Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational

Debates
Author(s): Andrei P. Tsygankov
Source: International Studies Review , Dec., 2008, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 762-775
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association

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International Studies Review (2008) 10, 762-775

Self and Other in International Relations

Theory: Learning from Russian
Civilizational Debates1
Andrei P. Tsygankov
Departments of Political Science and International Relations,
San Francisco State University

One important critique ofthe "West's" hegemony in international rela

tions (IR) theory has been this theory's inability to come to terms with
the problem of difference or the Self/Other dialectic. To further high
light the importance of the Self/Other relations, this article proposes to
analyze Russian theoretical discourse of relating to Europe and the
West. For centuries, Russia has participated in intense interactions
among European, Asian and Middle Eastern regions, and it has devel
oped a language and theories for relating to its various Others. Studying
Russian debates can assist us in the task of reflecting on problematic
epistemological and ethical assumptions behind IR scholarship, as well
as suggest some paths to a genuinely diverse and global IR theory. To
research both continuity and progression of Russian arguments, I draw
cases from imperial and post-Soviet historical periods and analyze their
debates?Eurocentrism and Eurasia?in terms of assumptions their par
ticipants held about interacting with the Other. Although moving
beyond viewing the East/West interaction as something mutually exclu
sive has been a challenge to Russian thinkers, some of them have found
ways to conceptualize the two cultural entities as in dialogue with one
another and to learn from opposing perspectives.

Resemblances are the shadows of differences. Different people see different simi
larities and similar differences.
-Vladimir Nabokov

Scholars in the field of international relations (IR) acknowledge that their

discipline remains largely ethnocentric and hegemonic reflecting various cultural
biases of Western nations, particularly the United States (Alker and Biersteker
1984; Holsti 1985; Hoffmann 1995[1977]; Waever 1998; Crawford and Jarvis
2001; Tickner 2003). Despite various attempts to broaden and deepen the disci
pline, however, there remains a thick wall separating us from the rest of the
world in terms of how "we do IR." Graduate students coming to the United
States from outside are typically surprised to learn that debates over relative
power and democratic peace dominate this diverse field. Those trained to be
sensitive to history, culture, and ethics find that top IR programs offer a limited
selection of courses in these areas, often at the expense of statistics and game
theory. Area studies scholars rarely try to publish in IR journals, and?when they

'Some of the themes of this essay are explored in greater details in Tsygankov (2004, 2007).

? 2008 International Studies Association

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 Andrei P. Tsygankov 763

do?they are not infrequently rejected on the ground that their work is "not
really IR." In the meantime, some of the "real" IR scholars often equate
understanding of the world with elaboration on perceived foreign policy
concerns of their national governments.
One important critique of the "West's" hegemony in IR theory has been
this theory's inability to come to terms with the problem of difference (Inaya
tullah and Blaney 2004; Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Jones 2006) or the Self/
Other dialectic. Scholars with interests in culture have argued that the disci
pline of international relations continues colonial practices of teaching at the
periphery, rather than trying to learn from it. To further highlight the impor
tance of Self/Other relations, this paper proposes to analyze Russian theoretical
discourse of relating to Europe and the West. Russian civilizational debates,
defined as sustained reflections on reproducing cultural ties across time and
space, present an interesting case. For centuries, Russia has participated in
intense interactions among European, Asian and Middle Eastern regions, and
it has developed a language and theories for relating to its various Others.
Studying Russian civilizational debates can, therefore, assist us in the task of
reflecting on problematic epistemological and ethical assumptions behind IR
scholarship.
I argue that, as a European nation, Russians too had to face the challenge of
"provincializing Europe" (Chakrabarty 2000) and overcoming the attitude of
Eurocentrism in relations to significant Others. In the aftermath of the Crimean
war, through the voices of Nikolai Danilevski and Konstantin Leontyev, Russians
moved from not recognizing their distinctiveness from the European Self toward
the recognition-threat attitude to it. With some modifications, the new attitude
persisted throughout most of the twentieth century, but in the late 1970s-1980s,
Russians developed new, more dialectical ways of relating to the Other. Rather
than thinking about the East/West interaction as something mutually exclusive,
the late socialist and then post-socialist thinkers came to conceptualize the two
cultural entities as in dialogue with one another. Learning from opposing per
spectives has been a major challenge for Russian civilizational theory which
continues to be dominated by essentialist approaches. Still, some intellectual pro
gress took place, evidence of which has been Russia's new and increasingly
diverse field of international relations. To research both continuity and progres
sion of Russian civilizational arguments, I draw cases from imperial and post
Soviet historical periods. After reviewing scholarship on the Self/Other dialectic
(section 2) and Russian key civilizational schools (section 3), I analyze two pro
minent debates?Eurocentrism and Eurasia?in terms of assumptions their
participants hold about interacting with the Other (section 4). In conclusion,
I summarize lessons of Russian engagement with the Other and its implications
for global IR theory.

