudheim
expedition's landing almost forty years earlier, the Stena Arctica deposited a
lot of equipment and materials for transportation inland where construction
workers from northern Sweden built a roomy insulated wooden station on
stilts, Wasa, as their main base located on Basen nunatak in Vestfjella range
(some maps still use the German name, Kraul Mountains); in relation to
Svea it is nearer the Riiser-Larsen ice shelf. It was ready in 1989.
Thanks to the diplomatic efforts of Ambassador Teutenberg and the
Swedish Foreign Ministry a risky plan no one was really sure about actually
succeeded: the little Svea base already qualified Sweden for full
membership in the ATS at a special ATCM meeting in Paris, September
1988 – in other words well before the completion of Wasa station. The
Swedish Government immediately signed CRAMRA to be in on the
minerals regime,33 not knowing of course that two important actors,
Australia and France, would soon refuse to endorse that agreement.
The story of the Dutch experience described above, as well as the
Swedish one (both in 1959 and in the 1980s) is instructive because it
illustrates how it is not altruism and scientific internationalism that has been
a key element in the ATS. Rather national interests remain as both enabling
and constraining factors.34

A third wave of change, driven by economic globalization and

new partnerships
Economic globalization and the emphasis on entrepreneurship in science
are currently significant driving factors. Science policy analysts suggest that
with the end of the Cold War and the change from a bipolar world to the
more complex multi-centred one associated with globalization we can now
speak of a paradigmatic shift in the economics, organization and policy of
research from a Cold War period to a “globalized privatization regime”.35
Globalization involves a combination of new patterns of competition and
cooperation on the basis of regional geographic affinities and/or common
concerns among groupings of nations. For example non-Arctic states like
China, Japan, India and South Korea are linking into Arctic research
facilities on Svalbard. There exists an Asian Forum for Polar Sciences
(AFoPS) involving China, India, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea, with a
secretariat hosted by the Japanese Institute of Polar Research. Its scope also
includes the Antarctic.36
 Anne-Marie Brady, Kim Seungryeol and Sanjay Chaturvedi in their
respective chapters in this volume point out how China, Korea and India
have long-term economic interests in what is going on in polar regions and
want to mantle leadership roles in Antarctica in particular. The AFoPS is a
forum where they together with other Asian nations can mutually
harmonize some of these interests and coordinate their Arctic and Antarctic
research efforts. Since there is strength in numbers the forum affords the
countries involved a means to act in unison in a regional coordination effort
within the ATS. It may also benefit each individual nation when it comes to
future resource exploitation, in the Antarctic in the long term and in the
Arctic more immediately as sea-ice there continues to retreat. In the latter
regard, significantly, China for example is (hitherto unsuccessfully) trying
to gain observer status in the Arctic Council.
The growing trend in joint Antarctic expeditions witnessed during IPY-4
(2007–09) also seems to continue. Australia and Japan may get closer in
logistic cooperation in accessing Antarctica, and New Zealand port
authorities assisted South Korea's first-ever icebreaking vessel Araon
during its stopover for fuel and supplies in Christchurch before its mission
to Antarctica. Australia has offered India to share one of its research
stations, but India has refused this bid and opts for construction of a new
station in Larseman Hills. China is making its mark as a major player in the
construction of a new station at the top of the East Antarctic Plateau with an
eye to setting a new ice-coring record by pressing the time horizon back (at
Dome A) to one million years BP. China is also in the process of building a
new icebreaker with state-of-the-art research facilities that is expected to be
operational in 2013. This will help maximize effective expedition time in
both the Antarctic and Arctic. Further, a Chinese fixed wing aircraft is
planned to be available to Antarctic research teams by 2015 to facilitate
rapid transportation between stations and serve as a platform for aerial-
based geophysical studies. The country will also step up its efforts to study
polar environmental changes and intends to explore oil, gas and biological
resources in the two polar regions.37 Pakistan is also projecting the
upgrading of its station and the possibility of a new one to qualify for full
ATS membership; however not much has happened in the field.
In the examples just cited the quest for national power and prestige is
unmistakable (see Appendix, below). Malaysia meanwhile is coming
forward on behalf of Southeast Asia to develop polar research competence
and may one day erect a station in the long-term future. Such declarations,
however, must be assessed with caution: one has to distinguish between
lofty rhetoric and action on the ground. In some cases scientific
entrepreneurs are putting forth visions but the necessary political backing
has not materialized.
The impact of globalization and, with it, new forms of regionalization, is
very evident in Europe. With IPY-4 European countries have got together to
coordinate logistic efforts to make access to their Antarctic research stations
easier. The most prominent example of a new form of coordination is the
European Polar Consortium (EPC). It is a coordinated action financed by
the European Commission through its framework programme for research.
The consortium is composed of twenty-seven governmental ministries,
national funding agencies and national polar R&D authorities from nineteen
European countries, and the European Polar Board of the European Science
Foundation. The goal has been to facilitate long-term partnerships between
countries with large polar research programmes and those with smaller or
evolving programmes in Eastern and Central European countries. The long-
term goal is to develop what is called a “European Polar Entity”. The focus
is on both the Arctic and Antarctic.
In this connection, as a preliminary step, the Consortium has made an
inventory of all existing stations, research vessels and research aircraft
owned by various European countries.38 Besides providing a
comprehensive multinational picture of research capacities and focal points
the idea is to rationalize future use of resources in coordination and design
of European Scientific Platforms on the basis of scientific needs and
demands of the aggregated research community. It will allow operators to
plan deployment of resources in more efficient ways, slotting in researchers
in places on the basis of information and schedules that might not otherwise
be available to the individual scientists. Presently the EPC remains much of
a desktop product with little practical impact. Nevertheless, even if much of
it is rhetorical it may help move the discourse on Antarctic operations in
new directions.
The USA too has been stepping up the NSF programme for Antarctic
Infrastructure and Logistics, and special provisions are made for improving
research-coordinating networks. A recent concern is icebreaker operations.
These are critical to the continued existence of the US stations and their
associated outlying field sites. The highest-priority need in the south is to
support annual re-supply of McMurdo Station, the hub and lifeline of US
operations in Antarctica. The basic reason for its existence is to supply the
South Pole station, which means that icebreakers and a viable logistical
apparatus are vitally important. In this context a temporary solution for
improving early season access from sea by a channel into McMurdo Sound
during the past five years has been the leasing of the modern Oden II
icebreaker from Sweden to much more rapidly do the work that relatively
old-fashioned, inefficient and time-consuming US Coast Guard icebreakers
with much larger crews were finding problematic and troublesome.
Recently a couple of severe Scandinavian winters caused stoppage of
commercial shipping in the Gulf of Bothnia between Sweden and Finland.
This led to strong opposition to send the icebreaker to Antarctica the next
time round. The decision of the Swedish Maritime Administration to keep
the Oden home in the coming winter generated protests from Swedish polar
researchers who annually used the vessel in the Amundsen Sea to gather
data for climatological work on route to McMurdo Sound.39 US State
Secretary Hillary Clinton took direct contact with the Swedish Foreign
Minister Carl Bildt urging his government to extend the leasing
arrangement for the next austral summer. The New Zealand Foreign
Minister Murray McCully also sent a similar letter. In the end Sweden did
not budge from its position but chose to prioritize its regional business
interests at home much to the chagrin of the US authorities. The case
provides an interesting example of how the entry of a policy of
marketization and outsourcing of infrastructural services in an Antarctic
research programme has benefts but also increases uncertainty and
vulnerability.
The need to provide access to the ice-covered waters of Antarctica and
the Southern Ocean by a US ship outfitted to support scientific research is,
comparatively speaking, a secondary concern since it does not appear to be
the primary driver in justifying new strategic investments in US icebreaker
capabilities. This becomes clear from reading the report produced by a
panel of evaluators engaged by the Washington-based Academies of
Science (NAS) to review US policy and resources regarding the Antarctic
commitment. The panel in its report expressed worries about the
maintenance of the country's logistics lifeline on which the Antarctic
presence as a big power ultimately rests. The following statement in the
report makes clear what is at stake.

According to a representative of the Department of State assigned to

Antarctic issues, if resupply of South Pole Station is not successful and
the station were abandoned, this would jeopardize, and probably reduce,
the influence of the United States in Antarctic governance. There would
be significant consequences because abandonment of that key site would
create a vacuum in leadership and likely result in a scramble for control.
Abandoning it would be detrimental to the US position as well as to the
stability of the treaty system. To preserve the US and hence its influential
role in the Antarctic Treaty, it is paramount to maintain the three
permanent research stations and their associated active research programs
throughout the Antarctic continent.40

Reading between the lines, the statement clarifies how infrastructural

capacity and an ability to keep abreast of new logistical developments is
politically acute for nations that want to maintain a traditionally dominant
position in the current situation in a new era when they find themselves
challenged by China and a number of other players that are investing
heavily to claim leadership positions. Further, it indicates how rising costs
associated with new technologies in times of economic difficulties raises
question marks even in the USA concerning its Antarctic policy, given that
the country's supremacy in Antarctic affairs has always depended on
demonstrating its exceptional prowess in economic and scientific as well as
in diplomatic terms. US interests in Antarctica and its circumpolar oceans
when translated into foreign policy in Washington are symbiotically linked
to the existence of the ATS and perpetuating its stability.41
Globalization and privatization offer new ways of trying to preserve a
hegemonic position based less on individualism and more on suitable
partnerships through which new forms of international cooperation may be
orchestrated. The new issue that arises for smaller nations that lack
resources comparable to those of larger nations or superpowers is similar to
the one the Chinese used to criticize as a characteristic feature of
colonialism, i.e. the formation of “uneven” or “unequal agreements” where
the stronger (imperialist) partner dictated the terms. The question again is
the difference between word and deed – to what extent will the gap persist
between the language of scientific internationalism and the practice of
quasi-nationalism of the richer nations. A boost in transnationalism brings
with it a greater degree of integration in cost-sharing, logistical operations
and scientific practices. These go beyond what was possible as long as
transnational interaction was limited to coordination merely of nationally
controlled research programmes. When Australia's representative
emphasized the importance of careful wording in the shaping of SCAR's
original statutes (see above) he spoke from a position of opposition to
possible big power influence from the side of the USSR. Today Australia is
the second largest Antarctic actor itself, and like other big actors it can
readily endorse internationalism, while smaller nations or potentially large
actors like China and India that want to make their mark must carefully
weigh the pros and cons of bilateral and multilateral agreements.
Integrative efforts to overcome earlier fragmentation is helped by the
Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP),
formed in 1989 following on from several changes within the ATS (see
above). It is a nongovernmental organization that originally came out of
SCAR's Working Group on Logistics (WGL) whose tasks were taken over
by the Standing Group on Logistics and Operations (SCALOP). In 1991,
that is, three years after SCAR did, COMNAP gained observer status at the
ATCMs and began to provide its own independent advice to the AT parties.
In 2008 SCALOP was in turn abandoned as COMNAP in the context of the
new era and challenges at hand was reorganized, and became project
oriented with a more integrative focus on a coupling of managerial and
logistics tasks.
Presently COMNAP serves as an important conduit through which new
approaches to logistics may be operationally developed within the ATS.
These approaches involve facilitating and promoting international
partnerships with a multiplicity of national and private entrepreneurial
actors.42
According to a recent count the physical assets of the twenty-eight
national Antarctic programmes represented by COMNAP include a range of
aircraft, over forty vessels, around thirty Antarctic airfields, over thirty-
seven year-round stations, equipment that sustains telecommunications and
IT capabilities around the continent, and equipment required in support of
deep field operations. Human capacity involves more than 1,000 people in
the Antarctic winter and over 4,000 in austral summer time.43 With the help
of SCAR, COMNAP has established new systems to bring researchers to
East Antarctica by air to give them more rapid access to their research
laboratories there. This does away with the earlier more laborious routings
via ships and there is a double gain in valuable research time: the austral
summer working season on the continent is extended, which is attractive for
young researchers while senior scientists can more easily shuttle in and out
without being tied down for the entire season. At the same time precious
polar research vessels are relieved from logistical obligations; which in turn
gives them more cruise time for science. The new systems bring increased
transport efficiency comparable to that which Australia and New Zealand,
with their respective modes of shuttle traffic to Antarctica, have been
enjoying already for many years.
A key component in the network is DROMLAN, the Dronning Maud
Land Air Network, and an intercontinental link with shared aerial logistics
directly from Cape Town to destinations on DML available to all European
countries and members of SCAR. There are two main landing sites, blue ice
runways close to the Russian Novolazareskaja and the Norwegian Troll
stations, and from these extend a configuration of connecting fights by Twin
Otters and the like to various stations as needed, including especially
Vostok and the South Pole. Eleven countries are included: Belgium, France,
Germany, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Sweden
and the UK. DROMLAN is a vital element supporting the polar research
system, particularly its European part. Parallel to this there is the shipping
network, the Dronning Maud Land Shipment (DROMSHIP) with an ice-
strengthened freighter from Cape Town, again relieving polar research
vessels that would otherwise have to spend more time on logistical transport
operations. Still, there is a relative undercapacity to meet pressing demands
for dedicated icebreaking polar research vessels. Envisaged for the future is
the need for larger vessels of this kind plus, probably, a system of
international consortia to run them.
Another example of collaborative action is the recently started effort to
coordinate scientific and logistics activities on King George Island, an
island that is known for the proliferation of a large number of research
stations (fifteen facilities) across its territory. Ten countries are involved in a
plan to reduce duplication of activities by introducing new forms of direct
information exchange regarding their activities on the island by establishing
a database that apart from ongoing projects also includes information on
newly proposed projects, locations (with geographic coordinates) of each
project and principal investigators to contact. In the longer term this
provides a basis for identifying what logistics resources can be pooled
and/or shared or scientific tasks that may become linked and modified
across national Antarctic programmes.44
The growing practice of cost-sharing and coordination of logistic efforts
has a bearing on the internal dynamics of the ATS. The managers of
national Antarctic programmes are part of the strategic decision-making
process that in their own respective countries determines which projects
will actually receive support. The decision-making cultures in which they
are embedded differ considerably between countries, as do their national
reporting lines in each case across a range of ministries and departments. At
the same time, in their interaction with each other within the COMNAP
commonly agreed upon problems and issues tend to induce perspectives
that transcend national frameworks, as is the case in any epistemic
community.45 A priority issue today is to achieve better coordination of
vitally important search and rescue operations. Successful coordination in
this and other areas affords another layer of the building of mutual trust
among various nations within the ATS, comparable to what SCAR does in
the realm of science itself. The entry of consortia on the scene may also be
a further indicator of “regionalization” and “alliances” or alignments of
convenience involving a variety of state and private actors from various
countries. In that respect new cooperative approaches in logistics and cost-
sharing may introduce new dynamic twists within the ATS, phenomena
social scientists ought to investigate.
Another area where coherence of the ATS currently is enhanced, but also
differences occur, is of course around the issue of tourism (opportunity and
threat). Some parties to the AT have ports that are gateways for tourist
carriers and various stakeholders stand to gain from this business while
other countries that are members of the AT lack such facilities and may
therefore be inclined to take less positive positions with respect to a tourist
boom (on the challenges of tourism see further Jane Verbitsky, Chapter 11
in the present volume).
Sharing of stations – and under what flag?
In an information paper provided as NGO input to the XXIX ATCM in
Edinburgh in 2006 the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC)
reviewed the question of station sharing. The table below summarizes some
of the findings. A conclusion offered is that there is a continued prevalence
of the idea that in order to become a full Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Party (ATCP), one has to build a station to show seriousness of scientific
purpose, although formally the ATCPs have clarified that this is not
essential. As ASOC states:

The scientific mission and international scientific cooperation is

nominally at the heart of the ATS, and through SCAR the region has a
long-established scientific coordination body. It therefore seems
surprising that half a century after the adoption of this remarkable
Antarctic regime, we still see no truly international stations. The
“national sovereign approach” continues to be the principal driver of new
stations.46

Indeed it is striking that even though there are many examples of nations
sharing scientific equipment, modes of transportation and the housing of
researchers, one seldom finds a sharing of national emblems. Individual
states continue to prefer building and operating their own facilities under
their own fags. This is also apparent if one considers the new generation of
state-of-the art stations (some being necessary replacements of older
stations that have been covered and pressed down by snow) that have been
built during the last fifteen years and future ones currently projected or in
process (see the list in the Appendix table below). One important exception
is the very modern South African SANAE-IV station already put in place in
1995. It has an overcapacity of berths and therefore cost-sharing is a driving
factor behind endeavours to get other nations' scientists to use the facility.47
Another exception is the Concordia station operated jointly by France and
Italy. It is the third permanent all-year station on the Antarctic Plateau,
besides the Russian Vostok and American Amundsen-Scott bases. It is
sometimes referred to as an international station and in France initially,
there was some discussion of involving many more countries. Originally the
site developed because it was the optimal place for the first phase of deep
ice core drilling under the auspices of the European Science Foundation's
European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA – 1996–2006).48
Now that this is completed the focus has shifted to astronomy in order to
legitimate continuing investments in terms of cutting-edge science
(platforms for astronomical observation in Antarctica have in recent years
become highly relevant).
Table 10.1 Current examples of sharing stations
The following current examples of sharing stations show some of the
various modalities employed by Antarctic Treaty States as alternatives to
building a new, single-state station:
• No station – The Netherlands has been the most consistent about
following a “shared facilities” approach during the past fifteen years.
Recently it began construction of a marine laboratory to be opened
January 2013 on the site of the UK's Rothera station. The name of the
facility will probably be the Gerritsz laboratory in honour of Captain
Dirck Gerritsz Pomp who discovered the South Shetland Islands in
1598.
• Joint station – Since signing a cooperation agreement in 1993 to build
a station at Dome C, France and Italy have jointly built and are now
operating the Concordia station along with the European Space
Agency.
• Joint logistics – Finland's Aboa station is located near Sweden's Wasa
station, with the two stations sharing some logistics facilities.
• New partnership – The Law-Racovita station of Australia and
Romania (formerly Australia's Law station) provides another positive
example, which was noted in the Final Report from ATCM.
• Annexes – Germany has set up two annexes at another country's
station: Dallman Laboratory at Argentina's Jubany, and a Geodetic
Observatory at Chile's O'Higgins.
• Station transfers – There have been four instances in which British
stations that were no longer in use were transferred to other states:
These include Chile's Carvajal (transferred 1984; formerly Station T,
Adelaide); Ukraine's Verdansky (transferred 1996 – formerly Station F,
 Faraday); Chile's Canas Montalva (transferred 1986; formerly Station
V, View Point); and Uruguay's Elichiribehety (transferred 1997 –
formerly Station D, Hope Bay).
Source: ASOC (2006) ‘Station sharing in the Antarctic’, IPO94 submitted to XXIX ATCM held in
Edinburgh, 12–23 June 2006.

