EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A. ERIC SALIBAD
Y MALLARI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Can the police conduct a warrantless int1usive search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified tip
relayed by an anonymous informant? On this question, jurisprudence has vacillated over the years. The
Court definitively settles the issue once and for all.

In threshing out this issue, it must be remembered that in criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions
for violations of the law on dangerous drugs, our constitutional order does not adopt a stance of
neutrality - the law is heavily in favor of the accused. By constitutional design, the accused is afforded
the presumption of innocence1 - it is for the State to prove the guilt of the accused. Without the State
discharging this burden, the Court is given no alternative but to acquit the accused.

Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence against the accused is tainted by a violation of the
accused's right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is a most cherished and protected
right under the Bill of Rights, the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading to the
accused's acquittal.

Therefore, while the Court recognizes the necessity of adopting a decisive stance against the scourge of
illegal drugs, the eradication of illegal drugs in our society cannot be achieved by subverting the people's
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In simple terms, the Constitution does
not allow the end to justify the means. Otherwise, in eradicating one societal disease, a deadlier and
more sinister one is cultivated - the trampling of the people's fundamental, inalienable rights. The
State's steadfastness in eliminating the drug menace must be equally matched by its determination to
uphold and defend the Constitution. This Court will not sit idly by and allow the Constitution to be added
to the mounting body count in the State's war on illegal drugs.

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal2 filed by the accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y
Mallari (accused-appellant Sapla), assailing the Decision3 dated April 24, 2018 (assailed Decision) of the
Court of Appeals (CA)4 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 09296, which affirmed the Judgment5 dated January 9,
2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C
entitled People of the Philippines v. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a. k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari, finding accused-
appellant Sapla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The facts and antecedent proceedings, as narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision, and as culled from
the records of the case, are as follows:

In an Information dated 14 January 2014, the appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the said Information reads:

"That at around 1:20 in the afternoon of January 10, 2014 at Talaca, Agbannawag, Tabuk City, Kalinga
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of marijuana leaves,
a dangerous [drug], with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams and transport in transit through a
passenger [jeepney] with Plate No. AYA 270 the said marijuana without license, permit or authority from
any appropriate government entity or agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

The next day, or on 15 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] was committed to the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) at Tabuk City, Kalinga.

Upon his arraignment on 29 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged against him. In the court a quo's Pre-Trial Order dated 11 March 2014, the Prosecution and the
Defense stipulated their respective legal issues to be resolved by the court a quo. Also, the Prosecution
identified and marked its pieces of evidence, while the Defense made no proposals nor pre-mark[ed]
any exhibits.

Trial ensued thereafter.

The Prosecution presented three (3) police officers as its witnesses, namely: 1) Police Officer (PO)2 Jim
Mabiasan (hereinafter referred to as PO2 Mabiasan), an officer assigned at the 3rd Maneuver Company,
Regional Public Safety Battalion (RPSB) at Tabuk City and was the seizing officer; 2) PO3 Lito Labbutan
(hereinafter referred to as PO3 Labbutan), an intelligence operative of Kalinga Police Provincial Office -
Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (KPPO PAIDSOTG) who was tasked as the
arresting officer; and 3) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Delon Ngoslab (hereinafter referred to as PSI
Ngoslab), deputy company commander of the RPSB and team leader of the joint checkpoint operation.

The evidence for the Prosecution established that on 10 January 2014, at around 11:30 in the morning,
an officer on duty at the RPSB office received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the
said office that a certain male individual [would] be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the
Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then relayed the information to their deputy commander, PSI
Ngoslab, who subsequently called KPPO-PAIDSOTG for a possible joint operation. Thereafter, as a
standard operating procedure in drug operations, PO3 Labbutan, an operative of KPPO-PAIDSOTG,
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Afterwards, the chief of KPPO-
PAIDSOTG, PSI Baltazar Lingbawan (hereinafter referred to as PSI Lingbawan), briefed his operatives on
the said information. Later on, the said operatives of KPPO-PAIDSOTG arrived at the RPSB. PSI Ngoslab
immediately organized a team and as its team leader, assigned PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing officer, PO3
Labbutan as the arresting officer, while the rest of the police officers would provide security and backup.
The said officers then proceeded to the Talaca detachment.

At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the subject
male person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes,
red ball cap, and [was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270
bound for Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca
command post.

The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the
Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the road.
Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla] seated at
the rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he [was] the owner of
the blue sack in front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then
requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-appellant Sapla] opened the
sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped
in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested [accused-appellant Sapla],
informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in [the] Ilocano dialect. PO2
Mabiasan further searched [accused-appellant Sapla] and found one (I) LG cellular phone unit.
Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves and brought
[them] to their office at the Talaca detachment for proper markings.

At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of the seized items,
one (1) blue sack and four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wherein the same officer
placed his signature on the said items. Also, the actual conduct of inventory was witnessed by [accused-
appellant Sapla], and by the following: 1) Joan K. Balneg from the Department of Justice; 2) Victor
Fontanilla, an elected barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G. Dumalig, as media representative.
Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the said [accused-appellant Sapla] at the KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial
Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M. Duyan for further investigation.

At the said office, PO2 Mabiasan personally turned over the seized items to the investigator of the case,
PO2 Alexander Oman (hereinafter referred to as PO2 Oman), for custody, safekeeping and proper
disposition. Also, PSI Lingbawan wrote a letter addressed to the Provincial Chief, which requested that a
chemistry examination be conducted on the seized items. The following specimens were submitted for
initial laboratory examination: 1) one (1) blue sack with label J&N rice, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014
EXH. "A" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 2) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which
weighed 998.376 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-1" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 3) one
(1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 929.735 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10,
2014 EXH "A-2" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 4) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which
weighed 1,045.629 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-3" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 5) one
(1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 979.371 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10,
2014 EXH. "A-4" PNP-TALACA and signature,"· The said initial examination revealed that the specimens
"A-1" to "A-4" with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams, yielded positive results for the presence of
marijuana, a dangerous drug. In addition, Chemistry Report No. D-003-2014 revealed that indeed the
said specimens [did] contain marijuana and that the said report indicated that the "specimen[s]
submitted are retained in this laboratory for future reference."

Also, further investigation revealed that [accused-appellant Sapla] tried to conceal his true identity by
using a fictitious name - Eric Mallari Salibad. However, investigators were able to contact [accused-
appellant Sapla's] sister, who duly informed the said investigators that [accused appellant Sapla's] real
name is Jerry Guerrero Sapla.

On the other hand, the Defense presented [accused-appellant Sapla] as its sole witness.

The [accused-appellant Sapla] denied the charges against him and instead, offered a different version of
the incident. He claimed that on 8 January 2014, he went to Tabuk City to visit a certain relative named
Tony Sibal. Two (2) days later, [accused-appellant Sapla] boarded a jeepney, and left for Roxas, Isabela
to visit his nephew. Upon reaching Talaca checkpoint, police officers f1agged down the said jeepney in
order to check its passenger[s'] baggages and cargoes. The police of1icers then found marijuana inside a
sack and were looking for a person who wore fatigue pants at that time. From the three (3) passengers
who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers identified him as the owner of the marijuana found
inside the sack. [Accused-appellant Sapla] denied ownership of the marijuana, and asserted that he had
no baggage at that time. Thereafter, the police officers arrested [accused-appellant Sapla] and brought
him to the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and marijuana bricks were shown to him.7

The Ruling of the RTC

On January 9, 2017, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating
Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus
delicti of the crime. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO, a.k.a. ERIC
SALIBAD Y MALLARI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

The accused to pay the fine of Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos.

The 4 bricks of dried marijuana leaves be submitted to any authorized representative of the PDEA for
proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.8

Feeling aggrieved, accused-appellant Sapla filed an appeal before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied accused-appellant Sapla's appeal and affirmed the RTC 's
Decision with modifications. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 January 2017 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P1,000,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

The CA found that although the search and seizure conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was without a
search warrant, the same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. The CA
held that the essential requisite of probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless search and
seizure.

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue

Stripped to its core, the essential issue in the instant case is whether there was a valid search and
seizure conducted by the police officers. The answer to this critical question determines whether there
is enough evidence to sustain accused-appellant Sapla's conviction under Section 5 of R.A. 9165.

The Court's Ruling

The instant appeal is impressed with merit. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla and immediately
orders his release from incarceration.

The Constitutional Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

As eloquently explained by the Court in People v. Tudtud (Tudtud),10 "the Bill of Rights is the bedrock of
constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy
cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as
it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above
the articles on governmental power."11

And in the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is "at the top of the
hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, x x x
for the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right
against unreasonable search and seizure."12

The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures is found in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a
court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause through the
personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before
the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described.

Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in
the hierarchy of rights, any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not favored and
is strictly construed against the government.

Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures

There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence of a search warrant,
taking into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured."13
The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(3) search of a moving vehicle;

(4) consented warrantless search;

(5) customs search;

(6) stop and frisk; and

(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.14

Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-Applicability in the Instant Case

In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the RTC and CA
considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in
such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to
visual inspection."15

On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the officers made it
upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction."16

The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case is a search of a
moving vehicle. The situation presented in the instant case cannot be considered as a search of a
moving vehicle.

The fairly recent case of People v. Comprado17 (Comprado) is controlling inasmuch as the facts of the
said case are virtually identical to the instant case.

In Comprado, a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to the authorities as regards an alleged
courier of marijuana who had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling
from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. The CI eventually called the authorities and informed them that
the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound
for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet
colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." With this information, the police officers put up a checkpoint,
just as what the authorities did in the instant case. Afterwards, upon seeing the bus bearing the said
body and plate numbers approaching the checkpoint, again similar to the instant case, the said vehicle
was flagged down. The police officers boarded the bus and saw a man matching the description given to
them by the CI. The man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap. The man
was asked to open the bag. When the accused agreed to do so, the police officers saw a transparent
cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.

In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be classified as a search of a moving
vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person."18 The Court
added that "in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport
illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger
of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they
searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or
contents of the said bus."19

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the target of the search
conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or
contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the person who matched the description given
by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person wearing a collared white shirt with green
stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack.

As explained in Comprado, "to extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would
open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient
of waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that
vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target
person."20

Therefore, the search conducted in the instant case cannot be characterized as a search of a moving
vehicle.

Probable Cause as an Indispensable Requirement for an Extensive and Intrusive Warrantless Search of a
Moving Vehicle

In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle, the
operation undertaken by the authorities in the instant case cannot be deemed a valid warrantless
search of a moving vehicle.

In People v. Manago,21 the Court, through Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, explained
that a variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setting up of military or
police checkpoints. The setting up of such checkpoints is not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is
justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.

However, in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) where the
officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection
of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.22

Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless
searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been held to be valid
only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched."23

Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the
vehicle necessitates probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.

It was in Valmonte v. de Villa24 ( Valmonte) where the Court first held that vehicles can be stopped at a
checkpoint and extensively searched only when there is "probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense."25 This doctrine was directly adopted from
United States jurisprudence, specifically from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of the United
States (SCOTUS) in Dyke v. Taylor.26

As subsequently explained by the Court in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,27 probable cause means that
there is the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched:

x x x a reasonable ground of suspicion supp01ied by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to

warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged;
or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a
fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.28
Sheer Unverified Information from an Anonymous Informant does not engender Probable Cause on the
part of the Authorities that warrants an Extensive and Intrusive Search of a Moving Vehicle

As readily admitted by the CA, the singular circumstance that engendered probable cause on the part of
the police officers was the information they received through the RPSB Hotline (via text message) from
an anonymous person. Because of this information, the CA held that there was probable cause on the
part of the police to conduct an intrusive search.29

Does the mere reception of a text message from an anonymous person suffice to create probable cause
that enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive search without a search warrant? The
answer is a resounding no.

The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that in situations involving warrantless searches and
seizures, "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still
hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence
of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."30

A. United States Jurisprudence on Probable Cause vis-a-vis Tipped Information

Considering that the doctrine that an extensive warrantless search of a moving vehicle necessitates
probable cause was adopted by the Court from United States jurisprudence, examining United States
jurisprudence can aid in a fuller understanding on the existence of probable cause vis-a-vis tipped
information received from confidential informants.

In the 1964 case of Aguilar v. Texas,31 the SCOTUS delved into the constitutional requirements for
obtaining a state search warrant. In the said case, two Houston police officers applied to a local Justice
of the Peace for a warrant to search for narcotics in the petitioner's home based on "reliable
information" received from a supposed credible person that the "heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and
other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the
purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law."32

In invalidating the search warrant, the SCOTUS held that a two pronged test must be satisfied in order to
determine whether an informant's tip is sufficient in engendering probable cause, i.e., (1) the
informant's "basis of knowledge" must be revealed and (2) sufficient facts to establish either the
informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the informant's report must be provided:

Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information, and need not reflect the direct personal
observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, the magistrate must be informed
of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were
where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U. S. 528, was "credible" or his information "reliable."33

Subsequently, in the 1983 case of Illinois v. Gates,34 the police received an anonymous letter alleging
that the respondents were engaged in selling drugs and that the car of the respondents would be loaded
with drugs. Agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency searched the respondents' car, which contained
marijuana and other contraband items.

In finding that there was probable cause, the SCOTUS adopted the totality of circumstances test and
held that tipped information may engender probable cause under "a balanced assessment of the
relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's
tip"35 In the said case, the SCOTUS found that the details of the informant's tip were corroborated by
independent police work.

The SCOTUS emphasized however that "standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale
Police Department would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable
cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gateses' car and home. x x x Something more was
required, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that
contraband would be found in the Gateses' home and car."36

B. The Line of Philippine Jurisprudence on the Inability of a Solitary Tip to Engender Probable Cause
As early as 1988, our own Court had ruled that an extensive warrantless search and seizure conducted
on the sole basis of a confidential tip is tainted with illegality. In People v. Aminnudin,37 analogous to
the instant case, the authorities acted upon an information that the accused would be arriving from
Iloilo on board a vessel, the M/V Wilcon 9. The authorities waited for the vessel to arrive, accosted the
accused, and inspected the latter's bag wherein bundles of marijuana leaves were found. The Court
declared that the search and seizure was illegal, holding that, at the time of his apprehension,
Aminnudin was not "committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. x x x To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."38

Subsequently, in People v. Cuizon,39 the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
held that the warrantless search and subsequent arrest of the accused were deemed illegal because
"the prosecution failed to establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI agents
to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and
Lee were made."40 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the authorities merely relied on
"the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received that morning."41 The Court characterized the
tip received by the authorities from an anonymous informant as "hearsay information"42 that cannot
engender probable cause.

In People v. Encinada,43 the authorities acted solely on an informant's tip and stopped the tricycle
occupied by the accused and asked the latter to alight. The authorities then rummaged through the two
strapped plastic baby chairs that were loaded inside the tricycle. The authorities then found a package
of marijuana inserted between the two chairs. The Court, again through former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, held that "raw intelligence"44 was not enough to justify the warrantless search and seizure.
"The prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked
from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could
be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances."45

Likewise analogous to the instant case is People v. Aruta46 (Aruta) where an informant had told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be transporting illegal drugs from Baguio City by bus. Hence, the
police officers situated themselves at the bus terminal. Eventually, the informant pointed at a woman
crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." Subsequently, the authorities apprehended the
woman and inspected her bag which contained marijuana leaves.

In finding that there was an unlawful warrantless search, the Court in Aruta held that "it was only when
the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended
accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant."47 Hence, the Court held that the
search conducted on the accused therein based solely on the pointing finger of the informant was "a
clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure."48

Of more recent vintage is People v. Cogaed49 (Cogaed), which likewise involved a search conducted
through a checkpoint put up after an "unidentified civilian informer" shared information to the
authorities that a person would be transporting marijuana.

In finding that there was no probable cause on the part of the police that justified a warrantless search,
the Court, through Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, astutely explained that in cases
finding sufficient probable cause for the conduct of warrantless searches, "the police officers using their
senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying
manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit
drugs."50 However, the Court reasoned that the case of the accused was different because "he was
simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious,
moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made
by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police that Cogaed
was 'suspicious.'"51

In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in engendering probable cause that justifies a valid warrantless
search, "[i]t is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This
is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less
than this would be an infringement upon one's basic right to security of one's person and
effects."52 The Court explained that "the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the (acts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act," and not merely rely on the information passed
on to him or her.53

Adopting former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin's Dissenting Opinion in Esquillo v. People,54 the Court
in Cogaed stressed that reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.55 The Court emphasized that the matching of information transmitted by an
informant "still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search
Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant."56

Subsequently, in Veridiano v. People57 (Veridiano), a concerned citizen informed the police that the
accused was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. Based on this tip, the authorities set up
a checkpoint. The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew the appearance of the accused.
Eventually, the police chanced upon the accused inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. The jeepney was flagged down and the police asked the passengers to disembark. The police
officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to
remove the contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered from the accused a tea bag
containing what appeared to be marijuana.

In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court, again through Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor
F. Leonen, held that the accused was a "mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that
would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. x x x There
was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow
them to infer anything suspicious."58

The Court correctly explained that "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped
information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."59

A year after Veridiano, the Court decided the case of Comprado. As in the instant case, the authorities
alleged that they possessed reasonable cause to conduct a warrantless search solely on the basis of
information relayed by an informant.

The Court held in Comprado that the sole information relayed by an informant was not sufficient to
incite a genuine reason to conduct an intrusive search on the accused. The Court explained that "no
overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of
the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime."60

The Court emphasized that there should be the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity
from which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."61 In the said case,
as in the instant case, the accused was just a passenger carrying his bag. "There is nothing suspicious
much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting
officers to believe that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana."62

Recently, the Court unequivocally declared in People v. Yanson63 (Yanson) that a solitary tip hardly
suffices as probable cause that warrants the conduct of a ·warrantless intrusive search and seizure.

In Yanson, which involves an analogous factual milieu as in the instant case, "the Municipal Police
Station of M'lang, North Cotabato received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup - with plate
number 619 and carrying three (3) people - that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of
Police instructed the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the riverside police outpost along the road
from Matalam to M'lang."64

Afterwards, "[a]t around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the
team of police officers on standby. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The
driver alighted and, at an officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were
discovered beside the engine."65

In the erudite ponencia of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, the Court held that, in
determining whether there is probable cause that warrants an extensive or intrusive warrantless
searches of a moving vehicle, "bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not demand
moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it requires the existence of 'a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.'"66

The Court explained that in prior cases wherein the Court validated warrantless searches and seizures
on the basis of tipped information, "the seizures and arrests were not merely and exclusively based on
the initial tips. Rather, they were prompted by other attendant circumstances. Whatever initial suspicion
they had from being tipped was progressively heightened by other factors, such as the accused's failure
to produce identifying documents, papers pertinent to the items they were carrying, or their display of
suspicious behavior upon being approached."67 In such cases, the finding of probable cause was
premised "on more than just the initial information relayed by assets. It was the confluence of initial tips
and a myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained probable cause."68 However, the case
of Yanson was markedly different from these other cases. Just as in the instant case, the police officers
proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of a solitary tip:

This case is markedly different. The police officers here proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest
on the basis of a solitary tip: the radio message that a certain pickup carrying three (3) people was
transporting marijuana from Pikit. When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly matching this description)
reached the checkpoint, the arresting officers went ahead to initiate a search asking the driver about
inspecting the vehicle. Only upon this insistence did the driver alight. It was also only upon a police
officer's further prodding did he open the hood.

The records do not show, whether on the basis of indubitably established facts or the prosecution's
mere allegations, that the three (3) people on board the pickup were acting suspiciously, or that there
were other odd circumstances that could have prompted the police officers to conduct an extensive
search. Evidently, the police officers relied solely on the radio message they received when they
proceeded to inspect the

vehicle.69

In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by informants cannot
produce probable cause, the Court held that "[e]xclusive reliance on information tipped by informants
goes against the very nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
to be searched."70

As correctly explained by the Court in Yanson, "[t]o maintain otherwise would be to sanction frivolity,
opening the floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly
informants."71

And very recently, on September 4, 2019, the Court, through former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin,
promulgated its Decision in People v. Gardon-Mentoy72 (Gardon-Mentoy). In the said case, police
officers had set up a checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan based
on a tip from an unidentified informant that the accused-appellant would be transporting dangerous
drugs on board a shuttle van. Eventually, the authorities flagged down the approaching shuttle van
matching the description obtained from the informant and conducted a warrantless search of the
vehicle, yielding the discovery of a block-shaped bundle containing marijuana.

In holding that the warrantless search and seizure were without probable cause, the Court held that a
tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming from the personal
knowledge of the searching officers, was not yet actionable for purposes of conducting a search:

Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers' suspicion
about the block-shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give unquestioned acceptance and
belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers concerning the existence of
probable cause is never binding on the court whose duty remains to "independently scrutinize the
objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never
hesitated to overrule an officer's determination of probable cause when none exists."

But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-appellant panicked and tried
to get down from the van, impelling him and PO1 Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct on her part,
assuming it did occur, give sufficient cause to search and to arrest?
For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped bundle from one bag to
another should not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment
PO1 Rosales required her to produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified
tip from the unidentified informant, without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects.
The officers were themselves well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called
for independent verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the foundation for them to
rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other
circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or arresting
officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.73

The Court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v. People74 (Saluday), a bus inspection
conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said case,
the authorities merely conducted a "visual and minimally intrusive inspection"75 of the accused's bag-by
simply lifting the bag that noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. This is markedly dissimilar to
the instant case wherein the search conducted entailed the probing of the contents of the blue sack
allegedly possessed by accused-appellant Sapla.

Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities never received nor relied on sheer information relayed by an
informant, unlike in the instant case. In Saluday, the authorities had relied on their own senses in
determining probable cause, i.e., having personally lifted the bag revealing that a firearm was inside, as
well as having seen the very suspicious looks being given by the accused therein.

Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a
bus while in transit: (1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search must not be
discriminatory; (3) as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety; and (4)
the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence
was planted against the accused.76

It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.

First, unlike in Saluday wherein the search conducted was merely visual and minimally intrusive, the
search undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla was extensive, reaching inside the contents of the blue
sack that he allegedly possessed.

Second, the search was directed exclusively towards accused appellant Sapla; it was discriminatory.
Unlike in Saluday where the bags of the other bus passengers were also inspected, the search conducted
in the instant case focused exclusively on accused-appellant Sapla.

Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with the intent of ensuring public safety. At
the most, the search was conducted to apprehend a person who, as relayed by an anonymous
informant, was transporting illegal drugs.

Lastly, the Court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary measures were undertaken by the police
to ensure that no evidence was planted against accused-appellant Sapla, considering that the inventory,
photographing, and marking of the evidence were not immediately conducted after the apprehension of
accused-appellant Sapla at the scene of the incident.

C. The Divergent Line of Jurisprudence

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there is indeed a line of jurisprudence holding that information
received by the police provides a valid basis for conducting a warrantless search,77 tracing its origins to
the 1990 cases of People v. Tangliben78 (Tangliben) and People v. Maspil, Jr.79 (Maspil, Jr.). Several of
the cases following this line of jurisprudence also heavily rely on the 1992 case of People v.
Bagista80 (Bagista).

It is high time for a re-examination of this divergent line of jurisprudence.

In Tangliben, acting on information supplied by informers that dangerous drugs would be transported
through a bus, the authorities conducted a surveillance operation at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound in San Fernando, Pampanga. At 9:30 in the evening, the police noticed a person carrying a
red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag.
The police found marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper inside the bag.
It must be stressed that in Tangliben, the authorities' decision to conduct the warrantless search did not
rest solely on the tipped information supplied by the informants. The authorities, using their own
personal observation, saw that the accused was acting suspiciously.

Similar to Tangliben, in the great majority of cases upholding the validity of a warrantless search and
seizure on the basis of a confidential tip, the police did not rely exclusively on information sourced from
the informant. There were overt acts and other circumstances personally observed by the police that
engendered great suspicion. Hence, the holding that an inclusive warrantless search can be conducted
on the solitary basis of tipped information is far from being an established and inflexible doctrine.

To cite but a few examples, in the early case of People v. Malmstdedt,81 the authorities set up a
checkpoint in response to some reports that a Caucasian man was coming from Sagada with dangerous
drugs in his possession. At the checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and inspected it. Upon reaching
the accused, the police personally observed that there was a bulge on the accused's waist. This
prompted the officer to ask for the accused's identification papers, which the accused failed to provide.
The accused was then asked to reveal what was bulging on his waist, which turned out to be hashish, a
derivative of marijuana. In this case, the Court ruled that the probable cause justifying the warrantless
search was based on the personal observations of the authorities and not solely on the tipped
information:

It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity.82

In People v. Tuazon,83 the authorities did not solely rely on confidential information that the accused
would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu using a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411. Upon
conducting a visual search of the motor vehicle that was flagged down by the authorities, the police
personally saw a gun tucked on the accused's waist. Moreover, the accused was not able to produce any
pertinent document related to the firearm. This was what prompted the police to order the accused to
alight from the vehicle.

In People v. Quebral,84 the authorities did not solely rely on the police informer's report that two men
and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a specific plate number would deliver shabu, a
prohibited drug, at a Petron Gasoline Station in Balagtas, Bulacan. The authorities conducted a
surveillance operation and personally saw the accused handing out a white envelope to her co-accused,
a person included in the police's drug watch list.

In People v. Saycon,85 in holding that the authorities had probable cause in conducting an intrusive
warrantless search, the Court explained that probable cause was not engendered solely by the receipt of
confidential information. Probable cause was produced because a prior test-buy was conducted by the
authorities, which confirmed that the accused was engaged in the transportation and selling of shabu.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,86 the person subjected to a warrantless search and seizure
was personally observed by the police to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was
holding in his hands, he tried to resist. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost
the accused-appellant to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations,
coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.87

In People v. Solayao,88 "police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. This man was also 'wearing
a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.' Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight added to the
suspicion. After stopping him the police officers found an unlicensed 'homemade firearm' in his
possession."89

In People v. Lo Ho Wing,90 the authorities did not rely on an anonymous, unverified tip. Deep
penetration agents were recruited to infiltrate the crime syndicate. An undercover agent actually met
and conferred with the accused, personally confirming the criminal activities being planned by the
accused. In fact, the agent regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the criminal
syndicate.

The jurisprudence cited by the CA in holding that the anonymous text message sent to the RPSB Hotline
sufficed to engender probable cause on the part of the authorities, i.e., People v. Tampis91 (Tampis),
stated that "tipped information is - sufficient to provide probable cause to effect a warrantless search
and seizure."92

However, in Tampis, as in the aforementioned jurisprudence, the police did not merely rely on
information relayed by an informant. Prior to the warrantless search conducted, the police actually
"conducted a surveillance on the intended place and saw both appellants packing the suspected
marijuana leaves into a brown bag with the markings 'Tak Tak Tak Ajinomoto' inscribed on its
side."93 In Tampis, the authorities were able to personally witness the accused packing illegal drugs into
the brown bag prior to the warrantless search and seizure.

Moreover, it is observed that when the Court in Tampis held that "tipped information is sufficient to
provide probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure,"94 the Court cited the case
of Aruta as its basis. However, the Court in Aruta did not hold that tipped information in and of itself is
sufficient to create probable cause. In fact, in Aruta, as already previously explained, despite the fact
that the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta's
alleged activities, the warrantless search conducted on Aruta was deemed unlawful for lack of probable
cause.

The earliest case decided by the Court which upheld the validity of an extensive warrantless search
based exclusively on a solitary tip is the case of Maspil, Jr., wherein the authorities set up a checkpoint,
flagged down the jeep driven by the accused, and examined the contents thereof on the sole basis of
information provided by confidential informers.

In justifying the validity of the warrantless search, the Court in Maspil, Jr. depended heavily on the early
case of Valmonte, which delved into the constitutionality of checkpoints set up in Valenzuela City.

It bears stressing that the Court in Valmonte never delved into the validity of warrantless searches and
seizures on the pure basis of confidential information. Valmonte did not hold that in checkpoints,
intrusive searches can be conducted on the sole basis of tipped information. Valmonte merely stated
that checkpoints are not illegal per se.95 In fact, in Valmonte, the Court stressed that "[f]or as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search."96

Hence, the jurisprudential support of the Court's holding in Maspil, Jr. is, at best, frail.

With respect to Bagista, the Court held therein that the authorities had probable cause to search the
accused's belongings without a search warrant based solely on information received from a confidential
informant.