International Relations Theory and the Self/Other Dialectic

Scholars who are interested in culture have long argued that IR ought not be
viewed as a product of Western discourse alone?such an approach would
reflect a status quo bias and deprive us of the same transformative logic that
John Ruggie (1983) found missing in static neorealist thinking. Over time, a
number of scholars have issued a strong challenge to western intellectual hege
mony in international studies. For example, critics of modernization theory
revealed its unilinear and progressive pro-Western bias (Wiarda 1981; Oren
2000). Much like modernization theory, that historically assisted the state in
justifying its colonial practices, international relations theory tends to offer no
reciprocal engagement with the Other merely expecting it to follow the West's
lead. By allowing little conceptual space for "non-Western" theorists, western

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 764 Self and Other in International Relations Theory

IR treats them as dependent subjects (subalterns) and consumers of already

developed knowledge. Taking the Other seriously, or engaging in a dialogue
with it, means committing to assumptions of the Other's equality to the Self in
terms of defining parameters and boundaries of knowledge. By contrast, ethno
centric, or excessively pro-Western theories proclaim their commitment to
exclusively defined values of their environment and are closed for possible
fertilization from the external environment. Such theories assume superiority
of the Self and its moral community, and inferiority of the Other thereby justi
fying the legitimacy of hegemonic actions toward the Other. The authors of
ethnocentric ideas are willing to promote their visions outside their social uni
verse because they are firmly committed to their concept of "virtue" and
"good." Post-colonial scholarship argues that, in contrast to ethnocentrism,
production of a more global knowledge requires defining the Self and its
moral values as something open to negotiation, rather than absolute, exclusive,
and essentialist; and viewing the Other as different, but morally equal and, for
that reason, as a source of potential learning. In practical terms, such an
approach would promote negotiations to establish mutually acceptable norms
and reduce space for hegemonic actions.
Engaging in a dialogue with the Other also requires a particular sense of
ethics as mutual empowerment of the Self and the Other. In the West, the tradi
tion of communitarian thought in the humanities has long been engaged in
debates about inclusiveness and recognition in building order and community
(Walzer 1977; Maclntyre 1981, 1987; Taylor 1983, 1991, 1992). The principal
accomplishment of these debates has been justification of the ethics of responsi
bility as that to/for the Other(s) and distinction between such ethics and that of
rules/regulations for pre-given, autonomous subjects.2 Non-Western thinkers
have also generated important ideas about dialogue, mutual engagement, and
responsiveness for our words and actions. For instance, one might mention the
Russian religious philosophical tradition of acknowledging guilt/responsibility by
intellectuals for contributing to a discourse of social violence. In the early twenti
eth century, a group of former Marxist sympathizers responded to the revolution
of 1905 by publishing the collective volume Vekhi (1991) (Signposts) and calling
for the Russian intelligentsia to be constructive, rather than "nihilist," in its
social criticism. The authors of the volume held the Russian radical intelligentsia
responsible for the revolutionary violence giving a new turn to the old tradition
of intellectuals' reflections on their engagements with social reality.3 If we are to
adequately address challenges of a global multicultural world, we need a notion
of responsibility that involves both the Self and the Other. In this world, it is
important to sustain a discourse of constructive tensions in which "local" and
"global" both conflict and cooperate for the purpose of dialectical engagement
and negotiating a mutually acceptable norms and solutions.
Such mutual engagement or dialogical perspective should be distinguished
from realist and cosmopolitan perspectives, each of which is refusing to engage
the Other. For realists, the image of anarchy and competition remains the key
metaphor in describing the nature of world order. Although some realists appre
ciate the role of culture in international politics, most of them deny that the
world is becoming more globalized. This group is explicit about defining its

2Here, more traditionally-oriented theorists like Maclntyre (1981) appealed to premodern morality, whereas
more postmodernist thinkers argued for a need to radically reinterpret the notion of ethics and morality (Gilligan
1982; Taylor 1992).
3In 1974, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn continued this tradition of self-reflection and self-critique by publishing the
samizdat collective volume lz-pod glib. Solzhenitsyn (1992 [1974]) charged that the intelligensia had essentially lost
its sense of social responsibility and turned itself into a loyal servant of the Soviet regime (Ibid, 187-221). The Rus
sian tradition of intellectual repentance and responsibility is alive and well, however. See Siniyavski (1996) for an
example of liberal self-reflections (InteUigentsiya i vlast) and Panarin (1998), for a more conservative perspective.

