Lecture X

PRESUMPTIONS

Synopsis
1. Presumption as to territorial operation of the Statute . . 210
2. Presumption that Statutes are Consistent with
International Law 212
3. Presumption that legislature does not use
superfluous words 213
4. Presumption that words used by the legislature
bear ordinary meaning 214
5. Presumption that legislature does not intend any alteration
. in existing law except what is expressly declares 215
6. Presumption as to Legislature's knowledge of
English Grammar 216
A presumption on Re-enactment 217
8. Presumption as to Vested Rights 217
9. Presumption that the Legislature should be fair and
reasonable 219
10. Presumption regarding Jurisdiction 219
11. Presumption as to International Law ........ . 221
1. PRESUMPTION AS rro THE TERRI H)RIAL
OPERATION OF THE STATUTE:
The general presumption of law is that a enactlnent is tenitorial
in its operation. In other words, the presumption is that a laxvpassed
by the legislature will operates only within the territorial IiIllits of the
legislature, which has passed such law.
A law passed by the Indian Parliament can be given effect to
only in the territorial limits o; checountry. The legislature of one
country cannot call on the sut)jectof another country to appear
210
Lec.X1. Presumptions
before its tribunals because he has
jurisdiction.The ordinary principle never b
legislaturedeals with the subjects of construction
which are
presumed situated
restrictedto those subjects over wh that the
0m
authorityand from whom the Legislature the Legislature
enactment
is
c
It is obvious that the Legislature of an actexcept has the

authorityover the subjects of anotherone country cannot

complianq
country. have
In Kessowji Damodar Jairam v.
held that "Primarily, the legislation of a Khimji JaircunI
country is
the presumption in the absence-bf express territorial,
words is that
Parliament do not operate on the subjects of Acts of
beyond the territorial limits of that State; and the enacting State
a fortioridoes
operate on foreigners beyond those limits." Further not
the
that "It is an admitted principle of public law, that...a courtheld
nationhas
no jurisdiction over offences committed by foreignersoutdfits
territory, and every statute must be interpreted as nottobe
inconsistent with that established rule."
"Doctrine of territorial nexus" is to find out whether
the

provisions of particular State enactment have exü-a-ten-itorial

operatiotl

The doctrine is well established, and there is no disputeastoits

principles. If there is a ten-itorial nexus between the persons/property/
comply with
subject-matter of the enactment and the state seeking to consideltd
be
the provisions of the enactment, then the statute cannot territorial
the
as having extraterritorial operation. Adequacy oftheconnection
connection involves consideration of two elements, to beimposi
must be real and not illusory and the liability sought connection'
under the enactment must be relevant to that whichof
nexus
enactment has to satisfy the principles o f ten•itorial
f the
provisions
o
essentially evident from the factual application
the enactment. 2

1. ILR1888 12 Bom 507, v.

2. Shrikant Bha/chandra Karulkar and others
another, 1994 SCW 3822.
 of Statutes (Lec.X
Lectureson Interpretation
212
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalal the
In The that the "The doctrine of territorial nexus is
Coutt held
Supreme and there is no dispute as to the principles. As
well-established counsel for the petitioners, if there is a
enunciated by learned
between the person sought to be charged and the
nexus
territorial
tax him the upheld. Sufficiency
taxing statute may be
stateseekingto
connection involves a consideration of two elements,
ofthetenitorial
(a) the
namely, connectionmust be real and (b) the liability
to be imposed must be perfinent to that connection. It is
sought on the question of validity
conceded that it is of no imporKnce
be altogether disproportionate
thattheliabilityimposed is or may
words, if the connection is
totheten-itorialconnection. In other of such
sufficientin the sense mentioned above the extent
connection affectsmerely the policy and not the validity of the
In Stateof Bihar v. Smt. Charusila DastQ the Supreme
legislation."
Courtheldthat the doctrine of ten-itorial nexus would be applicable
toallkindsof legislations and the challenge to the constitutionality
ofthelegislationmust be tested by reference to this principle. To
applythe doctrineof territorial nexus, two conditions must be
fulfilled.

