OSCE Report On Serbia Elections 2023

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

17 DECEMBER 2023
ODIHR Election Observation Mission

Final Report
Warsaw
28 February 2024
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 1

II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................... 4
III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ................................................................... 5
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM ...................................................... 6
V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION............................................................................................ 7
VI. VOTER REGISTRATION ...................................................................................................... 10
VII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION ............................................................................................ 11
VIII. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN.................................................................................................... 13
IX. CAMPAIGN FINANCE .......................................................................................................... 15
X. MEDIA ...................................................................................................................................... 17
A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................................................................... 17
B. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................ 19
C. MEDIA MONITORING ............................................................................................................................. 20
XI. NATIONAL MINORITIES..................................................................................................... 21
XII. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION ................................................................................. 22
XIII. ELECTION OBSERVATION ................................................................................................ 24
XIV. ELECTION DAY ..................................................................................................................... 25
A. OPENING AND VOTING........................................................................................................................... 25
B. COUNTING AND TABULATION ............................................................................................................... 26
XV. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................................... 27
XVI. RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................... 28
A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................ 29
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................. 30
ANNEXE I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS .................................................................................. 32
ANNEXE II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
OBSERVATION MISSION.............................................................................................................. 34
ABOUT ODIHR ................................................................................................................................. 42
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
17 December 2023
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 1
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following an invitation from the authorities of the Republic of Serbia, the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the 17
December 2023 early parliamentary elections. For the short-term election observation around election
day, the ODIHR EOM was joined by delegations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament to form an International
Election Observation Mission (IEOM). The EOM assessed the compliance of the electoral process with
OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, and
national legislation.
In its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on 18 December, the IEOM concluded
that the elections, “though technically well-administered and offering voters a choice of political
alternatives, were dominated by the decisive involvement of the President, which, together with the
ruling party’s systemic advantages, created unjust conditions. The frequency of early elections has
further eroded public confidence in the functioning of democratic institutions and together with the lack
of political will left needed reforms unaddressed. Fundamental freedoms were generally respected in
the campaign, but it was marred by harsh rhetoric, bias in the media, pressure on public sector
employees and misuse of public resources. The underrepresentation of women in the campaign
demonstrates a need for greater commitment to ensure adequate involvement in political life. The work
of the Republic Electoral Commission (REC) benefited from improved transparency. The oversight
bodies for campaign and electronic media remained largely ineffective in deterring violations during
the election period. While media covered all electoral contestants in line with the law, most national
broadcasters lacked genuine analytical reporting, detracting from the voters’ ability to make an informed
choice. Election day was smoothly conducted but was marked by numerous procedural deficiencies,
including inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and counting, frequent instances of
overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, and numerous instances of group voting”.
The early parliamentary elections took place against a backdrop of intensified polarization, following
strikes driven by economic demands, and large-scale weekly ‘Serbia against Violence’ protests, which
were triggered by two mass shootings in May 2023. Prior to the elections, a number of concerns about
the respect for freedom of expression and cases of intimidation and harassment of civil activists, other
human rights defenders, and journalists, remained unresolved. Concurrently with the early
parliamentary elections, provincial assembly elections were held in Vojvodina, and local elections took
place in one-third of the municipalities.
The 250 members of the parliament are elected through a proportional representation system with closed
candidate lists from a single nationwide constituency. Overall, the legal framework provides an
adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections. The election-related legislation was significantly
revised in 2022, when some prior ODIHR recommendations related to election administration,
campaign finance, and election dispute resolution were addressed. However, several key issues remain
outstanding, including those related to ensuring a level playing field, measures to prevent misuse of
public office and state resources, separation between the official functions and campaign activities, and
effective mechanisms to prevent intimidation and pressure on voters, including vote buying. Several
ODIHR EOM interlocutors cited insufficient political will to address key problematic aspects of the
1
The English version of this report is the only official document. An unofficial translation is available in Serbian.
Republic of Serbia Page: 2
Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
process as the reason for the lack of further reform, and underlined the need for proper implementation
of the existing legislation.
Despite challenges posed by the short timelines for early elections, the concurrent organization of local
elections, the election administration efficiently conducted the electoral preparations. In the run-up to
elections, the REC largely enjoyed confidence in its technical capacity as well as improved
communication and transparency, however, its lack of a permanent secretariat, along with limited
human and financial resources, hinders its ability to sustainably improve its work between electoral
periods. Contrary to previous ODIHR recommendations, participation in the training for Polling Board
(PB) members was not mandatory. The scope of voter education was limited, and most voter education
and election material were not adapted for voters with visual, hearing or cognitive impairments, limiting
accessibility. Several LECs were susceptible to political influence due to the overlapping membership
and infrastructure shared between lower-level commissions and local authorities with a dominant
position of the ruling coalition.
Records of registered voters were maintained in the Unified Voter Register (UVR). The final number
of voters stood at 6,500,666. Restrictions on voting rights of citizens fully deprived of legal capacity
through a court decision are at odds with international standards and previous ODIHR
recommendations. Most ODIHR EOM interlocutors did not raise concerns about the inclusiveness of
voter lists. However, limited mechanisms to effectively scrutinize the UVR and the absence of detailed
data on changes in permanent and temporary registration as well as allegations of numerous deceased
persons remaining on the register and claims of large-scale voter migration in relation to local elections
significantly eroded public trust in the UVR’s accuracy. This limited confidence was further
exacerbated by a lack of a comprehensive response to these concerns from authorities. The prior ODIHR
recommendation to conduct a full audit of the UVR had not been implemented, which the authorities
attributed to legal restrictions concerning personal data privacy.
In an inclusive process, the REC registered candidate lists from 18 political parties and contestants,
including 7 representing national minorities, and rejected the registration of two lists for deficiencies in
nomination documents. The law does not provide for an opportunity to correct deficiencies in
nomination documents if a candidate is not on the voter lists or is already registered on another candidate
list. Moreover, the REC inconsistently applied the criteria for considering national minority status while
processing applications from lists declaring to represent national minorities. A voter may sign in support
of only one list, contrary to internation.al good practice and previous ODIHR recommendations.
The overall subdued campaign, dominated by the incumbent president, was characterized by hardened
polarization, aggressive rhetoric, personal discreditation, verbal abuse and inflammatory language.
Freedoms of expression and assembly were generally respected in the campaign, and the elections
offered voters a choice between genuine political alternatives. Yet, instances of pressure on public sector
employees, misuse of public resources, and voter inducement schemes raised concerns about voters’
ability to make a choice free from undue pressure. These practices, in addition to some challenges in
accessing public venues for the opposition, tilted the playing field, and blurred the line between state
and the party, at odds with international standards and paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen
Document.
The 2022 legislative changes improved regulation of campaign finance and addressed several ODIHR
recommendations. However, prior recommendations including those pertaining to the improvement of
the oversight mechanism and introduction of a campaign expenditure limit remain unaddressed, which
reduce transparency of the oversight, facilitates high campaign spending and undermines the level
playing field. Moreover, the lack of regulation on spending by third parties leaves room for
circumvention of campaign finance rules. Most contestants complied with the requirement of submitting
interim campaign finance reports, which were timely published on the website of the Agency for the
Prevention of Corruption (APC). However, the lack of public intervention by the APC in cases of misuse
of public offices reduced the dissuasive effect of its sanctions.
Despite some efforts to achieve more balanced gender representation, women remained
underrepresented in elected and appointed offices. While women constituted 43 percent of
parliamentary candidates, only two led candidate lists (11 percent). In the REC’s extended composition,
women made up 11 percent, while they accounted for 44 percent of Local Election Commissions (LECs)
and 42 percent of the PBs. Women candidates had limited visibility, and the campaign rarely addressed
issues related to gender equality. In the new parliament, 95 of the 250 members (38 per cent) were
women.
In the media, the diversity of views was reduced by hardened polarization and a strong influence of the
government on most outlets. The ODIHR EOM received numerous reports about critical journalists
subjected to verbal insults and attacks by state officials and pro-government media, to self-censorship;
many ODIHR EOM interlocutors noted a culture of impunity of such actions. Despite legislative
changes extending the ban on coverage by broadcasters of public officials participating in public
infrastructure inauguration events, the significant and undue advantage of incumbency through
extensive promotion of governmental projects by non-candidate public officials remained unaddressed.
All monitored national channels covered campaign activities in line with the law, but positive coverage
of the President and ruling parties dominated the programmes of most broadcasters further tilted the
level playing field. The Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) maintained a notably passive
approach to regulating media conduct during the campaign.
Contestants, political parties, parliamentary groups and voters may file complaints against decisions of
the election administration and violations; civil society observers do not have this right. After
substantive discussions, the REC handled 23 complaints before the elections, but rejected some on
formalistic grounds. The Administrative Court decided on seven appeals before election day, and
published well-reasoned decisions, but did not hold oral hearings, not in line with international good
practice. All complaints and appeals were considered within the deadlines. Some ODIHR EOM
interlocutors indicated that they had limited trust in the impartial resolution of their complaints by
election commissions and courts. The online register of complaints and appeals maintained by the REC
was regularly updated, contributing to the transparency of the electoral dispute resolution.
The law explicitly provides for citizen and international observation. While the citizen observer scene
was diverse, many civil society organizations reported a shrinking space for civic activities and a climate
of pressure. There were isolated instances of physical attacks and intimidation of citizen observers on
election day, and after the elections, pro-government entities made discrediting efforts targeting both
some citizen and international observer groups, as well as individual observers, conflicting with Serbia’s
international commitments to impartial election observation.
While the IEOM generally positively assessed the voting procedures, observers noted frequent
overcrowding and procedural inconsistencies on election day, underscoring the need for adequate
training. Further, some instances of serious irregularities, including vote-buying and ballot box stuffing
were observed. Measures for ensuring vote secrecy were insufficient, at odds with previous ODIHR
recommendations. Observers noted numerous instances of group voting, some cases of undue influence
and unauthorized tracking of voters, as well as ballot photographing. Vote count at polling stations and
results tabulation at LECs were generally efficient, yet procedural safeguards were inconsistently
implemented. Contributing to transparency, preliminary voting results by polling stations were
promptly published online, in line with a prior ODIHR recommendation.
After election day, the opposition alleged widespread irregularities, including pressure on voters, vote
buying, as well as organized busing of voters, and launched daily demonstrations in the capital. The
protests were generally peaceful but violent incidents occurred on 24 December, which led to the arrests
of several protestors. The LECs received some 360 and the REC 36 complaints regarding the voting
procedures and polling station results, mainly requesting the annulment of voting in polling stations;
most of these complaints were rejected. Due to procedural irregularities, the voting was repeated at 43
polling stations on 30 December and 2 January 2024. The final electoral results were announced on 12
January, and the parliament was constituted on 6 February. The voter turnout was 58.69 per cent.
This report offers a number of recommendations to support efforts to bring elections in the Republic of
Serbia closer in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for
democratic elections. Priority recommendations relate to initiating legislative amendments to further
align the electoral process with international standards, enhancing the training of electoral commission
members, developing a comprehensive voter education programme, improving the accuracy and
transparency of voter lists, preventing misuse of office and state resources, strengthening oversight of
voter intimidation, enhancing the implementation of campaign finance regulations, and fully enabling
the media regulator to act on relevant election-related violations. ODIHR stands ready to assist the
authorities to address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports.
II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Following an invitation from the authorities of the Republic of Serbia to observe the 17 December 2023
early parliamentary elections and in accordance with its mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) on 16
November. The mission, led by Ambassador Albert Jónsson, consisted of a 12-member core team based
in Belgrade and 30 long-term observers (LTOs) deployed on 21 November to 14 locations around the
country. The ODIHR EOM members remained in the country until 27 December to follow post-election
day developments.
For election day, the ODIHR EOM was joined by delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the European
Parliament (EP) to form an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM). Reinhold Lopatka was
appointed by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office as Special Co-ordinator and Leader of the OSCE short-
term observer mission. Farahnaz Karimi headed the OSCE PA delegation, Stefan Schennach headed
the PACE delegation and Klemen Grošelj headed the EP delegation. The institutions taking part in the
IEOM have all endorsed the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. The
IEOM deployed 361 observers from 41 OSCE participating States on election day, including 231 long-
term and short-term observers by ODIHR, a 73-member delegation from the OSCE PA, a 23-member
delegation from PACE, and a 13-member delegation from the EP; 44 per cent of the IEOM observers
were women. Opening was observed in 135 polling stations and voting was observed in 1,208 polling
stations across the country. Counting was observed in 117 polling stations, and the tabulation in 94
Local Electoral Commissions (LECs).
The ODIHR EOM assessed compliance of the election process with OSCE commitments and other
international obligations and standards for democratic elections and domestic legislation. This final
report follows a Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions that was released at a press
conference on 18 December. 2
The ODIHR EOM wishes to thank the authorities of the Republic of Serbia for their invitation to observe
the elections, and the Republic Electoral Commission (REC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for
their assistance. It also expresses appreciation to other state institutions, the judiciary, political parties,
media, civil society organizations, international community representatives, and other interlocutors for
their co-operation and for sharing their views.
2
See previous ODIHR election reports on Serbia.
III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
On 13 October 2023, President Aleksandar Vučić announced plans to hold parliamentary elections by
the end of the year, citing demands for early elections from most opposition parties. 3 On 1 November,
in line with the Constitution and based on the government’s proposal, the President dissolved the
parliament, and scheduled the early parliamentary elections for 17 December. 4 On the same day, local
elections for 65 of the 174 self-governing units, including the capital, were called by the Speaker of the
Parliament, following the sudden and simultaneous resignation of mayors from the ruling party. 5 On 16
November, provincial assembly elections in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina were set to be held
on the same day. 6 These were the third parliamentary elections in less than four years and the sixth since
2012. The frequency of the early elections further eroded public trust in democratic institutions and
electoral processes, and detracted from the efficiency of democratic governance. 7
The political landscape has been shaped by the continued dominance of the ruling Serbian Progressive
Party (SNS) and the incumbent President Mr. Vučić since 2012. In May 2023, Mr. Vučić stepped down
as the SNS president and was succeeded by Minister of Defence Miloš Vučević. In the April 2022 early
parliamentary elections, the SNS received 120 out of 250 seats, while the opposition coalition ‘United
for Victory of Serbia’ won 38 seats, and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) 31 seats. 8 Following two
mass shootings in May 2023, large-scale weekly ‘Serbia against Violence’ protests emerged in response
to perceived government inaction, requesting political reforms. 9 In the following months, strikes and
protests were organized across various sectors, including by farmers, teachers and postal employees,
with economic demands. In September 2023, tensions and instances of violence escalated in northern
Kosovo, further amplifying the public debate on the situation in Kosovo. 10
These early parliamentary elections unfolded amidst hardened polarization and widespread societal
discontent with Serbia’s economic and social state in some segments of the society. Most contestants
formulated their strategies around two major alliances: SNS-led ‘Aleksandar Vučić – Serbia Must Not
Stop’, and the other consisting of parties associating themselves with the ‘pro-European opposition’,
3
Several opposition parties demanded early elections between June and October 2023 in order to “stabilize the social
conditions”. In the same period, some opposition members of the parliament started to boycott parliamentary sessions.
4
The proposal, which was not made public in full, stated that holding parliamentary elections “would ensure a higher
degree of democracy, reducing the tensions created between opposing options in society, rejecting exclusivity and
hate speech, and affirming the right to freely express opinions and views on certain political, economic and other
issues, including further affirmation of European values”.
5
Several opposition and civil society members publicly expressed concerns that the early local elections were called
without a clear explanation and stated that the municipalities in question were generally SNS strongholds. The local
elections were observed by the ODIHR EOM only to the extent that they affected the early parliamentary elections.
6
As of 28 September, mayors from the ruling coalition started resigning, enabling the holding of local elections.
7
The government formed after the 2022 early parliamentary elections held office for less than 13 months. Many
ODIHR EOM interlocutors noted that frequent early elections effectively stalled the work of the executive and
legislative branches on some strategic issues and reforms. The European Commission’s Serbia 2023 Report also
concluded that “developments following the two tragic mass shootings […], the ensuing protests, and speculations
about snap parliamentary elections led to a shift in the reform priorities”.
8
In addition, NADA won 15 seats, Moramo 13, Dveri and Zavetnici 10 each, the Alliance of Hungarians of Vojvodina
(SVM) 5, the Party of Justice and Reconciliation (SPP) 3, the Party of Democratic Action and Together for Vojvodina
2 each, and the Coalition of Albanians of the Valley 1.
9
Nine children and a security guard were killed at a Belgrade primary school on 3 May, and eight people were killed
in Mladenovac on 4 May. Protestors demanded resignations of various officials, including the Ministers of Interior
and Education; the head of the Security and Information Agency; executives of the public broadcaster and the media
regulatory body (REM); and the revocation of the broadcasting licences of TV Pink and TV Happy.
10
All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, should be understood in line with the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99.
known as ‘Serbia against Violence’. 11 Several long-standing issues highlighted by domestic and
international organizations regarding the respect for freedom of expression, as well as cases of
intimidation and harassment of civil activists, LGBTI, other human rights defenders, and journalists,
remained unresolved prior to the elections. 12
In 2021, Serbia adopted a 2021-2030 National Strategy for Gender Equality, accompanied by a 2022
action plan. However, despite significant efforts by the authorities to promote women’s participation,
these have not yet been sufficient, and women continue to be underrepresented in some elected and
appointed offices. 13 The representation of women in the outgoing parliament was 34.8 per cent. 14
Women held 11 out of 29 ministerial positions, including the prime minister, a decrease from the
previous composition of the government from 46 to 38 per cent.
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Serbia is party to international and regional instruments related to holding democratic elections. 15 The
legal framework for parliamentary elections primarily consists of the 2006 Constitution, the 2022 Law
on Election of Members of the Parliament (LEMP), as well as instructions and decisions of the REC. 16
Following two wide-ranging inter-party dialogue processes between the ruling parties and the
opposition, the election-related legislation was significantly revised in 2022, when some prior ODIHR
recommendations related to election administration, campaign finance, and election dispute resolution
were addressed. The legal framework has remained largely unchanged since then, with the exception of
the two new laws on information environment and media, adopted in October 2023 (see Media section).
Overall, the legal framework provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections.
However, several previous ODIHR recommendations have not been sufficiently addressed, including
those related to ensuring a level playing field, measures to prevent misuse of public office and state
resources, separation between the official functions and campaign activities, effective mechanisms to
prevent intimidation and pressure on voters, and stakeholders’ access to access the Unified Voter
11
All opposition parties decided to participate in the elections. The parties of the ruling coalition, including SNS, SPS,
United Serbia (JS), SVM, SPP, and the Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina, contested with their own lists.
The ‘Serbia against Violence’ coalition was led by the Party of Freedom and Justice (SSP), the People’s Movement
of Serbia (NPS), and the Green-Left Front (ZLF), along with 11 additional parties and movements.
12
The European Commission’s Serbia 2023 Report noted “verbal attacks and smear campaigns against CSOs”,
concluded that “recurrent statements by high-level officials on the daily and investigative work of journalists provide
for a challenging environment for the exercise of freedom of expression”, and also raised concerns about hate speech,
threats and violence continuing to target “human rights defenders, the Roma community, and lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, intersex and queer persons”.
13
The 2021 EU Gender Country Profile for Serbia report recognizes significant attempts to mainstream gender
throughout the public sector but nevertheless concludes that “gender norms and stereotypes […] permeate all levels
of society and impact institutional awareness, knowledge and capacities to implement mandates”. The 2023 UN
Gender Brief on Serbia, while recognizing “slow but stable progress”, noted that “in 2022, out of 145 municipalities
in Serbia, 17 have women municipal presidents (11.7 per cent), while 5 out of 29 city mayors (17 per cent) are
women”. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2022, Serbia ranks 23rd out of 146 countries in terms of
women’s political empowerment.
14
In 2023, Serbia ranked as 47th of the 185 countries observed on the Inter-Parliamentary Union World Index of women
in national parliaments.
15
Including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 2003 Convention against Corruption, 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.
16
Other relevant provisions are found, inter alia, in the 2022 Law on Financing Political Activities, the 2009 Law on
Unified Voter Register, 2019 Law on Prevention of Corruption, the 2009 Law on Political Parties, the 2009 Law on
Administrative Disputes, the 2016 Law on Administrative Procedures and the 2005 Criminal Code.
Register (UVR). 17 In addition, the lack of harmonization between different laws leads to omissions and
occasional inconsistencies. 18
The government-led inter-agency Working Group on Co-ordination and Follow-up of the