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 Andrei P. Tsygankov 765

cultural community as local,4 and its vision of responsibility is, therefore, highly
reductionist. Realists emphasize anarchy as the key force in the world. They
perceive the Other as a threat and typically limit their recommendations for the
Self to those of a defensive nature. The cosmopolitan writers are fully aware of
the increasingly globalized character of world politics, but they maintain an
image of a progressively culturally homogeneous global society and overlook the
forces of identity and diversity. Most typically, this cultural development in global
society is linked to the progress of western civilization. Both conservative and rad
ical cosmopolitan writers tend to view cultural development as a worldwide
spread of westernized modernity and its norms of nation-states, market economy,
political democracy, etc., rather than as a dialectical interaction of diverse local
communities.5 Whether supportive or critical of the Westernization process,
cosmopolitans trace how the norms of a dominant civilization transcend the
values of different cultural communities, rather than studying non-unproble
matic receptions of "dominant" values by local cultures and emerging dialectic
syntheses of global and local.
These biases hidden in hegemonic IR theories reveal themselves in multiple
research agendas. Hegemonic theories avoid asking crucial questions: Who is the
Other that may react to their theories? How different is the Other from the Self
in its previous experience? How distinct is the Other in its present concerns?
Such ethical and epistemological agenda tend to produce knowledge that is
didactic and ethnocentric, rather than dialogical and dialectical. One can hardly
be surprised, for instance, by highly critical reactions to the familiar west-cen
tered theories of the end of history or clash of civilizations from non-western
Others, such as Russia and China (Tsygankov 2004). These theories bear an
excessive imprint of western culture and, by insisting on their universal applica
bility, they contribute to the hegemony/dependence relationships in the global
context. Therefore, cultural biases hidden in IR theory remain a deep-seated
obstacle for establishing robust institutions of world peace. In a world that is
multicultural and discourse-sensitive, not giving the Other the consideration it
deserves means not describing the world's problems adequately, much less
offering sensible solutions.

Russian Civilizational Theory and Its Currents

Seeking to respond to their nation's borderland location between European and
Asian civilizations, Russian politicians and intellectuals have pursued diverse
visions of relating to the Other. For the purpose of this article, civilization is
defined as an idea-based community that extends beyond a nation and is repro
duced across time and space in response to various historical developments.6
4For example, Huntington (1996) is explicit in dichotomizing the "West against the rest" and perceiving the
rise of alternative cultural communities as a threatening development.
5Some radical cosmopolitan writers, favoring the classical Marxist tradition emphasize the power of western capital
ism and industrial technology in reshaping world order and subsuming the diversity of local cultures. Ernst Gellner
(1983) and Benedict Anderson (1983) link nationalism to industrial modernization and print technology, and
Antony Giddens (1985) adds the role of information and military technology. Other, liberal cosmopolitans, such as
Michael Doyle (1986) and Francis Fukuyama (1989), argue for the progressive spread of Westernized market
democracy throughout the world. Still other scholars (Held 1995; Linklater 1998) argue for the emergence of new
structures and institutions of governance at the supranational and transnational levels. This group recognizes the
pluralism of local cultures and identities, and proposes that this plurality of identities flourish, not disappear, dur
ing the globalization era. At the same time, they call for radical global democratization transcending the currently
existing system of nation-states (Held 2000:283), rather than for dialogue and learning among local communities.
Their procedural universalism can hardly be neutral and may eventually encourage new divisions between exclu
sively denned Self and Other. For more "bottom up" perspectives, see Dallmayr (1999) and Inayatullah and Blaney
(2004).
6For similar definitions of civilization that emphasize ideas and claims that hold them together by reproduction
and defense over time, see Cox (1995:11), Jackson (1999:143), O'Hagan (2002), and Hall and Jackson (2007).

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 766 Self and Other in International Relations Theory

