COL Full Case 1

G.R. No.
199515, June 25, 2018
RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. "RHODORA RACHO TANAKA," Petitioner, v. SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of the foreign spouse and the
divorce decree be pleaded and proved as a fact before the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino spouse may
be granted the capacity to remarry once our courts find that the foreign divorce was validly obtained by
the foreign spouse according to his or her national law, and that the foreign spouse's national law
considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the June 2, 2011 Decision2 and October 3, 2011
Order3 of Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, which denied Rhodora Ilumin Racho's (Racho)
Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry.4 The denial was on the ground
that a Certificate of Divorce issued by the Japanese Embassy was insufficient to prove the existence of a
divorce decree.
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They
lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not have any children.5
Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She
secured a Divorce Certificate6 issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese
Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated7 by an authentication officer of the Department of
Foreign Affairs.8
She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was
informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to the Philippines
to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of
divorce.9
She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by
the City Registrar since there was no court order recognizing it. When she went to the Department of
Foreign Affairs to renew her passport, she was likewise told that she needed the proper court order. She
was also informed by the National Statistics Office that her divorce could only be annotated in the
Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her to remarry.10
She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised by her lawyer, and secured a Japanese Law English
Version of the Civil Code of Japan, 2000 Edition.11
On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to
Marry12 with the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City.
On June 2, 2011, Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City rendered a Decision,13 finding that
Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove
Tanaka's national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent evidence since it was not the divorce
decree itself.14
Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 arguing that under Japanese law, a divorce by agreement
becomes effective by oral notification, or by a document signed by both parties and by two (2) or more
witnesses.16
In an Order17 dated October 3, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion, finding that Racho
failed to present the notification of divorce and its acceptance.18
On December 19, 2011, Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari19 with this Court. In its January 18,
2012 Resolution, this Court deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a duly
authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce.20
Petitioner initially submitted a Manifestation,21 stating that a duly-authenticated acceptance certificate