Implementation of Recommendations for the Improvement of the Electoral Process was reconstituted
in March 2023. However, its activities lacked transparency, and it reached limited progress in further
addressing outstanding issues, with government interlocutors attributing this to the time constraints
before the early elections. 19 Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors cited insufficient political will to
address key problematic aspects of the electoral process and underlined the need for proper
implementation of the existing legislation.
To effectively address recommendations outlined in this and prior ODIHR election observation reports,
necessary legislative amendments should be initiated well in advance of the next elections through an
inclusive consultative process built upon a broad political consensus. If reconstituted, the inter-agency
Working Group on Co-ordination and Follow-up of the Implementation of Recommendations for the
Improvement of the Electoral Process should act in full transparency, with the inclusion of relevant
stakeholders, such as civil society organizations.
The 250 members of the parliament (Narodna Skupština) are elected for a four-year term through a
proportional representation system with closed candidate lists from a single nationwide constituency.
Mandates are distributed among candidate lists that receive at least 3 per cent of the votes cast. Lists
representing national minorities are exempt from the threshold requirement. 20
V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
The elections were managed by a three-level election administration, headed by the REC, comprising
166 local electoral commissions (LECs) and 8,273 polling boards (PBs). 21 Members of the election
commissions are nominated by political parties, in proportion to their representation in the parliament
and local assemblies. 22 The 2022 amendments mandate equitable gender representation and the
inclusion of persons with disabilities in election administration bodies. However, these provisions are
vague and were not implemented due to the absence of a legally prescribed enforcement mechanism
17
See also the 2022 ODIHR and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Joint
Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Framework Governing the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, which
recommended “undertaking wide-scope measures to prevent misuse of office and state resources, including a detailed
regulation of such practices, the provision for mechanisms of compliance and enforcement, and the provision for
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions”.
18
For example, polling boards are formed differently under the LEMP and the Law on Local Elections (LLE), and in
case of simultaneous elections, the LLE only states that voting should be conducted by the same polling boards (PB).
The LLE prescribes that complaints against LEC decisions should be filed within 72 hours, but also makes a reference
to the LEMP, where the deadline for appeals is 48 hours. Moreover, the LUVR prescribes permanent residence as a
prerequisite for inclusion in the voter register; at the same time, the LEMP does not contain such a requirement. The
definitions of the campaign period provided in the election law and the LFPA are not harmonized.
19
According to the government, the working group contributed to implementing practical and regulatory changes,
including in election administration instructions, the enhancement of training for the Agency for Prevention of
Corruption, and in facilitating the inclusion of citizens without a permanent residence in voter lists.
20
Moreover, alongside the exemption from the threshold, the quotients for national minority lists that receive less than
3 per cent of the votes cast are increased by 35 per cent during the seat allocation process.
21
Including special polling stations (PSs) established in 29 penitentiary institutions and 81 in Serbia’s diplomatic
representations across 35 countries to manage out-of-country voting.
22
All election management bodies operate in permanent and extended compositions, the latter including members
appointed by registered electoral contestants can have substitutes (deputy members). The REC, in its extended
composition, consisted of 17 permanent and 18 temporary members nominated by electoral contestants. Of the 17
permanent REC members, SNS nominated 7 members, SPS and SPP 3 each, and other parliamentary parties 1 each.
LECs have 7 to 13 members, appointed proportionally to the representation of political parties in local assemblies.
PBs comprise three members, proposed by the parliamentary groups.
and the insufficient capacity of the election administration. According to ODIHR EOM observations,
some 31 per cent of the REC, 44 percent of the LECs permanent membership, and some 42 per cent of
the PB members were women. 23 At the time of writing, the REC did not maintain any sex-disaggregated
data on the composition of election commissions. 24
Election administration should collect and publish disaggregated data on gender representation in its
bodies in a comprehensive and timely manner. Further efforts should be made to ensure a gender-
balanced representation in all election management bodies, in line with the law.
The REC conducted and streamed online regular sessions that were open to media and observers, and
published all of its decisions within 24 hours on its website, as required by law, contributing to
transparency. 25 Background materials were distributed timely to members well ahead of its sessions,
facilitating meaningful discussions on agenda items. In the run-up to elections, the REC largely enjoyed
confidence in its technical capacity from most stakeholders, with many noting improved communication
and transparency. 26 However, when opposition members raised objections or initiated alternative
proposals during sessions, decisions were nearly always adopted in line with the initial proposals by
members from the parliamentary majority. 27 Overall, the REC efficiently conducted the election
preparations; however, the lack of a permanent secretariat, along with limited human and financial
resources, hinders its ability to sustainably improve its work between electoral periods. 28
To achieve sustainable progress in its activities, such as developing instructions, training election
officials, improving voter education campaigns, and enhance the accessibility of the electoral process,
the Republic Electoral Commission should be granted sufficient administrative and technical capacity,
including its own permanent secretariat.
Prior to the elections, the REC amended ten existing instructions and adopted two new ones. 29 While
the amendments partially addressed previous ODIHR recommendations, including those aimed at
enhancing the access of persons with disabilities, tackling overcrowding, ensuring vote secrecy, and the
timely publication of election results by polling station, the impact of these regulatory amendments on
election day remained limited (see Election Day section). Moreover, some political parties and civil
23
In the LECs, the lowest representation of women (less than 10 percent) was observed in Bujanovac, Plandište,
Preševo, and Sjenica, while the highest representation (over 70 percent) occurred in Belgrade-Grocka, Irig, Ivanjica,
and Novi Kneževac.
24
Paragraph 40.13 of the 1991 OSCE Moscow Document commits participating States to “ensure the collection and
analysis of data to assess adequately, monitor and improve the situation of women”.
25
The usability of the information was limited due to non-user-friendly format. Decisions of the election administration
could only be filtered by election type or the nature of the decision, and the system did not allow for searching
documents using specific keywords.
26
The REC implemented an electronic documents management system and, for the first time, introduced electronic
voting for decision-making in sessions.
27
To have a quorum, more than half of the REC members had to be present. Decisions were taken by the majority of
all members. On 8 December, opposition REC members proposed draft or instructions related to the submission of
certain election-related complaints to the law enforcement for prosecution, storage of electoral materials by LECs,
the status of PB members in simultaneous parliamentary and local elections, and the positioning of screens in the PS.
However, their numbers were insufficient to convene a session. In the 15 December session, these proposals failed
to receive enough votes for agenda inclusion. Opposition REC members stated that the failure to address these
proposals undermines the REC’s collegiality and leaves several electoral shortcomings unaddressed.
28
In its operations, the REC relies on assistance from the Secretariat General of the National Assembly and the
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, which is available only during electoral periods. Most REC members,
besides their election-related roles, concurrently hold positions in professions external to the electoral process.
29
New provisions, inter alia, mandated local authorities to use data on accessibility when allocating PS, specified
deadlines for replacing PB members, prescribed additional functions for the queue and ballot box controllers on
election day to avoid overcrowding and ensure the secrecy of the vote, provided for the regular publication of voter
turnout data and election results by polling station, and detailed the publication of documents by LECs.
society organizations (CSOs) criticized certain new provisions, pointing out a lack of clarity in the
deadlines for replacing PB members in the extended composition. 30
The LECs, in extended composition, were established by the legal deadline of 9 December, and
generally managed technical preparations efficiently. However, many reported challenges stemming
from the simultaneous organization of parliamentary and local elections, low remuneration, and a
shortage of nominations, as well as a high number of last-minute changes in the composition of PBs.
Additionally, several LECs were susceptible to political influence due to the overlapping membership
and infrastructure shared between LECs and local authorities with a dominant position of the ruling
coalition. 31 In line with the law, all LEC decisions and other relevant material were published on the
REC website.
Five LECs and 51 PBs were formed for voters residing in Kosovo. Due to the inability to establish
polling stations in the municipalities of the voters’ residence, polling stations were set up in the city of
Vranje and municipalities of Kuršumlija, Raška, and Tutin. 32
The REC trained lower-level commissions online and in-person from mid-November until three days
before election day, using improved training manuals on election day procedures, determination of
results and complaints adjudication. 33 For most PB training sessions, ODIHR EOM LTOs reported low
attendance, occasionally noting the trainers’ low engagement, a lack of opportunity for questions and
clarifications, and non-user-friendly visual materials. Despite previous ODIHR recommendations,
participation in the training was not mandatory. 34 Moreover, many extended PB composition members
demonstrated a poor understanding of their status, seeing themselves as observers rather than as full-
fledged members. Overall, sparse attendance and uneven quality of training, at times, led to inconsistent
application of election day procedures (see Election Day section).
As previously recommended, to ensure consistent application of election day procedures and enhance
the professional capacity of the election administration, standardized mandatory training could be
considered for all Local Electoral Commission and Polling Board members and prospective members,
including the extended compositions of these bodies.
Voter education conducted by the REC was limited in scope and focused on voter mobilization and
verification of voter registration data. It was primarily delivered through online platforms, with
additional coverage in broadcast media. Several CSOs also undertook additional ‘go out and vote’
campaigns, mostly online. Voter information was not comprehensive and lacked emphasis on some
important matters, such as the protection of voters’ rights, including vote secrecy, and the rights of those
negatively affected by group and family voting. 35
To enhance the effective exercise of voting rights, the Republic Electoral Commission should develop
and implement a timely, comprehensive and targeted voter education programme, including on voters’
rights, the prevention of group voting, and the importance of voting by secret ballot. Detailed voter
information and education materials should be available in various accessible formats.
30
In addition, the opposition raised concerns that the instructions do not require the inclusion of the full text of
complaints in the PB result protocols.
31
ODIHR EOM LTOs reported cases in several municipalities, including Kovačica, Smeredevo, Užice, and Zrenjanin,
where LECs were dominated by local officials employed in SNS-controlled municipalities. These individuals were
identified in their dual roles as both LEC officials and local representatives of the ruling party, often encountered in
the same offices. Additionally, the presence of SNS campaign materials and symbols was noted in some LEC offices.
32
ODIHR EOM LTOs noted deficient communication to stakeholders about election preparations for voters from
Kosovo and difficulties accessing information on the LECs and PBs established for this purpose. On election day,
some PBs set up for Kosovo voters unlawfully required special accreditation for observers to enter.
33
For these elections, the REC developed 13 different training curricula for training of election management bodies.
34
Several political parties informed the ODIHR EOM that they trained the PB members they nominated.
35
The REC informed the ODIHR EOM that it developed an enhanced voter education curriculum but was not able to
implement it due to the limited period available before the early elections.
The law requires PS to be accessible to voters with physical disabilities. The REC mandated local
authorities to allocate PS venues based on accessibility assessments. However, the adherence to this
requirement varied among the municipalities. While the REC website and some voter information
videos were supported by sign language interpretation and text-to-speech functionality, most voter
education and election material were not adapted for voters with visual, hearing or cognitive
impairments, limiting accessibility. While individual assessments of accessibility of polling stations
were available, the REC did not publish any aggregated data on PS accessibility throughout the country.
VI. VOTER REGISTRATION
Citizens who are at least 18 years old on election day have the right to vote, except those fully deprived
of legal capacity through a court decision. The disenfranchisement of voters based on intellectual and
psychosocial disabilities is at odds with international standards and previous ODIHR
recommendations. 36
The legislation should be further harmonized with the objectives of the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities by removing all remaining restrictions on voting rights on the basis of
intellectual or psychosocial disability.
Voter registration is passive. The Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government
(MPALSG) is responsible for maintaining the Unified Voter Register (UVR), a permanent electronic
database based on the civil register. Following the 2022 amendments, the LEMP no longer prescribes
permanent residence as a prerequisite for the right to vote; however, the LUVR retains a requirement
of permanent address for inclusion in the UVR. In September 2023, the MPALSG and the Ministry of
Interior issued a clarification that voters without a permanent address will remain included in the voter
list based on their last registered address. 37 Despite multiple requests, the ODIHR EOM was not able to
verify the practical implementation of this arrangement, due to limited access to voter registration
data. 38
Many ODIHR EOM interlocutors criticized the law for not providing effective measures for political
parties and CSOs to access and inspect the UVR. While precinct voter lists were made available for
online scrutiny, the data provided was inadequate for a comprehensive verification, as the lists only
contained voters’ names in alphabetical order. Voters could also inspect their registration data at local
authority premises or online and request corrections until 13 December. 39
Most ODIHR EOM interlocutors did not raise concerns about the inclusiveness of the voter lists or
voters’ access to ID documents. However, many claimed that the UVR contains numerous entries of
deceased persons, including abroad, and alleged large-scale organized voter migration in connection
36
See Article 12 and Article 29 of the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Paragraph
9.4 of the 2013 CRPD Committee’s Communication No. 4/2011 states that “an exclusion of the right to vote on the
basis of a perceived or actual psychosocial or intellectual disability, including a restriction pursuant to an
individualized assessment, constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability, within the meaning of article 2 of the
Convention”.
37
Previously, citizens without permanent addresses were automatically removed from the UVR.
38
The clarification issued does not specify if voters whose addresses have been “passivized” before September 2023
will be re-included into the register. Despite multiple requests, the MPALSG did not provide clarification to the
ODIHR EOM and CSOs, including the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), seeking this
information.
39
According to the MPASLG, prior to election day, some 500 citizens requested corrections in their voter registration
data through the electronic government portal. Despite requests from the ODIHR EOM, the MPASLG did not provide
the information on the number of voters who changed their permanent and temporary residence from the call of
elections until election day.
with the local elections. 40 The lack of a comprehensive response from authorities, including the
MPALSG, to these allegations, along with limited mechanisms to scrutinize the UVR and the absence
of detailed data on changes in permanent and temporary registration significantly eroded public trust in
the accuracy of the voter register. 41 The long-standing ODIHR recommendation to conduct an audit of
the UVR has not been implemented prior to the elections, which the authorities attributed to legal
restrictions on personal data privacy. 42
To address concerns over the accuracy of voter lists and increase public confidence, the relevant laws,
regulations, and practices should be reconsidered to enable access to voter registration data and
facilitate the conduct of a meaningful audit of the Unified Voter Register with the participation of
relevant stakeholders, including political parties and civil society, in line with data protection
standards.
Special voter lists were compiled for voters in military and penitentiary institutions. 43 Mobile voting
can be requested due to serious illness, age or disability. The law also permits mobile voting requests
to be submitted for other voters without their consent or formal proof until 11:00 on election day. This
provision lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent misuse (See Election Day section). The final number
of voters for these elections was 6,500,666.
By law, voters could submit a request to their respective LECs to check if their voter list entries had
been marked and signed. The law does not prescribe any deadline for submitting such requests and
stipulates that LECs reply within 30 days, after the expiration of the deadline for complaints against
election-day irregularities. 44
VII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION
Citizens eligible to vote have the right to stand for parliament. Political parties, coalitions, and groups
of at least ten voters may submit candidate lists to the REC, provided they are supported by at least
10,000 signatures from voters, or 5,000 signatures for lists representing national minorities. At odds
with previous ODIHR recommendations, a voter may sign in support of only one candidate list. 45 This
practice may limit political pluralism and freedom of association and is contrary to international good
practice.
40
During the REC sessions on 23 and 25 December, several members voiced concerns about the limited scrutiny of the
UVR and noted that this lack of transparency might have allowed illegal voter migration in Belgrade. Consequently,
the REC decided to advise MPASLG and the Ministry of Interior to inspect vote invitations sent to allegedly fictitious
voters in Belgrade, flagged by the opposition as potential evidence of registration tampering. On 22 December, CRTA
issued a report, claiming qualitative and quantitative evidence of organized voter migration ahead of the 17 December
elections, anomalies in the voter register, voter transportation, and supervised voting, and pointed to a potential impact
on election results.
41
The authorities refuted claims of fictitious registrations in Belgrade, pointing to data that indicated stability in the
number of registered voters in the capital. The MPALSG responded to the concerns about discrepancies between
voter registration figures and census data by pointing out that census-based population and voter register figures do
not permit a proper comparison, due to the different methodology of processing the two sets of data. However, the
data the MPASLG provided to support their statement was not up-to-date and it was formatted in a way that did not
allow for proper verification. On 25 December, the MPASLG issued another statement dismissing all allegations of
manipulations with the voter register, calling CSO representatives “protagonists of foreign interests”.
42
In September 2019, the MPALSG established a working group, involving CSOs, to audit the UVR. However, the
audit did not take place due to legal restrictions on personal data privacy and an opinion of the Commissioner for
Information of Public Importance and Protection of Personal Data that limited CSOs’ audit capabilities.
43
The REC reported 39,270 registered voters abroad, and 6,876 detainees and prisoners on special voter lists.
44
By 4 January 2024, 474 such requests were filed with LECs but the REC did not provide any details about the findings
established following these checks.
45
Paragraph 196 of the 2020 ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation recommends
that “a requirement that a citizen be allowed to sign in support of only one party should be avoided, as such a
regulation would affect his/her right to freedom of association”.
As previously recommended, to further promote pluralism in the electoral process and freedom of
association, consideration could be given to removing the restriction against signing in support of more
than one list.
The signature collection and candidate registration period started with the call of the elections and ended
on 26 November. Support signatures must be certified by public notaries, municipal authorities, or
courts. Contestants did not report any difficulties to the ODIHR EOM regarding their access to these
certifying agencies. However, the 30 RSD cost per signature certification posed a financial burden for
some smaller political parties. 46 Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed concerns about the
potential use of fraudulent signatures by some contestants to endorse their candidate lists. Signatures
for two nominees were rejected by the REC for not being properly certified. 47 According to the REC,
four per cent of valid support signatures were disqualified as voters had already signed for another list.48
By law, contestants may rectify deficiencies in their nomination documents within 48 hours following
the publication of the respective REC decision. However, submitters are not provided with this
opportunity if a proposed candidate does not have the right to vote, has already been registered as a
candidate, or is the ‘holder’ (individual whose name was given to) of an already registered list. The
REC denied registration to the ‘Russian Minority Alliance’ list, arguing, among other reasons, that one
of its candidates was not found in the voter register, and did not provide the party with an opportunity
to rectify the deficiency. 49
The law could be reconsidered to permit contestants to rectify any identified deficiencies in their
nomination documents following the publication of the respective decision of the Republic Electoral
Commission.
The law prescribes a gender quota of at least 40 percent as a prerequisite for the registration of a list,
requiring that for every five candidates, at least two must be from the less represented gender. All
candidate lists fulfilled this requirement. In an overall inclusive process, the REC registered 18
candidate lists from 10 coalitions, 6 parties, and 2 groups of citizens. 50 Seven lists represented national
minorities. Of the total 2,817 parliamentary candidates, 1,205 (43 per cent) were women. Women
headed only 2 (11 per cent) of the candidate lists.
46
1 EUR equals 117 RSD (Serbian Dinar).
47
The REC enquired with the respective municipalities, which confirmed that they had not certified the signatures in
question endorsing the ‘Enough! European Path’ and the ‘Russian Minority Alliance’ lists. Subsequently, the REC
and the municipalities initiated legal proceedings with the relevant law enforcement bodies. The investigation had
not concluded prior to the official proclamation of the election results.
48
In total, some 6,000 support signatures were invalidated because the voter had signed for another list. For those
political parties that submitted their nominations close to the deadline, the disqualification rate exceeded 10 percent.
For instance, the ‘Čedomir Jovanović – It Must Be Different’ list had a disqualification rate of 10.9 per cent, while
the ‘Albanian Democratic Alternative – United Valley’ list had a disqualification rate of 12.4 per cent.
49
The representatives of the list provided ODIHR EOM with a certificate proving that the candidate in question was
included in the UVR. The certificate was dated the day following REC decision on the list’s non-registration.
Representatives of the list also stated they were not aware about the reason why this candidate was not found in the
UVR at the time they submitted their registration documents.
50
The REC rejected the ‘Russian Minority Alliance’ list due to the alleged ineligibility of one of its candidates, and the
‘Enough! European Path’ list for not having sufficient number of support signatures. Both parties appealed to the
Administrative Court that upheld the REC decisions.
VIII. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
The election campaign officially started with the call of the elections and ended on 14 December at
midnight.51 Freedoms of expression and assembly were generally respected in the campaign and voters
had a choice between political alternatives, but instances of pressure on public sector employees, misuse
of public resources, and voter inducement schemes raised concerns about voters’ ability to make a
choice free from undue pressure. These practices, in addition to some challenges in accessing public
venues for the opposition, tilted the playing field, provided undue advantage to the ruling party and
coalition, and blurred the line between state and the party, at odds with paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 OSCE
Copenhagen Document. 52
The campaign activities observed by the ODIHR EOM were generally subdued, with contestants
primarily engaging in small gatherings, door-to-door canvassing, and distribution of flyers. 53 The
campaign across most of the country was dominated by the prominent visibility of the incumbent
president and SNS, while the opposition concentrated its efforts in some major cities and enjoyed
limited visibility overall. The campaign period was marked by many cases of use of inflammatory
language, harsh rhetoric, verbal attacks, and smear campaigns. 54 While the law stipulates equal access
to public premises for campaigning, the venue allocation process was not always transparent. The
ODIHR EOM received several reports of opposition parties and candidates facing difficulties in
securing venues for campaigning, at odds with Paragraphs 7.7 and 9.2 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen
Document. 55
To ensure equal campaigning conditions, authorities should implement measures that fully enforce the
right of all electoral stakeholders to access and use public premises for campaigning on equal terms.
The campaign focused predominantly on economic issues and, to a lesser extent, on Serbia’s European
Union accession policy and international relations, the status of Kosovo, and migration. While the ruling
coalition highlighted its achievements, the opposition placed significant emphasis on calling for the
ousting of the President, the fight against corruption, and prevention of violence, particularly in response
to the May mass shootings.
Campaign regulations fall short of ensuring a level playing field and lack effective enforcement
mechanisms, contrary to previous ODIHR recommendations. The law allows public officials, including
the president, to participate in political activities, unless it conflicts with their office. President Vučić,
while not a candidate for these elections, assumed a central role in campaigning through heavy
51
While campaigning in traditional media is banned 48 hours before election day, these regulations are not applicable
online, where all contestants continued their campaigns during the silence period, including on election day.
52
Paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides for “a clear separation between the State and
political parties”. ODIHR and the Venice Commission’s Joint Guidelines for Preventing and Responding to the
Misuse of Administrative Resources during Electoral Processes requires the legal framework to “provide for a clear
separation between the exercise of politically sensitive public positions, in particular senior management positions,
and candidacy.”
53
ODIHR EOM LTOs observed a total of 46 campaign events of 12 electoral lists and 26 political parties.
54
The SNS website published confrontational articles against key opposition figures. On 5 December, SSP
leader Dragan Đilas accused SPS of being “an accomplice in crimes”, creating an “evil machinery” that destroys the
country. The same day, a party of the ‘Serbia against Violence’ coalition accused President Vučić of creating a “rotten
and collapsing system”, characterized by “corruption, crime, tyranny and manipulation”.
55
Representatives from ‘Serbia against Violence’ and other opposition parties informed the ODIHR EOM about being
denied access to public venues in Čačak, Kikinda, Kragujevac, Niš, Novi Sad, Pančevo, Subotica, Užice, Žitište and
Zrenjanin. In some cases, owners of private venues were reported to refrain from giving access to opposition parties
for fear of retribution. Paragraph 7.7 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document requires participating States to
“ensure that law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere
in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely
presenting their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting
their vote free of fear of retribution.” Paragraph 9.2 provides that: “Everyone will have the right of peaceful assembly
and demonstration. Any restrictions […] will be prescribed by law and consistent with international standards.”
involvement in SNS events, televised campaign appearances and billboards, providing an undue
advantage to his party. 56 Numerous opposition representatives raised concerns that the list of the SNS-
led coalition was named after Mr. Vučić, which, along with the use of his name and image in the
campaign, challenges the constitutional principle that the president needs to express the state of unity
of Serbia.
The law should provide for a clear separation between the official functions and campaigning activities
of the incumbents. Authorities should take measures to prevent misuse of office and state resources and
any violations should be proactively addressed through proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
Most opposition party representatives, as well as numerous voters, and CSOs raised numerous
allegations of pressure, particularly on public sector employees, to support the ruling party and
participate in its campaign events. 57 Several concerns were raised about citizens receiving unsolicited
phone calls from call centres affiliated with the ruling party. 58 Moreover, while not against the law,
social welfare initiatives, announced during the campaign period, were perceived by many ODIHR
EOM interlocutors as targeting vulnerable or low-income groups, such as pensioners, persons with
disabilities, and students, for electoral gain. 59 The ODIHR EOM noted some social network posts about
gifts provided to voters by the ruling party. 60
Authorities should prevent intimidation and pressure on voters, including employees of public and state
institutions and enterprises and strengthen the oversight mechanisms.
With a few exceptions, women had limited visibility as political party leaders, candidates or participants
in campaign events, challenging OSCE commitments. 61 In total, women constituted 20 percent of the
speakers and approximately one-third of the attendees at campaign events observed by the ODIHR
EOM. Issues related to gender equality were rarely addressed in the campaign of most political parties. 62
In campaign materials, women were predominantly portrayed in traditional settings, or as supporting
figures alongside male leaders or candidates.
Additional mechanisms and incentives should be established to encourage political parties to promote
women’s participation in political life, increase their visibility during electoral campaigns and advance
their role in politics.
56
The president was the main speaker at SNS rallies on 5 November in Leskovac, 9 November in Pirot, 12 November
in Smederevo, 26 November in Kraljevo, 29 November in Užice, 2 December in Belgrade, 8 December in Vranje,
11 December in Prokuplje, and 12 December in Novi Pazar.
57
ODIHR EOM observers received reports about pressure on public employees from Belgrade, Čačak, Kragujevac,
Novi Sad, Smederevo, Subotica, Užice, Zaječar, and Zrenjanin. In addition, ODIHR EOM interlocutors reported
similar instances in Bujanovac, Futog, Kragujevac, Leskovac, Niš, and Novi Sad, Voždovac and Vršac.
58
In November, the Centre for Investigative Journalism of Serbia (CINS) published a report about a call centre
supposedly linked to SNS. The report suggested that operators were recruited under the condition of voting for SNS,
and the origin of voters’ data was unclear. There were reports of a similar call centre set up in Niš.
59
During the campaign period, several payments were announced or distributed, including RSD 1,000 pre-loaded onto
student cards; RSD 10,000 to high school students from the Ministry of Finance through local administrations; RSD
10,000 to beneficiaries by the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans, and Social Affairs; and RSD 20,000 paid
to pensioners, financed by the Republic Pension and Disability Insurance Fund.
60
SNS local branches in Kraljevo, Mladenovac, and Vrbas shared posts online about delivering various gifts.
61
Throughout the campaign, only two women candidates achieved high visibility: Marinika Tepić, a lead candidate for
‘Serbia against Violence’, and Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski, representing Zavetnici. Paragraph 3 of the 2009 OSCE
Ministerial Council Decision 7/09 calls participating States to “encourage all political actors to promote equal
participation of women and men in political parties, with a view to achieving better gender-balanced representation
in elected public offices at all levels of decision-making”, and paragraph 23 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document
commits participating States to “making equality between men and women an integral part of [their] policies”.
62
In its campaign, Dveri addressed challenges faced by female entrepreneurs; SPS advocated for gender equality and
equal parliamentary representation, highlighting women's traditional roles; SNS emphasized women’s role as family
pillars; SSP spotlighted combating violence against women, and Zavetnici pledged to enhance women’s healthcare.
Campaign messages did not specifically target persons with disabilities. ODIHR EOM observations
indicated that approximately 67 percent of campaign venues, primarily indoor ones, were accessible to
persons with physical disabilities. However, no additional accessibility measures were noted at the
observed events.
All contestants actively engaged voters on social networks, primarily on Facebook and X. 63 On the
monitored platforms, the ruling party and President Vučić’s accounts saw the highest engagement, with
opposition parties’ ranging from medium to high engagement. 64 At the beginning of their campaign,
parties used social networks to articulate their stances and interact with citizens, but gradually shifted
focus to criticizing their opponents. During the campaign, the ruling party and the president increasingly
utilized TikTok, showcasing a mix of humorous content and posts about government achievements.
Regarding paid advertisements on social networks, the largest spenders were SNS and Narodna;
however, the spending of most parties combined was surpassed by that of President Vučić. 65
ODIHR EOM interlocutors made multiple allegations of disinformation being used to discredit political
opponents during the campaign, including through the utilization of automated social media accounts
(bots). 66 Some ODIHR EOM stakeholders noted the potential for foreign interference in the information
environment as a concern. Following election day, both the ruling party and the opposition accused each
other of using disinformation strategies of foreign origin in their reactions to the electoral results (see
Post-electoral Developments section).
IX. CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Campaign finance is primarily regulated by the 2022 Law on Financing Political Activities (LFPA) and
the 2019 Law on Prevention of Corruption (LPC). The 2022 amendments to the legal framework for
political party and campaign finance addressed some previous ODIHR recommendations, including by
lowering donation limits, introducing interim reporting on donations and expenditures, and setting
ceilings on political party membership fees and loans. However, some long-standing ODIHR
recommendations remain unaddressed, including those concerning the absence of a campaign
expenditure limit, lack of rules on campaigning by third parties, and the effectiveness of the oversight
mechanism.
Political parties represented in parliament receive annual public funding in proportion to their results in
the last elections, which can be used for campaigns. 67 Additionally, public funds are allocated to election
campaigns, disbursed in two payments. The first instalment, divided equally among all registered lists,
is paid after candidate registration. 68 The first instalment also requires a deposit of an equivalent amount,
63
The ODIHR EOM conducted qualitative analysis of the narrative and tone of the campaign discourse online, based
on content posted on Facebook and X by 57 electoral contestants and stakeholders.
64
The ruling party was the most active, averaging 11-20 posts per day, while most opposition parties posted between 6
and 10 times daily.
65
According to data from Meta Ad Library, between 3 November and 14 December, SNS was the largest spender on
Facebook/Meta Ads, with a total of EUR 30,044 spent, followed by People’s Party (Narodna)-EUR 12,318 and Dveri-
EUR 4,078. In terms of individual politicians, President Vučić led with an expenditure of EUR 65,715, followed by
Aleksandar Šapić, the incumbent SNS mayor of Belgrade, with EUR 33,484 and Bálint Pásztor (SVM) with EUR
23,319. In the fourth and fifth positions, there were other SVM candidates who spent EUR 12,306 and EUR 3,957,
respectively.
66
In the months leading up to the elections, the Bureau for Social Research (BIRODI) raised concerns and urged
legislative steps in connection with the suspected use of some 14,000 bots to manipulate the public discourse in
favour of the ruling party.
67
In 2023, the total amount of public funding allocated to parliamentary parties was RSD 1.7 billion. These funds are
paid monthly, based on calculations by the Ministry of Finance; however, the amounts paid are not published.
68
The first instalment equals 40 per cent of the total budgetary allocation for election campaigns, which amounted to
RSD 1.14 billion for these elections.
a condition that can pose a financial barrier for new parties. 69 According to the Ministry of Finance,
seven candidate lists posted the required deposit and received the first instalment of RSD 25.4 million
per list. The second disbursement, paid after the final election results are announced, is proportional to
the seats obtained, regardless of the actual campaign expenses. 70
To promote equal campaign opportunities, consideration could be given to waiving the deposit
requirement for the political parties and citizen groups not represented in the parliament and local
assemblies as a precondition of the first instalment of public funds for campaigning.
Campaigns may also be financed from monetary and in-kind donations, loans, membership fees, and
other private sources. The law prohibits donations from, inter alia, foreign and anonymous donors,
public contractors, associations and other non-profit organizations, trade unions and churches.
Donations must be made via bank transfer. Donations exceeding one average monthly salary must be
disclosed on the website of political parties within eight days of receipt. 71 For most parties, donations
were not a significant source of funding, and many did not declare any recent donations. 72 Campaign
spending by third parties remains unregulated, impacting the effectiveness of campaign regulations and
leaving a prior ODIHR recommendation unaddressed. 73
To ensure legal certainty and campaign finance accountability, the legislation should be further
reviewed to address gaps and prior ODIHR recommendations, including by explicit regulation of third-
party campaigning. The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption should proactively investigate and
sanction campaign spending by unauthorized entities.
Oversight of the finances of political parties and election campaigns is carried out by the Agency for
the Prevention of Corruption (APC). List submitters must report their campaign income and
expenditures, including online, to the APC no later than seven days before election day; final reports
are submitted within 30 days of the publication of election results. These reports are to be published on
the website of the APC. 74 As part of its activities in connection with the early parliamentary elections,
the APC published 14 interim reports before election day and one additional report thereafter. Interim
reports only covered the period until 15 days prior to the elections, leaving most expenditures
unreported, including those originating from public funds. While these reports provided information on
69
See also paragraph 232 of the ODIHR and Venice Commission’s Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, advising
that systems of public funding “aim to ensure that all parties, including opposition parties, small parties and new
parties, are able to compete in elections in accordance with the principle of equal opportunities, thereby strengthening
political pluralism and helping to ensure the proper functioning of democratic institutions”.
70
The second instalment is calculated from the remaining 60 per cent of the total budget allocation. Unused funds from
election campaigns must be returned to the budget. Transparency Serbia’s analysis of reports from the 2022 elections
found that in most cases, the declared expenses of contestants matched the budgetary funds they received, even
though these expenses were incurred before the exact allocation to each electoral list was determined.
71
An individual may donate up to 10 average monthly salaries (in September 2023, the average monthly salary was
RSD 75,000), while a legal person up to 30 monthly salaries annually. In election years, these limits are doubled.
72
Some political party representatives indicated that their fundraising opportunities were limited due to fear of
retribution among donors supporting opposition parties, concerns about potential tax controls, and the administrative
difficulties with reporting donations. Only 5 political parties contesting the elections, either independently or in
coalitions, disclosed recent donations; 15 did not declare any recent donations, 8 provided no information about
donations on their websites, and several minority parties did not have websites. Among the parties that reported
donations, SPS was the first with RSD 107.5 million, followed by SDS, with RSD 1.86 million.
73
Potential spending by third parties emerged from the investigative reporting by a journalist on an SNS-affiliated call
centre. In foreign media outlets, a case involving the provision of campaign activists for SVM from abroad was
raised. The ODIHR EOM also observed negative campaign posters, often targeting opposition politicians, without
any publication data, including in Belgrade and Zrenjanin. Article 6 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
Recommendation Rec(2003)4 on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral
campaigns states that the Rules concerning donations to political parties […] should also apply, as appropriate, to all
entities which are related, directly or indirectly, to a political party or are otherwise under the control of a political