Russian civilizational perspectives can be classified along two main axes: their
identity?Europe/West versus non-West?and a degree of essentialism.
The argument that Russia is a part of Europe is centuries-old (Neumann
1996), and it figures prominently in the national discourse, at least since Czar
Peter the Great. It was Europe that created the larger meaningful environment
in which Russia's rulers defended their core values. Although Europe's recogni
tion of Russia as one of its own was never unproblematic (Neumann 1999; Malia
1999), all Russia's leaders identified with European ideas. Some rulers?most
prominently Alexander II?attempted to redefine the country's identity in line
with the new European ideas of Enlightenment, constitutionalism, and capital
ism. Others sought to defend the old Europe and preserve the basic features of
the autocratic regime. Yet Russians disagreed on whether western Europe could
serve as a role model or whether Russia itself should become the leader of
European civilization. The disagreement lied at heart of the debate between
Westernizers and Slavophiles.
Westernizers supported Peter the Great's efforts to modernize Russia and went
on to advocate the widespread application of European institutions on Russian
soil. Influenced by the French Revolution, Westernizers grew critical of the
Russian autocratic tradition and produced a variety of arguments in favor of
social reform. The Decembrists of the early nineteenth century, for example,
followed the lead of people like Speranski and advocated constitutionalism and
the abolition of serfdom in Russia. Later, in the aftermath of Russia's defeat in
the Crimean War, Westernizers split into two distinct camps. One group?
Cadets, or constitutional democrats?continued to advocate Russia's liberal
reforms and constitutional development. Their most prominent spokesman was
the historian turned politician Pavel Milyukov (1910). Other Westernizers
emphasized the need for the country's industrialization. For example, Minister
of Finance Sergei Witte argued for a more radical break with the country's rural
tradition and the monarchy-led "energetic and decisive measures" to develop
the industrial base and satisfy the needs of Russia (Neumann 1996:70, 213).
Unlike Slavophiles, who often saw the industrialization of Russia as a sell-out to
Europe, this group advocated rapid economic development.
In contrast to Westernizers, Slavophiles thought of Russia as a unique culture,
rather than merely as an offspring of the European civilization. Beginning with
Ivan Kireyevski and Alexei Khomyakov, they saw their nation as a part of Europe
while advocating Russia's indigenous tradition, which they visualized as a genu
ine religious and social community. In the second half of the nineteenth
century, the spiritual leader of Slavophiles was the philosopher Vladimir Solovyev
(2000), who placed Christian religion at the center of his reflections about the
role of Russia in Europe. In response to the crisis of European identity in the
1840s-1850s, even some prominent Westernizers, such as Alexander Herzen,
grew disappointed with conservative restorations and adopted some of the ideas
of the Slavophiles. Herzen (1946), proposed not to discard Russia's communal
cultural features, but instead, build on those features in order to take a develop
ment shortcut and "catch up" with the West. In an extreme way, the "catching
up" line of thinking found its continuation in Bolshevism. Even for Slavophiles,
however, the West (Europe) remained the significant Other, and they continued
to make sense of Russian development by contrasting it to that of Europe. Like
Westernizers, Slavophiles were thoroughly familiar with western religious, social,
and political traditions, even though they were convinced that the West was fin
ished its role as the world's leader and that Russia must now become the capital
of world civilization.

7For good overviews of the Russian Westernizers-Slavophiles' debates, see Neumann (1999) and Tolz (2001).
For a selection of Russian original writings of Westernizers and Slavophiles, see Kohn (1955).

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 Andrei P. Tsygankov 767

The East, on the other hand, was viewed by both currents in a typical Euro
pean fashion?as barbaric, backward, and unworthy of acceptance. The attitude
only began to change when philosophers, such as Nikolai Danilevski and Konst
antin Leontyev, grew especially fearful of Europe in the aftermath of Russia's
humiliating defeat in the Crimean war. Lond before Samuel Huntington, the
late Slavophile Danilevski (1990 [1885]) asserted that Russia was a "special cul
tural-historical type" that could not see itself as a part of Europe. Leontyev went
further and became known for his calls to embrace the East. He parted with his
teacher's belief in a kingdom of Slavs as a way to defend Russia's distinctiveness
and predicted that Russia would create a "neo-Byzantine," rather than a
Slavonic, cultural type (Leontyev 2005[1891]). Russia's global mission, Leontyev
believed, would be to draw on the moral force of Byzantine Orthodoxy and save
Europe from herself by "uniting the Chinese state model with Indian religious
ness, and subordinating European socialism to them" (Duncan 2000:42-43). At
about the same time, Russia's prominent writers and philosophers, such as Fedor
Dostoyevski, were also reevaluating their original beliefs in Russia's European
destiny and arguing that "our future lies in Asia. It is time to part with ungrate
ful Europe. Russians are as much Asians as they are Europeans. The error of our
recent policy was in attempting to convince peoples of Europe that we are genu
ine Europeans" (Utkin 2000:135). Russians, therefore, turned to the East, but
more as a result of their new hatred toward Europe than of eagerness to learn
from different civilizations.
The Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 did not end the civilizational
debates. Although liberal Westernizers could no longer be part of the official dis
course, arguments between those who wanted to "teach" Europe and those who
wanted to build Russia's own distinct civilization continued. The former line was
especially pronounced in the Lenin-Trotski doctrine of world revolution which
was based on the self-perception of Soviet Russia as superior to the "decadent"
and "rotten" western capitalist civilization and justified a widespread external
expansion. The latter, however, emphasized self-sufficiency and rebuilt many of
familiar features of the old Russia, such as a strong autocratic state and a state
dependent economy. They were assisted by the work of some emigre intellectuals
who, building on Danilevski and Leontyev's ideas, developed the notion of
Russia as a principally non-European, "Eurasian" civilization (see especially Eura
sianism 1926) .8 Indeed, over the decades of revolutionary transformations, the
Soviet system obtained qualities of a distinctive civilization (Kotkin 1990;
Sinyavski 2001; Kara-Murza 2002). Yet, those who favored Russia's strong cultural
association with Europe persisted and ultimately prevailed. As Russia grew more
open to the outside world in the post-Stalin period, it developed its own version
of democratic socialism culminating in Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" in
relations with the West (English 2000). The leader of Perestroika was relying on
ideas of Russia's socialist distinctiveness (Larson and Shevchenko 2003), while
drawing on European social democratic ideas, as well as American theories of
trasnationalism and interdependence.
Soviet disintegration, while bringing about a fundamental change in Russia's
discourse, preserved the core civilizational disagreements. Liberal Westernizers
(Kozyrev 1995; Gaidar 1997; Trenin 2006) returned and argued for a "natural"
affinity of their country with the West based on such shared values as democracy,
human rights, and a free market. The new leaders Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yelt
sin's vision of "integration" and "strategic partnership with the West" assumed
that Russia would develop liberal democratic institutions and build a market
economy after the manner of the West. Westernizers were opposed by
The connection between Eurasianists and the official Soviet "Marxist" view is far from obvious. For some work
tracing the connection, see Hauner (1986) and Zyuganov (1999).