was not among the documents presented at the Regional Trial Court because of its unavailability to
petitioner during trial. She also pointed out that the Divorce Certificate issued by ,the Consulate General
of the Japanese Embassy was sufficient proof of the fact of divorce.22 She also manifested that Tanaka
had secured a marriage license on the basis of the same Divorce Certificate and had already remarried
another Filipino. Nevertheless, she has endeavored to secure the document as directed by this Court.23
On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance,24 attaching a duly authenticated Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce that she obtained in Japan.25 The Office of the Solicitor General
thereafter submitted its Comment26 on the Petition, to which petitioner submitted her Reply.27
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon
notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends
that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the
Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009" is sufficient to prove that she and her
husband have divorced by agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce.28
She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner of proving a divorce by agreement is by record of
its notification and by the fact of its acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate.
She maintains that the Divorce Certificate is signed by Consul Takayama, whom the Department of
Foreign Affairs certified as duly appointed and qualified to sign the document. She also states that the
Divorce Certificate has already been filed and recorded with the Civil Registry Office of Manila.29
She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states
that a matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.30
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that the Certificate of Divorce has no
probative value since it was not properly authenticated under Rule 132, Section 2431 of the Rules of
Court. However, it states that it has no objection to the admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce submitted by petitioner in compliance with this Court's January 18, 2012 Resolution.32
It likewise points out that petitioner never mentioned that she and her husband obtained a divorce by
agreement and only mentioned it in her motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court.
Thus, petitioner failed to prove that she is now capacitated to marry since her divorce was not obtained
by the alien spouse. She also failed to point to a specific provision in the Civil Code of Japan that allows
persons who obtained a divorce by agreement the capacity to remarry. In any case, a divorce by
agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code.33
In rebuttal, petitioner insists that all her evidence, including the Divorce Certificate, was formally offered
and held to be admissible as evidence by the Regional Trial Court.34 She also argues that the Office of the
Solicitor General should not have concluded that the law does not contemplate divorce by agreement or
consensual divorce since a discriminatory situation will arise if this type of divorce is not recognized.35
The issue in this case, initially, was whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the
Petition for Declaration of Capacity to Marry for insufficiency of evidence. After the submission of
Comment, however, the issue has evolved to whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report
of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and
respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to his national law.
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in
the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse's national law, thus:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd situation where a Filipino spouse remains
married to the foreign spouse even after a validly obtained divorce abroad.37 The addition of the second
paragraph gives the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have the marriage considered as dissolved,
and ultimately, to grant him or her the capacity to remarry.38
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only in issues on the validity of remarriage. It cannot be the
basis for any other liability, whether civil or criminal, that the Filipino spouse may incur due to
remarriage.
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient.39 In Garcia v. Recio,40 this
Court established the principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a
separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce decree and the national law of the
foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial courts.41 Hence, in Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas:42
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.43
II
Respondent's national law was duly admitted by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner presented "a copy
[of] the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan (Exh. "K") translated under the authorization of the
Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee."44 Article 728(1) of the Civil Code of Japan
reads:
Article 728. 1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.45
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of
Japan on January 18, 2010, which stated in part:
This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the basis of the Acceptance Certification of
Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009.46
This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance Certification of Notification of
Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. The Regional Trial Court further clarified:
[T]he Civil Law of Japan recognizes two (2) types of divorce, namely: (1) judicial divorce and (2) divorce
by agreement.
Under the same law, the divorce by agreement becomes effective by notification, orally or in a
document signed by both parties and two or more witnesses of full age, in accordance with the
provisions of Family Registration Law of Japan.47
Thus, while respondent's national law was duly admitted, petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
before the Regional Trial Court that a divorce was validly obtained according to the national law of her
foreign spouse. The Regional Trial Court would not have erred in dismissing her Petition.
III
Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce,48 certifying that the divorce issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama
Prefecture, has been accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the document was authenticated by
Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.49
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is a question of fact that
would not ordinarily be within this Court's ambit to resolve. Issues in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court50 are limited to questions of law.
In Garcia and Corpuz, this Court remanded the cases to the Regional Trial Courts for the reception of
evidence and for further proceedings.51 More recently in Medina v. Koike,52 this Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals to determine the national law of the foreign spouse:
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact
binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or
final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may
refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. - . . .
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of
fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of
the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.53
The court records, however, are already sufficient to fully resolve the factual issues.54 Additionally, the
Office of the Solicitor General neither posed any objection to the admission of the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce55 nor argued that the Petition presented questions of fact. In the
interest of judicial economy and efficiency, this Court shall resolve this case on its merits.
IV
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a
foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in that foreign country:
Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an Authentication56 issued
by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo
Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The
Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate
of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between
petitioner and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement
"becomes effective by notification."57 Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and respondent was validly obtained
according to respondent's national law.
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce by agreement is not the divorce
contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code, which provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.58 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse,"
the Office of the Solicitor General posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.
In a study on foreign marriages in 2007 conducted by the Philippine Statistics Authority, it was found
that "marriages between Filipino brides and foreign grooms comprised 5,537 or 66.7 percent while
those between Filipino grooms and foreign brides numbered 152 or 1.8 percent of the total marriages
outside the country."59 It also found that "[a]bout four in every ten interracial marriages (2,916 or
35.1%) were between Filipino brides and Japanese grooms." Statistics for foreign marriages in 2016
shows that there were 1,129 marriages between Filipino men and foreign women but 8,314 marriages
between Filipina women and foreign men.60 Thus, empirical data demonstrates that Filipino women are
more likely to enter into mixed marriages than Filipino men. Under Philippine laws relating to mixed
marriages, Filipino women are twice marginalized.
In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the burden of this narrow interpretation,
which may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
This constitutional provision provides a more active application than the passive orientation of Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal
protection of the laws." Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that
any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not require the
State to actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy-that complex of political,
cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment."61
In 1980, our country became a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).62 Under Articles 2(f) and S(a) of the treaty, the Philippines as a
state party, is required:
Article 2
....
(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
....
Article 5
....
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]
By enacting the Constitution and signing on the CEDAW, the State has committed to ensure and to
promote gender equality.
In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta for Women, which provides that
the State "shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations."63 This necessarily includes the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to
determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued,
the divorce becomes "validly obtained" and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status
should be given to the Filipino spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in the
divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own
national laws from something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos
from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards any agency on the part of the
Filipino spouse. It presumes that the Filipino spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of the
marital bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce proceedings are protracted litigations fraught
with bitterness and drama. Some marriages can end amicably, without the parties harboring any ill will
against each other. The parties could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if the national law of
the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity
between the former spouses, a friendly atmosphere for the children and extended families, and less
financial burden for the family.
Absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction only in the mid-20th century. The Philippines had
divorce laws in the past. In 1917, Act No. 271064 was enacted which allowed a wife to file for divorce in
cases of concubinage or a husband to file in cases of adultery.65
Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law, which was enacted during the Japanese occupation,
provided for 11 grounds for divorce, including "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at
least one year prior to the filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slander by deed or gross insult by one
spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable."66
At the end of World War II, Executive Order No. 141 was declared void and Act No. 2710 again took
effect.67 It was only until the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 that absolute divorce was prohibited in
our jurisdiction.
It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more progressive than current enactments.
Our laws should never be intended to put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution
guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should not tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation
of laws. To rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may not, only contributes to the
patriarchy. This interpretation encourages unequal partnerships and perpetuates abuse m intimate
relationships.68
In any case, the Solicitor General's argument has already been resolved in Republic v. Manalo,69 where
this Court held:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce . . . validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve,
and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held
in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.70 (Emphasis in the original)
Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as
long as it is validly obtained, regardless of who among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings.
The question in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouses initiated the proceedings but rather
if the divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent was valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2) kinds of divorce in Japan: judicial divorce and
divorce by agreement. Petitioner and respondent's divorce was considered as a divorce by agreement,
which is a valid divorce according to Japan's national law.71
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise posits that while petitioner was able to prove that the
national law of Japan allows absolute divorce, she was unable to "point to a specific provision of the
Japan[ese] Civil Code which states that both judicial divorce and divorce by agreement will allow the
spouses to remarry."72
To prove its argument, the Office of the Solicitor General cites Republic v. Orbecido III,73 where this Court
stated:
[R]espondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated
to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.74
The Office of the Solicitor General pointedly ignores that in Orbecido III, the respondent in that case
neither pleaded and proved that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, nor presented
any evidence of the national law of his alleged foreign spouse that would allow absolute divorce.
In this case, respondent's nationality was not questioned. The Regional Trial Court duly admitted
petitioner's presentation of respondent's national law. Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan as quoted
by the Office of the Solicitor General states:
Article 728 of the Japan Civil Code reads:
1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.
2. The same shall apply also if after the death of either husband or wife, the surviving spouse declares
his or her intention to terminate the matrimonial relationship.75
The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision contains no other qualifications that could limit
either spouse's capacity to remarry.
In Garcia v. Recio,76 this Court reversed the Regional Trial Court's finding of the Filipino spouse's capacity
to remarry since the national law of the foreign spouse stated certain conditions before the divorce
could be considered absolute:
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree - a conditional or provisional judgment of

divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this
matter.77
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation than that the
divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital tie.
Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties the
legal capacity to remarry. Thus, Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Petitioner alleges that respondent has since remarried, the National Statistics Office having found no
impediment to the registration of his Marriage Certificate.78 The validity of respondent's subsequent
marriage is irrelevant for the resolution of the issues in this case. The existence of respondent's
Marriage Certificate, however, only serves to highlight the absurd situation sought to be prevented in
the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:79
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. . . .
....
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.80
The ruling in Van Dorn was eventually codified in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
through the issuance of Executive Order No. 227 in 1987. The grant of substantive equal rights to the
Filipino spouse was broad enough that this Court, in the 1985 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals,81 "hinted, by way of obiter dictum"82 that it could be applied to Filipinos who have since been
naturalized as foreign citizens.
In Republic v. Orbecido III,83 this Court noted the obiter in Quita and stated outright that Filipino citizens
who later become naturalized as foreign citizens may validly obtain a divorce from their Filipino spouses:
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.84
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws, petitioner is still married to
respondent despite the latter's newfound companionship with another cannot be just.85 Justice is better
served if she is not discriminated against in her own country.86 As much as petitioner is free to seek
fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her commitment within
the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court June 2, 2011 Decision and October 3,
2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second
paragraph of the Family Code and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated
December 16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to remarry.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Amended Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's
Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant
to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in
said country dissolving their marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In
its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce between
the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.3 On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and
set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following requisites
under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein was consensual in nature,
obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen,
also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the
CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to
her cause.6
On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD
THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE
OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD
THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF
AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE
RULES.7
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as Divorce by Agreement
in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of divorce in Japan. She
insists that it is to her great disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is
required in order for her to avail of the benefit under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, since their divorce had already been granted abroad.8 Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere
fact that she consented to the divorce does not prevent the application of Article 26 for said provision
does not state that where the consent of the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no
longer finds application. In support of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the
Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the
event that he or she is divorced by a Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship.9 As to the
issue of evidence presented, petitioner explains that the reason why she was unable to present
authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was
unable to go to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a
copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the
Civil Code. There, she was issued a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do
not issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law due
to the potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this
constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence.10
We grant the petition.
The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v. Manalo,11 the facts
of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino,
was married to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce
before a Japanese Court, which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving
their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the Philippines and to have the
entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said
entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The trial court, however, denied
Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country.
On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the ruling of
the CA. There, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the
divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of
the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore,
should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.12
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the
fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she
initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2
of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue
of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts
may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held
that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.13 This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.14 Since both
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 2415 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.17
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce
decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese
Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those
matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision
dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019
MARLYN MONTON NULLADA, PETITIONER, v. THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN
ITO AND ALL PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
A. REYES, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks
to assail the Decision1 dated January 21, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of Manila in
Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832, that denied the recognition of a foreign divorce that was
obtained by petitioner Marlyn Monton Nullada (Marlyn) with Japanese national Akira Ito (Akira).
The Antecedents
The action arose from a Petition2 for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and
cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code, by Marlyn in 2014 with the RTC of Manila. She claimed that on July 29,
1997, she and Akira got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of
Marriage3 that was issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The document was registered with
both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry
Division.4
The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship, however,
eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009,
Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate5 that was issued by the
Embassy of Japan in the Philippines reads as follows:
Cert. No. IB12-08573-12
DIVORCE CERTIFICATE
ï¿½ ï¿½
Name: MARLYN MONTON NULLADA
ï¿½ ï¿½
Date of Birth: SEPTEMBER 03, 1968
ï¿½ ï¿½
Nationality: FILIPINO
ï¿½ ï¿½
Name of Spouse: AKIRA ITO
ï¿½ ï¿½
Date of Marriage: JULY 29, 1997
ï¿½ ï¿½
Date of Divorce: NOVEMBER 16, 2009
This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the basis of the Official Family Register
issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, Japan on February 06, 2013. This certificate is issued for the
purpose of the process of Notification of Foreign Divorce in the Republic of the Philippines.
Marlyn and Akira's acceptance of the notification of divorce by agreement was supported by an
Acceptance Certificate6 that was issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan, an English translation of
which forms part of the records.
As she sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines, Marlyn filed with the RTC the
petition that ended with the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that, after notice and hearing, judgment be
rendered as follows:
1. Recognizing the divorce obtained by [Marlyn and Akira], which was validly decreed in
Japan thus dissolving their marriage, to be likewise valid and effective in Philippine
jurisdiction;
2. Ordering respondent Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila to cancel the entry of marriage of
[Marlyn and Akira] recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila;
3. Ordering respondent Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila to register the Japan divorce decree
of [Marlyn and Akira] in the entry of marriage recorded in the Office of the Local Civil
Registry of Manila, and;
4. Declaring [Marlyn's] marriage to [Akira] as dissolved with a pronouncement that