The shift to an astronomical focus at Concordia is interesting and

significant as a response to the more general problem faced by nations
when stations in the long run become obsolete or need somehow to be given
a new start or revitalized to justify the great expense incurred in
maintaining them. It is sometimes diffcult to generate long-term sustainable
scientific interests around stations of a kind that will keep leading scientists
involved in the effort; failing this a station may end up becoming a hollow
shell maintained for political reasons, which for a nation with self-esteem
would mean a loss of face.
However, even though scientific motives are certainly strong in the case
of Concordia, as Chavelli Sulikowski also argues in her chapter in this
volume, one cannot exclude aspects of economics and politics. With its own
limited budget France has been keen to find partners and bring in a sharing
of costs and generate new scientific agendas. Politically the involvement of
Italy – a non-claimant country – as a partner may also be interpreted as
important because Concordia lies a fair distance outside the narrow French
sector – it is located in the Australian sector about 550 km from the Russian
Vostok base. Even more telling perhaps is that on the entire continental
territory France is the only claimant country that has a station outside its
own sector. Ultimately, because of the character of the ATS, national
interests are still the drivers when it comes to the operation of research
facilities.
Otherwise what is perhaps new on the scene is that there are a number of
entrepreneurs that in some countries for various reasons seek the limelight
and appeal to their political leaders in order to promote particular agendas.
There are examples of this in Estonia and to some extent Malaysia. In the
former case an unconventional scientific entrepreneur has been pushing the
idea of setting up a research station in his country's name, but he seems to
lack the necessary political backing. In the latter case individual lobbying
has been important in developing plans for Malaysian scientific
participation in the research programmes of other countries as an alternative
model of involvement in Antarctica.
The only truly international scientific station was the one Greenpeace ran
for a while as a watchdog operation in the Ross Sea region. It existed as an
all-year base in Antarctica for a total of five years from 1987 to 1991.
Behind it lay an ambitious campaign started in 1985 to promote Antarctica
as a “World Park”, an idea that came up in 1979. No non-governmental
organization had ever set up a base in Antarctica and there were many
practical as well as political obstacles to overcome. Countries that had bases
in the region were unanimously hostile to the idea of being Greenpeace's
neighbour on the ice. Officially they made it known that they didn't want to
mount rescue missions should something go wrong, but their antagonism
also masked their reluctance to encourage outside scrutiny. Although the
Greenpeace international base existed only temporarily it probably did have
some positive impact on public opinion in terms of awareness of the need
for good ecological practice in Antarctica. One of the tasks of the over-
winterers during their year on the ice included monitoring pollution from
the neighbouring bases, the US McMurdo base and New Zealand's Scott
base, which in some respects was an eye-opener.
A new ship was purchased in 1987, a former icebreaker christened
Gondwana replacing an older Greenpeace ship as the supply vessel. On its
annual trips to the ice the Gondwana also toured bases in the region to
monitor how closely they adhered to Antarctic Treaty regulations
concerning the environmental impact of such facilities. One of the scandals
that came to light was the way discarded equipment at the McMurdo base
had traditionally been placed on the sea-ice where as the ice melted away in
the austral summer it sank to the bottom of the bay. Another practice found
at some stations was that fluid used to develop photographs in darkrooms
was routinely dumped in the snow. Focusing attention on such practices and
the lack of appropriate forms for dealing with waste disposal helped force
the treaty nations to take these matters more seriously and, as it were, clean
up their act. In the 1987/88 season Greenpeace made headlines around the
world when fifteen protesters blocked the building site for a French airstrip
at Dumont D'Urville and ultimately led to a change of French plans. Over
the years not only ASOC but also Greenpeace activists gained informal
access to ACTM meetings where they acted as environmental lobbyists in
the corridors.
In other realms one can find research facilities that are funded and
operated by a large number of nations for a common purpose and on the
basis of an agreed upon cost-sharing formulae and rules for use and time
allocation to scientists from participating countries. Examples are the
European Southern Observatory with its network of telescopes in Chile, or
the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESFR) at Grenoble in
France.49 Allan Hemmings has recently pointed out how a number of
nations active in the Antarctic are able to resolve strategic and national
security interests in space and successfully collaborate on an International
Space Station but are unable to reach the same level of internationalism in
Antarctica. Although international scientific cooperation in the region is
well developed in other ways it does not as a rule involve joint facilities.
Counting 110 current main facilities in the Antarctic treaty area he notes
how only two of these are joint stations, and both involve only two states.
Given all the official talk about the potential advantages of scientific
cooperation, shared logistics and the need to diminish the environmental
footprint the situation is a glaring anomaly that underlines the great gap
between word and deed. Hemmings' conclusion confirms the argument of
the present paper, namely that the critical factor appears to be the
unresolved situation around territorial sovereignty and consequential
jurisdiction in Antarctica. As far as it relates to stations, scientific
cooperation appears secondary to national autonomy in the selection of
locations for other reasons.50
Generally one may distinguish at least five institutional motives for a
sharing of facilities: (1) economic (cost-sharing); (2) political (increased
legitimacy); (3) logistical (cost-sharing and efficiency); (4) scientific
(increased volume and quality of research, a matter that counts very much
these days in our Audit Society when bibliometric measures are used to
assess performance as a basis for further funding); (5) environmental
(minimizing the anthropocentric footprint). All of these considerations are
relevant in Antarctic science and they interplay.51
In spite of rhetoric to the contrary it would appear that in practice the first
three motives for the sharing of facilities weigh more heavily than the last
two. The predominant aspects in sharing of facilities still appear to be
economic and political. These two, as part of a formula for mutual benefit
and pragmatism, could realistically form the basis for “internationalization”
of a more far-reaching kind in a longer-term future; given science's
dimension as a continuation of politics by other means.
However, as already noted above with regard to the question of unused
capacity in certain parts of the austral summer season, limitations in the
possibility of recruiting a sufficient number of highly qualified researchers
in one's own country also plays in, especially when it comes to smaller
nations. Thus there is also a good scientific reason for national programmes
to try to attract scientists from other nations to utilize available space and
facilities, i.e. to proactively internationalize.
Moreover, from the point of view of strict scientific criteria the
proliferation of research stations – each with its own national flagpole – on
easily accessible King George Island is not warranted; rather, it makes
better sense to reduce duplication and reconfigure activities in, for example,
three multinationally shared stations.
In principle, once the Antarctic Treaty was in place there is no reason
why, theoretically, nations might not get together to create an international
research station, one, not with a national fag, but flying the fag of SCAR,
the ATS, or say Unesco. In practice such an international station would of
course probably once again open up the issue of sovereignty, both between
and within the nations involved.52
For future research in history and social studies of polar science it is
interesting to clearly identify the factors that made possible far-reaching
collaboration in nuclear physics and astronomy but not yet found in
Antarctic science. Comparisons with the peaceful uses of atomic energy and
collaboration in astronomy are particularly instructive if one is interested in
teasing out the limits of internationalism and the institutional motives at
play behind scientific efforts. Looking into the future, since increased
participation will still have to go through the ATS, it appears evident that in
organizational terms the application of the science criterion requires further
reinterpretation in what some scholars call a postcolonial take on the issue.
The challenge is to find ways and means of broadening participation of
further countries in Antarctic research and policy-making in line with a
more robust form of internationalism.

Notes
1 For comparative characterization of the three different regimes see
Aant Elzinga, “Antarctica, the construction of a continent by and for
science”, in Elisabeth Crawford, Terry Shinn and Sverker Sörlin (eds),
Denationalizing Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1993; Suter has reviewed the role of Malaysia and highlights the
concept of the Common Heritage of Humankind – cf. Keith Suter,
Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage?, London: Zed Books,
1991.
2 Klaus Dodds, “Amongst palm trees: ruminitions on the 1957 Antarctic
Treaty”, Polar Record 46(236), 2006, pp. 1–2; Malaysian scientists
have been gaining a foothold in Antarctic research through cooperation
with scientists in the national programmes of Argentina, Australia,
India, South Korea, New Zealand, South Africa and the UK. For
SCAR's role and history in relationship to the ATCMs see David W.H.
Walton, “The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research and the
Antarctic Treaty”, in Paul Arthur Berkman, Michael Long, David W.
H. Walton and Oran R. Young (eds), Science Diplomacy: Antarctica
and the Governance of International Spaces, Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Insitution Scholarly Press, 2011, pp. 59–68.
3 Shirley V. Scott, “Ingenious or innocuous? Article IV of the Antarctic
treaty is im perialism”, The Polar Journal 1(1), 2011, pp. 51–62.
4 ICSU, Stockholm Promemorium (1957), in the Valter Schytt archive at
the Swedish Royal Academy of Science, Stockholm. See further Aant
Elzinga, “Swedish non-participation in the Antarctic leg of the IGY
1957/58”, Berichter zur Polar-und Meerforschung 560, 2007, pp. 142–
162.
5 Originally Lloyd Berkner on behalf of ICSU's Bureau of the Comité
Speciale de l'Année Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI) had
contacted Hans Ahlmann, Sweden's nestor in polar research, but he
declined, probably because he had been away from active academic
life between 1950 and 1956 when he was Swedish ambassador in
Norway. Ahlmann passed the request on to his colleague at Stockholm
University, Professor Carl-Gustaf Rossby the famous meteorologist
who headed the Swedish national IGY committee. When Rossby
 suddenly died (19 August 1957) the task fell on the shoulders of the
same committee's vice chairman, Herlofsson.
6 Keith E. Bullen, Meetings of the Special Committee for Antarctic
Research (SCAR) at the Hague, February 2–6, 1958, Archive of
Australian Academy of Science. Series MS53, Box 2, Folder 11. G/5
(1958). I am grateful to Rip Bulkeley for bringing this document to my
attention and, furthermore, sending me a copy.
7 Ibid. The note appears as such in Bullen's report.
8 See for example some chapters in Susan Barr and Cornelia Lüdecke
(eds), The History of the International Polar Years (IPYs): From Pole
to Pole, Vol. I., Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2010.
9 The argument that the USA opted for scientific cooperation and
coordination as a realpolitik in the national interest for managing the
threat posed by the possibility of Soviet bases in Antarctica is
succinctly outlined by Simone Turchetti, Simon Naylor, Karin Dean
and Martin Siegert, “On thick ice: scientific internationalism and
Antarctic affairs 1957–1980”, History and Technology 24(4), 2008, pp.
351–376. For the Chinese case see Anne-Marie Brady in the present
volume (Chapter 2). US State Department manipulations to bring
Taiwan into the IGY led to the exclusion of People's Republic of China
scientists who for their part had well-documented plans to participate.
This historical fact has for a long time been suppressed in the
(politically) sanitized account of the IGY found in the annals of
science; recently what was going on behind the unpolitical (scientific)
facade has been incisively analysed on the basis of newly accessible
archival sources – for more detail see Zuoyue Wang and Jiuchen
Zhang, “China and the International Geophysical Year”, in Roger D.
Launius, James Rodger Fleming and David H. DeVorkin (eds),
Globalizing Polar Science: Reconsidering the International Polar and
Geophysical Years, Houndmills, Basing-stoke, Hampshire, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 143–155.
10 Peter Abbink, “Antarctic policymaking and science in the Netherlands,
Belgium and Germany (1957–1990)”, Circumpolar Studies
(Groningen: University of Groningen Arctic Centre) 6, 2009, pp. 61,
77.
11 A few years later, after many difficulties, a series of joint Belgian—
Dutch expeditions (1963–66) did for a while manage to continue some
research in Antarctica but thereafter fizzled out. Between 1968 and
1970 the Belgians conducted three summer campaigns using the South
African SANAE base as a platform.
12 Christopher Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty, Wellington: New Zealand
Institute of International Affairs, 1972; M. J. Peterson, Managing the
Frozen South: The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty
System, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008; Rip Bulkeley,
“Aspects of the Soviet IGY”, Russian Journal of Earth Sciences, 10,
2008, pp. 1–17; Irina Gan, “The Soviet preparation for the IGY
Antarctic program and the Australian response: politics and science”,
2nd SCAR Workshop on History of Antarctic Research, Santiago,
Chile 21–22 September 2006, Boletín Antártico Chileno: The Chilean
Antarctic Science Magazine, Punta Arenas: INACH, 2009, pp. 60–70;
Simon Naylor, Katrina Dean, Martin Siegert and Simon Turicetti,
“Science, geopolitics and the governance of Antarctica”, Nature
Geoscience 1, 2008, pp. 143–145; and Rip Bulkeley, “The political
origins of the Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Record 46(236), 2006, pp. 9–
11.
13 Aant Elzinga, “The interplay of science and politics: the case of
Antarctica”, in Uno Svedin and Britt Hägerhäll Aniasson (eds), Society
and the Environment: A Swedish Perspective, Kluwer, Dordrecht,
1992, pp. 257–283; Aant Elzinga, “Science as the continuation of
politics by other means”, in Thomas Brante, Steve Fuller and William
Lynch (eds), Controversial Science: From Content to Contention,
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993, pp. 127–152; Aant
Elzinga, “Antarctica, the construction of a continent by and for
science”, in Elisabeth Crawford, Terry Shinn and Sverker Sorlin (eds),
Denationalizing Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1993; Aant Elzinga, “Geopolitics, science and internationalism during
and after IGY”, 2nd SCAR Workshop on History of Antarctic
Research, Santiago, Chile 21–22 September 2006, Boletín Antártico
Chileno: The Chilean Antarctic Science Magazine, Punta Arenas:
INACH, 2009, pp. 71–81; for the interesting case of how
disagreements led to a failed European attempt to realize a feasible
 plan 1970–74 for ice core drilling in Antarctica (a precursor to the
successful EPICA programme of 1995–2005), see Bernhard Stauffer,
“Early attempts for an European Antarctic science programme”,
Polarforschung 78(3), 2009, pp. 113–118.
14 Schytt was the IGU delegate to SCAR.
15 Bo Johnson Teutenberg “Some Swedish viewpoints on the Antarctic
Treaty System”, in Anders Karlqvist (ed.), Sweden and Antarctica,
Stockholm: Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, 1985, pp. 69–77.
16 Ibid., p. 70.
17 Ibid., p. 71.
18 Peter J. Beck, “Fifty years on: putting the Antarctic treaty into
historical books”, Polar Record 46(236), 2010, pp. 4–7.
19 Charles Swithenbank, Foothold on Antarctica: The First International
Expedition (1949–52) Through the Eyes of its Youngest Member,
Lewis, Sussex: The Book Guild Ltd, 1999; for the historical and
political significance of Otto Nordenskjöld's expedition to the
Antarctic Peninsula at the very beginning of the twentieth century see
Aant Elzinga, Torgny Nordin, David Turner and Urban Wråkberg
(eds), Historical and Current Perspectives on Otto Nordenskjöld's
Antarctic Expedition 1901–1903, Gothenburg: Royal Society of Arts
and Sciences in Göteborg, 2004, pp. 262–290. The history of the early
Norwegian influence is sketched in Noel D. Barrett, “Norway and the
‘winning’ of Australian Antarctica”, Polar Record 45(235), 2009, pp.
360–367.
20 Valter Schytt, Letter 28 February 1956 to Richard Hubley, found in the
Valter Schytt archive at Professor Per Holmlund's Office, Department
of Physical Geography, Stockholm University.
21 For Ahlmann's glaciological paradigm but also a critical appraisal of
real existing political and other motives that tend to be ignored but
were actually intertwined with scientific ones in the Swedish
partnership in NBSX, see Lisbeth Lewander, “Swedish polar policies
from the first International Polar Year to the present”, in Launius,
Fleming and DeVorkin, Globalizing Polar Science, pp. 107–122.
 An example is A. P. Crary who was in charge of the overland traverse
22 programme and the second in command of the US scientific effort in
Antarctica – Albert P. Crary, “The Antarctic”, Scientific American
207(3), 1962, pp. 60–73.
23 Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty, p. 11; cf. F. M. Auburn, The Ross
Dependency, The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1972; for a review of
changes in New Zealand's interest in Antarctica in historical
perspective from past to present, see Anne-Marie Brady in Chapter 8
in this volume.
24 Adrian Howkins, “Defending polar empire: opposition to India's
proposal to raise the ‘Antarctic Question’ at the United Nations in
1956”, Polar Record 44(228), 2010, pp. 35–44.
25 John Hanessian, “The Antarctic Treaty 1959”, The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 9, 1960, pp. 436–480.
26 Ibid., p. 451.
27 Ibid.; Bulkeley, “The political origins of the Antarctic Treaty”. For her
tireless work in the UN system towards disarmament and world peace,
later, Alva Myrdal was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982.
28 See Scott, op. cit. in note 3 above.
29 Anders Karlqvist, personal communication.
30 On the history of the Christchurch—McMurdo airlink and its
importance for both New Zealand and the USA see Tony Phillips,
Gateway to the Ice: Christchurch International Airport – Antarctic
Link from 1955, Christchurch: Christchurch International Airport Ltd,
2001.
31 It was a kind of gentlemen's agreement – no monetary transactions
were involved, it was purely a matter of an exchange in terms of
services rendered. Dutch researchers later participated in several
Scandinavian expeditions (early 1990s) in an exchange whereby they
bought a track-vehicle (BV) from Hägglunds and put it at their hosts'
disposal. Olle Melander, personal communication.
32 The politics of naming in this part of DML is interesting. After the
Maudheim expedition Norwegian cartographers in certain cases
 replaced names that had been introduced by the German
Schwabenland expedition of 1939; new names put on nunataks and
passes in some cases also associated with those of heroes in the
Norwegian wartime resistance movement (Heimefront) against the
Nazi-German occupation of Norway.
33 Together with eight other nations Sweden was among the first batch of
nine signatories that came in on 25 November 1988. In 1989 another
ten signatories joined, with Japan as the last one on 22 November
1989.
34 On the discriminatory gatekeeping character of the science criterion
discussed in the CRAMRA context see Francesco Francioni,
“Resource sharing in Antarctic: for what benefit?”, European Journal
of International Law 1(1), 1990, pp. 258–268.
35 Philipp Mirowski and Esther Mirjam Sent, “The commercialization of
science and the response of STS”, in Edward Hackett, Olga
Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch et al. (eds), The Handbook of Science
and Technology Studies, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Third Edn,
2007, pp. 635–689; also see Aant Elzinga and Andrew Jamison,
“Changing policy agendas in science and technology”, in Sheila
Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James Petersen and Trevor Pinch (eds),
The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, London: Sage,
Revised Edn, 1995; for a games theory approach invoking the “theory
of coalitions” to explain emergent cooperative arrangements in the
face of external threats (outsiders/insiders problem) to a “commons”
see Urs Luterbacher, “International cooperation: the problem of the
commons and the special case of the Antarctic region”, Synthese 100,
1994, pp. 413–440.
36 For an account of the AFoPS and the activities of its members during
IPY-4 see Igor Krupnik, Ian Allison, Robin Bell et al. (eds),
Understanding Polar Challenges: International Polar Year 2007–
2008. Summary of the IPY Joint Committee, Canadian Circumpolar
Institute, University of Alberta: CCI Press, 2011, Part V, Chapter 5.3:
“Engaging Asian Nations in IPY: Asian Forum for Polar Sciences
(AFoPS)”, pp. 553–574.
37 Nature.com Newsblog, 27 June 2011,
http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/06/china_plans_new_icebreaker.ht
ml, accessed 7 July 2011.
38 An extensive inventory and European strategy discussion may be
found in European Polar Consortium, The Landscape of European
Polar Research, Vol. II, European Polar Capacity – An Overview of
Research Infrastructures in the Arctic and Antarctic (EPC Report,
2007). This is a review of European research infrastructures in the
Arctic and Antarctic with details regarding ninety-eight stations,
seventy-one airstrips, thirty-two icegoing vessels, twenty-six aircraft
and nine databases, as well as the landscape of cooperation including
that with non-European nations. The new European Space Agency's
Earth Explorer CryoSat-2 satellite is also an important resource in this
context.
39 Göran Björck, Elisabeth Abrahamsson et al., 11 July 2011, “Låt Oden
vara!” (Let Oden be!), Göteborgs-Posten, p. 27 (debate article signed
by ten scientists), www.gp.se/nyheter/debatt/1.672518-lat-oden-vara-,
accessed 16 July 2012.
40 National Academies of Science (NAS), Polar Icebreakers in a
Changing World; An Assessment of the US Needs, Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2007, p. 23.
41 Christopher C. Joyner, “United States foreign policy interests in the
Antarctic”, The Polar Journal 1(1), 2011, pp. 17–35.
42 For COMNAP and its present role of “facilitating and promoting
international partnerships” see José Retamales and Michelle Rogan-
Finnmore, “The role of the Council of Antarctic Managers of National
Antarctic Programs”, in Berkman, Long, Walton and Young, Science
Diplomacy, pp. 231–240. Also in that same volume see John Thiede,
“Modern research in the polar regions”, pp. 161–164.
43 Retamales and Rogan-Finnmore (cited in note 42 above), pp. 234–235.
44 Ibid., p. 236; Allan D. Hemmings, “Why did we get an International
Space Station before an International Antarctic Station?”, The Polar
Journal 1(1), 2011, pp. 5–16.
45 The notion of “epistemic community” is defined by Peter M. Haas as a
network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue area. In other words it is a
transnational network of knowledge-based experts who help decision-
makers define the problems they face, and hence influence both
concepts and perspectives among policy-makers, all the more so since
the experts are also the ones who define appropriate policy solutions
and evaluate their outcomes. The classical reference is Peter Haas,
“Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy
coordination”, International Organization 41(6), 1992, pp. 1–35.
46 ASOC – Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, Station Sharing in
Antarctica. Information Paper 94 (2006), submitted to XXIX ATCM
(Edinburgh 12–13 June 2006).
47 A certain degree of overcapacity is not uncommon at most stations
(with the exception of the South Pole station and a small number of
others) if one considers the entire austral summer season as a whole,
while on the other hand within this timeframe there tends to be a peak
with many visits, a pattern that has to do with time constraints often
imposed, say, in the normal course of an academic year.
48 The other, the second leg of EPICA was located at the German Kohnen
station on Amundsenisen, Dronning Maud Land. For the lead role of
France in EPICA at the Dome C site see Chavelli Sulikowski (Chapter
9) in this volume who also discusses the signifcance of partnerships
formed.
49 The European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) is an
international research institution for cutting-edge research with
photons to study the complex structure and dynamics of matter. It
involves nineteen countries. As a research cooperative regime it is
based on a convention to which are appended four annexes. Located in
Grenoble (France), the ESRF was the first of the third-generation hard
x-ray sources to operate, coming on line for experiments by users with
a 6-GeV storage ring and a partial complement of commissioned
beamlines in 1994.
50 Hemmings, “Why did we get an International Space Station before an
International Antarctic Station?,” pp. 5–16.
51 For the concept “institutional motives” see Aant Elzinga, Changing
Trends in Antarctic Research, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1993, Chapter 1.
52 The politics surrounding the creation of the Antarctic Treaty
Secretariat and its powers is perhaps symptomatic of some of the
difficulties. Jan Huber, after finishing his term of office as secretary,
has described some of the legal sticky points, among others the one of
jurisdiction and the fact that the Secretariat has in a sense hung in
limbo in periods between the ATCMs because Consultative Parties
wish to prevent it from gaining a form of permanency or autonomy
that might interfere with the sovereign powers of individual
governments. See Johannes Huber, “Notes on the past, present and
future of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat”, Diplomacia (Santiago de
Chile), 120, 2009, pp. 35–43. The need for the Secretariat to operate in
all member states rather than just the host state was emphasized by
some scholars all along, e.g. Karen Scott, “Institutional developments
within the Antarctic Treaty System”, International Comparative Law
Quarterly 52, 2003, pp. 473–487.
11 Titanic Part II?