2. PRESUMPTION THAT STATUTES ARE

WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONSISTENT
It has to be presumed that the legislature enacts only such
legislationswhich are inconsistent with international law. It is general
presumption that all the enactments enacted by the legislature are
presumedthat they are not against principles of international law
or inconsistentwith international law.
In SanoJiPasteur Holdings SA and others v Departtnent
OfRevenueMinistryofFinance, New Delhi3 where there is enough
nexusbetweenthe taxpayer and the taxing states then the taxation
Offoreigneconomic
transactions are permitted by cunvnt international
law,It was stated
that ' 'Nonnatively, the custonuuy international law
l,
[193711SCR874. 3. W.PNos.
2, AIR 1959SO
(lt. 152-201.3; 2013 AP
673v
 Lec.Xl Presumptions 213
does not forbid double-taxation,resulting from the interactionof the
domestic laws of two or more states, as long as legislation of each
of the concerned states is consistent with international law."
In (1) Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Limited and Another; (2)
Jindal Drilling and Industries Limited and Another; (3).Great
Offshore Limitedand Another v. Union of India and Otherl€it
was stated that there had been no extension of the territorialwater
limit which is 12nauticalmiles upto this day. It was held that this
is inconsistent with UNCLOS. 2
But in GiridharDamodar v. Kassigar Hiragar 3 it was stated
that "it would be the duty of the Courts acting in the execution of
a statutory enactment,to give effect to it, it being immaterial whether
the judgment renderedwould in the circumstances be recognized by
foreign tribunalsas being consistent with International Law and the
general principlesof justice."
3. PRESUMPTIONTHAT LEGISLATURE DOES
NOT USE SUPERFLUOUSWORDS:
It is to be presumedby the Court that the legislaturedoes
not unnecessarilyuse any words. The Courts should
that the legislaturedoes not perform an idle act of presume
superfluous statute.4 All the words used by the enacting a
a statute or any enactmenthave to be assigned legislaturein
Court. 5 The Court should interpret a statute meaningby the
in
no word, clauseor sentence is to be rendered such a way that
or superfluous. insignificant,void
In Bright Bros. (p) Ltd., v. J. K Sayani 6,
that "one of the cardinal principles of it has been-stated
interpretation that no word
l. (2008) Il SCC 439.
Aflicle 3 of S.2 of Part 11of UNCLOS,
1982.
1893 (17) ILR(Bom) 662.
4. Su,eitzer Dean, 118 Idaho 568,
572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990).
5. The v,Bautne (1905) 2 CLR 405
6. AIR 1976 Mad 55. at 414.
214 Lectures on Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.X
used by the Legislature in a statute should be ignored or should be
held to be meaningless, superfluous or otiose, unless the Court is
driven to such a conclusion,havinÅregard to the scheme, object,and
other relevant circumstances of the statutory provision."
In Maguire v. Yankelit was observed that "general rule of
statutory construction that courts should not nullify a statuteor
deprive a law of potency or force unless such course is absolutely
necessary." The Court observed in Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist.2
that ' 'a statute shouldbe construedso that effect is given to all
its provisions so that no part will be rendered superfluousor
insignificant."3
In relation to the principle of ejusclelllgeneris, it has been
stated in Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv.,4 that
"the rule ejusdem generis must be considered in connection with
the rule of construction that effect must be given to all the words
of the statute if possible so that none wild be void, superfluous or
redundant."
4. PRESUMPTION THAT WORDS USED BY THE
LEGISLATURE BEAR ORDINARY MEANING:
It is to be presumed that the words legislature has used, they
bear ordinary meaning only. The Court has to intelvretlwordsof
an enactment literally. Only when such literal interpretation leads
to absurdity can the court deviate from the plain meaning of the
words. The courts cannot procced in assign ing any other•meaning
to a word used by the legislatureother than its literal meaning
except when.it is clear that there is sone tunbiguity or any technical
meaning is assigned to it. The plain and natural meaning, i.e. the
literal and popular meaningof a word is to be attributed to such
word, not a figurativeone.
1. 99 Idaho 829, 836, 590 P.2d 85, 92 ( 1978). See also Sampsonv.
Layton, 86 Idaho 453, 457, 387 883, 885 (1963).
2. Dist. No, 132, 898 P.2d43, 127 Idaho 112.
3. Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 117, 898 P.2d
43, 48 (1995).
4. 135 Idaho 568, 572, 21 P.3d 890, 894 (2001).
Lec.Xl Presumptions
In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi
Municipality
heldthat in some situations the ordin ary thes
dictionary
may not be considered and instead given
a
to
mischief and advance the remedy to the avoidsomeor
aggrieved t
5. PRESUMPTION THAT
NOT INTEND ANY ALTERATION LEGISLATORE
1
EXCEPT WHAT IS EXPRESSLY DECLARED:
The presumption is that the intention of
parliammtinmakng
a statute is not to change an existing common law.
the intention, the legislator would reveal it clearly
Thus, unless specifically intended, a statue cannotberegatdedas
the effect of introducing a change in the generallaw.lntheligt
of this presumption, the ambiguous words of theflatutemust
be attributed to a meaning that is in keepingwith
law.
"The general rule in exposition of all Acts ofParlimentisthÅ
that in all doubtful matters, and where the expressionö in
terms, they are to receive such a construction as may beagreeable
to the rules of common law, in cases of that nature;
f«statutesltt
IN,
not presumed to make any alteration in-the common
otherwisethan the Act does expressly declare; not
general matters, the law presumes the Act did would