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 768 Self and Other in International Relations Theory

Table 1 Russian Civilizational Currents: West Versus Non-West

Europe/West ^- Non-West
Conservative Westernizers Slavophiles Late Slavophiles
Liberal Westernizers Socialist Expansionists Easterners
Democratic Socialists Eurasianists
Civilized Eurasianists Socialist Isolationists
Neo-Eurasianists

neo-Eurasianists (Panarin 1998; Zyuganov 1999; Dugin 2002), the group th

traced its roots to Danilevski and the classical Eurasianist movement of the 192
1930s. Neo-Eurasianism viewed Russia as a land-based civilization with strong ti
in the former Soviet region, Asia, and the Muslim world, and emphasized relat
cultural and geopolitical independence, or "self-standing" (samostoianiye in Rus
sian). It is a concern with the stability of borders and the accommodation of an
ethnically diverse Euro-Asian periphery and the domestic population, as well as
the sometimes uncooperative stances of seemingly alien Westerners, that lay at
the heart of Eurasianist political philosophy and has given Eurasianism a new li
under the post-Soviet geopolitical situation.
Westernizers and Eurasianists represent polar opposites of Russia's civili
tional identity. Spatially, they relate to the West and non-Western nations resp
tively. They also offer radically different perspectives on Russia's past. Wh
Westernizers have a tendency to be nihilistic about the national history, Eurasia
nists are prone to an exaggerated sense of pride, even glorification of Russ
past. Both currents also have a tendency to display essentialist attitudes toward
the Other: if Russia is with the West, then it cannot be with the East, and vic
versa. Between these two extremes are multiple less essentialist perspectives th
view civilization building as an interactive process involving elements of learni
from diverse cultural entities. One example of such a perspective is the so-calle
"civilized Eurasianism" pioneered by the philosopher Aleksandr Panarin in h
early writings (1994, 1995).9 Other intellectuals and politicians have develo
civilizational visions with similar dualistic meanings. Thus, parliamentarian Vla
mir Lukin (1994) and presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich (1994) argued t
the market economy and political democracy should be viewed as compatib
with Russia's distinct Eurasianist interests. The political consultant Gleb Pavlovs
(2004) coined another term?"Euro-East" which seeks to position Russia as c
turally European, yet poised to preserve a special influence in the former Sovi
region.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the discussed civilizational currents in Russia along
the axes of their identity and degree of essentialism.

The Self/Other in Russian Civilization Debates

This section offers a brief discussion of how Russian thinkers have analyzed rela
tionships with the Other. The cases are drawn from the Russian and post-Soviet
eras- to demonstrate complexity, as well as a learning curve, in civilizational dis
cussions. In the span of a hundred years, some Russian thinkers have abandoned
the essentialist "either West or East" discourse and learned to conduct a dia
logue between two opposing perspectives. In so doing, they have moved beyond
ignoring or recognizing the Other merely as a threat and toward viewing it in
more inclusive terms.

9After 1996, Panarin's views became closer to radical Eurasianists. See especially, Panarin (2000, 2001).