Tourism, uncertainty, and insecurity in

Antarctica
Verbitsky Jane

On 14 April 1912 the SS Titanic, pride of the White Star Line, struck an
iceberg on her maiden voyage from Southampton to New York. The
‘unsinkable’ ship sank rapidly beneath the icy waters off the Newfoundland
coast with the loss of 1,522 passengers and crew.1 Today, the Titanic is
remembered not just as one of the most luxurious ships ever built, but as a
symbol of human folly and arrogance, of mistaken belief in mastery of the
natural environment, and of the tragic consequences of negligence and
disregard for safety procedures and security protocols. Despite this, nearly
one hundred years after the Titanic sinking, the lessons learned from the
disaster have yet to be properly applied to Antarctic tourism. Given the
exponential growth of tourism in the fifth largest continent, perhaps the
most pertinent question that can be asked is not “Could there be a disaster
of Titanic proportions in the Antarctic?”, but “When will there be a disaster
of Titanic proportions in the Antarctic?”.
This chapter argues that the extraordinary growth of Antarctic tourism
since the 1980s, coupled with insufficient planning for, and regulation of,
tourism by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) over the last
two decades has created a situation whereby tourism has become a time
bomb issue for the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Antarctica's non-
sovereign status, the lack of authoritative governance institutions under the
ATS, ATCPs emphasis on consensus decision-making, differing views
among the Consultative Parties about tourism issues, and the position of
Antarctica in the international system as a commons area mean that
achieving a set of conclusive and binding outcomes in relation to tourism is
extremely difficult. However, without legal intervention and rigorous
assessment, management, and monitoring, tourism is likely not only to
become a source of increasing harm to the Antarctic environment, but itself
to become an ever more hazardous undertaking in the Antarctic and its
environs. The most appropriate response to these threats is the
establishment of a multilateral Antarctic tourist convention, sponsored by
the ATCPs and intended to become an integral part of the ATS, that lays out
a clear framework of prescriptions and proscriptions for both public and
private operators involved in the tourist industry and applies to as wide a
range of actors as possible in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.

Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty

Sustained human contact with the world's fifth largest continent began only
recently. While Antarctica had long fascinated the imagination of
adventurers, the difficulties of travelling to the southern polar regions, the
extreme nature of the environment, and the sheer difficulty of maintaining
human life on the continent limited interaction until the nineteenth century
to sporadic voyages by explorers, and irregular visitations by sealers and
whalers. In the mid-nineteenth century, though, the first national
expeditions were arranged and the ‘heroic’ age of Antarctic exploration was
ushered in.2 Roald Amundsen's feat in successfully reaching the South Pole
in December 1911 was matched by later explorers, but it was not until the
1940s that the first permanent research bases were set up in the continent.
These bases were visible manifestations of the rash of sovereign territorial
claims which had been made in twentieth century Antarctica by seven
states: Argentina (1943), Australia (1933), Chile (1940), France (1924),
New Zealand (1923), Norway (1939), and the United Kingdom (1908 and
1917).3
Increasingly, political and scientific attention began to be paid to the
continent. This intensified during the 1957–58 International Geophysical
Year (IGY) when, over a period of eighteen months, twelve states
cooperated on a series of scientific research projects. The success of these
collaborative projects under the aegis of the IGY helped motivate the
creation of the Antarctic Treaty,4 a multilateral treaty whose original
signatories were the seven Antarctic claimant states, plus five others who
had also participated in Antarctic projects during the IGY.
The Treaty is an extraordinary document in many respects, not least
because it was created during the Cold War, at a time of great tension
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Negotiation of the Treaty
took place in 1959, the same year in which Fidel Castro successfully led an
armed revolt to take power in Cuba, and the Treaty came into force in the
year in which the Berlin Wall was erected. Despite this background, the
twelve original signatories established a treaty that became the first arms
control agreement of the nuclear age, and a landmark instrument in
denoting a former ‘terra nullius’ as an area to be used for the common
benefit of humankind. Its other remarkable feature is that the assertions of
sovereignty over Antarctica made by the seven claimant states are placed in
abeyance for the duration of the Treaty. Additionally, under the terms of
Article IV(2), no new claims to sovereignty or enlargement of an existing
claim may be made while the Treaty is in force. To all intents and purposes,
the Treaty ‘freezes’ existing claims and prevents new claims being made in
Antarctica.
That tourism was not anticipated to become a core industry in the
continent is evident from the text of the Antarctic Treaty. Building on the
success of the IGY, the Treaty prioritized the importance of scientific
research, and dissemination of the results of that research for the benefit of
humanity. The preamble to the Treaty thus emphasizes “the substantial
contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international
cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica”.5 The primacy of
scientific research in Antarctica is confirmed in Article II which notes that
the scientific investigation and cooperation that occurred during the
International Geophysical Year should continue within the parameters of the
Treaty, while Article III lays out the practical framework for achievement of
these objectives. Underscoring the common importance of scientific
research in the territory, the Treaty specifies that Antarctica is to “be used
for peaceful purposes only”.6 Consequently, military installations,
manoeuvres, and weapons testing are absolutely prohibited in Antarctica, as
are nuclear explosions and disposal in the continent (defined in Article VI
as the “area south of 60 ° South Latitude”7) of radioactive waste material.8
To ensure transparency, accountability, and adherence among signatories
to the terms of the Treaty, Article VII provides that Contracting Parties who
are also eligible to attend Consultative Meetings have the right to designate
observers to carry out inspections and “have complete freedom of access at
any time to any or all areas of Antarctica”.9 Additionally, stations,
equipment and installations in Antarctica, and ships and aircraft at
embarkation and disembarkation points are also required to be “open at all
times to inspection”10 by such observers. Aerial observation is also
permitted to be carried out at any time over any part of Antarctica by
designated observers.11
Supplementing the inspection rights are the information-sharing
provisions of Article VII. These require that Contracting Parties give
advance notice to each other of “all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on
the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized
in or proceeding from its territory”,12 as well as details of Antarctic stations
occupied by its own nationals, and any military personnel or equipment that
parties wish to bring to Antarctica.
The Treaty, then, is grounded in the assumption that scientific research
will henceforth be the focus of Contracting Parties' attention and investment
in the Antarctic, and that observers, scientists, and ancillary service and
support staff (occasionally supplemented by military personnel seconded to
duties at the national scientific research bases), will form the core
workforce in the Antarctic. Large-scale Antarctic tourism was not a
foreseeable phenomenon at that time; hence the words “tourism” or
“tourist” do not appear anywhere in the Treaty.

The growth of Antarctic tourism

However, although tourism is nowhere mentioned in the text of the
Antarctic Treaty, it rapidly became one of the two activities most commonly
associated with the continent, and from 1966 it appeared regularly on the
agenda of the ATCMs as an issue requiring both attention and action.13
Organized tourist activities in the Antarctic were, in fact, occurring before
the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. The first commercial fight to visit
Antarctica occurred in 1956 when a Linea Aerea Nacional plane overflew
the South Shetland Islands and Trinity Peninsula, and was followed a year
later by a Pan American Airways cruiser which landed at McMurdo
Sound.14 By 1966 cruises had become a regular feature of the Antarctic
tourist industry.15 Combining both elements, Fly-Sail or Fly/Cruise
operations (where tourists arrive in the Antarctic by aircraft, then undertake
excursions by yacht or cruiser) began during the 2004 season.16
Tourist numbers from the 1950s through the 1970s were very limited
with fewer than 1,000 tourists per year visiting Antarctica.17 From the mid-
1980s onward, though, annual tourist numbers began to climb and by 1992–
93 had risen to 6,704. The figures progressed upward, reaching 12,248 sea-
and land-based tourists in 2000–01, 19,771 landed tourists in 2003–04, and
40,069 during the 2007–08 season. However, the last three austral summer
seasons have coincided with a global recession and, as with tourism in other
destinations, Antarctic tourist numbers declined over this period. The
number of landed tourists in Antarctic dropped from 37,568 in 2008–09 to
36,875 in 2009–10. The numbers reduced again in the most recent season
(2010–11) to 33,824.18 However, despite the recent drop in Antarctic
tourism, numbers are likely to rise again as the tourism consumer market
increases in emerging economies and as the global tourism market recovers
from the recession.19 The general trend, as the Antarctic and Southern
Ocean Coalition (ASOC) noted in 2008, has been continuing “increase of
tourism resulting in tourist numbers doubling every few years – currently
about five years”.20 Over the last three decades, globalization has been a
major driver of tourism in the Antarctic. This has combined with greater
global consciousness of environmental degradation, particularly of the
dwindling number of wilderness and ‘untouched’ areas in the world. As
more traditional destinations have become mass market holiday spots,
appetites have been fuelled among tourism consumers both for unorthodox
or unusual tourism locations, and for eco-tourism experiences. These
factors coincided with technological advances enabling more ice-
strengthened ships to be built, and with the post-Cold War release of former
Soviet ice-breakers and ice-strengthened vessels on to the free market.21
Not only are there now more ships that can cope with Antarctic conditions,
but the number of ships with capacity to carry a large number of tourist
passengers into Antarctic waters has increased significantly. The largest
ships to visit Antarctica, the Princess Cruise Line's 109,000-ton Golden
Princess and Star Princess, each carried more than 3,500 passengers and
crew.22
Global warming has also played a part in the rise of Antarctic tourism,
lengthening the tourist season in the continent. In 2000 the Lonely Planet:
Antarctica guidebook advised would-be tourists that the “Antarctic tour
season is short – about four months”, from November to February.23
However, by 2008 the guidebook was advising that the tourist season
covered a five-month period from November to March.24 In addition to
cruise ships being able to carry more tourists to the Antarctic, climate
change has enabled ships to navigate the waters of the Southern Ocean for
an extended period of time, pushing up the total number of landed sea-
borne tourists in Antarctica each year.25
Tourism has not only expanded vertically, however. Horizontal expansion
has been facilitated by the increased range of activities in which Antarctic
tourists are now engaged. These include mountaineering, kayaking,
trekking, skiing, ballooning, skydiving,26 marathons, and long-distance
swimming,27 as well as more traditional activities such as photography,
guided tours of selected sites, visits to scientific research stations, and
observation of indigenous wildlife, fora, and fauna. The growth in tourism
has also triggered a concomitant increase in the number of non-
governmental or private operators engaged in Antarctic tourism. In 1991
seven Antarctic tour operators formed the International Association of
Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO). By 2010 more than 100 companies
from 14 different countries had joined the industry group,28 and IAATO
operators were responsible for landing 26,933 passengers from 53 vessels
during the 2008–09 Antarctic tourist season.29
While little research has been done on determining the contemporary
value of tourism to the Antarctic economy, some idea of its current worth
can be gauged from a study of the market value of the Antarctic tourism
industry, estimated to be US$44–55 million for the 1996–97 season when
there were 7,322 landed cruise passengers.30 In the 2008–09 season the
number of landed cruise passengers was close to 27,000, an increase of
more than 350 per cent.
This growth in demand for Antarctic experiences is expected to continue
long-term. Lamers, Haase, and Amelung note that there is anticipated to be
an increase not only in the main Antarctic tourist markets of North
America, Europe, and Australia, but also in Russia, China, India and other
developing and transitional economy states.31
Tourism is, thus, not only a significant contributor to the Antarctic
economy, but is likely to become greater as the years pass. Economic
benefits, though, are not the only ones engendered by tourism. Indeed, the
way in which tourism can be used as a tool for conservation and support of
protected areas has received attention from a number of authors.32 Bushell
and McCool note that, among other things, tourism can: provide support for
protected areas; support sustainable use of the natural heritage; link practice
to conventions and guideline; foster attachment to heritage; encourage a
stewardship ethic among the public; work with local stakeholders and
industry; work to support local community development; and contribute to
civil society, respect for others, and for heritage.33 Antarctic tourism has
also been credited with providing assistance for various scientific research
stations by transporting people and materials down to the continent on
commercial cruise ships, and with motivating the cleanup of notoriously
polluted research stations.34

Antarctic tourism: problems and issues

Unfortunately, not all tourism in Antarctica provides such positive results.
Concern has been increasingly voiced about the negative impacts of tourism
on the Antarctic environment. So, too, have concerns about the problems
that can be caused by tourist vessels in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic
waters. The potential threats include: contamination by tourists of sites not
yet investigated by scientists; introduction of non-indigenous animals,
plants, or microorganisms; disruption of wildlife breeding cycles; pollution
from tourist vessels; degradation of sites caused by repeated tourist visits;
increased likelihood of maritime and aviation emergencies in the region due
to increased traffic; environmental hazards arising from accidents on land,
sea, or air in the Antarctic region; and pressures to establish permanent
land-based tourist facilities.35
One of the key issues for tourism in Antarctica is the cumulative impacts
of human contact with the environment, also known as the “nibbling effect”
or “destruction by insignificant increments”.36 The overwhelming majority
(approximately 85 per cent) of tourists visit Antarctica's top twenty landing
sites, all of them situated along the Antarctic Peninsula.37 This raises
obvious questions about how much contact and carrying capacity the sites
can sustain before they become subject to unacceptable deterioration. On a
continent dedicated to scientific research for the benefit of humankind, the
deleterious impacts of tourism represent a significant challenge to
realization of this Treaty objective.
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is the founding document and hub of a
series of legal instruments which collectively make up the Antarctic Treaty
System. These include the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals 1972,38 the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources 1980 (CCAMLR),39 the Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 1988 (CRAMRA),40 and the
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991
(PEPAT).41 Antarctic tourism, therefore, does not take place in a vacuum.
According to the provisions of PEPAT, “activities in the Antarctic Treaty
area shall be planned and conducted so as to limit adverse impacts on the
Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems”.42 To
reinforce this, the Protocol requires that a system of prior assessment of the
impacts of activities on the environment (Environmental Impact
Assessment) be conducted according to whether the impacts are identified
as having “less than a minor or transitory impact”, “a minor or transitory
impact”, or “more than a minor or transitory impact”.43 If an activity is
deemed to have less than a minor or transitory impact then it “may proceed
forthwith”.44 Otherwise, an Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) must be
prepared. If an IEE indicates that the activity will have more than a minor
or transitory impact, then a Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation
(CEE) is required to be prepared.
 Comprehensive Environmental Evaluations trigger a process whereby
their drafts are circulated to all Parties and made publicly available for
comment during a 90-day period. Simultaneously, they are also sent to the
Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) with a strict time criterion
of ensuring that this is done within a minimum of 120 days before the next
ATCM meeting.45 The ATCM considers together the draft CEE and advice
from the CEP. If approved, a final CEE is prepared, circulated to the Parties,
and made publicly available a minimum of 60 days before the activity takes
place.46
In addition to the annex dealing with environmental impact assessments,
PEPAT also contains annexes covering waste disposal and waste
management, area protection and management, and liability for
environmental emergencies. Annex V (Area Protection and Management),
for instance, enables the designation of specific parts of Antarctica as
Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest, while
Annex VI (Liability Arising From Environmental Emergencies) requires
operators to take preventative measures to reduce the risk of environmental
emergencies and to put in place contingency plans “for responses to
incidents with potential adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment or
dependent and associated ecosystems”.47
The ATCPs, via the ATCMs, have also created their own regulations and
guidelines for tourists and expedition organizers to supplement PEPAT.
According to the ATS Secretariat, two key sets of provisions are contained
in

the Environment Protocol and Tourism Guidelines attached to

Recommendation XVIII-1 (1994)… supplemented in 2004 with
guidelines on contingency planning, insurance and other matters…. The
ATCM also issues specific guidelines for the sites most visited by
tourists. They include practical guidance for tour operators and guides on
how they should conduct visits in those sites, taking into account their
environmental values.48

IAATO, too, has constructed by-laws49 regulating tourism for their own
members, and affirms its commitment to the Antarctic Treaty and ATS,
including PEPAT. Its website displays the ATCM guidelines referred to
above for tourists and tour operators, and templates for reporting
procedures. Members are required to adhere to these instruments, and to
follow the procedures laid down by the Protocol and the ATCMs.
However, while there exists a basic framework of regulation for Antarctic
tourism, that framework is skeletal at best, and many aspects of tourism are
simply not addressed and managed, or are not legally binding and
enforceable. Nor are some of the central parts of that framework
implemented evenly and rigorously. For instance, significant critiques of the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process have been made,
suggesting that the procedures are not sufficiently robust in design or
implementation.50 Criticism has also focused on the lack of investigation
within the EIA process of cumulative impacts. And, as Joyner has stated,
“… the ultimate arbiter of what will be done on the continent belongs to
individual national governments. A government can proceed as it wishes,
and this procedure contradicts what should be a comprehensive
approach.”51 The incompleteness of the framework means that there are
gaps in Antarctic tourist regulation which leave the current state of
operations vulnerable and open to abuse or mishap.