In Bagista, the Court relied heavily on the SCOTUS' decision in Carroll vs. U.S97 (Carroll) in holding that
"[w]ith regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility
of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."98

Does Carroll support the notion that an unverified tipped information engenders probable cause?
In Carroll, which upheld the validity of a warrantless search of a vehicle used to transport contraband
liquor in Michigan, the SCOTUS found that the warrantless search was justified in light of the following
circumstances:

The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal prohibition agents, and
one Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car was going westward on the highway
between Detroit and Grand Rapids at a point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts leading to the
search and seizure were as follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in
Grand Rapids. Three men came to that apartment, a man named Kruska and the two defendants, Carroll
and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford, working in the Michigan Chair Company
in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey. The price was fixed at $13 a case. The three
men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids to get the liquor and that they would be back in
half or three-quarters of an hour. They went away, and in a short time Kruska came back and said they
could not get it that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would deliver it the next
day. They had come to the apartment in an automobile known as an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number
of which Cronenwett then identified, a[s] did Scully. The proposed vendors did not return the next day,
and the evidence disclosed no explanation of their failure to do so. One may surmise that it was
suspicion of the real character of the proposed purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first
name when arrested in December following. Cronenwett and his subordinates were engaged in
patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act.
This seems to have been their regular tour of duty. On the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going
eastward from Grand Rapids in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett and Scully some
distance out from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch, that the Carroll boys
had passed them going toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see where they
were going. The officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to Detroit, but there lost trace of them.
On the 15th of December, some two months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty,
with Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when
Kiro and Carroll met and passed them in the same automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to
Grand Rapids. The government agents turned their car and followed the defendants to a point some
sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped them and searched the car.

xxxx

We know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that Detroit and its
neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the International Boundary, is one of the most active
centers for introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. It is
obvious from the evidence that the prohibition agents were engaged in a regular patrol along the
important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to stop and seize liquor carried in automobiles. They
knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe that the Carroll boys, as they called them, were
so-called "bootleggers" in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were engaged in plying the unlawful trade of
selling such liquor in that city. The officers had soon after noted their going from Grand Rapids half way
to Detroit, and attempted to follow them to that city to see where they went, but they escaped
observation. Two months later, these officers suddenly met the same men on their way westward,
presumably from Detroit. The partners in the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were
together in the same automobile they had been in the night when they tried to furnish the whisky to the
officers which was thus identified as part of the firm equipment. They were coming from the direction of
the great source of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids, where they plied their trade. That the officers,
when they saw the defendants, believed that they were carrying liquor we can have no doubt, and we
think it is equally clear that they had reasonable cause for thinking so. Emphasis is put by defendant's
counsel on the statement made by one of the officers that they were not looking for defendants at the
particular time when they appeared. We do not perceive that it has any weight. As soon as they did
appear, the officers were entitled to use their reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which they had
previous knowledge in respect to the defendants.99

Hence, in Carroll, the probable cause justifying the warrantless search was not founded on information
relayed by confidential informants; there were no informants involved in the case whatsoever. Probable
cause existed because the state authorities themselves had personally interacted with the accused,
having engaged with them in an undercover transaction.

Therefore, just as in Maspil, Jr., the jurisprudential support upon which Bagista heavily relies is not
strong.

It is also not lost on the Court that in Bagista, the Court did not decide with unanimity.

In his Dissenting Opinion in Bagista, Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla expressed the view that "the
information alone received by the NARCOM agents, without other suspicious circumstances surrounding
the accused, did not give rise to a probable cause justifying the warrantless search made on the bag of
the accused." In explaining his dissent, Justice Padilla correctly explained that:

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone of an
information they received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5'2" or 5'3" in
height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the
baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused was riding, whether male or female, and
whether or not their physical appearance answered the description of the suspect as described in the
alleged information. If there really was such an information, as claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a
perplexing thought why they had to search the baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those
who appeared to answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana.

Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her bag,
where they allegedly found the marijuana.
From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for
evidence when they searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused. They
had no probable cause to reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana
alluded to in the information they allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal
effects of herein accused on the basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of
probable cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that the marijuana seized in the course of such
warrantless search was inadmissible in evidence.100

It is said that dissenting opinions often appeal to the intelligence of a future age.101 For Justice Padilla's
Dissenting Opinion, such age has come. This holding, which is reflected in the recent tide of
jurisprudence, must now fully find the light of day as it is more in line with the basic constitutional
precept that the Bill of Rights occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law, hovering above the
articles on governmental power. The Court's holding that tipped information, on its own, cannot
engender probable cause is guided by the principle that the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures sits at the very top of the hierarchy of rights, wherein any allowable transgression of such right
is subject to the most stringent of scrutiny.

Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to the
doctrine that exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that
permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which include both
long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should be the prevailing and controlling line of
jurisprudence.

Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely dangerous and perilous precedent wherein, on the
sheer basis of an unverified information passed along by an alleged informant, the authorities are given
the unbridled license to undertake extensive and highly intrusive searches, even in the absence of any
overt circumstance that engenders a reasonable belief that an illegal activity is afoot.

This fear was eloquently expressed by former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion in People v. Montilla.102 In holding that law and jurisprudence require stricter
grounds for valid arrests and searches, former Chief Justice Panganiban explained that allowing
warrantless searches and seizures based on tipped information alone places the sacred constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures in great jeopardy:

x x x Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of

the Makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a
possible violator of the law could then be subject to search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless
power upon informants who will no longer be required to affirm under oath their accusations, for they
can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless arrests and searches. Even law
enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without warrants, for they can always
claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon before. This would
clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search
and seizure. Indeed, the majority's ruling would open loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures.103

It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Court were to allow intrusive warrantless searches
and seizures on the solitary basis of unverified, anonymous tips.

Any person can easily hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false and fabricated information to
the police. Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly take advantage of this and easily harass and intimidate
another by simply giving false information to the police, allowing the latter to invasively search the
vehicle or premises of such person on the sole basis of a bogus tip.

On the side of the authorities, unscrupulous law enforcement agents can easily justify the infiltration of
a citizen's vehicle or residence, violating his or her right to privacy, by merely claiming that raw
intelligence was received, even if there really was no such information received or if the information
received was fabricated.

Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and heavilv-protected right against unreasonable search and
seizure will be at the mercy a phony tips. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures will be
rendered hollow and meaningless. The Court cannot sanction such erosion of the Bill of Rights.

D. The Absence of Probable Cause in the Instant Case

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, to reiterate, the police merely adopted the
unverified and unsubstantiated suspicion of another person, i.e., the person who sent the text through
the RPSB Hotline. Apart from the information passed on to them, the police simply had no reason to
reasonably believe that the passenger vehicle contained an item, article or object which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction.

What further militates against the finding that there was sufficient probable cause on the part of the
police to conduct an intrusive search is the fact that the information regarding the description of the
person alleged to be transporting illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red
ball cap, and carrying a blue sack, was relayed merely through a text message from a completely
anonymous person. The police did not even endeavor to inquire how this stranger gathered the
information. The authorities did not even ascertain in any manner whether the information coming from
the complete stranger was credible. After receiving this anonymous text message, without giving any
second thought, the police accepted the unverified information as gospel truth and immediately
proceeded in establishing the checkpoint. To be sure, information coming from a complete and
anonymous stranger, without the police officers undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their
own, cannot reasonably produce probable cause that warrants the conduct of an intrusive search.

In fact, as borne from the cross-examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the authorities did not even personally
receive and examine the anonymous text message. The contents of the text message were only relayed
to them by a duty guard, whose identity the police could not even recall:

Q x x x [W]ho received the information, was it you or another person, Mr. Witness?

A The duty guard, sir.

Q And usually now, informations (sic) is usually transmitted and text (sic) to the duty guard, Mr.
Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you produce the transcript of the text message (sic) can you write in a piece of paper, Mr.
Witness?

A Our duty guard just informed us the information, sir.

Q So the text was not preserve (sic), Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who is you duty guard, Mr. Witness?

A I cannot remember, sir.104

Simply stated, the information received through text message was not only hearsay evidence; it
is double hearsay.

Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan himself, tipped information received by the authorities through
the duty guard was unwritten and unrecorded, violating the Standard Operating Procedure that any
information received by a police station that shall be duly considered by the authorities should be
properly written in a log book or police blotter:

Q Is it not an (sic) Standard Operating Procedure that any information received by the Police Stations or
a detachment properly written in a log book or written in a Police blotter, that is the Standard Operating
Procedure, correct, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q It was not written the information that you received, correct, Mr. Witness?

A Not at that time, sir.105

Further, it does not escape the attention of the Court that, as testified to by PSI Ngoslab on cross-
examination, the mobile phone which received the anonymous person's text message was not even an
official government issued phone.106 From the records of the case, it is unclear as to who owned or
possessed the said phone used as the supposed official hotline of the RPSB Office. Furthermore, PSI
Ngoslab testified that he was not even sure whether the said official hotline still existed.107

Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possibly arise from
double hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped information. A reasonably discreet and
prudent man will surely not believe that an offense has been committed and that the item sought in
connection with said offense are in the place to be searched based solely on the say-so of an unknown
duty guard that a random, unverified text message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone by a complete
stranger.

Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search,
considering that the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on an
unverified and anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was an
invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

The Inapplicability of The Other Instances of Reasonable Warrantless Searches and Seizures

Neither are the other instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures applicable in the instant
case.

Without need of elaborate explanation, the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was not
incidental to a lawful arrest. Such requires a lawful arrest that precedes the search, which is not the case
here. Further, the prosecution has not alleged and proven that there was a seizure of evidence in plain
view, that it was a customs search, and that there were exigent and emergency circumstances that
warranted a warrantless search.

Neither can the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla be considered a valid stop and
frisk search. The Court has explained that stop and frisk searches refer to 'the act of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.' Thus, the
allowable scope of a 'stop and frisk' search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for
weapons."108 The search conducted by the authorities on accused-appellant Sapla went beyond a
protective search of outer clothing for weapons or contraband.

Moreover, while it was clarified by the Court in Malacat v. Court of Appeals109 that probable cause is
not required to conduct stop and frisk searches, "mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a 'stop and
frisk.' A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions,
to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him."110 In Comprado,
Cogaed, and Veridiano, the Court has held that mere reliance on information relayed by an informant
does not suffice to provide a genuine reason for the police to conduct a warrantless search and seizure.
In other words, in the aforesaid cases, the Court has held that information from an informant is mere
suspicion that does not validate a stop and frisk search.

Invalid Consented Warrantless Search

Neither can the Court consider the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla as a valid consented
search.

The CA found that accused-appellant Sapla "consented to the search in this case and that the illegal
drugs - four (4) bricks of marijuana, discovered as a result of consented search [are] admissible in
evidence."111

The Court disagrees.

In Tudtud, the Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures if the following requisites are present:

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
 3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.112

Considering that a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, the Court has held that
"[t]he fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to
constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence
in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a
search does not amount to permission thereto."113

Hence, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag114 or the chairs containing
marijuana to the arresting officer,115 the Court has held there was no valid consent to the search.116

Again, in Veridiano, the Court emphasized that the consent to a warrantless search and seizure must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and unattended by duress or coercion.117 Mere passive
conformity to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence which does not amount to consent
and that the presence of a coercive environment negates the cl2im that the petitioner therein
consented to the warrantless search.118

The very recent case of Yanson is likewise instructive. As in the instant case, "Sison, [the therein
accused] who was then unarmed, was prodded by the arresting officers to open the pickup's hood. His
beguiling conformity is easily accounted by how he was then surrounded by police officers who had
specifically flagged him and his companions down. He was under the coercive force of armed law
enforcers. His consent, if at all, was clearly vitiated."119

In the instant case, the totality of the evidence presented convinces the Court that accused-appellant
Sapla's apparent consent to the search conducted by the police was not unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be seriously denied that accused-
appellant Sapla was subjected to a coercive environment, considering that he was confronted by several
armed police officers in a checkpoint.

In fact, from the testimony of PO3 Mabiasan himself, it becomes readily apparent that accused-
appellant Sapla's alleged voluntary opening of the sack was not unequivocal. When PO3 Mabiasan asked
accused-appellant Sapla to open the sack, the latter clearly hesitated and it was only "[a]fter a
while [that] he voluntarily opened [the sack]."120

At most, accused-appellant Sapla's alleged act of opening the blue sack was mere passive conformity to
a warrantless search conducted in a coercive and intimidating environment. Hence, the Court cannot
consider the search conducted as a valid consented search.

The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

The necessary and inescapable consequence of the illegality of the search and seizure conducted by the
police in the instant case is the inadmissibility of the drug specimens retrieved.

According to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."121

Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated marijuana bricks, there is no more need for the
Court to discuss the other issues surrounding the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla, particularly
the gaps in the chain of custody of the alleged seized marijuana bricks, which likewise renders the same
inadmissible. The prosecution is left with no evidence left to support the conviction of accused-appellant
Sapla. Consequently, accused-appellant Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged.

Epilogue

The Court fully recognizes the necessity of adopting a resolute and aggressive stance against the menace
of illegal drugs. Our Constitution declares that the maintenance of peace and order and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.122

Nevertheless, by sacrificing the sacred and indelible right against unreasonable searches and seizures for
expediency's sake, the very maintenance of peace and order sought after is rendered wholly nugatory.
By disregarding basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the proliferation of illegal drugs, instead
of protecting the general welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is viciously assaulted. In other words,
when the Constitution i.s disregarded, the battle waged against illegal drugs becomes a self-defeating
and self-destructive enterprise. A battle waged against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the
people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the people.123

The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent
mantle of the rule of men dislodges the rule of law.124

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated April 24, 2018
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09296 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari is ACQUITTED of the crime charged
on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he
is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days
from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur.

To aid courts in upholding the constitutional right against unreasonable searches, I revisit the doctrines
regarding two (2) exceptions often invoked to justify warrantless searches of passengers on moving
vehicles, such as the one in this case: first, stop-and-frisk searches based on probable cause, genuine
reason, or reasonable suspicion; and second, the search of a moving vehicle.

Philippine doctrine on stop-and-frisk searches originates in the American case of Terry v. Ohio.1 In that
case, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the admissibility of evidence obtained from a
warrantless search of a person whose actions suggested to a police officer that he was casing a joint for
a robbery. According to it, a limited search was permissible when preceded by unusual conduct that, by
virtue of a police officer's experience, led him to reasonably conclude that criminal activity was afoot,
and the person to be searched may have been armed and dangerous.2

Terry was later cited in Posadas v. Court of Appeals.3 There, this Court held that to deem a warrantless
search justified, a court must look into its reasonableness, which was, in turn, predicated on the
presence of observable suspicious acts by the person to be searched: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the
search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable
cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.4
This Court then cited Terry by way of quoting the following submission of the Solicitor
General: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object
is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).... The United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a
situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to
occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain the status
quo while obtaining more information[.]5
Applying Terry to Posadas, this Court concluded that because of the petitioner's suspicious actions, it
was reasonable for the police officers to believe that he was concealing something illegal in his bag, and
thus, reasonable for them to search it.

In People v. Solayao,6 this Court upheld the validity of the warrantless search based on the
circumstances that reasonably aroused the officers' suspicions: the accused looked drunk, wore a
"camouflage uniform," and fled upon seeing the officers. It also considered the context within which the
officers observed those suspicious actions: they were then verifying reports of anned persons roaming
around the barangay at night.

Similarly, in Manalili v. Court of Appeals,7 this Court found that the police officers had sufficient reason
to stop and search the petitioner after observing that he had red eyes, was wobbling like a drunk
person, and was in an area that was frequented by drug addicts.

Refining the doctrine further, this Court in Malacat v. Court of Appeals8 emphasized that for a stop-and-
frisk search to be reasonable, a police officer's suspicion must be based on a "genuine reason." In that
case, the officer's claim that the petitioner was part of a group that had earlier attempted to bomb Plaza
Miranda was unsupported by any supporting police report, record, or testimonies from other officers
who chased that group. This Court also found that the petitioner's behavior-merely standing in a corner
with his eyes "moving very fast" - could not be considered genuine reason.

The ponente of Manalili, Justice Artemio Panganiban, wrote a concurring opinion, elaborating further on
the concept of genuine reason. Comparing and contrasting the facts in each case, he explained why the
stop-�and-frisk search in Malacat was founded on no genuine reason, yet the search
in Manalili was: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, when these specially trained enforcers saw Manalili with reddish eyes and walking in a wobbly
manner characteristic of a person "high" on drugs per their experience, and in a known hangout of drug
users, there was sufficient genuine reason to stop and frisk the suspect. It is well to emphasize that
under different circumstances, such as where the policemen are not specially trained and in common
places where people ordinarily converge, the same features displayed by a person will not normally
justify a warrantless arrest or search on him.

The case before us presents such a situation. The policemen merely observed that Malacat's eyes were
moving very fast. They did not notice any bulges or packets about the bodies of these men indicating
that they might be hiding explosive paraphernalia. From their outward look, nothing suggested that they
were at the time armed and dangerous. Hence, there was no justification for a stop-and-frisk.9
The concept of genuine reason as the basis for reasonable suspicion has been expounded upon further
such that, in Philippine jurisprudence, an officer must observe more than one (1) circumstance, which
when taken alone is apparently innocent, but when taken together with other circumstances, arouse
suspicion.

In his dissent in Esquillo v. People,10 Justice Lucas Bersamin (Justice Bersamin) parsed the factual
circumstances in cases where the police officers' suspicions were found reasonable, so as to justify a
stop-and-frisk search. He concluded that "[t]he common thread of these examples is the presence
of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference
of criminal activity."11 Justice Bersamin's analysis was echoed in People v. Cogaed,12 which was in turn
reiterated in a line of cases.13 In Cogaed, this Court agreed that "reliance on only one suspicious
circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search."14

Thus, to not violate the constitutional right against unreasonable searches, a stop-and-frisk search must
be based on suspicion, which, to be deemed reasonable, requires the presence of more than one (1)
suspicious circumstance that aroused the officer's suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

Considering this requirement, information provided by a confidential informant, without additional

grounds for suspicion, is not enough to arouse suspicion that may be characterized as reasonable. That a
person matches the informant's tip is not an additional circumstance separate from the fact that
information was given. They are part and parcel of one (1) strand of information. Thus, assuming that a
person arrives matching an informant's description, for an officer's suspicion of that person to be
deemed reasonable, there must be another observed activity which, taken together with the tip,
aroused such suspicion.

II

When warrantless searches target individuals who happen to be on motor vehicles, recognized
exceptions pertaining to searches of motor vehicles are often invoked to justify them. These searches
are valid only under specific circumstances, for exceptional reasons.

In Valmonte v. De Villa,15 this Court considered the constitutionality of warrantless searches of motor
vehicles at military checkpoints. In declining to hold that military checkpoints are per se
unconstitutional, this Court observed that certain non-intrusive searches of motor vehicles are
reasonable, and thus, need no warrant: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.16 (Citations omitted)
Thus, this Court concluded that searches at military checkpoints may be valid, provided that they are
conducted "within reasonable limits": ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.17
Acting on a motion for reconsideration, this Court in its Resolution18 in Valmonte clarified the limitations
that must be observed: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free
passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as
long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of
the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable search.19 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Thus, as stated in Valmonte, to be deemed reasonable, a search of a motor vehicle at a checkpoint must
be limited only to a visual search, and must not be extensive. A reasonable search at a routine
checkpoint excludes extensive searches, absent other recognized exceptional circumstances leading to
an extensive search.

This was reiterated in Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,20 in which this Court declared a warrantless
search made at a checkpoint illegal. This Court reiterated that warrantless searches of moving vehicles
are reasonable when these are searches and "seizure of evidence in plain view"; 21 conversely, an
extensive search is not reasonable simply because it was conducted on a moving vehicle.

After observing that no genuine reason for suspicion was present in Aniag, Jr., this Court considered
whether the evidence seized was nonetheless admissible because of consent from the person searched.
Rejecting the claim, this Court evaluated how the checkpoint was set up, as well as the circumstances of
the person searched: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver
of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.

While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that "guidelines
shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the implementation
of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in
consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5,
Resolution No. 2323." The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock in the
afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not
shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for
the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint
that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists
passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise.
With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any
choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would
raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist and to conduct an
extensive search of his vehicle.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As
conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was
any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent"
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.22 (Citations omitted)
The concept of consent to extensive warrantless searches was elaborated in Dela Cruz v. People,23 which
involved routine security inspections conducted at a seaport terminal.

Citing People v. Suzuki,24 which recognized the reasonableness of airport security procedures, this Court
in Dela Cruz likened seaports to airports and explained that the extensive inspections regularly
conducted there proceed from the port personnel's "authority and policy to ensure the safety of
travelers and vehicles within the port."25 In ports of travel, persons have a reduced expectation of
privacy, due to public safety and security concerns over terrorism and hijacking. Travelers are generally
notified that they and their baggage will be searched, and even subject to x-rays; as such, they are well
aware ahead of time that they must submit to searches at the port. This Court pointed out that if the
petitioner did not want his bag inspected, he could have opted not to travel.

The authority and policy of port personnel to ensure the safety of travelers, as with the resulting
reduced expectation of privacy at a port of travel, distinguishes the search conducted in Dela Cruz from
that in Aniag, Jr. In Aniag, Jr., the petitioner's driver was stopped at a checkpoint that had only been
installed 30 minutes prior, and he did not even know what it was for. In Dela Cruz, a traveler voluntarily
submits to being searched at a port, informed of why it was being done. It may not have involved
moving vehicle searches, but it articulates that a traveler consents to extensive searches at ports as a
condition of entry, pursuant to recognized reasonable safeguards for ensuring the traveling public's
safety.

Saluday v. People26 extended this reasoning to cover warrantless searches of public buses. There, a bus
was stopped at a military checkpoint and its male passengers were asked to disembark, while its female
passengers were allowed to stay put. When a military task force member boarded the bus to inspect it,
he noticed a small bag on the rear seat and lifted it, only to find it much heavier than it looked. Upon
learning that the petitioner and his brother had been seated near the bag, he asked them to board the
bus and open the bag. The petitioner obliged, revealing that the bag contained a gun, ammo, a hand
grenade, and a 10-inch hunting knife.27

In deciding on whether the items were admissible in evidence, this Court separately evaluated the initial
inspection, which consisted of merely lifting the suspicious bag; and the latter inspection, in which the
officer inspected the bag after having it opened.

As to the initial inspection, this Court observed that, like in the ports of Suzuki and Dela Cruz, the
traveling public's safety is a concern in buses. This moderates the expectation of privacy a person may
reasonably have in that space. Given this, and considering that the act of lifting the bag was visual and
minimally intrusive, this initial inspection was deemed reasonable.

As for the more extensive search of the bag's contents, this Court did not conclude that, because of
security issues, it was reasonable. Its only basis for not rejecting the search as unreasonable was that,
prior to the intrusive search, the officer obtained clear consent to open the
bag: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered "yes, just open it" based
on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of his
bag. In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals aptly held: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police officers asked the accused if they could see
the contents of his bag and he answered "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." When
asked if they could open and see it, he said "you can see it." In the present case, accused-appellant told
the member of the task force that "it was only a cellphone" when asked who owns the bag and what are
its contents. When asked by the member of the task force if he could open it, accused-�appellant told
him "yes, just open it." Hence, as in Omaweng, there was a waiver of accused-appellant's right against
warrantless search.28 (Citation omitted)
Thus, although this Court in Saluday did not declare the evidence seized inadmissible, the intrusive
search of the bag was not categorically found reasonable. It did not rule on the reasonableness of the
intrusive search. Rather, the validity of the search was anchored on the waiver of the petitioner's right
when he told the officer, "yes, just open [the bag]."29cralawred

III

Finally, in reference to the dissent, the guidelines laid down in Saluday would be sufficient to address
those concerns. I quote: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the following guidelines. Prior to entry,
passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and
seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at
bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required
instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in the
passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the
terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus
owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow
for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced
to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger
onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked
and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or
private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike
an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these
passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged clown at
designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine
inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and
the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid
reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold
the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause
for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any
discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances,
the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar
groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring
public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced
that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the
present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals,
just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.30 (Emphasis in the original)
The facts in Saluday are not on all fours with this case. The initial search in Saluday was the third of the
permissible searches of public vehicles in transit: the routine inspection at a military checkpoint. This
case, on the other hand, is a targeted search of an individual on board a public vehicle based on an
anonymous informant's tip.
It may be argued that this case falls under one (1) of the permissible searches of a public vehicle in
transit: "upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles[.]" 31 Because
the Saluday guidelines do not qualify "receipt of information," it may be tempting to say that when
officers are told by anyone at all-an anonymous phone call and text message, in this case-that a
passenger on a public vehicle is carrying anything illegal, they may stop the vehicle en route and
intrusively search such passenger.

This, however, is ultimately untenable. The permitted searches in Saluday pertain to an exception to the
general rule against warrantless searches, i.e., cases where the safety of others may be at risk. Courts
must be more circumspect when invoking it, and law enforcers must not treat it as an expedient way to
circumvent the Constitution. Before accepting that a search was permissible based on the received
information, courts must at the very least evaluate the circumstances of the supposed information.

Even if this case had involved a permissible inspection upon receipt of information that a passenger is
carrying contraband, the search would still not be deemed reasonable, as it failed to satisfy the
conditions under the Saluday guidelines.

The guidelines require that the manner of search be the least intrusive, yet the search here involved an
intrusive probing of the bag. The guidelines also require that the search be conducted only to ensure
public safety; however, the search here was unequivocally made to apprehend a person who, as
reported by an anonymous phone call and text message, was transporting marijuana. Finally, the
guidelines require that "courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure
that no evidence was planted against the accused," but there were no such measures here.

For all these reasons, I find the search conducted on accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric
Salibad y Mallari unreasonable.

ACCORDINGLY, I concur.

Endnotes:
G.R. No. 200370

MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 Mario Veridiano y Sapi (Veridiano) assails the
Decision2 dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 33588, which affirmed his conviction for violation of Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 9165.4

In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna, 5 Veridiano was charged
with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Information read:

That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody
one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of dried marijuana leaves, a
dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on the
merits ensued.7

During trial, the prosecution presented PO 1 Guillermo Cabello (PO 1 Cabello) and POI Daniel Solano
(POI Solano) to testify.8

According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a
certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain
alias "Baho," who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal
drugs.9

P03 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and P02 Alvin Vergara (P02 Vergara)
who were both on duty. 10 Chief of Police June Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02 Vergara to set up a
checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna. 11

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.

They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he was not on board. 12 At around 10:00
a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. 13 They
flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. 14 The police officers instructed the
passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of
their pockets.15

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana." 16 POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. 17 Veridiano was
arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. 18 He was then brought to the police station.19

At the police station, PO 1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO 1 Solano, who also placed his
initials. 20 PO 1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with
the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.21 The contents of the tea bag
tested positive for marijuana.22

For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San Pablo City on January 15,
2008.23 After participating in the festivities, he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney bound
for Nagcarlan.24 At around 10:00 a.m., the jeepney passed a police checkpoint in Barangay Taytay,
Nagcarlan.25 Veridiano noticed that the jeepney was being followed by three (3) motorcycles, each with
two (2) passengers in civilian attire.26
When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists flagged down the
jeepney.27 Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano.28 However, they found
nothing on his person.29 Still, Veridiano was accosted and brought to the police station where he was
informed that "illegal drug was ... found in his possession. "30

In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,31 the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.32

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." 33 He argued
that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous
tree. "[['34]] Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of
custody. 35

On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "[t]he legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over [the person of the accused]."36 Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to
question any irregularity in his arrest.37 With regard to the alleged illegal warrantless search conducted
by the police officers, the prosecution argued that Veridiano' s "submissive deportment at the time of
the search" indicated that he consented to the warrantless search. 38

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision39 affirming the guilt ofVeridiano.40

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in jlagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his
possession.41 Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived his right to question any
irregularity that may have attended his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.42 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that Veridiano consented to the
warrantless search because he did not protest when the police asked him to remove the contents of his
pocket.43

Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the

Resolution dated January 25, 2012.44

On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.45

Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.46 He asserts that his arrest was illegal.47 Petitioner was merely
seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that would give
the police officers reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or that he was
committing a crime. 48 Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is insufficient to constitute
probable cause that would support a valid warrantless arrest. 49

Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues· that "the accompanying [warrantless] search was likewise
illegal."50 Hence, under Article III, Section 2,51 in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)52 of the Constitution,
the seized tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit of a poisonous
tree."53

Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana is admissible in evidence,
petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to preserve its integrity. 54 The apprehending team did
not strictly comply with the rule on chain of custody under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165.55

In a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
petition. 56 In the Manifestation and Motion dated August 1, 2012,57 respondent stated that it would no
longer file a comment.

The following issues are for this Court's resolution:

First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;

Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and
Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

The Petition is granted.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c)
any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as
constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through
a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived
and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."58

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation
during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. 59 The reason for this rule
is that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused."60

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from
questioning the admissibility of evidence seized.61 The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected
when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in atimely manner.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate
and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

As a component of the right to privacy,62 the fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 63

To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution considers any evidence obtained in violation of this right as
inadmissible. 64

The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures.65 It is only directed
against those that are unreasonable.66 Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the
scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden. 67

In People v. Aruta, 68 this Court explained that the language of the Constitution implies that "searches
and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant
of arrest."69 The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. 70

However, People v. Cogaed71 clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless."72 The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless
searches laid down in jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest," 73 (2) search
of "evidence in 'plain view,"' (3) "search of a moving vehicle," (4) "consented warrantless search[es]," (5)
"customs search," (6) "stop and frisk," and (7) "exigent and emergency circumstances." 74

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any given
situation, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable ... search ... is purely a judicial question," the resolution of
which depends upon the unique and distinct factual circumstances. 75 This may involve an inquiry into
"the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured." 76

II
Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto of having marijuana in his possession making the warrantless search lawful. 77

This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is
made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be
reversed."78 For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer."80

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.
In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused
did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of
illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended. 81

The warrantless search in People v. Racho82 was also considered unlawful.83 The police officers received
information that a man was in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound for
Baler, Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a red and white striped [t]-shirt." 84 The
police officers waited for the bus along the national highway.85 When the bus arrived, Jack Racho
(Racho) disembarked and waited along the highway for a tricycle.86 Suddenly, the police officers
approached him and invited him to the police station since he was suspected of having shabu in his
possession.87 As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white envelope fell yielding a sachet of
shabu.88

In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that Racho was not "committing a
crime in the presence of the police officers" at the time he was apprehended. 89 Moreover, Racho's arrest
was solely based on a tip.90 Although there are cases stating that reliable information is sufficient to
justify a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, they were covered under the other exceptions
to the rule on warrantless searches.91

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.92 The rule requires that an
offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in fact
committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. 94 An arrest under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the
point of arrest.
Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.