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 Andrei P. Tsygankov 769

Table 2 Russian Civilizational Currents: Degree of Essentialism

More Essentialist ^-^ Less Essentialist

Pre-Soviet Westernizers
Slavophiles
Easterners
Soviet Socialist Expansionists Democratic Socialists
Socialist Isolationists
Pre-Soviet Liberal Westernizers Civilized Eurasianists
Neo-Eurasianists Euro-Easterners

Eurocentrism

With regard to viewing the Eastern Other, Russia's ninete

was not principally different from that of western Europ
east of Russia were viewed with a mixture of superiority a
attitude was the predominant one, as both Westernize
engaged in sparing over how Europe should be leading
toward a better future. While Westernizers put the emph
institutions, Slavophiles pointed to Europe's decline and a
could offer genuine salvation for the world. However, bo
non-Western nations as an object of modernization or a so
because of their "primitive" political institutions
Solovyev referred to as an "inhumane God" (Duncan 2
to this deeply ingrained Eurocentric worldview only c
began to crumble under pressures generated by a strug
and egalitarian ideas of the French revolution split the Eu
progressive and anti-revolutionary camps. Divided aga
increasingly viewed by many Russians as morally weak. Th
war added to the perception of weakness and the view
hostile. The combined image of a morally corrupt and
nent laid the groundwork for the emergence of anti-
theories.
Danilevski was among first to turn to the East and away from Europe, and his
approach soon resonated with dominant attitudes in elite circles. His response to
the Eurocentric attitude, displayed by both Westernizers and Slavophiles,
included several key points. The most significant was the concept of "historico
cultural types," which was meant to undermine the linier view of progress. Antic
ipating the later theories of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, Danilevski
distinquished ten types of civilization in the past, of which Romano-Germanic of
European was only one. "These types are not evolutionary stages on the ladder
of gradual perfectibility...but entirely different plans?plans without any com
mon denominator?in which each entity evolves in a specific and distinct fashion
toward the multiformity and perfection within its reach." (Danilevski
1990[1885]:8). Progress therefore was not unidirectional and universal.
Danilevski (1990[1885]: 123) proposed abandoning the concept "universal
humanity" (obshchechelovechestvo) in favor of the notion of "all-humanity" (vseche
lovechestvo), by which he meant a richness of cross-cultural interactions across the
world. For Russia, this perspective did not mean the need to "lead" Europe or
"catch up" with it, as was emphasized by Westernizers and Slavophiles, respec
tively. Russia could still create a new, eleventh cultural type?and it might yet
prove to be the most developed?but it would not owe anything to Europe.
In fact, Danilevski insisted on Russia being tough on Europe in defending its
foreign policy interests.

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 770 Self and Other in International Relations Theory

Leontyev, a student of Danilevski, went even further in parting with Russia's

Eurocentrism. A former diplomat in Turkey, he abandoned Danilevski's idea of
creating the Slav cultural type. "We should regard Pan-Slavism as something very
dangerous if not downright disastrous" (Walicki 1979:304). Although he shared
his teacher's desire for Russia to control Cons tan tinopole, Leontyev saw such
control as a platform for creating an original Orthodox-Byzantine, rather than
Slavonic, culture. His greater trust in non-European cultures was expressed in
his belief that Russia should ultimately save Europe from itself by "uniting the
Chinese state model with Indian religiousness and subordinating European
socialism to them" (Duncan 2000:43). Leontyev, therefore, showed himself to
be even more hostile toward Europe and more receptive toward non-European
cultures than Danilevski. Of all nineteenth-century philosophers, Leontyev came
the closest to the worldview of Vostochniki (Easterners), or those Russian scholars
who saw Russia's mission as being in Asia, rather than in the Balkans and Eastern
Europe (Hauner 1986:49).
Europeanists responded to writings of Danilevski and Leontyev by reiterating
their beliefs in Europe's future and hailing the two thinkers' projects as danger
ous Utopias. Milyukov saw in Danilevski's Russia and Europe an ideology of
"hatred toward Europe and a grand project?a Pan-Slav federation headed by
Russia" (Novikova and Sizemskaya 1997:174). Solovyev (2000:413) accused Dani
levski of a desire to create a Slav future on the ruins of European culture and he
had a similarly harsh reaction to the writing of Leontyev (Solovyev 2000:418).
Both Westernizers and Slavophiles showed hardly any enlightenment regarding
non-European cultures, and they refused to engage Danilevski and Leontyev on
this issue. The pro-European attitude toward the East remained deeply ethnocen
tric, which was soon noted by their critics (Strakhov 1990[1888]). Solovyev, for
instance, demonstrated his deep fear of the Muslim East and later became
obsessed with the "yellow peril" (Duncan 2000:44-45). His way of reconciling
the East with the West was through coercive power and the imposition of Russian
values. Although Danilevski and Leontyev were far from adopting the recogni
tion-acceptance attitude toward the East, by challenging the Eurocentric ideology
they laid out important preconditions for future movement in the identified
direction.