party.
74
The final report covers the entire campaign period, and is published within seven days of receipt. For these elections,
the APC facilitated electronic submission of reports signed digitally.
initial expenditures, they did not always specify the sources of campaign funding. 75 The APC is
mandated to report on its control of campaign expenditures within 120 days of the submission of final
reports. 76 To collect information on campaign expenditures, the APC deployed 144 field monitors,
enabling it to compare the expenses reported in the final reports with its own field data. However, the
field monitors did not contribute to the APC’s other election-related mandates, particularly preventing
misuse of public offices and state resources.
During the campaign, the APC received a number of reports alleging misuse of public resources, and
issued 15 public decisions on the matter, related to parliamentary and local elections. 77 While the APC
is authorized to investigate the potential misuse of public offices in breach of the LPC, which prohibits
officials from using public resources for promoting political parties, proper enforcement and
sanctioning mechanism are lacking. If a violation is found, the APC’s lowest sanction is a warning,
which is not public. 78 Furthermore, decisions on other sanctions are published only after the conclusion
of the administrative appeal process, which remains lengthy, despite a prior ODIHR recommendation.79
The APC informed the ODIHR EOM that it investigated over 30 cases under the LPC during the
campaign, but did not publish any decisions before election day. The lack of public intervention by the
APC reduced the dissuasive effect of its sanctions.
The law should be amended to require the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption to promptly make
public its decisions on violation of the Law on the Prevention of Corruption during election campaigns,
along with any related appeals. Additionally, monitoring the compliance with this law should be a
designated task for the Agency’s field monitors, if they continue to be deployed in future elections.
While the legal framework provides for the requisite transparency of campaign financing, the absence
of a reasonable limit on campaign expenditure, at odds with a prior ODIHR recommendation, facilitates
high campaign spending, potentially affecting the playing field. 80 Moreover, the lack of regulation on
spending by third parties and inadequate enforcement of the existing regulations leave room for
circumvention of campaign finance rules.
X. MEDIA
A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
Television is the primary source of information, followed by online media and social networks. Despite
the large number of media outlets, the diversity of views is limited by significant polarization, prevalent
self-censorship among journalists, and strong government influence on most media. Many outlets
75
The highest initial campaign costs were reported by the SPS-led list (RSD 189 million), followed by the SNS-led list
(RSD 146 million). The ‘Serbia against Violence’ list reported the spending of RSD 9.2 million. Several contestants
reported expenses significantly higher than their declared incomes. The ‘Vojislav Šešelj, PhD – Serbian Radical
Party’ list reported only expenses, without any income.
76
Following its control of the final reports from the April 2022 early parliamentary elections, the APC identified a
number of irregularities and initiated misdemeanour proceedings against five election contestants. It also investigated
16 reports submitted by NGOs during the campaign and determined violations in 7 such cases.
77
The three decisions related to the parliamentary elections concerned claims that website and social network posts by
public officials benefited SNS. The APC found no violations of the law.
78
The law provides that only information that a procedure has been initiated against a public official shall be available
to the public. In the APC’s interpretation, this provision requires it to provide information upon request.
79
Violations of these prohibitions may be investigated by the APC ex officio or upon a complaint, and during election
campaigns, a decision must be issued within 5 days following the initiation of investigation. These decisions may be
appealed within 15 days to the Agency Board, which has up to 60 days to issue a final decision.
80
See paragraph 19 of the General Comment 25 to the ICCPR, which underlines that “Reasonable limitations on
campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not
undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or .
Also, see paragraph 248 of the 2020 ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation and
paragraphs 96 and 97 of the 2022 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Opinion.
remain dependent on inequitably distributed subsidies, including state co-financed projects. 81 While the
law ensures more inclusive media coverage during campaigns, most opposition parties highlighted
persistent lack of access to national broadcasters in presenting their views outside these periods. At the
same time, some interlocutors noted that opposition politicians often refuse to participate in the
programmes of private broadcasters, citing bias and potential reputational harm.
Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed limited trust in the information from the national public
broadcasters and, based on their political affiliations, certain private outlets. Many ODIHR EOM
interlocutors also criticized the process of awarding broadcasting licences, alleging that it may have
been influenced by political favouritism. 82 In 2022, following a public competition, the Regulatory
Authority for Electronic Media (REM) renewed national frequency licences for the private TV Pink, TV
Prva, Happy TV, and TV B92, all widely perceived as favouring the ruling parties. Channels critical of
the government, including Insajder, N1 and Nova S, remain accessible only through cable providers, in
some cases with limited reach. 83
Some international organizations, many ODIHR EOM interlocutors and CSOs described a deterioration
of the right to freedom of expression over the past years. 84 The ODIHR EOM received numerous reports
about journalists critical of the government being subjected to verbal insults, including by state officials,
as well as co-ordinated attacks by pro-government media during the campaign period. 85 Several
journalists, particularly from the regions, reported threats, enduring pressure and intimidation, including
targeted lawsuits, and noted a culture of impunity of such actions. 86 This climate of vilification
reinforces the chilling effect on critical voices and leads to self-censorship.
The competent authorities should fulfil their duty to protect the safety of media staff through effective
and timely measures, including promptly investigate and bring to justice those involved in attacks on,
81
Two out of four private TV channels with national coverage informed the ODIHR EOM of their alignment with
government policies, while the other two stated that they are entertainment-oriented and avoid political topics.
82
The Media Freedom Rapid Response consortium, through a statement endorsed by seven national and international
organizations, criticized the process of granting licenses. According to the statement, the process “lacked
transparency and did not comply with international media freedom standards”, and it represented yet another example
of the REM’s “failure to protect media diversity and pluralism in Serbia”.
83
BK, Happy TV, K1, Kopernikus, Kurir TV, N1, Nova S, Tanjug, TV B92, TV Pink, TV Prva, TV2, UNA, and Vesti
applied for four national frequencies. A separate public competition was announced for the fifth national frequency,
with BK, Kopernikus, Kurir TV, and Nova S applying. Nova S challenged REM’s decision to grant frequencies in the
Administrative Court, but the case remained pending prior to election day.
84
A May 2023 European Parliament resolution deplored the “further deterioration of freedom of expression, the cases
of hate speech and smear campaigns and the increasing number of strategic lawsuits against public participation”.
ODIHR EOM interlocutors referred to the growing trend of strengthening government control, including through
‘rewarding’ media with state subsidies, influencing the media regulator politically, and limiting access to information
using 'national security' and 'personal data protection' as legal arguments.
85
On 2 November, the Prime Minister called journalists from Danas ’uncivilized sadists and haters’, accusing the
opposition media of orchestrating the postal workers’ strike. The same day, the Minister of Trade called journalists
‘scum’ and ‘garbage’ in an Instagram post. On 13 November, SNS officials labelled the editorial staff of Danas as
‘trash’ and ‘shameless bastards’ on X. Such accusations were often extensively discussed in current affairs shows,
further inciting threats against the targeted journalists, including through anonymous messages. According to the
Association of Journalists of Serbia (UNS), three physical attacks on journalists took place during the post-election
day opposition protests in Belgrade, two of which were committed by police officers.
86
As of 25 December, the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS) documented 8 physical attacks,
118 cases of pressure, and 40 verbal threats targeting journalists in 2023. The UNS recorded 111 cases of violation
of journalists’ rights in 2023. The 2020 General Mandatory Instruction by the Public Prosecutor calls for
immediate actions “in cases of criminal offenses in which the safety of journalists and media workers is threatened”.
As reported by the Supreme Public Prosecution Office, by 31 October, 70 criminal cases related to journalists’ safety
were initiated in 2023. Additionally, RTS and RTV received numerous bomb threats, significantly disrupting their
normal operations and regular broadcasts. In March 2023, the OSCE Media Freedom Representative expressed
concerns over targeting of journalists in Serbia, stating that “acts that threaten the personal safety and integrity of
journalists represent a serious obstacle to media freedom and hamper the free flow of information and citizens’ right
to access information of public interest”.
and ill-treatment of journalists and other media actors, as well as publicly condemn all threats against
journalists.
B. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The media-related legal framework pertaining to elections consists primarily of the LEMP, the Law on
Electronic Media and the Law on Public Service Broadcasting. The law stipulates an obligation for the
media to provide information about contestants impartially, and upholds the right of citizens to be
informed about the electoral programmes and activities of the contestants.
In October 2023, the Law on Electronic Media and the Law on Public Information and Media were
adopted, following extensive consultations with relevant stakeholders. The laws, inter alia, provided a
new definition of political advertisement, and introduced provisions aimed at preventing undue
interference on media, as well as strengthening the independence of the REM. 87 While acknowledging
the positive aspects of these changes, some ODIHR EOM interlocutors raised concerns about the
effective implementation of the provisions related to editorial independence. Moreover, the new laws
permit state-owned telecommunication companies to own media outlets, which, in the opinion of
several ODIHR EOM interlocutors, could result in an increased state influence over the media. 88
The legislative changes extended the ban on coverage by broadcasters of public officials participating
in public infrastructure inauguration events, if they are candidates, from 10 to 30 days prior to election
day. This provision was largely adhered to. 89 However, it was insufficient to effectively address the
significant and undue advantage of incumbency, as both public and most private media extensively
promoted governmental infrastructure projects during the campaign period, and covered public
officials, who were not candidates. 90
By law, public broadcasters are required to provide all electoral contestants with free airtime to present
their platforms. 91 In addition, broadcasters may sell airtime to contestants, provided they establish non-
discriminatory pricing. For these elections, most major TV channels made such paid airtime available.
However, cable channels N1 and Nova S decided not to, arguing that this could unduly benefit the ruling
87
Starting in 2024, nominees for the Council can be proposed by the ombudsman, the Equality Commissioner, the
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, universities, journalistic, media,
film and theatre associations, associations with the aim of protecting children, national minority councils, churches
and religious communities. The parliament will no longer have the mandate to nominate members for the REM
Council. Newly defined provisions outline REM’s responsibilities during campaigns and specify sanctions for
misdemeanours. Additionally, legislative amendments stipulate that political advertisements must be clearly labelled
and cannot be disguised within informational or entertainment programme.
88
The new provision on state ownership of the media is at odds with the Media Strategy 2020–2025, reference to which
was removed from the law. See the European Commission’s Serbia 2023 Report, which states that “the legislative
process was not finalized fully in line with the EU acquis and European standards.” As reported by the Serbian
Business Registers Agency, as of December 2023, approximately one-fifth of registered media outlets have not
complied with legal requirements to register all necessary data, including ownership details.
89
On 23 November, Bálint Pásztor, the top candidate of SVM, accompanied by another candidate from the same list,
inaugurated new sidewalks in Stara Moravica, which was covered by the Hungarian-language television outlet
registered in Serbia, PannonRTV. On 28 November, Mr. Pásztor participated in the inauguration of a newly opened
railway line between Subotica and Szeged (Hungary), an event covered PannonRTV. On 8 December, Ivica Dačić,
leader of the SPS list and Minister of Foreign Affairs, opened a Serbian consulate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
was covered by several broadcasters, including TV Prva and TV Novi Pazar.
90
The media covered several governmental projects, including the Minister of Energy opening a bridge in Mrčajevci
on 25 November and signing public employee benefits deal on 26 November. The President participated in a road
opening in Šabac on 27 November, inaugurated a new railway line from Subotica to Szeged with the Minister of
Energy on 3 December, announced new airport constructions across Serbia on 6 December, and drove on a new
highway in the Kruševac area on 7 December. Additionally, on 11 December, the President inaugurated the Serbia-
Bulgaria natural gas interconnector in Niš alongside the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Bulgaria.
91
RTS2 provided 35 minutes of live broadcasting, and the Radio Television of Vojvodina’s RTV1 provided 15 minutes
of airtime per contestant in the entire campaign period. The order of the appearance of contestants was determined
by lottery. While not obliged by the law, the private TV Pink provided the contestants with 10 minutes of free airtime.
parties, which possess more substantial funds and had the advantage of starting their campaigns earlier
due to early registration. This decision was criticized by the ruling coalition, asserting that it impeded
their campaigning efforts. 92
The 2023 legislative changes reinforce the REM’s role in overseeing broadcast media by specifying its
duties to monitor media during campaigns and detailing deadlines and sanctions for resolving media-
related complaints. 93 Nevertheless, the amendments related to the composition of the REM council did
not come into effect during this campaign period. Most EOM interlocutors reported critically low trust
in the efficiency of the current composition of the REM, citing the potential of political influence. 94 The
REM maintained a notably passive approach to regulating media conduct during the campaign. It did
not publish any monitoring results before election day, nor did it initiate any procedures based on its
media monitoring. 95 While receiving 22 complaints, the REM did not issue any public responses prior
to election day, arguing that complaints cannot be addressed in an expedited manner, which continued
to significantly undermine its effectiveness. 96
The independence of the Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (REM) should be effectively
guaranteed, in line with the new legal provisions. The REM should proactively use its legal powers to
act ex officio on violations of media regulation, based on its systematic monitoring.
C. MEDIA MONITORING CLICK HERE TO READ MEDIA MONITORING RESULTS
The ODIHR EOM monitored primetime broadcasts of the public Radio Television of Serbia’s RTS1
and the Radio Television of Vojvodina’s RTV1 channels, and private national television outlets TV B92,
Happy TV, TV Pink and TV Prva, between 21 November and 14 December. The media monitoring
established that the coverage of the president, despite not being a candidate, dominated the prime-time
news of the monitored broadcasters. 97 The president and the ruling party combined were featured in 91
per cent of the non-election related newscasts on national channels and were generally portrayed in a
positive tone, further tilting the playing field. 98
All national broadcasters covered campaign activities in line with the law, providing equal airtime to
contestants. However, contestants who registered early, such as SNS, SPS and Dveri, as well as ‘Serbia
92
Furthermore, the ruling party and the government accused the channels of selective coverage and bias, disinformation,
and expressed concerns that N1 and Nova S, being cross-border channels, are not subject to Serbian media laws.
93
According to the law, the REM shall initiate a procedure for investigating election campaign violations within 48
hours. This initiation can be based on its monitoring, a report from any individual or legal entity, or other available
data. The broadcaster has between 3 and 15 days to provide a statement. The decision to conclude the investigation
will be communicated within 72 hours of its initiation. In the case of the 2022 election campaign, following 12
violations reported to the REM and 4 identified through its monitoring, the body filed 8 requests to start legal
proceedings for these offenses.
94
The REM Council’s current management, as mandated by law, was nominated by the parliament and the Provincial
Assembly of Vojvodina. The last member nominated by the opposition resigned in June 2023.
95
On 26 December, the REM presented its media monitoring results from 1 November to 14 December of the four
public channels RTS1, RTS2, RTV1, RTV2, and four cable TVs N1, Nova S, Al Jazeera, and TV K1. The report covers
the amount of time dedicated to certain political actors and electoral contestants, as well as the tone of the coverage.
Despite monitoring private broadcasters with national frequencies (B92, Happy TV, TV Pink, TV Prva), these results
were omitted from the report, and no assessment or conclusions were provided.
96
Out of 22 complaints published on the REM website, 8 were regarding TV Pink, 4 about B92, 3 concerning TV Prva,
and 3 about TV Happy. The majority of these complaints cited violations regarding balanced coverage in news
programmes. The only instance where the REM took proactive action was when a pornographic video featuring a
politician from ‘Serbia Against Violence’ was aired during a morning show on TV Pink.
97
In addition, the main news programmes of the cable TV channels Informer TV, Kurir TV, and TV N1, as well as the
content of seven daily newspapers, were also monitored.
98
Some 64 per cent of the non-election-related news on RTS1, 72 per cent on B92, 75 per cent on TV Pink, 61 per cent
on TV Prva, and 52 per cent of the regional public RTV1 featured the president. Between 52 and 79 per cent of his
coverage on national channels was in positive tone. During the last week of the election campaign, the president
appeared in the talk shows on TV Happy, TV Prva, and TV Pink. Moreover, national TV channels frequently
interrupted entertainment shows to broadcast live coverage of the president.
against Violence’, were more prominently featured in the election-related news on most national TV
channels. 99 While this coverage was generally neutral or positive, ‘Serbia Against Violence’ was mostly
negatively covered on B92 and TV Pink. Positively, RTS refused to broadcast materials containing
negative campaigning from all contestants. The majority of broadcasters with national frequencies
narrowly interpretated of the law, which limited most of their election-related news blocks to
compilations of short clips pre-recorded by the contestants. 100 This resulted in a lack of comprehensive
and objective coverage of the contestants, and blurred the separation between editorial content and
political advertising, contrary to OSCE commitments. 101
To provide impartial information about the contestants and allow voters to make an informed choice,
the media should exercise their right for editorial independence and avoid using material produced by
parties in news and information programmes, especially during election campaigns.
Among the news programmes monitored on cable TV networks, most provided mainly positive and
neutral coverage of the election contestants and authorities, while TV N1 presented a critical portrait of
the president, the ruling parties and authorities. 102 In the run-up to the elections, the public RTS and
some private broadcasters, including N1 and Insajder, organized televised debates. While featuring
prominent party representatives from both the ruling party and opposition, these often turned into
accusatory exchanges lacking in-depth discussion, hindering the voters’ opportunity to learn more about
the contestants. The coverage of SNS and the ruling party was mostly positive in current affairs
programmes, the coverage of ‘Serbia Against Violence’ on TV Pink and Happy TV was negative,
including instances of insults. 103 The monitored newspapers frequently featured the president on the
front pages, praising the government’s achievements, while criticizing the opposition. 104
XI. NATIONAL MINORITIES
There are 23 officially recognized national minorities in Serbia, which exercise their rights through their
respective National Minority Councils.105 The Constitution guarantees the rights and freedoms of
99
SNS received 10 to 26 per cent of coverage, SPS between 6 and 14, and Dveri 6 to 14 per cent in neutral or positive
tone. ‘Serbia against Violence’ received between 10 and 36 per cent, however, with a mainly negative tone on B92
and TV Pink, and neutral or positive tone on other channels.
100
The broadcasters generally justified these decisions with their stated policy of not interpreting campaign messages
and cited their limited resources for covering such events.
101
See paragraph 9.1 the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and paragraph 26 of the 1991 Moscow Document. See
also paragraph I.3 of the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2007)15, which states that “regulatory
frameworks on media coverage of elections should respect the editorial independence of the media”.
102
Informer TV dedicated 43 per cent of its news to the president, and 22 per cent to the authorities, mostly in a positive
tone. While ‘Serbia Against Violence’ received some 13 per cent of coverage, it was almost exclusively in a negative
tone. Kurir TV dedicated 49 per cent of its news to the SNS-coalition, which was covered mostly in a positive tone,
while the president received 18 per cent of the news coverage in a positive or neutral tone. N1’s news programmes
covered the president in 23 per cent of their content and the ruling party in 55 per cent of their content, and of this
coverage, 55 and 60 per cent, respectively, was in a negative tone.
103
In the programme “Ćirilica” on Happy TV, the opposition was labelled ‘idiots’ and ‘ignorant’, and ‘Serbia Against
Violence’ was accused of engaging in violence and being associated with the mass shootings. On TV Pink, the
opposition were termed ‘liars’ and were often claimed to be financially and ideologically influenced by the West.
104
The front pages of pro-government newspapers frequently depicted the president in a positive light while portraying
the opposition negatively, often accusing them of destabilizing the country. On 30 November, an opposition politician
was labelled ‘human disgrace’ in Večernje Novosti, and on 2 December, ‘Serbia Against Violence’ was characterized
as a gathering of 'drug addicts, criminals, and thieves' in Informer. Ten days before the elections, the weekly NIN
published an extensive interview with the president, which was also made available in video format. On 10 January
2024, the editorial staff of the weekly resigned and announced their intention to continue their work at a new
magazine, citing their commitment to professional integrity. On the other hand, compared to other dailies, Danas
allocated more space to the opposition. Its coverage critically and, in some cases, harshly assessed the SNS-led list
and the campaign’s domination by the president, often highlighting the alleged irregularities of the electoral process.
105
Minority groups together represent some 12 per cent of the population, with ethnic Hungarians, Bosniaks, and Roma
being the largest, comprising some 2.8, 2.3, and some 2 per cent of the population, respectively.
minorities, including those related to political association, cultural institutions, education, and access to
information in their own languages. As of 2023, out of the 121 political parties listed in the registry
administered by the MPALSG, 71 were registered as representing national minorities. The Law on
Political Parties contains provisions promoting the participation of national minorities in public life,
including providing preferential criteria to register political parties. 106
Many ODIHR EOM interlocutors noted that some political entities consistently aim to misuse national
minority-related preferential provisions to access related benefits, including allocation of campaign
funds, exemption from the three percent threshold, reduced number of support signatures and enhanced
representation. 107 The REC, which has the authority to grant minority status to candidate lists, retains
broad discretionary powers to interpret and implement the respective provisions, detracting from a prior
ODIHR recommendation. 108 Moreover, prior to these elections, the REC did not apply the criteria
consistently to all contestants when considering their national minority status. 109
To prevent the misuse of special provisions for national minority lists, consideration should be given to
further refining the legal criteria for determining national minority status and the procedures for
registering these lists.
In line with the law, the REC prepared multilingual voter education and election material in all
municipalities where national minority languages are in official use. Election material in one or more
minority languages was available in 44 municipalities. The REC registered seven national minority
candidate lists, representing the Albanian, Bosniak, Croat, Hungarian, Montenegrin, Russian, and Vlach
communities. Following the elections, the Albanian, Bosniak, Croat, Hungarian and Russian minorities
obtained representation in the parliament. Despite being the third largest minority in the country, no
candidate list representing the Roma community applied for registration. The ODIHR EOM received
several reports indicating that members of the Roma community continue to be vulnerable to pressure
and vote buying due to socio-economic factors. 110
XII. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The February 2022 legislative changes addressed a number of prior ODIHR recommendations by
extending legal standing to voters registered in a polling station and prolonging the timeframes for filing
and reviewing complaints. Depending on the subject matter, the legal standing is granted to submitters
106
By law, national minorities can register a political party with 1,000 certified support signatures from voters; the
registration of non-minority parties requires 10,000 signatures.
107
In addition, paragraph 140 of the 2022 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Opinion notes that “The current system
of national minority status for electoral lists does not guarantee the representation of all national minorities.” The
2019 fourth opinion of the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities has stated that “the current system benefits mainly a few larger minorities and has
recommended a revision”.
108
A national minority list may only be nominated by a political party representing a national minority, or a coalition
exclusively composed of political parties of national minorities. The REC is responsible for determining whether a
list genuinely represents a national minority, and if the list’s primary objective is to represent minority interests and
protect minority rights. In this process, the REC has the authority to consult with the relevant national minority
council. The REC retains significant discretion in denying national minority status to a list, particularly if any of its
candidates are known to belong to a political party that does not represent a national minority or if there are other
clear indications of an attempt to circumvent the law.
109
For example, the REC cited the absence of the relevant national minority council’s opinion as a reason for not
registering the ‘Enough! European Path’ list. However, this opinion was not sought for various other lists that were
granted national minority status, as they were considered “well-established national minority parties” by the REC.
Moreover, the REC decided on registering the lists declaring representation of national minorities (or requested
additional signatures) prior to determining the national minority status of such lists. Such order of consideration
allowed for selective application of the registration criteria to national minority lists.
110
On 2 December, following an SNS rally in Belgrade, members of the Roma community alleged they had been paid
by SNS to attend the event.
of candidate lists, political parties, candidates, parliamentary groups and voters. Citizen observers can
only submit complaints related to their right to observe the printing and handover of ballots, which
limits the effectiveness of their observer role. Complaints against actions and decisions of the election
administration are handled by the REC, whose decisions may be appealed to the Administrative Court.
The deadlines for filing and resolving complaints range between 48 and 72 hours, in line with
international good practice.
Before election day, the REC handled 23 complaints, primarily related to the registration or rejection
of candidate lists. 111 All complaints were considered within the deadlines and in public sessions, often
following substantive discussions, but some complaints were handled formalistically. 112 The online
complaints register maintained by the REC was regularly updated and included LEC decisions and
appeals, contributing to transparency of the electoral dispute resolution, and addressing a prior ODIHR
recommendation. Recent changes in the jurisdiction regarding appeals against LEC decisions related to
local elections were a cause of confusion for some stakeholders. 113 A number of ODIHR EOM
interlocutors opined that election commissions and courts are potentially susceptible to political
influence, and therefore, they had limited trust in the impartial resolution of their complaints.
The Administrative Court received eight appeals before election day, and upheld REC decisions in all
four cases reviewed on the merits; four appeals were dismissed on procedural grounds. 114 The Court’s
decisions were reasoned and timely published on its website. However, the scope of the Court’s review
was at times unduly narrow, which reduced the effectiveness of judicial remedy. 115 Moreover, while
the law requires oral public hearings in administrative disputes, in practice, the Administrative Court
decided on electoral appeals on the basis of written submissions, limiting the opportunity to present
one’s case, contrary to international good practice, and leaving a prior ODIHR recommendation
unaddressed. 116
The Administrative Court should use all available means to uphold the right to an effective remedy in
electoral disputes, and should hold oral public hearings in such cases.
Complaints against misuse of public resources and office in election campaigns are submitted to the
Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (see Campaign Finance section). In addition, the law
establishes an ad hoc Committee for Campaign Oversight, which may issue public statements on
campaign violations. However, the formula for appointing Committee members ensures a majority for
111
Fifteen complainants argued that President Vučić acting as a list bearer was incompatible with his constitutional role.
These complaints were dismissed as falling outside the REC competence. Other complaints related to the registration
of minority lists, the composition of LECs, and the appeals process.
112
For instance, on 30 November, the REC rejected a complaint regarding the non-registration of electoral list ’Enough!
European path’, as the complaint was submitted by an unauthorized person, even though the same individual was
previously authorized to apply for the registration of the list. In the same session, REC declined a complaint against
non-registration of the ‘Russian Minority Alliance’, despite evidence refuting the grounds for the list’s non-
registration.
113
Following the entry into force of legislative amendments adopted in February 2022, appeals against LEC decisions
on local elections are no longer handled by the Administrative Court but by the higher court located within the
territorial jurisdiction of the respective LEC. For example, on 3 December, the REC declined to handle a complaint
submitted due to a mistake made by a LEC in indicating the appropriate legal remedy. The LEC incorrectly stated in
its decision that it could be appealed to the REC instead of the local higher court.
114
Two appeals related to REC decisions on complaints about President Vučić as a list bearer.
115
For example, on 4 December, the Administrative Court upheld the REC’s decision to deny registration to the electoral
list of the ‘Russian Minority Alliance’. The Court limited its review to the materials available to the REC at the time
of the disputed decision. On appeal, the Alliance provided additional evidence, but this appeal did not get enough
votes to be upheld in the REC.
116
The 2009 Law on Administrative Disputes provides that courts decide “based on the facts identified in oral public
discussion”. The Administrative Court informed the ODIHR EOM that this provision is not applied in light of the
short deadline for electoral disputes. Paragraph II.3.3.h of the Guidelines on the Council of Europe’s Venice
Commission’s Code of Good Practices in Electoral Matters advises for the applicant’s right to a hearing involving
both parties to be protected.
the ruling parties. 117 Moreover, this Committee lacks the mandate to address individual complaints and
does not have the necessary tools for meaningful campaign oversight or for addressing breaches of
campaign rules, such as pressure on voters. Before election day, the Committee issued several
statements urging contestants to act with integrity. It did not endorse a member’s proposal to issue a
statement concerning President Vučić’s involvement in the campaign.
During the campaign, several stakeholders informed the ODIHR EOM that they submitted reports of
suspected electoral offences to the police and prosecutors. The REC forwarded evidence of potentially
fraudulent support signatures to prosecutors’ offices (see Candidate Registration section). Despite some
serious allegations in the public domain, including claims of vote-buying and other manipulative
interference with the free expression of voters’ will, the law enforcement bodies did not publicly
comment on any ongoing investigations until after election day. No reports of electoral offences have
resulted in prosecutions in 2022. 118
XIII. ELECTION OBSERVATION
The law provides for citizen and international observation and guarantees observers unhindered access
to the entire election process. CSOs registered for election-related statutory purposes may nominate
observers until seven days before the elections. International observers must be nominated at least ten
days before the elections. One citizen and two international observers from the same entities can be
present at a given election commission at the same time.
The Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) and the Center for Research, Transparency and
Accountability (CRTA) carried out nationwide long-term observation. Other organizations, such as the
Bureau for Social Research (BIRODI) and Transparency International (TI), examined specific aspects
of the electoral process, including conducting media monitoring and analysing campaign finance. In an
inclusive manner, the REC accredited a total of 5,112 observers from 9 CSOs and 475 international
observers from 25 organizations.
Many CSOs have reported a climate of pressure and a diminishing space for civic activities. 119 On
election day, citizen observer groups reported instances of physical attacks and intimidation of their
representatives (see Election Day section). Following the 26 December publication of a CRTA report
alleging organized voter migration related to the local elections, authorities and pro-government media
publicly accused the organization of destabilizing the country’s constitutional order. 120 Some
international observer organizations and individual observers, including from the IEOM, also faced
117
The Committee comprises ten prominent public figures appointed by the parliament, with five members nominated
by the government and five members nominated by parliamentary groups.
118
The Public Prosecutors’ 2022 report on the state of criminality and protection of legality indicated that in addition to
3 cases under investigation from the previous reporting period, 9 new investigations into vote-buying were launched
in 2022; by the end of 2022, 4 of these 12 cases were dismissed and 8 were still being investigated.
119
The European Commission’s Serbia 2023 Report noted “verbal attacks and smear campaigns against CSOs”. In the
pre-electoral period, alleged spyware attack attempts on mobile phones of CSO members were reported.
120
On 22 December, during a press point, the Prime Minister accused CRTA of “violating the constitutional order and
attempting to destabilize the country”, further stating on 25 December that organizations “like CRTA are openly
preparing material for disinformation and are supported by enemies from the region, tycoon-owned media, and
foreigners who want to bring their protégés to power.”
targeted discrediting efforts from state authorities and media outlets close to the ruling party. 121 These
actions against impartial election observation conflict with Serbia’s international commitments. 122
Authorities should guarantee adequate conditions for both citizen and international observers to
conduct their activities with unimpeded access to all election-related information in a timely manner
and in an environment free from pressure and intimidation, in line with Serbia's international
commitments.
XIV. ELECTION DAY
Election day was generally orderly, but isolated incidents occurred involving physical attacks against
and intimidation of polling board members and citizen observers. 123 Additionally, widespread claims
emerged throughout the day about a potentially large number of voters living abroad, who were
organized and bused to the capital to vote for the ruling party. These allegations undermined public trust
in the integrity of the local elections and also affected the acceptance of the parliamentary results (see
Post-electoral Developments section).124
A. OPENING AND VOTING
The polling stations observed generally opened on time. IEOM observers positively evaluated the
opening procedures in 118 out of 135 polling stations. Most polling stations adhered to procedures,
though observers noted some shortcomings: in 12 polling stations, chairpersons did not show to all
present that the ballot boxes were empty; in 4 cases, control sheets were not signed or properly inserted
into the ballot box; and in 9 polling stations, the ballot boxes were not properly sealed. Twelve polling
stations experienced delays in opening.
The IEOM gave a positive assessment to the voting process in 93 per cent of the 1,208 polling stations
observed. Negative assessments were primarily attributed to overcrowding and inadequate measures to
ensure secrecy of the vote, detracting from long-standing ODIHR recommendations. 125 Serious
irregularities observed by the IEOM included 9 cases of vote buying and 5 cases of ballot box stuffing.
121
On 22 December, the Prime Minister stated that the absence of complaints recorded in the PS results protocols by
international observers indicates a lack of irregularities. Although the LEMP permits observers to note their
observations in such protocols on election day, most international and some citizen observers are specifically
instructed not to enter their remarks in the PB protocols, as it is not in line with their methodology of non-interference
to do so. Between 25 and 29 December, state leaders, including the President and the First Deputy Prime Minister,
accused some international observers of biased behaviour, citing individual statements by some IEOM members in
the media, stating these were not consistent with the IEOM’s Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.
122
Paragraph 8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that “the participating States consider that the presence
of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking
place”.
123
On election day, media reported on instances of physical attacks on PB members appointed by ZLF in Ruski Krstur
and Zvezdara, carried out by unknown perpetrators, and an SNS activist assaulted in Novi Sad. In addition, a vehicle
belonging to CRTA observers was damaged in Odzaci. The cases were reported to prosecutors’ offices. CRTA also
reported cases of intimidation of their observers, in Doljevac, Odžaci, and Žabalj.
124
Video footage appeared on social networks depicting Štark Arena, purportedly being used as a hub for organizing
voters from Bosnia and Herzegovina registered in Belgrade. Representatives of ‘Serbia Against Violence” list
claimed that some 40,000 voters were brought to Belgrade to vote. The Prime Minister denied any wrongdoing in
this regard in a social media post, stating that on election day some 20,360 persons crossed the border from Bosnia
and Herzegovina to Serbia, out of which only some 10-15,000 had voting rights, including 5-6,000 in Belgrade. By
law, providing bus transport to voters is not prohibited, except when it is provided in exchange for votes.
125
In 24 per cent of the observations, not all voters marked their ballots in secrecy, which is a high number and of
concern. In 21 per cent of polling stations, secrecy of the vote was compromised by inadequately positioned voting
screens, and in 7 per cent, by the incorrect folding of ballots. Also see Paragraph 23 of the 2022 ODIHR and Venice
Commission Joint Opinion.
The IEOM noted instances of group or family voting in some 19 per cent of polling stations.126
Observers reported 14 instances of unauthorized tracking of voters. The IEOM also witnessed 22
instances of voters taking photos of their ballots, and 20 attempts to influence voters for whom to vote.
Unauthorized persons were observed inside of the 3 per cent of the polling stations observed, at times
with signs of pressure or intimidation of voters. 127
Additional procedural shortcomings were noted in 39 per cent of the observations, primarily due to PB
members’ improper implementation of procedures, potentially indicative of the lack of adequate
training. These included ballot boxes not being properly sealed in 9 per cent of observations,
inconsistent verification of voters’ identities in about 4 per cent, improper checking of voters’ fingers
for invisible ink in 9 per cent, and not inking voters’ fingers at the time of voting in 9 per cent of the
observations.
Observers noted that over one third of the polling stations did not comply with the legal requirement to
inform voters about the voting process and their right to a secret vote. The IEOM followed some
instances of mobile voting and found that several voters included on the mobile voters’ lists had not
requested homebound voting and, consequently, refused to cast their vote using this procedure.
In 9 per cent of the observations, mainly due to the small size of premises, the layout of PS was not
adequate for voting. This, combined with the large number of PB members, led to overcrowding in 10
per cent of the observations. 128 The election law and REC instructions do not include provisions for
assistive tools that would enable voters with visual or cognitive impairments to vote independently.
Moreover, some 60 per cent of the polling stations observed lacked independent access for persons with
physical disabilities, and in 25 per cent, the layout was not accommodating for such voters, despite the
REC’s efforts to improve accessibility.
As previously recommended, further efforts should be made to allocate adequate premises for polling
stations to prevent overcrowding, ensure the secrecy of the vote, and provide easy independent access
for voters with physical disabilities.
Most PS included ‘extended’ PB members nominated by electoral contestants, with SNS-list