Enduring difficulties in Antarctic tourism policy and regulation

There are a number of factors that contribute to this situation, but the key
one is sovereignty. Because the Treaty prevents sovereign claims upon the
territory being pursued, no state signatory has been able to have its claim
recognized in international law. Consequently, there is no sovereign
government in Antarctica. What exists, instead, is a system of governance
based upon the Antarctic Treaty and the other instruments making up the
Antarctic Treaty System. While there is no authoritative set of
governmental institutions able to make and implement legislation for
Antarctica, the governance structures and procedures that have evolved
under the ATS have, through a process of consensus decision-making and
voluntary agreement among the signatories, been able to create a set of
policy regimes52 covering various aspects of Antarctic life.
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty established a system of regular
information sharing and consultative meetings among signatories, and these
meetings form the core decision-making infrastructure for Antarctica. The
consultative meetings provide an opportunity for participants to formulate,
consider, and recommend to their governments “measures in furtherance of
the principles and objectives of the Treaty”.53 To be able to participate and
vote at the consultative meetings, though, signatory states must fall into one
of two categories. They must be either an original Contracting Party (i.e.
one of the twelve states that signed the Treaty in 1959), or a state that
acceded subsequently to the Treaty and has demonstrated interest in
Antarctica. For this latter group of states interest has, according to Article
IX(2), to be demonstrated by “conducting substantial scientific research
activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the
dispatch of a scientific expedition”. Absent this demonstration of interest,
states which have acceded to the Treaty are only able to attend the
consultative meetings as observers, and have no voting rights.
The importance of the Consultative Meetings lies not just in the
information-sharing exercises but, especially, in the ability for states to be
able to contribute to formulation of a Measure that will be recommended to
all signatory governments. It is through the Measures mechanism that much
of the day to day, practical governance of Antarctica is worked out.
Signatory states that implement the Measures agreed upon at consultative
meetings introduce legislation or regulations in their own countries that are
binding upon their nationals. Thus, when nationals of a signatory state
travel to Antarctica they are captured by a Measure that was initiated in an
ATCM but which is given legal effect by their own state.
However, the effectiveness of the Measures is limited by the fact that
signatory states are not required to implement the Measures, but merely
recommended to do so. It is up to a state to decide whether to follow the
recommendation. Political will thus becomes an important feature in
consideration of whether a state will implement a Measure. Similarly,
enforcement of the Measures is dependent upon the actions of each
signatory state. Some states are more vigilant than others in requiring
adherence of their nationals to the Measures; some interpret the Measures
selectively or in a manner that coincides with their national interests.
Furthermore, even if all signatory states decided to follow an ATCM
recommended Measure, it would still leave most countries outside the
policy framework as only 50 of the approximately 19554 states in the world
are signatories to the Antarctic Treaty.
 Another factor that limits the effectiveness of the tourism policy
framework is that the tourists who visit Antarctica cannot be guaranteed to
be nationals of signatory states. Neither can the tourism operations staff or
the company owners. As well, the companies organizing Antarctic tourism
may not be registered in the state of an Antarctic Treaty signatory, and the
vessels that they operate may be fagged to a non-signatory state. Potentially,
then, a significant number of the tourists, industry personnel, companies,
and vessels involved in Antarctic tourism may fall outside the ATS extant
policy framework, particularly as the tourism industry becomes larger.
Industry self-regulation as established by IAATO, though helpful, cannot
close the gaps in the policy framework. While IAATO maintains it is “an
industry group that has resolved to set the highest possible tourism
operating standards in its effort to protect Antarctica”,55 and its by-laws are
compliant with the Treaty and ATS instruments, members who breach the
by-laws can only be “subject to reprimand or change in membership status,
e.g. probation or expulsion, after review by the Membership and Executive
Committees”.56 Additionally, membership of IAATO is not compulsory,
and so not all tourist operators belong to IAATO.
This has created a difficulty in recent times as the Antarctic tourism
industry has grown. The problem of free-riders who use common-pool
resources and benefit from the efforts of responsible others to manage and
maintain the resources, but do not themselves abide by those management
and maintenance rules, is well known in environmental politics.57 The free-
rider problem is one that is now plaguing Antarctic tourism. According to
Monteath, “Some companies refuse to join IAATO. So, they do whatever
they want. They are the potential rogues.”58
Adding to the difficulties is the lack in the Antarctic policy-making
context of policy entrepreneurs59 and imaginaries who could initiate and
take a leading role in debates about tourism and the construction of policy
at ATCMs.
These factors are significant ones, but they are not insurmountable. What
seems to prevent a coherent Antarctic tourism policy being established is
the differing perspectives of the signatory states and other interested parties
towards tourism. Enzenbacher has commented on the “spectrum of views
on Antarctic tourism policy and management and the direction it should
take”,60 including two dichotomous views presented at the Twenty-Ninth
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting that took place in Edinburgh in
2006. One view focused on the ability of the industry, through IAATO, to
self-regulate; the other queried the appropriateness of the tourism industry
influencing the tourism policy agenda, “the absence of objective tourism
management expertise within Treaty delegations and the lack of a
coordinated ATS approach to oversee Antarctic tourism”.61 Without a clear
vision and direction for tourism, it is likely that only piecemeal actions will
be taken by the ATCPs.

Antarctic tourism: the need for intervention

This leaves a dangerous void. Tourism in Antarctica is growing at an
unprecedented rate. If tourist numbers continue to increase then at a
conservative estimate (and even taking into account the recent drop in
numbers), more than 60,000 tourists annually will visit Antarctic by 2020.
Cumulative impacts upon Antarctic fora, fauna, and wildlife are likely to
grow exponentially. This presents some very difficult issues that the ATCPs
need to resolve urgently before disaster strikes and serious harm is done to
the Antarctic environment. The invidious effects of human/nature
interaction in Antarctic tourism will not spontaneously resolve themselves,
and the impacts cannot be rectified. Antarctica is the most pristine of the
wilderness areas on earth, but it will not long remain so if the current set of
issues hindering development of a comprehensive tourism policy
framework is not addressed by the ATCPs. Without carefully considered
assessment, intervention, regulation, management, and monitoring of
tourism in the immediate future, the ATCPs will be guilty of negligence in
their Article IX(1) (f)62 duty to preserve and conserve the living resources
of Antarctica.

Maritime concerns
The need for intervention is made more urgent by maritime incidents in the
Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters. The sinking and discharge of 600,000
litres of diesel fuel by the Bahia Paraiso at Anvers Island in 1989, the
precursor to a spate of sinkings, groundings, and other maritime accidents
in the Antarctic region over the following decade,63 should sound as a
warning bell to the ATCPs that time is running out to be able to implement
policy that can, as far as possible, prevent future incidents of this nature.
The disastrous effect of an oil spill in polar waters by a marine vessel was
vividly demonstrated when the Exxon Valdez discharged eleven million
gallons of oil in the Arctic in 1989. A similar incident in Antarctica would
be a disaster of unimaginable scale given Antarctica's unique place in the
global ecosystem and its importance as an irreplaceable site for scientific
experimentation.
Indeed, it is the significant risk of maritime disaster in ship-borne tourism
that should focus the minds of the ATCPs and provide impetus for reform in
Antarctic tourism regulation. The Chair's Report from the Antarctic Treaty
Meeting of Experts on the Management of Ship-borne Tourism in the
Antarctic Treaty Area held in Wellington in December 2009 traverses a
plethora of problems: the uncertainty of operating in the Antarctic Treaty
area for vessels because “many areas have not been surveyed to modern
standards”;64 lack of clarity about the formal relationship between ATCMs
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO); lack of legally required
standards of navigational training in Antarctic waters for crew of Antarctic-
bound vessels; uneven implementation among Consultative Parties of
Measure 4 (2004) on Insurance and Contingency Planning for Tourism and
Non-governmental Activities in the Antarctic Treaty Area; an absence of
guidelines for responding to large-scale marine spills in the Antarctic Treaty
area; lack of coordination between parties on contingency planning for
“incidents with potential adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment”;65
lack of participation by some Antarctic-going vessels in current vessel-
monitoring schemes in the region; the need for greater coordination
between the five parties with Search and Rescue responsibilities, national
programmes, and IAATO; and the need for a mandatory Polar Code for
ships that would include requirements and measures specific to the
Antarctic waters.
Antarctic ship-borne tourism, in short, is operating in an increasingly
dangerous situation. More and more vessels are negotiating the Southern
Ocean and Antarctic waters, but they do so at their peril as
 the majority of the Antarctic sea remains un-surveyed or requires a
modern re-survey and less than 1 percent of the sea area within the 200 m
contour has been adequately surveyed to meet the needs of contemporary
shipping entering Antarctic waters.66

Many of these vessels (approximately 50 per cent) are fagged to non-

parties, and do not participate in the existing vessel-monitoring programmes
in Antarctica. Sea ice changes continue to make navigation hazardous to
ships in the Antarctic region. However, tracking, tracing, and reaching
vessels requiring emergency assistance in Antarctic waters is difficult
because of the large size of the region, and will become more problematic
as the funding for Polar View (an instrument that has proven very effective
for improving navigation safety, routing efficiency, and assisting in
emergency situations) ran out in June 2010. Although funding for Polar
View was acquired for the 2011–12 austral summer season, it should be
noted that the funding basis is not permanent, and depends upon the
willingness of institutions such as the European Space Agency to continue
their financial support.67
The potential for a serious maritime incident in the Antarctic region
involving loss of human life and significant damage to the environment is,
therefore, very high. The track record of four tourist vessels grounding and
one sinking in the Antarctic Treaty area in just three years is not one that
inspires confidence, and without a comprehensive plan for Antarctic
tourism generated by the Consultative Parties the future is only too likely to
produce a disaster in the region. Commentators have noted that the
Consultative Parties are on “borrowed time”68 with ship-borne tourism, that
there “is increasing concern about the potential for a maritime disaster
involving a cruise ship in Antarctic waters”,69 that “a disaster is waiting to
happen unless urgent action is taken”,70 and that another fatal accident, “a
new Titanic”,71 will occur. In the words of one journal headline, “How long
before the next Titanic?”.72

The IMO and Antarctic-bound ships

It is, in fact, a United Nations agency, the International Maritime
Organization, rather than the ATCPs via the ATCM framework, which has
made efforts to engage with and address some of these problems. Three
recent initiatives undertaken by the IMO are aimed at mitigating potential
pollution and safety problems. The first initiative was an amendment to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973
and Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL). The amendment bans, from 1 August
2011, the use and carriage of heavy and intermediate fuel oils for ships
operating in the Antarctic Treaty area, and is expected to affect larger cruise
ships carrying more than 500 passengers.73 Although it cannot prevent an
oil spill, the MARPOL amendment should decrease the chances in an
Antarctic spill incident of the denser, harder to disperse, and more
environmentally damaging oils being involved.
The second initiative involved the re-drafting and updating of the IMO's
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters to cover Antarctic waters.
The Guidelines, adopted by the IMO in late 2009, are “intended to be
applied to ships constructed on or after 1 January 2011, although
Governments are invited to apply the guidelines, as far as possible, before
that date”.74 Although the Guidelines apply to newly constructed ships and
are not retroactive, they represent an important step forward in the
construction of international baseline safety and protection standards for
vessels that will in future journey to the Antarctic.
The IMO also began work in “February 2010 on a mandatory
International Code of safety for ships operating in polar waters (Polar
Code)”,75 covering “vessel design, safety equipment, ship operations and
crew training for ice navigation” and intended to take effect in 2013.76
Although this latter initiative is still a long way from being finished, its
successful completion and implementation would help allay many of the
fears currently held about tourism vessel safety in the Southern Ocean and
Antarctic waters.

The need for an Antarctic tourism convention

Despite these advances, many outstanding problems remain and these
cannot simply be deferred indefinitely or delegated to another organization
for resolution.77 As Aant Elzinga notes, there has been little institutional
dynamism within the ATS since the adoption of PEPAT in 1991.78
Additionally, there is a real sense in which, as Sanjay Chaturvedi puts it, the
ATS “today finds itself at a crossroads”.79 What this means for the long-
term future of the ATS is a critical need to deal with issues – not just
tourism, but also bio-prospecting and extended continental shelf claims
under Article 76 of UNCLOS – that have become increasingly urgent and in
need of clear, unambiguous direction and regulation by the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties. Without such direction and regulation the ATS and the
ATCPs risk losing legitimacy, authenticity, and respect as the core
multilateral governance system and actors within Antarctica.
Put simply, in the context of tourism, the time for the ATCPs to deal with
the issue by incremental Measures is long past. For two decades the ATCPs
have been cognizant of the growth of tourism in the continent. For almost
as long, research and advice has been presented at ATCMs to indicate the
need to the ATCPs to plan for and manage tourism in the Antarctic in a
manner that is consistent with the stewardship ethic that has evolved under
the ATS. The discussions that have taken place at the Consultative Meetings
demonstrate a clear awareness on the part of the ATCPs that tourism does
need to be controlled and that, without regulation, there will be negative
impacts on the environment.80 However, the Measures that have been
introduced through Consultative Meetings are essentially reactive ones that
have been implemented in the wake of tourist number increases. They are
not proactive initiatives Measures introduced as part of a long-term,
comprehensive plan for tourism in the area. Effectively, the ATCPs have
been playing a lagging game of catch-up as Antarctic tourism booms. But
trying to play catch-up as tourism races ahead in a unique, fragile
environment is a plan doomed to failure.
What is needed is for the ATCPs to create a comprehensive tourist policy
with a clear and unambiguous framework for all actors in the industry, and
to implement this via a multilateral convention that covers all aspects of
tourism in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Such a convention, once it
came into force, would become an ATS instrument and an integral part of
ATCPs' governance in the region.
Introducing and negotiating a hard international law instrument, such as a
convention, is a difficult and time-consuming process. As Palmer has noted,
“nations tend to shy away from the specificity they often involve”,81 and
Rayfuse asserts that “effective international agreements are easier to reach
before vested interests become entrenched”.82 Downie has also identified
the “lowest common denominator” problem where states who have the
most interest in addressing an environmental problem must try to get the
cooperation of countries with little or no interest in the problem, leading to
a situation where the outcome “often represents, at least at the start, the
lowest common denominator measures that the relevant countries are
willing to accept”.83 However, where hard law changes are presaged by soft
law, such as a hortatory declaration, a positive outcome appears easier to
achieve. The value of initiating change toward an environmental hard law
instrument via soft law processes is that

soft law solutions change the political thinking on an issue. They alter the
circumstances in which an issue is considered; they cause opinion to
coalesce. These changes can be a very important catalyst in securing an
agreement with a harder edge later…. Soft law is where international law
and international politics combine to build new norms.84

Saying is easier than doing in international law, and there is no doubt that
introducing a tourist convention for Antarctica would be a diplomatically
challenging task, and one that would likely require a harder-edged
interaction between the states than the ‘softly softly’ diplomacy that has
been such a characteristic of ATCPs governance. The ATS has been praised
for the cooperative interactions of the ATCPs which have enabled the
system to endure, to evolve over time, and to achieve condominium
governance.85 That form of consensus decision-making comes at a price,
though, and the price appears to have been deference to the differing views
held by various ATCPs and the placing of some issues on the back-burner in
order to avoid confrontation and overt splits between the parties. Tourism
policy has been one of those back-burner issues.
A background of that nature would seem to negate the possibility of
achieving agreement on a tourist convention, but that need not be the case.
Prior to the adoption of PEPAT with its prohibition on mining, a diversity of
views among parties was also held about what the proper vision and policy
for Antarctic mineral resources should be and, given the commercial
interests involved, there was widespread pessimism that a mining ban
would ever be achieved. It is possible, therefore, to envisage agreement
between the parties on tourism policy that is enshrined in a convention,
particularly if preceded by a declaration and, especially, if accompanied by
civil society activism and public pressure on national governments to
engage in good faith with the tourism issue. The recent campaigns to ban
landmines and cluster bombs, both of which engendered international
conventions that are now in force, demonstrated powerfully the
effectiveness of focused civil society action on recalcitrant governments.
Another motivational factor is the response from non-signatory states,
particularly those in the Global South, that would undoubtedly be
forthcoming should a major, tourism-derived disaster occur in Antarctica in
the near future.86 That response would certainly focus on the exclusive
nature of the ATCPs ‘club’ and the overwhelmingly western, Global North
orientation of the Consultative Parties. This was an issue that was debated
fiercely at the United Nations General Assembly during the 1980s when the
Group of 77, led by Malaysia, questioned vigorously the governance
arrangements for Antarctica and what they perceived as the rich states'
preserve in Antarctica. The debate engendered questions about the status of
Antarctica such as whether it really was a global commons and common
heritage of mankind territory, or whether it had, de facto, become a
continent ring-fenced by the Antarctic Treaty states, and whose future
would be determined by them. The subsequent opening up of ATCPs
membership to states such as China and India helped subdue the debate, as
did the establishment of PEPAT with its mining prohibition and the
assurance that, for fifty years at least, there would not be a scramble for
lucrative mining rights in Antarctica. Additionally, the perception that the
ATCPs were acting carefully in Antarctic governance and in evolving a
stewardship ethic towards the continent provided another reason to take
Antarctica off the General Assembly agenda.87
However, a tourism disaster in Antarctica would be only too likely to
reawaken debates about Antarctica among developing states, and to put the
Antarctica issue back on to the General Assembly agenda. Non-signatory
states could not be expected to be forgiving of such a disaster occurring
under the ATCPs watch, especially given the history of warnings about a
foreseeable occurrence of this nature. The bypassing of opportunities to act,
relegation of a number of issues to another organization altogether, and
inability to achieve consensus on tourism even after two decades may
provide, in the event of a disaster, the evidence that non-signatory states
need to advocate for future governance of Antarctica by a more
representative and responsible organization that is not bound by ATS
protocols.
It is, in fact, a potential tourism disaster that might give birth to a new
type of tourism in Antarctica – literally disaster tourism. Disaster tourism
can be defined as “a type of tourism that is associated with death, tragedy
and suffering”.88 According to CNN, disaster tourism is a growing niche
market in the travel industry, evidenced in the wake of natural disasters
such as the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami that devastated much of South East
Asia, and the wreckage of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005.89
Ironically, the Irish Independent has reported that “the 100th anniversary of
the Titanic disaster is set to trigger a tourism bonanza with ‘disaster cruises’
to the spot where the great ship sank”.90

Advantages of an Antarctic tourism convention

An ATS-sponsored multilateral tourist convention would have a number of
advantages for future governance in the region, particularly as it would be
able to plug a variety of gaps in the existing Antarctic tourism framework.
Crucially, it would require the parties to agree on at least a basic philosophy
for Antarctic tourism that accords with Treaty principles and objectives.
That alone would be a major step forward in Antarctic tourism policy as
there is neither an overarching plan nor a clear direction determined by the
Consultative Parties for tourism in the region. Consequently, there is a
current risk that tourism will develop in a fashion that is antithetical to the
Antarctic Treaty. Having an agreed philosophy as the foundation of
Antarctic tourism would enable the parties to move ahead and create a
comprehensive tourism policy, using Treaty-consistent philosophy as the
generator of policy parameters.
A comprehensive tourism policy that reaffirms commitment to the
Antarctic Treaty and also to another ATS instrument, PEPAT, would reduce
the risk of future conflict around the issue of sovereignty-centred tourism.
Although the Antarctic Treaty freezes sovereign claims upon the continent,
there has been concern raised that tourism is being used to reinforce and
further these claims. Scott, for instance, asserts that “Australia is using
tourism, and control of tourist activity, to support its claim to sovereignty.
Similarly, the primary reason for Argentina and Chile promoting tourist
activity on the Antarctic Peninsula is that it provides support for their
territorial claims.”91 The issue of land-based tourism facilities has become
linked to these concerns as the possibility of these facilities raises issues
about property rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction. A very real division
among the Consultative Parties is apparent on these matters.92 Nevertheless,
a tourist convention that reinforces a central feature of the Antarctic Treaty
– the non-sovereign status of Antarctica – would provide a decisive
response to any Consultative Party with aspirations to gain claims leverage
through sovereignty-centred tourism.
Accreditation would be a most appropriate issue for the ATCPs to
address via a convention. Currently, IAATO is the group which provides
accreditation for Antarctic tour operators. IAATO, though, has grown out of
the tourist industry and has vested interests in that industry. It is not a
neutral, independent group. Some ATCPs have, de facto, made IAATO the
monopoly provider for parts of the Antarctic region under their control.93
This privileging in Antarctic tourism of IAATO by some states means that
there are different rules pertaining to the industry being applied in the
Antarctic region. Yet achieving a coherent and coordinated tourism policy
requires transparent application of universal rules, standards, and policy
across the region. And, as mentioned earlier, not all tourist operators are
members of IAATO. Moving the locus of accreditation to the ATCPs would
enhance capture of operators, and eliminate or significantly reduce the free-
rider problem, particularly if the ATCPs refused to cooperate with tourist
operators not accredited by them, for instance, by refusing to allow them
access to port facilities in ATCP coastal states, refusing to allow tours of
their research stations in Antarctica, and refusing any application by a non-
accredited operator for an EIA licence. It would be beneficial both to
perceived industry integrity and to universal coverage of the tourist
industry, therefore, if the ATCPs were to take control of tourist operator
accreditation and to do it through the vehicle of a convention.
Ideally, a convention would establish an official body charged with
Antarctic tourism coordination funded from taxes and charges on the
tourism industry.94 Such a body would be able to promulgate regulations in
accordance with existing ATS instruments, work with tourism operators to
achieve optimum outcomes consistent with the Antarctic Treaty, and require
tourism operators to undertake actions in response to tourism-related
environmental concerns. It could be responsible for some of the core tasks
vital to future tourism in the continent such as controlling the geographical
scale of tourism in Antarctica, and confining tourism to certain areas of the
territory to ensure that as-yet-scientifically unexamined areas are off-limits
to tourists. In this context, it could restrict tourism numbers in areas prone
to stress, and declare seasonal limits to commercial tourism in order to
retain the integrity of sites. Coordination of site visits with tourist operators
to prevent undue traffic in particular areas, and maintaining
communications with all tourist operators to ensure orderly and coherent
patterns of visitations to the continent would also be vital undertakings.
Tasks such as maintaining lists of accredited operators, managing advance
notification and post-visit reporting, and providing information and visitor
guidelines on Antarctica to intending tourists would also form part of its
workload. An Antarctic tourism coordination entity would, thus, manage
overall tourist numbers and activities so that Treaty principles and
objectives are not compromised, and tourist operations are occurring
effectively and efficiently, yet in a manner that is still consistent with the
Treaty itself.
The expert scientific community would, necessarily, have an important
role to play in such a tourism entity. Given the criticisms mentioned earlier
of the cumbersome decision-making process at ATCMs, lack of rigour in
the EIA process, and sovereignty-centred tourism issues, it would be
preferable to remove, as far as possible, the ATCPs from decision-making
in this area, and delegate authority for tourism decisions to Antarctic
scientific groups such as the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
(SCAR) and the CEP which are already an integral part of the ATS
infrastructure. It is expert scientific groups like these that are in the best
position to know and understand the impacts of tourism on the white
continent and the environmental implications for the future of continuing
tourist visitations. Their expert opinions should be central to deciding, for
instance, what are the appropriate numbers of visitors at the most popular
tourist sites and which types of tourist activities should be permitted or
suspended in any austral summer season.
 An important accompaniment to the tasks undertaken by an Antarctic
tourism coordination body would be the creation of an official tourist
database, and an information repository that would act as a clearinghouse
for research on Antarctic tourism. In this context, it should be noted that
essential tourism information, such as total annual tourist numbers, is not
collated or archived in one database, making it difficult for researchers and
policy-makers to access verifiable statistical evidence on Antarctic tourism.
It is vital for holistic monitoring, management, and evaluation of tourism in
Antarctica that the Consultative Parties have access to a variety of
independent, objective, up-to-date information and advice streams about
Antarctic tourism, so that tourism policy can evolve on a considered and
careful basis.