Post-Soviet Eurasia

A different discursive development took place under post-Soviet conditions. The

dominance of pro-Western narratives, associated with Mikhail Gorbachev and
Boris Yeltsin, was soon met with a formidable opposition, which advanced a dif
ferent civilizational identity for Russia. Initiated by presidential advisor
Stankevich and then the Chief of Foreign Intelligence, Yevgeni Primakov, this
perspective advocated the notion of Russia as a distinctly Eurasianist power.
Although the Eurasia debate is far from over, it has already revealed the full
spectrum of Russian attitudes toward the Other.
Westernizers?not unlike the Europeanists a century ago?have demonstrated
the attitude of hegemony or nonrecognition toward the non-Western Other and
an attitude of dependence toward the Western Other. According to this school,
Russia is an organic part of Western civilization, whose "genuine" identity was
hijacked by the Bolsheviks and the Soviet system. During the Cold War Russia had
acted against its own national identity and interests, and now it finally has an
opportunity to become a "normal" western country. Thus, Andrei Kozyrev
(1995:16) argued that the Soviet Union was not merely a "normal" or merely
"underdeveloped," but a "wrongfully developed" country. Russia is now to correct
this distortion by accepting the priority of the individual and the free market over
society and the state in order to develop what he referred to as a "natural

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 Andrei P. Tsygankov 771

partnership" with western countries (Kozyrev 1992). By ignoring historically spe

cific aspects of Russia's development and challenges of interaction with both East
and West, this vision sought to sidestep the question of Russia's civilizational
Other. It was a clear product of a long tradition of linear Westernist thinking. Such
eminent nineteenth century historians, as Vasili Klyuchevski and Pavel Milyukov,
saw Russia's national characteristics, but insisted?not unlike the west-centered
modernization school?that their country would nevertheless develop in the same
direction as the West and go through the same stages of development.
Many neo-Eurasianists, on the other hand, revealed the recognition-threat atti
tude toward western nations. Much like Samuel Huntington (1996) in his "clash
of civilizations" thesis, Eurasianists concluded that the world represents a strug
gle for identity and domination among culturally alien units. In this world, the
main threat to Russia's identity and status comes from the Atlanticism or "trade
civilization," associated especially with the United States. Some neo-Eurasianists
(Dugin 2002) advocate constant accumulation of power by way of territorial
expansion as the only appropriate behavior. In this struggle for power against
the "trade civilization," they want to pit Europe against the United States and
eventually build a larger geopolitical axis of allies?such as Germany, Iran, and
Japan?in order to resist Atlanticist influences. Other neo-Eurasianists (Zyuganov
1999) advocate the restoration of the "union" within the former Soviet borders
and interpret empires as independent civilizations that are relatively self-suffi
cient and geopolitically stable, not constantly expanding units. The two groups
are in agreement, however, about the perceived threat from the West and want
to build closer relationships with China, India, and the Muslim world in response
to this threat. Much like Danilevski and the earlier Eurasianists, neo-Eurasianists
are mainly concerned about containing European cultural influences. As this
group's guru wrote (Gumilev 1990), Europe represents an alien Supraethnic
group and can never be mixed with Russia.
This battle of the two civilizational essentialisms, Western and Eurasinist, is far
from the only discoursive development in Russia. A powerful intellectual tradition,
Eurasianism has been adopted and considerably modified by scholars and politi
cians uncomfortable with the zero sum civilizational dichotomy. Politically, the
move was supported by Russia's second foreign minister Yevgeni Primakov, and
therefore?at least by default?by President Yeltsin, who appointed Primakov.
One influential spokesman of the moderate Eurasianism in policy circles was
Presidential advisor Stankevich. Stankevich (1992) took issue with Kozyrev since
his first attempt to systematically formulate Russia's national interests at the For
eign Ministry conference "The Transformed Russia in the New World" in Febru
ary 1992, and since then, Stankevich (1992) has sought to promote the vision of
Russia as a cultural bridge between Europe and Asia insisting, for example, on
defending the rights of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics and reacti
vating special relations with Muslim countries. In arguing the notion of Russia's
special "civilizational status," Stankevich and those who shared this perspective
(Panarin 1995) have been critical of many of the West's characteristics, such as
individualism and consumerism, and do not view western civilization as universal.
Yet, they have also fought against Neo-Eurasianist attempts to present Russia as
culturally superior, insisting on learning from the West skills of free enterprise
and political liberty. The more dialectical perspective was reflected in official
documents. For example, the country's National Security Concept of 1997
described Russia as an "influential European and Asian power" and recom
mended that Russia maintain equal relations with "global European and Asian
economic and political actors."1

10National Security Concepts and Foreign Policy Concepts are available in: Shakleyina (2002:Vol. 4, 51-90,
110-111).