representatives present in 85 per cent and ‘Serbia Against Violence’ in 68 per cent of the observations.
Citizen observers monitored the process in one out of four polling stations, enhancing transparency.
B. COUNTING AND TABULATION
The IEOM assessed the counting negatively in 10 of the 117 polling stations observed, mainly due to
significant procedural errors or omissions. These included PBs not following the prescribed order for
counting electoral contests (first parliamentary, then local elections) in 17 cases, and failing to count
voters’ signatures before opening the ballot boxes in 13 cases. Further, in 13 observations, PBs had
difficulties reconciling the number of ballots in the ballot box with the number of ballots issued; in 21
observations, reconciling the results in PB protocols was problematic. Contrary to the procedures, the
protocol was pre-signed by PB members in 12 cases, and in 15 cases, election materials were not
properly packed and sealed at the end of counting. In 26 observations, the results protocols were not
posted at the entrance of the PS, as required by the law, negatively impacting transparency.
126
Group or family voting, where multiple individuals are behind the voting screen simultaneously, is illegal, unless a
voter requested assistance. Such instances were more frequently observed outside the capital (20.4 per cent of the
observations) than in Belgrade (12 per cent).
127
Such cases were reported in 4.2 per cent of the polling stations observed in Belgrade and 2.7 per cent outside the
capital.
128
Overcrowding was more frequently observed in the capital (20.9 per cent) than outside (10 per cent).
Results tabulation was observed in 94 LECs and assessed positively in all but 3 cases. Negative
assessments resulted from instances of not adhering to the procedure for the receipt of PB results
protocols and cases of limited transparency. Discrepancies in PB results protocols during intake at LECs
were observed in 32 cases, prompting LECs making corrections based on the inspection of election
materials in 16 cases. IEOM observers reported overcrowding in 9 LECs, and noted tension or unrest
in 3 instances. As per common practice, most LECs worked continuously on election night, but some
suspended the intake of PB materials and protocols for several hours, resuming later on 18 December.
While not in violation of the law, such breaks reduced the transparency of the tabulation process. 129
XV. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS
The REC began publishing the parliamentary results shortly after the polls closed. In line with a prior
ODIHR recommendation, the published results were disaggregated by polling station and also contained
scanned protocols. The Prime Minister declared victory for SNS on election night, based on projections
from unofficial data. On 18 December, within the legal deadline, the REC announced the preliminary
results for the early parliamentary elections. The preliminary results for local elections were announced
on 18 December by the respective LECs. 130
From 18 December, ‘Serbia against Violence’ initiated daily protests in Belgrade, demanding the
repetition of both the local and the early parliamentary elections due to alleged irregularities, including
pressure on voters, vote buying, and organized busing of voters within Serbia and from abroad. 131
Opposition parties also demanded immediate access to the UVR to verify the allegations of organized
voter migration. While most demonstrations were peaceful, violence erupted on 24 December in
Belgrade, leading to riot police deploying tear gas against the protestors and making 38 arrests. State
officials, including the president, repeatedly accused protestors, opposition parties, and supporting
CSOs of attempting to destabilize the country.
PS results may be challenged by voters who were unlawfully prevented from voting or whose right to
a free and secret ballot was violated, as well as by list submitters on the grounds of any irregularities.
Some 360 requests for the annulment of parliamentary voting results were made to LECs and 36
complaints regarding irregularities were made to the REC. Among these, around 200 complaints
requested the annulment of voting results in all PS on the territory of a LEC or nationwide, citing
violations of campaign conditions, pressure on voters, inaccurate voter lists, and other general issues,
rather than specific irregularities in particular PS. These were dismissed on procedural grounds or
rejected due to lack of evidence.
The Constitutional Court has the legal authority to determine whether irregularities significantly
influenced the election result and can annul the electoral process partially or entirely upon petitions. If
the Court annuls an electoral process, the law requires it to be repeated within 10 days, which is
practically challenging. Moreover, the Court is not bound by a specific deadline to resolve electoral
disputes, potentially affecting the timeliness of this remedy. Alleging widespread irregularities, two
requests for the partial or full annulment of the early parliamentary elections were submitted to the
Constitutional Court. The court had not made a ruling by the time of the first session of the new
parliament.
129
This was observed in the LECs of Bela Crkva, Kovin, Niš and Ruma.
130
In the 110-member municipal assembly of Belgrade, SNS obtained 49 mandates, ‘Serbia Against Violence’ 43,
NADA 7, ‘We – Voice of People’ 6, and SPS 5.
131
The largest demonstration took place on 30 December in Belgrade with tens of thousands of participants. Some
protests involved road blocks set up in Belgrade in front of public offices. Occasional protests were also held in other
locations throughout the country, such as Ljig, Niš, and Novi Pazar.
The law should provide a reasonably short deadline for the Constitutional Court to handle electoral
petitions and allow for a longer period to hold a repeat election.
Voting must be repeated in PS where results cannot be determined or are annulled by a LEC due to
certain procedural irregularities, including those not impacting the election outcome, at odds with a
prior ODIHR recommendation. Following the LECs’ inspection of election materials, parliamentary
voting results were annulled in 35 polling stations, where repeat voting took place on 30 December. 132
The REC considered some 100 appeals against LEC decisions to reject requests for the annulment of
voting results. These were timely decided in public sessions, often following substantive debates, but
most were rejected, although frequently as a result of the majority of REC members present abstaining
from the vote on the appeal. 133 In eight instances, the REC overturned LEC decisions, annulled polling
station results, and scheduled repeat elections for 2 January 2024. 134 Discussions at the REC showed
that LECs handled annulment requests differently, especially in terms of required evidence and fact
verification. At times, the REC took decision while lacking complete documentation for informed
decision-making on the appeals, particularly when objections annexed to PB results protocols were
missing. The Administrative Court received 47 appeals, dismissed 20 on procedural grounds and upheld
REC decisions in all cases reviewed on the merits.
Consideration should be given to elaborating additional guidance for Local Election Commissions on
the substantive consideration of requests for the annulment of voting results and rules for the REC on
handling the appeals against their decisions.
Following the repeat elections, three appeals against LEC decisions related to the examination of
electoral material were considered by the REC and rejected. 135 The final results of the early
parliamentary elections were announced on 12 January, with a voter turnout of 58.69 per cent,
confirming the victory of the SNS-led coalition. A complaint submitted by ‘Serbia against Violence’
against the announcement of the final election results, citing previously raised concerns and arguing
that not all appeals had been concluded, was rejected by the REC on 18 January. The new parliament
convened for its first session on 6 February. 136 In the new composition of the parliament, 95 members
(38 percent) were women, constituting a moderate increase compared to the previous composition.
XVI. RECOMMENDATIONS
These recommendations as contained throughout the text are offered with a view to further enhance the
conduct of elections in Serbia and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE commitments
and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. These recommendations
should be read in conjunction with past ODIHR recommendations that have not yet been addressed.
132
In 14 cases, this was due to incomplete or improperly signed PB protocols, and in eight cases, the number of ballots
found in the ballot box was higher than the number of those who signed the voter lists. Other cases included instances
when PB protocols were not delivered, when numbers in PB protocols could not be reconciled, the absence of, or
improperly signed, ballot box control sheets, and cases of violations of secrecy during voting.
133
When appeals were put to vote, the majority of REC members present at the session frequently did not cast any vote,
and the appeals were thus deemed rejected. This practice of de facto abstention is questionable, as it effectively
amounts to inaction by an administrative body.
134
In these cases, the irregularities included violations of voting secrecy, voters being illegitimately denied ballots, and
breaches of mobile voting procedures.
135
Two appellants requested LECs to allow them examine voter lists in specific PSs from both the 17 December and the
repeat elections, but the deadline for such requests in relation to the 17 December elections has already expired. The
third appeal for a sample control of results protocols was dismissed because it was filed by an unauthorized person.
136
Representatives of all opposition parties, but the DS, which got eight mandates, attended the session.
ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of Serbia to further improve the electoral process and to
address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports. 137
A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. To effectively address recommendations outlined in this and prior ODIHR election observation
reports, necessary legislative amendments should be initiated well in advance of the next
elections through an inclusive consultative process built upon a broad political consensus. If
reconstituted, the inter-agency Working Group on Co-ordination and Follow-up of the
Implementation of Recommendations for the Improvement of the Electoral Process should act
in full transparency, with the inclusion of relevant stakeholders, such as civil society
organizations.
2. As previously recommended, to ensure consistent application of election day procedures and