petitioner [Marlyn] shall have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Petitioner prays for other relief just and equitable under the premises.7
The RTC found the petition to be in due form and substance, and thus, issued an Order of Hearing8 with
order for publication. Copies of the petition were also ordered served upon the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.9 On February 12, 2015, the OSG entered its
appearance for the Republic of the Philippines, and then deputized the City Prosecutor of Manila for
assistance in all the hearings of the case.10 Given proof of compliance with the action's jurisdictional
requirements, trial before the RTC ensued.11
During the trial, Marlyn testified mainly to identify the following pieces of documentary evidence that
were submitted to support the petition:
(1) Report of Marriage12 (Exhibit "H") that was issued by the Embassy of the Republic of the
Philippines in Japan on the registration with the embassy of Akira and Marlyn's marriage on July
29, 1997 in Japan;
ï¿½ ï¿½
(2) Authentication Certificate of the Report of Marriage13 (Exhibit "H-1");
ï¿½ ï¿½
(3) Divorce Certificate14 (Exhibit "J") issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines on the basis
of the Official Family Register issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, Japan;
ï¿½ ï¿½
(4) Authentication Certificate of the Divorce Certificate15 (Exhibit "J-1");
ï¿½ ï¿½
(5) Acceptance Certificate16 (translated in English) (Exhibit "L"); and
ï¿½ ï¿½
(6) Excerpts of the Japanese Civil Code17 (Exhibit "M").
Marlyn also identified and submitted a Judicial Affidavit18 (Exliibits "N," and "N-1"), which was adopted
as her direct testimony.19 Mary Ann Chico, registration officer of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, also
testified in court to present original copies of the divorce and authentication certificates that were filed
with local civil registry.20
Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by publication. The Republic also
did not offer any evidence to rebut the case of Marlyn.21
Ruling of the RTC
On January 21, 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The fallo of the RTC decision
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED.
Notify the parties/counsels/Trial Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.22
Under the third paragraph of Article 1723 of the New Civil Code is a policy of non-recognition of divorce.
For the trial court, the fact that Marlyn also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira
barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which would have
otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had validly obtained a
divorce.24 While the intent of the law is to equalize Filipinos with their foreigner spouses who are free to
marry again after the divorce, the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of equity behind the law
when he or she is an initiator or active participant in procuring the divorce.25
Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court via an
Order dated April 26, 2016.26 This prompted Marlyn to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Present Petition
Marlyn seeks to justify her immediate recourse to the Court by explaining that the present petition
involves a pure question of law based on a lone issue, as follows: Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2
of the Family Code has a restrictive application so as to apply only in cases where it is the alien spouse
who sought the divorce, and not where the divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses.27
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the decision of the RTC on the
ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper application of Article 26 of the
Family Code. "[D]irect recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken
where only questions of law are raised or involved."28 In this case, the RTC's resolve to dismiss the
petition filed before it delved solely on its application of the statutory provision to the facts undisputed
before it. This question of law was directly resolved by the Court in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo,29 which was promulgated by the Court subsequent to the filing of
the present petition.
The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code, which states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Underscoring ours)
The facts in Manalo are similar to the circumstances in this case. A divorce decree between a Filipino
and a Japanese national was obtained by the spouses upon a case that was filed in Japan by Manalo, the
Filipino spouse. Initially, the recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines was rejected by the RTC
where the petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment was filed, as the trial court
cited Article 15 of the New Civil Code and reasoned that as a rule, "the Philippine law 'does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country x x x[.]"' On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), however, the RTC decision was overturned. The
appellate court held that Article 26 of the Family Code should apply even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce. The decree made the Japanese spouse no longer married to Manalo; he then had the capacity
to remarry. It would be unjust to still deem Manalo married to the Japanese who, in turn, was no longer
married to her. The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce was inconsequential. This ruling of the
CA was then affirmed by the Court in Manalo upon a petition for review on certiorari that was filed by
the Republic of the Philippines.
Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual milieu that attended
in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC's decision that refused to recognize the
divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse in Japan solely on the
ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by the spouses. The Court finds no reason to deviate from
its recent disposition on the issue, as made in Manalo, thus:
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision [Art. 26], a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.
We rule in the affirmative.
In the Manalo decision, the Court went on to cite jurisprudence wherein the legal effects of a foreign
divorce decree, albeit obtained by a Filipino spouse, were acknowledged in our jurisdiction but limited
on the issues of child custody30 and property relations.31 In several other jurisprudence,32 recognition of
the effects of a foreign divorce was also implied from the Court's disposition of the cases. The specific
issue on the binding effect of a divorce decree obtained by a Filipino spouse on one's marital status was
then expressly and directly tackled by the Court. In determining whether a divorce decree obtained by a
foreigner spouse should be recognized in the Philippines, it is immaterial that the divorce is sought by
the Filipino national. The Court reasoned:
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized
a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the
marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
xxxx
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien capacitating him
or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish
whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.
"The legislature is presumed to know that meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."
xxxx
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreing divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law. (Emphasis ours)
While opposition to the foregoing interpretation is commonly raised on the basis of the nationality
principle, such principle is not an absolute and unbending rule. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code should be deemed an exception to the general rule.33
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC warrants the Court's
reversal. The dismissal of Marlyn's petition based on the trial court's interpretation of Article 26 of the
Family Code is erroneous in light of the Court's disposition in Manalo. The fact that the divorce was by
the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Aldra was not sufficient ground to reject the decree in this
jurisdiction.
While Marlyn and Akira's divorce decree was not disputed by the OSG, a recognition of the divorce,
however, could not extend as a matter of course. Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the
submission of the decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. The
Japanese law on divorce must then be sufficiently proved. "Because our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven x x x like any other fact."34 In ATCI Overseas Corp.,
et al. v. Echin,35 the Court reiterated the following rules on proof of foreign laws:
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which read:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
authenticated by his seal of office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of court having a seal, under the seal of such court.36
Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of excerpts of
The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of
Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300.37 This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance
with the rules on proof of Japan's law on divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by
the Court in Manalo to resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and
reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 21, 2016 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 213198, July 01, 2019
GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA, A.K.A. "GENEVIEVE ARREZA TOYO," PETITIONER, v. TETSUSHI TOYO,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. They must be proven as fact
under our rules on evidence. A divorce decree obtained abroad is deemed a foreign judgment, hence
the indispensable need to have it pleaded and proved before its legal effects may be extended to the
Filipino spouse.1
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the Regional Trial Court's February 14, 2014 Judgment3 and June 11, 2014 Resolution4 in SP. PROC. No.
Q-12-71339 be reversed and set aside. The Regional Trial Court denied Genevieve Rosal Arreza a.k.a.
Genevieve Arreza Toyo's (Genevieve) Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration
of capacity to remarry.5
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were
married in Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named Keiichi Toyo.6
After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of
Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's family
register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.7
On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.8
In support of her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate,9 Tetsushi's Family
Register,10 the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce,11 and an English translation of the
Civil Code of Japan,12 among others.13
After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court set the case for
hearing on October 16, 2012.14
On the day of the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the Petition. After the jurisdictional requirements
were established and marked, trial on the merits ensued.15
On February 14, 2014, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment16 denying Genevieve's Petition. It
decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement
was accepted by the local government of Japan,17 she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan's
law.18
The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation
submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese
Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.19
Aggrieved, Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Regional Trial Court's
June 11, 2014 Resolution.20
Thus, Genevieve filed before this Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.21
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English translation of the Civil Code of
Japan as an official publication in accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court. That it is
an official publication, she points out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of Japan's law under Rule
132, Section 25 of the Rules of Court.22
Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not considering the English translation of the
Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors' credentials.23
In its August 13, 2014 Resolution,24 this Court required respondents to file their comment.
In their Comment,25 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain that the Regional
Trial Court was correct in denying the petition for petitioner's failure to prove respondent Tetsushi's
national law.26 They stress that in proving a foreign country's law, one must comply with the
requirements under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.27
Respondents similarly claim that what Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court presumes is "the fact
of printing and publication[,]"28 not that it was an official publication by the government of Japan.29
Finally, respondents insist that before the English translation of the Japan Civil Code may be considered
as a learned treatise, the trial court must first take judicial notice that the writer is recognized in his or
her profession as an expert in the subject.30
In its March 25, 2015 Resolution,31 this Court directed petitioner to file her reply.
In her Reply,32 petitioner asserts that she submitted in evidence the Civil Code of Japan as an official
publication printed "under authorization of the Ministry of Justice[.]"33 She contends that because it was
printed by a public authority, the Civil Code of Japan is deemed to be an official publication under Rule
131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court and, therefore, is a self-authenticating document that need not
be certified under Rule 132, Section 24.34
In its August 3, 2016 Resolution,35 this Court resolved to dispense with the filing of respondent Tetsushi's
Comment. In addition, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda.
In her Memorandum,36 petitioner reiterates that the Regional Trial Court erred in not considering the
Civil Code of Japan as an official publication and its English translation as a learned treatise.37
On September 23, 2016, respondents manifested that they are adopting their Comment as their
memorandum.38
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry filed by
petitioner Genevieve Rosal Arreza a.k.a. Genevieve Arreza Toyo.
When a Filipino and an alien get married, and the alien spouse later acquires a valid divorce abroad, the
Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry provided that the divorce obtained by the foreign
spouse enables him or her to remarry. Article 26 of the Family Code, as amended,39 provides:cralawred
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
The second paragraph was introduced as a corrective measure to resolve an absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse even after their marital bond had been severed by
the divorce decree obtained abroad.40 Through this provision, Philippine courts are given the authority
"to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage."41 It bestowed upon the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage considered dissolved, granting him or her the capacity to
remarry.42
Nonetheless, settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it
is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also
the alien spouse's national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. As explained in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas:43
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his [or her] claim or defense.44 (Citations omitted)
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law, purported to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, can be established by complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 2445 and
2546 of the Rules of Court:cralawred
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.47 (Citations omitted)
Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents petitioner submitted to prove the divorce
decree have complied with the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25.48 However, it found the copy
of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted
that these documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese
Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.49
Notwithstanding, petitioner argues that the English translation of the Japan Civil Code is an official
publication having been published under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice50 and, therefore, is
considered a self-authenticating document.51
Petitioner is mistaken.
In Patula v. People,52 this Court explained the nature of a self-authenticating document:cralawred
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented
as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has
been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the
formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In
contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person
without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or
agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law
or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a
private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one
within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the
document is not being offered as genuine.53 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc.,54 a private
company in Japan engaged in publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be known
as the EHS Law Bulletin Series.55 However, these translations are "not advertised as a source of official
translations of Japanese laws;"56 rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws
and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese.57
Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official publication exempted from
the requirement of authentication.
Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise. Under the Rules of Court, "[a]
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his [or her] personal knowledge[.]"58 The
evidence is hearsay when it is "not . . . what the witness knows himself [or herself] but of what he [or
she] has heard from others."59 The rule excluding hearsay evidence is not limited to oral testimony or
statements, but also covers written statements.60
The rule is that hearsay evidence "is devoid of probative value[.]"61 However, a published treatise may
be admitted as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an
expert witness testifies that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the subject.62
Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the translator's and advisors' qualifications.
Nor was an expert witness presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the translator's and
advisors' credentials is the inside cover page of the English translation of the Civil Code of
Japan.63 Hence, the Regional Trial Court was correct in not considering the English translation as a
learned treatise.
Finally, settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45
petition.64 Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan's law on divorce,65 are not within this Court's
ambit to resolve.66
Nonetheless, in Medina v. Koike,67 this Court ruled that while the Petition raised questions of fact,
"substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the [Court of Appeals] for further
appropriate proceedings":cralawred
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the
existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of
the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of
fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
....
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may
refer the case to the [Court of Appeals] under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:cralawred
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. ï¿½ ...
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of
fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of
the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.
This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be
dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode of appeal.
Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the
case to the [Court of Appeals], the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of
justice warrant that the case be referred to the [Court of Appeals] for further appropriate proceedings. It
bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be
allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the
existence of the courts.68 (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, including the reception of evidence,
to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
cralawlawlibrary
[ G.R. No. 227605. December 05, 2019 ]
IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE BETWEEN MINURO * TAKAHASHI AND
JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA,
JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 103196 entitled In Re: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce Between Minuro
Takahashi and Juliet Rendora Moraña:
1. Decision[2] dated July 5, 2016 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner Juliet Rendora Moraña's
petition for recognition of foreign divorce decree in Japan; and
2. Resolution[3] dated October 13, 2016 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
On June 24, 2002, petitioner and Minoru Takahashi got married in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thereafter,
they moved to live in Japan where they bore two (2) children, namely: Haruna Takahashi (born on
January 5, 2003) and Nanami Takahashi (born on May 8, 2006).[4]
Ten (10) years later, the couple got estranged. Petitioner alleged that her husband failed to perform his
marital obligations to her. He refused to give support to their two (2) children, and worse, started
cohabiting with another woman. Because of her persistent demand for financial support, her husband
suggested they secure a divorce so the Japanese government would give financial assistance to their
children and send them to school. Believing it was for the good of their children, petitioner agreed to
divorce her husband. Consequently, they jointly applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City, Japan.[5]
On May 22, 2012, the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City granted their application for divorce and
issued the corresponding Divorce Report.[6]
On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court-Manila an action for recognition of the
Divorce Report. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 12-128788 and raffled to Branch 29.
During the proceedings, petitioner offered the following exhibits:

"A" Petition for Recognition of Foreign Decree of Divorce
"B" Compliance dated January 5, 2013
"C" Letter addressed to the Office of the Solicitor General
"D" Letter to the Public Prosecutor
"E" OSG's Notice of Appearance and deputation letter
"F" Order dated January 24, 2013
"G" Affidavit of Publication

"H" April 29, 2013 issue of Hataw newspaper
"I" May 6, 2013 issue of Hataw newspaper
"J" Marriage Contract
"K" Printout of the Divorce Law of Japan and its English translation
"L" Divorce Report dated May 22, 2012 and its English translation
"M" Certificate of All Matters and its English translation
"N" Letter Request dated July 9, 2013 addressed to the Japanese Embassy
"O" Letter Request dated August 4, 2012 addressed to the Japanese Embassy
"P" Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit
"Q" Photocopy of petitioner's passport

The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision[7] dated December 23, 2013, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to present in
evidence the Divorce Decree itself. The trial court held that the Divorce Report and Certificate of All
Matters cannot take the place of the Divorce Decree itself which is the best evidence here. Besides, the
authenticated Divorce Certificate issued by the Japanese government was not even included in
petitioner's formal offer of evidence aside from the fact that it was a mere photocopy and was not
properly identified nay authenticated in open court. Too, on cross, it appeared that petitioner herself
was the one who secured the Divorce Decree which fact is not allowed under Philippine laws.
By Order[8] dated June 30, 2014, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.[9]
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed through its assailed Decision[10] dated July 5, 2016. It
emphasized that before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized in the Philippines, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity with the foreign law allowing it. This
was not complied with here. Too, petitioner failed to offer in evidence the foreign Divorce Decree itself
which she purportedly obtained in Japan. The Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters cannot
substitute for the Divorce Decree contemplated by the rules. More, petitioner failed to prove the
existence of the foreign law allowing the divorce in question.
In any case, a foreign Divorce Decree cannot be recognized under Section 26 of the Family Code when
the same was obtained by the Filipino spouse. Records showed that the Divorce Decree was not
obtained by Minoru alone, but by petitioner, as well.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[11] was denied under its assailed Resolution dated October 13,
2016.[12]
The Present Appeal