People v. Gerente95 illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court.
In Gerente, the accused was convicted for murder and for violation of Republic Act No. 6425. 96 He
assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that they were allegedly
seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest.97 On appeal, the accused's conviction was
affirmed.98 This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the
accused killed the victim:

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found
the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed
his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions
did.99 (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts surrounding the commission
of an offense was underscored in In Re Saliba v. Warden. 100

In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo)
as one (1) of the accused in the Maguindano Massacre. 101 Salibo presented himself before the
authorities to clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and detained. 102 In
granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was not restrained under a lawful court process
or order. 103 Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest: 104

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his
name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the
presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to
commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. 105 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicta arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act
from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed,
or is about to be committed.10

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge
of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

III

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and
frisk" searches.

A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua 107 as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." 108 Thus, the allowable scope of a
"stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons." 109
Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards
crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 110

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable
cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or
hunch. 111 Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the
particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. 112 Reliance on one (1)
suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search. 113

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 114 the police officers conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan City
Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug addicts.115 They chanced upon a male person who had
"reddish eyes and [was] walking in a swaying manner."116 Suspecting that the man was high on drugs,
the police officers approached him, introduced themselves, and asked him what he was
holding.117 However, the man resisted. 118 Upon further investigation, the police officers found marijuana
in the man's possession. 119 This Court held that the circumstances of the case gave the police officers
justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs. 120

In People v. Solayao, 121 the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons within Caibiran.122 They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom was the
accused in a camouflage uniform. 123 When the police officers approached, his companions fled leaving
behind the accused who was told not to run away. 124 One (1) of the police officers introduced himself
and seized from the accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves. 125 This Court likewise found
justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions fled upon seeing the government
agents." 126

The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid because the accused in both
cases exhibited overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search.
In contrast with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed127 was considered as an invalid
"stop and frisk" search because of the absence of a single suspicious circumstance that would justify a
warrantless search.

In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya would be transporting
marijuana. 128 A passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The
driver then disembarked and signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana. 129 The
police officers approached the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and
Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their bags. 130

Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's
bag. 131 In holding that the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not
a single suspicious circumstance" that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2) men
and search their belongings. 132 Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in possession
of marijuana. 133

Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act
that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession.
Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show
that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything
suspicious.

IV

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered
through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence. 134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given ... [and unattended] by duress or coercion." 135

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances. 136 This
may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given such as "the presence of
coercive police procedures."137
Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which
amounts to no consent at all. 138 In Cogaed, this Court observed:

Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment
brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the
police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. 139

The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented to the warrantless
search.

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing
searches and seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical
purposes.140 Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant
when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating transactions involving
contraband or dangerous articles. 141 However, the inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds
of searches.142 Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause. 143

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. 144 Due to the number of cases involving
warrantless ·searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative to discuss
the parameters by which searches in checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid. 145 They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives
of individuals and ensure their safety. 146 They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's
survival is in danger. 147 Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist'sright to 'free
passage'"148 to a certain extent, they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." 149 The
extent of routine inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law
enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches. 150

In Valmonte v. De Villa, 151 this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search[es]."152 Thus, a search where an "officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not
unreasonable. 153

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains
instruments of an offense. 154

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a visual
search. This holds especially true when the object of the search is a public vehicle where individuals
have a reasonably reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are
permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to
the exclusionary principle under the Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an extensive
search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or
tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information,
there have been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.

In People v. Breis,155 apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement agents
observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground to believe
that a crime was being committed.156 The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law
enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box which the accused had in
their possession. 157 In their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law
enforcer out of the way. 158 Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and leaving
one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.159
In People v. Mariacos, 160 a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal drugs was
about to be transported on a passenger jeepney. 161 The bag was marked with "O.K."162 On the basis of
the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney. 163 Upon seeing the bag
described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the
bag. 164 The tipped information and the police officer's personal observations gave rise to probable cause
that rendered the warrantless search valid. 165

The police officers in People v. Ayangao166 and People v. Libnao167 likewise received tipped information
regarding the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause to arrest the
accused based on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where the accused was
arrested. 168 On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers noticed marijuana leaves protruding
through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused. 169

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits
of warrantless searches.1âwphi1 They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any
law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that
may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The
checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based on reasonable
suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 170 where this Court justified the warrantless search of the
accused who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police officers identified themselves. 171

On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v.
People, 172 the search conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in accordance
with routine security measures in ports. 173 This case, however, should not be construed to apply to
border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per se; 174 there is a "reasonable reduced
expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through or stop at airports or other ports of travel. 175

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing
marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be
acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-SP
and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is
hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DIOSCORO COMOSO TUREMUTSA, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements in drugs cases will result in an accused's
acquittal.

This resolves an appeal of the October 9, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05992, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court January 22, 2013 Decision. 2 The trial court convicted
accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa (Comoso) for violation of Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In a March 27, 20053 Information, Comoso was charged with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act, particularly for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The Information read:

That on or about the 26th day of March 2005, more or less 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon, (sic) at
Quim[s]on, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, convey,
distribute and deliver one (1) piece transparent plastic sachet containing dried Marijuana
leaves/flowering tops, a dangerous drug weighing more or less 1.1 grams to one poseur-buyer for a
consideration of Four Hundred (P400) Pesos, (sic) without being authorized by law to convey, distribute
and deliver the same, which act is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, Comoso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits then ensued. 5

Prosecution witnesses testified that on March 26, 2005, the Anti-Drug Special Operation Task Force and
Drug Enforcement Action Division planned a buy-bust operation after receiving information from their
civilian asset that a certain "Coro" was selling illegal drugs in Quimson, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto
Princesa City. The team prepared four (4) P100.00 bills, with Serial Nos. KU494857, MB020653,
QQ011743, and DD744924.6

At around 2:30 p.m., Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and Police Officer 3 Jose Fernandez
(PO3 Fernandez) proceeded to the area of the operation. They parked their motorcycle and walked
about 50 meters to the target area, where the asset told them to wait since their target, later identified
as Comoso, was still playing tong-its. The police officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in
front of Comoso's house.7

Soon after, Comoso arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing marijuana in
exchange for the asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in turn, removed his hat�the pre-arranged signal
that the transaction had been consummated.8

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the scene and arrested
Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet from the asset, while PO3 Fernandez
frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust money, one (1) used marijuana stick, and a lighter. PO2
Aquino then marked both the plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his initials "FJA." 9

As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick and lighter. He
then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.10
On April 8, 2005, about two (2) weeks after the buy-bust operation, Police Superintendent Julita T. De
Villa (Superintendent De Villa), a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Regional Crime
Laboratory Office, MIMAROPA, received the samples of seized items and a letter-request for laboratory
examination. In Chemistry Report No. D-017-05, she found that the specimens tested positive for
marijuana.11

Comoso, a fisher residing on Liberty Road, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City, solely testified in
his defense. He alleged that in the afternoon of March 26, 2005, on his way home from delivering his
catch, he was grabbed and frisked by two (2) armed men, whom he figured were police officers. They
first brought Comoso to the airport, then to the police station, where he would be detained.

The police officers recovered from Comoso P420.00, the money he had earned from selling fish. He
denied having sold illegal drugs.12

In its January 22, 2013 Decision,13 the Regional Trial Court found Comoso guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The dispositive
portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having satisfactorily proven the guilt of the
accused DIOSCORO COMOSO y TUREMUTSA, the Court hereby found him GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs and
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

The confiscated marijuana used in prosecuting this case is hereby ordered to be turned over to the local
office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.14

Comoso appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that: (1) the poseur-buyer, the sole witness to
the transaction, was never presented as a witness; and (2) the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti was not properly established.15

In its October 9, 2015 Decision,16 the Court of Appeals dismissed Comoso's appeal and affirmed his
conviction.

According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution's failure to present the informant in court was not
fatal to the case since the informant's testimony would merely be corroborative. It held that the
testimony of the arresting officer, who witnessed the transaction, was sufficient to prove the
prosecution's version of events.17

Maintaining that the chain of custody was established, the Court of Appeals excused the absence of
photographs of the seized items since there were justifiable reasons for noncompliance. It found that
the prosecution had duly established that PO2 Aquino had custody of the seized items from their seizure
until their turnover to the crime laboratory.18 Since Comoso failed to present any evidence that the
prosecution witnesses had ill motives against him, the Court of Appeals held that the regularity in the
performance of official duty should be presumed.19

Comoso filed a Notice of Appeal.20 His appeal having been given due course the Court of Appeals
elevated the records of this case to this Court.21

In its December 5, 2016 Resolution,22 this Court noted the records and directed the parties to file their
supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General, representing plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines, manifested that it would no longer submit a supplemental brief and moved that this Court
instead consider the arguments in its Brief submitted before the Court of Appeals. 23 Accused-appellant,
on the other hand, submitted a Supplemental Brief.24

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that the prosecution has sufficiently established accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt since PO2 Aquino witnessed the entire exchange and was
able to testify to the sequence of events. It claims that in drugs cases, the police officers' narration of
facts should be given credence as they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 25

The Office of the Solicitor General further asserts that despite changes in the seized item's custody and
possession, their identity had been proven by the totality of the prosecution's evidence. Maintaining
that the chain of custody remained unbroken, it argues that the "integrity of the evidence is presumed
preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will[,] or proof that evidence has been tampered
with[.]"26

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, counters that PO2 Aquino did not testify that the seized items
were marked or inventoried in front of him. He points out that there were no photographs of the seized
items taken, and that he did not sign the inventory of seized items. Moreover, he claims that the
prosecution failed to prove that there was no "possibility of switching, planting, or contamination." 27

Accused-appellant contends that the chain of custody was not established, pointing out that there was
no transfer of the seized items from the arresting officer to the investigating officer. He further notes
that it was not explained how the seized items were handled from the crime laboratory to the forensic
chemist, the transfer of which took 11 days from March 28 to April 8, 2005. This, he argues, puts a
"cloud of doubt and suspicion as to the supposed preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value"28 of the corpus delicti.29

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant
Dioscoro Comoso y Turemusta's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act despite not strictly complying with the requisites for preserving
the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.

An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.30 To secure conviction, the prosecution
must overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of the accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. � In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the
defense:31

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not demand
absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of
establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from benevolence, it is not merely engendered by
abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises from a constitutional imperative[.]32

The burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Failure to discharge this burden warrants an accused's
acquittal.

II

The sale of illegal drugs is punished under Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act:

SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. � The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: "(1) proof that the transaction
or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence."33

Evidence proving that a transaction took place "must be credible and complete." 34 In buy-bust
operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-buyer.

In People v. Andaya35 the prosecution failed to present their informant, who was also their poseur-
buyer, to testify on the sale of illegal drugs. Despite the police officers occupying "different positions
where they could see and observe the asset[,]"36 this Court noted that none of them had witnessed the
transaction and only acted upon the informant/poseur-buyer's pre-arranged signal. This proved fatal to
the prosecution's case:

Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer
himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-
arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-
bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya.
However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe
how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue
against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the
transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance
from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.37

Andaya recognized that not presenting the informant was different from not presenting the poseur-
buyer. As held in prior cases,38 there was no need to present the confidential informant since the
testimony would merely corroborate the testimonies of those who actually witnessed the transaction.
The case is different, however, if the confidential informant and the poseur-buyer were one and the
same person:

The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances
could be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused. In this case,
however, it was different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the
same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya. 39

As with Andaya, the confidential informant here, despite also acting as the poseur-buyer, was never
presented to testify to the transaction. Nonetheless, PO2 Aquino testifying that he had witnessed the
entire transaction40 suffices to prove the offense's first element�that the transaction took place absent
any irregularity in the performance of law enforcers' duties.

This, however, does not suffice to overcome the presumption of innocence. To do so, the prosecution
must prove the second element of the offense, or the existence of the corpus delicti.

In proving the second element of the offense, the prosecution must establish compliance with the chain
of custody requirements outlined in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended
by Republic Act No. 10640:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. � The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items[;]

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That
when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to
be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued
immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification[.] (Emphasis in the original)

Chain of custody in the seizure of illegal drugs is defined as:

... the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.41

Moreover, every link in the chain of custody, as summarized in People v. Nandi,42 must be established:

[F]irst, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.43

Here, PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic sachet from
accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that he had also prepared the
Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items to the crime laboratory. 44

However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the inventory before
accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant; and (3) PO2 Aquino turned the
items over to an investigating officer. He testified:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, you said that you got the plastic sachet containing this illegal drug from your
civilian asset, could you tell us what did you do to this plastic sachet containing illegal drug (sic) or
marijuana leaves?
A I marked it with my initials and brought it in (sic) the crime lab.
Q What mark did you place, Mr. Witness?
A My initials.45 (Emphasis supplied)

The prosecution further presented evidence that Superintendent De Villa, the forensic chemist, only
received the seized items on April 8, 2005,46 or 10 working days after the buy-bust operation on March
26, 2005. This is obviously beyond the 24-hour period required by law, a delay for which the prosecution
has not been able to explain. This creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to
the forensic chemist was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant:
This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or tampering of the
seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist, especially since the amount was as little as 0.02 grams.
Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may not be the same items allegedly seized by the buy-bust
team from accused-appellant. The doubt that the break created should have been enough to acquit
accused-appellant.47

Worse, nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required to be present and sign the
inventory�an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media�were present, even though this was a pre-planned entrapment operation. Moreover, the
prosecution did not justify the law enforcement officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody. It
merely stated that "the integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will[,] or proof that the evidence has been tampered with." 48

Generally, noncompliance with these requirements would not have rendered the search and seizure
invalid "under justifiable grounds."49 However, the absence of any justification only serves to magnify
the irregularity of the police officer's performance of their official duties:

To sanction non-compliance, two requisites must be satisfied. First, the prosecution must identify and
prove "justifiable grounds." Second, it must show that, despite non-compliance, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. To satisfy the second requirement, the
prosecution must establish that positive steps were observed to ensure such preservation. The
prosecution cannot rely on broad justifications and sweeping guarantees that the integrity and
evidentiary value of seized items were preserved.50

The prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers' lapses under the mantle of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official duties. This presumption only applies when nothing in the
evidence shows that the police officers deviated from the standard procedures required by law.
In People v. Kamad:51

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious
evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in
the context of an existing mle of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the
record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by
law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant
lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty.52

The law's stringent requirements are not designed to hamper police operations with needless
procedural minutiae. They merely ensure that courts can, with reasonable moral certainty, guarantee
that the illegal drug presented by the prosecution is the same illegal drug that was seized from the
accused:

Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the seized items.
Conversely, non-compliance with it tarnishes the credibility of the corpus delicti around which
prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish
the very claim that an offense against the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.

Fidelity to chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics may easily be
mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and detection through methods that exceed human
sensory perception (such as, specially trained canine units and screening devices) are often needed to
ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs. The physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects
facilitates their adulteration and substitution. It also makes conducive the planting of evidence.
In Mallillin v. People:

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are
subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly
close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody
over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other
cases by accident or otherwise - in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that
applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting
standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or
tampered with.

People v. Holgado, et al., recognized that:

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement. . . ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized,
and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the
substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third,
the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth,
the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or
peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating,
or tampering of evidence in any manner.

When the identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section 21, the second
element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remains wanting. It follows then, that this non-
compliance justifies an accused's acquittal. In People v. Lorenzo:

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established
with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact
that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as
exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict.53 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the often minuscule amounts of dangerous drugs seized by law enforcement officers compel
courts to be more circumspect in the examination of the evidence. Reasonable doubt arises in the
prosecution's narrative when the links in the chain of custody cannot be properly established. There is
no guarantee that the evidence had not been tampered with, substituted, or altered.
In People v. Holgado:54

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic
Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be
scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be
readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows in cases where an accused has been
discharged from other simultaneous offenses due to mishandling of evidence. Had the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals been so judicious in this case, a speedier resolution would have been
handed to Holgado and Misarez whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established. 55

This Court has already recognized the numerous "orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related
cases"56 that have been languishing in the clogged dockets of our lower courts. Thus, in People v.
Lim,57 this Court mandated the policy that must be followed in prosecuting drugs cases:

[T]o weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up
drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the
justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the
investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the
case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to
either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of
probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.58 (Citation omitted)

Lim serves as a clarion call to law enforcement officers and those involved in the prosecution of drugs
cases to be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. Because the prosecution was unable to
establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must
prevail. Accused-appellant must, thus, be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals October 9, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05992 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa
is ACQUITTED for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Superintendent of the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm,
Puerto Princesa City for immediate implementation. The Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT the
action he or she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Carandang,*JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007

VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C.

CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C.
MENDOZA, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A.
MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA, in their capacity as members of the Department
of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE
SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief,
Philippine National Police, P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA G.
TANIGUE, Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 172074-76 June 1, 2007

LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN,
and RAFAEL V. MARIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, in
his capacity as Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors composed of EMMANUEL
Y. VELASCO, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and MERBA A.
WAGA (Panel), RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Acting Deputy Director, Directorate for
Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, in her capacity as Acting
Executive Officer of DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 175013 June 1, 2007

CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of
Justice and overall superior of the Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146, and HONORABLE
ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
150, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners’
prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners’
cases.

The Facts

Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, Liza L.
Maza (Maza), Joel G. Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A. Casiño (Casiño), and
Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),1 are members of the House of Representatives representing various party-
list groups.2 Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are private individuals. Petitioners all face charges for
Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases
pending with the RTC Makati.

G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on
24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers3 arrested Beltran on 25
February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon
City. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the
crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon
City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech
Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the
20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s
arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The inquest prosecutor 4 indicted
Beltran and filed the corresponding Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
(MeTC).5

The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27 February 2006, he was subjected to a
second inquest, with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion. A panel of State
prosecutors6 from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The inquest was based on two letters, both
dated 27 February 2006, of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue is
the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine
National Police (PNP), while Mendoza is the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters referred to
the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners
in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, San Juan, and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an alleged foiled plot
to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have
formed a "tactical alliance."

On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict
Beltran and San Juan as "leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information with the
RTC Makati. The Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals "conspiring and
confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously form a
tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed
regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP)
and thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government, x x x." 7 The
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-452, was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding Judge
Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino).

Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against him. 8 Before the
motion could be resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to Branch
146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya).

In its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the finding of probable cause against
Beltran.9 Beltran sought reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without
resolving Beltran’s motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case was re-raffled,
issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying Beltran’s motion.

Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders dated 31 May 2006 and 29 August 2006
and to enjoin Beltran’s prosecution.

In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion was valid
and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony.

G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad Petitions)

Based on Tanigue and Mendoza’s letters, the DOJ sent subpoenas to petitioners on 6 March 2006
requiring them to appear at the DOJ Office on 13 March 2006 "to get copies of the complaint and its
attachment." Prior to their receipt of the subpoenas, petitioners had quartered themselves inside the
House of Representatives building for fear of being subjected to warrantless arrest.

During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the counsel for the CIDG presented a masked
man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners.
Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave
copies of the affidavit to media members present during the proceedings. The panel of
prosecutors10 gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits. Petitioners were
furnished the complete copies of documents supporting the CIDG’s letters only on 17 March 2006.

Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of impartiality and
independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the
statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’
case,11 and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. The DOJ
panel of prosecutors denied petitioners’ motion on 22 March 2006. Petitioners sought reconsideration
 and additionally prayed for the dismissal of the cases. However, the panel of prosecutors denied
petitioners’ motions on 4 April 2006.

Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006.

Acting on petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the Court issued a status quo order
on 5 June 2006. Prior to this, however, the panel of prosecutors, on 21 April 2006, issued a Resolution
finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46 others with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the
corresponding Information with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944
(later consolidated with Criminal Case No. 06-452 in Branch 146), charging petitioners and their co-
accused as "principals, masterminds, [or] heads" of a Rebellion.12 Consequently, the petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 172070-72 filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.

In his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General submits that the preliminary
investigation of petitioners was not tainted with irregularities. The Solicitor General also claims that the
filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944 has mooted the Maza petition.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b)
whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and

2. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent prosecutors should be enjoined from
continuing with the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.13

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant.14 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when
such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

xxxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.

The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a
warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have
conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when
another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they
overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw
Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to
believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that
they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006. 17
Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest officer is to
determine if the arrest of the detained person was made "in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113."18 If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest
officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:

Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in
accordance with the Rules, he shall:

a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

b) note down the disposition on the referral document;

c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and

d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor
for appropriate action.

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or Provincial
Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the
order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said
officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the
copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the complainant and his
witnesses and other supporting evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to
Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest void. 19 Beltran would have
been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial
determination of probable cause, which effectively took the place of such proceeding.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict

Beltran for Rebellion.

Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."20 To accord respect to the discretion granted to
the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the
prosecutor’s determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to
review the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations.21 However, in the few exceptional cases where
the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause, thus denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process, we have
not hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutor’s
findings.22 This exception holds true here.

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed –

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

The elements of the offense are:

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –

(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or

(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or

 (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives.23

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end.24

The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion
consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these
documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause
to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn
before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for two
affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,26 and Raul Cachuela
(Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,27 none of the affidavits mentions Beltran.28 In his affidavit, Escala
recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo, Casiño, Maza, Mariano,
Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia,
Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual who looked like
San Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he
attended the CPP’s "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities;
and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were purchased partly from contributions by
Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an
armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was
in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during
the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting,
maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the
affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran’s alleged presence during the 1992 CPP
Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.

In fact, Cachuela’s affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP Plenum as "Chairman, Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU)." Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge,
mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.29 As for the alleged funding of the CPP’s
military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds, Cachuela’s affidavit merely contained a general
conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. Cachuela merely alleged that "ang mga ibang
mga pondo namin ay galing sa mga party list na naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA –
pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN, x x x."30 Such a general conclusion does not
establish probable cause.

In his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes’ affidavit, dated 25
February 2006,31 as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in
his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which
plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others.

The claim is untenable. Fuentes’ affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ
on 27 February 2006. Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes’ affidavit in their
possession when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day. Indeed, although
this affidavit is dated 25 February 2006, the CIDG first presented it only during the preliminary
investigation of the other petitioners on 13 March 2006 during which Fuentes subscribed to his
statement before respondent prosecutor Velasco.

Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by motu proprio submitting to Branch
137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes’ affidavit as part of their Comment to Beltran’s motion for judicial
determination of probable cause. Such belated submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence
against Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the prosecution’s case. Assuming them to be true,
what the allegations in Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion,
punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in
meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to
commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since
the felony charged in the Information against Beltran and San Juan in Criminal Case No. 06-452 is
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San
Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred
when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.
The minutes32 of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in Batangas between members of MKP and CPP,
including Beltran, also do not detract from our finding.1a\^/phi1.net Nowhere in the minutes was
Beltran implicated. While the minutes state that a certain "Cris" attended the alleged meeting, there is
no other evidence on record indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. San Juan, from whom the "flash drive"
containing the so-called minutes was allegedly taken, denies knowing Beltran.

To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or heading a Rebellion.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation. Thus, even assuming
that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right since there is no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the
Rebellion.33 However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for "conspiring and confederating"
with others in forming a "tactical alliance" to commit rebellion. As worded, the Information does not
charge Beltran with Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense. 34

On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions

The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted

With Irregularities.

As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is similarly loath to enjoin the prosecution of
offenses, a practice rooted on public interest as the speedy closure of criminal investigations fosters
public safety.35 However, such relief in equity may be granted if, among others, the same is necessary (a)
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner 36 or (b) to afford
adequate protection to constitutional rights.37 The case of the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and
172074-76 falls under these exceptions.

The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four years, two months
and one day is outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

Procedure.—The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus
two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined
the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either
dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the
respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present
against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the
respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination,
copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting
affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits
shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with
copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file
a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
 (d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint
based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a
party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or
cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be
asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and
other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be
terminated within five (5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether
or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied)

Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier ruling,
"so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material
damage,"38 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent prosecutors failed to
comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors
treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints 39 and accepted
the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public
without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by
Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must
determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the
case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG letters,
respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the
DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments." During the
investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to
an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’
affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings.
Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was
only four days later, on 17 March 2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments
to the CIDG letters.1a\^/phi1.net

These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors’ statement in the Order of 22 March 2006 that
the preliminary investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal
Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s
antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media
knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them,
respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim
that the entire proceeding was a sham.

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual
the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand,
and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary
investigation as not "a mere formal or technical right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due
process in criminal justice.41 This especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable for those accused as principals.

Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, respondent prosecutors’ filing of the Information
against petitioners on 21 April 2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati does not moot the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76. Our power to enjoin prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the
simple filing of the Information with the trial court.1a\^/phi1.net

On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of Impartiality

We find merit in petitioners’ doubt on respondent prosecutors’ impartiality. Respondent Secretary of
Justice, who exercises supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an interview on
13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation, that, "We [the DOJ] will just declare probable
cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x."42 Petitioners raised this issue in their petition,43 but
respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a
determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause.

A Final Word

The obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of respondent Secretary of Justice
and respondent prosecutors brings to mind an observation we made in another equally politically
charged case. We reiterate what we stated then, if only to emphasize the importance of maintaining the
integrity of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary investigations in particular, thus:

[W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends,
or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of observing the
interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor,
weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may be
public’s perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.44 1a\^/phi1.net

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we SET ASIDE the Order dated 31 May 2006
of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, we SET ASIDE the Orders
dated 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent prosecutors. We ORDER the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, G.R. Nos. 172070-72
June 1, 2007

LADLAD vs. VELASCO

G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007

Facts:

Beltran Petition:

On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a “State of National
Emergency.” Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao,
Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame.

Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for
which he was arrested.

He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech
Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found
probable cause.

BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.

He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state
prosecutors.

The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy director. The letters
contained results of CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, et al as “leaders and promoters” of an
alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause.

Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such
inquest was void.

Ladlad and Maza petitions:

Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion.

Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest.

During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an
eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes
to media members present during the proceedings.

Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence, considering the
political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the
Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’ case, and the manner in which the
prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation.

Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3.

Issues:
1. WON the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? NO.
2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO.

3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES.

Held:

1)

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only when
the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.

The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a
warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have
conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when
another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they
overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw
Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to
believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that
they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

2)

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest
of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters.
We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are
insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.

Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership
in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.

3)

The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint must be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability,
before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza
of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of
them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government
official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must
determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the
case, otherwise he shall “issue a subpoena to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG letters,
respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the
DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments.”

During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to
an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’
affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings.
Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics during
the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that
petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors
not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire
proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the
prosecutors who conducted the PI.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos,
Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge,
ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 185587

RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 185636

RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 190005

VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained
skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD)
launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.

While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this Court’s
jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners have chosen to take
recourse directly before us and that the cases are of significant national interest.

Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require consideration.
Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this Court will pass primarily upon
the following:

1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.
 2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the political
offense doctrine.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of the orders and resolutions
of public respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners for the crime of multiple murder.

Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate
legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.

The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine
Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte.4 Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed
to be victims of Operation VD.5

The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8 was immediately
dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and to collect, preserve and analyze
the skeletal remains.6 Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an investigation team composed of intelligence
officers, and medico-legal and DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from
alleged relatives of the victims DNA samples for matching.7

The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the identities of the skeletal remains and even the
length of time that they had been buried. The report recommended the conduct of further tests to
confirm the identities of the remains and the time window of death.9

However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National
Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the names of ten (10) possible victims after
comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives and witnesses.11

The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. All of them
swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and
were never seen again.

They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among those discovered at the mass grave
site.

Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,12 Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),15 Randall B.
Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members
of the Central Committee.

According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement Operation VD, namely,
(1) the Intel Group responsible for gathering information on suspected military spies and civilians who
would not support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged with their arrests; (3) the
Investigation Group which would subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or
the "cleaners" of those confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not support the
movement.19

From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by
members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation VD.21

On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring,
among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses. 22 Petitioner
Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file counter-
affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December
2006 during the preliminary investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit
because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.27

In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information
for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including
petitioners herein, for the death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio
Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin
Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco
Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado.29

Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and
Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were
vital to the success of the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.

The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC
Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando) on 28 February 2007, and
docketed as Criminal Case No. H-1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution recommending the
filing of the Information.32

On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all
mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them
with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.34

On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 176830 seeking the annulment
of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as
well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition. 36

Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the
RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner
Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of
rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion. 40

We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition and the prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction, and set 42 the case for oral
arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on 27 March 2007. 43

The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral arguments:

1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy of petitioner
Ocampo;

2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;

3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion charge against
him in the RTC.44

Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10 days. 45 On 3 April 2007, the
Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under a ₱100,000 cash bond. 46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single Information filed before
the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15 counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion
to Admit Amended Information and New Informations on 11 April 2007. 47 In an Order dated 27 July
2007, Judge Abando held in abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings
during the pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28 January 2008 by virtue of
the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March 2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with
Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant. 50

On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.51 Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis
filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before being able to rule thereon, Judge
Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution dated
23 April 2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to transfer the
venue of the case.

The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina
(Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to
the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed their Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration. 55

In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of the case pending the
resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.