enhance the professional capacity of the election administration, standardized mandatory
training could be considered for all Local Electoral Commission and Polling Board members
and prospective members, including the extended compositions of these bodies.
3. To enhance the effective exercise of voting rights, the Republic Electoral Commission should
develop and implement a timely, comprehensive and targeted voter education programme,
including on voters’ rights, the prevention of group voting, and the importance of voting by
secret ballot. Detailed voter information and education materials should be available in various
accessible formats.
4. To address concerns over the accuracy of voter lists and increase public confidence, the relevant
laws, regulations, and practices should be reconsidered to enable access to voter registration data
and facilitate the conduct of a meaningful audit of the Unified Voter Register with the
participation of relevant stakeholders, including political parties and civil society, in line with
data protection standards.
5. The law should provide for a clear separation between the official functions and campaigning
activities of the incumbents. Authorities should take measures to prevent misuse of office and
state resources and any violations should be proactively addressed through proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions.
6. Authorities should prevent intimidation and pressure on voters, including employees of public
and state institutions and enterprises and strengthen the oversight mechanisms.
7. The independence of the Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (REM) should be effectively
guaranteed, in line with the new legal provisions. The REM should proactively use its legal
powers to act ex officio on violations of media regulation, based on its systematic monitoring.
137
In paragraph 25 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document, OSCE participating States committed themselves “to follow
up promptly the ODIHR’s election assessment and recommendations”. The follow-up of prior recommendations is
assessed by the ODIHR EOM as follows: recommendations 9, 10 and 19 from the final report of the 2017 presidential
election, recommendations 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 25, 26 and 27 from the final report of the 2020 parliamentary elections,
and recommendations 24 and 26 from the final report of the 2022 early parliamentary elections are fully implemented.
Recommendations 1, 8 and 12 from the final report of the 2017 presidential election, recommendations 1, 2, 8, 19
and 29 from the final report of the 2020 parliamentary elections are mostly implemented. Recommendations 3, 4, 6,
7, 11, 13, 16, 18 and 20 from the final report of the 2017 presidential election, recommendations 3, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16,
18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 28 from the final report of the 2020 parliamentary elections, and recommendations 1, 7, 8,
9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20 and 23 from the final report of the 2022 early parliamentary elections are partially
implemented. See also the ODIHR Electoral Recommendations Database.
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
Election Administration
8. Election administration should collect and publish disaggregated data on gender representation
in its bodies in a comprehensive and timely manner. Further efforts should be made to ensure a
gender-balanced representation in all election management bodies, in line with the law.
9. To achieve sustainable progress in its activities, such as developing instructions, training