design, they
d that
that
have expressed it in the Act."3 If it is clear
of the legislat•ureinlpassing a new Statute must
law
common law on the subject, the common
the Statute must prevail.4
1. Milor
AIR 1965 SC 871. Kedar Natll
2. Shatrughan Singh and Others v.
Lakshmi Kuer,AIR 1944 ALL 126. 708) 11
3. 957; (1 233.
Arthur v. Bokenham,88 E.R. Fitzg.
(1730)
Bockenham, 94 E.R. 734(L730); Alias
4. Tennekoon v. Somawathie Perera
0016/1986.
 cloves on interpretation of Statutes
c VLec.X
by V-„ovd Devlin in National Assistance
Board
is a well-established principle of constructionthat
to be taken {is effecting a fundamental
uses words alteration
law unless it that point unmistakably
to
Nusion.
PRESUMPTION AS TO LEGISLATURE'S
6. ENGLISII
OV GRAMMAR:
ititpvesumed that the Legislature is acquaintedwithEnglish
arandthe language used to express the legislature's intent
grammaticallycorrect. The, way in' which Legislature
catesits expression or intent with people is with its
ommu
the language used by the Legislatureis English.
is conveyed by the legislature is intended as same, and
Whatever
otheris presumed that the express words in the legislature.
penalandTaxing statutes are to be construedstrictly,and
otherthan the words is presumed. In Taxingstatutes,
nothing
is to be read in and implied whereas one can only fairly
nothing
atthelanguage used. 2 There is a presumption that in taxing
look
statutes,
it should not be taxed withoiat clear words and every
word
of an Act of Parliament should be construed accordingto
its natural construction of words. 3
Tluspresumption should not lead to any doubt as to the
yammaticalcorrectness of the language adopted by the Legislature
toexpress
its intent. If the words are not correctlyexpressedby
theLegislaturewhich is changing its meaning other than it is
intended,then it will lead to absurdity. So, the rulesof English
Grammar avenecessary, and they should not be neglectedbecause
theCourtscan
interpret it easily according to the Legislature's
So, Courts should be aware that the languageusedby the
intent.
119521 2 Q.B. 648; The same principle was upheldby the Supreme
Courtin the cases of M,K, Ranganathan and Anr,vs, Governnwnt
of Madras and Central Bank of India vs,
604;
state of Kerala Ors, AIR 1955 SC
2, and Ovs (2009 sec 94 , 1200913 SCR
cape Brandy
3,
Re, Syndicate v. IRC, (1921) KB 64.
Micklethwaiv,(1885) Il Ex 452,
 Lec.X1
Presumptions 217
Legislature is not
expressingthe having any grammatical
errors and perfectly
legislature's intent.
7. A PRESUMPTION
ON RE-ENACTMENT:
ms presumption
used in subsequent Act, says that, when words in a former Act are
then it is intended that the words which are
repeated in subsequent
enactment have the same meaning as the
former Act intended. It is
presumed that the lawmakersintended the
same nraning as in the
former Act until the object of both enactments
are same. If the object is different,
then the formerenactment cannot
control the later enactment. If the
Legislaturerepeats certain words
which are in latter enactment to a subsequent
enactment without any
change, then the same meaning to which formerenactment
has been
given by Courts is to be given to latter enactment.When the language
is changed, or words are substituted by the amendment,then it is
presumed that the chånge is made intentionallyby the Legislature
or with intention and motive. l If the words are taken from an earlier
statute which is of same subject matter, then a presumptionis drawn
that the Parliament is intended it to be followed in the later enactment,
but if the terms are different, then it is not better to use.2 In pari
materia statutes can be resorted to resolvingany ambiguities.It
should be noted that the statutes should be parimateria.
S. PRESUMPTION AS TO VESTEDRIGHTS:
It is presumed that the vested rights are preserved.A vested
riokt means, a right which is exercisable by a person or available
to a person and thist sort of rights may either be inherent or
statutory. Inherent rights are nothing but birthrights.E.g., Right to
move freely, Rights to enjoy one's fruits of labour,right to sue
(Unless barred by a statute, it is an inherentright3),•rightto own
private property, etc. The presumption is that the vested rights
1. Pratiraksha MazdoorSangh Jalgon & Othersv.StateofMaharashtra
& Others, (2001 (1) Mh. L.J. 407.
2. Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector,
5 SCC 447.
Director of Enforcement,
3. Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director,
AIR 2010 SC 2239.
218 Lectures on Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.X