On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss. 57

On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of
Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No.
185587, prayed for the unconditional and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further
incarceration.59

On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge
Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636,
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner Baylosis.61

The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009. 62

On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases with G.R. No.
176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner Echanis’s immediate release,
to which the OSG did not interpose any objection on these conditions: that the temporary release shall
only be for the purpose of his attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August
2009; and that his temporary release shall not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter condition was later
modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of his actual participation in the
peace negotiations.66

On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis under a ₱100,000
cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace negotiations.67

Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to petitioner Ladlad’s motion to quash
before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on 13 February 2009. 69

On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August 2009.71

On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge
Medina.72 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.

On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587
and 185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment thereon. The OSG submitted its
Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos. 185636 and
185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December 201076 and on 21 January
2011,77 respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.

On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21 July 2011, petitioner
Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of
a ₱100,000 cash bail to them considering that they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating team,
which was then holding negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord. 81

On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the
amount of ₱100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period
of their actual participation in the peace negotiations.82

Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.

OUR RULING

Petitioners were accorded due

process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.

A. Preliminary Investigation

A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.85 While the right to have a preliminary
investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component
of due process in the administration of criminal justice.86

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be
heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to
the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses
lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who
committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of
one's defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.89 Thus, one who has been
afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process. 90

Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint and the
attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not served a subpoena due to
the false address indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to
Prosecutor Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of appearance
before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels’
addresses.93 Thus, they were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.

Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain
Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case
without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14
September 2006 stated that a meeting presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the
launching of Operation VD was agreed upon.95 Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-
affidavit dated 22 December 2006 stating that he was in military custody from October 1976 until his
escape in May 1985.96 Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007
admitted that he made a mistake in his original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in
June 1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the opportunity to reply to the Supplemental
Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.

Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter deliberately delayed the service of the
Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right to due process. 98

As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor
Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the
respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their
counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be
found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo
@ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However,
Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.99

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid.100 The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded
attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.101

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named
respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a
majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.

Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53 Sct. Rallos St.,
QC,"102 which had never been his address at any time.103 In connection with this claim, we take note of
the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlad’s wife,104 was sent to the same address, and
that she was among those mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-
affidavits.

Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad’s counsel filed a formal entry of
appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad
had received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.

Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary
investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.

We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to remain passive
during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due
process, since their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.

Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s allegation of collusion to surreptitiously insert the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records. There was nothing surreptitious about the
Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an earlier affidavit and admits the mistake committed
regarding the date of the alleged meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was
also clearly stated. Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his
counter-affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with the opportunity
to question the execution of Zacarias Piedad’s Supplemental Affidavit.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For
him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit
of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental
Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective
affidavits of several other witnesses107 attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.

As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be
pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of
Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the
resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:

Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall
be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March 2007, 108 the
former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter
or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition
for certiorari directly before this Court on 16 March 2007.

B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution
in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners. 109

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. 111 In fact, the
judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable
for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.112

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents
showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's
resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence.113

Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the records
submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against
them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence
in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. 115

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is
addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide
latitude given to trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v.
Sandiganbayan117 as follows:

x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be interfered with in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings,
as well as the conclusions of law. x x x.

Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a
question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.

Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the
complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable cause for
petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As stated
above, the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies with the
requirement of personal determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the documents attached
thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with
which he is being charged."118

Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown by the following
portion of the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by the Provincial
Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents: Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn
Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory
Office, PNP, Region VIII and Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains,
this court has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused of the
crime charged.119

At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of
arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not within
the purview of a petition for certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.

The political offense doctrine is not a

ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." 121

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. 122 Thus, when a
killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing
assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone.

However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with
simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to
the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.123

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for
the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124

Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly
seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.

We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the
defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.125 The proof showing political
motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence
supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.

As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA,126 if during trial,
petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of
rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:

SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
(n)

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial
court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as
petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.127

A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid
indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. 128

To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized under
Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944
was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.129

However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944.1awp++i1 Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had
already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their
motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and
independence.130 When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed
supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 We eventually ordered
the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.

Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the ₱100,000 cash bond posted before the
Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila.1âwphi1

The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in
view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release from detention under the cash bond of
₱100,000 each shall continue under the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the
period of their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
government or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It
shall be the duty of the government to inform this Court the moment that peace negotiations are
concluded.

WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner
Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until
the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G.
Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this
Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC
Manila, whichever is sooner.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

 THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. Nos. 235937-40. July 23, 2018 ]

JOHANNE EDWARD B. LABAY, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
 DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the Resolutions
dated July 10, 2017[1] and October 19, 2017[2] of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division in Criminal Case Nos.
SB-17-CRM-0642 to 0643 and Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-0644 to 0645. The first assailed resolution
denied petitioner's motion for reinvestigation, among others, while the second assailed motion denied
petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration of the first assailed resolution.

The Facts

The case arose from the complaint dated May 11, 2015 filed by the Field Investigation Office I (FIO I) of
the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Johanne Edward B. Labay (Petitioner Labay) for his
participation in the alleged anomalous utilization of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of
former Representative of the 1st District of Davao del Sur, Marc Douglas C. Cagas IV (Rep. Cagas IV). The
complaint was for violation of Article 217 (Malversation of Public Funds or Property), Article 171
(Falsification of Public Documents), paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (7), Article 217 in relation to Article 171
(Malversation thru Falsification of Public Documents), all of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as well as
Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended. The case was docketed as
OMB-C-C-15-0152.[3]

The complaint alleged that Rep. Cagas IV, in conspiracy with other public officials and private individuals
such as petitioner Labay, through the Technology Resource Center (TRC), sought the release and transfer
of his PDAF in the total amount of Php6,000,000.00 to Farmer-business Development Corporation (FDC),
which was led by its then president, herein petitioner Labay. However, upon field verification conducted
by the FIO I, it appears that the livelihood projects funded by Rep. Cagas IV's PDAF were never
implemented and were considered to be "ghost projects."[4]

In a Joint Order dated September 1, 2015, the Ombudsman directed respondents to file their respective
counter-affidavits.[5] Several respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits. However, copies of this
Order could not be served on petitioner Labay.[6]

According to the Ombudsman, it exerted diligent efforts to serve copies of the September 1, 2015 Joint
Order on petitioner Labay through his office and at his last known address. However, the copies were
returned unserved because he was no longer employed in that office and he was unknown at the given
residential address. As such, the Ombudsman proceeded with the preliminary investigation without any
counter-affidavit or participation from petitioner Labay.[7]

In a Resolution dated May 10, 2016,[8] the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Rep. Cagas IV and
his co-respondents, including petitioner Labay, for conspiracy in the commission of two counts of
Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, one count of Malversation of Public Funds, and one count of
Malversation thru Falsification.

Petitioner alleges that it was unknown to him that preliminary investigations for the charges against him
were being conducted by the Ombudsman. According to him, it was only sometime in October 2016 that
he learned of the cases when his daughter, Atty. Jo Blanca P.B. Labay, came across the press releases of
the Ombudsman wherein petitioner was mentioned as among those who are facing charges.[9]

On October 3, 2016, Atty. Labay, on behalf of her father, attempted to secure information on the cases
from the Central Records of the Ombudsman, but she was advised to submit a written request.
Accordingly, Atty. Labay sent the Ombudsman a letter dated October 4, 2016 in compliance with the said
directive.[10]

In a letter dated October 10, 2016, the Ombudsman replied to Atty. Labay's request and served on her
copies of its May 10, 2016 Resolution. At the same time, the Ombudsman directed Atty. Labay to file a
motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution within five days from receipt thereof.[11]
Accordingly, petitioner, through Atty. Labay, filed an Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment
of Filing of Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents dated
November 16, 2016.[12] In said Omnibus Motion, petitioner prayed that the Ombudsman conduct a
reinvestigation on his alleged participation in the crimes charged and take into consideration his answer
and counter-evidence which he would present. He pointed out that he had neither been notified that a
complaint had been filed against him nor was furnished a copy of the same. Thus, he argued that he was
not afforded an opportunity to present his defense and to participate during the preliminary
investigation. More importantly, petitioner prayed that he be furnished copies of the complaint-affidavit
and other supporting documents and that he be given time to gather his evidence and submit his answer
to the complaint. At the same time, he prayed for the deferment of the filing of any charges against him
arising out of the May 10, 2016 Resolution pending the reinvestigation of the case.[13]

In its Order dated November 25, 2016,[14] the Ombudsman denied petitioner Labay's Omnibus Motion,
ruling thus:

This Office had exerted diligent efforts to serve on Labay copies of the 1 September 2015 Order directing
him to submit his counter-affidavit and the 10 May 2016 Resolution finding him probably guilty of the
charges. The same were sent to his office and at his last known address and were returned unserved
because he was no longer employed in that office, or was unknown at the given address. There was
sufficient compliance with due process.

The filing by Labay of the Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation on 16 November 2016 cured whatever
defect in the observance of due process. Denial of due process cannot he success. fully invoked by a
party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, this Office, through the undersigned, DENIES respondents Marc Douglas C. Cagas
IV's Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 August 2016; Maria Rosalinda M. Lacsamana's Motion for
Reconsideration dated 08 August 2016; Consuela Lilian R. Espiritu's Motion for Reconsideration dated 10
August 2016; Marivic V. Jover's Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September 2016; and Johanne
Edward B. Labay's Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information with Request for
Copies of Complaint-Affidavits and Supporting Documents dated 16 November 2016.

All indictments against them, as originally embodied in the Resolution dated 10 May 2016, STAND.

SO ORDERED.[15] (Emphasis in the original)

Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner Labay filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order
dated 25 November 2016) and Deferment of Filing of Information with Reiterative Request for Copies of
Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents dated January 30, 2017.[16] Petitioner essentially
reiterated his arguments in his first omnibus motion, but added that the filing of the said omnibus
motion did not cure the defects in the Ombudsman's failure to observe due process.[17]

The Ombudsman treated this second Omnibus Motion as a second motion for reconsideration and
denied the same for lack of merit in its Order dated February 1, 2017.[18]

On March 24, 2017, the Ombudsman filed four (4) Informations before the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner Labay and his co-accused.[19]

It was only on March 28, 2017, four days after the Informations had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan, that petitioner Labay was furnished a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit and its supporting
evidence.[20]

On April 4, 2017, petitioner Labay received copies of the Informations filed by the Ombudsman with the
Sandiganbayan. Immediately thereafter, on April 5, 2017, petitioner Labay filed an Extremely Urgent
Motion of even date, arguing that he is entitled to a reinvestigation of the case to prevent injustice
against him brought about by the wrongful filing of charges without affording him his right to a complete
preliminary investigation.[21]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In the assailed Resolution dated July 10, 2017, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court -

(1) DECLARES the existence of probable cause in these cases. Accordingly, let warrants of arrest be
issued against all the accused except for accused Marc Douglas Chan Cagas IV who had already
posted bail;

(2) NOTES the Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause With Entry of
Appearance dated April 4, 2017, filed by accused Marc Douglas Chan Cagas IV; and the Motion To
Set Aside No Bail Recommendation in Crim Case No. SB-17-CRM-0644 for Malversation Through
Falsification and To Fix the Amount of Bail in Crim Case No. SB-17-CRM-0644 for Malversation
Through Falsification filed by accused Johanne Edward B. Labay; and

(3) DENIES the Motion For Reinvestigation and To Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest filed by
accused Johanne Edward B. Labay for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[22]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[23] dated August 3, 2017. However, this
was denied for lack of merit and for being pro forma in the second assailed Resolution dated October 19,
2017.[24]

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.

The Petition

In the present petition, petitioner prays for the (1) issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of injunction; (2) nullification and setting aside of the assailed Resolutions; (3) remand of the case to the
Office of the Ombudsman for a reinvestigation of petitioner; and (4) suspension of the criminal
proceedings with respect to petitioner Labay, pending the resolution of the reinvestigation before the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied him the constitutional right to due process by denying his prayer for
a reinvestigation. Essentially, petitioner argues that he was not accorded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard since he could not have effectively and intelligently moved for the reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's May 10, 2016 Resolution due to the latter's failure to furnish him with a copy of the
complaint affidavit and its attachments upon which the resolution was based.

In a Resolution[25] dated March 21, 2018, this Court required respondent to file its Comment on the
Petition and at the same time issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Sandiganbayan
to suspend the criminal proceedings against petitioner Labay.

On April 2, 2018, the People of the Philippines represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
counsel, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed an Entry of Appearance with Comment and
Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order Issued on 21 March 2018.[26] It claimed that the
Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Labay's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. It argued that there was no violation of his constitutional right to due process

considering that he was given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence through the
Ombudsman's effort to issue subpoenas at his last known addresses, especially since the government
substantially complied with the requirements of the law in doing so.[27]

Aside from the effort exerted in issuing subpoenas, the OSP contended that petitioner Labay was
eventually informed of the nature of the accusations against him when he was furnished a copy of the
Ombudsman's May 10, 2016 Resolution, in response to which he was able to file an omnibus motion. It
further maintains that petitioner Labay had the opportunity to refute the charges against him and
present any countervailing evidence he may have, but faults him for hiding on technicalities and insisting
that he was denied due process without presenting any evidence to support his claim of having a valid
and meritorious defense. In other words, the OSP asserted that petitioner Labay was afforded due
process when he filed two motions seeking reinvestigation and reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
rulings.[28]

From the arguments presented by the parties, the Court is now faced with the issue of whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioner Labay's motion for reinvestigation and ruling that he was not deprived of due process.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that petitioner's constitutional right to
due process was violated when he was not furnished a copy of the complaint affidavit and its
attachments during the preliminary investigation.

Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of every person to due process before
they are deprived of their life, liberty, or property. Due process in criminal prosecutions is further
emphasized under Section 14, Article III which provides that no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law. The same provision also states that the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.

Criminal due process requires that the procedure established by law or the rules be followed to assure
that the State makes no mistake in taking the life or liberty except that of the guilty. All the necessary
measures must be taken to guarantee procedural due process throughout all stages of a criminal
prosecution-from the inception of custodial investigation until rendition of judgment.[29]

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. [30]

The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and be formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical
right. It is a substantive right since the accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged
anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense, and the right to an opportunity to avoid a
painful process is a valuable right.[31] It is meant to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to
conduct useless and expensive trials. Indeed, to deny a person's claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.[32]

Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 07 otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) lays down the procedure to be followed in handling
preliminary investigations of criminal complaints brought before the Ombudsman for offenses in
violation of R.A. 3019, as amended, R.A. 1379 as amended, R.A. 6713, Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, and for such other offenses committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office.[33] It provides:

Section 3. Preliminary investigation; who may conduct. Preliminary Investigation may be conducted by
any of the following:

1) Ombudsman Investigators;

2) Special Prosecuting Officers;

3) Deputized Prosecutors;

4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations or

5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.

Section 4. Procedure - The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:

a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall
require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.

b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto
a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondents to submit, within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service
thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service
of the counter-affidavits.

c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider the comment
filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the
evidence on record.

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of
particulars be entertained. If respondents desire any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be clarified,
the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided
in paragraph (f) of this section.

e) If the respondents cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been
served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis
of the evidence on the record.

f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are facts material to
the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory
hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or
witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the
questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and
served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.

g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the
records of the case together with his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action
thereon.

No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or
approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the
proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also provides similar guidelines in the
conduct of preliminary investigation, to wit:

Section 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause.
They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file.
The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of who must certify
that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if
he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching
to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and
these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying,
or photographing at the expense of there questing party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn
to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-
affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within
the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence
presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a
witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without th. right to examine or cross-examine.
They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or
witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other
documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5)
days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not
there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (3a)

It is clear from the foregoing that an accused in a criminal case has the right to be informed of the
charges against him,[34] to submit a counter affidavit, and to have access to and examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant.[35]

In the case before Us, a complaint was filed by the FIO I of the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioner Labay for representing the Farmerbusjness Development Corporation (FDC) in the alleged
anomalous utilization of the PDAF of Rep. Cagas IV.[36] The Ombudsman directed those charged to file
their respective counter-affidavits,[37] but copies of this Order could not be served on petitioner Labay.
[38]
It appears that the Ombudsman attempted to serve copies of the September 1, 2015 Joint Order on
petitioner Labay at his office at the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and at his last known
residence. However, the copies were returned unserved because he was no longer employed in that
office and he was unknown at the given residential address. As such, the Ombudsman proceeded with
the preliminary investigation without any counter-affidavit or participation from petitioner Labay.[39]

Thereafter, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and his co-respondents for
conspiracy in the commission of two counts of Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, one count of
Malversation of Public Funds, and one count of Malversation thru Falsification.

Upon learning from press releases of the Ombudsman about the criminal charges against him,
[40]
petitioner Labay, through his daughter, Atty. Labay, attempted to secure information on the cases
from the Central Records of the Ombudsman. Upon being advised to submit a written request, Atty.
Labay sent the Ombudsman a letter dated October 4, 2016 in compliance with the said directive. [41] In
response to Atty. Labay's letter request, the Ombudsman replied to Atty. Labay's request through a letter
dated October 10, 2016 and served on her copies of its May 10, 2016 Resolution. In the letter, the
Ombudsman directed Atty. Labay to file a motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution within five
days from receipt thereof.[42]

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information with
Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents dated November 16, 2016,
[43]
praying, among others, that a reinvestigation be conducted on his behalf, asserting that he was not
afforded an opportunity to present his defense and to participate during the preliminary investigation
since he had neither been notified that a complaint had been filed against him nor was furnished a copy
of the same. Petitioner also prayed that he be furnished copies of the complaint-affidavit and other
supporting documents and that he be given time to gather his evidence and submit his answer to the
complaint.[44] However, the Ombudsman denied petitioner Labay's Omnibus Motion, ruling that his right
to due process had not been violated since he had the opportunity to be heard when he filed the
Omnibus Motion.[45]

Aggrieved, petitioner Labay filed another Omnibus Motion essentially reiterating his arguments in his
first omnibus motion, but additionally argued that the filing of the first omnibus motion did not cure the
defects in the Ombudsman's failure to observe due process when it failed to serve on him copies of the
complaint affidavit.[46] The Ombudsman treated this second Omnibus Motion as a second motion for
reconsideration and denied the same for lack of merit in its Order dated February 1, 2017. [47]

Thereafter, on March 24, 2017, the Ombudsman filed four (4) Informations before the Sandiganbayan
against petitioner Labay and his co-accused.[48] It was only on March 28, 2017 that petitioner Labay was
furnished a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit and its supporting evidence.[49]

Upon receiving copies of the Informations filed by the Ombudsman, petitioner Labay immediately filed
an Extremely Urgent Motion with the Sandiganbayan arguing that he is entitled to a reinvestigation of
the case to prevent injustice against him brought about by the wrongful filing of charges without
affording him his right to a complete preliminary investigation.[50]

The Sandiganbayan, however, sustained the Ombudsman's position in the assailed Resolution dated July
10, 2017, ruling that petitioner's right to due process was not violated since he was afforded reasonable
opportunity to address the charges against him when he filed two motions with the Ombudsman. The
Sandiganbayan ruled, thus:

The Court finds accused Labay's motion for reinvestigation bereft of merit.

The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of
his case. What the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard.
When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his
side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process
must fail.

Admittedly, there is no showing that accused Labay was served a copy of the order requiring him to file
his counter-affidavit. The record shows, however, that on October 4, 2016, accused Labay wrote the
Office of the Ombudsman requesting information on case numbers and titles of the cases it referred to
in its press release where his name appears. In reply to the said letter, the Office of the Ombudsman
confirmed that accused Labay is a respondent in two (2) cases and furnished him copies of the
Resolutions dated May 10, 2016 and June 3, 2016. It also reminded accused Labay that he has five (5)
days from notice within which to file a motion for reconsideration.

Thus, on November 16, 2016, accused Labay filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing
of Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavits and Supporting Documents assailing the
Office of the Ombudsman's Resolution dated May 10, 2016, finding probably cause to indict him. The
said motion was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Order dated November 25, 2016 upon
the following ratiocination:

xxxx

Thereafter, accused Labay filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Deferment of Filing of
Information assailing the above order. In denying the said motion, the Office of the Ombudsman pointed
out that while accused Labay asserted that he did not commit the crimes imputed to him and that he did
not participate in any conspiracy in the commission of the crimes, he prayed that the Office of the
Ombudsman conduct a reinvestigation, furnish him a copy of the complaint, allow him to gather
evidence and submit counter-affidavit. Further, the Office of the Ombudsman held that when accused
Labay filed his second motion, he already exhausted his remedy under Section 7(a), Rule II of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which allows the filing of only one (1) motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation.

The above circumstances unerringly show that accused Labay was accorded due process by filing two (2)
motions before the Office of the Ombudsman.

We disagree.

There is no dispute that the Ombudsman was unable to serve copies of the complaint or of its
September 1, 2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay prior to or even during the preliminary investigation
of the case. This was never denied by the OSP in its Comment, stating thus:

20. By Joint Order dated 01 September 2015, the Office of the Ombudsman directed therein respondents
(including Labay) to file their respective counter-affidavits.

21. Despite earnest efforts, copies of the Joint Order could not be served in the last known or given
addresses of Cunanan, Semillano, Carrasco, Reyes, and herein petitioner Labay, after they have been
noted to be unknown in said addresses, or had moved out and left no forwarding address.[51] (emphasis
in the original)

As pointed out by petitioner, the Ombudsman only tried to effect service of the order to file his counter
affidavit on petitioner on one instance, albeit to two different addresses. However, this service failed
since petitioner was no longer employed at his former office at NAPC, as confirmed by the letter sent by
the NAPC Secretary and Lead Convenor, and since he was no longer residing at the residential address
where the order was sent.

In its Comment, the OSP seeks refuge in paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure
which provides that in cases where the respondents cannot be served with the order to file their
counter-affidavit, or having been served but does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed
submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.

While the Ombudsman was correct in resolving the complaint based on the evidence presented in
accordance with Paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, the situation, however,
effectively changed when petitioner made himself available to the Ombudsman when he requested
access to the case records. The Ombudsman had a clear opportunity to furnish petitioner with copies of
the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents. Instead, it merely decided to furnish petitioner
with a copy of its May 10, 2016 Resolution.

Even assuming that the Ombudsman was merely complying with Atty. Labay's request for information
when it responded with the case titles and docket numbers of the cases pending against petitioner
Labay, it should have exercised its duty to inform petitioner of the charges filed against him by furnishing
him copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents. Or at the very least, it should have
directed and allowed petitioner to access these records at its office. This, however, was not done by the
Ombudsman.

We also cannot subscribe to the Sandiganbayan's justification that petitioner was afforded reasonable
opportunity to address the charges against him since he was able to file a motion for reinvestigation with
the Ombudsman. By the mere fact that petitioner was not yet even furnished a copy of the complaint
affidavit at the time he received the Ombudsman's May 10, 2016 Resolution, it is clear that he could not
effectively and sufficiently address the allegations against him. Petitioner Labay should not be blamed for
being unable to raise any substantive defense in either the omnibus motions he filed with the
Ombudsman since he had not even seen any of the allegations filed against by the FIO. More
importantly, he could not have been expected to seek appropriate evidence to support his defense when
he was not even given any access to the documents submitted by the FIO in support of its complaint.
In fact, the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process is made even more evident when
the Ombudsman unceremoniously denied his request to be furnished copies of the complaint affidavit
and its supporting documents in the first omnibus motion that he filed, and reiterated in his second
omnibus motion. In both orders denying the two omnibus motions, the Ombudsman seemingly ignored
petitioner's requests and effectively denied petitioner of his right to secure copies of the complaint
affidavit. This should not be tolerated.

Unfortunately, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to grant petitioner
Labay's Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion despite the glaring violations committed by the Ombudsman.
The Sandiganbayan should have recognized these patent violations and ordered the remand of the case
to the Ombudsman for the conduct of a proper preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner
Labay's participation in the crimes charged. Instead, it chose to turn a blind eye towards the injustice
committed against petitioner.

Time and again, the Court has held that suppression of evidence, regardless of its nature, is enough to
violate the due process rights of the accused.[52] In the present case, it was not only the prosecution's
evidence which was withheld from petitioner. In denying petitioner Labay's multiple requests for copies
of the complaint affidavit, the Ombudsman deprived him of his right to sufficiently and reasonably know
the charges and accusations against him. This is a patent violation of his constitutional right to due
process.

In Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,[53] this Court ordered the dismissal of the criminal case against the accused
when they were not sufficiently apprised of the charges against them during preliminary investigation,
thus:

We have judiciously studied the case records and we find that the preliminary investigation of the
charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid down in Administrative Order No.
07.

In the 12 November 1991 Order of Graft Investigator Manriquez, petitioners were merely directed to
submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 and SAR No.
91-05. The said order was not accompanied by a single affidavit of any person charging petitioners of any
offense as required by law. They were just required to comment upon the allegations in Civil Case No.
20,550-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA
Special Audit Report. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary
investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was being
conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had intended merely to adopt the allegations of the plaintiffs
in the civil case or the Special Audit Report (whose recommendation for the cancellation of the contract
in question had been complied with) as his basis for criminal prosecution, then the procedure was
plainly anomalous and highly irregular. As a consequence, petitioners constitutional right to due process
was violated. (citations omitted)

While the Duterte case is not on all fours with the case before Us, We find that the Ombudsman's failure
to furnish petitioner Labay with copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents despite
the latter's numerous attempts and requests to secure the same is more severe as it gravely endangers
petitioner's right to liberty through no fault of his own. Undeniably, petitioner Labay's receipt of the May
10, 2016 Resolution is not equivalent to receipt of the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents.

The OSP's assertion in its comment that petitioner deliberately evaded the Ombudsman's attempts to
serve its orders on him is purely hypothetical and is not supported by any concrete proof. There is also
no merit in the OSP's position that it was incumbent on petitioner Labay to justify his whereabouts
during the time that the Ombudsman was attempting service of the subpoena on him since no law or
regulation requires an accused in a preliminary investigation to submit himself to the Ombudsman or at
the very least update the latter of his latest address. The burden should not be placed on the accused
since it is the State which has the responsibility to use its resources for the proper implementation of the
law. To rule otherwise would effectively curtail the constitutionally protected rights of the people to be
secure with their life, liberty and property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 10, 2017 and October 19, 2017 issued
by the Sandiganbayan, Third Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-0642 to 0643 and Criminal Case
Nos. SB-17-CRM-0644 to 0645 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor is ORDERED to file motions to withdraw Information in the aforedescribed criminal cases.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 240676, March 18, 2019

JIMMY LIM PALACIOS, PETITIONER, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

 DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition1 for review on certiorari are the Decision2 dated January 18, 2018 and the
Resolution3 dated July 11/2018 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 150260, which
upheld the Orders dated October 5, 20164 and January 25, 20175 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 86 (RTC) denying petitioner Jimmy Lim Palacios' (petitioner) motion for reinvestigation and
to recall warrant of arrest.

The Facts

The present case stemmed from a complaint6 for violation of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. (RA)
92627 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" filed by
Maria Cecilia Ramirez (Ramirez) against petitioner. Ramirez alleged that she and petitioner were
married8 on November 17, 1987 and thereafter, had a son.9 However, petitioner abandoned them and
refused to give them financial support, acts which constitute economic abuse under Section 5 (i) of RA
9262. Further, in her Sinumpaang-Reklamong Salaysay filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Quezon City (OCP-QC), she alleged that petitioner's residence where he may be served with summons
is Block 3 Lot 24 Turquoise St., Las Pi�as Royale Estate, Naga Road, Brgy. Pulang Lupa Dos, Las
Pi�as City.

In a Resolution10 dated March 19, 2015, the OCP-QC recommended that petitioner be indicted for the
crime charged. In resolving the case based on the evidence proffered solely by Ramirez, the investigating
prosecutor held that petitioner failed to appear during the preliminary investigation and submit his
counter-affidavit despite being given ample opportunity to do so.11 Consequently, the corresponding
Information12 was filed before the RTC, docketed as Crim. Case No. R-QZN-15-04286 and a warrant13 for
petitioner's arrest was issued pursuant to the RTC Order14 dated May 12, 2015 (May 12, 2015 Order).

Sometime in September 2016, petitioner, through his lawyer, filed before the RTC an extremely very
urgent motion for reinvestigation and to recall warrant of arrest,15 decrying violation of his right to due
process upon learning of the case that Ramirez filed against him and the RTC's May 12, 2015 Order
directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He averred that he only learned of the subject complaint
when, in a criminal case that he had filed against her, his lawyer was furnished with a copy of
her Kontra-Salaysay16 where the May 12, 2015 Order was attached as an annex. He further alleged that
he would not have been denied of his right to due process and to a preliminary investigation had
Ramirez not concealed his true and correct address, i.e., Block 9 Lot 6 Pag-Ibig Homes, Talon IV, Las
Pi�as City. As a result of the fraud employed by Ramirez, petitioner asserted that he was not able to
interpose his valid and meritorious defenses to show that no probable cause exists to charge him in this
case.17

The RTC Ruling

In an Order18 dated October 5, 2016, the RTC denied petitioner's motion, citing A.M. No. 11-6-10-
SC19 which states that a motion for preliminary investigation shall only be granted where the accused
was subjected to inquest proceedings,20 which was not the case here.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration21 was denied in an Order22 dated January 25, 2017. Thus, he
elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari23 ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision24 dated January 18, 2018, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed RTC
Orders upon finding that petitioner was given the opportunity to participate in the preliminary
investigation, based on the certification25 of Assistant City Prosecutor Pedro M. Tresvalles (ACP
Tresvalles) dated March 19, 2015. Likewise, it was observed that ACP Tresvalles had examined Ramirez's
statements and the pieces of evidence, and on the basis thereof, found that there was probable cause.
Furthermore, it was determined that the accused was informed of the complaint and evidence against
him and was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Finally, the CA affirmed the RTC's
finding that pursuant to A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC, a motion for preliminary investigation shall only be
granted when accused was subjected to inquest proceedings, which was not so in this case. 26
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration27 was denied in a Resolution28 dated July 11, 2018; hence, this
petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the denial of petitioner's
motion for preliminary investigation and to recall warrant of arrest.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to

engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.29 The rationale of preliminary investigation is to "protect the
accused from the inconvenience, expense[,] and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the
reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a
competent officer."30 Section 1,31 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court requires the conduct of a preliminary
investigation before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to fine.