Conclusion
Whether the ATCPs will seek the opportunity to redress problems in
tourism policy through the vehicle of a multilateral convention, or continue
to delay making critical decisions through the ATCMs is a moot question.
Creation of a multilateral tourist convention by the ATCPs would not
provide a guarantee of an incident-free future in Antarctic tourism, but
without it the continent will inevitably be witness to preventable tragedies.
In this unique continent, an exceptional commons, that would be a tragedy
for all of humankind. A multilateral tourist convention offers an opportunity
for the ATCPs to rectify the problems caused by lack of a comprehensive
tourist policy, and put in place the safety and security Measures that both
tourists and the Antarctic environment need to be protected from each other.

Notes
1 Eyewitness to History, “The Sinking of the Titanic, 1912” [accessed 26
March 2010], www.eyewitnesstohistory.com.
2 According to Thomas Bauer the ‘heroic age’ ended “with the death of
Sir Ernest Shackleton aboard the Quest on January 5, 1922”, Thomas
Bauer, Tourism in the Antarctic: Opportunities, Constraints, and
Future Prospects, New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2001, p. 51.
3 Kevin Hillstrom and Laurie Collier Hillstrom, Australia, Oceania and
Antarctica: A Continental Overview of Environmental Issues, Santa
Barbara: ABC Clio, 2003, pp. 233–234; Paul Berkman, Science Into
Policy: Global Lessons from Antarctica, San Diego: Academic Press,
2002, pp. 34–49.
4 The Antarctic Treaty, Washington 1959 402 UNTS 1961 72. Hereafter,
Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
5 Preamble, Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
6 Article VII (4), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
7 Article VII (5)(a), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
8 Article I, Article V, Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
9 Article VII (2), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
10 Article VII (3), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
11 Article VII (4), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
12 Article VII (5)(a), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
13 Richard Herr, “The Regulation of Antarctic Tourism: A Study in
Regime Effectiveness”, in Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds),
Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the
Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996, p. 205.
14 Thomas Bauer, Tourism in the Antarctic: Opportunities, Constraints,
and Future Prospects, p. 80.
15 Shirley Scott, “How Cautious is Precautious?: Antarctic Tourism and
the Precautionary Principle”, International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 50:4 (2001), p. 967.
16 Kees Bastmeijer, “Managing Human Activities in Antarctica: Should
Wilderness Protection Count?”, New Zealand Yearbook of
International Law (2005) [accessed 18 January 2010],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969388.
17 TVNZ, “Slow Down in Antarctic Tourism”, TVNZ Travel News, 13
February 2009 [accessed 14 June 2009], http://tvnz.co.nz/travel-
 news/slow-down-in-antarctic-tourism-2486138.
18 IAATO, “Tourism Statistics: 1992–2001 Antarctic Tourist Trends”,
“2000–2001 Tourists By Nationality (Landed)”, “2007–2008 Tourists
By Nationality (Landed)”, “2008–2009 Summary of Seaborne,
Airborne, and Land-Based Antarctic Tourism”, “2009–2010 Tourism
Summary” [accessed 12 May 2010 and 7 August 2010],
www.iaato.org/tourism_stats.html; Kraig Becker, “Antarctic Tourism
Drops in 2010”, 15 June 2011,
www.gadling.com/2011/06/15/antarctic-tourism-drops-in-2010/.
19 See UNWTO Tourism Highlights, 2011 edition, pp. 2–5, World
Tourism Organisation, 2011 [accessed 13 November 2011],
http://mkt.unwto.org/sites/all/fles/docpdf/unwtohighlights11enlr_1.pdf.
20 ASOC, “A Decade of Antarctic Tourism: Status, Change, and Actions
Needed”, IP 41, Information Paper Submitted by ASOC to the XXXI
ATCM, Kiev, 2–14 June 2008, ATCM Agenda Item 11 and CEP
Agenda Item 6(b), p. 4.
21 Daniela Haase, “Tourism in the Antarctic: Modi Operandi and
Regulatory Effectiveness”, University of Canterbury: Unpublished
PhD Thesis, 2008, p. 9.
22 Colin Woodward, “Why Did an Antarctic Cruise Ship Sink?,”
Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 2009 [accessed 25 July 2010],
www.csmonitor.com/2009/0420/po6s08-wogn.html.
23 Jeff Rubin, Lonely Planet: Antarctica, 2nd edn, Melbourne: Lonely
Planet Publications, 2000, p. 64.
24 Jeff Rubin, Lonely Planet: Antarctica, 4th edn, Melbourne: Lonely
Planet Publications, 2008, p. 16.
25 Nancy Cawley, “Feeling the Heat”, New Zealand Listener, 11–17 April
2009, p. 28.
26 Jeff Rubin, Lonely Planet: Antarctica, pp. 75–82.
27 Kees Bastmeijer, “Tourism in Antarctica: Increasing Diversity and
Legal Criteria for Authorization”, New Zealand Journal of
Environmental Law 7 (2003), p. 90.
 IAATO, “About IAATO” and “About IAATO: Objectives” [accessed
28 18 February 2010], www.iaato.org/objectives.html.
29 Report of the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators
2008–2009 Under Article III(2) of the Antarctic Treaty (2009) IP 33
rev.2, p. 8.
30 This was a study undertaken for a doctoral dissertation at the
University of Tasmania by P. J. Tracey, “Managing Antarctic
Tourism”, quoted in Debra Enzenbacher, “Antarctic Tourism Policy-
making: Current Challenges and Future Prospects”, in G. Triggs and
A. Riddell (eds), Antarctica: Legal and Environmental Challenges for
the Future, London: British Institute of International and Comparative
Law, 2007, pp. 172.
31 Machiel Lamers, Daniela Haase, and Bas Amelung, “Facing the
Elements: Analysing Trends in Antarctic Tourism”, Tourism Review
63:1 (2008), p. 19.
32 See G. Cessford, “Antarctic Tourism – A Frontier for Wilderness
Management”, in P. Dingwell (ed.), Antarctica in the Environmental
Age, Wellington: Department of Conservation, 1988, pp. 23–30, and
Robert Powell, Stephen Kellert, and Sam Ham, “Antarctic Tourists:
Ambassadors or Consumers?”, Polar Record 44:230 (2008), pp. 233–
241.
33 Robyn Bushell and Stephen McCool, “Tourism as a Tool for
Conservation and Support of Protected Areas: Setting the Agenda”, in
R. Bushell and P. Eagles (eds), Tourism and Protected Areas: Benefits
Beyond Boundaries, Wallingford: CAB International, 2007, pp. 13–23.
34 B. Deutsch, “Sinking Raises Questions About Antarctic Tourism”,
Dallas Morning News, 31 December 2007, p. 2 [accessed 5 October
2009],
www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/fea/travel/thisweek/stories/D
N-antarc_1230tra.State.Edition1.d925de.html.
35 Christopher Joyner, Governing the Frozen Continent: The Antarctic
Regime and Environmental Protection, Carolina: University of South
Carolina, 1998, pp. 208–212; Yves Frenot, Steven Chown, Jennie
Whinam et al., “Biological Invasions in the Antarctic: Extent, Impacts
 and Implications”, Biological Review 80 (2005), pp. 45–72; Ivana
Zovko, “Vessel-Sourced Pollution in the Southern Ocean: Benefits and
Shortcomings of Regional Regulation”, in Gillian Triggs and Anna
Riddell (eds), Antarctica: Legal and Environmental Challenges for the
Future, London: British Institute of International and Comparative
Law, 2007, pp. 194–195; T. Tin, Z. Fleming, K. A. Hughes et al.,
“Impacts of Local Human Activities on the Antarctic Environment”,
Antarctic Science 21:1 (2009), pp. 5–26.
36 J. Dalziell and M. De Poorter, “Managing Cumulative Environmental
Impacts: Antarctica's Challenge for the 21st Century”, in P. Dingwell,
Antarctica in the Environmental Age, p. 16.
37 Debra Enzenbacher, “Antarctic Tourism Policy-Making”, p. 155.
38 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 29 UST 44 1,
TIAS no. 8826.
39 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, 1980 19 ILM 841.
40 This Convention is not in force and has, effectively, been superseded
by PEPAT.
41 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991 30
ILM 1461. Hereafter, PEPAT.
42 PEPAT, Article 3(2)(a).
43 PEPAT, Article 8(1).
44 PEPAT, Annex I, Article 1(2).
45 PEPAT, Annex I, Article 3(3) and (4).
46 PEPAT, Annex I, Article 3(5) and (6).
47 PEPAT, Annex VI, Article 4(1)(a).
48 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, “Tourism and Non-Governmental
Activities” [accessed 28 May 2010],
www.ats.aq/e/ats_other_tourism.htm.
49 IAATO, “By-Laws”, Article 10, Operational Procedures [accessed 21
April 2010], www.iaato.org/bylaws.html.
50 Alan Hemmings and Ricardo Roura, “A Square Peg in a Round Hole:
Fitting Impact Assessment Under the Antarctic Environmental
Protocol to Antarctic Tourism”, Impact Assessment and Project
Appraisal 21:1 (2003), pp. 13–24; Kees Bastmeijer and Ricardo
Roura, “Environmental Impact Assessment in Antarctica”, in Kees
Bastmeijer and Timo Koivurova (eds), Theory and Practice of
Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, Leiden/Boston:
Brill/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008 [accessed 8 January 2010],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297285.
51 Christopher Joyner, Governing the Frozen Continent: The Antarctic
Regime and Environmental Protection, p. 156.
52 An international regime is “a set of integrated principles, norms, rules,
procedures and institutions that actors create or accept to regulate and
coordinate action in a particular issue area of international relations”,
David Downie, “Global Environmental Policy: Governance Through
Regimes”, in Regina Axelrod, David Downie, and Norman Vig, The
Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy, Washington: CQ
Press, 2005, p. 64.
53 Article IX(1), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
54 According to CIA The World Factbook, Southern Sudan became the
world's 195th state on 9 July 2011 [accessed 10 July 2011],
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
55 IAATO, “About IAATO” [accessed 20 April 2010],
www.iaato.org/about.html.
56 IAATO, “About IAATO: By-laws, Article 3: Membership, Section F”
[accessed 21 April 2010], www.iaato.org/bylaws.html.
57 For example, Lorraine Elliot, “Global Environmental Governance”, in
Rorden Wilkinson and Steve Hughes (eds), Global Governance:
Critical Perspectives, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 60–61, and
Daniela Haase, Machiel Lamers, and Bas Amelung, “Heading Into
Uncharted Territory? Exploring the Institutional Robustness of Self-
Regulation in the Antarctic Tourism Sector”, Journal of Sustainable
Tourism 17:4 (2009), pp. 412–413.
58 Quoted in Nancy Cawley, “Feeling the Heat”, p. 28. See also ATCM,
Chairman's Report from Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on
Tourism and Non-governmental Activities in Antarctica, XXVII
ATCM Working Paper WP004, Topic iiia, para.30, p. 11.
59 Nancy Roberts and Paula King, “Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity
Structure and Function in the Policy Process”, Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 1:2 (1991), pp. 147–175.
60 Debra Enzenbacher, “Antarctic Tourism Policy-Making”, p. 163.
61 Ibid.
62 Antarctic Treaty, 1959.
63 A Norwegian vessel, MS Nordkapp, hit rocks near Deception Island in
January 2007. The MS Explorer hit an iceberg and sank in November
2007. A Panamanian-registered vessel, MV Cuidad de Ushuaia, ran
aground in December of the same year. In January 2008 the MS Fram
collided with ice.
64 Chair's Report, Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on the
Management of Shipborne Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area,
Wellington, New Zealand, 9–11 December 2009, Recommendation 4,
p. 4.
65 Idem, Recommendation 13, p. 5. The recommendations traversed in
this paragraph are taken from the Chair's Report and also include
recommendations 3, 7–9, and 14 from pp. 3–5.
66 Idem, para. 41, p. 13.
67 Andrew Fleming, email communication, 20 July 2011.
68 Chair's Report, Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on the
Management of Shipborne Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area,
Wellington, New Zealand, 9–11 December 2009, Annex 4, “Remarks
by New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Murray McCully”,
p. 40.
69 Trevor Hughes quoted in Nancy Cawley, “Feeling the Heat”, p. 31.
70 Paul Bignell, “The Sinking of the Explorer”, Independent, 12 April
2009 [accessed 18 August 2010], www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-
 and-advice/the-sinking-of-the-explorer-1667532.html.
71 The Economist, “Waiting for Another Titanic”, 12 February 2009
[accessed 19 September 2010],
www.economist.com/world/americas/PrinterFriendly.cfm?
story_id=13110412.
72 Stephen Talty, “How Long Before the Next Titanic?”, 29 January 2009
[accessed 29 January 2009], www.mensjournal.com/next-titanic.
73 TTN: Travel and Tourism News Middle East “Ecotourism: New Rules
for Antarctic Tourism”, 28:8 August 2010 [accessed 17 September
2010], www.ttnworldwide.com/arcarticles.aspx?id=1386artid=9860;
WWF, “Ships Banned From Carrying Heavy Oil in Antarctic Waters”,
31 March 2010 [accessed 27 August 2010], www.wwf.org.nz/?
4040/Ships-banned-from-carrying-heavy-oil-in-Antarctic-waters; IMO
Newsroom, MEPC-Briefng 10, “IMO Environment Committee Makes
Progress”, 26 March 2010 [accessed 30 August 2010],
www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?
topic_id=1859doc_id=12724.
74 IMO Newsroom, “Assembly–26th session: 23 November to 2
December 2009”, Press Briefings [accessed 30 August 2010],
www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?
topic_id=1773doc_id=12165.
75 Antarctic Treaty Database, “Resolution 7 (2010) – ATCM XXXIII –
CEP XIII, Punta del Este” [accessed 7 August 2010],
www.ats.aq/devAS/info_Measures_listitem.aspx?lang=eid=477.
76 Nautical Log, “Polar Code”, 2009 [accessed 7 August 2010],
http://nauticallog.blogs-pot.com/2009/12/polar-code.html.
77 On this point see also Aant Elzinga, Chapter 10 in this volume.
78 Idem.
79 Sanjay Chaturvedi, Chapter 3 in this volume.
80 See, for instance, Final Report of the Thirty-second Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting, XXXII ATCM, Baltimore, USA, Washington
Ministerial Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic
Treaty, Appendix 1, pp. 161–162 and Measure 15 (2009), pp. 199–200.
81 Geoffrey Palmer, Environment: The International Challenge,
Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1995, p. 61.
82 Rosemary Rayfuse, “Warm Waters and Cold Shoulders: Jostling for
Jurisdiction in Polar Oceans”, University of New South Wales Faculty
of Law Research Series, UNSWFLRS 56, 2008, p. 7 [accessed 25
September 2010],
www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2008/56.html.
83 David Downie, “Global Environmental Policy: Governance Through
Regimes”, p. 72.
84 Geoffrey Palmer, Environment: The International Challenge, p. 63.
85 Donald Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.
153–154.
86 Peter Beck, “Twenty Years On: the UN and the ‘Question of
Antarctica’, 1983–2003”, Polar Record 40:214 (2004), p. 211.
87 K. Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in
International Law, The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, pp.
244–248.
88 Zoe Graham, “Is Disaster Tourism Acceptable?,” BBC World Have
Your Say, 25 February 2010 [accessed 18 September 2010],
http://worldhaveyoursay.wordpress.com/2010/02/25/is-disaster-
tourism-acceptable/.
89 Dean Irvine, “Trend Watch: Disaster Tourism”, CNN World Weekly, 28
September 2007 [accessed 20 October 2010],
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/09/27/ww.trends.disaster
tourism/.
90 Ralph Riegel, “‘Disaster’ Cruises to Mark Titanic's Centenary”,
Independent.IE, 7 August 2010 [accessed 18 September 2010],
www.independent.ie/national-news/disaster-cruises-to-mark-titanics-
centenary-2288084.html.
91 Shirley Scott, “How Cautious is Precautious?: Antarctic Tourism and
the Precautionary Principle”, p. 970. See also Kees Bastmeijer,
Machiel Lamers, and Juan Harcha, “Permanent Land-Based Facilities
 for Tourism in Antarctica: The Need for Regulation”, RECEIL 17:1
(2008), pp. 84–85.
92 See, for instance, the differing positions taken by, on the one hand,
New Zealand, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA and,
on the other hand, Chile, at the XXVII ATCM in Chairman's Report
from Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on Tourism and Non-
governmental Activities in Antarctica, XXVII ATCM Working Paper
WP004, Topic iiib, paras. 34–39, pp. 12–13. The Chilean statement
would seem to confirm ASOC's assertion that

Some claimant states appear unwilling or unable to foreclose on

the potential freedom of their citizens and instrumentalities to
establish property rights in that state's claimed territory…. Some
states are even actively encouraging tourism and have built new, or
converted existing, infrastructure to service tourism.
ASOC, “Strategic Issues Posed by Commercial Tourism in the
Antarctic Treaty Area”, Information Paper IP 120, 2006, Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting 2006, Agenda Item ATCM 12, p. 6

93 Carl Murray and Julia Jabour, “Independent Expeditions and Antarctic

Tourism Policy”, Polar Record 40:215 (2004), p. 309.
94 For instance, an Antarctic tourism coordination body could be funded
from monies derived from a variety of sources: accreditation charges
paid by Antarctic tourism operators; annual Antarctic tourism licence
charges; a ‘pax’ tax that varies for each tourism operator depending on
the number of tourists they transport to the continent; ‘green’ taxes that
are designed to minimize human contact with Antarctica and rise
proportionally for each landed tourist an operator transports; charges
imposed on tourism operators for guided tours of research stations; and
insurance charges or levies for high-risk tourist activities. This is not
intended to be an exhaustive list of all possible taxes and charges. For
discussion of the variety of environmental taxes and charges see
Jeffrey McNeely, “Sustainable Finance for Protected Areas”, Paper
presented to Protected Areas in the 21st Century: From Islands to
Networks, Albany, Western Australia, 24–28 November 1997, pp. 1–
14; Paul Elkins, “European Environmental Taxes and Charges: Recent
Experience, Issues and Trends”, Ecological Economics 31 (1999), pp.
39–62; Neil Hawke and Pamela Hargreaves, “Environmental
Compensation Schemes: Experience and Prospects”, Environmental
Law Review 5 (2003), pp. 9–22; Stig Sollund, “Environment Taxes”,
Introductory Presentation on Agenda 2 of IFAD Meeting of United
Nations Group of Experts on Domestic Resource Mobilisation – A
Discussion of Enduring and Emerging Issues, Rome, 4–5 September
2007, pp. 1–5 [accessed 11 October 2011],
www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2007DRM.../05EnvironmentalTaxes.doc.
12 Biological prospecting in the
Antarctic