should not be taken away and they shall be preserved. Ihe I-zgislature's
intent is to be shown to take away ve$ed rights, and the Legislature
should not take åway without compensating. The-repealinglaw
should expressly mention that the rights under the repealedAct are
taken away, and unless and until it won't show such an intentionit
is presumed that those rights are not taken away. The wordswhich
show that the vested rights are taken away should be expressed
precisely, and this should not lead to multiple interpretationsand if
it so, then the presumption that the rights are not takenaway is
adopted. The intention of the Legislature is necessary to show that
the vested rights are taken away in a particular enactment.
As stated by Bowen, L.J. in 'Re Cunol "in the construction
of statutes you must not construe the words so as to take away
rights which already existed before the statute was passedunlggs
you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention
of the Legislature." The same principle reiterated in manyIndian'
cases2.
As Brett M.R. observed in3"it is a proper rule of construction
or injuring
not to construe an Act of Parliament as interfering with
so to
persons' rights without compensation unless one is obliged
construe it." 4
In Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas -Conservation
that vested
Board,5 at p.638, Williams J held that the "presumption
legislature.is
rights are not affected unless the intention of the
clear-applies whether the legislation is retrospective or prospective
may be bad if it affects
in operation. A prospective enactment
1. (1889) 43 Ch. D, 12 at p, 17
2. Ravula Subba Rao and Ann v. The Commissionerof IncomeTax,
Madras, AIR 1956 SC 604; Mohendra Lal v, RamprasadPadarath,
AIR 1954 Gau 109; District Board through its Secretaryvs. Noor
Mohammad , (1956) 26 AWR 561,
3. Attorney General v. Ilorner, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 245.
4. The Bombay Namdeo Co-op '-ative Agency Ltd. v. Virdhaval,1937
(39) BomLR 189.
5. [19331 S.C.R. 629.