In this case, although the OCP-QC conducted a preliminary investigation relative to the complaint filed
by Ramirez against petitioner, the latter bewails the lack of notice to him of the proceedings, which
resulted in his failure to participate in the preliminary investigation. He claims that Ramirez committed
fraud by intentionally giving the wrong address in her Sinumpaang-Reklamong Salaysay instead of his
true and correct residence address, which is Block 9 Lot 6 Pag-Ibig Homes, Talon IV, Las Pi�as City, as
evidenced by: (a) a Certification32 dated July 10, 2017 issued by Barangay Talon Kuatro, Las Pi�as City;
(b) his Seaman's Service Record Book;33 and (c) their Marriage Contract34 dated November 17, 1987. To
bolster his claim that Ramirez was fully aware of his correct address, he pointed out that in the
petition35 for declaration of nullity of their marriage and the Affidavit of Withdrawal36 dated May 3,
1990, both of which Ramirez filed, she indicated his address at Block 9 Lot 6 37 Pag-Ibig Homes, Talon, Las
Pi�as, Metro Manila. Thus, petitioner contends that he was denied due process when Ramirez
supplied the wrong address when she filed the present complaint against him.

Due process is comprised of two (2) components � substantive due process which requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal.38 The essence of procedural due
process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. 39 "Non-
observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and
present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties."40

The Court has punctiliously examined the available records of this case and found no showing that
indeed, petitioner had been duly notified of the charges filed against him by Ramirez or served with
a subpoena relative to the preliminary investigation conducted by the OCP-QC. The Court therefore
takes exception to the CA's observation41 that petitioner failed to prove that he was denied participation
in the preliminary investigation, for it would have been impossible for him to prove such negative
allegation. Instead, under the circumstances, it was incumbent upon respondent to show that petitioner
had been duly notified of the proceedings and that, despite notice, he still failed to appear or participate
thereat. In the absence of such proof, the Court therefore finds that petitioner had not been given an
opportunity to be heard. Case law states that "[w]hen service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving notice
rests upon the party asserting its existence."42

It bears to stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or
technical.43 As such, to deny petitioner's motion for reinvestigation on the basis of the provisions of A.M.
No. 11-6-10-SC would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process 44 on purely
procedural grounds. Thus, the courts a quo should allow petitioner to be accorded the right to submit
counter-affidavits and evidence in a preliminary investigation for, after all, "the fiscal is not called by the
Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do
justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice."45
Contrary to the CA's conclusion, the fact that ACP Tresvalles certified in the Information that: (a) he had
conducted the preliminary investigation in accordance with law and examined Ramirez's statements and
pieces of evidence; and (b) the accused was informed of the complaint and evidence against him, and
thus, given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence, should not suffice in light of the absence of
notice to petitioner regarding the conduct of the preliminary investigation. Given petitioner's insistence
that Ramirez provided the wrong address in her complaint, it behooved the respondent to show that
petitioner was duly notified at the said address, especially in light of the fact that the warrant for his
arrest was returned unserved46 at the said address. Such failure, to the Court's mind, compounded the
violation of petitioner's constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process. Besides, the said certification
in the Information is merely pro forma, and hence, does not enjoy the presumption of regularity in its
issuance.47 Consequently, Crim. Case No. R-QZN-15-04286 pending before the RTC must be suspended
until the completion of a preliminary investigation in order to afford petitioner a chance to present his
counter-affidavit and any countervailing evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 18, 2018 and the Resolution dated July 11, 2018 rendered by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 150260 upholding the Orders dated October 5, 2016 and January
25, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Office
of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation
on the charge of violation of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262 against petitioner Jimmy Lim Palacios.
The trial on the merits of Crim. Case No. R-QZN-15-04286 shall be SUSPENDED until the conclusion of
the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 212761-62, July 31, 2018

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, AND ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.

G.R. NOS. 213473-74

JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. NOS. 213538-39

JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The present consolidated1 petitions for certiorari2 filed by petitioners Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada
(Estrada), John Raymund de Asis (De Asis), and Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) assail the Joint
Resolution3 dated 28 March 2014 and the Joint Order4 dated 4 June 2014 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 finding probable cause to indict
them, along with several others, for the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended, and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

The Facts

Petitioners are charged as co-conspirators for their respective participation in the illegal pillaging of
public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Estrada for the years
2004 to 2012. The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for
Plunder5 filed by the National Bureau of Investigation and Atty. Levito D. Baligod (NBI Complaint) on 16
September 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0313; and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 30196 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO Complaint) on 18
November 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0397, both before the Ombudsman. Briefly stated,
petitioners were implicated for allegedly committing the following acts:

(a) Estrada, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for: (1) authorizing the illegal utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of fraudulent non-
governmental organizations created and controlled by Napoles' JLN Corporation (JLN-controlled NGOs);
(2) acquiring and receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his commission, kickbacks,
or rebates in the total amount of P183,793,750.00; and (3) giving unwarranted benefits to Napoles and
the JLN-controlled NGOs in the implementation of his PDAF-funded projects, causing undue injury to the
government in an amount of more than P278,000,000.00;7

(b) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion,
and disbursement of Estrada's PDAF through: (1) the commencement via "business propositions" with
Estrada regarding his allocated PDAF; (2) the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as
"conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-funded projects; (3) the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents
to make it appear that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; (4) the falsification and
machinations used in securing funds from the various implementing agencies (IAs) and in liquidating
disbursements; and (5) the remittance of Estrada's PDAF for misappropriation; and

(c) De Asis, as driver/messenger/janitor of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing and
releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs through, among others, his designation as
President/Incorporator of a JLN-controlled NGO, namely, Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation,
Inc. (KPMFI) and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles' control.

The NBI Complaint alleged that, based on the sworn statements of Benhur Luy (Luy) along with several
other JLN employees including Marina Sula (Sula) and Merlina Su�as (Su�as) (collectively, the
whistleblowers), the PDAF scheme would commence with Napoles and the legislator - in this case,
Estrada � discussing the utilization of the latter's PDAF. During this stage, the legislator and Napoles
would discuss the list of projects, description or purpose of the projects, corresponding implementing
government agency, project cost, and "commission" or "rebate" of the legislator, ranging from 40-60%
of the total project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO). After the
negotiations and upon instruction of Napoles, Luy would prepare the so-called "Listing," containing the
list of projects allocated by the legislator to Napoles and her NGOs, project title or description, name of
the IA under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) Menu, and the project cost. Thereafter, Napoles
would submit the "Listing" to the legislator. The legislator would prepare a letter, which incorporated
the "Listing" submitted by Napoles, addressed to the Senate President and the Finance Committee
Chairperson in the case of a Senator, or to the House Speaker and Chairperson of the Appropriations
Committee in the case of a Congressman, who would then endorse such request to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) for the release of the SARO. Upon receipt by the DBM of a copy of the
letter with the endorsement, the legislator would give Napoles a copy of the letter with a "received"
stamp and Napoles would give the legislator the agreed advance legislator's commission.

Thereafter, Luy and other Napoles' employees would follow-up the release of the SARO from the DBM,
by citing the details of the legislator's letter to expedite the release of the SARO. Upon release of the
SARO, the DBM would furnish a copy of it to the legislator, who in turn, would give a copy of it to
Napoles. Upon receipt of the copy of the SARO, Napoles would order her employees to prepare the
balance of the legislator's commission, which would be delivered by Napoles to the legislator or his/her
authorized representative.

Napoles, who chose the NGO owned or controlled by her that would implement the project, would
instruct her employee to prepare a letter for the legislator to sign endorsing her NGO to the IA. The
legislator would sign the letter endorsing Napoles' NGOs to the IAs, based on the agreement with
Napoles. The IA would then prepare a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the legislator, the
IA, and the selected NGO. Napoles' employee would secure a copy of the MOA. Thereafter, the DBM
would release the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to the IA concerned, and the head of the IA would
expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement,
in exchange for a 10% share in the project cost.

The succeeding checks would be issued upon compliance with the necessary documentation, i.e. official
receipts, delivery receipts, sales invoices, inspection reports, delivery reports, certificates of acceptance,
terminal reports, and master lists of beneficiaries. Napoles' employees, upon instruction of Napoles,
would pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned. Once the funds
are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal of
the money, and Napoles' employees would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for
accounting. Napoles would then decide how much would be left in the office and how much would be
brought to her residence in Taguig City. Napoles and her employees would subsequently manufacture
fictitious lists of beneficiaries, inspection reports, and similar documents that would make it appear that
the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not.

Under this modus operandi, Estrada, with the help of Napoles and De Asis, among others, funneled his
PDAF amounting to around P262,575,000.008 to the JLN-controlled NGOs, specifically Masaganang Ani
Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI) and Social Development Program for Farmers Foundation,
Inc. (SDPFFI), and in return, received "commissions" or "rebates" amounting to P183,793,750.00,
through his authorized representative, Pauline Labayen (Labayen) and Ruby Tuason (Tuason). 9

On the other hand, the FIO Complaint alleged that Estrada and Labayen, in conspiracy with Napoles and
her NGOs, committed plunder through repeated misuse of public funds as shown by the series of SAROs
issued to effect releases of funds from the PDAF allocation of Estrada to Napoles' NGOs, and through
accumulation of more than P50,000,000.00 in the form of kickbacks.10 Estrada likewise violated Section
3(e) of RA 3019 by acting with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in endorsing MAMFI and SDPFFI
in violation of existing laws, such as the GAA, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184,
Government Procurement Policy Board Resolution No. 012-2007 and Commission on Audit (COA)
Circular 2007-01.

Both the NBI Complaint and the FIO Complaint cited the COA Special Audit Office Report No. 2012-2013
(COA report) in illustrating the PDAF allotments of Estrada in 2007-2009:

�
SARO Number Amount (P) IA NGO
08-06025 16.490 million � �
09-02770 9.700 million National Agribusines MAMFI
Corporation (NABCOR)
08-01697 24.250 million[11
08-03116 18.915 million[12
09-01612 19.400 million National Livelihood �
09-02769 29.100 million Development Corporation
(NLDC)
G-09-07076 30.070 million
G-09-07579 24.250 million
08-06025 19.400 million NABCOR SDPFFI
G-09-07579 24.250 million NLDC
F-09-09579 24.250 million
08-01698 22.500 million Technology Resource Center
(TRC)
TOTAL P262.575� million[13 � �

The COA Report also made the following observations applicable to all of the PDAF disbursements of
Estrada for 2007-2009: (1) the implementation of most livelihood projects was undertaken by the NGOs,
not the IAs, in violation of existing laws; (2) the selection of NGOs and implementation of the projects
were not compliant with existing regulations; (3) the selected NGOs, their suppliers and beneficiaries are
unknown, or could not be located at their given addresses, or submitted questionable documents, or
failed to liquidate or fully document the utilization of funds; and (4) irregularities manifested in the
implementation of the livelihood projects, such as multiple attendance of the same beneficiaries to the
same or similar trainings and multiple receipt of the same or similar kits.14

Pursuant to the Orders of the Ombudsman directing the petitioners and their co-respondents in the
complaints to submit their counter-affidavits, Estrada submitted his separate Counter-Affidavits to the
NBI Complaint on 8 January 2014, and to the FIO Complaint on 16 January 2014. De Asis failed to submit
his counter-affidavit to the NBI Complaint, while Napoles failed to submit her counter-affidavit to both
complaints. The petitioners' co-respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits between 9
December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

In both his Counter-Affidavits,15 Estrada denied having received, directly or indirectly, any amount from
Napoles, or any person associated with her, or any NGO owned or controlled by her, and having
amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth. He further denied instructing or directing any of
his staff to commit and/or participate in any irregular and unlawful transaction involving his PDAF
allocations.

Estrada claimed that he committed no intentional or willful wrongdoing in his choice of NGOs to
implement the PDAF projects, and he had no knowledge or notice of any relationship between the NGOs
that implemented the projects and Napoles. He further claimed that the "letters where (a) [he]
requested certain livelihood programs and projects to be implemented by certain [NGOs] and those
where (b) [he] authorized [his] staff to follow[-]up, supervise, sign, and act in [his] behalf to ensure the
proper and timely implementation of these projects do not show that [he] authorized the performance
of any illegal activity."16 Answering the charge against him for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, he
alleged that there was no manifest partiality or evident bad faith in endorsing the NGOs to implement
the PDAF projects, since he only endorsed the NGOs accredited and selected by the IAs, and his act of
endorsement was merely recommendatory and not deemed irregular or in violation of law. 17

On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Joint Resolution finding probable cause to
charge petitioners and several other respondents in the NBI and FIO Complaints for one (1) count of
Plunder and eleven (11) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence, the Ombudsman concluded that
petitioners conspired with the DBM personnel, and the heads of the IAs, specifically NABCOR, NLDC, and
TRC, in amassing ill-gotten wealth by diverting the PDAF of Estrada from its intended project recipients
to JLN-controlled NGOs, specifically MAMFI and SDPFFI. Estrada, in particular, took advantage of his
official position and amassed, accumulated, and acquired ill-gotten wealth by receiving money from
Napoles, through Tuason and Labayen, in the amount of P183,793,750.00 in exchange for endorsing
JLN-controlled NGOs to the IAs of his PDAF-funded projects. De Asis, for his part, participated in the
conspiracy by facilitating the transfer of the checks from the IAs and depositing the same to the bank
accounts of the JLN-controlled NGOs. Furthermore, the Ombudsman found that petitioners, among
others, acting in concert are manifestly partial, and in evident bad faith in violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 in relation to Estrada's PDAF releases, coursed through NABCOR, NLDC, TRC, MAMFI, and SDPFFI.

The motions for reconsideration were denied in the Joint Order issued by the Ombudsman on 4 June
2014.

Following the denial of the petitioners' motions for reconsideration, the Ombudsman filed several
Informations before the Sandiganbayan, charging petitioners with one (1) count of Plunder and eleven
(11) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Thus, Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles filed their separate petitions for certiorari assailing the Joint
Resolution and Joint Order of the Ombudsman before this Court. The petition filed by Estrada is
docketed as G.R. Nos. 212761-62, the petition filed by De Asis is docketed as G.R. Nos. 213473-74, and
the petition filed by Napoles is docketed as G.R. Nos. 213538-39.

Estrada subsequently filed a Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari on 28 May 2015 and a Second
Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari on 16 March 2018 basically asserting that his indictment is an
act of political persecution and violates his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The Issue

The sole issue left to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Ombudsman committed any grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed Resolution and Order ultimately finding probable cause
against Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles for the charges against them.

The Ruling of the Court

We do not find merit in the petitions.

Both the Constitution18 and RA 6770,19 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989, give the Ombudsman wide
latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. 20 As an
independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people, and is the preserver of the integrity of the public service." 21

This Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the determination by the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause.22 Since the Ombudsman is armed with the power to
investigate, it is in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand
needed to make a finding of probable cause.23 As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound
judgment of the Ombudsman.24

This policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.25 Otherwise, innumerable petitions
seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the
functions of the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped with petitions if they had to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time prosecutors decide to file
an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.26

Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge
of grave abuse of discretion.27 Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.28 The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law.29

Thus, for the present petition to prosper, petitioners would have to show this Court that the
Ombudsman exercised its power, to determine whether there is probable cause, in an arbitrary or
despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. On the petitioners lie the burden of demonstrating
all the facts essential to establish the right to a writ of certiorari.30

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. 31 The executive
determination of probable cause, made during preliminary investigation, is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. 32Whether or
not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not the
prosecutor has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter
that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. 33 The judicial determination
of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused.34

Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, probable cause is needed
to be established by the investigating officer, to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial, during preliminary investigation. Thus, probable cause has
been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted.35 It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.36 In
determining probable cause, the average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he or she has no technical knowledge. 37

We have explained the concept of probable cause in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman (Estrada)38 in
this wise:

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United
States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence
which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

x x x. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused
can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers
to establish his innocence. x x x.

xxxx

x x x. In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing
definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These
are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative
to what must be proved.

"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt." McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U. S. at
161. And this "means less than evidence which would justify condemnation" or conviction, as Marshall,
C. J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348. Since
Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where
"the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that" an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences
with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the
law in the community's protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of
executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their
part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their
conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording
the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring
more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the
mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.39 (Emphasis supplied)

In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present. 40 In Reyes v.
Ombudsman (Reyes),41 this Court unanimously held that in determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case a against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty ." We explained that:

Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing elements need
not be definitively established for it is enough that their presence becomes reasonably apparent. This
is because probable cause - the determinative matter in a preliminary investigation implies mere
probability of guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction would suffice.

Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and that the presence or absence of the elements of
the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits. Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as
well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at
the preliminary investigation level."

Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the "technical rules of
evidence should not be applied" in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that "the
determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or
defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented." Thus, in Estrada v. Ombudsman
(Estrada), the Court declared that since a preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights
and obligations of parties, "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."42 (Emphasis supplied)

We reiterated the same principles in Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman (Cambe):43

x x x [P]robable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is "merely
an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it." It "is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence." Therefore, "the validity and
merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level." Accordingly, "owing to
the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied
in the course of its proceedings." In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled
that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay," and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the
proceedings is improper.44 (Boldfacing and underscoring in the original)

In the present case, petitioners are charged with the crime of plunder and violation of Section 3(e) RA
3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 245 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following
elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b)
that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts described in Section 1(d)46 hereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the
ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated, or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). On
the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3(e)47 of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge
of his functions.

The Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding
probable cause to indict Estrada for one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.

In its Joint Resolution48 dated 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman found that probable cause exists to indict
Estrada for plunder, after finding that the elements of the crime charged are reasonably apparent based
on the evidence on record:

First, it is undisputed that Senator Estrada was a public officer at the time material to the charges.

Second, he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth.

As disclosed by the evidence, he repeatedly received sums of money from Janet Napoles for endorsing
her NGOs to implement the projects to be funded by his PDAF.

xxxx

As outlined by witnesses Luy, Sula and Su�as which Tuason similarly claimed, once a PDAF allocation
becomes available to Senator Estrada, his staff Labayen would inform Tuason of this development.
Tuason, in turn, would relay the information to either Napoles or witness Luy. Napoles or Luy would
then prepare a listing of the projects available where Luy would specifically indicate the IAs. This listing
would be sent to Labayen who would then endorse it to the DBM under her authority as Deputy Chief-
of-Staff of Senator Estrada. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator Estrada to the DBM,
Napoles would give Tuason or Labayen a down payment for delivery to Senator Estrada. After the SARO
and/or NCA is released, Napoles would give Tuason the full payment for delivery to Senator
Estrada through Labayen or by Tuason.

It bears noting that money was paid and delivered to Senator Estrada even before the SARO and/or
NCA is released. Napoles would advance Senator Estrada's down payment from her own pocket upon
the mere release by his Office of the listing of projects to the DBM, with the remainder of the amount
payable to be given after the SARO representing the legislator's PDAF allocation is released by the DBM
and a copy of the SARO forwarded to Napoles.

Significantly, after the DBM issues the SARO, Senator Estrada, through Labayen, would then write
another letter addressed to the IAs which would identify and indorse Napoles' NGOs as his preferred
NGO to undertake the PDAF-funded project, thereby effectively designating in writing the Napoles-
affiliated NGO to implement projects funded by his PDAF. Along with the other PDAF documents,
the indorsement letter of Senator Estrada is transmitted to the IA, which, in turn, handles the
preparation of the MOA concerning the project, to be entered into by the Senator's Office, the IA and
the chosen NGO.

[Dennis] Cunanan, [Deputy Director General of TRC], in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed that Senator
Estrada confirmed to him that he, indeed, chose the NGOs named in the aforementioned letters and
insisted that the choice be honored by the TRC:

17.4.� . . . I remember vividly how both Senators Revilla and Estrada admonished me because they
thought that TRC was purportedly "delaying" the projects. Both Senators Revilla and Estrada insisted
that the TRC should honor their choice of NGO, which they selected to implement the projects, since
the projects were funded from their PDAF. They both asked me to ensure that TRC would immediately
act on and approve their respective projects. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

As previously discussed, the indorsements enabled Napoles to gain access to substantial sums of public
funds. The collective acts of Senator Estrada, Napoles, et al. allowed the illegal diversion of public funds
to their own personal use.

It cannot be gainsaid that the sums of money received by Senator Estrada amount to "kickbacks" or
"commissions" from a government project within the purview of Sec. 1 (d) (2) of RA 7080. He repeatedly
received commissions, percentage or kickbacks representing his share in the project cost allocated from
his PDAF, in exchange for his indorsement of Napole[s'] NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded projects.
Worse, the evidence indicates that he took undue advantage of his official position, authority and
influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense, and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines, within the purview of Sec. 1 (d) (6) of RA 7080. He used and
took undue advantage of his official position, authority and influence as a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines to access his PDAF and illegally divert the allocations to the possession and control of
Napoles and her cohorts, in exchange for commissions, kickbacks, percentages from the PDAF
allocations.

Undue pressure and influence from Senator Estrada's Office, as well as his endorsement of Napoles'
NGOs, were brought to bear upon the public officers and employees of the IAs.

[Francisco] Figura, an officer from the TRC, claimed that the TRC management told him: "legislators
highly recommended certain NGOs/Foundations as conduit implementors and since PDAFs are their
discretionary funds, they have the prerogative to choose their NGO's"; and the TRC management warned
him that "if TRC would disregard it (choice of NGO), they (legislators) would feel insulted and would
simply take away their PDAF from TRC, and TRC losses (sic) the chance to earn service fees." Figura
further claimed that he tried his best to resist the pressure exerted on him and did his best to perform
his duties faithfully; [but] he and other low-ranking TRC officials had no power to "simply disregard the
wishes of Senator [Estrada],"especially on the matter of public bidding for the PDAF projects.

Cunanan, narrates that he met Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007, who "introduced herself as the
representative of certain legislators wo supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded projects;" at
the same occasion, Napoles told him that "her principals were then Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile,
Senators Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr., Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada;" letters signed by Estrada prove that
he [Estrada] directly indorsed NGOs affiliated with or controlled by Napoles to implement his PDAF
projects; in the course of his duties, he "often ended up taking and/or making telephone
verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their staff members;" during one of these
telephone conversations, Estrada admonished him and "insisted that the TRC should honor their
choice of the NGO....since the projects were funded from their PDAF;" "all the liquidation documents
and the completion reports of the NGO always bore the signatures of Ms. Pauline Labayen, the duly
designated representative of Sen. Estrada;" and he occasionally met with witness Luy,
who pressured him to expedite the release of the funds by calling the offices of the legislators.

NLDC's [Gondelina] Amata also mentioned about undue pressure surrounding the designation of NLDC
as one of the Implementing Agencies for PDAF. Her fellow NLDC employee [Gregoria] Buenaventura
adds that in accordance with her functions, she "checked and verified the endorsement letters of
Senator [Estrada], which designated the NGOs that would implement his PDAF projects and found
them to be valid and authentic;" she also confirmed the authenticity of the authorization given by
Estrada to his subordinates regarding the monitoring, supervision and implementation of PDAF
projects; and her evaluation and verification reports were accurate.

Another NLDC officer, [Alexis] Sevidal, claimed that Senator Estrada and Napoles, not NLDC employees,
were responsible for the misuse of the PDAF; Senator Estrada, through Labayen, was responsible
for "identifying the projects, determining the project costs and choosing the NGOs" which
was "manifested in the letters of Senator Estrada and Ms. Pauline Labayen...that were sent to the
NLDC;" and that he and other NLDC employees were victims of the "political climate" and "bullied into
submission by the lawmakers."

The evidence evinces that Senator Estrada used and took undue advantage of his official position,
authority and influence as a Senator to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

The PDAF was allocated to Senator Estrada by virtue of his position, hence, he exercised control in the
selection of his priority projects and programs. He indorsed Napoles' NGOs in consideration for the
remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. These circumstances were compounded by the
fact that the PDAF-funded projects were "ghost projects" and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went
into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts. Undeniably, Senator Estrada unjustly enriched himself at
the expense, and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Third, the amounts earned by Senator Estrada through kickbacks and commissions amounted to more
than Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Witness Luy's ledger shows, among others, that Senator Estrada received the following amounts as and
by way of kickbacks and commissions:
 Year Amount received� by Senator Estrada (In
PhP)
2004 1,500,000.00
2005 16,170,000.00
2006 12,750,000.00
2007 16,250,000.00
2008 51,250,000.00
2009 2,200,000.00
2010 73,923,750.00
2012 9,750,000.00
Total: Php183,793,750.00

The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired by
Senator Estrada stands at Php183,793,750.00, at the very least.

The sums were received by the Senator either personally or through his Deputy Chief-Of-Staff, Labayen,
as earlier discussed.

Napoles provided those kickbacks and commissions. Witnesses Luy and Su�as, not to mention Tuason,
stated that Napoles was assisted in delivering the kickbacks and commissions by her employees and
cohorts John Raymond de Asis, Ronald John Lim and Tuason.

Senator Estrada's commission of the acts covered by Section 1 (d) (2) and Section 1 (d) (6) of RA No.
7080 repeatedly took place over the years 2004 to 2012. This shows a pattern � a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts � directed towards a common purpose or goal, which is to enable
Senator Estrada to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.

Senator Estrada, taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence as a Senator acted, in connivance with his subordinate-authorized representative Labayen, to
receive commissions and kickbacks for indorsing the Napoles NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded
project; and likewise, in connivance with Napoles, with the assistance of her employees and cohorts
Tuason, de Asis and Lim who delivered the kickbacks to him. These acts are linked by the fact that they
were plainly geared towards a common goal which was to amass, acquire and accumulate ill-gotten
wealth amounting to at least Php183,793,750.00 for Senator Estrada.49 (Emphasis in the original)

In concluding that there is probable cause to indict Estrada for 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) RA
3019, the Ombudsman likewise examined the evidence on record in finding that it is reasonably
apparent that the elements of the crime are present:

First, respondents Senator Estrada, Labayen, x x x were all public officers at the time material to the
charges. Their respective roles in the processing and release of PDAF disbursements were in the exercise
of their administrative and/or official functions.

Senator Estrada himself chose, in writing, the Napoles-affiliated NGO to implement projects funded by
his PDAF. His trusted authorized staff: respondent Labayen, then prepared indorsement letters and
other communications relating to the PDAF disbursements addressed to the DBM and the IAs (NABCOR,
TRC and NLDC). This trusted staff member also participated in the preparation and execution of MOAs
with the NGOs and the IAs, inspection and acceptance reports, disbursement reports and other PDAF
documents.

xxxx

From the accounts of witnesses Luy, Sula and Su�as as well as of Tuason, Napoles made a business
proposal to Labayen regarding the Senator's PDAF, which Labayen accepted. Senator Estrada later chose
NGOs affiliated with/controlled by Napoles to implement his PDAF-funded projects.

xxxx

Second, Senator Estrada and respondent-public officers of the IAs were manifestly partial to Napoles,
her staff and the NGOs affiliated she controlled.
xxxx

That Napoles and the NGOs affiliated with/controlled by her were extended undue favor is manifest.

Senator Estrada repeatedly and directly chose the NGOs headed or controlled by Napoles and her
cohorts to implement his projects without the benefit of a public bidding, and without being authorized
by an appropriation law or ordinance.

As correctly pointed out by the FIO, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184 states that an
NGO may be contracted only when so authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance.

xxxx

National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 476, as amended by NBC No. 479, provides that PDAF allocations
should be directly released only to those government agencies identified in the project menu of the
pertinent General Appropriations Act (GAAs). The GAAs in effect at the time material to the charges,
however, did not authorize the direct release of funds to NGOs, let alone the direct contracting of NGOs
to implement government projects. This, however, did not appear to have impeded Estrada's direct
selection of the Napoles affiliated or controlled NGOs, and which choice was accepted in toto by the IAs.

Even assuming arguendo that the GAAs allowed the engagement of NGOs to implement PDAF-funded
projects, such engagements remain subject to public bidding requirements. x x x.

xxxx

The aforementioned laws and rules, however, were disregarded by public respondents, Senator Estrada
having just chosen the Napoles-founded NGOs. Such blatant disregard of public bidding requirements is
highly suspect, especially in view of the ruling in Alvarez v. People.

xxxx

Notatu dignum is the extraordinary speed attendant to the examination, processing and approval by the
concerned NABCOR, NLDC and TRC officers of the PDAF releases to the Napoles-affiliated or controlled
NGOs. In most instances, the DVs were accomplished, signed and approved on the same day. Certainly,
the required, careful examination of the transaction's supporting documents could not have taken place
if the DV was processed and approved in one day.

xxxx

In addition to the presence of manifest partiality on the part of respondent public officers alluded
to, evident bad faith is present.

xxxx

That several respondent public officers unduly benefitted from the diversion of the PDAF is borne by the
records.