election officials, improving voter education campaigns, and enhance the accessibility of the
electoral process, the Republic Electoral Commission should be granted sufficient
administrative and technical capacity, including its own permanent secretariat.
Voter Registration
10. The legislation should be further harmonized with the objectives of the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities by removing all remaining restrictions on voting rights on
the basis of intellectual or psychosocial disability.
Candidate Registration
11. As previously recommended, to further promote pluralism in the electoral process and freedom
of association, consideration could be given to removing the restriction against signing in
support of more than one list.
12. The law could be reconsidered to permit contestants to rectify any identified deficiencies in their
nomination documents following the publication of the respective decision of the Republic
Electoral Commission.
Electoral Campaign
13. To ensure equal campaigning conditions, authorities should implement measures that fully
enforce the right of all electoral stakeholders to access and use public premises for campaigning
on equal terms.
14. Additional mechanisms and incentives should be established to encourage political parties to
promote women’s participation in political life, increase their visibility during electoral
campaigns and advance their role in politics.
Campaign Finance
15. To promote equal campaign opportunities, consideration could be given to waiving the deposit
requirement for the political parties and citizen groups not represented in the parliament and
local assemblies as a precondition of the first instalment of public funds for campaigning.
16. To ensure legal certainty and campaign finance accountability, the legislation should be further
reviewed to address gaps and prior ODIHR recommendations, including by explicit regulation
of third-party campaigning. The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption should proactively
investigate and sanction campaign spending by unauthorized entities.
17. The law should be amended to require the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption to promptly
make public its decisions on violation of the Law on the Prevention of Corruption during election
campaigns, along with any related appeals. Additionally, monitoring the compliance with this
law should be a designated task for the Agency’s field monitors, if they continue to be deployed
in future elections.
Media
18. The competent authorities should fulfil their duty to protect the safety of media staff through
effective and timely measures, including promptly investigate and bring to justice those involved
in attacks on, and ill-treatment of journalists and other media actors, as well as publicly condemn
all threats against journalists.
19. To provide impartial information about the contestants and allow voters to make an informed
choice, the media should exercise their right for editorial independence and avoid using material
produced by parties in news and information programmes, especially during election campaigns.
National Minorities
20. To prevent the misuse of special provisions for national minority lists, consideration should be
given to further refining the legal criteria for determining national minority status and the
procedures for registering these lists.
Election Dispute Resolution
21. The Administrative Court should use all available means to uphold the right to an effective
remedy in electoral disputes, and should hold oral public hearings in such cases.
Election Observation
22. Authorities should guarantee adequate conditions for both citizen and international observers to
conduct their activities with unimpeded access to all election-related information in a timely
manner and in an environment free from pressure and intimidation, in line with Serbia's
international commitments.
Election Day
23. As previously recommended, further efforts should be made to allocate adequate premises for
polling stations to prevent overcrowding, ensure the secrecy of the vote, and provide easy
independent access for voters with physical disabilities.
Post-electoral Developments
24. The law should provide a reasonably short deadline for the Constitutional Court to handle
electoral petitions and allow for a longer period to hold a repeat election.
25. Consideration should be given to elaborating additional guidance for Local Election
Commissions on the substantive consideration of requests for the annulment of voting results
and rules for the REC on handling the appeals against their decisions.
ANNEXE I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS 138
Total number of registered voters 6,500,666