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 772 Self and Other in International Relations Theory

Table 3 Russia's Civilizational Debates: Recognition of the Other and Representative Authors

No Recognition Recognition-Threat Recognition-Acceptance

Eurocentrism Milyukov Danilevski
Solovyev Leontyev
Eurasia Kozyrev Zyuganov Stankevich

More recently, Russians have developed yet another version of a cross-cul

dialogue. President Putin embraced the earlier articulated vision of Rus
part of the West insisting that Russia "was, is and will, of course, be a
European power" (Putin 2005). Putin is clear, however, that while moving in
same direction of freedom and democracy as Europeans, Russia does so
own pace given its own conditions and special ties with non-European natio
Putin's supporters have interpreted his vision using the idea of "Euro-E
civilization, which should be differentiated from the previously discussed
and "Eurasia" (Tsygankov 2007). They have articulated three componen
the new civilizational idea. First, the countries of the Euro-East, such as Ru
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, share with Europe values of a market econom
growing middle class. Second, because of their preoccupation with domestic
nomic and social modernization, the Euro-Eastern area is in special ne
maintaining political stability. Finally, domestic transformation of the Eur
ern nations requires preservation of political sovereignty and defense
attempts by outsiders to exploit the internal resources of the nations
region.
The Eurasia debate has demonstrated that, despite the prominence of essen
tialist perspectives on relating to the Western Other, Russians have been moving
in a number of different directions. This movement is far from homogeneous,
yet it shows that many Russians refuse to reflect on their identity in essentialist
categories and see the challenge of identity construction as bridging separate ele
ments from East and West, rather than chosing between them. This growing atti
tude of recognition-acceptance reflects realities of a rapidly changing world of
globalization, in which culturally ethnocentric perspectives, such as Francis
Fukuyama's "end of history" or Huntington's "clash of civilizations," cannot
serve as reliable guides. Increasingly, understanding of this compexity finds its
expression in a pluralistic IR scholarship emerging in post-Soviet Russia. If any
thing, Russian theory of IR today is arguably more open to dialogue with the
outside world than that of Western nations. Intellectual paroichialism and isola
tionism, widespread in the Soviet era, are now fighting a marginal battle, and
mainstream IR scholars can no longer imagine their development without a
dialogue with their foreign colleagues (Lebedeva 2004; Tsygankov and Tsygankov
2004).

Conclusion
For scholars of IR?a discipline commonly viewed as excessively Western and
America-centric?reviewing Russian debates on relating to different Others is
important. Geographically positioned between Europe and Asia, Russia has been
involved in intense cross-national interactions and has produced a rich civiliza
tional discourse. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Russian think
ers were intellectually dependent on Europe, and they gave little recognition to

nOn a number of occasions, Putin has referred to Russia as a country of "Eurasian" identity, and he has further
developed ties with nations outside the West. In the mind of many Russian politicians, "European" and "Eurasian"
are not in opposition to one another.

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 Andrei P. Tsygankov 773

the Eastern Other. The situation began to change with Russia's defeat in the
Crimean war and the resulting growing perception that Europe was no longer
interested in giving Russia its due recognition. Danilevski and Leontyev's writings
marked the end of Russia's intellectual Eurocentrism and?through formulation
of theories of "historico-cultural types" and "Byzantian roots"?prepared the
ground for a more complex civilizational engagement with Europe and
non-European nations. The more recent Eurasia debate revealed, along with
highly essentialist attitudes toward the Western Other, a number of efforts to
develop a dialogue among different cultures and civilizations. Overall, despite
the prominence of essentialism in Russian civilizational discourse, one can regis
ter intellectual progress in moving from not recognizing the Other to recogniz
ing and accepting it. Table 3 summarizes Russia's civilizational debates.
As scholars of IR develop an awareness of the cultural and civilizational
assumptions behind their research, it is important to study various roles played
by these assumptions, as well as ways in which one can move beyond the
Self/Other dichotomy in empirical research and policy recommendations. This,
of course, cannot happen without full realization that scholarship has profound
ethical implications, and that the scholar is involved in the production of values,
as much as empirical knowledge. Avoiding engaging in ethical reasoning is
impossible, so long as we continue to live in a multicultural world, in which
there are multiple Others and multiple moral contexts. Much more is required
for moving away from what remains "an American social science" (Hoffmann
1995 [1977]) and toward a genuinely global discipline that is able to accept the
vital significance of the Other in the production of knowledge. Global theory of
IR is cosmopolitan and culturally diverse at the same time, and it is a process, in
which bottom-up developments and influences are as valuable as those that look
at the world from the top-down.

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