As earlier mentioned, Tuason claimed that she regularly remitted significant portions (around 50%) of
the diverted sums to Estrada, which portions represented Senator Estrada's "share" or "commission" in
the scheme, x x x.

xxxx

Notably, Tuason admitted having received a 5% commission for acting as liaison between Napoles and
Senator Estrada.

Witness Luy's business ledgers validate Tuason's claim that Labayen did, from time to time, receive
money from Napoles that was intended for Estrada.

xxxx

Indubitably, repeatedly receiving portions of sums of money wrongfully diverted from public coffers
constitutes evident bad faith.
Third, the assailed PDAF-related transactions caused undue injury to the Government in the aggregate
amount of PHP278,000,000.00.

Based on the 2007-2009 COA Report as well as on the independent field verification conducted by the
FIO, the projects supposedly funded by Senator Estrada's PDAF were "ghost[s]" or inexistent. There
were no livelihood kits distributed to beneficiaries. Witnesses Luy, Sula and Sufias declared that, per
directive given by Napoles, they made up lists of fictitious beneficiaries to make it appear that the
projects were implemented, albeit none took place.

Instead of using the PDAF disbursements received by them to implement the livelihood projects,
respondent De Asis as well as witnesses Luy, Sula and Su�as, all acting for Napoles, continuously
diverted these sums amounting to PHP278,000,000.00 to the pocket of Napoles.

Certainly, these repeated, illegal transfers of public funds to Napoles' control, purportedly for projects
which did not exist, and just as repeated irregular disbursements thereof, represent quantifiable,
pecuniary losses to the Government, constituting undue injury within the context of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019.

Fourth, respondents Estrada, Labayen x x x, granted respondent Napoles unwarranted benefits.

xxxx

x x x. That they repeatedly failed to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9184, its implementing rules
and regulations, GPPB regulations as well as national budget circulars shows that unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference were given to private respondents.

The NGOs selected by Estrada did not appear to have the capacity to implement the undertakings to
begin with. At the time material to the charges, these entities did not possess the required accreditation
to transact with the Government, let alone possess a track record in project implementation to speak
of.50

In Clave v. Office of the Ombudsman,51 we held that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the
Ombudsman only has to find enough relevant evidence to support its belief that the accused most likely
committed the crime charged. Otherwise, grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to its ruling.

Given the ample supporting evidence it has on hand, the Ombudsman's exercise of prerogative to
charge Estrada with plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was not whimsical, capricious, or
arbitrary, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. Estrada's bare claim to the contrary cannot prevail
over such positive findings of the Ombudsman.

In Reyes, we unanimously ruled that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding
probable cause to indict Reyes of plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 after its consideration
that the testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to reasonably conclude that
Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and, hence, must stand trial therefor. The
testimonial and documentary evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman in Reyes are: (a) the declarations
of the whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Su�as; (b) Tuason's verified statement which corroborated the
whistleblowers accounts; (c) the business ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts
received by Senator Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his "commission" from the so-called PDAF
scam; (d) the 2007-2009 COA Report documenting the results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF
disbursements - that there were serious irregularities relating to the implementation of PDAF-funded
projects, including those endorsed by Senator Enrile; and (e) the reports on the independent field
verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO which secured sworn statements of local
government officials and purported beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be
inexistent.

We held in Reyes that: "[i]ndeed, these pieces of evidence are already sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that the crimes charged were committed and Reyes is probably guilty thereof as it
remains apparent that: (a) Reyes, a public officer, connived with Senator Enrile and several other
persons x x x in the perpetuation of the afore-described PDAF scam, among others, in entering into
transactions involving the illegal disbursement of PDAF funds; (b) Senator Enrile and Reyes acted with
manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith by repeatedly endorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as
beneficiaries of his PDAF without the benefit of public bidding and/or negotiated procurement in
violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement; (c) the PDAF-funded
projects turned out to be inexistent; (d) such acts caused undue injury to the government, and at the
same time, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to the beneficiaries of the scam; and
(e) Senator Enrile, through Reyes, was able to accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least P172,834,500.00."52

In Cambe, we likewise upheld the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against Revilla and held that
Revilla should stand for trial for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, considering that after
taking all the pieces of evidence together, i.e. the PDAF documents, the whistleblowers' testimonies,
Luy's business ledger, the COA and FIO reports, these pieces of evidence tend to prima facie� establish
that irregularities had indeed attended the disbursement of Revilla's PDAF and that he had a hand in
such anomalous releases, being the head of office which unquestionably exercised operational control
thereof. We agreed with the Ombudsman's observation that, "[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by virtue
of his position as a Senator, and therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority projects
and programs. He indorsed [Napoles'] NGOs in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks and
commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be
'ghost projects', and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her
cohorts, [there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly enriched himself at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines." 53

In the present case, the Ombudsman relied upon the same testimonial and documentary evidence relied
upon by the Ombudsman in Reyes and Cambe, specifically: (a) the testimonies of the whistleblowers
Luy, Sula, and Su�as; (b) the affidavits of Tuason and other co-respondents in the NBI and FIO
Complaints; (c) the business ledgers prepared by Luy, showing the amounts received by Estrada, through
Tuason and Labayen, as his "commission" from the so-called PDAF scam; (d) the COA Report
documenting the results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements; and (e) the reports on
the independent field verification conducted by the FIO. Aside from the said pieces of evidence, the
Ombudsman pointed to the PDAF documents, corporate papers of JLN-controlled NGOs, and admissions
made by some of Estrada's co-respondents themselves, in concluding that a person of ordinary caution
and prudence would believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that plunder and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were indeed committed by Estrada, among the respondents named in the Joint
Resolution.

Applying our ruling in Reyes and Cambe to the present case, the Ombudsman, thus, did not abuse its
discretion in holding that the same pieces of evidence, taken together, are already sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged were committed and Estrada is probably guilty
thereof, since it remains apparent that: (a) Estrada, a public officer, connived with Napoles and several
other persons in entering into transactions involving the illegal disbursement of PDAF funds; (b) Estrada
acted with manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith by repeatedly endorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs
as beneficiaries of his PDAF in violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government
procurement; (c) the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be inexistent; (d) such acts caused undue
injury to the government, and at the same time, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference
to the beneficiaries of the scam; and (e) Estrada, through Tuason and Labayen, was able to accumulate
and acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P183,793,750.00.

Given that the Court previously unanimously ruled in Reyes that the following pieces of evidence: (a) the
declarations of the whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Su�as; (b) Tuason's verified statement which
corroborated the whistleblowers' accounts; (c) the business ledgers prepared by Luy; (d) the COA Report
documenting the results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements; and (e) the reports on
the independent field verification conducted by the FIO, all taken together are already sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged were committed, specifically plunder and
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and petitioners in Reyes and Cambe were probably guilty thereof,
we shall likewise take these into account and uphold in the present case the finding of the Ombudsman
as to the existence of probable cause against Estrada based on the said pieces of evidence.

Besides, we held in Estrada, that "the sufficiency of the evidence put forward by the Ombudsman
against Sen. Estrada to establish its finding of probable cause in the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in
OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 was judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan, when it
examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued a warrant of arrest against Sen. Estrada on
23 June 2014."54

In Sec. De Lima v. Reyes,55 this Court held that once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, such as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Estrada, any
question on the prosecution's conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.
Thus, the Ombudsman's exercise of prerogative to charge Estrada with plunder and violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 was not whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary, amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

To emphasize, a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial
on the merits.56 Moreover, the validity and merit of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.57

Thus, Estrada's defense, similar to De Asis' and Napoles', which is anchored on the absence of all the
elements of the crime charged, is better ventilated during trial and not during preliminary investigation.

Moreover, as to De Asis' arguments that there is no evidence that he knowingly took part in the acts of
plunder, and that he merely acted as driver, messenger, and janitor in good faith when he delivered
money to Napoles' house or he picked up checks and deposited the same in banks,58 we have already
ruled upon the same arguments raised by De Asis and upheld the finding of probable cause against him
in the case of Cambe:

Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator of KPMFI which was one of the
many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF allocations.
Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Su�as explicitly named De Asis as one of those who prepared
money to be given to the lawmaker. Said whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among others,
received the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after
the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet
Napoles' house. Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that, in all probability,
De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.

To refute the foregoing allegations, De Asis presented defenses which heavily centered on his
perceived want of criminal intent, as well as the alleged absence of the elements of the crimes
charged. However, such defenses are evidentiary in nature, and thus, are better ventilated during trial
and not during preliminary investigation. To stress, a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the fulland exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon
only after a full-blown trial on the merits.59 (Emphasis supplied)

As to the finding of probable cause to indict Napoles for the crimes charged, and as to her argument
that the NBI and FIO Complaints are defective and insufficient in form and substance as to the charges
against her, we likewise find our ruling in Reyes applicable to this case:

Anent Janet Napole[s'] complicity in the abovementioned crimes, records similarly show that she, in all
reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the calculated misuse of Senator Enrile's PDAF. As
exhibited in the modus operandi discussed earlier, once Janet Napoles was informed of the availability
of a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the "lead employee" of the JLN Corporation, would prepare a
listing of the available projects specifically indicating the IAs. After said listing is released by the Office of
Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery
to Senator Enrile through Reyes, with the remainder of the amount given to the Senator after the SARO
and/or NCA is released. Senator Enrile would then indorse Janet Napole[s'] NGOs to undertake the
PDAF-funded projects, which were "ghost projects" that allowed Janet Napoles and her cohorts to
pocket the PDAF allocation.

Based on the evidence in support thereof, the Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against
Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has prima facie been established that: (a) she, in conspiracy
with Senator Enrile, Reyes, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-
described modus operandi to obtain Senator Enrile's PDAF, who supposedly abused his authority as a
public officer in order to do so; (b) through this modus operandi, it appears that Senator Enrile
repeatedly received ill-gotten wealth in the form of "kickbacks" in the years 2004-2010; and (c) the total
value of "kickbacks" given to Senator Enrile amounted to at least P172,834,500.00.

In the same manner, there is probable cause against Janet Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, as it is ostensible that: (a) she conspired with public officials, i.e., Senator Enrile and his chief of
staff, Reyes, who exercised official functions whenever they would enter into transactions involving
illegal disbursements of the PDAF; (b) Senator Enrile, among others, has shown manifest partiality and
evident bad faith by repeatedly indorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF-funded
projects - even without the benefit of a public bidding and/or negotiated procurement, in direct
violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement;and (c) the "ghost" PDAF-
funded projects caused undue prejudice to the government in the amount of P345,000,000.00.

xxxx

Furthermore, there is no merit in Janet Napole[s'] assertion that the complaints are insufficient in form
and in substance for the reason that it lacked certain particularities such as the time, place, and manner
of the commission of the crimes charged. "According to Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypotheticallv admitted, constitute the elements of the offense." In this case, the NBI and the FIO
Complaints stated that: (a) Senator Emile, Reyes, and Janet Napoles, among others, are the ones
responsible for the PDAF scam; (b) Janet Napoles, et al. are being accused of Plunder and violations of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019; (c) they used a certain modus operandi to perpetuate said scam, details of
which were stated therein; (d) because of the PDAF scam, the Philippine government was prejudiced
and defrauded in the approximate amount of P345,000,000.00; and (e) the PDAF scam happened
sometime between the years 2004 and 2010, specifically in Taguig City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and
Pasay City. The aforesaid allegations were essentially reproduced in the sixteen (16) Informations �
one (1) for Plunder and fifteen (15) for violation of RA 3019 � filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Evidently, these factual assertions already square with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-cited. Upon such averments, there is no gainsaying that Janet
Napoles has been completely informed of the accusations against her to enable her to prepare for an
intelligent defense. The NBI and the FIO Complaints are, therefore, sufficient in form and in
substance.60 (Boldfacing and underscoring in the original)

Applying our ruling in Reyes and Cambe, we likewise do not find that the Ombudsman gravely abused
its discretion in finding probable cause to indict De Asis and Napoles for the crimes charged in the
present case.

Moreover, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.'s dissent should not have individually assessed as
inadmissible and incompetent the evidence used by the Ombudsman in finding that probable cause
exists to indict petitioners for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

In De Lima v. Judge Guerrero,61� penned by Justice Velasco, the Court held that the admissibility of
evidence, their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the credibility of the witness are matters that
are best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial, not during a preliminary investigation where the
technical rules of evidence are not applied nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, the better alternative is to proceed to the conduct of trial on
the merits and for the prosecution to present its evidence in support of its allegations.

In any event, we have already ruled on the arguments raised by Justice Velasco in individually refuting
the evidence used by the Ombudsman in finding probable cause in the cases of Reyes and Cambe.

First, there is no basis in ruling at this stage that the whistleblowers' statements, along with those of
Estrada's co-respondents, are not admissible as evidence for being hearsay and covered by the res inter
alios acta rule. We have already unanimously ruled in Reyes, and reiterated in Cambe, that technical
rules on evidence, such as hearsay evidence and the res inter alios acta rule, should not be rigidly
applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings, thus:

Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which
states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be
sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in
the course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's
appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on
evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights
and obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies
substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by
the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law
edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control
over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this case. 62 (Emphasis supplied)

To reiterate, in Estrada, where the present petitioner is the same petitioner, we held that since a
preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties, "probable
cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay."63 On the applicability of res inter alios acta rule, we further stated that: "In OMB-C-C-13-0313
and OMB-C-C-13-0397, the admissions of Sen. Estrada's co-respondents can in no way prejudice Sen.
Estrada. Even granting Justice Velasco's argument that the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-
13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 mentioned the testimonies of Sen. Estrada's co-respondents like Tuason
and Cunanan, their testimonies were merely corroborative of the testimonies of complainants'
witnesses Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Su�as and were not mentioned in isolation from the
testimonies of complainants' witnesses."64

Second, as to Estrada's endorsement letters, which he admittedly executed, instructing the IAs to have
his PDAF-funded projects implemented by JLN-controlled NGOs, we held in Cambe that "the PDAF
documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to
release his PDAF funds to the identified JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made
possible the processing of his PDAF, x x x � directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they
were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that 'the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment
phases of project implementation.' x x x. It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as
Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices
throughout the years x x x under the DBM's menu for pork barrel allocations. '[However,] [i]t bears
noting that the NGO is directly endorsed by the legislator [and that] [n]o public bidding or negotiated
procurement [took] place[,]' [in] defiance of [GPPB] Resolution No. 012-2007." 65 Similarly, Estrada's
endorsement letters directly implicate him for the crimes charged and there is no basis for his argument
that his letters were merely recommendatory.

Third, as to Luy's business ledger, Luy's admission of falsification of PDAF-related documents did not cast
serious doubt on its credibility, considering that in Cambe, we already held:

Luy's testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would sometimes forge the
legislators' signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her prior agreement with
the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that this authorization allows for a more expedient
processing of PDAF funds since the documents required for their release need not pass through the
legislator's respective offices. It is also apparent that this grant of authority gives the legislators room for
plausible deniability: the forging of signatures may serve as a security measure for legislators to disclaim
their participation in the event of discovery. Therefore, Luy's testimony completely makes sense as to
why the legislators would agree to authorize Napoles and her staff to forge their signatures. As
such, even if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does not mean that the legislators did
not authorize such forgery.66 (Emphasis supplied)

And, fourth, as to the COA Report and FIO verifications, we likewise find that these evidence buttress
the finding of probable cause against Estrada as they did against Revilla since we held in Cambe:

The findings of the COA in its SAO Report No. 2012-2013 (COA report) also buttress the finding of
probable cause against Sen. Revilla. This report presents in detail the various irregularities in the
disbursement of the PDAF allocations of several legislators in the years 2007 to 2009, such as: (a) the IAs
not actually implementing the purported projects, and instead, directly releasing the funds to the NGOs
after deducting a "management fee," which were done at the behest of the sponsoring legislator x x x;
(b) the involved NGOs did not have any track record in the implementation of government projects,
provided fictitious addresses, submitted false documents, and were selected without any public bidding
and complying with COA Circular No. 2007-001 and GPPB Resolution No. 12-2007; and (c) the suppliers
who purportedly provided supplies to the NGOs denied ever dealing with the latter. Resultantly, the
COA Report concluded that the PDAF-funded projects of Sen. Revilla were "ghost" or inexistent.
The findings in the COA report were further corroborated by the field verifications conducted by the
Field Investigation Office - Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) to determine whether or not Sen. Revilla's
PDAF was indeed utilized for its intended livelihood projects. In the course of investigation, it was
revealed that the mayors and municipal agriculturists, who had reportedly received livelihood assistance
kits/packages, purportedly procured through Sen. Revilla's PDAF, actually denied receiving the same and
worse, were not even aware of any PDAF-funded projects intended for their benefit. Moreover, the
signatures on the certificates of acceptance and delivery reports were forged, and in fact, the supposed
beneficiaries listed therein were neither residents of the place where they were named as such; had
jumbled surnames; deceased; or even downright fictitious. The foregoing led the FIO to similarly
conclude that the purported livelihood projects were "ghost" projects, and that its proceeds amounting
to P517,000,000.00 were never used for the same.67

Accordingly, as Justice Velasco's dissent put it: "x x x the Ombudsman is given wide latitude, in the
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to prosecute offenses involving public officials and
employees, pursuant to Sec. 15 of RA No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. As
such, the Ombudsman possesses the authority to determine whether probable cause exists or not in a
given set of facts and circumstances that would warrant the filing of a criminal case against erring
government employees."68 Thus, we have consistently held that we will not interfere in the
determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, absent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether probable cause
exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. 69 The
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the
accused.70 All that the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the counter-
allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof.71 Even Justice Velasco's dissent stated that:

Certainly, prosecutors are given a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether an information
should be filed in court or whether the complaint shall be dismissed, and the courts must respect the
exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face,
and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. It is
for this reason that Sen. Estrada's asseveration of political persecution has no leg to stand on. Before
such a claim may prosper, it must be proved that the public prosecutor � the Ombudsman, in this
case � employed bad faith in prosecuting the case, or that it has employed schemes that lead to no
other purpose than to place Sen. Estrada in contempt and disrepute. I do not find such malevolent
designs in the case at bar.72 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there is no evidence that the Ombudsman acted in capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. No manifest error or grave abuse of discretion or bad faith
can be imputed to the public prosecutor, or the Ombudsman in this case. In fine, the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause prevails over petitioners' bare allegations of grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the Court must defer to the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman, in the absence of
actual grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit and AFFIRM the finding of probable cause
against all the petitioners.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 166510 April 29, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN "KOKOY" ROMUALDEZ, and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The relevant antecedent facts are stated in the Decision of the Court dated 23 July 2008 1 . We reproduce
them, to wit:

The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information reads:

That on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a public officer being then the Provincial Governor of the Province of
Leyte, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his Office,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the
Government in the following manner: accused public officer being then the elected Provincial Governor
of Leyte and without abandoning said position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign
countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and
United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment and/or
assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is
incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect
dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte
in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-six Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 56/100 (US
$276,911.56), US Currency or its equivalent amount of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven
Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three
Hundred Forty-eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) both Philippine Currencies, respectively, to the
damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds, namely: (1) that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute the offense with which the accused was charged; and (2) that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished by prescription. He argued that the acts imputed against him do
not constitute an offense because: (a) the cited provision of the law applies only to public officers
charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or other concessions, and the act charged — receiving dual
compensation — is absolutely irrelevant and unrelated to the act of granting licenses, permits, or other
concessions; and (b) there can be no damage and prejudice to the Government considering that he
actually rendered services for the dual positions of Provincial Governor of Leyte and Ambassador to
foreign countries.

To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11
of R.A. 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed on or
about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division
of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. He argued that there was no
interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken under the
1987 complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) were null and void
pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG and Cruz, Jr. [sic]. He likewise argued
that the Revised Penal Code provision that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippines should not apply to his case, as he was charged with an offense not covered by the
Revised Penal Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws (Republic Act
No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that found in the Revised Penal Code.

The People opposed the motion to quash on the argument that Romualdez is misleading the court in
asserting that Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 does not apply to him when Section 2 (b) of the law states that
corrupt practices may be committed by public officers who include "elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government." On the issue of prescription, the People
argued that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel, and that prescription is a matter of
technicality to which no one has a vested right. Romualdez filed a Reply to this Opposition.

The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the first Resolution assailed in this petition.
The Sandiganbayan stated:

We find that the allegation of damage and prejudice to the Government in the amount of P5,806,709.50
representing the accused's compensation is without basis, absent a showing that the accused did not
actually render services for his two concurrent positions as Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte
and as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and United States of
America. The accused alleges in the subject Motion that he actually rendered services to the
government. To receive compensation for actual services rendered would not come within the ambit of
improper or illegal use of funds or properties of the government; nor would it constitute unjust
enrichment tantamount to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Jurisprudence has established what "evident bad faith" and "gross negligence" entail, thus:

In order to be held guilty of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, the act of the accused that caused
undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. But bad
faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law, the "bad faith" must be "evident".

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . "Gross negligence" is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
willful or omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to
consequences as far as other persons may be affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The accused may have been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding of two concurrent
positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him criminally liable under the Information charged
against him, given the elements of the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court quoted above.
At most, any liability arising from the holding of both positions by the accused may be administrative in
nature.

xxx xxx xxx

However, as discussed above, the Information does not sufficiently aver how the act of receiving dual
compensation resulted to undue injury to the government so as to make the accused liable for violation
of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The Sandiganbayan found no merit in Romualdez' prescription argument.

The People moved to reconsider this Resolution, citing "reversible errors" that the Sandiganbayan
committed in its ruling. Romualdez opposed the People's motion, but also moved for a partial
reconsideration of the Resolution's ruling on prescription. The People opposed Romualdez' motion for
partial reconsideration.

Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan denied via the second assailed Resolution the People's motion for
reconsideration under the following terms —

The Court held in its Resolution of June 22, 2004, and so maintains and sustains, that assuming the
averments of the foregoing information are hypothetically admitted by the accused, it would not
constitute the offense of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 as the elements of (a) causing undue
injury to any party, including the government, by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
to such parties, and (b) that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, are wanting.

As it is, a perusal of the information shows that pertinently, accused is being charged for: (a) having
himself appointed as ambassador to various posts while serving as governor of the Province of Leyte and
(b) for collecting dual compensation for said positions. As to the first, the Court finds that accused
cannot be held criminally liable, whether or not he had himself appointed to the position of the
ambassador while concurrently holding the position of provincial governor, because the act of
appointment is something that can only be imputed to the appointing authority.

Even assuming that the appointee influenced the appointing authority, the appointee only makes a
passive participation by entering into the appointment, unless it is alleged that he acted in conspiracy
with his appointing authority, which, however, is not so claimed by the prosecution in the instant case.
Thus, even if the accused's appointment was contrary to law or the constitution, it is the appointing
authority that should be responsible therefor because it is the latter who is the doer of the alleged
wrongful act. In fact, under the rules on payment of compensation, the appointing authority responsible
for such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the
appointment been lawful. As it is, the appointing authority herein, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
has been laid to rest, so it would be incongruous and illogical to hold his appointee, herein accused,
liable for the appointment.

Further, the allegation in the information that the accused collected compensation in the amounts of
Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and
Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred Forty Eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86)
cannot sustain the theory of the prosecution that the accused caused damage and prejudice to the
government, in the absence of any contention that receipt of such was tantamount to giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party and to acting with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Besides receiving compensation is an incident of
actual services rendered, hence it cannot be construed as injury or damage to the government.

It likewise found no merit in Romualdez' motion for partial reconsideration. 2

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan in quashing the subject information. Private respondent responded with a Motion to
Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam, wherein he argued that the proper remedy to an order granting a
motion to quash a criminal information is by way of appeal under Rule 45 since such order is a final
order and not merely interlocutory. Private respondent likewise raised before this Court his argument
that the criminal action or liability had already been extinguished by prescription, which argument was
debunked by the Sandiganbayan.

The Court granted the petition in its 23 July 2008 Decision. While the Court acknowledged that the
mode for review of a final ruling of the Sandiganbayan was by way of a Rule 45 petition, it nonetheless
allowed the Rule 65 petition of petitioners, acceding that such remedy was available on the claim that
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction had been properly and substantially
alleged. The Decision then proceeded to determine that the quashal of the information was indeed
attended with grave abuse of discretion, the information having sufficiently alleged the elements of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offense with which private respondent was charged. The Decision
concluded that the Sandiganbayan had committed grave abuse of discretion by premising its quashal of
the information "on considerations that either not appropriate in evaluating a motion to quash; are
evidentiary details not required to be stated in an Information; are matters of defense that have no
place in an Information; or are statements amounting to rulings on the merits that a court cannot issue
before trial."

Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, placing renewed focus on his argument that the
criminal charge against him had been extinguished on account of prescription. In a Minute Resolution
dated 9 September 2008, the Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. On the argument of
prescription, the Resolution stated:

We did not rule on the issue of prescription because the Sandiganbayan's ruling on this point was not
the subject of the People's petition for certiorari. While the private respondent asserted in his Motion to
Dismiss Ad Cautelam filed with us that prescription had set in, he did not file his own petition to assail
this aspect of the Sandiganbayan ruling, he is deemed to have accepted it; he cannot now assert that in
the People's petitionthat sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayan ruling on some other ground, we
should pass upon the issue of prescription he raised in his motion.

Hence this second motion for reconsideration, which reiterates the argument that the charges against
private respondent have already prescribed. The Court required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda on whether or not prescription lies in favor of respondent.
The matter of prescription is front and foremost before us. It has been raised that following our ruling in
Romualdez v. Marcelo,3 the criminal charges against private respondent have been extinguished by
prescription. The Court agrees and accordingly grants the instant motion.

Private respondent was charged with violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed "on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986". However,
the subject criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5 November 2001, following a
preliminary investigation that commenced only on 4 June 2001. The time span that elapsed from the
alleged commission of the offense up to the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the fifteen (15)
year prescriptive period provided under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 3019. 4

Admittedly, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) had attempted to file similar
criminal cases against private respondent on 22 February 1989. However, said cases were quashed
based on prevailing jurisprudence that informations filed by the PCGG and not the Office of the Special
Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman are null and void for lack of authority on the part of the PCGG to
file the same. This made it necessary for the Office of the Ombudsman as the competent office to
conduct the required preliminary investigation to enable the filing of the present charges.

The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by the PCGG that preceded it
could not have interrupted the fifteen (15)-year prescription period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,5 the investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten
wealth cases, absent previous authority from the President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and
corruption cases involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary investigation conducted by
the PCGG leading to the filing of the first information is void ab initio, and thus could not be considered
as having tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general rule that the
commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period. After all, a void ab initio
proceeding such as the first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect
by this Court.

The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled only when
the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation. 6 As such
preliminary investigation was commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were
committed, the offense had already prescribed as of such time.

Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or resurrected by mere
amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence had again to be
adduced before a new information could be filed. The rule may well be that the amendment of a
criminal complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet such rule will not
apply when the original information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment.

The situation herein differs from that in the recent case of SEC v. Interport, 7 where the Court had
occasion to reexamine the principles governing the prescription of offenses punishable under special
laws. Therein, the Court found that the investigative proceedings conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission had tolled the prescriptive period for violations of the Revised Securities Act,
even if no subsequent criminal cases were instituted within the prescriptive period. The basic difference
lies in the fact that no taint of invalidity had attached to the authority of the SEC to conduct such
investigation, whereas the preliminary investigation conducted herein by the PCGG is simply void ab
initio for want of authority.

Indeed the Court in 2006 had the opportunity to favorably rule on the same issue of prescription on
similar premises raised by the same respondent. In Romualdez v. Marcelo8 , as in this case, the original
preliminary investigation was conducted by the PCGG, which then acted as complainant in the complaint
filed with the Sandiganbayan. Given that it had been settled that such investigation and information
filed by the PCGG was null and void, the Court proceeded to rule that "[i]n contemplation of the law, no
proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods." As explained by
Justice Ynares-Santiago:

Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or
initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case of People v.
Maravilla, this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of
preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the case of
Llenes v. Dicdican, this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the
Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same
could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods. 9

Clearly, following stare decisis, private respondent’s claim of prescription has merit, similar in premises
as it is to the situation in Marcelo. Unfortunately, such argument had not received serious consideration
from this Court. The Sandiganbayan had apparently rejected the claim of prescription, but instead
quashed the information on a different ground relating to the elements of the offense. It was on that
point which the Court, in its 23 July 2008 Decision, understandably focused. However, given the reality
that the arguments raised after the promulgation of the Decision have highlighted the matter of
prescription as well as the precedent set in Marcelo, the earlier quashal of the information is, ultimately,
the correct result still.

It would be specious to fault private respondent for failing to challenge the Sandiganbayan’s
pronouncement that prescription had not arisen in his favor. The Sandiganbayan quashed the
information against respondent, the very same relief he had sought as he invoked the prescription
argument. Why would the private respondent challenge such ruling favorable to him on motion for
reconsideration or in a separate petition before a higher court? Imagine, for example, that the People
did not anymore challenge the Sandiganbayan rulings anymore. The dissent implies that respondent in
that instance should nonetheless appeal the Sandiganbayan’s rulings because it ruled differently on the
issue of prescription. No lawyer would conceivably give such advise to his client. Had respondent indeed
challenged the Sandiganbayan’s ruling on that point, what enforceable relief could he have obtained
other than that already granted by the Anti-Graft Court?