Fair game?
Julia Jabour

The collection of samples of biological material (bioprospecting) is being

undertaken in the Antarctic (that is, the continent of Antarctica and the
Southern Ocean surrounding it south of 60° South) on an increasing scale
and for a range of potential applications.1 The Antarctic is a perfect target
for this activity for a number of reasons. First, it is subject to an extreme
climate, meaning that its fauna and fora, which have been relatively
undisturbed and isolated for millennia, have made novel functional
adaptations to enhance their chances of survival; and second, scientific
knowledge about many Antarctic organisms is still comparatively naïve.
Consequently there is potentially a good chance of novelty being present,
especially in marine organisms. For example, krill oil was discovered to be
high in polyunsaturated omega-3 fatty acids that have nutraceutical
applications, and the antifreeze polypeptides or glycopeptides found in some
polar fish species have important uses in medical technology.2
To scientists and investors, the Antarctic presents an exciting resource.
However, bioprospecting as it is currently being undertaken is raising
interesting issues — the answers to which are not, so far at least, wholly
satisfactory from an egalitarian point of view. For example, bioprospecting
in the Antarctic does not have clarity about jurisdictional scope, regulatory
status, access arrangements, environmental implications, commercial use of
material and information or benefit sharing.3 Yet in common with many
other areas of the world, bio-prospecting is already happening, patents are
being filed and products developed — all inside a relative legal and
administrative vacuum.
Scientists from different countries, including many from Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties (ATCPs), are undertaking bioprospecting activities (e.g.
collecting samples of soil, water and organisms) as part of government-
funded scientific research in the Antarctic. However the ATCPs have been
reluctant to extend regulation over their biological prospecting activities
beyond what is already required for any authorised activity in the Antarctic
(i.e. scientific research, operational support or tourism). Current regulation
involves an environmental evaluation of the activity prior to it being
conducted and monitoring for unforeseen impacts during and after.
Bioprospecting does not attract special legal attention in the Antarctic.
The subject has been on Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM)
agendas since around 20024 and in 2009 the Parties decided that
bioprospecting was adequately regulated for the time being by existing laws
within the Antarctic Treaty System.5 This was reaffirmed in 2011, and the
Final Report noted: ‘the Antarctic Treaty system was the appropriate forum
for dealing with Antarctic bioprospecting’.6 The 2011 ATCM was informed
about current developments in the international realm, specifically the
adoption of the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity
and a report from the United Nations General Assembly Ad hoc Informal
Working Group on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity in areas beyond national jurisdic-tion.7 These developments — the
addition to the CBD of a protocol on access and benefit sharing (adopted 30
October 20108) and the report from a specialist group from Oceans and Law
of the Sea at the UN (June 2011) — might have spurred the ATCPs into
action; in any case it was agreed to establish an intersessional contact group
on bioprospecting.
Previously, a research project followed the trend in applications for
patents in the US and European Patent Databases relating to krill-derived
material and the results showed a significant increase in the number of
patents being filed.9 Another useful resource, the Bioprospector database,
was established in a joint United Nations University/United Nations
Environment Program initiative.10 It contains information on Antarctic
bioprospecting activities, although the data can only give a rough indication
of scale because of intellectual property and confidentiality restrictions. In
2005, the ATCM recommended that governments continue to review and
report on biological prospecting activities in Antarctica. At the ATCM in
2011, only two parties — Argentina and the Netherlands — made such a
report.11 Nevertheless it is in this context of actual, rather than hypothetical,
activity that bioprospecting in the Antarctic is examined here.
The unique physical attributes of the region, including the temperature,
light and ice regimes, attract the attention of bioprospectors looking for
novelty. However, the place is also unique from the perspective of its
political and legal status, which is sui generis — one of a kind. Claims to
sovereignty over parts of Antarctica that have not been proven in
international law have generated a multilateral treaty regime, implemented
domestically and dedicated to managing all human uses of the Antarctic and
its resources. This chapter explores whether Antarctica's uniqueness excuses
the ATCPs from access and benefit-sharing obligations that they might
otherwise owe to the international community from resources removed from
an unowned ‘international’ place beyond national jurisdiction. Examining
the sui generis status of Antarctica will give insight into the differences, if
any, between bioprospecting and high seas fishing. The purpose of this
approach is to explore governance arrangements for Antarctic
bioprospecting and in the process examine the fundamental question of
whether the Antarctic is global commons and its resources, the common
heritage of mankind. Connected to this is a query about whether limitations
should be put on who has the right to exploit, use and benefit from Antarctic
biodiversity above and beyond what exists in law now, and what the broader
ethical implications might be.

Sui generis Antarctica

Matters such as jurisdiction, access and benefit sharing in the Antarctic
context are not unambiguous because of the unperfected claims to
sovereignty in Antarctica. With no single sovereign ‘owner’ of Antarctic
biological resources, and no explicit regulation by the ATCPs, the onus
remains on individual Treaty signatories to provide rules and guidelines for
their nationals undertaking bio-prospecting anywhere in the Antarctic. This
is consistent with Article 4 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which
states:

Subject to the rights of other States, and except as otherwise expressly

provided in this Convention, the provisions of this Convention apply, in
relation to each Contracting Party:
(a) In the case of components of biological diversity, in areas within the
limits of its national jurisdiction; and
(b) In the case of processes and activities, regardless of where their
effects occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the
area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.

This chapter takes the view that the whole of the Antarctic is ‘beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction’. This is the practical approach to sovereignty:
the area is, until proven otherwise, beyond national jurisdiction in a
territorial sense. However, every government whose citizens are in the
Antarctic has jurisdiction over its people, in a nationality sense. This might
not be the popular view of the claimants but it is how the Antarctic legal
system works in situ.

Where is ‘the Antarctic’?

The Antarctic itself is defined in a number of creative ways, depending on
who is doing the defining and for what purpose (legal, practical, fisheries
management, environmental). One definition that could be used in regulating
bio-prospecting (and hence would help to clarify other issues such as
jurisdiction) is that used in the Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty's area of
application is defined in Article VI as the area south of 60° South, including
all ice shelves. (The status of the seabed will be discussed later.) If the
ATCPs choose to regulate bioprospect-ing substantively with a Measure
from an ATCM or even a freestanding convention or protocol, their mandate
to do so will be derived from the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. It would be a simple
matter to adopt the Article VI area of application in a new regime. However,
this kind of simplicity has hardly ever been the case — the other components
of the Treaty System all have different areas of application.
 The 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), for
example, has an area of application appropriate to seals: the seas south of
60° South (Article 1). However, no account is taken of the terrestrial
environment on which seals haul out to moult and breed. The 1980
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) goes some way towards correcting this, with a different area of
application based on a biogeo-graphically distinct zone known as the
Antarctic Convergence. In some places, this area is further north than the
Treaty's 60° South (CCAMLR, Article 1) and includes some sub-Antarctic
island territories. Because CCAMLR applies to marine living resources
(Article 1; but not including seals or whales), it is also a potential source of
substantive regulation for bioprospecting, particularly if harvesting is
involved, as is the case with krill now.
Finally, 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty (Madrid Protocol), even though it is read in conjunction with its
parent Treaty, has its own area of application, described as the Antarctic
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems (Madrid Protocol,
Articles 2 and 3 and elsewhere). The first part is the same as Article VI of
the Treaty; ‘dependent and associated ecosystems’ do not have coordinates
but would extend the Antarctic boundary north of 60°S if the words
dependent and associated were taken literally. For example, the phrase could
be applied to the foraging range of marine mammals such as Southern
elephant seals that migrate between the sub-Antarctic (north of the border)
and the continent.
The four Antarctic Treaty legal instruments each have different areas of
application, which is unhelpful in trying to clarify terms and concepts in
bioprospecting. It is essential, therefore, to have a clear understanding of
where the Antarctic is located so that if the Parties are contemplating
substantive regulation of bio-prospecting, as opposed to simply considering
sample collection as scientific research, and regulation is to include
limitations on who has the right to exploit, use and benefit from Antarctic
biodiversity, relevant and representative boundaries must be drawn up.

Who owns the Antarctic and its resources?

In 1959 when the Antarctic Treaty was adopted, seven states (Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, United Kingdom) laid claim
to parts of the continent (three claims overlapped: Argentina, Chile and the
UK). Two other states (the United States of America and the Soviet Union
(now the Russian Federation)) reserved their rights to make claims. One
section of the Antarctic continent remains unclaimed to this day and is the
largest single piece of unclaimed territory on earth. None of these positions
has altered since December 1959 when Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty
acknowledged the acquisition of territory then put aside all discussion of it
as a creative means of solving the problem, without actually solving it.
Article IV acknowledges and preserves the positions of all Parties (claimant
or otherwise) indefinitely and nothing any state party does will affect this.
Therefore there is no single ‘owner’ of Antarctic resources.

The Antarctic as global commons?

Given the variety of definitions derived from Antarctic law, and with no
sovereign/s because of Article IV of the Treaty, is it possible to make a case
that the Antarctic is global commons instead? Global commons are
traditionally described as areas beyond national jurisdiction which are terra
nullius, owned by no-one and therefore capable of appropriation, or terra
communis, owned by everyone and over which ‘no single decision-making
unit holds exclusive title’.12 Using these descriptions it is possible to make
the provisional case that the high seas are global commons and perhaps even
the continent might be as well because it doesn't actually have one exclusive
sovereign. Deciding who owns Antarctica is not as straightforward as this,
however.
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty preserves the claims to territory as they
were in 1959, thus the claims have been acknowledged and protected but not
legally perfected. States parties can (and do) exert their authority but only
over their nationals, ships and aircraft while in the Antarctic (Antarctic
Treaty Article VIII). The Antarctic Treaty also preserves the position of
states parties in relation to high seas rights and duties under other
international law (Article VI). This international law contains numerous
constraints on Antarctic Treaty parties, but also opportunities to exercise
rights in the Antarctic. For example, the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) has zero quotas to prohibit commercial
whaling for any species anywhere, and there is a whale sanctuary established
under the Convention's schedule to give whales in the Southern Ocean extra
protection. Notwithstanding, its Article VIII permits the taking of whales in
the Southern Ocean through a scientific research permit provision and a rule
that permits reservations to decisions made in the International Whaling
Commission. Similarly, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)
Article 87 permits freedom to fish but this is constrained through, among
other things, the duty to cooperate with fisheries management agencies in
Article 117 (LOSC). In addition, the Antarctic — as defined in CCAMLR —
contains undisputed sovereign territory wherein States parties can exercise
jurisdiction exclusive of other states, as established in the Chairman's
Statement appended to the Final Act of the conference adopting CCAMLR.
In a different context, it could also be argued that south of 60° South is no
longer strictly beyond national jurisdiction since the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf ratified the coordinates of Australia's
extended continental shelf off Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, and
Macquarie Island, both of which extend south into the Antarctic Treaty
area.13 The Australian government was thus granted the right to extend its
exclusive jurisdiction over the area of the seabed and subsoil within this
extended continental shelf zone.14 However, Australia also has a
corresponding duty to share benefits from minerals extraction from the
seabed of the extended zone, as set out in LOSC Article 82, from the 200 nm
exclusive economic zone boundary seawards. This is because the LOSC
codifies the common heritage of mankind (CHM) designation for the sea bed
beyond national jurisdiction.

Are Antarctic resources common heritage of mankind?

The CHM concept originated during the third UN Law of the Sea conference
in 1967, when Ambassador Pardo from Malta successfully appealed for the
sea bed, beyond national jurisdiction, to be considered the common heritage
of mankind.15 In this context, Ambassador Pardo is interpreted to have meant
that the sea bed beyond national jurisdiction should not be owned by anyone;
management and benefits should be shared; it should be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes; and should be conserved for mankind, including future
generations.16
Like other buzzwords and phrases, common heritage of mankind tends to
be used indiscriminately and inappropriately. However, interpretive guidance
can be had from the international law instruments that formally encode it,
e.g. the LOSC in which common heritage applies to

the area of the sea-bed and ocean foor and the subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the
common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective
of the geographical location of States.17

LOSC came into force on 16 November 1994, thus giving legal effect to
common heritage of mankind.
In addition outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies are also
locations where the common heritage designation has the force of law. In the
Outer Space Treaty, for example, the following guiding principles were
outlined as the first three articles:
1 The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the
benefit and in the interests of all mankind.
2 Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all
States on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.
3 Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) expresses a common
heritagelike concept with regard to global biodiversity (e.g. ‘common
concern of humankind’ in the CBD Preamble). It can also be argued that
global climate is of significant global concern.
Despite these examples, common heritage of mankind, per se, does not
have an unambiguous legal definition and may not stand independently of
these treaties that invoke it.18 Persistent usage and common interpretation
may alter this perception in time but there are few, if any, actual instances of
the concept becoming a reality, almost as if it had no legal substance.
Certainly it would be difficult to argue that CHM is customary international
law. Recent work by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), for example,
concluded that the common heritage privileges availabel through LOSC
Article 82 (‘payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles’) are dormant because of
difficulties of implementation.19
Common heritage and global commons may be noble ideals but they do
not find support among the ATCPs, most of which are highly developed
countries that do not, themselves, stand to benefit from access or benefit-
sharing arrangements from current bioprospecting activities.

The commons concepts and Antarctic governance

None of the international conventions mentioned that expressly allocate
benefits to the international community has, as yet, paid out (e.g. invoking
either LOSC Article 82 or Article 140, ‘Benefit of mankind’ for sea bed
mining). This is primarily because there is no current minerals exploitation
on the sea bed and no attempts by a sovereign state to annex outer space or
the moon. No express legal provisions allocating benefits have appeared in
current Antarctic instruments either, nor are they likely to.20 The Antarctic
Treaty, while expressly acknowledging ‘all mankind’ (Preamble) and the
benefits of peace and science, does not provide a mechanism in it, or in any
of its active subsequent legal instruments, for sharing the benefits of
Antarctic resources.
Assuming, arguendo, that the sub-text of global commons and common
heritage is about access and benefit sharing, the ATCP position can be
exemplifed by their response to the actions of the Group of 77 developing
countries (G77) in the United Nations during the 1980s.21 During this time,
Malaysia — speaking on behalf of the Group — noted, among other things,
that the ATCPs were negotiating a minerals convention but that the Antarctic
should be considered the common heritage of mankind with all states,
particularly developing states, able to gain access and share the benefits from
any regime to exploit minerals. Their arguments rested on Malaysia's
perception that Antarctic resources were common property, unable to be
appropriated by any single state. Counter arguments from the Treaty Parties
were minimalist: Ignoring questions about benefit-sharing from Antarctic
resources, they simply pointed out that accession to the Antarctic Treaty was
open to any state Member of the United Nations22 as if accession to the
Treaty was the only barrier between developing countries and Antarctic
resources.
 When the minerals regime dissolved in 1989 in favour of an
environmental protocol to the Treaty that prohibited mining, G77 interest in
Antarctica began to dissolve as well. Only Malaysia has remained involved.
Each year since 2002 it has been invited to observe at the ATCM and each
year it is encouraged to accede to the Antarctic Treaty. Until October 2011,
Malaysia considered but rejected this encouragement, preferring instead to
continue accepting invitations to attend ATCMs, which the ATCPs continued
to issue, and securing places for Malaysian scientists with ATCP scientific
programmes heading south (e.g. Australian and New Zealand Antarctic
programmes). Malaysia acceded to the Antarctic Treaty on 31 October 2011,
and expressed its desire to quickly become a Consultative Party.
Ironically, the concepts of access and benefit sharing were formally
adopted in the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities (CRAMRA), to which the G77 was so strongly opposed
and which eventually failed. CRAMRA contained provisions acknowledging
that participation should be open to all states, particularly developing ones
(Preamble) and that the interests of the international community as a whole
should be taken into account in decisions about mineral resource activities
(Article 2.3(g)). Within CRAMRA there were also provisions for the
exchange of money earned from fees payable for various activities but there
were no instructions for disbursement of money in excess of budgetary
requirements. This function was to be the responsibility of a Commission,
established under Article 21. CRAMRA never entered into force, for a host
of political reasons, and formal access and benefit-sharing arrangements
have not reappeared in the Antarctic Treaty System.
Today the ATS regulates all human uses of the Antarctic. The
international community is rewarded for its faith in the system by receiving a
relatively healthy Antarctic environment and having free access to some
scientific information such as climate change forecasting and the status of
biodiversity. Whether this is what the international community would prefer
is a moot point.

The Antarctic approach to biological resources

Putting aside the questions of whether the Antarctic is or is not global
commons and its resources (including its environment) the common heritage
of mankind, limitations already exist on who can access resources and
benefit from its biological diversity or its clean environment. Note, however,
that all states parties are prohibited from extracting non-living resources,
under the provisions of Article 7 of the Madrid Protocol, though they may
conduct scientific research.

Limits on access to Antarctic biological resources

The ATS has a range of legal instruments regulating access to biological
resources. Essentially, all living things are given broad-ranging protection
under the Madrid Protocol (especially Annex II — the Conservation of
Antarctic Fauna and Flora), with an emphasis on permitting access for
purposes of scientific research. Even specially protected species can be taken
(within the specific meanings attributed to that term under Article 1, Annex
II) in accordance with a permit, for essential science. Some species also have
more specific protection.
Seals, for example, are not covered under CCAMLR despite them being
‘Antarctic marine living resources’. Rather, they can be harvested in
accordance with the regulatory regime established by CCAS, but only by the
nationals of signatory states. CCAMLR Commission Members can harvest
other marine living resources such as fin-fish and squid in accordance with
the CCAMLR Convention and in compliance with conservation measures
designed using ecosystem-based management principles. Whales are also
not covered under CCAMLR, even though they too ft the category. As
described, they are given special protection under a separate legal
instrument, outside the ATS.
There is no consistency of approach to Antarctic biological resources.
Some species are considered purely utilitarian (e.g. Patagonian toothfish);
others are both iconic and utilitarian (e.g. krill and whales). Krill – the
keystone zooplankton species in the Antarctic food web – is also harvested
and increasingly being used in bioprospecting industries, despite concerns
about total krill biomass.23 Whales, on the other hand, are so iconic to some
that all species are specially protected – irrespective of their conservation
status, while to others whales are simply sea-food. Species such as
phytoplankton attract relatively low interest in terms of bioprospecting but
have a central place in the Antarctic ecosystem (e.g. krill eat phytoplankton).
Fur seals, the stocks of which were decimated in the 1800s, had their
Specially Protected Species status under the Madrid Protocol revoked
because of a dramatic recovery in population numbers, but without future
management plans in place to ensure a downgrading in protection does not
compromise populations.24 Finally, while the ATCPs have consistently
acknowledged obligations to protect Antarctic species from the introduction
of alien species that could decimate naïve native populations, even more so
in a warming climate, they have hitherto been unable to agree on basic first
steps such as minimum biosecurity and quarantine protocols in place at the
gateway ports. The lack of a consistent approach to Antarctic biodiversity
confuses discussion about access to biological resources.

Benefit-sharing arrangements in the Antarctic

There are a number of phases of bioprospecting, given different titles by
different authors. Essentially they all relate to the activities of collecting
sample material, isolating ‘novelty’, screening for bioactivity and developing
a product. The process is not always linear and may require many loops, for
example the collection of more samples before novelty is isolated or the
screening process goes ahead. Developing a product may occur as many as
15 years after initial sample collection, if it occurs at all.
The first phase of sample collection may be quite straightforward, with no
major environmental implications and no further regulation required other
than what is already provided for in the ATS (especially the environmental
Madrid Protocol). Sample collection is scientific research and as such it will
be given only cursory attention as all ATS instruments give priority to
scientific research.
The subsequent phases are carried out ex situ in laboratories around the
world; however, in some cases it might be necessary to undertake in situ
resampling. The processes can become very expensive if there are problems
with synthetic replication, for example, and might not even result in a
marketable product. This raises two immediate problems for developers: one
is guaranteed continued access to the resource in an area that might be, on
the one hand claimed but also beyond national jurisdiction; and the second is
whether or not a developer would be asked to share benefits for sourcing
material from the Antarctic, where there is no sovereign owner.
 At some point the ATCPs might be forced to arbitrate on these matters and
put in place some legal mechanism for implementing their decisions.
Decisions that are complex like this will involve the ATCPs making value
judgements based on the values of individual states (and infuential
individuals within bureaucracies), adequate examination of the facts,
consideration of all perspectives, consequences of alternatives and,
ultimately, what is most beneficial to the state. Traditional approaches to
common good become more tenuous when recipients of personal and/or
commercial rewards (e.g. peer respect, profits from end-product sales or
licensing) are obliged to share with others who have made no contribution to
the process. This forced munifcence takes the stakes well beyond a simple
appeal to altruism; money is involved, and the objective of bio-prospecting
is, first and foremost, a commercial one. Notwithstanding, altruistic
obligations such as access and benefit sharing have been translated into legal
norms and given expression in modern international environmental law,
most notably in relation to the sea bed beyond national jurisdiction25 but also
the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD. Precedent does exist in the LOSC, even
though actual benefits have not yet begun to fow, and a better structure will
exist through the Nagoya Protocol, once it enters into force.