Total number of votes cast 3,815,007
Voters’ turnout 58,69 per cent
Total number of valid votes 3,710,978
Total number of invalid votes 104,029
Candidate list Votes won Percentage of Mandates

votes cast won
(1) Aleksandar Vučić – Serbia Must Not Stop; 1,783,701 46,75 129
(2) Ivica Dačić – Prime Minister Of Serbia; 249,916 6,55 18
(3) Vojislav Šešelj, PHD. - Serbian Radical 55,782 1,46 0
Party
(4) Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski - Boško 105,165 2,76 0
Obradović - National Gathering - State Building
Strength - Serbian Party ZAVETNICI - Serbian
Movement DVERI
(5) Miloš Jovanović, PHD. - Hope For Serbia - 191,431 5,02 13
Serbian Coalition Hope - National Democratic
Alternative - New Democratic Party Of Serbia
(NOVI DSS) - Movement for the Restoration of
the Kingdom of Serbia (POKS)
(6) Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség - Elnökünkért, 64,747 1,7 6
Közösségünkért, A Jövőért! Alliance Of
Vojvodina Hungarians - For Our President, For
Our Community, For The Future!
(7) ‘Serbia against Violence’ - Miroslav Miki 902,450 23,66 65
Aleksić - Marinika Tepić (Party Of Freedom
And Justice, People’s Movement Of Serbia,
Green-Left Front, Don’t Let Belgrade
D(R)Own, Ecological Uprising - Ćuta,
Democratic Party, Movement Of Free Citizens,
Serbia Center, Together, Movement For
Reversal, United Trade Unions Of Serbia
“Sloga”, New Face Of Serbia)
(8) Usame Zukorlić - United For Justice - 29,066 0,76 2
Justice And Reconciliation Party - Bosniaks Of
Sandžak, Tomislav Žigmanov - Democratic
Alliance Of Croats In Vojvodina
(9) Sda Sandžaka - Sulejman Ugljanin, Phd 21,827 0.57 2
(10) Together For The Future And Development 6,786 0,18 0
- Coalition For Peace And Tolerance
(11) People’s Party - Safe Choice. Serious 33,388 0,88 0
People - Vuk Jeremić, Sanda Rašković Ivić,
PHD., Siniša Kovačević, Vladimir Gajić,
Marina Lipovac Tanasković
(12) Saša Radulović (Enough Is Enough -Djb) - 45,079 1,18 0
Boris Tadić (Social Democratic Party - Sds) -
Ana Pejić (Abducted Babies) - Good Morning
Serbia
138
Data according to the final results published by the REC
(13) Political Fight Of Albanians Continue - 13,501 0,35 1

Shaip Kamberi - Beteja Politike E Shqiptarëve
Vazhdon – Shaip Kamberi
(14) WE – Voice of the People, Prof. Dr 178,830 4,69 13
Branimir Nestorović
(15) Serbia In The West – Zoran Vuletić - 5,462 0,14 0
Nemanja Milošević - Ask The Professionals -
Vladimir Kovačević
(16) Russian Party - Slobodan Nikolić 11,369 0,3 1
(17) Čedomir Jovanović - It Has To Be 9,243 0,24 0
Different
(18) Albanian Democratic Alternative - United 3,235 0,08 0
Valley / Alternativa Demokratike Shqiptare-
Lugina E Bashkuar
ANNEXE II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION

OBSERVATION MISSION
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Reinhold Lopatka Austria Special Coordinator