Our 2004 ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan10 cannot be cited against the position of private
respondent’s. The Sandiganbayan in that case denied the Motion to Quash filed based on prescription,
and so it was incumbent on petitioner therein to file an appropriate remedial action to reverse that
ruling and cause the quashal of the information. Herein, even as the Sandiganbayan disagreed with the
prescription argument, it nonetheless granted the Motion to Quash, and it would be ridiculous for the
petitioner to object to such action.

Notably, private respondent had already raised the issue of prescription in the very first responsive
pleading he filed before the Court – the Motion to Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam 11 dated 14 April
2005. The claim that private respondent should be deemed as having accepted the Sandiganbayan’s
ruling on prescription would have been on firmer ground had private respondent remained silent on
that point at the first opportunity he had before the Court.

The fact that prescription lies in favor of private respondent posed an additional burden on the
petitioner, which had opted to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari instead of the normal recourse to a
Rule 45. Prescription would have been considered in favor of private respondent whether this matter
was raised before us in a Rule 45 or a Rule 65 petition. Yet the bar for petitioner is markedly higher
under Rule 65 than under Rule 45, and its option to resort to Rule 65 instead in the end appears
needlessly burdensome for its part, a burden not helped by the fact that prescription avails in favor of
private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision dated 23 July 2008 and
the Resolution dated 9 September 2008 in the instant case are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition is
HEREBY DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
See People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, 23 July 2008, 559 SCRA 492.

2
Id. at 496-500.

3
G.R. Nos. 165510-33, 28 July 2006, 497 SCRA 89.

4
"Prescription of offenses. – All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in fifteen
years."

Applying People v. Pacificador, G.R. No. 139405, 13 March 2001, 354 SCRA 310, any
offenses involving violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 which respondent might have
committed from 1976 to 1982, the latter year being that prescribed in 10 years under
the law in effect at the time. In 1982, the law was amended by setting the period of
prescription at 15 years but the new period only applies to offenses committed after
1982. Nonetheless, this point is moot in this case since the preliminary investigation by
the Ombudsman commenced more than fifteen years after February, 1986.

5
G.R. No. 94595, 26 February 1991, 194 SCRA 474.

6
See Salvador v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135249, 16 January 2004.

7
G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008.

8
G.R. Nos. 165510-33, 28 July 2006, 497 SCRA 89.

9
Id., at 104.

10
G.R. No. 152259, 29 July 2004.

11
Rollo, pp. 174-197.
 DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I dissent. I reiterate my view on the matter of prescription, as expressed in my dissenting opinion

in Romualdez v. Marcelo.1

Private respondent cannot claim that prescription has set in in his favor despite his voluntary absence
from this jurisdiction from 1986 to April 2000 or for a period of nearly fourteen (14) years. A person who
commits a crime cannot simply flee from this jurisdiction, wait out for the prescriptive period to expire,
then come back to move for the dismissal of the charge against him on the ground of prescription.

First, there is a law, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which clearly provides that "[t]he term
of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago."

Both Romualdez v. Marcelo and the present case involve a violation of a special law, i.e., Republic Act
No. 3019 (RA 3019), otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." Section 11 of RA
3019 provides that, "All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in fifteen years." This special
law, however, does not specifically provide for a procedure for computing the prescriptive period.

In People v. Pacificador,2 the Court held that Section 2 of Act No. 33263 governs the computation of
prescriptive period of offenses defined and penalized by special laws. Accordingly, in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,4 the Court ruled that since the law involved, RA
3019, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is that provided
in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, to wit:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

In this connection, although the Revised Penal Code (RPC) expressly states in Article 10 thereof that
"[o]ffenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of [the RPC]," it likewise provides that the RPC "shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary." Verily, in a long line of court decisions,5 provisions of
the RPC have been applied suppletorily to resolve cases where special laws are silent on the matters in
issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled.

In computing the prescription of offenses, Article 91 of the RPC provides:

ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.- The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying Article 10 of the RPC, the provisions of Article 91 may be applied suppletorily to cases involving
violations of special laws where the latter are silent on the matters in issue. The only exception supplied
by Article 10 is "unless the [special laws] should specially provide the contrary."

As can be gleaned from Section 2 of Act No. 3326, said provision is "silent" as to whether the absence of
the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period fixed in the special law, RA
3019 in this case. This silence has been interpreted by the majority in Romualdez v. Marcelo to mean
that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend an interruption of the prescription by the absence of the
offender from Philippine soil, unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91 of the RPC. Further, the majority
concluded that "the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused
from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. x x x Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the Philippines as a
ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have been
expressly provided in Act No. 3326."

I cannot subscribe to this view.

It is conceded that both RA 3019 and Act No. 3326 are silent on whether the absence of the offender
from the Philippines bar the running of the prescriptive period. Ineluctably, this silence calls for the
suppletory application of related provisions of the RPC, pursuant to Article 10 thereof. Article 10 is
clear: "This Code (RPC) shall be supplementary to such laws (special laws), unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary." Thus, RPC provisions which are applicable shall supplement or supply
what is lacking in the special law unless prohibited by the latter. In this regard, it must be emphasized
that nothing in RA 3019 or in Act No. 3326 prohibits the suppletory application of Article 91 of the RPC.
Hence, there is no bar to the application to these special laws of Article 91 regarding the tolling of the
prescriptive period during the absence of the offender from Philippine jurisdiction.

The "silence" of Act No. 3326 should not be interpreted as that law restricting itself to its own provisions
in determining when the prescriptive period should be considered interrupted. The rule of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius6 is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation which may be ignored
where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. 7 This maxim
may be disregarded if adherence thereto would cause inconvenience, hardship, and injury to public
interest.8 Certainly, to consider the absence of an offender from the Philippine jurisdiction as not a bar
to the running of prescriptive period would inevitably cause injury to public interest, and thus, warrants
a disregard of this auxiliary rule.

I believe that more befitting in this case is the rule that where an interpretation of law would endanger
or sacrifice great public interest, such interpretation should be avoided. 9 The courts should presume that
such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal
words.10

Second, the accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the
simple expedient of fleeing from the State’s jurisdiction.

The majority opinion in Romualdez v. Marcelo cited the 1923 case of People v. Moran,11 which in turn
quoted from Wharton’s 1889 Criminal Pleading and Practice, to justify its "liberal interpretation of the
law on prescription in criminal cases." The majority emphasized this excerpt from the Moran ruling:

x x x The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at
liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from henceforth he may
cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. 12

This Court’s position was soundly rejected by the legislature when it enacted the Revised Penal Code in
1930. A more exacting rule on prescription was embodied in the Code, Article 91 of which was plain and
categorical: "The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago." Besides, it must be noted that even the cases involving liberal interpretation of the statute
of limitations in favor of the accused relate only to the following issues: (1) retroactive 13 or
prospective14 application of laws providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of
the nature of the felony committed vis a vis the applicable prescriptive period;15 and (3) the reckoning of
when the prescriptive period runs.16 Thus, contrary to the opinion of the majority in Romualdez, these
cases are no authority to support the conclusion that the prescriptive period in a special law runs while
the accused is abroad.

I reiterate my dissenting opinion in the Romualdez case:

There is good reason for the rule freezing the prescriptive period while the accused is abroad. The
accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the simple expedient
of escaping from the State's jurisdiction. This should be the rule even in the absence of a law tolling the
running of the prescriptive period while the accused is abroad and beyond the State's jurisdiction. An
accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being a fugitive from the State's jurisdiction. In this case,
there is even a law - Article 91 of the RPC, which Article 10 of the RPC expressly makes applicable to
special laws like RA 3019 - tolling the running of the prescriptive period while the accused is abroad.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the
balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of the State's ability to investigate
and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should not encourage
individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction
to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for
such anomalous practice. (Emphasis supplied)

I maintain that an accused cannot acquire legal immunity by fleeing from the State’s jurisdiction. To
allow such a loophole will make a mockery of our criminal laws. Contrary to private respondent’s claim,
prescription has not set in.

Accordingly, I vote to DENY the motion for reconsideration.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 216920

GIRLIE M. QUISAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 10, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968, which
affirmed the denial of petitioner Girlie M. Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to Quash before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144 (RTC).

The Facts

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya4 or
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7610,5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse Exploitation and
Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal6 or Information was filed before the RTC on January
11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.

On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack
of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her motion, petitioner
pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano
H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang
(SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal was penned by ACP De La Cruz, without any approval from any
higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or
approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard, petitioner claimed that
nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang
had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the
Information against her. As such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional
defect that cannot be cured.7

In its Comment and Opposition,8 the OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor, SACP Hirang,
was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32.9 Further, it
maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed with the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in
the Certification in the Information itself.10

The RTC Ruling

In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It found
the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City
Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations.12

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied in an Order14 dated July 10, 2013.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.15

The CA Ruling

In a Decision16 dated October 10, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that pursuant to Section 9
of RA 10071,17 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 201 O," as well as OCP-Makati Office
Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor of Makati authorized SACP Hirang to approve the issuance of, inter
alia, resolutions finding probable cause and the filing of Informations before the courts. As such, SACP
Hirang may, on behalf of the City Prosecutor, approve the Pasiya which found probable cause to indict
petitioner of violation of Section 10 of RA 7610.18

Further, it held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Pabatid Sakdal clearly indicated
that the same was filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and with the prior written authority
or approval of the City Prosecutor. In this regard, the CA opined that such Certification enjoys the
presumption of regularity accorded to a public officer's performance of official functions, in the absence
of convincing evidence to the contrary.19
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,20 but was denied in a Resolution21 dated January 30,
2015; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the R TC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion to quash.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint
or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a
complaint or information may be filed before the courts, viz.:

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within
ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.1âwphi1

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore,
subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 11 7 of the same Rules, to wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:

xxxx

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this relation, People v. Garfin22 firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without
the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by
silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings.23

In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the grounds
that: (a) the City Prosecutor ofMakati may delegate its authority to approve the filing of the Pabatid
Sakdal pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32;
and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before the RTC was with the
prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.

The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City
Prosecutor the power to "[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and
have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons
accused,"24 he may indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the
interest of the prosecution service. The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this
provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division
chiefs or review prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance, other
action, and any information recommended by any prosecutor for approval,"25 without necessarily
diminishing the City Prosecutor's authority to act directly in appropriate cases. 26 By virtue of the
foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang, Deputy City Prosecutor
Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review
prosecutors for the OCP-Makati.27

In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged,
was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati,
SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.

Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC, as
there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the
OCPMakati' s division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La
Cruz which stated, among others, that "DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng
sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig" 28 -
which translates to "and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the
City Prosecutor."

In the cases of People v. Garfin,29 Turingan v. Garfin,30 and Tolentino v. Paqueo,31 the Court had already
rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the
Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the
authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those
authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was
authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any
showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior
written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is
likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought the approval of either the City
Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid
Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya approved by
designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same
person or any other authorized officer in the OCP-Makati.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De
La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had
any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek the prior written approval from those
authorized to do so before filing the Information before the RTC.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as
the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the
same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in
the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions
contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the
Govemment."32

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated
January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case
against her is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

[ G.R. No. 217787, September 18, 2019 ]

SOCORRO F. ONGKINGCO AND MARIE PAZ B. ONGKINGCO, PETITIONERS, VS. KAZUHIRO SUGIYAMA
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Petitioners Socorro F. Ongkingco and Marie Paz B. Ongkingco filed a petition for review on certiorari,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October 24, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 35356,
which affirmed in toto the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC affirmed in toto the
Decision3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) which found petitioners guilty of four (4) counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 318339 to 318342. The MeTC ordered
petitioners to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each for Criminal Case Nos. 318339 to 318341, and P200,000.00
for Criminal Case No. 318342, and to jointly and severally pay complainant Kazuhiro Sugiyama the face
amount of the 4 dishonored checks in the total amount of P797,025.00, with interest at 12% per
annum from the filing of the complaint on April 11, 2002 until the amount is fully paid, and cost of suits.

The facts are as follows:

On April 6, 2001, respondent Kasuhiro4 Sugiyama entered into a "Contract Agreement"5 with New Rhia
Car Services, Inc. where petitioner Socorro is the President and Chairperson of the Board of Directors,
and petitioner Maria Paz B. Ongkingco is a Board Director. Under the Agreement, Sugiyama would
receive a monthly dividend of P90,675.00 for five years in exchange for his investment of P2,200,000.00
in New Rhia Car Services, Inc. To cover Sugiyama's monthly dividends, petitioners issued six (6) checks.
The first three (3) checks, dated September 10, 2011, October 10, 2001 and November 10, 2001, were
good checks, but the remaining 3 checks bounced for having been draw against insufficient funds.

In a Memorandum of Agreement6 dated October 2001, Socorro, President and General Manager of New
Rhia Car Service, Inc., obtained a loan from Sugiyama, a Director of the same company, amounting to
P500,000.00 with a five percent (5%) interest for a period of one (1) month. As a guarantee and
payment for the said obligation, Socorro issued an Allied Bank Check with No. 0000127109 dated
November 30, 2001, amounting to P525,000.00. When the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds, just like the 3 other checks initially issued
by petitioners. A formal demand letter dated March 5, 2002 was delivered to Socorro's office, but no
payment was made. Thus, Sugiyama filed a complaint against petitioners for four (4) counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22.

Save for the check numbers, check dates and amounts, the accusatory portions ofthe four (4) separate
Informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 318339,7 318340,8 3183419 and 318342,10 similarly read
as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of December 2001 or prior thereto, in the City of Makati Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the officers and
authorized signatories of New Rhia Car Services, [Inc.] did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make out, draw and issue to Kasuhiro Sugiyama, to apply on account or for value the check
described below:

Check No. : 0000122834

Drawn Against: Allied Bank
In the Amount of: [P]90,675.00
Dated/Postdated: December 10, 2001
Payable to: Kasuhiro Sugiyama

[S]aid accused well knowing that at the time of the issue thereof, said account did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon
its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason ''Draw Against Insufficient
Funds" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay the payee the amount
of the said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Makati, 7 August 2002.

[Signed]
EDGARDO G. HIRANO
Prosecutor II
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation has been conducted in this case; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof;
that the accused were given a chance to be informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against them; that they were given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence; and that this
Information is filed with the approval of the 1st Assistant City Prosecutor having been first obtained.

[Signed]
EDGARDO G. HIRANO
Prosecutor II

Both petitioners pleaded not guilty to the four (4) charges. On February 4, 2003, Socorro and Sugiyama
executed an "Addendum to Contract Agreement,"11 agreeing on a new schedule of payment with
interests, but the obligation remain unpaid.

On May 20, 2011, the MeTC rendered a Decision12 finding petitioners guilty of four (4) counts of
violation of B.P. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court renders judgment finding accused Socorro F. Ongkingco and Marie Paz B.
Ongkingco GUILTY of the offense of Violation of B.P. 22 on four (4) counts and hereby sentences them to
pay the respective FINE of:

1. P100.000.00 for Criminal Case No. 318339;

2. P100.000.00 for Criminal Case No. 318340;

3. P100.000.00 for Criminal Case No. 318341; and

4. P200.000.00 for Criminal Case No. 318342

with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Further, both accused are jointly and severally ORDERED to PAY complainant Kazuhiro Sugiyama the
respective face amount of the four (4) dishonored checks under Criminal Case Nos. 318339 to 318341 or
a total amount ofP797,025.00 with interest of 12.0% per annum from the filing of the complaint on April
11, 2002 until the amount is fully paid and cost of suits.

SO ORDERED.13

The MeTC ruled that the first and third elements of violation of B.P. 22 are present, namely: the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value, and the subsequent dishonor by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. The MeTC found that the subject 4 checks were issued
by the accused Socorro and Marie Paz as guarantee payment for the principal loan of P525,000.00 and
its interest obtained from Sugiyama. The MeTC noted that the accused admitted the issuance of the said
checks to Sugiyama in consideration of the loan to New Rhia Car Services, Inc.; thus, the subject checks
were issued on account or for value. The MeTC added that when the 4 checks were presented for
payment on their respective due dates, they were dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)" as shown on the dorsal portion of the said checks.

As regards the second element which requires that the prosecution must prove the knowledge of the
maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of the issue, he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment, the MeTC held:

Prosecution, in the case at bar, had presented witness [Marilou) La Serna [a staff of Sugiyama's private
counsel/private prosecutor] who testified that the demand letter dated March 5, 2002 demanding for
the payment of the dishonored checks was received by the secretary of accused Socorro as shown by
the handwritten signature on the face of the said letter. Said letter was personally delivered to the office
of accused Socorro at Amorsolo Mansion, Adelantado Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. While witness
La Serna did not met (sic) personally Socorro at the office, the secretary acknowledged the receipt of the
latter upon asking permission from accused Socorro who was inside the room (TSN dated March 09,
2010, page 7). Accused Marie Paz, on the other hand, failed to refute the same absent any controverting
evidence on her part. Prosecution, thus, was able to prove the receipt of the demand letter/notice of
dishonor. Despite receipt of the same, both accused failed to pay the face amount of the dishonored
checks or to make arrangement for the full settlement of the same.14

The MeTC further ruled that the prosecution was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the civil
liability of both Socorro and Marie Paz, thus:

x x x Accused Socorro did not deny the issuance of the subject checks in which she is one of the
signatories in favor of the complainant Sugiyama. (TSN dated September 06, 2010, page 16). Accused
Marie, for her part, failed to controvert the same. This was supported by the subject checks together
with the Contract of Agreement marked as (Exhibit "B to B-1") and Addendum to Contract Agreement
marked as (Exhibit "C to C-4"). However, upon presentment with the drawee bank for payment on their
respective due dates, it was dishonored for the reason "DAIF." Despite verbal demands by complainant
Sugiyama and receipt of the written demand letter made by its counsel, accused still failed to pay or
make arrangement for the full settlement of the face value of the dishonored checks. Both accused
should be held civilly answerable for the face amount of the subject four (4) dishonored checks under
Criminal Case Nos. 318339 to 318342 covering a total amount of P797,025.00.15

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the RTC, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the MeTC in an
Order16 dated June 28, 2012.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.

On October 24, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision denying the petition for review, the fallo of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Order dated 28 June 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 59, in Criminal Case Nos. 11-2287 & 11-2290 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.17

The CA ruled that petitioners' stance that they cannot be made liable for the value of the dishonored
checks as the same were issued without any consideration begs the question. As aptly held by the MeTC
and affirmed by the RTC, the subject checks were issued to guarantee the payment or return of the
money which Sugiyama gave to petitioners as loan and the corresponding interest. The CA added that
jurisprudence abounds that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the same was issued for a valuable consideration which may consist either in some right,
interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side.

In rejecting petitioners' theory that they could not be held criminally liable as they merely drew and
signed the corporate check as officers of the corporation, the CA pointed out that under paragraph 2,
Section 1 of B.P. 22, where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person/s who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable. This is because, generally, only natural
persons may commit a crime, and a criminal case can only be filed against the officers of a corporation
and not against the corporation itself, which can only act through its officers.

The CA also ruled that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence that petitioners issued the subject
dishonored checks. The CA pointed out that all petitioner Marie had to offer by way of defense was her
mere denial that she was not a signatory thereto, and that she neither testified nor participated in the
trial. The CA added that she could not invoke her lack of involvement in the negotiation for the
transaction as a defense, as B.P. 22 punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check, and not the
purpose for which the check was issued or in consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.

With the CA's denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for review
on certiorari, raising the following grounds: (1) the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Socorro received the notice of dishonor; (2) the prosecution failed to prove that Maria Paz is a
signatory to the checks involved in the case; and (3) the "Addendum to Contract Agreement" executed
by the parties obliterated the obligation arising from the dishonored checks. Petitioners also raise for
the first time that the four (4) Informations filed before the MeTC, Makati City, do not bear the approval
of the city prosecutor.
The petition is partly meritorious.

The dissent seeks to grant the petition, reverse and set aside the Decision of the CA, and acquit
petitioners on the grounds (1) that the Informations are defective for having been filed without prior
approval of the city prosecutor; and (2) that receipt of the notice of dishonor was not proven. The
dissent adds that this is without prejudice to the right of private complainant Sugiyama to pursue an
independent civil action against New Rhia Car Services, Inc. for the amount of the dishonored checks.

The dissent found that there is no proof in the records that Prosecutor II Edgardo G. Hirang filed the
Informations with prior authority from the 1st Assistant City Prosecutor. Assuming that Prosecutor II
Hirang was indeed authorized to do so, the Informations would still be defective because an Assistant
City Prosecutor is not one of the authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.18

In support of his view, the dissent cites the following cases:

1. People v. Judge Garfin,19 where the Court held that where the Information was filed by an
unauthorized officer, the infirmity therein constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be
cured;

2. Cudia v. CA,20 where the Court ruled that: (a) when the law requires an Information to be
filed by a specified public officer, the same cannot be filed by another; if not, the court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the accused and over the subject matter; and (b) the defense of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding; and

3. Maximo, et al. v. Villapando, Jr.,21 where the Court ruled that mere certification in the
Information that it was filed with approval of the city prosecutor is not enough; there must be a
demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was indeed given by the city
prosecutor to the assistant prosecutor to approve the filing of the Information.

The Court holds that the foregoing cases are not applicable. For one, as aptly pointed out by the Office
of the Solicitor General, petitioners are barred by estoppel by laches for their unjustified delay in raising
the issue of lack of prior written authority or approval to file the Informations. For another, the
supposed lack of written authority or approval to file the Informations is a waivable ground for a motion
to quash information.

In Garfin, the Information for violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8282, or the "Social Security
Law," was filed by a State Prosecutor with prior authority and approval of the Regional State Prosecutor.
The Court ruled, however, that nowhere in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 127522 is the regional state
prosecutor granted the power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file an
Information without prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor. No directive was issued by the Secretary of Justice to the Regional State Prosecutor to
investigate and/or prosecute Social Security System (SSS) cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction,
pursuant to Section 15 of P.D. No. 1275 which governs the appointment of special prosecutors. The
Court held that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating the State
Prosecutor as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the Information by the
provincial or city prosecutor, the Information filed before the trial court was filed by an officer without
authority to file the same. As the infirmity in the Information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that
cannot be cured, the judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In Cudia, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed a motion to dismiss/withdraw the Information, stating
that through inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the
Information, despite the fact that the accused was apprehended for illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm and ammunition within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. Despite the
opposition of the accused, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court invalidated the
Information filed by the city prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction over the place where
the said offense was committed, which is within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor. The Court
held that an Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be
filed by another, otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. The Court also stressed that
questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, and that an
infirmity in the Information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence or even by express consent.

In Maximo, an Information for perjury was filed against the accused before the MeTC of Makati City. A
motion to quash Information was filed, alleging that the person who filed the Information had no
authority to do so, because the Resolution finding probable cause did not bear the approval of the city
prosecutor. It was contended that the Information bears a certification that the filing of the same had
the prior authority or approval of the city prosecutor, and that there is a presumption of regularity that
prior written authority or approval was obtained in the filing of the Information, despite the non
presentation of the Office Order, which was the alleged basis of the authority. Stressing that there must
be a demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was given by the city prosecutor to the
assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the Information, the Court affirmed the findings of the
CA that: (1) the copy of the Office Order, allegedly authorizing the assistant city prosecutor to sign in
behalf of the city prosecutor, was not found in the record; (2) said Office Order is not a matter of judicial
notice, and a copy thereof must be presented in order for the court to have knowledge of its contents;
and (3) in the absence thereof, there was no valid delegation of authority by the city prosecutor to its
assistant city prosecutor.

In Garfin and Maximo, a motion to dismiss and motion to quash, respectively, were filed by the accused
on the ground that the Information was filed without prior written authority or approval of the city
prosecutor. Meanwhile, in Cudia, a motion to dismiss or withdraw Information was also filed by the city
prosecutor himself for lack of territorial jurisdiction over the offense.

In stark contrast to Garfin, Cudia and Maximo, petitioners failed to raise the lack of written authority or
approval of the city prosecutor before the MeTC, the RTC, and the CA without any justifiable reason. No
motion to dismiss or motion to quash was filed by petitioners. From the filing of the Informations in
2002, petitioners were silent on why they raised the said issue for the first time before the Court in
2015 via a petition for review on certiorari.

Defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, laches is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.23 Laches can be imputed against petitioners,
because a considerable length of time had elapsed before they raised the said procedural issue, and
reasonable diligence should have prompted them to file a motion to dismiss or to quash the Information
before the trial court. For the first time after almost 13 years after the filing of the Informations against
them, petitioners are now before the Court decrying that the prosecutor who filed the Informations
against them had no authority to do so.

It is also not amiss to state that had petitioners questioned the authority of Prosecutor II Hirang before
the trial court, the defect in the Informations could have been cured before the arraignment of the
accused by a simple motion of the prosecution to amend the Information; the amendment at this stage
of the proceedings being a matter of right on the part of the prosecution, or for the court to direct the
amendment thereof to show the signature or approval of the city prosecutor in filing the
Information.24 Moreover, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates that
if the motion to quash is based on the alleged defect of the complaint or Information which can be
cured by an amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. Either of these two could
have been done to address the issue of lack of written authority or approval of the officer who filed the
Information.

It is significant to note that under the substantive law,25 a public prosecutor has the authority to file an
Information, but before he or she can do so, a prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman, or his or her deputy, is required by a
procedural rule, i.e., Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It also bears
emphasis that under Section 9, Rule 117 of the same Rule, the ground that the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so, which prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the
case — referred to in Garfin and Cudia — pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the offense, which is a non-
waivable ground. The three other non-waivable grounds for a motion to quash the information are: (1)
the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (2) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
and (3) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
To recall, the Information in Garfin was sought to be dismissed, as it was filed by a special prosecutor
with the prior authority and approval of the regional state prosecutor, who was not authorized by the
Secretary of Justice to act as special counsel in SSS cases. On the other hand, the Information
in Cudia was sought to be dismissed or withdrawn, as it was inadvertently filed by the city prosecutor
who had no territorial jurisdiction over the place where the offense of illegal possession of firearm was
committed. In contrast to Garfin and Cudia where the officers had no authority under the law to file the
Information, the Information for perjury in Maximo was filed by the assistant city prosecutor with a
certification that it was done so with prior authority or approval of the city prosecutor, but the written
authority or delegation given by the city prosecutor to the former, to approve the filing of the
information, was not found on record, as pointed out in a motion to quash.

As held in Villa v. Ibañez,26 jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law, while jurisdiction
over the case is invested by the act of the plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the complaint or
information. Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, like a violation of the
Social Security Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked
with the filing of the Information.

Accordingly, in instances where the information is filed by an authorized officer, like a public prosecutor,
without the approval of the city prosecutor appearing in the information, but the resolution for filing of
the information bears the approval of the city prosecutor, or his or her duly authorized deputy, and such
lack of approval is timely objected to before arraignment, the court may require the public prosecutor to
have the signature of the city prosecutor affixed in the information to avoid undue delay. However, if
the objection is raised after arraignment, at any stage of the proceeding or even on appeal, the same
should no longer be a ground to declare the information as invalid, because it is no longer a question of
jurisdiction over the case. After all, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor attached to the
information carries with it the recommendation to file the information and the approval to file the
information by the prosecutor, or his or her duly authorized deputy.

If the information is filed by the public prosecutor without the city prosecutor's or his or her deputy's
approval both in the information and, the resolution for the filing thereof, then the court should require
the public prosecutor to seek the approval of the city prosecutor before arraignment; otherwise, the
case may be dismissed on the ground of lack of authority to file the information under Section 3(d), Rule
117. This ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, which may cause the dismissal of the
case.

If, however, the information is filed by an unauthorized official—not a public prosecutor, like a private
complainant, or even public officers who are not authorized by law or rule to file the information—then
the information is invalid from the very beginning, and the court should motu proprio dismiss the case
even without any motion to dismiss, because such kind of information cannot confer upon the court
jurisdiction over the case.

In this particular case, there is proof in the records that Prosecutor II Hirang filed the Informations with
prior authority from the 1st Assistant City Prosecutor. The records—which include those of the
preliminary investigation accompanying the informations filed before the court, as required under Rule
112—dearly show that 1st Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Jaime A. Adoc, signing in behalf of the City
Prosecutor, approved the filing of four (4) counts of violation of B.P. 22, after it was recommended for
approval by the Investigating Prosecutor.

The dispositive portion of the Resolution dated August 7, 2002 of the City Prosecution Office of Makati
City says it all:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondents be indicted with

four (4) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and that the attached Information for that
purpose be approved for filing in court.

Bail Recommended: P7,000.00 for each check for each accused.

Makati City, August 7, 2002.

[Signed]
EDGARDO G. HIRANO
Prosecutor II
RECOMMENDING APPROVAL:

[Signed]
Review Prosecutor

APPROVED:

FOR THE CITY PROSECUTOR

[Signed]
JAIME A. ADOC
1st Assistant City Prosecutor27

Contrary to the dissent that the prior approval came from the 1st Assistant Prosecutor, who had no
authority to file an Information on his own, the afore-quoted dispositive clearly indicates that ACP Adoc
approved the filing of the case "FOR THE CITY PROSECUTOR" and not on his own. It would be too late at
this stage to task the prosecution, and it would amount to denial of due process, to presume that ACP
Adoc had no authority to approve the filing of the subject Informations. Had petitioners questioned ACP
Adoc's authority or lack of approval by the city prosecutor before the MeTC, and not just for the first
time before the Court, the prosecution could have easily presented such authority to approve the filing
of the Information.

At any rate, the CA committed reversible error in affirming the conviction of petitioner Marie Paz of
violation of four (4) counts of B.P. 22, because the prosecution failed to prove that she received a notice
of dishonor. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, questions of fact may be raised if any of the following is
present: (1) When there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on
speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of
the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.28 Here, the seventh and tenth exceptions are present.