Discussion
A 2007 high level think-tank on future challenges and possibilities for the
polar regions in a changing climate reported that a ‘business as usual’
approach to polar governance may not be sustainable in the long term and
that it was vital that the ATCM regained its previous proactivity by dealing
with issues before they became reality or contentious. Proactivity would
enable negotiations to proceed in the absence of vested interests.26 The
think-tank regarded the issue of bioprospecting as important and noted that it
was under the consideration of the UN; furthermore, they pinpointed both
governance and economics as issues specifically for the attention of the
ATCPs in the future.27 Bioprospecting has all the hallmarks of a troublesome
issue for the ATCPs: it already exists, there are vested interests and there is
no specific regulation.
To show the scale of the problem, it is informative to look at just one
aspect of bioprospecting: the fling of patents. Using information on patents
registered in the European and US Patent Offices since the 1970s, Foster et
al.28 constructed a database to detect trends in the krill fishery of the
Southern Ocean. The research, originally published in 2003 and updated in
2009 (published in 2011), aimed to test whether the increase in notifications
required by CCAMLR for new and exploratory fisheries for krill matched
patent registrations. In an attempt to understand the discrepancies between
notifications of intent to harvest krill and actual reported catches, the
CCAMLR Scientific Committee had previously asked Members to supply
krill market information (prices, economics of the fishery, products)29 and in
2008 it again asked Members for information specifically on product types
to be derived from catches.30
Of all the potential bioprospecting activity in the Southern Ocean, it was
thought that the harvesting of marine species such as krill was the least-
problematic scenario because of the existence of the CCAMLR regulations
and their remit to conserve and use rationally ‘the populations of fin-fish,
molluscs, crustaceans and all other species of living organisms, including
birds’ (CCAMLR Article 1).31 Krill fishing has been carried out in the
Southern Ocean since the 1970s, with a variety of end uses for the harvest.
The patent database shows continuing global interest in the development of
patents for krill products (Figure 12.1), and how expectations about the
potential uses of krill have changed from krill for human food to krill for
human use, particularly medicines(Figure 12.2).32
The Foster et al. database confirms existing knowledge that krill are being
harvested for human use (pharmaceutical applications) and as an aquaculture
food stock rather than for human consumption — which was their original
use. Japan and Poland are two fishing states that originally dominated the
patent activity, but lately they have been overshadowed by the progressive
increase in patents being lodged by US and Canadian entities. This leads to
the conclusion that it is too late for the ATCPs to consider bioprospecting as
a hypothetical activity. The patent and Bioprospector databases clearly show
that activity has gone far beyond this point. Accordingly, it is also too late to
develop a commons conscience. While it is certainly not too late to invent a
new system to manage bioprospecting, it is highly unlikely in the near future
given the current frame of
Figure 12.1 Cumulative number of krill-related patents lodged from 1976 to
2008 (source, and to be viewed in conjunction with, Foster et al.
2011, Figure 2. Used with permission).
Figure 12.2 Comparison of krill-related patents for food and medicinal use.
Note that krill for aquaculture food stock surged in the hiatus
period of the 1990s (source, and to be viewed in conjunction
with, Foster et al. 2011, Figure 6. Used with permission).

mind of the ATCPs who, in 2011, confirmed that the current ATS had
appropriate regulation in place.
On the face of it, the taking of biological specimens from the Southern
Ocean or the Antarctic continent in the quest for potential novelty and
bioactivity should not be seen as activities that have an ethical or moral
contradiction to them. Rather, bioprospecting is a commercial venture
balanced on a substrate of legitimate scientific research, not unlike Southern
Ocean high seas fishing. In the case of bio-prospecting, as with fishing,
ownership of the resources (e.g. krill) will be conferred on the proponent
(the bioprospector or the fisher) by the laws of his sovereign state (which
may have been guided by relevant Antarctic regulation) but with no
consideration whatsoever for the whole of mankind as a beneficiary.
Even if it could be argued that the Southern Ocean is a global commons
where resources belong to everyone, exclusive rewards are being derived
from those resources now. Southern Ocean fishers harvest fish for their own
benefit, even though yield is based on an allowable catch for the whole
fishery calculated through scientific research and regulated through legal and
administrative frameworks. Fishers do not fish for purely egalitarian reasons
— to feed masses of starving people — even though the World Health
Organization lists malnutrition, especially in developing countries, as a
major health problem that moral imperatives dictate every capable human
should help to address.33 High seas fishers are rewarded for their effort by
selling their fish in the marketplace. The market makes the product of the
fishers' labours accessible to anyone who has purchasing power, having first
established a margin of profit for itself. Reward is not guaranteed, however.
The fishers might not catch enough fish to make their voyage economically
viable; the market might be saturated with fish, bringing the price down;
they might strike bad weather or heavy ice conditions, or have a fire onboard
that would render them in grave danger; or fag states might impose
excessively large licence fees to try to reduce overcapacity in the fishing
feet. Both the burden and the risks lie squarely with the fishers, so why
should Antarctic bioprospecting be treated differently to fishing?
In the case of bioprospecting, the investor is the risk-taker. Access to
resources in an unusual, unowned place like the Antarctic may not be
guaranteed as the investor is not able to deal directly with one sovereign
government to negotiate current industry standard conditions such as prior
informed consent or the means of fair and equitable sharing. Even at
sovereign state level these conditions are problematic and developing
countries argue that more needs to be done to secure their so-called rights in
relation to bioprospecting.34 In the Antarctic, however, the investor may
need to do little more than source original material from the region, perhaps
accomplished through a small scientific project, and may never need to
resample or even harvest. The bulk of the work occurs in a laboratory
outside the Antarctic Treaty area and thus outside the control of the ATCPs.
One drawback in trying to apply commons concepts to Antarctic
bioprospecting is actually a structural one: there is no institution to
undertake the functions of a surrogate sovereign. The ATCPs have carte
blanche to discuss matters of relevance to the Antarctic, make decisions by
consensus at each annual ATCM and take recommendations to their
governments for action. Yet the ATCM itself ceases to exist, per se, at the
end of each meeting, only to be resurrected again the following year. In the
interim, the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat — the administrative servant of the
ATCM — has no autonomy and no power beyond what is necessary to carry
out its functions. Considering the disparate groups of state parties (claimants,
non-claimants and others) and the long and complex history leading to the
adoption of the Secretariat, granting the organisation institutional autonomy
outside the ATCM would be unlikely (unthinkable, even).

Conclusion
Bioprospecting is an activity that lives up to all the very high egalitarian
expectations laid out in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, including those of peace
and the free exchange of scientific information.35 Moreover, exclusive
reward from bio-prospecting is as legitimate as exclusive reward from
fishing for the states parties to the relevant instruments of the ATS. The
Southern Ocean under CCAMLR is not a global commons in relation to all
Antarctic marine living resources (CCAMLR Article 1) as access is both
controlled and competency-based. The marine species most likely to be
bioactive are also ostensibly covered under CCAMLR's rules about
harvesting and conservation (although this is yet to be fully tested). If non-
living or sedentary resources from the sea bed become the object of
bioprospecting activity, they will be freely accessible while the only activity
involves sample collection — euphemistically called marine scientific
research — promoted specifically by the ATS and protected generally by the
LOSC. If living terrestrial resources are bioprospecting targets (e.g.
microbes in soil), nationals of states parties to the Antarctic Treaty/Madrid
Protocol can freely access them, in accordance with legal obligations which
include environmental evaluation and respect of special provisions that may
apply (e.g. permits to enter specially protected areas).
If sample collection is all that actually occurs in the Antarctic, then
reporting the findings, even as simply as describing taxa in the academic
literature, will suffice in terms of obligations owed to all mankind under the
provisions that require scientific results and observations from Antarctica be
shared (Treaty Preamble and Article III).
Notwithstanding, the ATCPs can choose to make new regulations about
bio-prospecting that do incorporate equitable access or at least benefit-
sharing schemes. This could not cover the activities of third party states
because their consent would be required, and in any case the ATCPs would
be confident that while representing less than 25 per cent of the world's
states the 50 Treaty parties realistically embody the sum total of global
interest in and capacity to undertake Antarctic bioprospecting. Furthermore,
it is highly unlikely that the ATCPs would hand over regulation of Antarctic
bioprospecting to a third party such as the United Nations.
It might be possible for the ATCPs to reach consensus on such schemes as
the payment of fees by commercial bioprospectors into a common fund to
support Antarctic science; royalty payments into the same fund for
commercially successful products; and an open-access sample receptacle for
common usage.36 Each one is a means of sharing benefits that does not
involve the direct transfer of money and in each case does not leave the
Antarctic environment open to a resources rush with potentially negative
consequences.
The prospect of a challenge by developing countries based on commons
arguments is remote, to say the least, and the supremacy of the ATCPs goes
unchallenged today, 50 years into their governance. This is confirmed, in
some measure, by the accession of Malaysia to the Antarctic Treaty in 2011.
It is plain from their behaviour that the ATCPs do not embrace commons
arguments except insofar as the individual legal instruments promote peace,
cooperation and science, and environmental safeguards to help retain
environmental integrity. Developing countries are naturally limited in their
ability to access Antarctic resources, due in part to a lack of capacity, and the
argument the ATCPs would run if challenged on how Antarctic activities
benefit all mankind, is to offer peace, scientific results and a pristine
environment as alternatives, thereby satisfying any possible contradiction
over ethics.

Notes
1 Bioprospector, United Nations University, availabel at
www.bioprospector.org/bio-prospector/antarctica/home.action; Foster,
J., Nicol, S., Kawguchi, S. (2011) The use of patent databases to detect
trends in the krill fishery. CCAMLR Science, 18, pp. 135–144.
2 Bioprospector, ibid.
3 Netherlands (2008) ‘Report of the ATCM Intersessional Contact Group
to examine the issue of biological prospecting in the Antarctic Treaty
Area’, Working Paper 4 to ATCM XXXI, at p. 7.
4 Jabour-Green, J., Nicol, D. (2003) Bioprospecting in areas outside
national jurisdiction: Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Melbourne
Journal of International Law 4:1, pp. 76–111. For another perspective
see Vigni, P. (2006) Antarctic bioprospecting: Is it compatible with the
value of Antarctica as a natural reserve? In: Francioni, F. and Scovazzi,
T. (eds) Biotechnology and International Law (Oxford: Hart), pp. 111–
145.
 5 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, Resolution 9 (2009) ATCM
XXXII, Baltimore, availabel at www.ats.aq; Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden (2009) ‘The Antarctic
Biological Prospecting Database’, Working Paper 1 to ATCM XXXII,
availabel at www.ats.aq1.
6 Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, Final Report, ATCM XXXIV, Buenos
Aires, paras 422–428, availabel at www.ats.aq.
7 Ibid. See also Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Nagoya Protocol on Access and benefit-Sharing, availabel at
www.cbd.int/abs/; United Nations, Ad hoc Openended Informal
Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and
sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national
jurisdiction, information availabel at
www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversityworkinggroup/biodi-
versityworkinggroup.htm.
8 For general information see Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Access and benefit-sharing in practice: Trends in partnerships
across sectors. Technical Series No. 38, availabel at www.cbd.int.
9 Foster et al., note 1.
10 Bioprospector, note 1.
11 Argentina, ‘Report on the recent bioprospecting activities carried out by
Argentina during the period 2010–2011’, Information Paper 16 to
ATCM XXXIV, Buenos Aires; and Netherlands, ‘A case of biological
prospecting’, Information Paper 62 to ATCM XXXIV, Buenos Aires,
availabel at www.ats.aq.
12 Wijkman, P.M. (1982) Managing the global commons. International
Organisation 36:3, pp. 511–536.
13 Jabour, J. (2008) The Australian continental shelf: Has Australia's high
latitude diplomacy paid off? Marine Policy 33: pp. 429–431.
14 14 Ibid.
15 UN Doc. A/6695, 1967.
16 Joyner, C. C. (1986) Legal implications of the concept of the common
heritage of mankind. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35:
 pp. 190–199; Larschan, B., Brennan, B. C. (1982) The common
heritage of mankind principle in international law. Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 21:2, pp. 305–337; Weiss, E. B. (1989) In Fairness
to Future Generations: International law, common patrimony and
intergenerational equity (New York, The United Nations University,
Transnational Publishers Inc.); and Zou, K. (1991) The common
heritage of mankind and the Antarctic Treaty System. Netherlands
International Law Review 38:2, pp. 173–198.
17 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) Preamble.
18 Triggs, G. (1986) International Law and Australian Sovereignty in
Antarctica (Sydney: Legal Books).
19 International Seabed Authority (2009) Issues associated with the
implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. ISA Technical Study No. 4, availabel at
http:www.isa.org.jm.
20 Jabour, J., Weber, M. (2008) Is it time to cut the Gordian knot of polar
sovereignty? RECIEL 17:1, pp. 27–40.
21 Beck, P. (1986) Antarctica at the United Nations, 1985: The end of
consensus? Polar Record 23:143, pp. 159–166; Tepper, R., Haward, M.
(2005) The development of Malaysia's position on Antarctica: 1982 to
2004. Polar Record 41:217, pp. 113–124.
22 For example see UN Doc A/C.1/38/PV.42 (1983).
23 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, CCAMLR XXX, Advance Copy, Report of the Thirtieth
Meeting of the Commission, Hobart, Australia, 24 October–4
November 2011, paras 8.8–8.10.
24 Jabour, J. (2008) Successful conservation — then what? The de-listing
of Arctocepha-lus fur seal species in Antarctica. Journal of
International Wildlife Law and Policy 11:1, pp. 1–29.
25 Brunnée, J. (2007) Common areas, common heritage, and common
concern. In Bodansky, D., Brunnée, J. and Hey, E. (eds) The Oxford
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 550–573.
 Polar Regions Unit, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Offce (2007)
26 Polar regions: Challenges and possibilities. Report of the Chair of the
Meeting held at Wilton Park, UK, 1–4 October, 2007, p. 7.
27 Ibid.
28 Foster et al., note 1.
29 Nicol, S., Foster, J. (2003) Perspective — recent trends in the fishery
for Antarctic krill. Aquatic Living Resources 16: pp. 42–45.
30 Foster et al., note 1.
31 Jabour-Green and Nicol, note 4.
32 Foster et al., note 1.
33 WHO World Health Organization. Nutrition, availabel at
www.who.int/nutrition/en.
34 Straus, J. (2008) How to break the deadlock preventing a fair and
rational use of biodiversity. The Journal of World Intellectual Property
11:4, pp. 229–295.
35 Guyomard, A.E. (2006), Bioprospecting in Antarctica: A new challenge
for the Antarctic Treaty System. In: Francioni, F. and Scovazzi, T. (eds)
Biotechnology and International Law, Oxford: Hart, pp. 147–169.
36 Jabour-Green and Nicol, note 4.
Index

Abdullah Badawi 99
Adelie Land 166, 167, 168
Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels 171
Agreement on the Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws 171
Ahlmann, Hans 199, 217n21
albatrosses 23, 171
Alexander I Land 137
Alfred Wegener Institute of Polar and Marine Research (AWI) of Germany
104, 202
Aliyev, Heydar 140
Aliyev, Ilham 140
Amelung, Bas 224
Amundsen, Roald 221
Amundsen Scott base 135
Antarctic governance 197, 206
Antarctic imperialism 194
Antarctic mineral resources 7, 9, 41–3, 76, 115, 140–1, 171, 172, 199, 201,
203, 217n34; see also Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA); mining 171, 172, 173, 174
Antarctic Peninsula 14, 225
Antarctic Problem 14, 17
Antarctic regime 173
Antarctic Research, A European Network for Astrophysics 178
Antarctic research stations 223–4; Akademik Vernadsky138; Amundsen–
Scott (South Pole) 116, 206, 208, 209, 218n47; Arctowski 201;
Bharati68–9; Byrd 116; Changcheng33; Concordia 177, 178, 209;
Faraday (renamed Akademik Vernadsky) 137–8; Jang Bogo 79–80; on
King George Island 208, 210, 212; Kunlun 34; Leningradskaia133, 136;
in Laserman Hills 204; McMurdo 100, 152, 202, 205, 211; Maitri 61;
Mirny 136, 140, 143n2; Molodezhnaya133, 136, 139, 141;
Novolazarevskaia136–7, 208; Palmer 116; Progress136–7;
Russkaia133, 136; SANAE 209; Scott Base 98, 100, 211; Sejong76, 79;
Siple 116; Svea203; Troll 208; Wasa203; Willard 116; Vostok133, 136,
208, 209, 210; Zhongshan 33–4; see also further lists appearing on 210
and 214 (Appendix)
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) 172, 209–10, 211,
218n46, 223, 240–1n92
Antarctic sovereignty 8–9, 14, 195–6, 197, 209, 220–1, 225–6, 234;
extended continental shelf claims 231; sovereign territorial claims 18,
19, 24, 25, 135–7, 141–2, 163, 171, 176, 221, 234
Antarctic tourism 8, 122, 175, 208–9; activities 223; carrying capacity 225;
commercial cruises 222–4; see also Princess Cruise Line; cumulative
impacts 225, 228; differing ATCP views of 220, 228, 234, 240–1n92;
disaster tourism 233; eco-tourism 223; and environment 220, 224–225;
Europe and Antarctica, tourism market 224; free-riders 228; hazardous
nature 220, 224, 230; lack of comprehensive policy 228–9, 234; lack of
regulation 220, 226, 229; markets 224; negative impacts 224; numbers
223, 228; policy entrepreneurs and imaginaries 228; positive benefts
 224; possible multilateral convention 220, 232, 234–6; predictions of
disaster 234; sovereignty-centred tourism 234–5; tourism charges and
taxes 235, 241n94; tourism measures 231–2; tourist season 223; value
of industry 224
Antarctic Treaty: Article I 16; Article II 16, 221; Article III 222; Article IV
17, 18, 20, 24, 245–6; Article VII 222; Article IX 227, 229; challenges
faced 8; claimant states 7; Cold War era 1, 221; consensus decision-
making 220, 232; critiques of 2, 8; governance 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 111–13,
117–22, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171, 175, 179, 180; politics of 3, 9, 76;
post-Cold War era 1, 2, 3, 6; research outputs 2
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) 14, 15, 17, 21, 163, 170,
174, 175, 194, 203, 209, 211, 242–3, 251, 254
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) 7, 8, 9, 38, 41, 115, 148, 17,
18, 19, 24, 97, 99, 100, 107, 169, 171, 173, 174, 179, 193, 194, 197,
201, 209, 220, 226, 228–36, 242, 251, 255
Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 193, 219n52
Antarctic Treaty System 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 24, 163, 164, 165, 172, 174,
179; claimant states 136; Belarus 139; Estonia 141; as an institution 1,
13, 19, 21, 22, 24, 41, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 105, 107, 194, 200, 206, 208,
212, 220, 225, 231; Russia 132–7, 141–2; science criterion as entry
ticket 194, 197, 200, 213, 217n34; Soviet Union 130; stability of 206;
Ukraine 137–8, 142
Antarctica: as commons 220, 233, 236; globalization 223; heroic age of
exploration 221; scientifc research 15, 18, 221–2, 225, 227; stewardship
ethic 224, 231, 233; sui generis 243, 252, 256; terra nullius 221;
wilderness 229
Antarctica New Zealand 104
Antarctica sectors 136
Arctic 133–5, 176, 177; ice cover shrinkage 101; see also North Polar
region; Russia: ‘polar state’
Arctic and Antarctic 176, 204, 205
Area Protection 174
Argentina and Antarctica 97, 104, 106, 107, 169, 200
Arturo Parodi Antarctic station 140
Arvid Pardo 97
Asian Forum for Polar Sciences (AFoPS) 6, 100, 203, 218n36
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 100, 106, 107
astronomy in Antarctica 209
Australia and Antarctica 1, 8, 15, 20, 21, 98, 104, 106, 107, 119, 136, 166,
169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 178, 197, 204, 207;
Australian Academy of Science 195; Australian Antarctic Division (AAD)
104; Australian Antarctic Territory 2, 136, 143n2; sovereign territorial
claim 221, 234; tourism market 224
Azerbaijan and Antarctica 6, 139–40, 142; funding 140; publications 140
Azizan Abu Samah 104

Bagirov, Huseyn 140

Bahia Paraiso229
Beardsmore Glacier, conference at 198
Beck, Peter 57, 59, 105
Bedritsky, Alexandr 135, 144n18
Beeby, Christopher 200
Bektursunov, Kadyrbek 141
Belarus and Antarctica 6, 132, 138–9, 142; Belarus Antarctic Expedition
(BAE) 139; Belarus Government 139; funding 139; Soviet Antarctic
Expedition (SAE), Belarus input 138; Union of Russia and Belarus 139;
see also Antarctic Treaty System: Belarus; Customs Union; Gora
Vechernyaya feld base; Antarctic research station: Molodezhnaya
Belgium and Antarctica 197, 208, 216n10
Bellingshausen, Faddei see Russia and Antarctica: Russian Antarctic
Expedition under Bellingshausen and Lazarev
Berlin Wall 221
Bifocalism 18
Bildt, Carl 205
bioprospecting 8–9, 68, 231, 242, 248; and the Antarctic Treaty System
243, 251, 255; and CCAMLR 245, 252; and the commons 254; and the
Convention on Biological Diversity 244; industries 250; investor 254;
phases 250; objective 251, 253; objects 255; patents 251
Bioprospector database 243, 252, 256
Brady, Anne-Marie 105, 203, 215n9
Brazil and Antarctica 194, 201
British Antarctic Survey (BAS) 104, 137–8
Bullen, Keith 195–6, 215n6
Bushell, Robyn 224
bycatch 171

Canada and Antarctica: scientifc links with China 33

Castro, Fidel 221
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifque 165
Chaturvedi, Sanjay 193, 203, 231
Chen Lianzeng 37
Chernobyl 172
Chernomydrin, Victor 134
Chile and Antarctica 33, 200; Institute Antarctico Chileno (INACH) 104;
sovereign territorial claim 221, 234
Chilingarov, Artur 134, 144n18
China and Antarctica 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 67, 98, 100, 105, 106, 179, 194, 201, 203,
204, 207; accession to Antarctic Treaty 35; Antarctic organizations 32;
as ATCP 233; budgets 31, 36–7; CCAMLR 40; “China threat” 44, 45;
Cold War era 34, 39;
China and Antarctica — cont. critique of ATS 40–3; diplomacy 33; fishing
45; foreign policy 43–4, 45–6; governance 44–6; leadership roles in
ATS 37–8; mineral resources 41–3; polar exploration 35; propaganda
38–9; research stations 33–4; science 38; sovereignty claims 43; Taiwan
39; tourism market 224
China Arctic and Antarctic Administration 33–4
Chirkov, Anton 141
Christchurch-McMurdo air-route 202, 217n30
Chun Doo-hwan 80
claims see Antarctic sovereignty
climate change and Antarctica 64, 164, 175
Clinton, Hilary 205
Cold War 193, 196, 197; end of 193, 201
Collaborative East Antarctic Marine Census 178
colonialism 193, 194, 197, 206
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) 20, 22, 23, 169–71, 202, 225
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 21
Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) 163, 174, 175, 225, 235
Common Economic Space 132, 142
Common Fisheries Policy 166
common heritage of mankind 50, 57, 61, 65, 243; and access and beneft-
sharing 248; and Antarctic resources 247, 249; and the Convention on
Biological Diversity 247; defnition 247; and LOSC 246–7
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 131–2, 141–2
Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE) 225
Concert of Asia 64
consortia 204, 208; see also Dronning Maud Land Air Network
(DROMLAN); Dronning Maud Land Shipping (DROMSHIP)
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 243; Article 4, 244; and
common heritage of mankind 247; and Nagoya Protocol 243, 251
Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals 1972 (CCAS) 120, 225,
244, 249
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) 40, 120, 156, 245, 249–52, 255
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
(CRAMRA) 19, 76, 97, 105, 119, 148, 164, 171, 172, 173, 174, 203,
217n34, 223
Cooperative Fisheries Surveillance Treaty 170
cost-sharing (in Antarctic logistics) 193, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212
Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP) 207,
208, 218n42
Cousteau, Jacques 172
Cousteau Foundation 173
Crick, Bernard 14
Crozet Island 166, 168, 169, 170, 171
Cuba 221
Customs Union 132, 142, 146n64

Dastidar, Prabir G. 2, 38
demilitarisation 13, 24
Deng Xiaoping 43–4
Dodds, Klaus 52–4, 194
Dome A 31, 34, 179
Dome C 177, 178
Downie, David 232
Dronning Maud Land (DML) 199, 202–3, 217n32
Dronning Maud Land Air Network (DROMLAN) 207–8
Dronning Maud Land Shipping (DROMSHIP) 208
Dudeney, John R. 2, 38, 41

ecosystem-based approach 23
Ecuador and Antarctica 104, 106, 107
Eden, Sally 56
Elzinga, Aant 231
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 174, 225–6, 231–2, 235
Environmental Law 163
Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations 172
Environmental Protection 173, 174, 175
Enzenbacher, Debra 228
Erebus crash 148
Erlander, Tage 200
Estonia and Antarctica 6, 131, 137, 141–2, 211; Club of Estonian Members
of Polar Expeditions 141; Estonian government 141; funding 141;
Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE), Estonia input 131, 141; see also
Antarctic Treaty System: Estonia; Kaupp, Enn; Saarso, Mart;
Tammiksaar, Erki
European Commission 167
European Community 166
European Polar Board 177, 178, 179, 204
European Polar Consortium 204, 205, 218n38
European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA) 177, 178, 209,
219n48
European Science Foundation 178, 204, 209
European Synchrotron Radiation facility (ESFR) 212, 219n49
European Union and Antarctica 165, 166, 176
Exclusive Economic Zone 166, 169, 170, 171
Expéditions Polaires Françaises 168
Exxon Valdez 229

Fedchuk, Andriy 138

Fidler, David P. 69
fishing 45, 120–1
Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) 98
Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations) 23
France and Antarctica 7, 119, 209, 210; Antarctic agencies 165–8; budget
165; CCAMLR 169–71; CRAMRA 171–3; foreign policy 165, 179;
history 167–8; international collaborations 33, 175–9; Madrid Protocol
173–5; national interests 164, 167; National Plan of Action 171; policy
167, 179, 180 politics 163, 167, 176, 179; science 165, 166, 168, 176,
177, 179, 180; sovereign territorial claim 163, 168, 169, 221; tourism
175
Gaudin, Christian 166, 167
Gaidashev, Aleksei 139
Galindez Island 137
Georgia 131
Germany and Antarctica 33, 176, 177, 178, 202
globalization 193, 203, 206
Gora Vechernyaya feld base 139
Greenland Ice Core Project 178
Greenpeace 211
Group of 77, 233
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Antarctic Waters 231
Guo Peiqing 38, 41, 42

Haase (Liggett), Daniela 224

Hammarskjöld, Dag 200
Hanessian, John 200
Haward, Marcus 103, 105
Hawke, Bob 172
Heard Island and McDonald Islands 171
Hempel, Gotthilf 202
Hemmings, Allan 212
Heritage of Mankind, as Antarctic regime concept 194
Herlofsson, Nicolai 195
Heroic Era 18
Hong Kong and Antarctica 39, 40
hot pursuit 170
Hu Lingtai 41
Huber, Jan 219n52

ice core drilling 178

illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 24, 166, 170
Ilolov, Mamadsho 140
India and Antarctica 1, 2, 3, 4–5, 6, 98, 105, 106, 107, 194, 200, 201, 203,
207; Arctic presence 62; ATCP 233; budget 62; CRAMRA 59; foreign
policy dimension 50; Indian Ocean dimension 62–4; intervention in the
UN 54–6; scientific interest 62; tourism market 224
Indonesia and Antarctica 8
Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) 225
Institut Polaire Française Paul Emile Victor 165, 166, 167, 178
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 17
International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO) 224, 226,
228–9, 234
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973
and Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL) 230–1
International Cooperation 164, 175, 176, 177, 179
International Council of Scientifc Unions (ICSU) 15, 195
International Geophysical Year (IGY) 14–15, 34, 130, 143n2, 144n28, 168,
195, 196, 197, 199, 215n5, 221–2
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 98, 229–31
International Polar Year(s) (IPY) 8, 14–15, 84, 134–5, 144n18, 166, 176,
179, 204, 215n8
international research station 211, 213
International Seabed Authority 248
International Space Station 212
internationalisation 212
Italy 33, 176, 177, 178
Italy and Antarctica 38, 202, 209, 210

Japan and Antarctica 6, 33, 105, 106, 203, 204

Joyner, Christopher C. 3, 5, 226
Kaplan, Robert 64
Karlqvist, Anders 202
Kaupp, Enn 141
Kayumov, Abdulhamid 140
Kazakhstan and Antarctica 6, 132, 141–2; see also Customs Union
Kerguelen Islands 166, 168, 169, 170, 171
Kim Dae-jung 81
Kim Young-sam 80–1
King George Island 135
Korea and Antarctica 1, 3, 5, 6, 33, 203, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105; accession to
Antarctic Treaty 76; Antarctic organizations 75–9, 104; biotechnology
87; budget 75, 78; corporate involvement 78; diplomacy 76, 83;
economic interests 85–9; fishing 76, 85; governance 86; icebreaker 88–
9; mineral resources 86; politics 80–2; research stations 76, 79–80;
science 83–5
krill 242; and bioprospecting 252; fishing 245, 251–2; iconic status 250;
and market information 251; and patents 243, 251–3
Kudekov, Tursynbek 141

Laiba, Anatoly 136–7

Lamers, Machiel 224
Latvia 131
Lasswell, Harold 1, 14
Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 19, 20, 21, 22; see also United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Lee Myung-bak 81–2
Li Ming-juinn 39
Li Shenggui 36
Linea Area Nacional 222
Ling Xiaoliang 42
Lithuania and Antarctica 131
Litvinov, Valery 137–8
Livingstone, David 54
Lonely Planet: Antarctica 223
Lukashenko, Alexander 139
Lukin, Valery 132, 136
Luns, Joseph 197

McCool, Stephen 224

McCully, Murray 205
McMurdo Sound 222
Madrid Protocol 86, 97, 105, 134, 163, 173–5
Mahathir bin Mohamad 5, 96, 97, 98, 99
Malaysia and Antarctica 3, 5, 6, 8, 19, 21, 35, 66, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 194, 201, 203, 204, 211; Academy of Sciences
Malaysia (ASM) 100, 101, 102, 103, 106; Little Napoleons 98;
Malaysian Antarctic Research Programme (MARP) 101, 102, 104;
Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica (MISA) 105, 105;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia 99, 100, 102; Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment (MONRE) 101, 102; Ministry of Science,
Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) 101, 102; National Antarctic
Research Centre (NARC) 101, 102; National Polar Science Agency
101, 102, 106; National Task Force on Antarctic Research 101, 102,
233; and New Zealand 159; in the UN 248–9; Universiti Putra Malaysia
(UPM) 103; University of Malaya (UM) 101, 104
Maximus Ongkili 101
Melander, Olle 200, 217n31
Ministry of Land and Natural Resources (China) 32
Mitigation Measures 171
Mitterand, François 173
Modelling and Observation Studies of Antarctic Katabatics (MOSAK)
Monteath, C. 228
Moon Treaty 23
Mount Vinson 140
Myrdal, Alva 201

Najib Razak 99
Nash, Walter 53, 200
National Academies of Science (NAS, Washington, DC) 206
national interests 193, 202
National Science Foundation (NSF, in USA) 205
Netherlands and Antarctica 201, 210, 216n10, 216n11
New Economic World Order 193
New Zealand and Antarctica 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 21, 33, 53, 97, 98, 100, 172,
175, 178, 198, 200, 202, 204, 205; Antarctic governance 157; Antarctic
NGOs 152; Antarctic organizations 150–2; Antarctica New Zealand
104; claimant state 148–50; economic interests 155–6; environmental
interests 157–8; Erebus crash 148; and foreign policy 158–9; geography
147; history 147–8; international collaboration 159; leadership roles in
ATS; Malaysia 159; political interests 156–7; science 154–5; Scott Base
152–4, 158; sovereign territorial claim 149, 221; strategic interests 160;
UNCLOS 150; United States 158–9
Niyazov, Saparmurat 131
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 98, 100
Non-Native Species 174
Nordenskjöld, Otto 199, 200
North Polar region 132; see also Arctic
Norway and Antarctica 21, 33, 169; sovereign territorial claim 221
Norwegian–British–Swedish Antarctic Expedition 199, 216n19
Nuclear Free Zone 25

Offce Parlementaire D'Évaluation des Choix Scientifques et Technologique

166, 172
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 99 outsourcing 205

Pacifc Andes 40
Pakistan and Antarctica 3, 204
Palmer, Geoffrey 232
Pan American Airways 222
Pan Min 36
Park Chung-hee 80
patents: US and European Databases 243; krill-related 252–3
Patriot Hills 135, 140
Patrushev, Nikolai 135
Poland and Antarctica 201
Polar Code 229, 231
Polar Research Institute of China 33
Polar View 230
Pole of Inaccessibility 197
politics as a concept 3, 9, 13, 14; definitions 3, 13, 4, 25
post-colonial 50, 51, 5–54
Princess Cruise Line 223
privatization 206
Programma Nazionale di Richerde in Antartide 178
Pronichev, Vladimir 135
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991
(PEPAT); see also Madrid Protocol Punta Arenas 135
Putin, Vladimir 134

“Question of Antarctica” 96, 97, 98, 99, 105, 106, 107

Ramachandran, S. 2, 38
Rayfuse, Rosemary 232
regionalisation 204, 208
Robin, Gordon de Q 199
Rocard, Michel 167, 172, 173
Roh Moo-hyun 81
Romania and Antarctica; scientifc links with China 33
Ross Dependency 149
Russia (Russian Federation) and Antarctica 1, 3, 6, 33, 131–7, 141–2, 208;
Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) 131–2, 137, 143n7;
budget 6, 136; decree regarding Antarctica 133–5; failings 135; funding
131, 133, 135; icebreaker 6; Leningradskaia Antarctic station 133, 136;
logistics 130, 133–4, 142; ‘minimum allowable’ operations in
Antarctica 134; Mirny Antarctic station 136, 140, 143n2; Molodezhnaya
Antarctic station 133, 136, 139, 141; Novolazarevskaia Antarctic station
136–7; ‘optimal’ operations in Antarctica 134; ‘polar state’ 132–3, 135;
Progress Antarctic station 136–7; research outputs 2; resupply 136;
Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE) 132–4, 139–42; Russian Antarctic
 Expedition under Bellingshausen and Lazarev 130, 137, 141; Russian
Association of Members of Polar Expeditions 134; Russian Government
132–5; Russian Polar Marine Geological Prospecting Expedition 136;
Russkaia Antarctic station 133, 136; salary 133; strike 133; tourism
market 224; Union of Russia and Belarus 139; vessels 130, 134, 136–7,
139; Vostok Antarctic station 133, 136; see also Antarctic Treaty
System: Russia; Antarctic Treaty System: Soviet Union; Arctic;
Customs Union; South Pole; South Polar region; Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR)
Russia–Georgia confict in South Ossetia 131
Russian Federal Security Service 135

Saarso, Mart 141

Saint Paul and Amsterdam Islands 166, 168
Sarkozy, Nicolas 167
Savatyugin, Lev 131
Schytt, Valter 198, 199
science as politics 196–7
science/politics boundary 196
scientifc autonomy, principle of 196
Scientifc Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) 14, 35, 100, 106, 117,
193, 194, 195–6, 197, 207, 209, 212, 235
scientifc internationalism, principle of 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 203, 206
Scott, Karen 219n52
Scott, Shirley 194, 234
Scott Base 98, 100
Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) 200
Scottish Association for Marine Science 104
sealers and whalers 221
search and Rescue 229
Seungryeol, Kim 203
ships: Araon204; Gondwana 211; Laurence M. Gould 116; Nathaniel B.
Palmer 116; Oden II 205; Polarstern 202; Stena Arctica 203; Xue Long
32
Siti Aisyah Alias, Dr 102
Sobral, José Maria 200
South Africa and Antarctica 21, 38, 166, 169, 208, 209;
South Africa National Antarctic Programme (SANAP) 104
South Polar region 130–1, 133–4, 142
South Pole 134–5, 140, 142, 197
South Shetland Islands 222
Southern Ocean 163
South-South Countries 97
Soviet Union see Russia; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
Spain 177
Spitsbergen 177
Standing Group on Logistics and Operations (SCALOP) 207
State Oceanic Administration (China) 32
station sharing 209, 210, 218n46
Stockholm conference 197, 198, 215n4
Stokke, Olav Schramm 3
Striha, Maksim 138
Strugatsky, Vladimir 135
Sub-Antarctic 165, 166, 170
sui generis 243–4
Sulikowski, Chavelli 210
superpowers 195, 196–7, 206
Sweden and Antarctica 198–201, 202, 203, 205; Swedish Antarctic
Research Programme (SWEDARP) 202

Taiwan and Antarctica 39–40

Tajikistan and Antarctica 6, 131, 140, 142, 146n64; funding 140; Soviet
Antarctic Expedition (SAE), Tajikistan input 131, 140
Tammiksaar, Erki 141
Terres australes et antarctiques françaises 165, 166, 167, 168
Teutenberg, Bo Johnson 198, 199, 200, 202
Titanic, SS 220
transnationalism 206
Trinity Peninsula 222
Truman Doctrine 196–7
Turkmenistan 131

Ukraine and Antarctica 6, 137–8, 142, 146n64; Akademik Vernadsky

Antarctic station (former Faraday) 138; XXXI Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Kiev 138; budget 138; funding 138,
142; logistics 138; Ukraine and Russia 137; Ukrainian Antarctic Centre
(UAC) 137–8, 142; Ukrainian Antarctic Expedition (UAE) 137;
Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers 138; vessels 130, 137
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 6, 7, 15, 168, 172; Antarctic
Treaty, Cold War era 1, 197, 207, 221; Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) 130; Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE) 130–3, 136–8,
140–1, 143n2, 196; Soviet government 130–3; see also Russia
United Kingdom and Antarctica 21, 104, 105, 106, 107, 166, 169, 200;
British Antarctic Survey (BAS) 137–8; sovereign territorial claim 221
United Nations and Antarctica 19, 21, 198, 200–1
United Nations Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf 43, 114–15,
150
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 57, 58, 97,
114, 231, 246; common heritage of mankind 246–7; International
Seabed Authority 248, 251; marine scientifc research 255
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 98
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 22
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 106
United States and Antarctica 5, 7, 14, 15, 33, 100, 106, 178, 197, 200, 206;
Antarctic interests 111; Antarctic organizations 110–11; Antarctic
sovereignty 113–14; Antarctic Treaty, Cold War era 1, 111–12, 221;
biological prospecting 117–18; budgets 6; climate change 116–17;
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 120; Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
120; Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities (CRAMRA) 119; environmental protection 118–19; fishing
120–1; foreign policy 110–28; icebreaker 6, 158; mineral resources in
Antarctica 115; New Zealand 158–9; Operation Deep Freeze 14;
Operation High Jump 14; research outputs 2; scientifc interests 115–16,
117; tourism 121–2, 224; United Nations Commission on Limits of the
Continental Shelf 114–15; whaling 121

Verbitsky, Jane 209

Vidas, Davor 3
Vidas, Davor 3
Von Bismark, Otto 13

Walton, David W.H. 2, 38, 41

Washington conference 198
Wei Wenliang 36
whaling 22, 121
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 201
World Heritage Convention 23
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 15
World Wilderness Park, as Antarctic regime concept 194, 211

Yan Qide 41, 42

Zhang Zhanhai 36
Zhu Jiangang 42