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays that the dispositions of the Court of
Appeals be reversed and set aside.
Petitioner argues that equity and substantial justice merit the grant of the petition. If Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applied in this case, an absurd situation would arise wherein she is still considered
married to her husband, while her husband is no longer legally married to her.
She asserts it was not she who voluntarily secured the divorce decree. It was her husband who
encouraged her to apply for a divorce decree so that the Japanese government would support and send
their children to school. When she testified that she secured the divorce papers, she actually meant it
was she who requested copies of the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters. She and her husband
jointly applied for divorce. She could not have applied for divorce on her own since she is not well
versed in the Japanese language and characters.
She further avers that only the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters were issued to her by the
Japanese government. These documents are equivalent to the Divorce Decree itself. In any case, there is
no difference between a "Divorce Decree" and the "Divorce Report" she presented in court. The Divorce
Report itself bears the fact that she and her husband obtained a divorce in Japan. More, although the
Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters are mere photocopies, the same were duly authenticated
by the Japanese Embassy.
As for the Divorce Certificate, the Court of Appeals said that the same was not properly offered as it was
submitted to the court merely via a Manifestation. The Court of Appeals, however, failed to consider the
fact that the Divorce Certificate was given to her counsel by the Japanese Embassy only after she had
presented her evidence and after she had gone back to Japan to care for her children. The belated
availability of the Divorce Certificate was, therefore, beyond her control. In any event, the trial court all
admitted her evidence sans any objection from the State. Also, neither the public prosecutor nor the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) challenged the divorce she and her husband obtained in Japan.
The OSG, on the other hand, posits that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere rehash of the
arguments which both the trial court and the Court of Appeals had already resolved in full.[13]
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the dismissal of the petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree?
Ruling
While Philippine law does not allow absolute divorce, Article 26 of the Family Code allows a Filipino
married to a foreign national to contract a subsequent marriage if a divorce decree is validly obtained by
the alien spouse abroad, thus:
Article 26. x x x
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage.[14]
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a me1nber of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the idea is to
avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is
recognized by his or her national law. The aim was to solve the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have
already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already
married again.[15]
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas[16] and Garcia v. Recio,[17] the Court held that in any case involving recognition of
a foreign divorce judgment, both the Divorce Decree and the applicable national law of the alien spouse
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence.
Here, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision denying the petition for recognition of
foreign decree of divorce on three (3) grounds, viz.:
1. A divorce decree obtained by a Filipino abroad cannot be recognized in the Philippines
because Philippine law does not allow divorce;
2. The Divorce Decree was not presented and proved in evidence; and
3. The existence of the Japanese law on divorce was not proved.

The Court does not agree.
A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized

in the Philippines although it was the Filipino
spouse who obtained the same
Republic v. Manalo[18] emphasized that even if it was the Filipino spouse who initiated and obtained the
divorce decree, the same may be recognized in the Philippines, viz.:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding. x x x
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absu1rd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration,
and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should
be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. x x x
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. x x x
x x x Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. x x x
x x x In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites of the
equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification.
x x x there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse.
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights
and obligations in (an) alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any
subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the
eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the
stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences,
not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage,
but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed
according to indigenous customs.
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. x x x it is recognized that not
all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. x x x it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x x
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may,
therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent. (Emphasis supplied)
Racho v. Tanaka[19] further enunciated that the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce
proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals. Verily, therefore, even. though it was petitioner
herself or jointly with her husband who applied for and obtained the divorce decree in this case, the
same may be recognized in our jurisdiction. So must it be.
The next question: Were the Divorce Decree itself and the Japanese law on divorce sufficiently proved in
this case?
Divorce Decree
Petitioner identified, presented, and formally offered in evidence the Divorce Report[20] issued by the
Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City. It clearly bears the fact of divorce by agreement of the
parties, viz.:
Husband Wife
JULIET MORAÑA
Name MINORU TAKAHASHI
TAKAHASHI
Date of Birth September 13, 1975 July 26, 1978
82-2 Oaza Managura, 1-13-15-403 Minato
Ekiya-cho, Fukuyama City Machi, Fukuyama City
Address
Name of Householder: Name of Householder:
(Registered Address)
Tadashi Takahashi Juliet Moraña
Takahashi
82-2 Oaza Managura, Ekiya-cho, Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture
Permanent Domicile
(For foreigner, write only Head of family Nationality of Wife
the Nationality) Minoru Takahashi Republic of the
Philippines
Father of Husband: Father of Wife: Cesar
Name of Parents and the Tadashi Takahashi Moraña, Jr.
Relationship Mother: Tomoe Mother: Zosima Moraña
Relationship: Second Son Relationship: Daughter
__x__Divorce by Agreement ____Settlement ____Arranged on
Type of divorce: ____Mediation Date: ____Approval of Request ____Date:
____Arbitration Date: ____Court Decision ____Date:

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, declined to consider the Divorce Report as
the Divorce Decree itself. According to the trial court, the Divorce Report was "limited to the report of
the divorce granted to the parties."[21] On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that the Divorce
Report "cannot be considered as act of an official body or tribunal as would constitute the divorce decree
contemplated by the Rules."[22]
The Court is not persuaded. Records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan
issued to petitioner and her husband when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce judgment" to
speak of because the divorce proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but through the
Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since the Divorce
Report was issued by the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official
body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the "Divorce
Decree" in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her former
husband.
Notably, the fact of divorce was also supported by the Certificate of All Matters[23] issued by the
Japanese government to petitioner's husband Minoru Takahashi, indicating the date of divorce,
petitioner's name from whom he got divorced and petitioner's nationality as well, thus:
[Date of Divorce] May 22, 2012
Divorce [Name of Spouse] Juliet Moraña Takahashi
[Nationality of Spouse] Republic of the Philippines

More, petitioner submitted below a duly authenticated copy of the Divorce Certificate[24] issued by the
Japanese government.[25] The fact alone that the document was submitted to the trial court without
anyone identifying it on the stand or making a formal offer thereof in evidence does not call for
dismissal of the petition.
For one, the State did not question the existence of the Divorce Report, Divorce Certificate, and more
importantly the fact of divorce between petitioner and her husband. As Republic v.
Manalo[26] pronounced, if the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the existence of the
divorce report and divorce certificate decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign
official body.
For another, petitioner explained that despite repeated prompt requests from the Japanese Embassy,
the latter released the Divorce Certificate quite belatedly after petitioner had already terminated her
testimony and returned to Japan to care for her children.[27]
Still another, the Divorce Report, Certificate of All Matters, and Divorce Certificate were all
authenticated by the Japanese Embassy. These are proofs of official records which are admissible in
evidence under Sections 19 and 24, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, to wit:
Section 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation (in) evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Finally, the Court has, time and again, held that the court's primary duty is to dispense justice; and
procedural rules are designed to secure and not to override substantial justice. On several occasions, the
Court relaxed procedural rules to advance substantial justice.[28] More so here because what is involved
is a matter affecting the lives of petitioner and her children; the case is meritorious; the belated issuance
of the Divorce Certificate was not due to petitioner's fault; and the relaxation of the rules here will not
prejudice the State.[29]
True, marriage is an inviolable social institution and must be protected by the State. But in cases like
these, there is no more "institution" to protect as the supposed institution was already legally
broken. Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it.[30]
Law on divorce in Japan
This brings us to the next question: was petitioner able to prove the applicable law on divorce in Japan
of which her former husband is a national? On this score, Republic v. Manalo[31] ordained:
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it,
as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function.
Here, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of pertinent portions of the Japanese law
on divorce and its English translation.[32] There was no proof at all that these printouts reflected the
existing law on divorce in Japan and its correct English translation. Indeed, our rules require more than a
printout from a website to prove a foreign law. In Racho,[33] the Japanese law on divorce was duly
proved through a copy of the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan translated under the
authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee. At any rate, considering
that the fact of divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher interest of substantial justice compels
that petitioner be afforded the chance to properly prove the Japanese law on divorce, with the end view
that petitioner may be eventually freed from a marriage in which she is the only remaining party.
In Manalo,[34] the Court, too, did not dismiss the case, but simply remanded it to the trial court for
reception of evidence pertaining to the existence of the Japanese law on divorce.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 5, 2016 and Resolution dated October
13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 103196 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court – Branch 29, Manila for presentation in evidence of the
pertinent Japanese law on divorce following the procedure in Racho v. Tanaka.[35] Thereafter, the court
shall render a new decision on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

199515, June 25, 2018

Petitioner initially submitted a Manifestation,21 stating that a duly-authenticated acceptance certificate

1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree - a conditional or provisional judgment of

G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018

STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

We grant the petition.

G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019

A. REYES, JR., J.:

Cert. No. IB12-08573-12

4. Declaring [Marlyn's] marriage to [Akira] as dissolved with a pronouncement that

Ruling of the RTC

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED.

The Present Petition

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

We rule in the affirmative.

G.R. No. 213198, July 01, 2019

In Patula v. People,52 this Court explained the nature of a self-authenticating document:cralawred

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. ï¿½ ...

JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

During the proceedings, petitioner offered the following exhibits:

"B" Compliance dated January 5, 2013

"C" Letter addressed to the Office of the Solicitor General

"D" Letter to the Public Prosecutor

"E" OSG's Notice of Appearance and deputation letter

"F" Order dated January 24, 2013

"G" Affidavit of Publication

"I" May 6, 2013 issue of Hataw newspaper

"J" Marriage Contract

"M" Certificate of All Matters and its English translation

"P" Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit

"Q" Photocopy of petitioner's passport

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

The Present Appeal

3. The existence of the Japanese law on divorce was not proved.

A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized

Type of divorce: ____Mediation Date: ____Approval of Request ____Date:

____Arbitration Date: ____Court Decision ____Date:

Divorce [Name of Spouse] Juliet Moraña Takahashi

[Nationality of Spouse] Republic of the Philippines

Public documents are:

Law on divorce in Japan

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Type of divorce: Mediation Date: Approval of Request Date:

Arbitration Date: Court Decision Date: