LSAT

PrepTest 15
Explained
a guide to the june, 1995 exam
 © 2006 Kaplan, Inc.

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SECTION I:
READING COMPREHENSION
Passage 1: What Happened
to the Dinosaurs?
Questions 1–7
Topic and Scope: Dinosaur extinction; specifically,
various different contemporary theories for dinosaurs’
disappearance.
Purpose and Main Idea: The author spends most of the
time explaining and touting the newest of three
theories (the “volcanic-eruption theory”) as to why the
dinosaurs died out. Two earlier theories are described
as well, but the author seems to have the most
confidence in this new one.
Paragraph Structure: Each of the first three
paragraphs is devoted to a thumbnail description of a
theory: the “climatic theory” (paragraph 1) that held
sway until the 1980s; the “meteorite-impact theory”
(paragraph 2) popular in the ’80s; and the “volcanic-
eruption theory” (paragraphs 3–4), which is supported
by newly-discovered evidence in India. The introductory
keyword “Moreover” leads us to expect more
information about the new theory, and that’s just what
we get: We learn that the evidence for the other two
theories (the change in sea level and the iridium
deposits) supports, or at least is consistent with, the
eruption theory as well.
The Big Picture:
• Sometimes the LSAT writers throw you a real
curve when a Reading Comp. section begins—a
really complex passage, or one that’s way beyond
most everyone’s ken. Happily for the June, 1995
test takers, that wasn’t the case here. The
passage’s structure is as straightforward as can
be, what with the theories and keyword
“Moreover” clearly signaling the key shifts; and
thanks to Jurassic Park, this is hardly a topic that
most would find either unfamiliar or scary. On
your LSAT, the testmakers may not be so obliging.
Just remember: At least one of those passages
will be of “low difficulty,” like this one, meaning
that most people are expected to do well on it.
Find it, and attack it early in the section, even if
it’s not printed first.
Section I: Reading Comprehension
• Actually, the only examinees who screwed up
were those who saw that the topic was science
and, knee-jerk, hightailed it to another passage. A
word to the wise: Even science passages can be
manageable.
• Whenever the author describes several different
points of view, take care to ascertain her views
on them: Which, if any, does she especially favor?
Here, it’s not too tough to detect the author’s
enthusiasm for the volcano theory, but other
passages may be more challenging in this regard.
The Questions:
1. (C)
This choice is a nice paraphrase of information in
paragraph 2, which describes the nuts and bolts of the
“meteorite-impact theory.”
(A) Au contraire. Lines 5–9 demonstrate that the
“climactic theor y”—a theor y that preceded the
“meteorite-impact theor y”—could account for the
extinction of ocean species at the end of the
Cretaceous era.
(B) refers to the details of the “volcanic-eruption
theory,” a new theory intended to take the place of the
older “meteorite-impact theory” of the 1980s.
(D) Au contraire aussi. Paragraph 1 says that
researchers initially thought that the drop in sea level
thought to be behind the mass extinction episode at
the end of the Cretaceous era was the result of
“noncatastrophic geological processes.”
(E) mistakenly attributes an element of the “volcanic-
eruption theory” to the “meteorite-impact theory.”
2. (A)
The depths of the Earth’s mantle are described in two
places, line 28 and line 40, and we hope you kept
reading past the first reference because the right
answer is yielded by the second. Lines 40–41 are
choice (A) almost word-for-word.
(B) Only the element iridium is described here, and in
fact that’s an element that is present in the mantle but
rare on the Earth’s surface. (B) gets it all cockeyed.
(C) According to lines 27–28, the mantle is rather
unstable, and we get no information as to whether
things are more stable closer to the surface.
(D) The only reference to CO2 comes in line 24, before
the mantle is even mentioned, and all we’re told is that
it’s released with lava. Yes, the lava eruption is
triggered by mantle instability, but that’s a long way
from what (D) is saying.
1
PrepTest 15 Explained

(E) As with (C), we’re given no comparison between 5. (D)

the mantle and the upper regions. And, anyhow, the This choice is an excellent paraphrase of the
mantle (when heated by the core) becomes less dense information contained in lines 42–47.
in places, not “uniformly” so.
(A) is beyond the scope of the passage, which only
discusses possible developments at the end of the
3. (D)
Cretaceous era.
Lines 39–43 say that the Earth’s mantle is rich in
(B) According to the “volcanic-eruption theory,” the
iridium, while its surface doesn’t have much of the
increase in atmospheric iridium and the drop in sea
stuff. Hence, we can infer that Cretaceous era lava
level were both caused by volcanic activity; there was
(lava is just heated rock from the Earth’s interior) “was
no direct connection between the drop in sea level and
richer in iridium” than surface rock.
the rise in atmospheric iridium levels.
(A) is beyond the scope of the passage, which never
(C) Again, the extinction of ocean species at the end
compares Cretaceous era lava with meteorites in
of the Cretaceous era, according to the volcanic theory,
terms of their respective carbon dioxide content.
was due to volcanic activity, not to rising levels of iridium
(B) Au contraire. Lines 29–32 indicate that lava is no in the atmosphere.
more dense than—and may well be less dense than—
(E) The “volcanic-eruption theory” never claims that
the molten rock just above the Earth’s core.
iridium is released into the atmosphere through “normal
(C) According to the “volcanic-eruption theory,” the geological processes.” This last phrase is associated
Earth’s climate was changed by massive volcanic with the “climactic theory” discussed in paragraph 1.
eruptions, not by the release of iridium hexaflouride,
which was simply a byproduct of those eruptions. 6. (B)
(E) The “volcanic-eruption theory” states that Cretaceous Lines 54–57 say that, according to the “volcanic-
era lava distributed iridium more evenly on the Earth’s eruption theory,” the gradual fall in sea level was the
surface than meteorite impacts could have; it doesn’t, result of the upward movement of diapirs toward the
however, claim that the lava was richer in iridium than Earth’s surface.
meteorites.
(A) Lines 26–34 demonstrate that this theory makes
assumptions about the temperature of molten rock just
4. (A)
above the Earth’s core.
What could be more of a slam dunk? If you pre-phrased
(C) is beyond the scope of the text, which doesn’t
an answer after reading the passage but before
discuss episodes of mass extinction before the one at
reading the choices, it’s possible that you came up
the end of the Cretaceous era.
with (A) almost word-for-word.
(D) While the “volcanic-eruption theory” explains the
(B), (C) “Attacking”? “Inadequacies”? The author isn’t
distribution of iridium on the Earth’s surface, it doesn’t
critical of any of the theories. She’s just reporting on
try to explain either the relative scarcity of this element
which theories have held sway when. And (B)’s
on the Earth’s surface or its relative abundance in
implication that more than one theory was popular
meteorites.
before the 1980s is just inaccurate, as line 10 makes
clear. (E) According to the “volcanic-eruption theory,” iridium
should be distributed relatively evenly in this layer of
(D) implies that the topic and scope of the passage
clay.
focus on general principles of scientific inquiry, and the
relationship between evidence and theories. But no
7. (B)
“general assertion” is made; this passage is, as noted
above, a straightforward examination of dinosaur The “volcanic-eruption theory” claims that volcanic
extinction theories, based largely on chronology. activity caused the climactic changes that resulted in
the mass extinction that occurred at the end of the
(E) is a mess. No “skepticism” is confirmed, and the
Cretaceous era. If similar volcanic activity had occurred
“view held prior to the 1980s” is but one of the three
at other times, but had not resulted in climactic
theories explained, not the highlight of the passage.
changes, then we’d have to think twice about whether
this theory is in fact on the right track.

2
 Section I: Reading Comprehension

(A) The “volcanic-eruption theory” claims that iridium

hexaflouride comes from the Earth’s interior. Hence,
the theor y wouldn’t be called into question if
meteorites were found to have only minor quantities of
the stuff. If anything, this evidence would tend to
strengthen the theory.
(C) The existence of other episodes of mass extinction
would have no bearing on the “volcanic-eruption theory,”
which (so far as we know, anyway) concerns only the
mass extinction at the end of the Cretaceous era.
(D) The “volcanic-eruption theory” doesn’t deny that
meteorites hit the Earth at the end of the Cretaceous
era; it simply claims that, however frequent these impacts
may have been, they can’t account for the physical
evidence associated with the mass extinction at the
end of this era.
(E) If marine species are in fact more vulnerable to
sudden changes in sea level than to gradual changes,
this fact would in no way undermine the notion that
they could’ve succumbed to a gradual change at the
end of the Cretaceous era, as the “volcanic-eruption
theory” suggests.

3
PrepTest 15 Explained
Passage 2: Women and Folklore
Questions 8–15
Topic and Scope: Folklore studies; specifically, a
recent shift in interest to women folklorists.
Purpose and Main Idea: The author sets out to provide
evidence as to the increased interest in women
folklorists. While the passage begins with a description
of another shift—to “the folk” (performers) and away
from just “the lore” (stories)—notice that the author
never gets back to that until paragraph 4. The bulk of
his interest is women performers.
Paragraph Structure: Paragraph 1 lays out the topic,
scope, and shifts described above, and paragraph 2
provides specifics as to the shift to interest in women:
a specific element of what’s been true in folklore “until
recently” (compare line 2 to line 13), and a specific
example of how things are different.
Paragraph 3 first takes us back a century—to show
that this interest in women folklorists isn’t unique to
the present day—and then highlights the content, pros,
and cons of two contemporary studies of two women
folklorists. Paragraph 4’s focus is defined by lines 52–53
—brief speculation as to the potential “result[s] of this
line of study”—both the increased emphasis on
women and the interest in “the folk” rather than just
“the lore.”
The Big Picture:
• Early on you should listen keenly for keywords
that hint at overall structure. Here, for instance,
“It has become…a truism…until recently” clearly
tells you that, in the author’s mind, that truism no
longer holds. Figure out the truism and you have
the author’s p.o.v. in the bag!
• You must listen for, recognize, and interpret
keywords throughout your reading, of course, not
just at the beginning.
• Many students reported some initial confusion as
to what “the lore was often more studied than the
folk” meant. LSAT authors will often toss in a
figure of speech like this—simply to see whether
it throws you! Of course, the author immediately
adds “That is,” (line 3)—indicating that the
phrase is about to be redefined. (And, of course,
this is all something of a curve, because the
author spends more time on the role of women
than on the folk vs. lore stuff anyhow.)
4
• Always remember: If a difficult phrase or concept
is important enough, the author will define it
more clearly for you before too long. (And if it’s
not important, who cares what it means?)
The Questions:
8. (E)
This choice nicely captures the author’s topic, scope,
and purpose.
(A) According to lines 7–9, folk performers, as opposed
to just their works, began to get attention from the
early 1970s. The increased emphasis on women, the
text implies, is an even more recent phenomenon.
Besides, the precise date when scholars first began to
give attention to the contributions of women folklorists
is a mere detail.
(B) nicely sums up the gist of paragraph 4, but certainly
doesn’t qualify as the passage’s main point.
(C) Lines 38–48 indicate that recent works about
women folklorists don’t focus primarily on the “the
problems of repertoire analysis.”
(D) The text claims that folklore studies have shifted
from an almost exclusive emphasis on folklore itself to
an interest in the people who transmit it. (D) makes a
quite different claim.
9. (E)
Paragraph 2’s purpose, as noted above, is to provide
examples of the new trend toward focusing on women
in folklore studies, and the author asserts that The
Dynamics of Folklore is a “telling” example—“perhaps
more telling,” even, than several recent studies in
which women are central.
(A) What’s “too soon to tell” is the extent of the shift
(line 18–20), but the author has no such reservations
as to whether women are coming to the forefront.
(B) Weigle & Farrer are looking backwards to
traditional folklore collection, and The Dynamics is an
example of the new trend, so the latter couldn’t
possibly be there to “refute” the former. In any case,
lines 18–21 act as a transitional sentence clearly
separating the two details.
(C) Wrong paragraph. Repertoire analysis doesn’t show
up until paragraph 3.
(D) may be highly tempting to less than careful readers,
but paragraph 2 is solely about the new interest in
women folklorists. It sidesteps the “performer vs.
material” distinction that’s raised in paragraphs 1 and
4 and highlighted in (D).

10. (C)
The folklorists mentioned in the last paragraph are
concerned with studying folklore in its larger cultural
“context,” and in understanding the different ends to
which it is put by men and women. The book in (C)
reflects these two interests.
(A) overlooks the male/female distinction made by
current folklore researchers.
(B) gets the male/female distinction right, but misses
the cultural emphasis of current scholarship.
(D) reflects the historical emphasis on the substance of
folklore itself to the exclusion of those who transmit it.
(E) distor ts a detail from the wrong paragraph—
paragraph 1.
11. (B)
This choice captures the essence of lines 7–10.
(A) Folklore research has recently been concentrating
on the differences, not the similarities, in the ways that
men and women use folklore.
(C) This choice distor ts a detail from the wrong
paragraph—paragraph 3.
(D) Au contraire. Folklore research has increasingly
sought to place folklore in its proper cultural context.
(E) Since the early 1970s, there has been an
increasing scholarly interest in individuals who transmit
folklore.
12. (A)
Early folklorists, remember, concentrated on the
folklore itself, and not on the people who transmitted
the stuff. Why? Because these folklorists felt that the
performers were not creative people who contributed
to the material itself.
(B) is beyond the scope of the passage, which discusses
scholarship about performers of folklore, not the views
of the performers themselves.
(C) is also beyond the scope of the passage, which,
again, focuses on scholarship about folk performers.
There’s no real discussion about folklore itself, let
alone whether it underwent change from generation to
generation.
(D) distorts the gist of lines 13–18, which state that
early folklorists tended to downplay the contributions of
women performers. That’s quite different from saying
that early folklorists thought that women didn’t have
much of a role in transmitting folklore.
Section I: Reading Comprehension
(E) The male/female distinction regarding the meaning
of a piece of folklore was not one made by early
folklorists. This is a distinction made by contemporary
scholars.
13. (A)
Before the early 1970s, folklorists studied folklore but
paid no attention to the people who were involved in
transmitting it. Likewise, the anthropologist in (A)
studies “implements” (i.e., tools) but pays no attention
to the people who used those implements.
(B)–(E) None of these choices reflects the basic
pattern of pre-1970s scholarship on folklore: an
emphasis on a “cultural product” combined with a lack
of interest in those who actually “use” the product.
14. (D)
According to the last paragraph of the text, current
folklore scholarship is concerned with analyzing the
links between specific pieces of folklore and the larger
society from which it emerged. Hence, “context” here
refers to the “environment” and “circumstances”
surrounding a piece of folklore.
(A), (C), and (E) are all beyond the scope of the
passage, which doesn’t deal either with the internal
relationships among different parts of a piece of
folklore or with the connection between folklore and
physical locale.
(B) The text doesn’t delve into the issue of successive
interpretations of the same piece of folklore by different
scholars.
15. (B)
Abraham’s book is “notable” (line 43) but “unfortunately”
(line 46) lacks a key element, and that amounts to less
than 100% endorsement.
(A) The “approval” cannot be “wholehearted” given
lines 46–48.
(C), (D), and (E) all ignore the reference to Abraham’s
book being “notable.” (Moreover, they’re all so close in
meaning that it’s almost impossible to choose among
them.)
5
PrepTest 15 Explained
Passage 3: Pocock and Political Discourse
Questions 16–21
Topic and Scope: Pocock’s approach to political
discourse; specifically, his use of linguistic analysis to
interpret the political discourse of the past.
Purpose and Main Idea: The author’s purpose is to
describe and critique Pocock’s methodology. His
specific main idea is that Pocock’s methodology is a
valuable tool for understanding past political discourse,
even if it doesn’t fully explain each and every historical
document.
Paragraph Structure: Paragraph 1 describes Pocock’s
basic methodology and compares it (favorably) to
traditional methods of interpreting political texts of the
past. Paragraph 2 describes Pocock’s work: how he
has applied his methodology to investigate “civic
humanism” in eighteenth-century England.
Paragraph 3 continues the discussion of Pocock’s
work, noting that his analysis of political discourse in
eighteenth-century America doesn’t ring as true as his
analysis of English political discourse. Nevertheless,
the author ends the passage by saying that, although
Pocock’s work isn’t entirely on the mark, his
methodology is certainly on the right track.
The Big Picture:
• The passage begins unpromisingly. Take the
opening sentence, for instance: Many examinees’
heads were swimming as early as line 7. Note,
too, the sleight-of-hand in terms of topic and
scope: Pocock disappears from the passage until
line 22, yet turns out to be the central figure. This
kind of thing is very rare in LSAT passages. And
the passage stays about as difficult as it begins.
• The answer, of course, is to get a lot of mileage
out of the other three passages—which do turn
out to be more manageable—and try to budget
your time so that you end up having more than
the average 8 mins. or so when you finally take
this passage on.
6
The Questions:
16. (C)
This choice neatly captures the author’s topic, scope,
and purpose; and it clearly echoes the last sentence of
the passage in its critical approval of Pocock’s work.
(A), (B) “Civic humanism” (A) and “eighteenth-century
political texts” (B) are certainly prominent aspects of
this passage. But the main focus of this text is on
Pocock’s methodology and its application to
eighteenth-century political texts. Yet neither of these
choices even mentions Pocock.
(D) concentrates on a detail that emerges only in
paragraph 3.
(E) plays on a detail in paragraph 1.
17. (C)
The association of English whigs and “a vocabulary of
economic progress” is explicitly made in lines 32–34,
but this passage is so dense that you are perhaps to
be forgiven if you missed it.
(A) Tempting if your outside associations of Jefferson
label him as a populist or “progressive,” but we’re
specifically told that, to Pocock, Jefferson echoed Tory
vocabulary (lines 42–45). The author disagrees, of
course, but the focus of the question is Pocock’s view.
(B) To make this choice work you have to go to way too
much trouble. Once you hear Pocock label Jefferson a
closet Tory (lines 42–45), you have to assume that
Jefferson’s opponents, the Federalists, were therefore
closet Whigs, and then assume that the Federalists
must therefore have adopted the Whig political
vocabulary mentioned a paragraph ago. Yikes! Far less
risky to grab the explicit right answer in lines 32–34.
(D), (E) Au contraire. The Tories are cited as the
antithesis of the Whigs, and the rural landowners are
identified with the former. Both groups’ vocabulary,
inferably, is that “of public spirit and self-sufficiency”
(lines 29–30), not “economic progress.”
18. (D)
To the author, “Pocock’s ideas have proved fertile”
(lines 39–40), and thus it is fitting “to applaud the
historian [that’s Pocock, in case you have fallen asleep
by the end] who” (lines 59–60) while not 100%
successful, has made political vocabularies a vital
topic. The author’s attitude, then, is much more
positive than negative.
 Section I: Reading Comprehension

(A) 1/2 right, 1/2 wrong. “Fruitful” is positive enough 21. (A)
as a characterization of one of Pocock’s key Paragraph 1 describes Pocock’s basic method of
assumptions, but “cant” (line 39) is Namier speaking studying political discourse; paragraphs 2 and 3
of political language in the 1700s, and is way too describe the application of this method to the cases of
negative to ascribe to the author as a judgment on eighteenth-centur y England and America; and
Pocock. paragraph 3 evaluates the merits of Pocock’s method
(B) “Sharp” is positive, but as used here it describes in light of its application to these cases. (A) reflects
a “contrast’ (line 16), not a characteristic of Pocock. this sequence.
And “elitist” at line 46 is Jefferson’s characterization (B) The author has reservations about Pocock’s work,
of English Tories. and he states them after a presentation of the evidence.
(C) 1/2 right, 1/2 wrong, but in reverse order. (C) What hypothesis? This passage describes and
“Controversial” is applied to some of Pocock’s evaluates a scholarly mode of inquiry.
theories, but the “naiveté” is that of the theorists who
(D) The author does evaluate Pocock’s work and does
preceded Pocock.
suggest a future direction for research, but this choice
(E) “Importance” sounds okay, but in line 55 it’s used says nothing about all of the description of Pocock’s
in connection with different eighteenth-century political work.
vocabularies, not Pocock. “Simply” doesn’t have either
(E) What comparisons and contrasts? What categories
positive or negative overtones.
of evaluation? What framework?
19. (B)
This choice nicely paraphrases the author’s criticism
(lines 17–21) of the method of political analysis used
in the 1950s.
(A) The keyword “while” (line 13) indicates that the
author contrasts the assumptions of the 1950s with
the way literary historians derive the meaning of a
political text.
(C) is beyond the scope of the passage, which never
suggests that political texts can be “read in…different
ways” depending on one’s philosophic bent.
(D) This is an assumption made by Pocock, not
analysts of the 1950s.
(E) The author is critical of the 1950s methodology for
assuming that historical knowledge wasn’t relevant to
the interpretation of documents.

20. (D)
In lines 41–54, the author argues that Pocock erred in
applying the same “linguistic dichotomy” to both
England and America. What works for England, the
author asserts, doesn’t necessarily work for America.
(A) is beyond the scope of the passage. Pocock
concerns himself with political discourse only.
(B) It’s the author, not Pocock, who “denigrates” the
role of analytic philosophers in analyzing political texts.
(C), (E) The author wholeheartedly endorses Pocock’s
interpretation of eighteenth-century political discourse
in England.

7
PrepTest 15 Explained
Passage 4: Black Economic Progress
Questions 22–27
Topic and Scope: Black economic progress; specifically,
the effects civil rights laws and educational
opportunities have had on Black economic progress.
Purpose and Main Idea: The author’s purpose is to
counter an argument regarding Black economic
progress. Her specific main idea is that civil rights
laws, not increased educational opportunities, account
for recent Black economic progress.
Paragraph Structure: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are
descriptive in nature. Paragraph 1 outlines the relevant
civil rights laws, while paragraph 2 explains the
“continuous change” hypothesis, which argues that
Black economic progress should be attributed to
improved educational opportunities rather than civil
rights laws.
Paragraphs 3 and 4, to the contrary, are argumentative
in nature. In paragraph 3, the author cites several
reasons to explain why educational opportunities can’t
account for Black economic progress. In paragraph 4,
she claims that the economic progress made by Blacks
since the mid-1960s is directly attributable to the civil
rights legislation of the mid-1960s.
The Big Picture:
• Not a promising place to begin work on the
Reading Comp. section. Why? The author’s voice
doesn’t enter the picture until paragraph 3. The
first couple of paragraphs bombard you with a lot
of detail without giving you any clear signals
about where the passage is headed. In general,
it’s best to work first on passages where topic,
scope, and authorial purpose are clear early on.
These passages lend themselves to scoring quick
and easy points.
• When a passage contains a lot of details, it’s
easy to get bogged down in them. Don’t let this
happen to you on test day. Remember, you’re only
going to get questioned about one or two details.
As you read through the passage, move past
details quickly, noting where they appear, so that
you can look them up easily should you have to.
8
The Questions:
22. (E)
Title VII prohibits all employers “from making employment
decisions on the basis of race.” Executive Order 11,246,
on the other hand, concerns only government contractors.
In other words, Title VII “governs hiring practices in a
wider variety of workplaces.”
(A), (B) It’s Executive Order 11,246 that calls for
monitoring employers to ensure minority representation
(A) and deals with government contractors (B).
(C) and (D) are beyond the scope of the passage, which
never brings up the issues of wage discrimination (C) or
minority representation in government (D).
23. (B)
Lines 30–32 state that, in the mid-1940s, Blacks were
catching up to Whites in amount of schooling, but were
not yet equal. (B) makes precisely the same point in a
different way.
(A), (C), and (D) are all beyond the scope of the passage.
There’s no mention of White school expenditures (A),
Black or White school curriculums (B), or the general
quality of White schools (D).
(E) 1/2 right, 1/2 wrong. Lines 34–35 say that teachers
at Black schools did experience wage increases in the
mid-1940s, but we aren’t told whether wages increased
at a greater or lesser rate than wages for teachers at
White schools.
24. (C)
The author’s specific main idea, as we’ve already
mentioned, is that Black economic progress should be
attributed to civil rights legislation, not to better
educational opportunities. In making this argument,
she rebuts the “continuous change” hypothesis, which
asserts just the opposite.
(A) The author contends that the “continuous change”
hypothesis is incorrect, not that it’s incomplete.
(B), (D) The author does indeed discuss both the
“impact of education” (B) and “Black economic progress
before and after the 1960s” (D), but these are mere
details intended to support her larger argument.
(E) The author provides her own perspective about the
factors behind Black economic progress, not the
“current view.”
 Section I: Reading Comprehension

25. (C)
This choice neatly summarizes the essence of lines
12–16.
(A), (D), (E) All we’re told about continuity theorists is
that they don’t believe that legislation accounts for
recent Black economic progress; we aren’t told
anything regarding their general attitude about
legislation’s effects on discrimination.
(B) Continuity theorists claim that Blacks have made
progress in education, but they don’t ascribe this
progress to the law.

26. (A)
This concession is sandwiched between information
intended to bolster the claim that civil rights laws have
contributed to Black economic progress. Hence, its
meant to strengthen that claim by explaining away a
possible objection to it.
(B) The only cause of Black economic progress that
the author cites is civil rights legislation.
(C), (D) The author concedes nothing to the continuity
theorists (C). Nor does she alter her argument in light
of their hypothesis (D).
(E) This is scope of the entire passage, not just the
lines that come after 60.

27. (D)
The “continuous change” hypothesis claims that Black
economic progress is unrelated to government actions.
Similarly, (D) features a scenario in which progress is
made without government assistance.
(A), (B), (C), (E) In each of these scenarios, a problem
is solved through government intervention.

9
PrepTest 15 Explained
SECTION II:
LOGICAL REASONING
1. (A)
By providing a rationale for prohibiting an otherwise
legal activity—namely, harm to which others must be
exposed—(A) justifies Walter’s recommendation for
the airlines. Smoking is that otherwise legal activity,
and the nonsmokers on a plane are the “others” who
can’t avoid harm.
(B) “Only if” is the tipoff here. Walter’s purpose isn’t
to describe a precondition for a ban on smoking, but to
recommend a ban in one specific situation. Even if (B)
matched up well to ever y element of Walter’s
argument—which it doesn’t, because the reference to
“most situations” has no connection to what Walter
says—(B) still wouldn’t justify his proposal, but would
simply establish a condition necessary for a smoking
ban.
(C) The “legal activity” would have to be smoking, but
how would one “modify” it? By using a cigarette holder?
C’mon.
(D) is a justification for keeping smokers out of planes,
not for keeping planes free of smoke.
(E) is a justification for making an activity, presumably
smoking, “legal in all situations.” This one is way off.
2. (D)
“…your challenge is ineffectual, since you are simply
jealous…” Those nine words are all you need to answer
this “logical flaw” question, and having read them you
should have jumped to the choices and grabbed (D).
One is never permitted to rebut an opponent by
criticizing his or her personality, character, or motives.
Doing so is called an ad hominem attack, but LSAC
doesn’t expect you to know the Latin term; (D) is how
the testmakers typically word it.
(A) The chemist restates no claim, and the use of the
Evidence Keyword “since” establishes that he does
offer evidence. It’s not effective evidence, but it’s
evidence nonetheless.
(B) is only tempting if you decide that since the physicist
believes that “measurements and calculations are
inaccurate,” the chemist must believe that they are
accurate. But as we’ve noted, the chemist disagrees
with the physicist on personal grounds, not on the
grounds of accuracy.
(C) Nope, in this context “solve” has only one meaning:
to locate the answer to a problem.
10
(E) To “rest on a contradiction” means to base your
argument on two premises that cannot both be true.
The chemist does contradict, or take issue with, the
physicist, but there are no conflicting premises within
the chemist’s argument.
3. (E)
The argument proposes a cause-and-effect relationship:
Because ulcer patients possessed this bacteria strain,
and someone accidentally ingested the strain and got
his first ulcer, therefore the strain probably brings on
ulcers. Hard to prove, but easy to rebut: If one were to
find test subjects who possess the bacteria strain but
no ulcer, that would certainly toss the theory out the
window, wouldn’t it? Now, (E) found no such test
subjects out of a large sample: Many people without
ulcers were examined and no traces of the bacteria
strain were found. Hence, (E) supports the reasoning by
short-circuiting a major possible exception.
Think of it in formal logic terms. The stimulus essentially
argues that “If you have the bacteria strain, then you’ll
get an ulcer,” the contrapositive of which is “If you don’t
have an ulcer, then you won’t have the bacteria strain.”
And there they are in (E), 2,000 people who fit that
definition—no ulcer, and no bacteria either.
(A) A secondary disease is outside the scope of an
investigation of whether a particular cause results in a
particular effect.
(B) The stimulus doesn’t argue that the bacteria
causes only ulcers, so the presence or absence of
other ailments is irrelevant.
(C) Even if we accept that one can learn about human
diseases from studying other animals—a notion that
comes from without the stimulus, not from within—the
absence of ulcers in (C) would weaken the case for the
causal agent, not strengthen it.
(D) appeals to an expert’s authority. Phooey. Experts
can be wrong.
4. (D)
The stimulus conclusion—to which we seek a parallel
—is hypothetical: Should one of these test subjects
own a pet, he or she would have a lower average blood
pressure. The evidence? Lowered blood pressure
apparently caused by petting animals. (D) has it right.
(D) uses the relaxing caused by a short boat ride in the
same way that the stimulus uses the lower blood
pressure caused by animal petting: as evidence for the
hypothesis that ownership of an object (a boat and a
pet, respectively) would cause a general improvement
of the trait (relaxing and lower b.p., respectively).

(A) is only superficially similar to the stimulus. Its evidence
lacks the sense of one action having a particular effect
on one limited group of people, and its conclusion fails
to allege that ownership of an object would have a
greater effect.
(B), (C) Each errs by focusing on a policy recommendation
—retaining a car and dumping cer tain plants,
respectively. The stimulus never recommends anything;
it predicts what would happen (lower blood pressure) if
the test subjects owned a pet.
(E), like (A), may be tempting because of its hypothetical
conclusion. But in the stimulus, petting an animal and
owning a pet are two different things—which is in fact
the root of the flawed logic: Since they are different
things, one cannot assume that the salutary effect
caused by petting an animal would be repeated, let
alone intensified, by pet ownership. But (E)’s one coat
vs. two coats lacks that difference. Two coats of paint
probably would make for a whiter fence.
5. (A)
This discrepancy (or “paradox”) hinges on the definition
of “best bill collector.” How can he be the best if his
collection rate is the worst? Maybe you were able to
predict the answer and maybe you weren’t, but we
hope you recognized it as soon as you saw it: The
reason his collection rate is so bad is that he’s
assigned to the hardest-core cases—as would befit the
best employee in the firm.
(B) is akin to (D) back in Question 3. What Young’s co-
workers think of him is as irrelevant to this paradox as
the expertise of the stomach researcher is to the
cause of ulcers.
(C) deepens the paradox, by suggesting that his crummy
rate of collections is in fact his norm.
(D) is laughably irrelevant—though if you chose (D)
you’re probably not laughing. We’re not told whether
Young’s credit dept. job involved collections, and if it
did, whether Young was good or bad at it. Not that any
of that would make any difference to his performance
at this job.
(E) Length of tenure is irrelevant too, having nothing to
do with Young’s collection rate belying his status as the
best collector.
6. (B)
The author sees a bit of a paradox here: Ancient
primates, such as the one whose jawbone was found
in Namibia, lived in dense forests, yet today Namibia is
dry and treeless. To resolve this paradox, the author
Section II: Logical Reasoning
concludes that Namibia’s landscape must have
changed over the centuries, but that assumes that that
ape did, in fact, live in or near Namibia—choice (B). If
it didn’t—if it wandered into Namibia far from its
forested homeland and thereupon expired, or if
perhaps the jawbone was blown by the wind or carried
by someone to that spot—then Namibia’s terrain need
not have changed at all. Since (B), if false, would
weaken the argument, it is a necessary assumption.
(A) Modern apes are outside the scope of this
argument. It’s modern Namibian terrain and ancient
apes that are at issue.
(C) Certainly the author believes that at least one
ape—the one whose jawbone was found—lived in
Namibia between 10 and 15 million years ago. But
apes prior to 15 million years ago are outside the
scope.
(D) Why apes lived in dense forests may or may not
have anything to do with their diet. And (D), like (A),
errs by mentioning modern apes.
(E) provides an explanation as to how the change in
Namibian terrain might have taken place, but it’s far
from the only possible one. In any event the author is
arguing about whether the change occurred, not how.
7. (B)
Is job-related stress the #1 workplace problem? Our
author concludes no, it’s not, because most workers
complain about boredom, not job stress. But if stress
and boredom are somehow related, then there’s no
contradiction, and that’s essentially what we get in (B).
(B) implies that workers who explicitly complain about
boredom are implicitly demonstrating signs of stress;
hence the two go hand in hand; hence stress is
probably the #1 problem.
(A), (D), (E) Non-complaining workers are outside the
scope here, since the issue is “What’s the most
serious workplace problem?,” and the source of the
evidence is those who are making their complaints
known. Workers who are relatively happy, for whatever
reason, aren’t part of this debate.
(C) doesn’t discuss complainers, either—just responders.
And the “recentness” of responses has nothing to do
with the argument.
8. (A)
Keywords are the key to structure, and structure is the
key to figuring out this author’s conclusion quickly.
A yes/no question is posed: Should the government
stop trying to figure out how much toxin is O.K. in our
11
PrepTest 15 Explained
food? Three potent Keywords govern what’s left,
starting with “Only if,” which as always signals a
necessary condition—necessary, that is, for a Yes
answer to the question. “However” signals a contrast
—i.e. a statement that that necessary condition has
not been fulfilled. And “furthermore” is a Continuation
Keyword, which means “more of the same.” Feel free
to read more deeply into the stimulus if you like, but
the sheer structure leads to only one conclusion: A
condition necessary for abandoning the government’s
efforts has not been met, hence the government
should not abandon its efforts—choice (A). (Note that
(A) substitutes “should continue” for “should not
abandon”—a common testmaker tactic.)
(B) is the “Only if” clause—the condition necessary, in
the author’s view, for the government to abandon its
efforts.
(C) is a very close paraphrase of the “However” clause
—a piece of evidence suggesting that the necessary
condition has not been met.
(D) is an equally close paraphrase of the “Furthermore”
clause—more evidence.
(E) cannot be the author’s conclusion, because the
issue is not “Are the government’s detection methods
refined enough?”; no evidence either way is provided.
(E) is a misreading of the very last clause of the stimulus.
Inferably the author would probably approve of the
government’s raising “the threshold of detection,” but
only because of her conclusion that detection needs to
continue…which brings us back to (A).
9. (E)
The stimulus for this inference question is more
complex than most, but all four wrong answers are
arguably more obvious than most, so perhaps it
balances out.
Over a quarter-century of labor-saving technologies,
we’re told, workers have been able to produce goods
(“output”) a lot faster, with the potential result that a
worker could put in fewer hours and get more leisure
time. However, there has not been correspondence:
The average output per hour has grown twice as fast as
the average worker’s leisure time. (E) follows from that
last sentence: If the average worker is producing goods
a lot faster but isn’t working a lot fewer hours, then he
must be producing more per week than he did a
quarter century ago, prior to the introduction of all
those technologies.
Don’t see it? Check out the lameness of the other four
choices:
12
(A) Nothing is ever said about workers’ spending habits
or abilities.
(B) Job creation is never mentioned.
(C) The percentage of all persons who work is never
even alluded to.
(D) “Anticipated” by whom? Nothing is mentioned about
what was in people’s minds 25 years ago. (And even if
“anticipated” is read as a paraphrase of “potentially,”
all we’re told is that the number of hours worked was
potentially smaller and the number of leisure hours
potentially greater. Nothing about output expectations
whatsoever.)
Sherlock Holmes had it right: When all other possibilities
have been eliminated, what’s left, however implausible,
must be the truth.
10. (C)
Yet another paradox. A bunch of ancient Asian
communities stopped hunting-and-gathering and
started cultivating their food. Their diet and health went
to blazes compared to the old days, and yet they never
went back to hunting-and-gathering. How come?
Pre-phrasing an answer might be tough, especially if
you’re unfamiliar with the archaeological terminology,
but we hope that your search of the choices yielded (C)
reasonably readily. If, as (C) suggests, there were just
too many people to make hunting-and-gathering viable,
why indeed would those ancient Asians go back to it,
notwithstanding their dietary problems?
(A), if anything, would provide a reason for the Asians
to resume hunting-and-gathering—to grab all that wild
flora and fauna.
(B)’s contrast of stored vs. fresh foods has nothing to
do with the argument at hand, and in any case
describes something that hunter-gatherers and
agriculturalists had in common, which doesn’t do the
job.
(D) rather comically implies that the Asians failed to
return to hunting-and-gathering in order to keep up with
the Joneses elsewhere in the world. Huh?
(E) seems to imply that ancient Asians chose agriculture
over hunting-and-gathering because the former burned
more calories and hence would make them buff up. But
that makes no sense: Remember that the agricultural
peoples had a terrible diet and bad health compared
with the old hunter/gatherers. Concern for their well
being would seem to mandate returning to the old
ways—which they failed to do. So (E), if anything,
deepens the paradox.

11. (E)
Just like question 8, this one begins with a question
that the author is apparently going to attempt to
answer. There are only three possibilities allowed by
the author to begin an article with the phrase “in a
surprise development”: the development was a
surprise to the journalist alone, the development was a
surprise to some other person, and the development
was a surprise to people in general. In each case, the
author says that the set phrase is inappropriate. The
argument’s conclusion, therefore, is (E): In no case is
it a good journalistic practice to begin a paragraph with
the phrase “in a surprise development.”
(A) and (B) The journalist never describes circumstances
in which it is appropriate to use the phrase “in a
surprise development.”
(C) Although the author does describe three distinct
sorts of circumstances in which the phrase is used,
that’s not his conclusion; he makes that distinction in
order to help him arrive at his conclusion, that in no
circumstances is it appropriate to use the phrase.
(D) This is way off; the author never discusses what’s
permissible in summing up a story; he only considers
the phrase “in a surprise development” as an
introduction, and even there he finds it wanting.
12. (C)
Despite the technical jargon, this stimulus is actually
made up of a bunch of formal logic statements. Take
the third sentence: If X (yellow to black), then either Y
(polypyrroles form on zeolites) or Z (polypyrroles form
in zeolites). The last sentence tells us that X occurred
(yellow to black), but Y didn’t. From this we can deduce
that Z must have occurred: polypyrroles formed from
pyrroles inside the zeolite. The second sentence tells
us that when polypyrroles form inside the zeolites, they
form in delicate chains. Therefore, we can infer (C):
some of the pyrroles in which the zeolite was
submerged formed into polypyrrole chains.
(A) The stimulus says that the zeolite was “free of any
pyrrole” before it was submerged, so (A) is impossible.
(B) Since the polypyrroles must have formed in and
not on the zeolite, they must have been formed as
chains, not lumps.
(D) There’s no reason why some pyrrole couldn’t attach
itself to the zeolite; all we know is that no polypyrroles
formed from pyrroles on the zeolite.
(E) Since the polypyrroles formed inside the zeolite,
we know some pyrroles reached the zeolite’s inner
Section II: Logical Reasoning
channels; we have absolutely no reason to infer that
only a “little” did so.
13. (E)
The author says that the pedigree standards applied to
working dogs ignore those genetic traits that allow the
dogs to serve the purpose for which they were originally
bred; as a result, those practical traits may be lost.
She decides that the standards set by pedigree
organizations for working dogs should include the
ability to do the work for which they were intended.
We’re looking for a principle that suppor ts this
conclusion. (E) says that organizations that set
standards for activities or “products” (and presumably
pedigree dogs fit this designation) should ensure that
they can serve their original purposes; i.e. according to
(E), the author is right and pedigree organizations
should ensure that “working” dogs are still able to
work.
(A) talks about the sort of standards organizations
should not set, but it doesn’t justify the author’s
conclusion about what standards pedigree organizations
should set.
(B) The author isn’t in favor of enforcing those
standards currently in effect, but favors setting new
standards.
(C) argues that organizations should see that their
standards are met; the author is attacking the prior
question of what sort of standards should be set in the
first place.
(D) The author doesn’t favor standards requiring working
ability because today’s pedigree dogs will actually be
required to work; she argues in favor of the standards
because they reflect the original purpose of the breeds.
14. (B)
The author is attempting to establish the conclusion
that standards set by pedigree organizations for
working dogs should require working ability. The phrase
“certain traits like herding ability risk being lost among
pedigreed dogs” is intended to suppor t this
conclusion. The phrase itself is supported, since it
occurs at the end of a chain of reasoning: Pedigree
organizations don’t specify work traits among their
standards; breeders only maintain traits specified by
pedigree organizations; traits not maintained by
breeders risk being lost; therefore work traits like
herding ability risk being lost. As (B) says, the phrase
is a “subsidiary” conclusion; that is, it’s a conclusion
drawn on the way to the main conclusion.
13
PrepTest 15 Explained
(A) On the contrary—as we’ve seen, it’s supported by
several pieces of evidence.
(C) Far from acknowledging a possible objection to the
author’s proposal, the phrase states the main reason
for the author’s proposal.
(D) is dead wrong. The argument accepts the claim
that traits like herding ability risk being lost; the
author’s proposal is intended to avert this very real
danger.
(E) No earlier claim depends on the phrase; rather, the
phrase is supported by earlier claims, and in turn gives
support to the conclusion.
15. (C)
You may not have been able to pre-phrase this
“strongly-supported conclusion,” but hopefully choice
(C) made sense to you upon evaluation. The arthritis
medication works by inhibiting the functioning of the
hormone that causes pain and swelling. However, the
hormone doesn’t only cause pain and swelling in cases
of rheumatoid arthritis; it’s also normally activated in
response to injury and infection. It therefore seems
reasonable to suppose that the medication would
inhibit the normal action of the hormone in response to
an injury. This in turn supports (C)’s contention that a
person taking the medication might sustain a joint
injury and, because of a lack of the pain and swelling
that normally accompany such an injury, be unaware
of it.
(A) There’s no evidence that the medication would
repair cell damage that has already occurred; quite the
contrar y, since the only action ascribed to the
medication is that of inhibiting the functioning of the
hormone.
(B) No mention of harmful side effects is made in the
argument, so it’s impossible to know whether or not
any side effects would be outweighed by benefits.
(D) We have no idea whether the hormone inhibited by
the medication has anything to do with diabetes or
lupus, so there’s no reason to conclude that the
medication would be of any use in combating these
diseases.
(E) On the contrary, we’d expect the medication to have
some effect on any joint disease involving the production
of the hormone that causes pain and swelling. We
don’t know that there are any other such diseases
besides rheumatoid arthritis, but we certainly can’t
conclude that there aren’t.
14
16. (E)
The author has concluded that for the amaryllis plant,
going dormant is a positive thing, and that therefore an
amar yllis plant’s owner should actually induce
dormancy in his plant. But the evidence doesn’t
support this; it seems much more likely that going
dormant is simply the amar yllis plant’s defense
against the drought that occurs in its natural habitat. If
so, then without a drought there’s probably no need for
a period of dormancy. As (E) recognizes, the author
assumes that there’s more to dormancy than a
defensive reaction, that the dormancy confers some
other positive benefit on amaryllis plants.
(A), (B) The author only speaks of amaryllis plants,
and so need not assume anything about other plants or
how other plants compare to amaryllis plants.
(C) The author never specified when water should be
withheld from amaryllis plants kept as houseplants,
only that it should be done at some time each year to
induce dormancy. The lack of specificity in the
argument regarding the time frame for withholding
water kills this one.
(D) Although the author believes dormancy is good for
amaryllis plants, he needn’t assume that the only thing
that could go wrong with an amaryllis plant is too short
a period of dormancy.
17. (D)
The author accepts the theory that yawning is most
powerfully triggered by seeing someone else yawn
because 1) a lot of people believe the theory today and
2) according to “historians of popular culture” people
all over the world have commonly believed the theory.
That’s not a very convincing argument; we’d like to
have something more than widespread belief to fall
back on. That’s the flaw (D) points out; the argument
relies on opinion, whereas the question under
consideration—“what triggers yawning?”—is a
scientific, or factual question, the answer to which
needs to be suppor ted by substantive factual
evidence.
(A) The author doesn’t indulge in circular argumentation
—his evidence, albeit weak, is certainly different from
his conclusion.
(B) The author never defines “historians of popular
culture,” but there’s no reason to suppose that popular
beliefs about yawning are outside their area of
expertise.

(C) The author refers to common popular belief; he
makes no reference to particular cases, either typical
or atypical.
(E) The author concludes that seeing other people yawn
is the “most irresistible” cause of yawning; he never
claims, or assumes, that it’s the only cause of yawning.
18. (B)
The stimulus in this Parallel Reasoning question is so
formal in nature that it can be boiled down to algebra:
All A are B (All gourmet cooks enjoy variety).
No B is C (No one who enjoys variety prefers bland
food).
Therefore, no C is A (or if you prefer, All C are not A,
same difference: The conclusion is that gourmet cooks
and preferrers of bland food have nothing in common).
In correct choice (B), Huang Collection paintings are A,
abstract paintings are B, and paintings included in next
week’s auction are C, and if you plug those terms into
the algebra above, you’ll see that (B) functions
identically. Here’s how the wrong choices play out:
(A) All A are B. All B are C. Therefore, all A are C. This
is the classic Aristotelian deductive syllogism, by the
way. The sheer absence of a negative or “not” term
means that you could have rejected (A) right away.
(C) All A are B. No A is C. Therefore, no C is B. Note
the second premise’s subtle shift away from the
original.
(D) All A are B. No C is B. (So far so good, actually.
Remember that No B is C is the same as No C is B.
They’re reversible.) Therefore, no B is C. (Oops; close
but no cigar.)
(E) All A are B…and here algebra falls short, because
the remainder of (E) brings in complex terms like
prices in general, adequate reflection of price, true
value, and next week’s auction. Because (E) is not as
strictly written as the stimulus, it, like (A), can be
quickly rejected.
19. (A)
Because no one witnessed the meeting between the
minister and the opposition party leader except for the
minister’s aide, the author concludes that it must have
been the minister’s aide who provided the information
that brought the minister down, rather than a political
enemy of the minister. Does this make sense? After
all, the opposition leader was at the meeting too;
mightn’t he or she have given the information to the
newspapers? As (A) points out, the evidence provided
by the author, makes a competing conclusion—that the
Section II: Logical Reasoning
opposition leader spilled the beans—just as likely as
the author’s conclusion.
(B) The author never states that the chain of events
was inevitable; that is, he never assumes that, once
the information from the secret meeting was released,
it was inevitable that the minister be brought down.
(C) The author never discusses any “different occasion”;
both evidence and conclusion concern this particular
finance minister and this secret meeting.
(D) The evidence is entirely relevant to the point at
issue, which is “who was responsible for bringing the
finance minister down?”
(E) The evidence is that the effect (the minister’s
downfall) was impossible without the action (giving the
information to the newspaper). This means that the
latter was necessary for the former; the author never
treats the evidence of the action as though it was
sufficient to bring about the effect.
20. (A)
Evans discounts those critics who dismiss him and his
poetry, because he says they themselves are not true
poets and only a true poet can function as a critic of
poetry. Why does he say that they’re not true poets?
He’s read their poetry and doesn’t think much of it—it
doesn’t “convey genuine poetic creativity,” as true
poetry should. He’s relying on his own judgment of
poetry; therefore, he’s assumes that he’s a fit judge of
poetry and poetic creativity, and according to his own
criteria, he must also be assuming that he is a true
poet. As (A) points out, he’s assuming exactly what he
set out to prove, that the critics are wrong and he’s a
true poet.
(B) Evans never assumes or implies that everyone is
either a poet or a critic. All she says is that if you’re not
one, you can’t be the other.
(C) Evans never implies that a poet’s standing can be
judged independently of his or her poetry; in fact, the
criteria given for a true poet is one whose works
conveys genuine poetic creativity.
(D) Far from making an absolute distinction between
critics and poets, the author says that only true poets
can function as critics of poetry.
(E) On the contrary, true poets would be in a position
to criticize their own work.
21. (E)
Ouch!—one of the nastiest question stems we’ve
come across in a long time. If there was ever a
question worth blowing off temporarily strictly based on
15
PrepTest 15 Explained
its stem, this is it. Be that as it may, let’s take the
stem apart to see what they’re after here.
The correct choice will be able to serve as the premise
of an argument against the claim, but it must be an
argument that relies on the principle. So we’re not
looking for something that by itself weakens the claim,
but rather the basis for an argument that, if based on
the principle, would weaken the claim. Tricky, eh?
According to the principle, if one claims that Country X
lowered its taxes to serve the advantage of foreign
companies, one must show how the foreign
companies’ interests actually helped bring about the
change; that is, one must show that the reason for the
tariffs’ being lowered was the usefulness of that
course of action to foreign companies. Since we’re
supposed to counter the claim that Country X’s tariffs
were lowered in order to help foreign companies, we
should therefore look for a choice that weakens the
connection between foreign companies and the change
in policy. The best choice is (E); if there’s no evidence
that foreign companies themselves played a role in
inducing the change then, according to the principle, it
becomes much more difficult to explain the change by
the fact that it served their interests.
(A) The principle says nothing about the interests of
any second group, like consumers, being served, so
(A) doesn’t apply to the principle.
(B) introduces new economic considerations like
importers’ profits; the principle had nothing to do with
such things, only with who was responsible for inducing
the change.
(C) discusses the short-term effects of the change on
Country X; we’re only interested in whether the change
occurred in response to foreign interests.
(D) is better than (C) because at least it tells us about
foreign companies, but it doesn’t tell us what we
wanted to know—whether they helped bring about the
change.
22. (E)
The scientist discovers that in the tropics, migratory
fish generally follow a migration pattern that’s exactly
the opposite of the pattern followed by fish in
temperate zones: they mature in fresh water and
spawn in the ocean. Does this disprove the scientist’s
theory that food availability determines migration
patterns? That’s impossible to know, unless we know
something about the food availability in the tropics—is
there more or less food available in the ocean? Unless
we know the answer to (E), we don’t know whether the
fish in the tropics are acting in accordance with the
scientist’s theory or in violation of that theory.
16
(A) completely ignores the issue of food availability
which is the whole basis of the theory; the scientist
said nothing about temperature, so (A) is irrelevant.
(B) introduces an irrelevant distinction; the scientist
was interested in comparing the total amount of
nourishment available in the different places. The point
is that fish need a lot of nourishment when they mature
and little when they spawn—it doesn’t matter what
type of food they eat to get that nourishment.
(C) Because the scientist is talking about general
migration patterns, it doesn’t matter if there are a few
exceptions to the rule. Thus, if there were a species of
fish with populations in both areas, it wouldn’t make any
difference to the theory whether the fish exhibited the
same or different migration patterns in the two different
zones; what matters is what fish “generally” do.
(D) is pretty plainly irrelevant. The total number of
species has nothing to do with the role of food in
determining migration patterns.
23. (B)
According to the author, computers can only solve
problems by following some set of mechanically
applicable rules, and some problems just can’t be
solved that way; it follows therefore that no computer
can solve that type of problem. But the author takes
this one step further; she says that no computer will be
able to do everything that some human mind can do.
She must be assuming that some human mind can do
what she’s just shown no computer can do—that is,
she assumes that some human mind (or “at least one”
human mind, as (B) says) can solve one of those
problems that can’t be solved by following a
mechanically applicable set of rules.
(A) The author needs to establish that some non-
mechanical problems are solvable by humans; it
wouldn’t help to assume that there’s some non-
mechanical problem that’s UNsolvable by humans.
(C), (D) and (E) all make the same mistake. Since
computers also have the ability to solve problems by
following mechanically applicable rules, human ability
to solve such problems doesn’t show that humans can
do something that computers can’t. It wouldn’t help
the author to assume that one such problem can be
solved by every human (C), that every such problem (of
a certain sub-type) is solvable by almost every human
(D), or that every such problem is solvable by some
human (E). We’re only interested in human ability to
solve problems that can’t be solved by following sets of
mechanical rules.
 Section II: Logical Reasoning

24. (A)
The author is trying to demonstrate that the typical
response given to the survey is ambiguous. He does
this by taking that typical response and applying it to
the case of a theoretical representative individual. Take
a 48-year old man who says he feels as he did when he
was 36; at the age of 36, if he had made the same
type of response that he does now, he would have
claimed to have felt as he did when he was 27; and so
forth. This is an odd turn of events. How did the author
get from the group results to reapplying the typical
response over and over to a single person? As (A)
says, the author projects from the survey response to
hypothetical responses made by a single individual; he
looks at the responses the individual would have made
at an earlier age, and then another earlier age, and so
on, and uses that to show that the current response is
ambiguous.
(B) The author never discusses what would have been
the “most reasonable” thing for the respondents to say.
(C) The example of the 48-year-old man isn’t used as
a counterexample; it doesn’t show that people really
didn’t “almost unanimously” respond by saying that
they felt 75% of their real age. Instead, the example is
used to show that the response, which the author
never doubts, is inherently ambiguous.
(D) The author doesn’t set up two opposed statements
in direct contradiction of each other and force us to
choose one or the other; he’s simply interested in
showing that it’s difficult to understand what one
statement means.
(E) The author never speaks of “manipulation” on the
part of the questioners.

17
PrepTest 15 Explained
SECTION III:
LOGICAL REASONING
1. (B)
The stimulus begins with a claim made by
Shakespeare-philes, who feel that in England, at least,
Shakespeare’s work has been known and loved by all
classes, not just the elite. The key phrase comes
midway: “Skepticism about this claim is borne out
by…” This indicates that the author’s main point is to
take issue with that claim. Meanwhile, the
counterevidence comes from only one period and
source, the bound copies of Shakespeare from the
early 1800’s that the author feels could not have been
available to ordinary folk. So (B) is correct in taking
issue with the original claim, and has an appropriately
narrow scope (“at some time in the past”).
(A) The issue here is ‘Who historically has revered
Shakespeare (the elite or all classes?),’ and not ‘How
can you tell the elite apart from everyone else?’
(C) What aspects? What lack of appreciation today?
(D) goes too far. The evidence, as noted above, comes
only from the 1800’s. The author cannot be leading to
a blanket statement that only the educated upper class
has ever known and loved Shakespeare.
(E) It’s not the elite who are skeptical but the author,
and that skepticism is of the claim made in sentence
1, not of whether Shakespeare in fact wrote worthy
plays.
2. (E)
Even if only the educated rich of the early 1800’s could
own and peruse the books that the author cites, who’s
to say that everybody else couldn’t have known,
studied, and loved Shakespeare by seeing his plays
performed? The unwarranted assumption that people
could only get to know Shakespeare’s plays in book
form drives a stake through the heart of the logic.
(A), (B) The conclusion drawn, which lest we forget is
(B) in Question 1, isn’t aesthetic—“literary quality,” to
quote choice (A)—but sociological, on the topic of
‘Who has always revered Shakespeare?’ And contrary
to (B), the evidence isn’t “purely economic”—it
connects money to awareness of Shakespeare.
(C) is way off. No 20th century standards are cited, and
it’s not 18th century events that are being judged or
evaluated but a contemporary claim about the nature
of Shakespeare’s perennial fans.
18
(D), like (A) and (B), misunderstands the argument as
an attempt to judge literary quality.
3. (C)
If you recognize the president’s subtle but definite
scope shift, you can knock this question off in a jiffy.
All the evidence shows is that the material used in the
mailings is recycled. But the conclusion is that the
mailings are recyclable—which is different. The
president must be assuming that that which has been
recycled can be recycled again.
(A) The conclusion deals with the recyclability of the
mailings only. Paper put to other use is outside the
scope.
(B) The Kaplan “Denial Test” shows you why (B) is
wrong. Suppose for the moment that (B) is false:
Suppose some of the group’s mailings lack windows.
Would that new fact affect the argument? Not a bit; the
mailing materials could still be completely recyclable.
In contrast, note that if (C) is false—if the window
material isn’t recyclable—then the argument falls
apart.
(D) As anyone who has discarded newspapers or cans
in the normal trash will attest, that which is recyclable
isn’t always recycled! The issue here is recyclability,
which has nothing to do with what actually happens to
the mailings when they arrive at people’s homes.
(E) The conclusion concerns only “these mailings”—
the ones sent from HQ. That other mailings may or may
not be sent from elsewhere is beside the point.
4. (A)
The first line of attack is to mentally rewrite the first
sentence. (And paraphrasing a key idea is always
smart anyway.) If that “frequently expressed view…is
false,” it must mean that, to the author, written
constitutions are inherently no more liberal than, and
may be even less liberal than, unwritten ones. Which is
all (A) is saying. Notice that the actual “therefore”
sentence, the one you expect to be the conclusion,
does in fact simply echo sentence 1: It asserts a
condition (liberal interpretation and application) that’s
necessary for a written constitution to become liberal,
in contrast to the view that a written constitution is per
se liberal.
(B) screws up the phrase “properly understood.” The
author uses it in sentence 3 to introduce her view of
what a constitution should be properly understood to
be—namely, a sum of procedures. But (B) crazily
implies that one cannot properly understand a written
constitution. Huh?

(C), besides making no sense (how could it be easier
to misinterpret a written document than a set of
concepts that are mental or verbal only?), falls into
much the same trap as (B), by implying that the issue
is how a constitution can be understood or interpreted,
when the issue is, in fact, How liberal per se, is a
written constitution?
(D) The preservation of constitutions is never mentioned
or alluded to.
(E) There probably are criteria for evaluating how a
constitution is to be interpreted and applied, but the
author never gets into that. What she’s presenting,
in the last sentence, are criteria for deeming a
constitution as “liberal.”
5. (B)
Sentence 2, by itself, yields the correct answer. (B)’s
sentiment, that one cannot evaluate the liberalness of
a written constitution from the writing alone, directly
follows from sentence 2’s assertion that words have to
be put into effect or practice before they can be
assessed.
(A) contradicts both (B) and the text. By the author’s
definition, a paper with words on it is meaningless until
those words get turned into action.
(C) makes little sense (it has to be somewhat handy to
have a written constitution to consult from time to
time), and shifts the scope by implying that the issue
is which type of constitution is preferable, when it’s
really about which one is inherently more liberal.
(D) reflects a faulty paraphrase of sentence 1, and if
you picked (D) please read and follow this explanation
carefully. To state, as the author does, that it’s false
that written constitutions must be more liberal than
unwritten ones, doesn’t mean that the reverse is
true—that unwritten ones must be more liberal than
written ones. As noted in the explanation to Question
4, all we can assume is that written ones don’t have an
edge when it comes to liberalness. In fact, as we see
from the argument as a whole, the author believes that
neither type of constitution is inherently more liberal
than the other; it all depends on how a constitution is
interpreted and applied.
(E), besides leaving out the issue of application (which
is coequal with interpretation in the argument),
commits the common error of mistaking a necessary
condition for a sufficient one. Note that Keyword
“only”! Just because a constitution is interpreted and
applied liberally doesn’t make it liberal—there may be
other requirements that need to be met before a
constitution is deemed to be a liberal one.
Section III: Logical Reasoning
6. (E)
The author recommends that scientists focus on Earth-
like planets and carbon-based life when estimating the
probability of life on other planets, even though there
could well be non-carbon-based life on planets unlike
ours. How come? Because all known life forms are
carbon-based, and only Earth, to our knowledge,
suppor ts life. So the author is suggesting—for
whatever reason—that we’re wisest to use what we do
know in order to make reliable predictions about what
we don’t. Only (E) explicitly evokes this idea of
“concentrate on the known.”
(A), as a principle, would support a recommendation
that we not make use of observed phenomena when
making inferences about unobserved phenomena. This
is pretty much the antithesis of the author’s point of
view.
(B) sets up a contrast—explaining all phenomena vs.
explaining some phenomena—that has no connection
to the stimulus whatsoever.
(C), like (A), goes against the text. The author isn’t
opposed to making estimates about extraterrestrial
life, as is the principle in (C); she’s simply in favor of
basing those estimates on known rather than unknown
factors.
(D) may sound impressive, but is no closer to the text
than (B) is. The author is in no sense talking about
“explaining phenomena,” and has nothing to say about
reliance on a few principles vs. reliance on many.
7. (B)
The politician begins by citing the need for the
redistribution of wealth, without which economic
injustices will flourish. He then predicts that such
injustice, if it peaks, will turn those who are suffering
to violence. Finally, he asserts that the nation must do
whatever it can to alleviate problems—inferably
including the economic injustice just described—that
would otherwise lead to violence. So the implicit point
must be: We had better redistribute wealth, choice (B),
lest the chain of causation just described come to pass.
(A) Though the politician believes that violence is
inevitable result of intolerant injustice, and probably
believes that that is regrettable, his purpose is neither
to justify nor to condemn—his purpose is to
recommend a course of action that will avoid a lot of
escalating problems.
(C) This can’t be the politician’s conclusion because
no evidence to this effect is provided; the topic is
economic justice. In any event, he apparently believes
19
PrepTest 15 Explained
that decisions should be based on practical realities
and not on either of the grounds that (C) mentions.
(D) Actually, his point is that economic injustice had
better be remedied in order to prevent intolerable
social conditions that he believes are an inevitable
consequence of its continuation.
(E), like (E) in Question 5, mistakes a necessar y
condition for a sufficient one. “Unless” is a Keyword
signaling necessity. Redistributing wealth may not bring
about economic justice, but without it, violence is
inevitable.
8. (A)
The data aren’t presented in the most helpful order.
You might have tried to rearrange the facts
chronologically, and made a mental picture of the
situation, too: In 1985, they found 38 of these beetles
in a time span of two hours, while in 1989, in the same
place, they only found 10 in nine hours. Those data
might suggest a decline in the beetle population over
those four years, but no: The author’s conclusion is
that there probably was no drop because (Evidence
Keyword) ‘85 was wet and ‘89 was dry. Sentence 1
tells us that these normally motionless beetles move
around more in wet years. What’s the connection
between this fact and the data presented? The
implication is that in 1989, despite what the observer
reported, there were pretty much the same number of
beetles in that spot, but they weren’t moving as much
so they couldn’t be seen. (A) supports the argument
by shoring up this implication—to escape the gaze of
the observer the beetles would have to be pretty
darned invisible when motionless. It makes more
plausible the notion that the obser ver missed
approximately 28 additional beetles that were actually
there in 1989.
(B) doesn’t necessarily describe the environment at
which the observer was conducting the study, and in
any case, other beetle habitats are outside the scope
of this argument, which concerns one locale only.
(C) mentions reproduction in the expectation that
you’ll connect it with the issue at hand, which you
shouldn’t: A comparison of the number of beetles in
two separate years has nothing directly to do with
reproduction activity. But even if they were connected,
(C)’s suggestion that beetle movement relates to
reproduction activity would weaken the author’s logic,
because it would link the dry weather in 1989 to less
frequent reproduction and hence support the idea of a
1989 population drop.
20
(D) Useless background information: So they’re rare,
so what? The fact remains that some were observed in
1985 and fewer in 1989, and the issue is the
explanation for that decrease. (D)’s historical note is
at most of footnote interest only.
(E) The reference to predators is tempting, if only
because eaten beetles are nonexistent beetles, but
it’s a dead end. If predators are relevant in this
context, then why would they be any more or less
relevant in 1989 than 1985? (E) completely ignores
the essential time comparison at the heart of the logic,
so although you may feel that it raises a potentially
relevant element, it can’t possibly strengthen the
reasoning.
9. (B)
In concluding that raising blood-magnesium levels can
cure fatigue, the author interprets the obser ved
correlations between fatigue (especially fatigue
involved in chronic fatigue syndrome) and low levels of
blood magnesium as indicating that the low levels of
magnesium caused the fatigue. But he hasn’t shown
this to be the case. As (B) points out, it’s quite
possible that it’s fatigue that causes lower
concentrations of magnesium in the blood. If that were
the case, raising the level of blood magnesium would
simply attack a result of fatigue, not the cause, and
would be unlikely to effect a cure.
(A) The argument doesn’t rely on the claim that
malabsorption of magnesium is always the cause of
low blood magnesium; the only causal link that plays a
role in the conclusion is the link between low blood
magnesium and fatigue.
(C)’s possibility is irrelevant; the fact that there is
some variation in magnesium levels among healthy
people wouldn’t challenge the author’s belief that
raising the levels of blood magnesium would cure the
fatigue associated with the syndrome.
(D) and (E) both criticize the author for not being specific
enough, but there’s no reason he should be specific.
He’s discussing in the most general terms what sort of
treatment would cure chronic fatigue; he’s not writing out
a prescription. Since his conclusion is general, he
needn’t do the things discussed in (D) and (E).
10. (B)
The consumer advocate argues that explicit safety
labels should be required for toys because it would
enable parents to be more effective in preventing toy-
related injuries; the labels currently required, “age-
range” labels, don’t do enough to reduce such injuries.

(B) strengthens this argument by confirming the
advocate’s claim that age-range labels and safety
labels have a different effect on parents. To take the
author’s own example, when parents see that a toy is
recommended for ages three and up, they take this to
mean that younger children won’t understand or enjoy
the toy; they don’t realize that it might mean that the
toy is dangerous for children younger than three. If the
label specifically warned that the toy can be
dangerous, parents would presumably be doubly
careful that it not fall into their young children’s hands.
(A) says some toys aren’t dangerous; this doesn’t
show the need for requiring safety labels for dangerous
toys.
(C) doesn’t strengthen the advocate’s argument because
the advocate wasn’t specifically interested in the case
of children under three; rather, she was trying to
demonstrate that safety labels are more effective than
age-range labels in preventing toy-related injuries for
children of any age.
(D) suggests that safety labels wouldn’t be ver y
effective in reducing injuries, or at least injuries to
those children whose parents don’t read labels.
(E) focuses on a particular hazard, but the advocate
was speaking of toy-related injuries in general; she
never said that safety labels would be especially
effective in preventing choking.
11. (C)
The whole stimulus is intended to prove the initial
statement that the toy-labeling law should require
explicit safety labels; the rest of the stimulus—the
explanation of what toy-labeling laws currently require
and why the proposed change would be an
improvement—is intended to support that statement.
Clearly, the statement in question is the argument’s
conclusion.
(A) As we’ve already said, the statement isn’t used to
support a further conclusion, the statement is the
conclusion.
(B) There are no “conflicting” goals discussed, and the
statement isn’t a compromise; instead, it’s the single
goal for which the advocate argues throughout the
stimulus.
(D) Huh?! Obviously, the advocate never attempts to
refute her own conclusion!
(E) The statement isn’t a “particular instance,” it is
itself the general principle under discussion; the only
particular instance discussed is the “three and up”
label, and that’s an instance of age-range labeling.
Section III: Logical Reasoning
12. (E)
The author says that organic farming leaves less land
available to serve as habitat for local wildlife than
chemical farming leaves, because organic farming
requires that more acreage be cultivated in order to
produce the same amount of food. The author reasons
that the more acreage cultivated by farmers, the less
land is left as habitat for local wildlife. He must be
assuming, as (E) says, that the land cultivated as
acreage by organic farmers can no longer serve as a
habitat for wildlife; otherwise, the increase in land
cultivated wouldn’t constitute a loss of wildlife habitat.
(A) The author hasn’t discussed the health threat
posed by chemical farming at all; for all we know he
accepts the argument that chemical farming threatens
the health of wildlife. He’s merely making the
counterpoint that organic farming also has a drawback
as far as wildlife is concerned.
(B) is similar to (A); the author doesn’t imply or assume
anything about whether or not chemicals cause harm to
wildlife. His only point is that organic farming cultivates
a wider area, and thus reduces wildlife habitat.
(C) The author is only interested in the effects that the
two farming methods have on wildlife, so he needn’t
assume anything about their other disadvantages.
(D) The author compared the acreage needed for total
food production; he doesn’t get into what type of crops
are being produced, so he doesn’t really need to
assume anything about that.
13. (A)
The stimulus is pretty simple: Reptiles have these
characteristics, therefore alligators—which we have to
know or at least accept as being reptiles—have ‘em,
too. In the same way, (A) argues that whatever’s true
about green plants must be true about grass (which is
a subset of green plants).
(B) “Some red butterflies” is more limited than the
stimulus’ “[all] reptiles,” and one red butterfly is not a
class or subset of a larger group, as alligators are of
reptiles or grass is of green plants.
(C) would be parallel if it read, “All books provide
knowledge about the empirical world, so Woolf’s book
does likewise.” But as (C) is written, that books can
provide such knowledge does not imply that each
individual book does so.
(D) The Ali film is not a subset of Fassbinder films, it’s
one particular example. To be parallel, (D) might have
read something like this: “All members of the Hanbury
family have seen all of Fassbinder’s films, so Dierdre
21
PrepTest 15 Explained
Hanbury has seen all of his films.” Note that there the
author would be assuming that Dierdre is a member of
that family, just as our original assumes (or knows) that
alligators are reptiles.
(E) features two separate terms—running a risk and
suffering a broken bone—in a way that the stimulus
doesn’t. (E) would be closer if it read “Skiers run a
high risk, so skier Lindsay runs a high risk.”
14. (C)
The author is trying to establish that waste of taxpayer
dollars occurs at weapons-producing plants. As proof,
he cites the fact that the government has decided to
reopen a plant and allow it to violate environmental,
health and safety laws, when it could just as easily
produce the weapons at a safer facility. Didn’t
something get lost in the shuffle? What happened to
taxpayer dollars? What does compliance with safety
laws have to do with wasting money? As (C) says, the
evidence doesn’t address the issue of wasting
taxpayer money, which is the subject of the argument’s
conclusion.
(A) The main problem with the reasoning isn’t that the
author hasn’t backed up the claim that the alternative
site is safer, but that the issue of safety isn’t even the
issue that the author set out to address.
(B) The author’s point that weapons laboratories are
money wasters doesn’t undermine his claim that
production plants are also money wasters.
(D)’s distinction between “research” and “weapons” is
confusing; the research spoken of in the argument is
weapons research. The argument makes a distinction
between weapons research and weapons productions,
and never confuses the two.
(E) The argument never compares research laboratories
to production plants except to say that they both waste
taxpayer money; they don’t have to be similar to be
compared in that respect.
15. (B)
Dr. Godfrey notices that the more students work at
their part time jobs, the worse they tend to do in
school; he concludes that they’re doing badly because
they’re working long hours. Dr. Nash also sees the
correlation between part-time work and poor grades,
but she draws the opposite conclusion; she believes
the students who work long hours do so because
they’re doing poorly in school. As (B) says, she offers
an alternative interpretation for the association noticed
by Godfrey.
22
(A) Dr. Nash disagrees with Dr. Godfrey’s claim that
part-time work contributes to students’ academic
problems; she never denies that those problems are
serious.
(C) Dr. Nash accepts the accuracy of Dr. Godfrey’s
evidence—i.e., she accepts that there is a correlation
between students working long hours part time and
doing poorly in school.
(D) Neither Dr. Nash nor Dr. Godfrey discusses the
general question of whether schools are at fault for
students’ academic problems; they discuss the much
more narrow problem of whether the school policy of
allowing part-time work has contributed to students’
academic problems.
(E) Dr. Nash believes that there is a relationship
between students’ academic problems and part-time
employment, just not the relationship that Dr. Godfrey
espouses.
16. (C)
Since Dr. Godfrey says that students are having
academic problems as a result of working long hours,
and Dr. Nash says students are working long hours
because they have academic problems, it would be
nice to see which came first: the poor academic
performance or the long work hours. As (C) says, if we
could look at the students in question and see whether
they had academic problems before they started
working, we’d be in a better position to know whether
the work could have caused their problems. (Obviously,
if the problems came before work, the work didn’t
cause the problems).
(A) Neither Dr. Nash nor Dr. Godfrey said anything
about the connection between academic problems and
future career success, so this question is irrelevant.
(B) Whether or not students also spend long hours at
other activities doesn’t matter. Both disputants accept
that there’s a connection between working long hours
and doing poorly in school; they only disagree about
which condition causes the other, and (B) wouldn’t
help clear that up.
(D) hints at some undescribed skullduggery, but doesn’t
address the question of whether they’re getting poor
grades because they’re working a lot or vice versa.
(E), like (A), speaks of what happens after high-school;
neither speaker says anything about this, so the
answer to the question posed in (E) wouldn’t help
resolve the dispute.

17. (A)
X reasons that there is an “inevitable” trade-off
between human and animal welfare in medical
research and that concern for human welfare should
prevail. Y responds by proposing an alternative way to
conduct medical research. Y does not believe that the
only way to conduct medical research is on animals or
humans. Y suggests that research being done on
animals could be done in some other way (e.g.,
computer modeling), without causing any suffering to
animals or to humans. Y rejects X’s claim that there
must be a “trade-off” between human and animal
welfare; or, as (A) says, Y contradicts a premise (that
there must be an inevitable trade-off) on which X’s
argument relies.
(B) Y does not disagree with X about the weight to be
given to animal suffering as opposed to human
suffering. In fact, Y could even agree with X! If the only
way to conduct medical research involved humans and
animals, Y may agree that human interests are more
important than animal interests. We just don’t know
what Y believes about the relative weight of human and
animal interests because Y does not compare the two.
All we know is that Y doesn’t believe that there is an
inevitable trade-off; Y believes that the same results
can be achieved by other means without animal
suffering.
(C) Y’s argument doesn’t present a logical consequence
of X’s premises; it contradicts X’s argument by denying
a premise on which X’s argument relies.
(D) Y disagrees with X’s argument; the new evidence
about other types of research is intended to refute X’s
point.
(E) Far from filling in a hole in X’s argument by supplying
an assumption, or unstated premise, Y attacks an
explicitly stated premise.
18. (A)
Question 18 involves a scope shift. The evidence is that,
in one particular environment, some types of bacteria
experienced random mutations. The conclusion is that
all genetic mutation is random. The credited response
needs to link this specific example to the general
conclusion. Combine the stimulus with (A). The stimulus
states that some genetic mutations are random, and (A)
states that either all mutations are random or none are.
If some mutations are random, then all mutations must
be random; the alternative option isn’t possible. If (A) is
true, all genetic mutations are random, which is our
conclusion.
Section III: Logical Reasoning
(B) At best, (B) only mildly supports the idea that
bacteria mutations occur randomly; it doesn’t however
support the conclusion that all genetic mutation is
random.
(C) Since the stimulus doesn’t tell us that all genetic
mutation in bacteria is random (it only mentions certain
kinds of bacteria), answer choice (C) doesn’t allow us
to conclude anything. (C)’s conclusion would only be
true if all genetic mutations in bacteria were random.
(D) indicates that the genetic mutations of these
particular kinds of bacteria would be random whatever
their environment, but doesn’t get us any closer to
drawing the conclusion that all genetic mutation is
random.
(E) too concentrates on the bacteria. (E) suggests that
the experiment did a good job of duplicating the
bacteria’s behavior in nature, at least in some
respects, but doesn’t allow us to draw conclusions
about all genetic mutations.
19. (A)
According to the club rules, it’s necessary to be a
member in good standing in order to vote. However,
that doesn’t mean that being a member in good
standing automatically entitles one to vote (is
sufficient). Jeffrey is a member in good standing
because he paid his dues, but remember that being a
member in good standing isn’t sufficient to guarantee
he gets to vote. The club president could have
disallowed his vote for another reason. Thomas makes
the common mistake of confusing that which is
necessary with that which is sufficient. To use the
terminology in (A): Thomas fails to take into account
the distinction between something not being prohibited
(Jeffrey is not prohibited from voting because he is a
club member in good standing and only club members
in good standing may vote) and its being authorized
(every member in good standing automatically gets to
vote).
(B) Thomas never attacks the president’s character
but does focus on the question of Jeffrey’s eligibility to
vote. Thus, neither part of (B) is correct.
(C) The only thing (C) could possibly be referring to is
Thomas’ statement in the second sentence “you’ve
admitted that club rules say…” But he’s not assuming
that because Althea didn’t deny what the club rules say
that the club rules are true. He’s citing club rules as
independent evidence, and reminding his opponent
that she’s already conceded this point.
23
PrepTest 15 Explained
(D) is irrelevant. The question is whether the President
had the right to prevent Jeffrey, a member of good
standing, from voting. Thomas doesn’t need to discuss
what they were voting about.
(E) is irrelevant. Thomas’ argument is about Jeffrey’s
voting eligibility and doesn’t depend on whether Althea
is an authority on club rules. Thomas’ argument
doesn’t improve if she is an authority and isn’t weaker
if she isn’t.
20. (B)
People who consume calories beyond their proper
weight-maintaining level normally store fat and gain
weight. But, people who regularly drink two or three
alcoholic beverage per day (a subset of all people) and
exceed their weight-maintaining caloric intake usually
don’t gain weight. To resolve the discrepancy, we want
the choice that most explains why the general rule
doesn’t apply to people who drink two to three
alcoholic beverages a day. According to (B), when
people drink two or three alcoholic beverages a day,
the excess calories that they consume tend to be
“dissipated” as heat; so (B) explains why they don’t
convert those excess calories into fat and gain weight.
(A) says that some people who drink don’t exceed
their weight-maintaining caloric intake, but we want to
know about those drinkers who do exceed their weight-
maintaining caloric intake.
(C) talks about people who do not drink alcoholic
beverages and therefore doesn’t explain anything
about people who do. Moreover, (C) doesn’t even
speak of people who consume calories beyond their
weight-maintaining limit; (C) speaks of people who eat
“high-calorie foods,” a totally new idea.
(D) intensifies the myster y of the absence of weight
gain in alcohol-drinkers without explaining it.
(E) opens up a whole new question (fewer calories) to
ponder, but doesn’t enlighten us as to why the alcohol
drinkers mentioned in the conclusion don’t put on the
weight.
21. (D)
The stimulus tells us that EEGs can “often, but not
always” detect the abnormal electrical signals
associated with temporal lobe epilepsy. We’re given
the first part of the conclusion: In general, a positive
EEG reading reliably indicates temporal lobe epilepsy.
This corresponds nicely to the fact that EEGs can
“often” detect the signals associated with epilepsy.
But as the “although” indicates, the rest of the
conclusion should correspond to the other part of the
24
evidence, the “not always.” So what can we conclude
from the fact that EEGs can’t always detect the
abnormal electrical impulses? How about (D): a
negative reading—failure to pick up evidence of
abnormal impulses—doesn’t necessarily mean that
temporal lobe epilepsy is not present.
(A) is absurd; a positive reading can’t “reasonably
reliably” indicate two contradictory things.
(B) The stimulus only discusses temporal lobe epilepsy,
so it would be inappropriate to introduce other forms of
epilepsy in the conclusion.
(C) The stimulus never mentions erroneous positive
reading, only erroneous negative ones. Therefore, the
correct conclusion can’t compare the relative accuracy
of positive vs. negative readings.
(E) distorts the case; although a negative reading is
not a sure indicator of the absence of temporal lobe
epilepsy, in no sense is a negative reading an indicator
of the presence of such epilepsy.
22. (C)
The quickest way to solve this Parallel Reasoning
problem is to consider the “flawed reasoning” directly.
The only way this conclusion must follow from the given
evidence is if there’s roughly the same number of
bicyclists in both age groups, and that’s a fact we can’t
take for granted. If there are, for instance, 100
bicyclists 18+ and 1,000 bicyclists under 18, then 90
people with lights on their bikes would constitute a
majority in the 18+ category, whereas 100 people with
lights on their bikes in the under 18 category would not
constitute a majority of that group. In this way, we can
take care of the evidence in the first sentence and still
show how it doesn’t necessarily lead to the conclusion
in the second sentence. So the nature of the flaw is a
confusion of proportion with number. Scanning the
choices, only (C) qualifies, with voters taking the role
of bicyclists 18+, non-voters standing in for bicyclists
under 18, and “being on the mailing list” the equivalent
of “having lights on their bikes.”
(A) In the original, the majority in one group possesses
a trait while the majority of another group does not.
(A), however, gives us the majority in the same group—
people in Sheldon—possessing different traits (buying
gas on Monday and groceries on Tuesday).
(B)’s conclusion is a statement of causation (“the
availability of videos was responsible”), which is
nothing like the stimulus.
(D) can be rejected because its first piece of evidence
is a statement about “every” member of a group, and

its conclusion evokes the concept of minimum (“must
have at least two fire trucks”), neither of which is
present in the stimulus. Also, note that the concept
that is prevalent in both groups in the original, the
aspect of majority, is only present in part in (D).
(E), like (D), veers away from the stimulus with a piece
of evidence about “everyone” in a particular group.
Also (E) involves two traits or behaviors, knitting and
sewing, whereas the stimulus involves only one: having
a light on one’s bike.
23. (E)
The author’s conclusion is that the government should
not require removal of all asbestos insulation because
such removal disturbs asbestos, and when asbestos is
disturbed it becomes a health hazard. When left
undisturbed, asbestos is harmless. (E) supports this
argument by suggesting a way in which asbestos
removal may be worse for our health than leaving the
asbestos undisturbed. Not only does the initial removal
pose a risk to our health, but, according to (E), the
removed asbestos remains a health hazard even after
removal due to the risk that it will be disturbed again,
resulting in the same negative consequences.
(A) The author is arguing that removing asbestos is
more dangerous than leaving it undisturbed; the fact
that there are other things more dangerous than
asbestos is irrelevant to the argument and therefore
doesn’t support it.
(B) doesn’t strengthen the argument because 1) we
already know that the removal of asbestos poses a
health risk and 2) it implies that workers who wear their
“required” protective gear can avoid the health risk of
asbestos (which would weaken the argument).
(C) makes an irrelevant distinction between types of
asbestos which doesn’t strengthen or weaken the
author’s claim that it’s safer to leave asbestos alone
(any kind of asbestos) than to remove it.
(D) actually weakens the argument by suggesting that
asbestos may be disturbed, and consequently become
a hazard, even if it is not deliberately removed; this
weakens the author’s idea that it’s safe not to remove
asbestos. If (D) were true, it wouldn’t be possible to
leave asbestos undisturbed; renovations or building
demolition would inevitably and unintentionally disturb
asbestos, thus posing a health risk even though the
asbestos wasn’t removed.
24. (C)
In a somewhat unusual argumentative structure (at
least by LSAT standards), the author draws two
Section III: Logical Reasoning
conclusions, both clearly marked by Keywords. The
stem in 24 alerts us to the relevant conclusion for this
one, namely: “Therefore,…the direction of the Earth’s
magnetic field has changed over time.” The evidence
for this conclusion is presented in the first two
sentences: The direction of magnetization in solidified
lava reflects the direction of the Earth’s magnetic field
at the time the lava solidifies, and there are major
differences in this magnetization direction among
solidified lava flows formed throughout the Earth’s
history. To show that this proves that the direction of
the Earth’s magnetic field has changed over time, the
author must assume that once lava has solidified, the
direction of its magnetization is permanently fixed. If
not—that is, if the direction of magnetization in
solidified lava can change unpredictably—then there’s
no way that the differing magnetization directions
documented in the evidence supports the notion that
the Earth’s magnetic field has changed over time. The
author must assume (C); otherwise, the differences
noted could be the result of unpredictable changes
within the solidified lava flows, not changes in the
Earth’s magnetic field at the time these lava flows
were formed.
(A) The author doesn’t state that only lava can be
used to measure the Earth’s magnetic direction,
merely that it can be. Apply the Kaplan Denial Test: The
argument doesn’t fall apart if other things besides lava
can reflect the Earth’s magnetic field direction as it
existed in the past, which confirms that (A) is not a
necessary assumption.
(B) fails to mention magnetization at all! Both the
evidence and conclusion deal with magnetization, so
any key assumption must include this concept.
Instead, (B) introduces the irrelevant concept of
“consistencies.”
(D) includes an irrelevant comparison and, like (B),
fails to mention magnetization. Apply the Kaplan Denial
Test and it will become readily apparent that (D) is not
a necessary assumption.
(E) is outside the scope of the argument. Magnetized
rocks? Hopefully, you dismissed this answer choice
quickly.
25. (D)
Now we’re asked to weaken the author’s second
conclusion (see the discussion for Question 24 above).
The author argues that lava flows that differ in age by
several thousand years have roughly the same
magnetic direction, but that lava flows that differ in age
by much more time (hundreds of thousands or even
25
PrepTest 15 Explained

millions of years) have different magnetic directions.
Therefore, the author concludes, the Earth’s magnetic
field changes slowly. Any answer choice that weakens
this argument must undermine the connection between
the slow passage of time and the slow change in
direction. Choice (D), which states that the magnetic
direction of lava can change rapidly (e.g., within two
weeks of a single flow’s solidification) undermines the
argument that the Ear th’s magnetic field, as
represented by lava, changes slowly.
(A) doesn’t link the magnetic direction of lava to the
Earth’s magnetic direction. It introduces the irrelevant
idea of “iron-containing liquids.” Besides, who cares
how the magnetic direction changes? The issue is
whether it changes and how fast. Hopefully you dismissed
(A) quickly as outside the scope of the argument.
(B) introduces useless background information. What’s
happened since scientists began measuring these
magnetic directions in no way damages the link
between the author’s evidence about the observation
of past lava flows and the conclusion drawn from it.
(C) is consistent with the idea that the change occurred
slowly (several time in a few million years). Remember
that we want to weaken the argument.
(E) fails to mention magnetic direction at all, and instead
focuses on an irrelevant aspect of the solidification
process.
result in a country being squeezed out of the global
market. As for a consequence of the former (raising
prices), we can’t infer a thing.
(B) Adopting technology slower than competitors will
lead to being squeezed from the global market, but the
author never states that this is the only way a company
can be squeezed from the global market. There may be
other ways a competitor gets squeezed from the global
market (e.g., political instability in a country) that don’t
involve technology. In other words, adopting technology
slower than competitors is sufficient for being
squeezed out of the global market, but we can’t infer,
as (B) does, that it’s a necessary condition.
(C) Did you catch the scope shift in this one? The mere
adoption of new manufacturing techniques is not the
issue; it’s whether a countr y’s manufacturers’
adoption of said techniques (or technology) is faster or
slower than that of its foreign competitors. (C) fails to
compare how quickly the different countries adopt
technology, and is thus not inferable.
(D) As seen above in (B), it’s possible for a group to
be squeezed out of the market for a reason other than
differences in the rate of technological adoption.

26. (E)
The key here is to notice that each statement is versed
in formal logic. The tricky thing is that the testmakers
make use of equivalent phrases along the way. For
example, “fall more slowly” = “fall less rapidly.” It’s up
to you to make the logical connection when it comes to
different ways of saying the same thing. In short, it all
comes back to critical reading.
So here’s the argument: If X (slower to adopt new tech
than competitors), then Y (prod costs fall more slowly
than competitors). But if Y (prod costs fall less rapidly
= prod costs fall more slowly), then Z (prices fall less
rapidly). Choice (E) can be derived from using the
contrapositive on both of these statements: If NOT Z
(prices fall AS or more rapidly as competitors), then
NOT Y (prod costs fall AS or more rapidly). Continuing
back to the first statement, if NOT Y (prod costs fall AS
rapidly), then NOT X (not slower to adopt new tech = as
fast as competitors to adopt new tech). Put it
together, it adds up to (E).
(A) The concept of “raising prices” is never mentioned
in the original stimulus and is not the opposite of “not
lowering prices as rapidly.” The latter will definitely

26

SECTION IV
LOGIC GAMES
Game 1: Student Speeches
Questions 1–6
The Action: Here’s a fairly standard sequencing game
in which we’re asked to order the speeches given by six
students—H, J, K, R, S, and T. The Key Issues will
involve our typical sequencing concerns:
1) Which speech is given in what time slot?
2) Which speeches can, must, or cannot be given
before what other speeches?
3) Which speeches can, must, or cannot be given after
what other speeches?
The Initial Setup: There are six speeches, so let’s write
1 through 6 across the page. (You’d probably do exactly
that if, in real life, you had to keep track of the
students’ speeches.) Remember to list the students
off to the side:
HJKRST
1 2 3 4 5 6
The Rules:
1) This rule is tough to symbolize, but think it through
and jot it down as best you can. We’re told that the
speeches given by H, J, and K can’t all be given
consecutively. “NO HJK” is fine for shorthand, as long
as you remember that these three entities can’t be
consecutive in any order. For example, KHJ and JKH
would violate this rule too.
2) Likewise, the speeches given by R, S, and T can’t be
consecutive. “NO RST” will suffice as long as you realize
that this rule has the same implications as Rule 1.
3) H’s speech is before S’s, so right away we know
that H can’t go 6th and S can’t go 1st. You could
include these implications in your master sketch, but
they should be obvious enough that you need not even
add them in. The important thing is to get the rule
down, so let’s shorthand it as “H…S.”
4) “NO J” over the 1 and 6 should do it for this rule.
5) T’s speech can’t be given consecutively with J’s
speech. Let’s write “NO TJ or JT.”
Key Deductions: See The Big Picture.
Section IV: Logic Games
The Final Visualization: Here’s our master sketch and
rules:
HJKRST
No HJK No J No J
No RST 1 2 3 4 5 6
H…S
No TJ or JT
The Big Picture:
• Some games simply don’t have any ear th-
shattering Key Deductions. While you should
always attempt to combine the rules and seek
out Key Deductions, you need to be able to
recognize when a game is left fairly “wide open”
as is the case here. In such cases, don’t knock
your head against the wall—if you don’t see
anything, save valuable time by moving on to the
questions.
• Even when there are no major Key Deductions,
don’t assume that there’s nothing of importance
to notice about the game before moving on to the
questions. Remember, not all entities are created
equal. To identify the most important entity, look
for the one that appears in the most rules. Here,
J is in two of the rules, and the game tends to
hinge on the placement of this entity. J can’t be
in 1 or 6 (Rule 4), and J is also prohibited from
being next to T (Rule 5). Some of the questions
are bound to be answered by T’s location limiting
the possibilities for J’s placement. Whether
directly or indirectly, the restrictions placed on J,
including J’s relation to T, will lead you to the
answer in quite a few of this game’s questions.
• Think before you draw. Make sure you understand
what a rule says before you even make a stab at
symbolizing it. In order to successfully master
this game, you had to fully think through the
implications of Rules 1 and 2 before putting
pencil to paper.
The Questions:
1. (D)
Use Kaplan’s technique for acceptability questions to
blow through this one in ten seconds. Compare each
rule to each choice, and cross off any choice in
violation of any rule. Rule 2 is violated by (A). Rule 3
lets us axe (E). Rule 4 eliminates (B), and Rule 5 does
away with (C) leaving us with (D).
27
PrepTest 15 Explained

2. (B)
With T in 3, J can’t go in 2 or 4 (Rule 5). And J can’t be
in 1 or 6 (Rule 4), so the only space left for J is 5,
choice (B).
(A), (C), (D), and (E) all could be true, but none must
be true.
3. (C)
With S and T in 3 and 4, respectively, Rule 5 prohibits
J from being next to T in 5. Of course, 1 and 6 are off
limits to J, so the only space open for J is 2. H has to
be before S (Rule 3), and the only open space before
S is 1, so place H in 1. Since we can’t have STR in a
row (Rule 2), R can’t go in 5, so K must go in 5 and R
must go in 6. The entire order is complete, and only
choice (C) corresponds.
(A), (B), (D), and (E) are all impossible.
4. (A)
With K in 1 and H in 5, Rule 3 forces S into slot 6. From
there we’re left with J, R, and T to fill out spaces 2, 3
and 4. Rule 5 still forbids T and J from being next to
each other, so one of them has to be in 2 and the other
must be in space 4. R must separate J and T, so R
must be in 3, choice (A).
(B), (C), (D), and (E) all could be true, but need not be
depending on how you place T and J in the 2 and 4
slots.
6. (A)
After placing K in the 3 spot, there’s not much to do
but try out each choice. If H is in 4, we know that S
must be in either 5 or 6. If S is in 5, the only spot open
to J is 2. But if J is in 2, this gives us JKH which
violates Rule 1. So S can’t be in 5. If S is in 6, the only
spot open to J is 5 (we just saw that J in 2 is no good
in any case). But if J is in 5, we get KHJ consecutive,
which also violates Rule 1. (A) is impossible and is
therefore our answer.
(B) HSKJRT is an ordering that shows that this could
be true.
(C) HJSKRT is an ordering that shows that this could
be true.
(D) HTKSJR is an ordering that shows that this could
be true.
(E) RJKTHS is an ordering that shows that this could
be true.

5. (D)
This question stem creates the block SRK. Rule 3 adds
H to the mix (but not necessarily right before S) to give
us H…SRK. This block takes up four of our six spaces,
leaving only J and T. We’re plenty used to splitting up
these two by now thanks to Rule 5, so we can further
intuit that the H…SRK block can’t be in slots 1 through
4 or slots 3 through 6. Both of these situations would
force J and T next to each other. The block also can’t
take consecutive slots 2 through 5, because that
would leave J in either 1 or 6, which violates Rule 4. We
know then that either J or T must be in between H and
S with the other at one end of the sequence. But once
again we’re forced to remember that J can’t go at
either end, so J must come between H and S, leaving
T in either 1 or 6. So here are the only possibilities:
THJSRK or HJSRKT. The only statement that could be
true is choice (D).

28

Game 2: Radar Areas
Questions 7–13
At first glance, this game may look odd and rather
confusing, but don’t be intimidated simply because a
game looks scary. Keep your composure; the first step,
as always, is to nail down the game’s action:
The Action: Four circular radar areas—R, S, T, and U—
are within the country of Zendu (although the specific
country doesn’t matter, as you’ll see in the fifth bullet
point under The Big Picture). Four planes—J, K, L, and
M—are each in the air over Zendu in accordance with
the rules. The rules are bound to clear the situation up
for us, but even at first glance you should be able to
intuit the Key Issues that the form the basis of the
game:
1) Which planes are in which radar areas?
2) Which planes can, must, or cannot be in the same
radar areas as which other planes?
The Initial Setup: An Initial Setup hinges mostly on the
rules built into the opening paragraph. Part (not all) of
area R intersects area T, so draw a circle for R and
another circle T that partially overlaps R. Next, we’re
told that part of area S intersects T. However, we can’t
add S to our sketch yet, because we don’t know about
S’s relationship to R; Ah, but now we do: The very next
clause in that sentence says that R and S don’t
intersect each other. So simply draw a circle for S that
intersects T but not R. Finally, we’re told that area U is
completely within areas R and T. U must therefore fall
in the space where R and T intersect, so draw another
circle in this space and label it U. Be careful not to
falsely assume that U takes up the entire area where
R and T intersect—this need not be the case. It’s quite
possible for a plane to be in the area where R and T
intersect, yet still outside of area U. This is more work
than we’re used to for creating an Initial Setup, but in
this game, understanding and visually representing the
Initial Setup is half the battle.
JKLM
R U T
U T
S K not in S
Section IV: Logic Games
The Rules:
The “rules” in the intro paragraph allowed us to
construct a picture of the physical layout of the radar
zones. The following indented rules tell us about the
radar zones in which the planes appear:
1) Our basic “loophole closer”: Each plane is in the
game and somewhere within the radar areas of our
sketch.
2) Pretty straightforward, but a little thought will let you
take it one step further: If J is in area S, then it’s either
in the part of S that intersects T or it’s in the part of S
that doesn’t intersect T. As long as you can visualize
this, you can shorthand it any way you want. One
possibility is to write a “J” in area S with one arrow
pointing to the space where S and T intersect and
another arrow pointing to the rest of S that doesn’t
intersect T.
3) “K ≠ J” should keep this rule nice and clear.
Whatever area one of these planes is in, the other
must be somewhere else. It would be difficult not to
automatically combine this with the previous rule to
deduce right here and now that K is not in area S.
4) “L ≠ M” should do it for this one. Since we have no
info so far on either of these planes, we can’t take this
any further, so jot it down and move on.
5) M is in exactly one of the areas: M = 1 should suffice
to help us remember this.
Key Deductions: Above, we combined Rules 2 and 3 to
deduce that K cannot be in area S.
Now let’s look more closely at Rule 5. Since M is in
exactly one area, M cannot be in area U. Why?
Because If a plane is in area U, then it’s actually in
three areas: U, R, and T. Can M be in area R? Sure, as
long as it’s not in the part of R that intersects with area
T. The same is true for M in areas T or S; it’s okay, as
long as M isn’t in the intersecting part.
The Final Visualization: So, here’s our final, rather
circular, sketch:
JKLM
K=J
L=M R
M=1 S
J
M not in U
29
PrepTest 15 Explained
The Big Picture:
• Force yourself to ask the relevant questions.
When you’re told that S and T intersect, you must
go further and ask “But wait, what about S and
R? How do they interrelate?” This is the kind of
active thinking that the Games section requires
and rewards.
• Remember, critical reading isn’t a requirement
limited to the Logical Reasoning and Reading
Comp sections—it’s vital in Logic Games as well,
especially when interpreting rules. For example,
it’s extremely important that you recognize that
just because area U is in the part of areas R and
T that intersect, U doesn’t necessarily have to be
that entire area. Also, be sure that you didn’t get
the rule backwards and put all of area R inside of
area U.
• Don’t be thrown just because a game is
unfamiliar. On some Games sections, the
testmakers throw in a somewhat unfamiliar
game. While it won’t necessarily be the hardest
game on the section, they do want to see whether
or not you can think on your feet, use your
common sense, and not be thrown for a loop just
because the setup is slightly different from a
more typical game.
• If you’re having a hard time getting a handle on a
seemingly unfamiliar game, try out different
situations. For example, try putting M in areas R,
S, T, and U and see what happens. Mentally work
out ways of separating L and M, or separating K
and J. This way you can quickly get a feel for
which planes can and can’t go where. Working out
a few “what if?” scenarios should make you feel
more comfortable with the game and help you get
a better handle on it.
• Don’t obsess over extraneous information. In this
game, the fact that the zones fall within the
country of Zendu doesn’t matter in the slightest.
Did you draw a huge circle representing Zendu
and then try to put the radar areas inside? Why?
Did you worry about the planes being in the air at
exactly noon? Why? The time frame never
changes; if it did, this would be more like a
“process” game. Sometimes the testmakers
throw in this extra useless information in order to
get nervous test takers to waste as much time as
possible. Don’t fall for it.
30
The Questions:
7. (D)
As with all acceptability questions, let’s just check the
rules against the choices. Rule 1 kills (A) because K
isn’t included. Rule 2 takes care of (B). Rule 3 knocks
off (E). (C) is the only tricky one. Our Big Deduction
above allows us to cross it off because we know that
M, which can only be in one area, can’t be in area U,
which is actually within two other areas. If this wasn’t
enough to kill (C), since area U is within area T, this
choice places L and M in the same area (T), which
violates Rule 4. In any case, the only choice left is (D),
which must be the acceptable listing.
8. (A)
If K is in 2 of the areas, then K must be in the area
where R and T intersect (we already deduced that K
can’t be in S). In order for this to be possible, J must
be in the part of S that doesn’t intersect T, since Rule
3 forces K and J into different areas. (A) can’t be true.
(B) and (C) must be true.
(D) and (E) could be true, but need not be.
9. (E)
We just saw in the setup for question 8 that K could be
in area T, which quickly kills (A), (B), and (C). The only
difference between (D) and (E) is whether or not J can
be in area T. And lo and behold, we see that J can be
in T from the correct choice (D) to acceptability
question 7. Basically, there’s no reason why any of the
planes cannot be in area T, and the answer is (E).
10. (E)
Here’s our Big Deduction staring us right in the face: M
in area U? Can’t do it; M can only be in one area, but
U is within two others. Choice (E) is the five-second
answer. If you hadn’t made this deduction up front, or
simply forgot about it, you could get the answer by
trying out the choices (which will no doubt take longer
than five seconds).
(A) is possible; we just saw from question 9 that
everyone could be in T.
(B) K can be in U as long as J isn’t in T.
(C) is possible as long as M isn’t in R. You may also
have noticed that L was in R in one of the wrong (and
therefore possible) answer choices from question 8.
(D) is possible; once again we benefit from turning to
correct choice (D) for acceptability question 7 which
validly places M in R.
 Section IV: Logic Games

11. (D)
A single plane can’t be in what two areas? We know
that S and R don’t intersect, so a plane couldn’t be in
both S and R. Not surprisingly, that’s too obvious, and
therefore not a choice. But we need go only one step
further: Since area U is completely within area R,
there’s no way for a plane to be simultaneously in
areas S and U. As easy as that, choice (D).
(A), (C) The areas listed in each of these choices
intersect, so it’s definitely possible for a plane to be in
both areas at once.
(B), (E) Area U is within areas R and T.

12. (E)
M is in area T. Since M is in exactly one area, so we
know that M is in the part of T that doesn’t intersect
with R or S. Rule 4 says that L and M can’t be in the
same area, so we know that L can’t be in the parts of
R or S that intersect with T. Thus L can’t be in U; L must
be in the non-intersecting part of area R or the non-
intersecting part of area S. At most, L can be in only
one area, which leads us to correct choice (E).
(A) through (D) are each quite possible.

13. (A)
The only way for a plane to be within three areas is to
be in area U, so L is in U (and therefore is also in R and
T). Rule 4 prohibits L and M from being in the same
area, so the only area open to M is S (which kills
choices (D) and (E)). We deduced way back that K
can’t be in area S, so axe (C). As we said before, the
only way to be in three areas is to be in area U. Since
S and U don’t intersect, J can’t be in three areas.
Cross off (B), which leaves us with our answer, (A).

31
PrepTest 15 Explained
Game 3: Car Pool Drivers
Questions 14–19
The Action: Sequencing with one small twist: We’re
asked to schedule four people—Fritz, Gina, Helen, and
Jerry—on the days on which they drive, Monday
through Saturday. Here’s the minor twist—four drivers
for six days means that some folks have to drive on
more than one day. The Key Issues will be:
1) Who drives on which day?
2) Which people can, must, or cannot drive on
consecutive days?
3) Which people drive before and after which other
drivers?
The Initial Setup: Keep this simple; list the days
across the page and the drivers off to the side, like so:
FGHJ
M T W TH F S
The Rules:
1) This is a loop-hole closer, but unlike most loop-hole
closers, it’s an important one. Every person drives at
least one day. This means that no driver is left out of
the schedule (which until this rule was a distinct
possibility).
2) “NO 2 IN A ROW” should do it for this one. For
example, if Gina drives on Monday, she can’t drive on
Tuesday.
3) “NO F” over our M for Monday should remind us of
this.
4) Break this rule up. “J” above the sketch with an
arrow pointing to the “W” for Wednesday and the “S”
for Saturday will take care of the first part of this rule.
However, Jerry could drive on both Wednesday and
Saturday as well as driving on other days. Add
something to your sketch to keep this added
information in mind. We’ll write “at least” next to the J
in our sketch to remind us of this, but whatever way you
came up with, including just memorizing the rule, is
fine as long as you come away with the correct
interpretation.
5) “If G drives on Mon, J isn’t on Sat.” Remember to
jot down the contrapositive: “If J drives on Sat, G
doesn’t drive on Mon.”
32
Key Deductions: As with Game 1, no major deductions
leap off the page at us. However, J is in Rules 4 and 5,
so let’s take a closer look there. J must drive on
Wednesday, Saturday, or both (and possibly elsewhere,
remember). If the conditional in Rule 5 takes place
(i.e., G drives on Monday), then J can’t be on Saturday
and would have to drive on Wednesday (at least). Also
think about the “NO 2 IN A ROW” rule. If we have J on
Wednesday, then we know that J can’t drive on Tuesday
or Thursday. Since this line of thinking is predicated on
a conditional, it won’t play out in every question.
Therefore, it isn’t absolutely necessary to think all this
through in order to succeed in this game. However,
noticing such things up front is always helpful in the
long run, and will help you to develop and to reinforce
the good habits and analytical thinking skills that will
be rewarded on test day.
The Final Visualization: Here’s our final sketch:
J at least
No F
FGHJ M T W Th F S
No 2 in a row
If G on Mon, J not on Sat
If J on Sat, G not on Mon
The Big Picture:
• Rule 4 is wordy and chock full of implications.
Often, a rule like this would mandate that Jerry
drive on Wednesday or Saturday, but not both.
However, the testmakers threw us a slight curve
here. No biggie—whenever you see a rule that’s
slightly different from what you’re used to, take a
few seconds to think it through.
• Often, the entity that appears in the most rules
will be the game’s most influential player. Never
let this entity stray too far from your mind.
• If an entity is limited to one of two positions, it’s
often worth plotting out the results of each. We
call this investigating the “limited options.” But it’s
also important to recognize when this strategy
doesn’t apply: Here, we could look at what
happens if Jerry drives on Wednesday and then
what happens when he drives on Saturday, but
since he can drive on both days, and on other days
as well, discovering all of the possible options
that result from Jerry’s situation would be a near
impossibility. As stated in the Key Deductions
paragraph above, mentally manipulating a few
possible scenarios is probably all that’s necessary
before moving on to the questions.
 Section IV: Logic Games

The Questions: 18. (B)

14. (D)
This game too begins with an acceptability question.
Pick a rule and compare. Rule 1 axes (E) since Fritz
isn’t included. Rule 2 does away with (A). Rule 4 kills
(C). Rule 5 takes care of (B), leaving us with (D).
15. (E)
Not much to do except try out the choices. We’ll get to
why the others are wrong, but first, if the order is G, F,
J, H, F, G we see that (E) is possible and is our answer.
(A) This is a direct violation of Rule 4. We know that
Jerry drives on at least one of these days.
(B) If Gina drives on Monday and Wednesday, then
Jerry can’t drive on Saturday (Rule 5), which once again
violates Rule 4.
(C) We know that Jerry drives on at least Wednesday
or Saturday, so if he also drives on Tuesday and Friday,
this would have him driving two days in a row. That’s a
no-no according to Rule 2.
(D) If Gina drives on Monday, then Rule 5 forces Jerry
to drive on Wednesday (at least). If Jerry also drives on
Thursday, he would be driving two days in a row, which
again violates Rule 2.
16. (C)
If Jerry drives on Wednesday and Saturday only, then
the contrapositive of Rule 5 tells us that Gina can’t
drive on Monday. Rule 3 already axed Fritz from Monday,
and since in this one Jerry drives only on Wednesday
and Saturday, Jerry can’t drive on Monday either. The
only person left for Monday is Helen, choice (C).
(A), (B), (D), and (E) could be true, but need not be.
Nothing to do but check out the choices. If Gina drives
on Monday, Jerry can’t drive Saturday (Rule 5), which
means that Jerry must drive on Wednesday. According
to Rule 2, he can’t drive on Tuesday as well. (B) can’t
be true and is the answer.
(A) H F J F G J is fine, so (A) could be true.
(C) and (E) G H J F J G shows that both of these could
be true.
(D) H J G F G J is acceptable, so (D) is not the answer.
19. (E)
Fritz drives twice, but the question stem and Rule 3 cut
his options down to Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. The
only way to get two days of driving out of him is for him
to drive Thursday and Saturday (otherwise, he’d have
to drive two days in a row, violating Rule 2). Since
Saturday is taken, Rule 4 forces Jerry to drive on
Wednesday, at least. Jerry could also drive on Friday,
with Gina on Monday and Helen on Tuesday, so (E)
could be true and is our answer.
(A) Fritz can’t drive three times since the stem says
that he drives exactly twice. If any of the others drive
three times, that wouldn’t leave enough days for
everyone to take a turn driving.
(B) Fritz drives twice, so that leaves four days for the
other three people. No, three people can’t drive exactly
once; one of them must drive twice to cover all six
days.
(C) Jerry must drive on Wednesday which is immediately
before Fritz’s day on Thursday.
(D) No, Jerry must drive on Wednesday.

17. (A)
If Gina drives on Monday and Saturday only, then Jerry
must drive on Wednesday (at least) according to Rule
4. Fritz and Helen must each drive on at least one of
the remaining three days. This leaves one day open
that Fritz, Helen, or Jerry will drive on. Check the
choices, and we see that (A) must be true. Whoever
drives on that extra day will be the one other person
besides Gina to drive on exactly two days.
(B) No, the person who drives on Wednesday (i.e.
Jerry) could drive on Friday.
(C), (D) The possible ordering G H J F J G kills both of
these choices.
(E) No, Fritz could be the driver on Tuesday (e.g. G F J
H J G).

33
PrepTest 15 Explained
Game 4: Plumber Teams
Questions 20–24
The Action: This game involves distributing plumbers
into four groups of two, which suggests a grouping
distribution action. Technically, there’s a selection
element as well: We need to select eight of the nine
plumbers. However, it’s probably easier to think in
terms of having to leave one plumber out as opposed
to having to choose eight of the nine. The plumbers are
chosen from five experienced plumbers—F, G, J, K, and
M—and four inexperienced plumbers—r, s, t, and v.
Let’s use capital letters for the experienced plumbers
and lowercase for the inexperienced ones. The Key
Issues will be:
1) Which two plumbers are assigned to each team?
2) Which plumbers can, must, or cannot be assigned
to the same team?
The Initial Setup: We have four teams of two, so let’s
put down four sets of two dashes. List the entities off
to the side:
EX inex.
FGJKM rstn
The Rules:
1) Basically a loop-hole closer, but the game would be
undoable without it.
2) This rule narrows down the possible pairings
enormously. Let’s write an “X” for “experienced” under
one of the dashes in each of the four teams.
3) Three rules for the price of one: “NO FM”—“NO Fr”
—“NO Fv.” These three restrictions tell us quite a bit
about Frank’s situation.
4) “If t, then G or K” tells us that only these two
experienced plumbers may team up with the
inexperienced Tim.
5) One rule for the price of one: “NO Jr” will do it.
Key Deductions: Rule 3 severely limits Frank’s options,
and Rule 4 limits it further. If Tim may only be teamed
with Gene or Kathy, then obviously Tim may not team
up with Frank. Add “NO Ft” to your list of Frank rules.
This means that Sally is the only inexperienced
plumber that Frank may team up with. Does that
mean “always Fs?” No; remember that we have five
experienced plumbers and need only four of them. It is
34
possible for Frank to team up with another experienced
plumber. If you like, you can write “If F, then Fs or F +
X (experienced).”
The Final Visualization: Here’s what we’re armed with
heading into the questions:
EX inex. No FM
FGJKM rstn No Fr
No Fn
If t, then G or K
X X X X No Jr
No Ft
If F, then Fs or F + X
The Big Picture:
• Always work out a game’s number situation in
advance, by asking yourself the relevant
questions. In this case: “How can I split five
experienced and four inexperienced plumbers into
four groups of two?” Answer: Always leave one
out. Then, when you get more information,
expand on what you know. As a consequence of
Rule 2, you should ask yourself: “How do the
numbers work now?” Answer: We must include
four experienced and four inexperienced
plumbers OR five experienced plumbers (giving us
one team made up only of experienced plumbers)
and three inexperienced ones.
• In three of the four games on this section it’s
beneficial to identify the most important entity,
which is normally the entity that appears in the
most rules. Here it’s obviously Frank. Once again,
there are no earth-shattering deductions to be
made in this game, but thinking through Frank’s
situation in advance greatly helps in answering
the questions.
• Always turn negatives into positives. Knowing
who doesn’t pair up with Frank is not nearly as
valuable as knowing who does or can (in this
case, Sally or one of the “X” plumbers).
The Questions:
20. (C)
Here’s our deduction about Frank. The only
inexperienced plumber that Frank can team up with is
Sally, choice (C). If you don’t remember how we
deduced this, look back at our work under Key
Deductions. (Note that Kathy, choice (A), is not an
inexperienced plumber.)
 Section IV: Logic Games

21. (C)
This is similar to an acceptability question. Rule 3
allows us to cross off (A) and (B). Rule 2 says that
each team must have at least one experienced
plumber, so there goes (D) and (E). We’re left with (C).

22. (B)
Take it one step at a time: Tim is assigned to a team,
and Sally is assigned to another. Sally’s partner is a
plumber who could have been Tim’s partner. Tim can
only partner with Gene and Kathy. So of G and K, one
of them will go with Tim and the other will go with Sally.
Since Sally isn’t teamed with Frank, then Frank can
only be teamed with another experienced plumber
(besides Gene and Kathy who are already taken). Mark
is no good thanks to Rule 3, which leaves only Jill,
choice (B).

23. (A)
If Gene is out, we know that 1) all of the other plumbers
are used, and 2) Tim’s partner is Kathy (see Rule 4).
Since exactly four experienced plumbers are used, we
must split them all up. Frank must therefore be teamed
with an inexperienced one, which means Sally. Rule 5
says that Jill and Roberta can’t be teamed up, so Jill
must be teamed with the only inexperienced plumber
left, Vernon choice (A).

24. (A)
All of the inexperienced plumbers are used, so one of
our experienced plumbers is the one to be left out. R,
T, and V aren’t with Gene, so either Gene is teamed
with Sally or Gene is the one left out. If Gene is teamed
with Sally, then Frank’s only possible inexperienced
partner is taken, which means that he’s the one left
out. Sally must therefore be teamed with either Frank
or Gene, choice (A).

35
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