To sustain a conviction of violation of B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
three (3) essential elements, namely:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, drawee bank for payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit;
or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reasons, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. However, while the prosecution established
the second element, i.e., receipt of the notice of dishonor, with respect to petitioner Socorro, it failed to
do so in the case of petitioner Marie Paz.

The prosecution identified and formally offered in evidence, and petitioners admitted29 to have issued
the four (4) subject Allied Bank checks as guaranty checks, to wit: Check No. 0000122834 dated
December 10, 2011 in the amount of P90,675.00 as Exhibits "D" to "D-2"; Check No. 0000122835 dated
January 10, 2002 in the amount of P90,675.00 as Exhibits "E" to "E-2"; Check No. 0000122836 dated
February 10, 2002 in the amount of P90,675.00 as Exhibits "F" to "F-2"; and Check No 0000127109 dated
November 30, 2001 in the amount of P525,000.00 as Exhibits "H" to "H-2." When presented for
payment, all said checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. The MeTC
admitted in evidence the prosecution's said Exhibits with their sub-markings.30

It is of no moment that the subject checks were issued as a guarantee and upon the insistence of private
complainant Sugiyama. What is significant is that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in
question to cover accounts and those same checks were dishonored upon presentment, regardless of
the purpose for such issuance.31 The legislative intent behind the enactment of B.P. 22, as may be
gathered from the statement of the bill's sponsor when then Cabinet Bill No. 9 was introduced before
the Batasan Pambansa, is to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from
becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to
the purpose of the issuance of the checks. Said legislative intent is made all the more certain when it is
considered that while the original text of the bill had contained a proviso excluding from the law's
coverage a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted
deleted the aforementioned qualifying proviso deliberately to make the enforcement of the act more
effective. It is, therefore, clear that the real intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of
issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and, thus, punishable under such law.32

Inasmuch as the second element involves a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the
check which is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge, thus:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the check is presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay
the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within five
(5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.33 In other
words, the presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
notice of dishonor and that within five (5) days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the
check or to make arrangements for its payment.34 The presumption or prima facie evidence, as
provided in this Section, cannot arise if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the
maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there
would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.35

The prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the presence of the second element
with respect to petitioner Socorro, who received the notice of dishonor through her secretary.
Prosecution witness Marilou La Serna, a legal staff of Sugiyama's private counsel, testified that the letter
dated March 5, 2002 demanding payment of the dishonored checks was received by the secretary of
petitioner Socorro, as shown by the handwritten signature on the face of the said letter.36 La Serna
clarified on direct examination that (1) it was petitioner Socorro's secretary who acknowledged receipt
of the said demand letter with the permission of Socorro, who was in another room of her office; and (2)
that there were several calls in the office of Socorro, as well as a time when she went to the law office of
Sugiyama's counsel, to inform that she acknowledged receipt of that demand letter:

[Private prosecutor Atty. Abrenica]

Q. How did you come to know the accused Socorro F. Ongkingco, Ms. Witness?

A. When I served a copy of the demand letter sometime in March 2002, a certain secretary who received
my letter and informed me that I have to wait for a while because she will go to the room of Ms. Socorro
Ongkingco.

Q. You mentioned earlier that you served a demand letter to Ms. Socorro Ongkingco, I'm showing to you
a demand letter previously marked as Exhibit "J", what is the relationship of this letter to the demand
letter that you mentioned?

A: This is the demand letter I served to Ms. Socorro Ongkingco.

Q: Now Ms. Witness, do you remember where is the office of this Ms. Socorro Ongkingco?

A: The office of Ms. Socorro Ongkingco was just a few meters away from our formerly (sic) office and it
was located in Amorsolo Mansion along Adelentado Street.
Q: Where is this Adelentado Street?

A: It's just a few meters away from our formerly (sic) office in Palanca Street.

Q: Now Ms. Witness, you mentioned that you personally served a copy of the demand letter to the
accused, can you go over this demand letter and show to the Honorable Court the proof of the receipt of
this demand letter?

A: It was signed by her secretary.

ATTY. ABRENICA:

Your Honor, can I request for sub-markings, this signature, date and the name of the office staff of Ms.
Socorro Ongkingco who received the demand letter as Exhibit "J-1", your Honor.

Q: Now, Ms. Witness, do you know if Ms. Socorro Ongkingco was able to read this demand letter?

A: Yes, Ma'am because when I first served the demand letter, the secretary who received that demand
letter informed me that she will go to the room of Ms. Ongkingco and after a few minutes, she came
back and Ms. Socorro Ongkingco replied that the secretary has to signed (sic) the receipt of the demand
letter.

Q: Now Ms. Witness, other than the statement of the secretary of Ms. Ongkingco, how else did you
know that Ms. Socorro Ongkingco actually received the demand letter?

A: There were a (sic) several calls in the office of Ms. Socorro Ongkingco and there was also a time when
she went to the office to informed (sic) that she acknowledged receipt of that demand letter.

Q: Where was that office where Ms. Socorro Ongkingco went?

A: Colonade Building along C. Palanca Street.

Q: Whose office is this?

A: That is the law office of Atty. Abrenica.

Q: Did Ms. Socorro Ongkingco actually go to that office?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: How did you know that she was there at the law office?

A: She was there because I met her for the first time [in] the law office to see our client Mr. Kasuhiro
Sugiyama but unfortunately, during that time Mr. Kasuhiro Sugiyama is out of the country, she was not
able to meet Mr. Kasuhiro Sugiyama and she met Atty. Percy Abrenica and I was the one who assist (sic)
her.

x x x.37

On cross-examination and re-direct examination, La Serna confirmed that the demand letter was
acknowledged receipt by the secretary with the permission of Socorro herself:

CROSS EXAMINATION BY THE

DEFENSE COUNSEL ATTY. ACHAS

xxxx

Q: Is this the demand letter Exhibit "J" served by you to Ms. Ongkingco?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where is the signature of Ms. Socorro Ongkingco?

A: Actually Sir, this is the signature of the secretary.

Q: It was acknowledged only by the secretary?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Not personally by Mrs. Ongkingco?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Actually, during that time when you go to the office of Ms. Ongkingco, the service letter, she did not
acknowledge the receipt of this letter?

A: She was not the one who acknowledged the letter.

COURT:

Q: Question from the Court, you have not met personally the accused at the time when you personally
served the demand letter?

A: I have not met Your Honor, but then I was informed by the secretary that she's going to leave me for
a while to go to the room of Ms. Ongkingco if she's going to sign the demand letter.38

xxxx

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q: Ms. Witness, why was the secretary who was (sic) the one who received and signed the receipt of this
demand letter?

A: It was the secretary who signed the receipt as per instruction of Ms. Socorro Ongkingco although I
haven't met her when I served the demand but the secretary told me that she will just leave me for a
while to ask the permission of Ms. Socorro Ongkingco.39

The testimony of La Serna shows that it was the secretary of petitioner Socorro who acknowledged
receipt of the demand letter dated March 5, 2002, with the permission of Socorro, who was just in
another room of her office. Suffice it to state that when the secretary of Socorro left for a while, came
back shortly, and acknowledged receipt of the same demand letter, the requisite receipt of the notice of
dishonor was satisfied.

Against the affirmative testimony of La Serna, Socorro merely denied knowledge and receipt of the
demand letter dated March 5, 2002. It is well settled that the defense of denial is inherently weak and
unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. Denial
should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, and the accused cannot solely rely on her
negative and self-serving negations, for such defense carries no weight in law and has no greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

Socorro could have easily presented, but failed to proffer the testimony of her secretary to dispute the
testimony of La Serna. Socorro neither denied that she permitted her secretary to receive the demand
letter, nor explained why her secretary acknowledged receipt of the said letter while she was in the
other room of her office. Socorro also failed to dispute La Serna's claim that there were several calls in
the office of Socorro, as well as a time when she went to the law office of Sugiyama's counsel, to inform
that she acknowledged receipt of that demand letter. Socorro did not, likewise, ascribe ill-motive on the
part of La Serna to testify falsely against her.

In Chua v. People,40 the Court found that the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was not
established, for failure to prove the petitioner's receipt of a notice of dishonor. In that case, the private
respondent testified that the personal secretary of the petitioner received the demand letter, but said
secretary was never presented to testify whether she in fact handed the demand letter to petitioner
who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. The Court noted that it is not enough for the
prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused, and that the prosecution must
prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from
the receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused. The factual circumstances in Chua differ from this
case, because petitioner Socorro was shown to have permitted her secretary to acknowledge receipt of
the demand letter while she was in another room of her office. Socorro also failed to dispute La Serna's
claim that she went to the law office of Sugiyama's counsel to inform that she acknowledged receipt of
that demand letter.

Meanwhile, Marie Paz cannot be faulted for failing to refute with evidence the allegation against her,
because Sugiyama and La Serna hardly testified as to the service of a notice of dishonor upon her. La
Serna never mentioned that Marie Paz was, likewise, served with a notice of dishonor. There is also no
proof that Socorro's secretary was duly authorized to receive the demand letter on behalf of Marie Paz.

When service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that notice was served must prove the fact of
service, and the burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence.41 Failure of the
prosecution to prove that the person who issued the check was given the requisite notice of dishonor is
a clear ground for acquittal. It bears emphasis that the giving of the written notice of dishonor does not
only supply proof for the element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up, but also
affords the offender due process.42 The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays
the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the
check by the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not
been paid.43 Thus, the absence of a notice of dishonor is a deprivation of petitioner's statutory right.44

After reviewing the records and applying the foregoing principles to this case, the Court rules that the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Socorro received a notice of dishonor
of the four (4) subject checks, but failed to do so in the case of petitioner Marie Paz. Perforce, petitioner
Socorro should be convicted of the four (4) charges for violation of B.P. 22, but petitioner Marie Paz
should be acquitted of the said charges.

As a general rule, when a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate's name, he or she
may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute,45 i.e., Section 1 of B.P. 22.46 However, a
corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly liable when he or she is
convicted.47 Conversely, once acquitted of the offense of violating B.P. 22, a corporate officer is
discharged of any civil liability arising from the issuance of the worthless check in the name of the
corporation he or she represents.48 This is without regard as to whether his acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt or that there was a pronouncement by the trial court that the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.49

Here, petitioner Socorro should be held civilly liable for the amounts covered by the dishonored checks,
in light of her conviction of the four (4) charges for violation of B.P. 22 and because she made herself
personally liable for the fixed monthly director's dividends in the amount of P90,675.00 and the
P525,000.00 loan with interest, based on the Contract Agreement dated April 6, 2011, the Addendum to
Contract Agreement dated February 4, 2003, and the Memorandum of Agreement dated October 2001,
which were all formally offered by the prosecution,50 and admitted in evidence by the trial court.51 To
be sure, petitioner Marie Paz was never shown to have been part of or privy to any of the said
agreements; thus, she cannot be held civilly liable for the dishonored checks.

In the Contract of Agreement52 dated April 6, 2001, Socorro, President and Chairman of the Board of
New Rhia Car Services, Inc., undertook and bound herself as obligor, among other matters, to pay
Sugiyama, as obligee, Ninety Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Five Pesos (P90,675.00) as monthly
director's dividends for a period of five (5) years, in consideration of his purchase of stock at New Rhia
Car Services, Inc. amounting to Two Million and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,200,000.00). To
recall, the first three (3) Allied Bank checks, dated September 10, 2011, October 10, 2001 and November
10, 2001, were good checks, but the remaining checks bounced for having been draw against insufficient
funds, i.e., Check No. 0000122834 dated December 10, 2011 in the amount of P90,675.00; Check No.
0000122835 dated January 10, 2002 in the amount of P90,675.00; and Check No. 0000122836 dated
February 10, 2002 in the amount of P90,675.00.

In the Memorandum of Agreement53 dated October 2001, Socorro, President and General Manager of
New Rhia Car Services, Inc., obtained from Sugiyama, a Director of New Rhia Car Services, Inc., a loan
amounting to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), with five percent (5%) interest rate for one
(1) month. As guarantee and payment for the said obligation, Socorro issued Allied Bank Check No.
0000127109 dated November 30, 2001, amounting to P525,000.00.

In the Addendum to Contract Agreement54 dated February 4, 2003, Socorro admitted having incurred
serious delay in the payment of the agreed monthly director's dividend stated in the Contract of
Agreement dated April 6, 2001, and agreed to adopt a new payment schedule of the monthly director's
dividend, including penalty interest, as well as the P500,000.00 loan covered by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated October 2001.

Generally, the stockholders and officers are not personally liable for the obligations of the corporation
except only when the veil of corporate fiction is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or
to work injustice.55 Here, petitioner Socorro bound herself personally liable for the monthly director's
dividends in the fixed amount of P90,675.00 for a period of five (5) years and for the P500,000.00 loan,
for which she issued the subject four (4) dishonored checks. She then admitted having incurred serious
delay in the payment of the said fixed monthly dividends and loan, and further agreed to adopt a new
payment schedule of payment therefor, but to no avail.

Granted that Socorro is authorized to sign checks as corporate officer and authorized signatory of New
Rhia Car Services, Inc., there is still no evidence on record that she was duly authorized, through a Board
Resolution or Secretary's Certificate, to guarantee a corporate director thereof [Sugiyama] fixed monthly
dividends for 5 years, to enter into a loan, and to adopt a new schedule of payment with the same
director, all in behalf of the corporation. It would be the height of injustice for the Court to allow
Socorro to hide behind the separate and distinct corporate personality of New Rhia Car Services, Inc.,
just to evade the corporate obligation which she herself bound to personally undertake.

It is not amiss to stress that the power to declare dividends under Section 43 of the Corporation Code of
the Philippines lies in the hands of the board of directors of a stock corporation, and can be declared
only out of its unrestricted retained earnings. Assuming arguendo that Socorro was authorized by the
Board to fix the monthly dividends of Sugiyama as a corporate director, it appears that she committed
an ultra vires act because dividends can be declared only out of unrestricted retained earnings of a
corporation, which earnings cannot obviously be fixed and pre-determined 5 years in advance.

In fine, since Socorro was convicted of four (4) charges of violation of B.P. 22, she must be held liable for
the face value of the subject four (4) dishonored checks which is P797,025.00, more so because she
personally bound herself liable for what appears to be unauthorized corporate obligations. Moreover,
the legal interest rate awarded by the MeTC, which was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA, must be
modified pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames,56 as follows: 12% per annum from the filing of the
complaint on April 11, 2002 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this
Decision, the legal interest rate is 6% per annum; and (3) from finality of this Decision until fully paid, the
legal interest rate is 6% per annum.

As to the penalty, the Court finds no reason to disturb the fines (with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency) imposed by the MeTC57 and affirmed by both the RTC and the CA, for being in accord with
Section 1 of B.P. 22, which provides for the penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days
but not more than one (1) year, or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court."

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 24,
2014 and the Resolution dated March 19, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35356
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION: the conviction of petitioner Socorro F. Ongkingco for four (4)
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, is AFFIRMED and she is ORDERED to PAY private
complainant Kazuhiro Sugiyama the face value of the four (4) dishonored checks in the amount of
P797,025.00 with the following legal interest rates: twelve percent (12%) per annum from the filing of
the complaint on April 11, 2002 until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013
until finality of this Decision; and from finality of this Decision until fully paid, the legal interest rate is six
percent (6%) per annum, plus costs of suit. Petitioner Marie Paz B. Ongkingco is ACQUITTED of the said
charges for lack of proof that she received a notice of dishonor.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 171420. October 05, 2016 ]

AURORA A. SALES, PETITIONER, VS. BENJAMIN D. ADAPON, OFELIA C. ADAPON AND TEOFILO D.
ADAPON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
It is error to dismiss a criminal complaint for falsification if the records already contained sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause to charge the respondents therewith on the basis alone that the
complainant, already residing abroad, did not herself submit to the clarificatory hearing, and the
investigating prosecutor did not state the matters that still required clarification.

The Case

In this appeal, the complainant for falsification appeals the adverse decision promulgated on October 19,
2005,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) annulled and set aside the resolution issued on December 14,
2004[2] by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No. 02-84 that had directed the filing against the
respondents of the information for violation of Article 172, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

Antecedents

The factual and procedural antecedents, as summed up by the CA in its assailed decision, are as follows:

Private respondent Aurora A. Sales, a US immigrant who has resided in said country since 1980 and
petitioners Benjamin D. Adapon and Teofilo D. Adapon are among the eleven (11) siblings of the late
Spouses Pedro H. Adapon and Severina Dimaano-Adapon. Petitioner Ofelia C. Adapon is the spouse of
petitioner Benjamin D. Adapon. Upon their demise, Spouses Pedro and Severina Adapon left a parcel of
land located in Rosario, Batangas covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6905 with a total area of
1,352,961 square meters.

On May 25, 2001, private respondent, represented by her son Adelfo A. Sales, filed a complaint against
her siblings, including herein petitioners and other heirs of the late Spouses Pedro and Severina Adapon
for nullification of various certificates of title emanating from TCT No. T-6905 and recovery of properties
covered by the void certificates. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. RY2K1-095 and currently
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87. In her complaint, private
respondent alleged that during her absence and without her knowledge and consent, the subject
property was subdivided several times and most of it were parceled out among the defendants in
varying areas and registered in their names. Private respondent also averred that she never agreed to an
arrangement for the subdivision of the subject property in the manner made by the defendants, neither
did she recall any extra-judicial settlement of the estate of her parents, much less a judicial partition
thereof.

On June 20, 2001, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint, attaching thereto a Deed of
Extra-judicial Settlement Among Heirs, purportedly executed in Makati City on November 5, 1990, by
and among the eleven (11) children of the late Spouses Pedro and Severina Adapon, including herein
private respondent.

Thereafter, on September 4, 2002, private respondent executed an affidavit subscribed and sworn to
before Vice-Consul Maria Lourdes C. Legaspi in New York City, USA, claiming that the deed of extra-
judicial settlement attached to the motion to dismiss which herein petitioners submitted in Civil Case No.
RY2K1-095, RTC, Batangas, Branch 87, is a falsified document. She claims that she did not sign the
subject deed, thus, she disowns the purported signature appearing on top of her name in said
document, the same having been placed there without her knowledge or consent. She was in the United
States on November 5, 1990 when the document was supposedly executed and could not have appeared
before the notary public in Makati City. Hence, the instant complaint charging herein petitioners with the
crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

Private respondent authorized Jerico B. Sales, her son-in-law, for the purpose of instituting the criminal
proceedings against petitioners.

On June 21, 2002, petitioners filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss or to Suspend
Preliminary Investigation. Petitioners alleged that in the execution of the deed of extra-judicial partition,
private respondent was represented by her daughter Victoria Adapon Sales-Santiago. During the
meetings to discuss the partition of their deceased parents' properties and in a number of deeds, it was
Victoria who represented private respondent. They were assured by Victoria that she had authority to
represent her mother, and they relied on the representation of Victoria. Petitioners further contend that
they could not be charged for use of falsified document since they have no knowledge of the alleged
falsity of the deed. It was Victoria who represented private respondent in the execution of the deed.
They do not know who actually executed the same. They merely presumed in good faith that the deed
was validly executed by or on behalf of private respondent. Thus, they have absolutely no knowledge
whether or not said deed was forged or falsified. Moreover, they never intended to cause damage or
prejudice to another person when they presented the deed in support of their motion to dismiss the civil
case filed by private respondent. They did so only to present clearly and distinctly their defenses in said
case.

On September 9, 2002, Prosecutor Cuevas recommended the dismissal albeit without prejudice of the
instant complaint on the ground that the affidavit was not sworn to by the private respondent before a
fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath as required by Rule 112, Sec.
3, par. a of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

However, upon manifestation of private respondent that she is submitting her affidavit sworn to before a
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General of New York City, the case was reopened.

On March 27, 2003, Prosecutor Cuevas issued a Resolution dismissing the instant complaint on the
ground that it is impossible for him to proceed with the preliminary investigation without the
appearance of private respondent who will be subjected to some clarificatory questions on certain
matters.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied
in an Order dated May 14, 2003.

On June 4, 2003, private respondent filed an Appeal or Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice.

On December 14, 2004, public respondent issued the assailed Resolution which reversed and set aside
the March 27, 2003 Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the corresponding
information against herein petitioners.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the public
respondent in a resolution dated February 8, 2005.[3]

In ordering the filing of the information against the respondents, thereby reversing the dismissal of the
criminal complaint for falsification, the DOJ pointed out that the dismissal on the sole basis of the non
attendance of the petitioner at the clarificatory hearing was erroneous because: firstly, the investigating
prosecutor did not state the matters that still needed to be clarified to justify the necessity for her to
personally appear that her failure to do the same would cause the dismissal of the complaint;
and, secondly, the totality of the evidence presented already established probable cause to indict the
respondents for the violation of Article 172, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code. The DOJ disposed
thusly:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas is directed to file the corresponding information for
use of falsified document under Article 172, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code against respondents
Benjamin, Teofilo and Ofelia, all surnamed Adapon, and to report the action taken within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Decision of the CA

By petition for certiorari, the respondents assailed the resolution of the DOJ, insisting that the DOJ had
thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On October 19, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed decision granting the petition for certiorari. Citing
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, it declared that the DOJ was guilty of grave abuse of discretion
because the investigating prosecutor was bound to personally examine the petitioner as the complainant
and her witnesses; and that the continuous absence of the complainant from the clarificatory hearing
had effectively prevented the investigating prosecutor from determining the existence of probable cause
against the respondents. It ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the
public respondent dated December 14, 2004 and February 8, 2005, respectively, are hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Through its resolution promulgated on February 9, 2006,[6] the CA denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

The sole issue is whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint because of the
petitioner's failure to appear at the clarificatory hearing set by the investigating prosecutor.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether or not there is sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed; and that the respondent,
who is probably guilty thereof, should be held for trial.[7] The nature and purposes of the preliminary
investigation have been expounded in Ang-Abaya v. Ang,[8] viz.:

A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case; sufficient
proof of the guilt of the criminal respondent must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial
court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Although a preliminary investigation is
not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair; the officer
conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime
with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the
accused. After all, the purpose of preliminary investigation is not only to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial; it is just as well for the
purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect
him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public
trial. More importantly, in the appraisal of the case presented to him for resolution, the duty of a
prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute.

xxxx

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual
the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and
peace of mind and liberty, on the other. Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary
investigation as not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive one, forming part of due process
in criminal justice. [Bold emphasis supplied]

As can be seen, the most important purpose of the preliminary investigation is to determine whether or
not a crime has been committed, and whether or not the respondent is probably guilty of the crime.
[9]
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption
that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would
lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion,
that a thing is so. The term does not mean actual or positive cause; nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require
an inquiry into whether or not there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. That it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged is enough. Precisely, there is a trial for
the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[10]

In view of the foregoing, the investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the petitioner's criminal
complaint for falsification simply because of her non-appearance at the clarificatory hearing. To start
with, her personal presence was excusable because of her advanced age and the distance of her place of
residence at the time (New York, United States of America) from the Province of Batangas, the venue of
the proceedings. Secondly, the records already contained sufficient evidence upon which the
investigating prosecutor could make a finding of probable cause. Thirdly, she was represented in the
proceedings by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales, whom she had constituted as her agent for purposes of
pursuing the criminal case against the respondents. Being her agent expressly authorized for that special
purpose, Jerico could competently respond to the investigating prosecutor's clarificatory questions in a
manner legally binding on her. Thirdly, had the investigating prosecutor sincerely considered her
personal presence as absolutely necessary in the determination of probable cause, he should have
granted her request to have her deposition taken instead. Such power was within his discretion as the
investigating prosecutor.[11] And, lastly, the investigating prosecutor's requiring her personal presence at
the clarificatory hearing was probably unnecessary and superfluous in view of his failure to specify the
matters still needing to be clarified. As earlier mentioned, the documents submitted by both parties in
the proceedings were already sufficient for the determination of whether or not probable cause existed
against the respondents. If the clarificatory hearing was geared towards the determination of the
existence of probable cause,[12] the nonspecification of the matters to be inquired into during the
clarificatory hearing indicated that no more matters needed to be clarified from the petitioner herself.

Although it was concededly discretionary on the part of the investigating prosecutor to call for the
clarificatory hearing considering that Section 4(e)[13] of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court has used the
word may in assigning such prerogative to him, the discretion was not unbounded because the rule
precisely stated that the clarificatory hearing was to be set only "if there are such facts and issues to be
clarified from a party or a witness."

On the other hand, it is a sound judicial policy for the courts to refrain from interfering in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation, and to just leave to the DOJ the ample latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of
offenders. Consistent with this policy, the courts do not review and reverse the Secretary of Justice's
findings and conclusions on probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion,[14] that is,
when the Secretary of Justice has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[15] As such, the Court
upholds the DOJ's executive determination of probable cause in the absence of a showing of grave abuse
of discretion.

The CA justified its nullification of the DOJ's reversal of the finding of lack of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor by opining that the dismissal of the criminal complaint was warranted because
the investigating prosecutor had not personally examined the petitioner as the complainant due to her
failure to attend the clarificatory hearing. It held that the personal examination of the complainant by
the investigating prosecutor was a prerequisite to the finding of probable cause, citing in support Section
4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides as follows:

Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of
the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to
submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

xxxx

The opinion of the CA was predicated on a very restrictive reading of the term complainant as used in
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Such term is not of the same import as the term plaintiff used
in civil procedure to describe the party in interest initiating the civil suit.[16] In criminal proceedings, the
real party in interest is the State, and the complaint or information is always brought in the name of the
People of the Philippines,[17] it being sufficient that the complainant is named in the information or
complaint as the offended party.[18] Herein, the petitioner as the complainant would be a mere witness
for the Prosecution at the trial,[19] subject to her right to intervene by counsel in the criminal prosecution
because the criminal action would entail civil liability.[20] Her participation in the criminal case as the
complainant was similar to that of the relator in other jurisdictions, the real party in interest in whose
name a legal action is brought by the State, or who relates the facts on which the action is based.[21]

The offense of falsification complained of was a public offense the charges for which could be initiated by
anyone, as opposed to a private crime whose institution could be made only by particular individuals.
[22]
This distinction validated the non-indispensability of the personal presence of the petitioner as the
complainant in the proceedings to determine the existence of probable cause against the respondents.
We note that she had already submitted relevant sworn declarations on the falsification, as well as the
affidavit of Jerico, her agent, containing allegations necessary and sufficient to establish probable cause
based on his direct familiarity with her signature and his personal knowledge of the denial of the
signature appearing in the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs presented before the Regional
Trial Court in Batangas.

Indeed, the DOJ discussed the justification for the finding of probable cause against the respondents,
and such discussion, being correct and to the point, is quoted herein and adopted with approval, to wit:

From the evidence thus presented, we find sufficient basis to hold respondents criminally liable for
introducing in evidence a falsified document. The elements if the crime penalized under Article 172,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code are all present in this case, namely:

1) The documents is false (as embraced in Article 171 and 172, paragraphs 1 & 2);

2) The offender had knowledge that such document was false (People v. Facundo, [CA], 43 O.G. 5088);
and

3) The offender introduced in evidence in any judicial proceeding such false or falsified document.

It has been held that "when a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies his signature
therein, a prima facie case for falsification is established which the defendant must overcome" (US v.
Viloria, 1 Phil 682; People v. Villafranca, [CA] 40 O.G. 4622). In this case, respondents' alleged reliance
upon the authority of Victoria Adapon Sales-Santiago to represent complainant in the discussion and
execution of the document of partition cannot overcome the prima facie case of falsification created by
complainant's denial of her purported signature on the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement which
she could not have executed as she was then in the United States where she permanently resides.
Contrary to respondents' claim, the authenticity of complainant's signature and her due execution of the
subject document may not be presumed from Victoria's alleged authority, more so, since no special
power of attorney was ever presented. Worse, respondents failed to present Victoria to corroborate
their claim.

The factual backdrop of the execution of the subject deed also negates respondents' claim of lack of
knowledge of the falsity of complainant's signature thereon. It is noteworthy that the parties to the
subject deed are closely related to each other, eleven (11) brothers and sisters at that. There is also no
dispute that complainant was already residing in the United States long before the execution of the
subject deed. Whether or not complainant was in the Philippines on November 5, 1990 when the
subject deed was executed would have been known to respondents. And while respondents claim that
Victoria has acted in representation of complainant, the subject deed was purportedly signed by
complainant in her own behalf.

Admittedly, the falsified deed was presented in support of a motion to dismiss filed by respondents in
Civil Case No. RY2K1, Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 87, which is a judicial proceeding. The fact
that respondents have no intent to cause damage or prejudice to another person is immaterial. It is
when the falsified document is used in another proceeding, which is not judicial, that intent to cause
damage is required. (Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review by Antonio L. Gregorio, 1985 7th Ed., p. 283).

Finally, it may not be amiss to state that a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects
(Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652). Needless to say, such quantum of evidence has been sufficiently met
in the instant case. The taking of complainant's deposition in New York is, therefore, not necessary at the
preliminary investigation stage which is summary in nature.[23]

In fine, the personal presence of the petitioner at the clarificatory hearing was unnecessary to establish
probable cause against the respondents, and requiring it was legally untenable.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on October 19, 2005; REINSTATES the resolution issued on
December 14, 2004 issued by the Department of Justice directing the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas
to file the corresponding information for use of falsified document under Article 172, paragraph 3, of
the Revised Penal Code against respondents Benjamin, Teofilo and Ofelia, all surnamed Adapon;
and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.