Farah Karimi Netherlands Head of Delegation
Artur Hovhannisyan Armenia MP
Sargis Khandanyan Armenia MP
Petra Bayr Austria MP
Ewa Ernst-Dziedzic Austria MP
Hubert Fuchs Austria MP
Lukas Mussi Austria Staff of Delegation
Azay Guliyev Azerbaijan MP
Kristof Calvo Belgium MP
Peter De Roover Belgium MP
Mark Demesmaeker Belgium MP
Celia Groothedde Belgium MP
Davor Bernardić Croatia MP
Zvonimir Troskot Croatia MP
Olgica Tolić Croatia Staff of Delegation
Kyriakos Hadjiyianni Cyprus MP
Kris Skriver Denmark MP
Kim Valentin Denmark MP
Eeva-Johanna Eloranta Finland MP
Petri Huru Finland MP
Stephanie Koltchanov France OSCE PA Secretariat
Malte Kaufmann Germany MP
Boris Mijatović Germany MP
Pauline Hennings Germany OSCE PA Secretariat
Freya Koci Germany OSCE PA Secretariat
Michael Creed Ireland MP
Vincenzo Amendola Italy MP
Anna Bilotti Italy MP
Fabrizio Comba Italy MP
Giuseppe De Cristofaro Italy MP
Emanuele Loperfido Italy MP
Federica Onori Italy MP
Catia Polidori Italy MP
Eugenio Zoffili Italy MP
Roberto Montella Italy OSCE PA Secretariat
Pia Califano Italy Staff of Delegation
Valeria Galardini Italy Staff of Delegation
Anastasiya Griadasova Kyrgyzstan OSCE PA Secretariat
Skaidrite Abrama Latvia MP
Ligita Gintere Latvia MP
Igors Aizstrauts Latvia Staff of Delegation
Sebastian Gassner Liechtenstein MP
Boris Dittrich Netherlands MP
Madeleine Van Toorenburg Netherlands MP
Monique Christiaanse Netherlands Staff of Delegation

Igor Janushev North Macedonia MP
Halil Snopche North Macedonia MP
Monika Zajkova North Macedonia MP
Biljana Ognenovska North Macedonia Staff of Delegation
Jorge Seguro Sanches Portugal MP
Radu-Mihai Mihail Romania MP
Teodora Mitru Romania Staff of Delegation
Dejan Kaloh Slovenia MP
Johan Buser Sweden MP
Denis Begic Sweden MP
Lars Isacsson Sweden MP
Ulrik Nilsson Sweden MP
Carina Odebrink Sweden MP
Linnea Wickman Sweden MP
Markus Wiechel Sweden MP
Simona De Ciutiis Sweden Staff of Delegation
Gustavo Pallares Spain OSCE PA Secretariat
Selami Altinok Türkiye MP
Tekin Bingol Türkiye MP
Kemal Celik Türkiye MP
Ozgul Saki Türkiye MP
Tugce Okumus Türkiye Staff of Delegation
Feyza Oz Türkiye Staff of Delegation
Rupa Huq United Kingdom MP
Nathaniel Parry United States OSCE PA Secretariat
Everett Schrage Price United States Staff of Delegation
Steven Price Schrage United States Staff of Delegation
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
Stefan Schennach Austria Head of Delegation

Jorida Tabaku Albania MP
Pauli Aalto-Setälä Finland MP
Liliana Tanguy France MP
Sylvie Affholder France PACE Secretariat
Carine Roller-Kaufman France PACE Secretariat
Givi Mikanadze Georgia MP
Harald Weyel Germany MP
Michael Janssen Germany Venice Commission
Andreas Nikolakopoulos Greece MP
Georgios Stamatis Greece MP
Sjoerd Warmerdam Netherlands MP
Dean Premik Slovenia MP
Tamara Vonta Slovenia MP
Laura Castel Spain MP
Antonio Gutiérrez Limones Spain MP
José María Sánchez García Spain MP
Laura Castel Spain MP
Óscar Sánchez Muñoz Spain Venice Commission
Pierre-Alain Fridez Switzerland MP
Jean-Pierre Grin Switzerland MP

Mehmed Akalin Türkiye MP
Yunus Emre Türkiye MP
Gökçe Gökçen Türkiye MP
European Parliament
Klemen Grošelj Slovenia Head of Delegation

Andreas Schieder Austria MEP
Jörgen Siil Estonia Staff of Delegation
Viola Von Cramon-Taubadel Germany MEP
Raffaele Luise Italy EP Secretariat
Gorana Pop Georgieva Netherlands EP Secretariat
Jan-Willem Vlasman Netherlands Staff of Delegation
Paul Ivan Romania Staff of Delegation
Vladimir Bilčík Slovakia MEP
Javier Nart Spain MEP
Pilar Gonzales Murillo Spain EP Secretariat
Ivan Hortal Sanchez Spain Staff of Delegation
Malin Björk Sweden MEP
ODIHR EOM Short- term Observers
Petrika Jorgji Albania

Christina Griessler Austria
Andrea Jakober Austria
Markus Pollak Austria
Gernot Schmiedt Austria
Anela Čavdar Bosnia and Herzegovina
Goran Mišković Bosnia and Herzegovina
Vladimir Hristov Bulgaria
Allan Dale Canada
Fatima Hassan Canada
Miranda Huron Canada
Jeffrey Mackey Canada
Christopher Millar Canada
Alexandria Mitchell Canada
Jodi-Lyn Newnham Canada
Mamadou Sow Canada
Steven Van Groningen Canada
Natalie Wilson Canada
Lada Curkovic Croatia
Hanne Bang Denmark
Soren Jensen Denmark
Kirsten Lind Denmark
Tue Magnussen Denmark
Kirsten Mogensen Denmark
Jan Munkholm Denmark
Peder Ventegodt Denmark
Niels Edvard Waltorp Denmark
Kadri Roosimägi Estonia
Kimmo Collander Finland
Matias Valtteri Frantsi Finland

Christian Barthlen France
Pompeo Coppola France
Vincent Degert France
Clément Desrumaux France
Vincent Godbillon France
Gabrielle Jouve France
Nadia Jurzac France
Pascale Le Hel France
Clément Masselin France
Marie-Flore Michel France
Eric Mirguet France
Sabrina Rouigui France
Pascal Salagnac France
Jasmine Salhab France
Justine Sanch-Maritan France
Geoffroy Savet France
Amaël Vier France
Benedicte Williams France
Laurence Wilson France
Henning Bess Germany
Franziska Best Germany
Ralph Böhlke Germany
Colin Brose Germany
Ulf Claassen Germany
Regina Cordes Larson Germany
Ute Ehren Germany
Stephan Fleig Germany
Marcel Geissler Germany
Harald Haendel Germany
Carlos Miguel Haubrich Seco Germany
Maren Hoeppner Germany
Martin Karl-Josef Hortig Germany
Christiane Jaenicke Germany
Werner Klinger Germany
Andreas Kunert Germany
Thomas Leszke Germany
Karl Pammer Germany
Anna Pysarenko Germany
Jennifer Rabener Germany
Barbara Rohmann Germany
Michaela Maria Seitz Germany
Benjamin Smale Germany
Heidrun Smers Germany
Frens Stoeckel Germany
Marlies Temme Germany
Pawel Voronin Germany
Barbara Henriette Wägerle Germany
Bianca Wieland Germany
Friederike Wünschmann Germany
Dávid Maróti Hungary
Balázs Áron Mravik Hungary
Katalin Tamus Hungary
Paul Brennan Ireland

Emer Costello Ireland
Sarah Donnelly Ireland
Jeremiah O’ Driscoll Ireland
Sara Stephens Ireland
Jurgita Barkauskiene Lithuania
Jevgenija Nesterova Lithuania
Nicoleta Ciobanu Moldova
Ana Lakic Montenegro
Slobodan Martinovic Montenegro
Marije Hinderiek Breedveld Netherlands
Thomas De Ridder Netherlands
Hendrik Graafland Netherlands
Maria Nijenhuis Netherlands
Kjire Delov North Macedonia
Magnhild Bogseth Norway
Thomas Dam Norway
Anette Froyland Norway
Bergny Ofstad Norway
Raquel Andrade Bastos Portugal
Andreea Ionescu Romania
Iuliia Ashina Russian Federation
Sergey Baburkin Russian Federation
Elena Balandina Russian Federation
Ilia Baranov Russian Federation
Kristina Bogdanova Russian Federation
Aleksei Budarev Russian Federation
Anna Chirkova Russian Federation
Victoria Elnikova Russian Federation
Igor Filiuk Russian Federation
Elena Gorshkova Russian Federation
Daria Ivanova Russian Federation
Alesya Khalyapina Russian Federation
Leonid Korolkov Russian Federation
Iuliia Korotun Russian Federation
Evgeny Kozhokin Russian Federation
Anastasiia Kruglova Russian Federation
Evgeny Loginov Russian Federation
Dmitrii Makarov Russian Federation
Dmitrii Maltsev Russian Federation
Dmitry Olisov Russian Federation
Andrey Ostvald Russian Federation
Anton Postigov Russian Federation
Aleksandr Prusov Russian Federation
Georgii Rubtsov Russian Federation
Leili Rustamova Russian Federation
Aleksei Semenikhin Russian Federation
Vera Sergieva Russian Federation
Irina Serkova Russian Federation
Olesia Shcherbova Russian Federation
Anna Sinelnikova Russian Federation
Elizaveta Titkova Russian Federation
Aleksei Topolskii Russian Federation
Aleksandr Ubilava Russian Federation

Alexander Vladychenko Russian Federation
Mikhail Zaitsev Russian Federation
Iuliia Zakurova Russian Federation
Marko Podstavek Slovakia
Tatjana Markus Sweden
Sven Linus Nygren Sweden
Helena Olsson Lignell Sweden
Christina Perez Sweden
Lisa Kristina Petri Sweden
Julia Maxine Agosti Switzerland
Gabriela Fuchs Switzerland
Marie- Therese Karlen Switzerland
Stephan Ziegler Switzerland
Artem Bykhalo Ukraine
Martin Brooks United Kingdom
Harry Busz United Kingdom
Katherine Chapanionek United Kingdom
Zoe Clack United Kingdom
Benoit Detalle United Kingdom
Catherine Dunmore United Kingdom
Rosa Natasha Fox United Kingdom
Clare Hunter Funnell United Kingdom
Nicholas Kay United Kingdom
Benjamin King-Beck United Kingdom
Frances Lasok United Kingdom
Chris Taylor United Kingdom
Paul Tzimas United Kingdom
Bogdan Banu United States
Daniel Brezina United States
Roman Broszkowski United States
Elizabeth Callahan United States
Francesca Calvi Giancristofaro United States
Kevin Deegan-Krause United States
Matthew Domboski United States
Michael Eldred United States
Eric Fey United States
Sarah Galt United States
Anslem Gentle United States
Chris Hershey United States
Siobhan Jackson United States
Kira Kay United States
Marceza Kotoni United States
OIena Lennon United States
Katherine Long United States
Margaret Mahoney Terrebonne United States
James McHugh United States
Garrett Monti United States
Sherry Murphy United States
Tara O’Connor United States
Michael Paarlberg United States
Anne Peskoe United States
Keith Prushankin United States
Constance Robinson United States

Emily Rome United States
Deborah Scroggin United States
Melody Shekari United States
Lauren Skompinski United States
Rokey Suleman II United States
Clifford Tatum United States
James Wellock United States
Degee Wilhelm United States
Sydnee Wilke United States
Adi Zuka United States
Kudratilla Lutfullaev Uzbekistan
Farkhod Nasriddinov Uzbekistan
ODIHR EOM Long-term observers
Iryna Shuliankova Belarus

Thomas Boserup Denmark
Torsten Juul Denmark
Alexandre Benz France
Véronique Lasserre-Fy France
Rodolphe Oberle France
Lela Taliuri Georgia
Jana Bürgers Gemany
Christian Konrad Germany
Claudia Schäfer Germany
Brian MacMahon Ireland
Elena Deceva Moldova
Franciscus Ruijs Netherlands
Anica Kuzmanovska North Macedonia
Trond Husby Norway
Narve Rio Norway
Alexander Bedritskiy Russian Federation
Boris Diakonov Russian Federation
Aleksandr Studenikin Russian Federation
Andrei Volkov Russian Federation
Mario Barfus Switzerland
Monica Giambonini Switzerland
Alexander Anderson United Kingdom
Patricia Cavanagh United Kingdom
Madeleine Cowley United Kingdom
Joseph Worrall United Kingdom
Catherine Lawrence United States
Harold Wayne Otto United States
Jenny Sowry United States
Cara Stern United States
ODIHR EOM Core team

Albert Jónsson Iceland Head of Mission
Aliaksandr Chaliadzinski Belarus
Vasil Vaschanka Belarus
Silke Tittel Germany
Marcell Nagy Hungary
Daniela Bottigelli Italy
Roman Railean Moldova
Max Bader Netherlands
Pawel Jurczak Poland
Katarzyna Witt Poland
Kira Kalinina Russian Federation
Oleksii Lychkovakh Ukraine
ABOUT ODIHR
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is OSCE’s principal institution
to assist participating States “to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to
abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and (…) to build, strengthen and protect
democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society” (1992 Helsinki Summit
Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human dimension.
ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland) was created as the Office for Free Elections at the 1990 Paris
Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the name of the Office was changed to
reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and democratization. Today it employs over
150 staff.
ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of election observation. Every year, it co-ordinates
and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers to assess whether elections in the OSCE
region are conducted in line with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards
for democratic elections and with national legislation. Its unique methodology provides an in-depth
insight into the electoral process in its entirety. Through assistance projects, ODIHR helps
participating States to improve their electoral framework.
The Office’s democratization activities include: rule of law, legislative support, democratic
governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender equality. ODIHR implements a number
of targeted assistance programmes annually, seeking to develop democratic structures.
ODIHR also assists participating States’ in fulfilling their obligations to promote and protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms consistent with OSCE human dimension commitments. This is
achieved by working with a variety of partners to foster collaboration, build capacity and provide
expertise in thematic areas, including human rights in the fight against terrorism, enhancing the
human rights protection of trafficked people, human rights education and training, human rights
monitoring and reporting, and women’s human rights and security.
Within the field of tolerance and non-discrimination, ODIHR provides support to the participating
States in strengthening their response to hate crimes and incidents of racism, xenophobia, anti-
Semitism and other forms of intolerance. ODIHR's activities related to tolerance and non-
discrimination are focused on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring,
reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as
educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding.
ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on Roma and Sinti. It promotes
capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities, and encourages the
participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making bodies.
All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE participating
States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations.
More information is available on the ODIHR website (www.osce.org/odihr).

OSCE Report On Serbia Elections 2023

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Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

ODIHR Election Observation Mission

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 1

ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 1

II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The government-led inter-agency Working Group on Co-ordination and Follow-up of the

VI. VOTER REGISTRATION

VII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

VIII. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

IX. CAMPAIGN FINANCE

B. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

C. MEDIA MONITORING CLICK HERE TO READ MEDIA MONITORING RESULTS

XI. NATIONAL MINORITIES

XII. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

XIII. ELECTION OBSERVATION

XIV. ELECTION DAY

A. OPENING AND VOTING

Most PS included ‘extended’ PB members nominated by electoral contestants, with SNS-list

B. COUNTING AND TABULATION

XV. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS

2. As previously recommended, to ensure consistent application of election day procedures and

9. To achieve sustainable progress in its activities, such as developing instructions, training

Election Dispute Resolution

ANNEXE I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS 138

Total number of registered voters 6,500,666

Candidate list Votes won Percentage of Mandates

(13) Political Fight Of Albanians Continue - 13,501 0,35 1

ANNEXE II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Reinhold Lopatka Austria Special Coordinator

Monique Christiaanse Netherlands Staff of Delegation

Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly

Stefan Schennach Austria Head of Delegation

Jean-Pierre Grin Switzerland MP

Klemen Grošelj Slovenia Head of Delegation

ODIHR EOM Short- term Observers

Petrika Jorgji Albania

Matias Valtteri Frantsi Finland

Paul Brennan Ireland

Aleksandr Ubilava Russian Federation

Constance Robinson United States

ODIHR EOM Long-term observers

Iryna Shuliankova Belarus

ODIHR EOM Core team

More information is available on the ODIHR website (www.osce.org/odihr).

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