Professional Documents
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China's Urbanization in The New Round of Technological Revolution, 2020-2050
China's Urbanization in The New Round of Technological Revolution, 2020-2050
Wang Wei, Deng Yusong, Niu Sanyuan, Wang Ruimin, Shao Ting, Zhao Yong
and Liu Xin are all researchers at the Institute of Market Economy, Develop-
ment Research Center of the State Council, Beijing, China
Routledge Studies on the Chinese Economy
Series Editor: Peter Nolan
University of Cambridge
PART I
A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization 1
PART II
A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization 81
PART III
The new round of technological revolution and China’s
urbanization 131
Postscript 212
Index 216
Figures
A historical review of
technological revolutions
and urbanization
One of the greatest inventions in history, city bears the best hopes of mankind.
It not only offers the main venue for people to get together, but also the center
of economic activities and technological innovation, the hub of transporta-
tion, trade, and information flow, and the best platform for public and private
services. Historically, urbanization is the process where the population and
economic and social activities shift towards cities, the way of life and work
changes, economic structure evolves, and social governance keeps improving.
Urbanization in its modern sense started in tandem with technological revo-
lution, thus being propelled by technological advances. Since the 18th century,
humanity has witnessed three technological revolutions, each of which has
triggered systemic and fundamental transformations in production and tech-
nology, nurtured a series of industries, greatly boosted productivity and effi-
ciency, and turned clusters of emerging industries to magnet for factors of
production such as labor, land, and capital. They have not only reshaped
industries and upgraded the economic structure, but also significantly fueled
urbanization. Urbanization is characterized by continuous policy reforms
and innovations. Industry upgrading, underpinned by technological revolu-
tions and the industrialization and commercialization of their outcomes,
requires systems and policies that accelerate the accumulation, relocation and
optimization of factors of production. As a result, unremitting impetus can
be generated to fuel and cluster emerging industries, promote city develop-
ment, and provide institutional groundwork for constant innovation of cities
and future technological iteration. This closes the loop from technological
revolution to industrial revolution, paving the way to a new round of techno-
logical revolution, including the rise of emerging industries, system reforms
and policy innovations, accumulation of factors of production and clustering
of industry, and a higher level of competence in development and innovation
via urbanization.
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-1
1 Process, typical models, and inspirations
of global urbanization
One of the greatest inventions in history, city bears the best hopes of man-
kind. It is not only the center of economic activities and technological innova-
tion but also the hub of transportation, trade, and information flow, providing
the best public and private services. A retrospect of urbanization highlights a
process characterized by continuous accumulation of population in cities,
evolution of economic structure, and improvement of social governance.
Since the inception of the first industrial revolution, urbanization has been
gathering momentum. However, the pathway, level, and quality of urbaniza-
tion vary significantly among regions. A clear understanding of the evolution
of urbanization and the path of urbanization in typical countries can help
identify the general pattern and provide inspirations for China’s urbanization
in the new era.
1.1 Definition of urbanization
Urbanization is a complex economic and social process with the focus of eco-
nomic and social development shifting from rural area to cities. Factors of
production such as land, labor, and capital have continuously concentrated in
cities. So have production and lifestyle (The United Nations, 2018).
Definition of cities varies from one country to another, measured by their
administrative division, demographic traits (population size and density), eco-
nomic traits, and urban characteristics (Figure 1.1). Of the 233 countries and
regions in the world, 121 adopt administrative criteria to distinguish cities
from rural areas. Fifty-nine of them, including China, take administrative divi-
sion as the only criterion. Another 108 countries and regions use the size or
density of population to define cities, of which 37 use demographic traits as the
only criteria. However, there is a huge difference where the size of population
is measured as a criterion, with some defining a settlement with more than 200
people as a city, while others adhering to a bottom line of 50,000 people. For
example, the United States defines a city as an area with more than 2,500 resi-
dents, whereas in Greece, a city is defined as an autonomous region with more
than 10,000 inhabitants in its population center. Thirty-eight countries and
regions use economic traits as part of the criteria to define a city. Sixty-nine
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-2
4 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
140
121
120
108
100
Number of criteria
80
69
59
60
40 37 38
20
8 12
0
Administrative Size and density Economic City facilities Unclear
division of population characteristics
As part of the criteria As the only criterion
refer to urban facilities, such as paved streets, water supply system, drainage, or
electric lighting, as part of the criteria. For example, in Nicaragua, a city is
defined as an administrative center with paved streets, electric lighting, and
more than 1,000 inhabitants. There are 12 countries and regions that do not
have clear criteria yet to define a city.
25 90.00
22.66
80.68 82.17 80.00
20 74.45
68.17 70.00
City population (100 million)
60.00
15
49.86 50.00
42.52 40.00
10
30.00
5.48 5.53 5.26
5 20.00
2.99
10.00
0.28
0 0.00
Africa Asia Europe Latin America & North Oceania
the Caribbean America
City Population (Left vertical axis: 100 million) Urbanization Rate (Right vertical axis: %)
world’s total. By 2050, 68% of the world’s population is expected to live in cit-
ies (The United Nations, 2018).
1.2 Stages of urbanization
In the millennia of agricultural society, the vast majority of the population
engaged in farming and lived in the countryside. Located sporadically in the
vast span of farmland and villages, cities served as the centers of administra-
tion, religious faith, defense and trade, and their residents only accounted for
a fraction of the total population. Urbanization in its modern sense only began
after the 18th century industrial revolution and the successive industrializa-
tion, marking the greatest historical change in human society.
Ray. M. Northam, an American scholar on urban geography depicted urban-
ization as a flattened S curve and proposed the “urbanization curve”2 in 1979
(Figure 1.3). With two points of inflection at 30% and 70%, the curve divides
urbanization into three stages, namely the initial stage with low level and slow
speed of urbanization (<30%), the acceleration stage with rapid assembly of
population in cities (30%–70%), and the advanced stage with decelerated or
stagnant growth of urban population after a high level of urbanization (>70%).
Generally speaking, the drivers, industrial structure, and corresponding
issues of urbanization vary across the three stages (see Table 1.1).
The initial stage begins when the urbanization rate exceeds 10%. During this
stage, industrialization gathers steam. Light industry becomes the main driver
of economic growth and urbanization. The share of industry in the whole
economy rises rapidly, whereas that of service industry grows at a lower rate.
Thirty percent of urbanization rate generally marks the beginning of the
acceleration stage mainly driven by heavy industry, a process that lasts until the
urbanization rate reaches 50%. As more people migrate to cities, the division
of labor gets more specialized, and the production methods become more
complex. With growing demand of urban residents for various types of ser-
vices, and of industrial sectors for intermediate services, the service sector
moves to a fast track for the generation of value-added and gains importance
in economic growth. At this stage, urbanization is increasingly dominated by
the service sector and emerging industries. It should be noted that this period
is critical as the quality of urbanization diverges at the watershed of 50% of
urbanization rate. Accelerated urbanization turbocharged by heavy industry
usually features urbanization rate between 30% and 50%, where industrial
development attracts rural population to cities to fuel rapid urbanization.
However, the accelerated development comes with a series of problems such as
traffic congestion, housing shortage, and environmental degradation. When
urbanization rate reaches 50%, cities gradually rely on the service sector for
development. At this stage, institutions and policies are essential to the quality
of urbanization, if they can promote urban infrastructure, sanitation, quality
of life, and the development of high value-added service industries and emerg-
ing industries.
Urbanization rate above 70% heralds the advanced stage. In this stage, the
economic structure continues to be dominated by the service sector. High val-
ue-added service industries and high-tech industries remain the leading agent
of urbanization.
proportion reached 16%, with 900 cities each home to 100,000 residents and
above. Thanks to the massive inflow of European migrants and the export of
primary products such as agricultural produces and minerals, some countries in
Latin America also entered the initial stage of urbanization. By 1925, urban
population reached 25% of the total population in Latin America.
In 2018, more than 20 countries in the world, mainly in Asia and Africa,
were still in the early stage of urbanization. For example, urbanization rate was
only 13% in Burundi in Africa, and below 20% in Niger, Malawi, and Sri
Lanka, etc.
In general, the early stage of urbanization was defined by the increasing
number of cities. Among innumerable villages, only those privileged with easy
access to resources or transportation were urbanized. While the number of
cities increased rapidly, their internal structure was not optimized, with rela-
tively monotonous functions and limited scale of individual cities.
When urbanization rate is between 30% and 50%, the development of heavy
and chemical industry attracts a large number of rural migrants, and the sec-
ondary industry becomes a dominant sector of the economy.
In 1800, with an urban population above 30% of its national total, the
United Kingdom entered the accelerated stage. By 1851, its urbanization rate
had exceeded 50%, making it the first country to become an urbanized society.
However, it was not until the advent of the Second Industrial Revolution in the
1870s that countries such as Germany and the United States caught up with
the development of heavy industry and entered the accelerated stage.
In terms of industrial structure, iron and steel, machinery chemical and
other sectors of heavy industry replaced light industry as the mainstay during
the acceleration period. After the 1870s, the invention of generators and elec-
tric motors, and the emergence of long-distance transmission technology
Process, typical models, and inspirations of global urbanization 11
Fifty percent of urbanization rate indicates that an area has become an urban-
ized society. The productive and consumer services begin to flourish, attracting
more rural people to cities. Urban infrastructure and sanitation begin to
improve substantially.
Industrialization in Britain preceded its urbanization, as industrial develop-
ment attracted a large number of rural people to cities for a living. But there
were no precedents to go by for urban construction. Governments had little
experience. Urban housing was so scarce that industrial workers flocking to
cities lived in makeshift shelters or ramshackle farmhouses provided by fac-
tory owners, with not less than four people crammed into a single room.
Sanitation was also very poor. Garbage was dumped everywhere. Drainage
was a luxury. Foul smell pervaded the air, turning settlements into breeding
grounds for cholera and other infectious diseases. The mortality rate in the
cities even exceeded that in the countryside, and infant mortality rate was
particularly high. Poor infrastructure curbed urban development. In the
1840s, London saw the rise of the “model dwelling” movement, where chari-
table organizations such as the Metropolitan Association for Improving the
Dwellings of the Industrious Classes (MAIDIC) and the Association for
Improving the Living Conditions of the Working Class took the lead to
improve housing for the working class. They built model houses that met
12 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
Urbanization rate above 70% suggests that cities have entered the advanced
stage of urbanization. Globally, developed cities with urbanization rate over
70% are generally driven by tertiary industries, especially knowledge-intensive
high-tech industries. Their population growth takes on a new pattern of “low
Process, typical models, and inspirations of global urbanization 13
birth rate and low death rate”. Urban population grows slowly or even stag-
nates. Urban–rural differences are blurring and regions are increasingly inte-
grated. At this stage, the main driving force of urbanization is globalization
and the third technological revolution represented by information technology.
The information technology revolution has amplified regional disparities.
Enterprises can allocate resources and organize production across borders,
and a new division of labor among cities has emerged across the world.
Since the 1950s, the third technological revolution rolled out in the United
States and other developed countries. The information industry originating
from the microelectronics revolution has established presence in both hardware
and software and replaced the energy-intensive heavy chemical industry as the
new pillar of developed countries. The information technology revolution has
also made large enterprises more flexible with siting and production organiza-
tion, and the “time-space compression” effect of new technologies such as just-
in-time manufacturing has strengthened comparative advantages of specific
regions. Removal of spatial barriers has amplified the nuanced differences
among regions in land and labor costs. Division of labor in these industries has
quickly taken place worldwide, with cities in the United States and Western
Europe adopting an industrial structure dominated by high-end manufactur-
ing and services, and heavy chemical industry and labor-intensive industries
relocated to developing countries.
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have become an important force for
industrial transfer and urban development. New York, London, Tokyo, and
other metropolises have become magnet for MNCs, gaining international
influence and building up high-end service industries as the pillar of the local
economy. With growing scale and complexity, MNCs have to outsource major
functions to specialized service providers. Yet talent pool and information
archive that are essential to the provision of financial service, legal service,
accounting and other specialized services can only be found in world-class cities.
Large cities in the industrial revolution era were mainly traditional manu-
facturing centers. But modern metropolitan areas, in particular world-class
cities, tend to host clusters of service providers, especially those of productive
services. The service sector continues to expand its contribution to economic
growth and employment (Table 1.2).
In the United States, Japan, and other countries where urbanization enters
a stable stage, contribution of the service sector to economic growth exceeds
60% and keeps rising. Among them, contribution of the service industry to
GDP growth in the United States increased from 79.3% in 1980s to 81.6% in
1990s, and jumped to 83.1% between 2000 and 2007. The share in Japan was
63.5% between 1980 and 1990 before surging to 102.5% between 1990 and
2000. Though the figure dropped to 78.9% between 2000 and 2007, Japan
remains highly dependent on the service sector (Table 1.3).
It should be noted that although Latin American countries, measured solely
by the benchmark of 70%, also entered a stable stage of urbanization in the
mid-1970s, most of them fell into the middle-income trap, as they failed to
14 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
Table 1.3 C
ontribution of the Service Industry to Economic Growth (1980–2007):
(Unit: %)
adapt to the new wave of global division of labor and to shift timely from
import substitution to export-driven growth. Their ordeal was compounded by
declining industrial competitiveness and populist distribution policies.
Governance issues accumulated in the intermediate stage, such as housing
shortage, infrastructure bottleneck, urban unemployment, and poverty have
remained uncured in the stable period of urbanization. Brazil, for example,
had an urban population of over 70% in the late 1970s. But the share of infor-
mal employment in cities was high. Its service sector was relatively underdevel-
oped, contributing to less than 40% of economic growth, which didn’t reach
50% until the 21st century.
Table 1.4 S
tructural Change of Added Value of American Service Industry (1950–2008):
(Unit: %)
12.8% and 22.2% to 20.1% and 25.5%, respectively. The constant industrial
transformation has anchored high-quality urbanization in the pioneer coun-
tries (Table 1.4).
In terms of urban governance, the pioneer countries improved urban public
policy and social security through exploration. The 19th century witnessed a
large number of rural people swarming into cities. However, due to inadequate
infrastructure and public services, cities in the United Kingdom suffered from
serious sanitary and environmental issues such as foul air, untreated sewage,
and epidemics. Mortality rate in cities was much higher than that of rural area.
Therefore, the British government promptly adjusted public policies and
enacted the Public Health Act in 1848, the Sanitary Act in 1866, and the world’s
first Clean Air Act in 1956. As a result, urban environmental issues were effec-
tively addressed. In the second half of the 19th century, Germany also faced
surge in urban population, poor sanitation, environmental pollution, and a
rioting working class during its urbanization. Against this backdrop, the
Bismarck government promulgated the Health Insurance Act in 1883, provid-
ing social relief for workers haunted by illness, workplace injuries and ageing.
The first social security system promoted healthy social transformation and
urbanization. As urbanization accelerated in the United States, the urban envi-
ronment and living conditions deteriorated. Urban poverty and crime became
rampant. At the end of the 19th century, the United States launched the urban
beautification movement, implemented housing reform, and passed the United
States Housing Act in 1937, which played a significant role in improving the
urban landscape, relieving urban poverty, and improving living conditions.
18 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
Overall, urbanization in the pioneer countries was led by the market with
follow-up intervention by the government. It was spontaneously driven by the
technological revolution and subsequent industrialization, and was dominated
by market mechanism and the private sector in its early stage. The private sec-
tor was the main force behind growing industries, population flow, and even
the provision of urban infrastructure. As urbanization progressed, urban resi-
dents raised new concerns and demands for public services. In response, the
government started to play a more prominent role in improving infrastructure,
combating infectious diseases, and providing social security coverage, contrib-
uting to the quality of urbanization.
After World War II, Japan and South Korea, the catching-up economies in
East Asia, rapidly completed industrialization and urbanization in about 30
years. From 1956 to 1973, Japan’s industrial output grew at an average annual
rate of 13.6%. From 1961 to 1980, South Korea’s manufacturing added value
grew at an average annual rate of 16.5%. Jobs created by urban industrial
development attracted large numbers of rural people to cities. Both countries
underwent from the initial stage of urbanization (<30%) to the mature stage
(>70%). Urbanization rate in Japan jumped from 27.8% in 1945 to 74.2% in
1973, with an average annual increase of 1.66 percentage points. Urbanization
rate in South Korea soared from 28.6% in 1960 to 78.2% in 1995, averaging an
annual growth of 1.42 percentage points.
In terms of initial endowment, catch-up economies had highly educated
human capital and strong external assistance. With the policy of to prioritize
education as a foundation for nation-building tool in the 1950s, Japan pro-
vided universal compulsory education and actively promoted vocational edu-
cation, effectively lifting human capital to a higher level. Both Japan and South
Korea benefited from external assistance and a favorable international market
for rapid urbanization. For example, with financial aid from the United States
in the 1950s, Japan introduced new technologies from the United States to
quickly build up its clusters of heavy chemical industry.
In terms of industrial development, the government was deeply involved
from the very beginning. Government-led industrial policies successfully pro-
moted industrial transformation and upgrading, transforming the center of
economic activities from industry to service. On the one hand, the government
provided enabling policies for industrial upgrading. For instance, the Japanese
government provided a series of supportive measures for the high-tech indus-
tries in terms of taxation, land and infrastructure. South Korea implemented
the “government-led growth strategy” during the take-off stage to support
export and heavy chemical industries with favorable financial and land policies,
accelerating capital formation (Figure 1.4). On the other hand, the Japanese
and Korean governments attached great importance to planning to align
Process, typical models, and inspirations of global urbanization 19
South Korea
70
60
50
40
%
30
20
10
0
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Industry (%) Services (%)
Japan
80
70
60
50
40
%
30
20
10
0
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
Figure 1.4 Share of Industry and Services in GDP (South Korea & Japan).
Source: World Bank database, the Japanese Statistics Bureau, and the National Statistics Center.
100
90 87.8
80.7 83.6
80
70.7
Urbanization Rate (%)
70 68.4
57.3 55.3 60.4
60
50
41.3 36.6 43
40
29.6
30
20
10
0
1950 1970 1990 2018 2030 2050
Globally Latin America
80
70
60
50
% of GDP
40
30
20
10
0
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
2021
Primary Industry Secondary Industry Tertiary Industry
Figure 1.6 The Proportion of Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Industries Latin Amer-
ica (1965–2022).
Source: The World Bank.
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1980 1990 1994 1997 1999 2002 2004 2005 2006 1979 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1996 1998 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008
affordable services, lowering living cost, and enhance urban industrial compet-
itiveness. A steady inflow of migrants is a source of vitality in cities.
and cities exert the most prominent hub-spoke effect. For example, when the
United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States reached 50% of urbaniza-
tion in 1851, 1900, and 1920, respectively, they were all ranked among the most
powerful countries in the world.
Typical countries had one point in common when their urbanization rates
reached 50%. Their industrial structure changed significantly and the service
industry (i.e. tertiary industry) began to overtake the manufacturing industry
to dominate the economic structure. The continuous upgrading of industrial
structure, especially the development of the tertiary industry, became an
important driver for the quality of urbanization. Therefore, 50% of urbaniza-
tion rate marks a critical juncture. Successful transformation to a service-
dominated economy will assure high-quality urbanization.
Generally speaking, when urbanization rate is below 50% (i.e. the accelera-
tion period dominated by industrialization), the industrial structure is still
dominated by heavy industry. The scalability and specialization of heavy
industry leads to increased dependence of enterprises on the external environ-
ment and social services, giving rise to producer services. Meanwhile, higher
income boosts consumer services. As industrialization advances, industries
28 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
1.4.2 Well-functioning infrastructure
have long had high urban population density. Yet their urban infrastructure
has been underdeveloped. New urban residents were packed into slums with
shabby infrastructure, vulnerable to poverty and crime. Poor order and secu-
rity have constrained the development of cities.
Table 1.7 Governance Challenges in Typical Countries with Urbanization Rate of 50%
Mobility of factors and an open market are the engine for urbanization.
Economy of scale through clustering is an important driver for urban devel-
opment. Free flow of factors enables enterprises to allocate factors on a
larger scale and effectively reduce production costs. A fully open market ena-
bles enterprises to ship products over a longer distance and have a better
chance to meet the best buyers. Factor mobility and an open market are also
conducive to the spread of technology, which is essential to continuous
industrial upgrading. The United Kingdom became “the factory of the
world” between the 18th and the 19th century largely because it could source
raw materials from colonies to minimize cost, and sell products globally to
benefit from the open market. Latin American countries and others that
implemented import substitution strategy restricted import and “protected”
domestic goods with high tariff. But inadequate demand at home made it
difficult for them to scale up the market. Domestic businesses were not moti-
vated for industrial transformation and upgrading. That’s how they gradu-
ally lost competitiveness in the era of global division of labor, and have been
bogged down in the vicious cycle of stagnant income, shrinking domestic
market, and escalating urban poverty.
1.5 Summary
Among the three stages of urbanization (the initial stage, the intermediate
stage and the advanced stage), the intermediate stage is critical to quality dif-
ferentiation, with 50% of urbanization rate as a watershed. After reaching the
benchmark of 50%, cities gradually enter a period where the service industry
takes a dominant position. At this stage, the ability of cities to formulate insti-
tutions and policies to improve infrastructure, sanitation, and quality of life,
and to promote high value-added service industries and emerging industries is
crucial to the quality of subsequent urbanization.
The comparative analysis of the paths and outcomes of urbanization in
typical countries in terms of initial endowments, industrial development, and
urban governance shows that to successfully promote urbanization, we should
learn from the success of pioneer countries and catch-up economies and from
the lessons of inadequate industrial support in Latin American countries. We
should seize the opportunity of the new round of technological revolution,
ratchet up urbanization with industrial development, and make cities more
inclusive and sustainable.
Overall, continuous industrial transformation and upgrading are the key to
successful urbanization. Facing challenges like infrastructure bottleneck, hous-
ing shortage, environmental pollution, and urban poverty amid urbanization,
Process, typical models, and inspirations of global urbanization 31
Notes
1 The first chapter of the first part of the National New Urbanization Planning
(2014–2020), released on March 16, 2014, defines “urbanization” as “a natural
historical process that is in tandem with industrialization, a process characterized
by the assembly of non-agro industries and rural population in cities and towns. It
is an objective trend of human social development and an important symbol of
national modernization”.
2 In fact, as early as 1974, the United Nations proposed a similar urbanization curve
in the United Nations Method of Urban and Rural Population Projections.
3 Transport means in the pre-industrial era included muddy roads, sailboats, and
horse traction. They facilitated the dispersal of population, evening out conditions
across regions.
4 This book follows Singelmann’s method to categorize service industry into distrib-
utive services, producer services, personal services and social services (see Service
Mechanism, Policy and Practice of Service Sector (Xingzhou Ren, Wei Wang et al.,
China Development Press, 2011).
5 12 territories in the region have not gained independence yet.
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2 Impact of technological revolutions
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34 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
During the deployment period, the leading technology is further matured and
optimized. So are its supportive technologies, which become more integrated
with one another. The leading technology is used in a wider scope, showing the
tendency of becoming a general technology. The leading technology and its
supportive technologies constitute a maturing technological cluster, with grow-
ing recognition by the public for its technological and commercial value.
Multiple new technologies “co-exist and integrate pending a critical mass” for
explosive growth in commercialization and industrialization.
During the first technological revolution, revolutionary tweaks to the proto-
type steam engine by Watt and others made the machine less demanding on
fuel, more fuel-efficient, and more cost-effective, ready to be deployed any-
where. Its extensive application in mining and metallurgy also brought about
breakthroughs in transportation, the textile industry, and related technologies
and industries.
Impact of technological revolutions on urbanization 35
Some people opine that the main feature of the technological change is
the replacement of organic materials by inorganic ones (Wrigley, 1987).
Others defines an industrial revolution as an increase in energy input,
especially non-animal energy. They consider steam power as the most sig-
nificant advance (Cipolla, 1965). Still others see the technological revolu-
tion as the use of machines rather than hand tools (Paulinyi, 1986).
Source: Mokyr, J. (2011). The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity
and Economic Progress. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195074772.001.0001
Internet were made possible. Claude Shannon proposed the idea of aligning
the “ON” and “OFF” of a circuit system with the “1” and “0” of the binary
numeral system, laying the theoretical foundation for digital circuit. John Von
Neumann’s pioneering use of binary as the basis for the numeral system of
computers greatly simplified their logic circuit. He also proposed the working
principle of modern computers based on stored programs and process control,
founding the theory of modern computers. After the 1960s, transistors, semi-
conductors, computers and controllers became important technologies. By
1971, the invention of microprocessor boosted computer and communication
technologies. In 1968, the first experimental computer network was set up. By
1986, network technologies such as the Internet had been rapidly developing.
In addition, with robust development of cable, fiber optic and satellite commu-
nication technologies and innovation in program-controlled switches and
mobile communication systems, fixed and mobile telephones gradually gained
popularity. The third technological revolution differs from the previous two in
that all scientific and technological fields are intertwined, scientific progress
and technological development reinforce each other, and the cycle of science-
technology conversion greatly shortens.
Table 2.1 S
hare of Different Markets in British Exports from the Late 17th
Century to the End of the 18th Century
The speed and scope for the spread of a technological revolution are usually
constrained by a range of factors at the time, including infrastructure, organi-
zation, and institutions. Perez (1983) argues that institutional change is as
important as technological change, and that systemic changes in technology
will not occur unless there are profound social, organizational, and technolog-
ical innovations. The adoption of new technologies needs investment, which
requires that property rights are properly protected. The adoption of new tech-
nologies may change the existing distribution of interest and thus be obstructed.
Good institutions should make such obstruction less likely to succeed (Comin
and Mestieri, 2014).
In addition, maturity of the infrastructure, new industries, new services, and
new management systems needed for the rapid application of technology can
determine the speed of diffusion of a given technology. For example, in the
United States, the patent law was amended in 1836 to replace the registration
system with an examination system. And a patent office was established to
oversee patent examination (Quigg, 1986). The improvement of the patent sys-
tem strongly motivated technological inventions, with a surge in the number of
patents. From 1850 to 1860, 25,250 patents were granted in the United States.
From 1890 to 1900, the number increased to 234,956. Moreover, the develop-
ment of the capital market, including venture capital, has strongly empowered
to IT innovation and the IT revolution in the United States. The Nasdaq
SmallCap Market has also contributed to the IT revolution by largely lowering
financing threshold of technology startups since its establishment in 1992. The
scale of venture capital increased from $1.931 billion in 1995 to 80.657 billion
in 2000 (Table 2.2).
71 new cities per year. More importantly, the momentum has become stronger.
From 1900 to 1940, the number of cities rose from 1,737 to 3,464, up by 43 per
year. From 1940 to 1970, the number almost doubled from 3,464 to 7,129, on
average adding 122 cities per year.
As technological revolutions expand urban space, development of metropo-
lis becomes a theme of urbanization. Cities evolve from single-center layout to
a poly-center pattern, and the scope of urbanization extends from city proper
to a much larger metropolitan area. In the United States, for example, metro-
politan urbanization began in 1910, when the number of metropolitan areas
was less than 50, whose population accounted for only 28.4% of the national
total and 60% of the total urban population. By 1960, when turbocharged
urbanization was completed, there were 212 metropolitan areas, with high con-
centration of residence and employment. They were home to more than 60% of
the U.S. population, or more than 90% of the urban population. Similarly,
from 1950 to 1970, there was a trend of relocating from urban centers to
peripheral areas in Japan. Three major metropolitan areas were around Tokyo,
Osaka, and Nagoya. Population of these areas grew by 20.019 million, raising
their share in the national population to 46.1%, up by nearly 10 percentage
points. Population of the Greater Tokyo Area alone grew by 11.618 million,
equivalent to 53.1% of the incremental population in Japan over the same period.
Dominant factors behind the rise and fall of cities are not the same at different
stages of development. In pre-industrial society, natural resources and location
played an important role. Access to main waterways and abundant natural
resources became the key. In the industrial society, natural conditions became
less relevant. Instead, technologies, especially flagship technologies, started to
play a more important role.
Technological revolutions affect the rise and fall of cities in the follow-
ing ways.
First, technological revolutions change the transportation and competitive
advantages, causing the rise and fall of cities. New transportation, energy and
communication technology trigger time–space compression, which reduces the
cost and time of transportation, communication and coordination, so that
enterprises and industries become less dependent on the natural environment.
As they are relocated, new cities are founded far away from areas rich in natu-
ral resources. Existing resource cities start to decline. For example, Manchester,
among similar cities, rose as a center of the first industrial revolution with its
abundant coal and iron ore reserve and convenient transportation. But with
the advent of the second industrial revolution and new industries, Manchester,
like other traditional industrial centers, declined. In addition, cities along the
main transportation routes before the new technological revolution faded away
due to the diversion of main transportation routes or the rise of new transpor-
tation modes, which contributed to the rise of new transportation hubs.
Impact of technological revolutions on urbanization 45
Second, new cities rise and old cities decline when technological revolutions
engender new factors, products, industries and markets. In Germany, the Ruhr
emerged and thrived by virtue of abundant coal reserve and convenient trans-
portation. After the 1970s, however, traditional industries such as coal and
steel rapidly declined due to the impact of new technologies and new energy.
The region was also plagued by a single production structure, environmental
degradation and other problems. As a result, it lost competitiveness and status
in the German economy. In the United States, the initial rise of cities such as
Chicago was attributable to the proximity to the Great Lakes and flourishing
trade. The manufacturing boom helped transform them from legacy trade
hubs to new industrial centers in the Midwest. However, as industrialization
approached its intermediate and advanced stages, traditional industries tailed
off, resulting in a 40-year downturn after a centennial boom. Meanwhile, since
the 1990s, emerging cities such as those in the Silicon Valley have benefited
from the Internet technology and the Internet industry to prevail during the
third technological revolution.
industries, achieving significant results by the late 1980s. Some of its large
and competitive traditional industries were retained, while a number of
high-tech enterprises were set up for research, development and coding of
software, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and biomedicine, mainly
benefiting from the technological leadership of the University of Pitts-
burgh and Carnegie Mellon University. It has since adopted a diversified
industrial structure with high-tech industries as the mainstay, supple-
mented by metallurgy, biopharmaceuticals, chemicals, computers, tele-
communications, and finance.
The transformation was successfully completed with remarkable
achievements. Since the 1990s, Pittsburgh has endeavored to be a world-
class city with the construction of the 4th largest international airport in
the United States and a large number of restaurants, cultural and sports
facilities. By improving infrastructure and the investment environment, it
becomes a preferred destination for foreign investment. After half a cen-
tury of transformation, Pittsburgh has also achieved remarkable progress
in social development, and has now become a national center for bank-
ing, healthcare and high-tech. In terms of education, Pittsburgh boasts
28 higher education institutions with more than 100,000 students. In the
21st century, Pittsburgh is transforming into a thriving industrial and
commercial portal known for biotechnology, computer software, robot
manufacturing, healthcare, finance, and education, setting a role model
for urban economic transformation in the United States.
Source: The Background Briefs by DRC IME.
Technological revolutions not only affect inter-city relations, but also the intra-
city spatial structure. Previous technological revolutions show that progress in
production methods, especially the agglomeration and mass production of
manufacturing and service industries, change the behavior and lifestyle of
urban residents in terms of housing, consumption and entertainment, with
decisive influence on how urban transport, housing, public infrastructure and
commercial layout evolve.
Take the United Kingdom, the birthplace of the first technological and
industrial revolution, as an example. Concentration of industrial production in
cities in the wake of the technological revolution reshaped the spatial structure
of cities. Before the technological revolution, most cities in England were polit-
ical, religious and economic centers, home to non-productive buildings such as
town halls, guild halls, and religious venues. Production in cities was domi-
nated by family workshops. There were no separate industrial and commercial
Impact of technological revolutions on urbanization 47
buildings, nor was there a division among industrial, commercial, and residen-
tial areas.12 After the first technological revolution, more factories were located
in the city center, and industrial buildings became an important part of the
urban landscape. As the population gathered in cities, new housing was built
up, constituting residential quarters separated from workplaces, better demar-
cating industrial, commercial, and residential areas. As the population and
industries further clustered, cities become crowded and chaotic, and the envi-
ronment deteriorated. As a result, the middle and upper classes moved to the
suburbs, sparing room for urban construction. The chaotic city centers became
industrial and commercial areas packed with lower-class residents, whereas the
middle and upper classes chose to live far from the cities. This process was
greatly facilitated by the improvement in transportation technology and sys-
tem. Before the 19th century, only the richest few could afford living outside
cities given the high cost of private cars. However, advance in transportation,
especially public transit, significantly brought down the cost of commuting,
making it possible for more better-off residents to move to the suburbs.
History in the United States shows that technological revolutions also influ-
ence how the intra-city spatial structure evolves from crowded downtown to
suburbanization, and to downtown revamp. At the early stage of development,
improved public transportation accelerated the growth of cities and changed
their central layout. Pedestrian cities became work zones, dotted with offices,
stores and warehouses. Tall buildings filled with offices and stores were built
along main streets, and department stores appeared.13 In the process, the con-
vergence of tram lines to urban centers made urban department stores more
important, promoting the growth of surrounding areas (Gordon, 2018).14 As
technological revolution and industrialization progressed, population and fac-
tories further clustered in urban centers, and the quality of life declined,
prompting migration to the suburbs. Cable cars had accelerated the outward
expansion of cities. But the development of trams and intercity transportation
catalyzed suburbanization. In the 20th century, suburbanization was further
fueled by the penetration of elevated railways, subways and trams. After World
War II, automobiles and highways stimulated “mass suburbanization” in the
United States. Manufacturing industries moved to the edge of urban centers
and suburbs, forming sub-industrial centers or continuous industrial zones
along railroad routes. It also gave rise to suburban industrial towns. Meanwhile,
public transportation vitalized the urban–rural continuum. Businesses in
urban centers also moved to the suburbs. The mid-1950s recorded a construc-
tion fever of shopping centers and large markets at highway intersections and
suburban neighborhood centers. Such suburban commercial areas accommo-
dated large department stores, community banks, movie theaters, restaurants,
gyms, and other recreational facilities. From 1954 to 1977, 15,000 suburban
commercial areas mushroomed in the United States.15 As middle-class resi-
dents moved outward, the remaining customers for urban shopping centers
were those who could not afford cars and had to rely on public transportation.
Some urban shopping centers had to close down. Suburbanization led to the
48 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
decline of urban centers and the weakening or void of traditional urban func-
tions. Outside the metropolitan areas, satellite cities and small peripheral towns
became the main residential and commercial centers, forming a post-suburban
spatial structure characterized by a grid-like structure.16
In the post-war Europe, popularity of railroads and automobiles offered
strong impetus to the construction of satellite cities, the poly-center structure,
and the formation of an urban pattern with centralized functions and decen-
tralized settlement. To accommodate urban expansion and soaring car parc,
radial roads and ring roads were built in most large cities. Population and land
uses were concentrated along public transport lines and stations. In the devel-
opment axis of Hamburg, Germany in 1969, for example, urban construction
was carried out along the axes, so that the open natural space was reserved
close to the city center. Each axis was linked by highways or trunk roads, the
centers of the districts along the axes were linked by fast electric trains, and the
plots among axes was used for agricultural production. By using the transpor-
tation axes as the framework to relocate the functions of the city center and
build satellite cities and new towns, the city center was reshaped, significantly
improving the intra-city environment city and revitalizing the city center.
The development of heavy industries such as steel, oil, and car making, boosted
a number of industrial cities, a process coupled with massive inflow of rural
population. In addition, construction fever of railroads, rapid development of
urban transportation and growing car parc in the United States marked the
dawn of a new era for transportation, contributing to greater efficiency of
transportation, sprawling cities and tighter urban–rural connection.
Led by computer and information technology, the third industrial revolu-
tion has reinforced urbanization and urban–rural integration in various coun-
tries. For one thing, the application and penetration of information technology
in agriculture and rural areas, i.e., agricultural and rural informatization, have
helped accelerate their modernization, integrated urban and rural informa-
tion infrastructure, and facilitated urban-rural industrial and social fusion.
For example, the U.S. Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS)
showed that in 1999 the proportion of corn production area using yield mon-
itors, yield maps, geographic soil maps, remote sensing maps, and GPS navi-
gation reached 36.5%, 13.7%, 25%, 12.7%, and 6.9%, respectively. Technical
progress has made rural industries increasingly informatized and integrated
with their urban counterparts. ICT has also boosted education, medical care
and other public services in the rural areas in a more coordinated manner
with urban service provision. For example, the United Kingdom used the
Internet for remote education and began building the National Grid for
Learning (NGFL) in 1998, aiming to improve teaching and school manage-
ment with ICT. Through this program, every rural school has gained online
access to updated educational content from a network of learning centers,
enabling rural children to receive the same educational content as their urban
peers (Figure 2.2).
2.4 Summary
From a long-term perspective, each of the previous technological revolutions
can be divided into three periods—the installation phase, the deployment
phase, and the explosion phase. During the installation phase, new leading
technology is not mature enough, with limited application in a few areas,
underdeveloped supportive technologies and infrastructure, and high uncer-
tainty about its technical and commercial value. In the deployment period, the
leading technology constantly improves. It is applied to a wider scope and in
more fields, showing the potential to become a general technology. Its technical
and commercial values are recognized by the public. Multiple new technolo-
gies “coexist and integrate pending a critical mass”. During the explosion
phase, the leading technology becomes a general technology, triggering explo-
sive growth in industrial application. History of technological revolutions
shows that they are all based on ground-breaking scientific discoveries, and
driven by increased market demand. Breakthroughs in general technologies
are key to technological revolutions, while institutional innovations offer solid
52 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
Figure 2.2 Impact of the Third Technological Revolution on Urban–Rural Relations.
Source: DRC IME.
Impact of technological revolutions on urbanization 53
Notes
1 Carlota Perez divides a technological revolution into two phases, the installation
phase, and the deployment phase, from the perspective of the relationship between
technological revolutions and financial capital. She further divides the two phases
into five stages: the irruption, the frenzy, the point of inflection, the synergy and the
maturity phase. We borrow Carlota Perez’s concept of the installation and installa-
tion phase and divide a technological revolution into three stages mainly from the
perspective of the impact of technological revolutions on industrial development.
2 Mokyr, Joel. The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress
[M] Huaxia Publishing House. 2008, p. 91.
3 Jan Fagerberg et al. The Oxford Handbook of Innovation [M]. Intellectual Property
Publishing House. 2012, p. 347.
4 Jan Fagerberg et al. The Oxford Handbook of Innovation [M]. Intellectual Property
Publishing House. 2012.
5 Jan Fagerberg et al. The Oxford Handbook of Innovation [M]. Intellectual Property
Publishing House. 2012, p. 362.
6 A technological singularity is a point at which a great advance in technological
development occurs in a very short period of time, causing a great change in society.
7 Triplett, J. E. Economic Statistics, the New Economy, and the Productivity
Slowdown [J]. Business Economics, 1999, 34(2): 13–17.
8 Carlota Perez. Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of
Bubbles and Golden Ages [M]. China Renmin University Press. 2007.
9 But there is also much literature that argues that technological revolutions are not
closely linked to scientific discovery. Please refer to the Oxford Handbook of
Innovation for more details.
10 For more details about the history of technological revolutions, please refer to:
Mokyr, Joel. The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress.
Huaxia Publishing House. 2008.
11 Technological revolutions can widen the income gap through the following ways.
First, they widen the income gap among jobs and industries by creating high-in-
come jobs. Second, low-skilled jobs will be replaced. Third, they give rise to monop-
olistic competitive markets, significantly widening the income gap between different
types of firms and employees.
12 Peter Clark and Paul Slack. English towns in transition 1500–1700. Wuhan University
Press. 1992, p. 1–3.
13 Howard P. Chudacoff, et al. The Evolution of American Urban Society. Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences Press. 2016, p. 93-95.
14 Robert J. Gordon. The Rise and Fall of American Growth. CITIC Press. 2018, p. 145.
15 Xu Heping. Suburbanization and the Evolution of Urban Functions and Spatial
Structure in the United States. Urban Development. 2001, pp. 20–21.
16 Howard P. Chudacoff, et al. The Evolution of American Urban Society. Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences Press. 2016, p. 272-275.
54 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
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3 The role of institutional policies in
urbanization and technological revolution
The initial stage of urbanization generally refers to the stage where urbaniza-
tion rate is between 10% and 30%. This stage is also the initial stage of the
urban economy. Its outstanding features are low level of urbanization,
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-4
56 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
Land is a basic material for production and living. With the start of industrial-
ization, cities gradually shifted from traditional commercial hubs to industrial
centers with increasing diversity. More land was needed to support the changes
in urban industries and functions, as well as the expansion of urban area.
The role of institutional policies in urbanization and technological 57
During the first industrial revolution, the British land system effectively met the
need of large industries. The enclosure movement concentrated land plots for
maximum development and utilization, conducive to the adoption of new pro-
duction technologies and operating methods. Large landlords, in particular
landed aristocrats, rented their lot to tenant farmers, making many yeomen
jobless and turning them into fresh supply of labor for the Industrial Revolution.
As practices in other countries show, a land system conducive to land transfer
and concentration, and the rise of large-scale factory production is crucial to
the initial development of industrialization and urbanization.
In the early stages of urbanization, development of industrial and service
sectors lagged behind, and cities were small in scale. Urban development was
something new to the government. In addition, land resources were adequately
available. City governments barely gave systematic consideration to develop-
ment planning. Nor did they command the capability to proactively plan the
layout, industrial and spatial structure of cities, poorly prepared buffer the
shock of population growth, factory emission and other problems. However,
with the development of cities, issues of transportation, environment, public
security, and housing caused by the absence of planning became more and more
prominent, making it imperative for the government to step in through land use
planning. Britain, the first country of industrialization and urbanization, was
also the first country to make laws on urban planning. To solve urban ills, the
United Kingdom introduced a public health law in 1848 to set sanitary stand-
ards for buildings, a housing law in 1890 to delegate the government to disman-
tle non-compliant buildings, and “Laws on Housing and Urban Planning”, the
world’s first urban planning law in 1909 to allow governments at all levels to
formulate urban planning bills. The last piece of legislation suggested that plan-
ning officially became an administrative function of the government.
The rise of the industrial sector means that cities are no longer trade hubs, but
also centers of production. After the industrial revolution, mechanical produc-
tion replaced manual production. Production evolved from a mere physical
effort to a combination of physical strength, knowledge and professional skills.
The demand for education has therefore arisen. Due to the concentration of
population, cities provide favorable conditions for running schools and other
cultural and educational activities. In addition, industrial production and tech-
nological progress also have impact on old-fashioned academic style. New
types of universities and middle schools emerge, putting technology and sci-
ence first in their research and teaching. Therefore, new science and technology
continue to be created, constantly empowering social progress.
When urban population accounts for 30%–70% of the total population, urban-
ization reaches its intermediate stage, a stage with the fastest pace urbaniza-
tion. According to changes in the industrial structure and difference in growth
rate, the intermediate stage can be further divided into two: the acceleration
period of urbanization led by industrialization and the period led by service
industries. The acceleration period of urbanization led by industrialization
ends with industry accounting for its highest share in GDP and a peak in total
industrial employment. The transition to the next period dominated by the
service industry often leads to divergence. Some traditional industrial cities
may suffer lasting decline due to their failure to transition smoothly. Generally
speaking, in the intermediate stage systems, policies, and urban governance
mechanisms basically take shape.
In the last 30 years of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century,
the power industry, steel industry, chemical industry, and automobile industry
thrived in the United States, Germany, and other countries thanks to the sec-
ond technological revolution. Heavy chemical industry replaced textile as the
leading industry. The level of socialization, specialization and scale of produc-
tion continued to increase, and the scale of cities was rapidly expanding.
Population of many important industrial cities multiplied, even up by tens of
folds, and city clusters started to emerge. Even in the countries that came late
in urbanization, the acceleration stage led by industrialization was mainly
driven by the rapid development of heavy chemical industry. The development
of power, steel, and chemical industries not only created jobs, but, more impor-
tantly, significantly improved inter-city infrastructure, promoted the integra-
tion of domestic and foreign markets, and laid a foundation for the scale
The role of institutional policies in urbanization and technological 59
During the acceleration stage of urbanization led by the heavy chemical indus-
try, the land and planning system is continuously improved, mainly to meet the
need of the heavy chemical industry and related infrastructure. As economic
structure changes, it’s increasingly imperative to update land use planning for
the new circumstance.
Urban expansion intensified the competition for land resources, making it
necessary to have new supply of land for residence and production. Take the
United States for example. Its policy focus was gradually shifted to the transfer
of agricultural land for non-agricultural development and fair distribution of
land resources. During this period, land was capitalized and circulated mainly
through repurposing and financial innovation. A comparative study shows
that ambiguous ownership and difficulty in legally and efficiently transferring
land are detrimental to urban development. For example, in the Philippines, it
took 13–15 years and 170 administrative procedures and signatures to obtain a
piece of land legally. As a result, 60%–70% of Filipinos didn’t have legal own-
ership of their land. This was a barrier for the mortgage market and hindered
the development of the local financial system. Even large companies struggled
to acquire land as needed (Farrell, 2010).
With the rapid development of urbanization and industrialization, planning
gained a more prominent status in urban development. In 1932, the United
Kingdom promulgated the Urban and Rural Planning Act, which superseded
previous legislation and became the core law of urban planning. In 1947, the
United Kingdom introduced the Urban and Rural Planning Act 1947, setting
the basis for modern urban planning. As is provided in the Act, urban planning
is a statutory obligation of the local government, and all development activities
must be approved by it. It stresses proactive planning over passive control, cod-
ifies land development as a right of the government, and authorizes the central
planning agent to coordinate development between regions.
Following the acceleration stage of urbanization, changes in the interna-
tional market and competition from foreign countries dragged the heavy chem-
ical industry in some cities into recession. Enterprises up and down the
industrial chain were forced to close down or move out. Rampant closure and
decline in turn left idle many land lots, with factories and houses abandoned,
and jobs slashed. In the wake of the decline, many cities implemented urban
renewal plans, repurposed the idle land, and tried incubate substitute indus-
tries. In practice, adjustment of land use planning is a prerequisite for indus-
trial restructuring and urban renewal.
As the leading industry in the intermediate stage, the heavy chemical industry
is typically capital-intensive, served well by a financial system led by banks. It’s
particularly true when the development trend is clear and technologies are
The role of institutional policies in urbanization and technological 61
During the acceleration stage of urbanization led by the heavy chemical indus-
try which features rapid development of industries, enhanced economic vital-
ity and intensified market competition, enterprises are continuously encouraged
to accelerate innovation. Government gears up investment in education and
innovation systems. Functions of education and innovation systems are fur-
ther improved. Universities and research institutions start to demonstrate their
positive effect on the development of their host cities.
With urban economic restructuring and changes in the leading industries,
the share of manufacturing in the economy gradually declines, and the share
of the service industry continues to rise. Changes in the leading industries
highlight the role of education and research institutions in supporting urban
transformation. After the decline of the original leading industries, new
industries need to be nurtured for urban renewal. Their need for new technol-
ogies and a skilled labor force puts forward new requirements for the develop-
ment of education and innovation systems. In the transformation of urban
economic structure from manufacturing to services, the education and scien-
tific research system and the industrial innovation system are increasingly
integrated.
62 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
When urban population accounts for more than 70% of the total population,
urbanization enters an advanced stage. At this stage, urban systems and poli-
cies basically take shape, with cities administered largely by laws and regula-
tions. Yet it becomes more challenging to adjust and reform incumbent systems
and policies. Competitiveness of cities and vitality of leading industries rely
more and more on the “acquired” advantages such as education and scientific
research, while traditional natural advantages in geographic location and
resource endowment are less relevant.
After urbanization enters a stable and mature stage, the proportion of the ser-
vice industry continues to grow, attracting a constant inflow of labor force. As
city clusters centered on metropolises provide diversified jobs, they become
magnet for migration. Policies on population management and social security
are full-fledged with continuous economic development and urbanization,
with few explicit barriers to population mobility. However, new immigrants in
cities, especially in high-cost metropolises, are exposed to growing pressure.
Adjustment of population-related systems and policies should focus on
improving public housing, medical care and other social security measures.
Sophistication of labor protection comes with concerns about over-protec-
tion. Since massive layoff is the last option during an economic downturn,
managers are reluctant to hire new staff. Such a mentality is a curse on both
corporate development and job creation. In addition, some regulations intend
to ensure that low-income employees receive decent salary, but they actually
inhibit the generation of low-skilled jobs in the service industry. For example,
the minimum wage effective in France is twice that of the United States. As a
result, American retailers employ 50% more people per unit of capital than
their French counterparts (Farrell, 2010).
As urbanization enters a stable and mature stage, the land and planning system
is well refined. Continuous expansion of some mid- and large-sized cities
makes land reserve inadequate for further development. More land is
needed to accommodate continuous influx of population and development
of industries. Urban renewal becomes an inevitable choice to make best use
of the stock of land. Urban renewal and repurposing need the consent of
owners. Their feasibility and efficiency are affected by the opinions of com-
munities (especially the local or neighboring communities) and other
organizations. Improvement of the land and planning legal system better
protects the interests of stakeholders, but it also hinders the efforts to
repurpose the land. Some countries have adopted tentative measures. For
The role of institutional policies in urbanization and technological 63
One-north City is located near the Buona Vista MRT station in the
southwest of Singapore. It covers an area of 200 hectares and is about a
20-minute drive from the CBD. As Singapore is located at 1° north lati-
tude, it is named “Weiyi”, literally latitude 1°. And it sounds similar to
“only” in Chinese.
One-north City is different from traditional planning in that it inte-
grates the function of centralized production and urban life service func-
tions, so as to fully meet the needs of work, study, lifestyle, consumption
and so on. Based on the concept of “one building as an innovation com-
munity”, it creates opportunities and space for people-to-people commu-
nication interaction. Covering a total of two square kilometers, One-north
City hosts research and development areas and supporting facilities such
as public services, education, apartments, and commerce, constituting a
multi-functional community for work and residence.
Land use of One-north City
After urbanization enters its advanced stage, the proportion of the service
industry is far higher than that of the primary and secondary industries.
Vitality and competitiveness of cities mainly depend on the development of
high-end service industries, especially knowledge-intensive ones. Since the
1990s, with changes in the economic structure of developed countries that first
entered the stable and mature stage of urbanization, their capital markets have
been replacing commercial banks as fundamental players of modern finance,
which is defined by a larger share of direct financing, a prominent role of risk
investment, robust capitalization of knowledge. In the mature stage of urban-
ization, financial assets are mainly concentrated in the capital market and the
real estate sector, the swings of which are often passed on to the economy,
amplifying market volatility. In the 1980s and 1990s, financial liberalization
greatly facilitated the international flow of capital. While optimizing the allo-
cation of resources, capital flow has also sent shockwaves to the economic
development of various countries. Their economy, financial market, capital
market and real estate sector are increasingly interlinked, making it easier for
local financial risks to be transmitted across border and escalate to regional
even global crises.
Economy of scale and deepening of the division of labor endow cities with
higher labor productivity. Development of urban industries and efficiency
gains fuel the rapid growth in the output of main products. Intra-city market
space cannot support the development of urban industries, hence an urgent
need to expand the market boundaries. Development of high-efficiency indus-
tries in cities and competitive pricing of products provide the possibility to
expand beyond the original space. In the process of urbanization, a pattern is
generally observed from initial establishment of a unified regional market to
removal of regional barriers and construction of a unified domestic market,
and later to continuous expansion of the global market with the boom of inter-
national trade.
Formation of a unified regional and domestic market further promotes spe-
cialized division of labor and trade activities. Resources continue to flow and
be reorganized at intra-city and inter-city levels, changing the scale, forms and
functions of cities accordingly. Development of multinational companies
reshapes the layout of global industrial chain, further propelling the formation
and development of the global market, paving the way to a new urban indus-
trial pattern. International metropolises are rising with global influence while
some cities are fading with the adjustment of the global industrial division of
labor. Mutual influence between globalization and urbanization is ever deep-
ening. In the process of urbanization and globalization, it’s imperative to
attach importance to the construction of a unified market and actively inte-
grate into the global market. This will provide new market space for the urban
industries to develop. Building a unified and open factors market and promot-
ing factor mobility and competition with it will help improve industrial effi-
ciency and enhance innovation. As economic development moves to the next
level, priority should be given to the rational mobility of core factors such as
labor, land, finance, and technology.
1998 2008
6
Figure 3.2 Correlation between the Share of the Service Industry in Total Added Value
and the Degree of Marketization.
Source: World Bank database, American Heritage Foundation “Economic Freedom Report 2008”.
68 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
Every major technological change stems from new advances in science. For
example, the first technological revolution and the development of natural
sciences, especially Newtonian mechanics and mathematics, laid a scientific
theoretical foundation for the invention of machines. Faraday’s electromag-
netic induction theory became the theoretical basis of the second technological
revolution. Since modern times, the emergence and development of modern
universities and extensive and solid higher education have provided a large
number of professional talent for scientific and technological progress. The
initial reform of the German education system (such as the Humboldt edu-
cation system) embraced the spirit of integrating teaching and research to
train professionals in various industries. Later America followed suit by inte-
grating general education and vocational education. Modern university
reforms have increasingly emphasized the importance of independent and
original research, and have given universities, research institutions, and
researchers greater autonomy in research directions. Government agencies
and government funds also give continuous financial support to basic
research on some innovative directions. The development of modern educa-
tion with a focus on universities has made them one of the important sources
of innovation. In the 20th century, most of cutting-edge scientific and
70 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
industrial sectors and maintain global leadership in them. The United States
may not have skilled and experienced government personnel who can help it
create an industry to ward against existing competitors, but it did set a prece-
dent in supporting basic research a long time ago. This has kept the United
States at the forefront of the development of emerging industries (Gomory
and Baumol, 2018).
Efficient economic organization is a key factor for growth. The reason for
the rise of the western world is the development of an efficient economic
organization. An efficient organization needs to be institutionalized and
requires the establishment of property ownership, constantly leading the
individual’s economic efforts to a social activity, so that the individual’s
rate of return is constantly approaching the social rate of return.
3.3.6 Inclusive market access and regulatory system that are conducive to the rise of
new industries
According to the past three technological revolutions, countries and cities vary
greatly in the pace of outcomes application and industrialization. In general, inclu-
sive market access and regulatory system are conducive to the rapid application of
technological outcomes and the development of emerging industries.
Technological revolution and the industrialization of its outcomes are man-
ifest as fundamental economic and social changes, which often have a huge
impact on the incumbent industrial system and resources allocation. If the
development of technological revolution undermines the interests of benefi-
ciaries of the incumbent system and policies, they will usually oppose or resist
technological advances. At the beginning of technological revolution, it is
common for social and institutional values to hold on to old paradigm and
resist the new one. As the British government pointed out in the “Regulation of
the Fourth Industrial Revolution” policy white paper in June 2019: “Regulation
has a huge impact on innovation, which can both stimulate new ideas and pre-
vent their implementation. It can influence investment risks and guide funds to
be used for valuable research and development. It can affect consumer confi-
dence and demand, and determine whether a company enters or exits the
market.” “Enterprises may face unnecessary obstacles when proposing new
propositions, while citizens face outdated protective measures. In this way, the
benefits of innovation to people and the economy may be lost.” On the whole,
the more rigid institutional system and the stricter access restrictions are
imposed on new industries, the more barriers are in place for technological
revolution and the commercialization of its outcomes. However, in the long
run, industrial reforms driven by technological revolution will continue to
remove institutional barriers and build up a new institutional policy system
that is consistent with the trend of technological revolution and industrial
development.
The coal industry and steel industry in the Ruhr region played an impor-
tant role in promoting the economic recovery in Germany before the
1950s. With the large-scale development and utilization of oil and natural
gas in the 1950s, the share of coal in energy consumption in Western
countries gradually dropped. At the same time, industrialization of third
world countries led to fierce competition in the international steel market,
and widespread use of new materials such as aluminum alloy and plastics
slashed the demand for steel, making the Ruhr region, which had rela-
tively high cost of steel making, lose comparative advantages. Under the
dual impact, Ruhr’s industrial structure was in big trouble.
From the 1950s to the late 1960s, the Ruhr region began to adjust its
industrial structure and implemented a “re-industrialization” strategy to
transform traditional industries, provide financial subsidies, and improve
infrastructure. The strategy was rather defensive in the early stage of
transformation, that is, to heavily subsidize merger and upgrading of coal
and steel companies, rather than to build a more diversified industrial
structure. As the policy failed to curb the decline, the Ruhr region began
to change course, gradually scaled down its dependence on the coal and
steel industries, and shifted focus to emerging industries. From 1985 to
1988, new enterprises in the region increased by 41%, far above the na-
tional average. With the development and growth of new enterprises in
information technology, biotechnology, health and pharmacy, new en-
ergy and other emerging industries, Ruhr reshuffled its industrial struc-
ture and rejuvenated the whole region.
3.5 Summary
In the process of urbanization, evolution of institutions and policies has an
important impact on the quality, mobility and reorganization of factors. At
different stages of urbanization, institutions and policies show different char-
acteristics. Transition between stages of is usually coupled with major changes
in underlying institutions and policies.
78 A historical review of technological revolutions and urbanization
Note
1 In theory and practice, Index of Economic Freedom is a good proxy of the degree
of marketization. Indicators against which economic freedom is measured are
closely relevant to the market economy. The greater the economic freedom, the
higher degree of marketization, and the more sophisticated the corresponding mar-
ket economy is. Index of Economic Freedom released by the Heritage Foundation
is one of the most authoritative matrix of economic freedom in the world. The
Index comprises 50 indicators to assess 130 countries and regions in the world.
These indicators are categorized into 10 groups, including trade policy, government
fiscal expenditure, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capi-
tal flow and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property
rights, regulation, and informal market activities (black market).
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Part II
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-5
4 Background, traits, and trends of the
new technological revolution
Since the beginning of the new century, the world has embraced a new round
of technological revolution. A cohort of new technological changes have taken
place, led by digital, intelligent and green technologies and their integration.
The technological revolution continues to evolve, demonstrating new trends.
Since the beginning of industrial revolution, the world has been haunted with
traffic congestion, environmental pollution and other challenges. To fix them,
innovative solutions are urgently needed. Since the first industrial revolution,
large-scale use of fossil fuel in economic development has caused severe pollu-
tion and global warming in spite of productivity gains. In the past 130 years,
human activities have triggered a rise in global temperature, and a series of
problems such as pollution of automobile exhaust, depletion of the ozone
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-6
84 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
Since the 2008 financial crisis, low-speed growth of the global economy has
motivated the promotion and application of new innovations. Many schol-
ars regard the financial crisis as a turning point in the long-term economic
cycle. The global economy may be in recession and readjustment between
two long-term economic cycles. History shows that at the end of each tech-
nological revolution, the global economy enters a protracted period of re-
cession pending the rise of a new round of technological revolution and
large-scale application in industrial sectors. Rapid development of emerging
industries provides new momentum for economic growth. The research
group on “Changes in the International Economic Landscape and China’s
Strategic Choices” under the DRC Centre ran a simulation, showing that
Background, traits, and trends of the new technological revolution 85
the global economic growth will remain in a downward trajectory, with a rela-
tively low growth rate for quite a while. From 2020 to 2035, average global
growth rate will be 2.6%. Growth in developed economies is likely to be weaker,
with an overall growth rate around 1.7%, lower than the average rate over the
past 50 years. Growth rate in developing countries will also decline, and their
average annual growth rate is projected to be around 4.9%.5 This global weak-
ening makes it urgent to rapidly apply and disseminate new technologies as a
source of extra growth. If history is a reference, the new round of technologi-
cal revolution may guide the world economy to a new phase of prosperity in
the coming 15–20 years, despite uncertainties about its prospect.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, new technologies have emerged
rapidly, such as big data, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, Internet
of Things, 3D printing, new materials, new energy and so on. New terms
have been proposed to describe the emerging technologies, the Fourth
Industrial Revolution by Schwab, the Third industrial Revolution by
Rifkin, Industry 4.0 in Germany, to name a few. They can be roughly di-
vided into two schools of thoughts. One believes that the current techno-
logical revolution typified by digital technology is part of the third
technological revolution and a continuation of the information age. The
other argues that digital technology makes the ongoing revolution com-
pletely different from the previous one, and it deserves to be singled out
as the fourth technological and the industrial revolution. For example,
Germany divides the information age into an automation stage based on
information technology and an intelligent stage based on cyber-physical
systems, hence the evolution from Industry 1.0 to Industry 4.0. The two
schools of thoughts are only different in the angle of observation.
4.2.1 Digitalization
4.2.2 Intelligence
From the perspective of production, the biggest difference between the new
round of technological revolution and its predecessors lies in the high level of
intelligence embedded in its products and services. Manufacturing, commerce
and agriculture are all moving on from automation to intelligence as the basis
of operation. Intelligence is empowering various sectors, from design and
R&D, assembly and integration, logistics and distribution, to financial service.
Digital technology is making production tools more intelligent at a faster pace.
Intelligent equipment such as 3D printers, CNC machine tools, and smart ro-
bots are thriving. Thanks to embedded intelligence, labor tools are more pow-
erful than just converting one form of energy to another. The “nuclear fusion”
of intelligent technologies such as 5G, Internet of Things, AI, digital twin,
cloud computing, edge computing, and time-sensitive networks, is propelling
humanity from the Internet of Everything to Intelligence of Everything, from
ubiquitous connectivity to ubiquitous empowerment, toward the new ear of
“intelligence+”6.
Especially from the perspective of industrial revolution, with breakthroughs
and development of chip technology, development and improvement of Inter-
net facilities, availability of affordable sensors in large quantities, and improve-
ment of advanced manufacturing technology, the manufacturing industry is
Background, traits, and trends of the new technological revolution 87
4.2.3 Greenization
4.2.4 Integrated development
innovation. For example, Tesla deeply integrates core technologies of new en-
ergy and smart vehicle to solve fundamental challenges of mobility and energy,
involving deep learning, AI chips, big data, supercomputing, battery, new en-
ergy, new materials and many other fields. By doing so, it has gone above tra-
ditional car maker and converted to a business and technology combo similar
to “Toyota + NVIDIA + Waymo + CATL”8.
Constellation Number Orbit Height Frequency Total Mass of Data Latency/ Inter Lead Latest
of (km) Range Capacity Single Transmission ms Satellite Investor Development
Satellites (Tbit· s−1) Satellite/ Rate Link
kg
OneWeb 720 1,200 Ku (user) 5–10 125 50 (user) 20–30 No SoftBank Frequency range
Ka (test and granted by
control) USA FCC
Starlink 4,425 1,110–1,325 Ku 8–10 386 1,000 25–30 Yes SpaceX Frequency range
Ka application
approved by
FCC
Telesat 1,171 1,000 (polar) Ka 1–10 N/A 1,000 30–50 Yes Telesat Frequency range
1,248 application
(inclination) approved by
FCC
Source: Review of the Overseas Development of Commercial Low-orbit Satellite Communication Constellations.
89
90 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
16
14
12
Trillion Yuan
10
8
6
4
2
0
2018
180
160
140
120
Trillion Yuan
100
80
60
40
20
0
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Growing signs show an innovation boom in the energy sector, with a long pipe-
line of innovative technologies. New energy technologies are deeply integrated
with information technology, new materials, and advanced manufacturing.
Low-carbon energies such as solar and wind, and new energy vehicles continue
to mature, with expected breakthroughs in large-scale energy storage, hydrogen
fuel cell, and distributed energy. New models of energy utilization, new busi-
ness formats, and new products abound. Intelligence-empowered energy pro-
duction and consumption are emerging. Distributed energy supply starts scale
application in industrial parks, urban communities, public buildings and pri-
vate housing.
Distributed energy systems are deployed at the user side in small-scale and
small-capacity modules, providing two-way power and heating/cooling transmis-
sion. Distributed generation is with high efficiency, low online loss, flexibility in
operation, and better economic performance. Moreover, it can be coordinated by
utility grid to facilitate scale development of renewables. Distributed energy has
become a priority of the energy industry.
According to some statistics, 25%–30% of the world’s newly installed ca-
pacity in recent years has been distributed power. Developed economies in
North America, Europe, and other regions have issued supportive policies.
Background, traits, and trends of the new technological revolution 93
Figure 4.2 Installed power generation capacity worldwide by source under IEA Policy
Scenario.
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2018.
Policies in European Union, the United States, and Japan have prioritized
rooftop PV systems for households and businesses in places with abundant
sunlight and high electricity price. This has greatly promoted the develop-
ment of rooftop PV. Although investment in the new system is relatively high,
it is also popular in developing countries, in particular in China and India,
given their growing appetite for power and abundant resources. As focus of
the distributed energy industry, distributed PV will enjoy explosive growth.
IEA predicts that the scale of rooftop PV will increase from less than 90 mil-
lion kilowatts in 2013 to 500 million kilowatts in 2040, up by nearly five times.
It is foreseen that distributed energy will reshape the production and con-
sumption pattern, sowing the seed for a new energy supply system. This will
save monetary and time cost for the construction of transmission and distri-
bution networks, and enable energy users to become producers and suppliers,
fundamentally changing how energy is produced and supplied, and how peo-
ple produce and live.
Since the beginning of the new century, an energy technology revolution has
gained traction. Deep integration of energy and information technologies pro-
motes the development of an intelligent energy system centered on smart grid.
The U.S. Department of Energy proposed to establish a “21st Century Energy
Network”, launched a smart energy building plan, and accelerated the con-
struction of a smart energy system. In order to improve reliability and quality
of power supply and promote renewables and other clean energy, EU proposed
to build a European technology platform for the “Future Grid” for the
94 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
construction of smart grid in 2004, and to implement the “Super Smart Grid”
plan in 2005. In 2013, the European Parliament announced to implement the
second “Smart Energy-Europe” plan, mainly to establish a high-efficiency and
self-regulated energy system based on information and communication tech-
nology. Smart grid was also a priority under Japan’s “New Generation Energy
and Social System Demonstration Program” in 2010, at par with “Smart City
Community”. Major developed economies have made remarkable progress in
technology development, standard setting and project demonstration of smart
metering, smart grid platform, grid monitoring and management, grid connec-
tion of renewables, large-scale storage, smart energy building, and PHV/
EV. With a “global grid” empowered by information technology, the develop-
ment of intelligent energy system will gather pace.
vehicles can be constantly recharged while on the go. Wireless charging and
solar power pavement may be potential solutions. Different from ordinary
electric vehicles, vehicles compatible with electrified roads can be called e-power
vehicles. The crucial distinction between e-power vehicles and early trolley-
buses is that e-power vehicles must carry some fuel or power batteries for
non-charging conditions. E-power vehicles must be “dual-energy” models. An-
other use of e-power vehicles is to replace fossil fuel in land freight transporta-
tion and to turn transportation sector greener.
4.3.3.4 Shared mobility
4.4 Summary
Environmental pollution and other pressing challenges have to be fixed with
technological solutions. New technologies are moving from installation to de-
ployment. Slowdown of the world economy calls out for new growth engine.
Hence, a new round of technological revolution is propagating on a global scale.
Different from its precedents, the new round of technological revolution is typ-
ified by digitalization, intelligence, green transformation, and trans-disciplinary
integration. It will gear up the high-speed, high-efficiency, and intelligent devel-
opment of information technology. Energy technology will continue to embrace
a low-carbon, distributed and intelligent pattern. Transportation technology
will be defined by ultra-high-speed, intelligence, green transformation and
shared mobility through collective breakthroughs. In the next 20–30 years, the
technological revolution will give rise to new leading technologies and general
Background, traits, and trends of the new technological revolution 101
technologies. Their explosive development will reshape the world economy and
society like never before, lifting quality of life to historic new high.
Notes
1 There are two perspectives to the scope of a technological revolution. One is the
impact on technological system, and the other is the impact on industrial revolu-
tion. A technology revolution is mainly triggered by basic and original technolo-
gies, which are at the core of technological changes and have the most far-reaching
and extensive impact on economic and social development. Measured by the im-
pact of technology, energy, information, and transportation technologies are the
most basic and critical elements in the technology system. Changes in these three
groups will have significant and extensive impact on other technologies, especially
industrial, economic and social development. Meanwhile, previous technological
revolutions have also been measured by their impact on industrial revolution, or
how they led to large-scale commercial application.
2 In the new round of technological revolution, in addition to energy, information
and transportation technologies, major breakthroughs have been achieved in bio-
medical and new materials. However, their economic and social implication is mar-
ginally less significant.
3 Beijing Transportation Development Research Institute. 2020 Beijing Transporta-
tion Development Annual Report, page 63. http://www.bjtrc.org.cn/List/index/
cid/7.html
4 The State Council Development Research Center “Changes in the International
Economic Landscape and China’s Strategic Choices” project: Ten major changes in
the international economic landscape in the next 15 years, China Development Ob-
servation, Issue 1, 2019, p. 38.
5 The State Council Development Research Center “Changes in the International
Economic Landscape and China’s Strategic Choices” research group: Ten major
changes in the international economic landscape in the next 15 years, China Devel-
opment Observation, Issue 1, 2019, p. 39.
6 An Xiaopeng. Reconstruction: The Logic of Digital Transformation, Electronic
Industry Press, 2019, p. 1.
7 An Xiaopeng. Reconstruction: The Logic of Digital Transformation, Electronic
Industry Press, 2019, p. 1.
8 Ren Zeping and Lian Yixi: Tesla’s Secret: The Rise of a Technology Complex,
Zeping Macro, December 20, 2020.
9 “A Planetary Network Comprising 12,000 Satellites – How Will Musk’s Starlink
Project Change the World?” https://www.stmcu.org.cn/article/id-329851
10 Bai Chunli: Main Development Trends and Areas for Key Breakthroughs of Tech-
nological Innovation, Caijing.com.cn, 2019. http://m.caijing.com.cn/article/172609?
target=blank
11 Bai Chunli: Main Development Trends and Areas for Key Breakthroughs of Tech-
nological Innovation, Caijing.com.cn, 2019. http://m.caijing.com.cn/article/172609?
target=blank
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102 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-7
104 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
Facebook Neural network Deep Learning Modules Chatbot Bot, AI Housekeeper Jarvis, Facial Recognition Technology
training hardware Torchenet, FBLearner Smart Picture Management DeepFace, DeepMask,
system Big Sur Flow Application Moment SharpMask, MultiPathNet
Apple Apple Neural Engine Visualized Map MapsenseGPS Siri, IOS Photo Management,
Natural Language Processing
VocalIQ
Amazon Annapurna ASIC AWS Distributed Machine
Smart Speaker Echo, Alexa Voice Amazon Lex, Amazon Polly,
Learning Platform Assistant, Smart Supermarket Amazon Rekognition
Amazon go, PrimrAir Drone
Google Customized TPU, TensorFlow System, Cloud Google Self-driving Cars, Google Voice Intelligence API, Google
Cloud TPU, Machine Learning Home Cloud, Deepmind
Quantum Computer Engine
Microsoft FPGA Chips Distributed Machine Skype Real-time Translation, Xiaoice Microsoft Cognitive Services
Learning Package Chatbot, Cortana Virtual Assistant,
DMTK, Bot Framework Tay, Smart Camera A-eye, Hololens
Holographic Glasses
IBM Human Brain SystemML Watson, Bluemis, ROSS
Simulation Chip
SyNAPSE
Tencent Tencent Cloud Platform, WechatAI, Dreamwrit, Tencent Smart Search Engine “Yunsou”
Angel, NCNN Miying and Chinese Semantic Platform
“Wenzhi”, Youtu AI Open
Platform
Baidu DuerOS Chip Paddle-Paddle Baidu Image Recognition, Baidu Apollo, DuerOS
Unmanned Vehicles, Duer
Alibaba Pingtouge Chip PAI2.0 Smart Speaker Tmall Genie X1, ET City Brain
Intelligent Assistant “Alime”
Source: Evergrande Institute.
106 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Bandwidth (TBPS)
2023 will account for 50% of the total global connections. Compared
with the connection of individuals, the data volume and uses of IP ad-
dress of the M2M connection are less, but the economic value is higher.
Moreover, Barnett and Park’s research suggests that the global Internet
structure is mainly controlled by a few core countries connected by the
same language, culture and history, such as the United States, UK, China
and Germany. However, global information production and consump-
tion is still imbalanced. For example, US plays a vital role in the global
information production, producing over 50% of online contents out-
side Europe.
Table 5.2 Comparison of Industry 4.0 in Germany and the US Industrial Internet
end of 2019, there were 74 platform-based digital companies valued over $10
billion around the world. Their total valuation reached US$8.98 trillion, up by
41.8% over the previous year. In 2019, the number of platforms valued from $1
billion to $10 billion increased by 108 compared with 2015, an increase of
nearly two folds in number and 151.9% in market value.7 For example, Alibaba
Taobao has a payroll for 8,000 people. Yet it hosts hundreds of thousands of
Impact of the new technological revolution on economic development 109
service providers and tens of millions of online merchants, creates jobs for 3
million logistics workers, and reaches out to nearly 500 million consumers. In
the next 20 years, Alibaba plus small and micro enterprises on its platform may
become the “fifth largest economy” in the world, contributing to the earnings
and development of 10 million small enterprises, serving 2 billion consumers
and creating 100 million jobs globally.
Third, the technological revolution facilitates network-based organization
of production. It enables Internet-based, coordinated and decentralized re-
source allocation, converting mass production to mass customization, and
turning production to a decentralized, flat and virtual exercise. Platform-based
organizations are based on digital technology, driven by data, supported by
platforms, and composed of highly coordinated economic units. Platforms,
consumers and service providers of platform-based economies collaborate in
meshes. For example, Apple has attracted nearly 400,000 developers to its eco-
system, developed millions of apps with hundreds of billions of downloads
since the launch of App Store in 2008. In the field of industrial equipment,
multinational companies represented by GE are accelerating the deployment
of machine interconnectivity strategy, harvesting massive machine operation
data through terminal information collection equipment and integrated data
platforms. This will engender a new network-based system for machine opera-
tion and maintenance.8 Besides, the ubiquitous network shaped by digital
technology makes processes such as R&D, design, production and manufac-
turing more open, cooperative, international and professional. Enterprises can
give unified instructions and standards to upstream and downstream enter-
prises around the world in all processes of the product life cycle through the
network, establishing a unified cooperation platform for digital design, virtual
assembly and testing. The traditionally closed, independent and linear mode
of R&D, production and manufacturing is increasingly open, coordinated and
network-based.9
400000.00 80.00
%
150000.00 30.00
100000.00 20.00
50000.00 10.00
0.00 0.00
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Railway passenger volume
High-speed rail passenger volume
Proporon of high-speed rail passenger volume in railway passenger volume
Figure 5.2 Share of China’s High-speed Rail Passenger Trips in Total Railway Passen-
ger Trips (2008–2021).
Source: Wind.
4000000
3500000
3000000
2500000
Megawatt
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
on employment and the labor market, hitting especially hard with the rise of
labor-saving and skill-based new technologies. The short-term disruption is
manifest in “technological unemployment”. The technological revolution
changes working organization and arrangement, giving rise to more plat-
form-based companies. More tasks are performed by individual contractors,
adding to employment flexibility while increasing the risk of jobs and income.12
Frey and Osborne (2017) estimated that 47% of jobs in the United States would
be under high risk of being automated in the next 10 or 20 years. The World
Bank (2016) found that a higher proportion of jobs in Europe, especially in
developing countries, would be more vulnerable to automation in the next 10
years. According to McKinsey Global Institute (2017), China has an automat-
able employment potential of 51%, greater than any other country.13
people don’t have access to the high-speed Internet and can’t fully engage in the
digital economy. Globally, out of the poorest 40% of households, 21% have no
mobile phones and 71% have no access to the Internet. Women are less likely
to use or own digital devices than men. There is a huge gap of digital device
penetration between the young population (20%) and those over 45 (8%).14 The
digital divide creates huge differences in digital dividends received by different
countries, regions, and communities, and between urban and rural areas, fur-
ther widening income gap. According to IMF, every percentage point of the
proportion of Internet users in the population would result in 0.1-0.4 percent-
age points of per capita income growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Conventional
tasks are replaced due to technological changes, and more jobs are shifting
from medium to either end of the pay spectrum. This reduces the share of la-
bor income in national income, and leads to a greater income gap among work-
ers with different skills. For example, a research of McKinsey Global Institute
(MGI) shows that by 2030, salary of jobs benefiting from AI will increase by
about 13% in relation to the total salary, and the share of jobs negatively af-
fected by the same margin.
5.6 Summary
Wide application and large-scale commercialization of new technology is
changing “key factors of production”, with data gaining importance. Data
promote the digital economy and speed up the rise of emerging industries such
as e-commerce and the industrial Internet. Traditional industrial chains are
converging, breaking up and disappearing at a faster pace, giving way to more
advanced digital industrial and supply chains. From the global perspective, the
new round of technological revolution reshapes regional comparative advan-
tages, driving rapid development of digital trade and trade in service and pro-
moting the localization and regional redistribution of global industrial chain
and world trade. Meanwhile, the new round of technological revolution pro-
motes intelligent, platform-style and Internet-based production mode, prompt-
ing profound changes in production and consumer demand. While changing
production mode, the technological revolution also has impact on consump-
tion mode, employment and income distribution. It expedites the transforma-
tion to a digital, shared and green urban lifestyle. Employment substitution is
coexisting with job creation. Digital divide widens the opportunity gap and
income gap among communities.
Notes
1 IDC: Data Age 2025, The Digitization of the World from Edge to Core. https://
www.seagate.com/files/www-content/our-story/trends/files/idc-seagate-dataage-
chine-whitepaper.pdf
2 UNCTAD Estimates of Global E-commerce 2018 Report.
3 CAICT: A New Vision of the Global Digital Economy (2020), https://dsj.guizhou.
gov.cn/xwzx/gnyw/202010/P020201027531667675294.pdf
114 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
4 Mckinsey Global Institute: The Future of Asia: Asian flows and networks are defin-
ing the next phase of globalization, September, 2019, https://www.mckinsey.com.cn
5 Mode of production of smart manufacturing can be defined by 6C: Connection,
Cloud, Cyber, Content, Community, Customization.
6 McKinsey: Paths to Industry 4.0 in China, https://www.mckinsey.com.cn/
7 CAICT: Observation of Platform Economy and Competition Policies 2020
8 Aliresearch: Digital Economy 2.0, 2017. https://i.aliresearch.com/file/20170109/2017
0109174300.pdf
9 Changes in the International Economic Landscape and China’s Strategic Choices,
Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council: Impacts of Global
Technological Changes on the International Economic Landscape, China Develop-
ment Observation, No. 6 (2019): 15–16.
10 World Bank’s World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends, Tsinghua Uni-
versity Publishing House, 2017.
11 China Environmental Protection Foundation and Green Mobility Special Founda-
tion: “Annual Report on the Development of Shared Mobility in China (2019)”,
Social Sciences Academic Press, 2019.
12 UN: The Impact of the Technological Revolution on Labor Markets and Income
Distribution, 2017. https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/
sites/45/publication/2017_Sept_Frontier_IssuesKeyMessages.pdf
13 Mckinsey Global Institute: A New Era of coexistence for Human and Machines:
Automation, Employment and Productivity. January, 2017, https://www.mckinsey.
com.cn//
14 World Bank: World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends, Tsinghua Pub-
lishing house, 2017.
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as a Service, 2015.
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ble are jobs to computerisation?” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114,
254–280, 2017, ISSN 0040-1625, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.08.019
Huang, Q., He, J., “Major trends in China’s industrialization process and industrial
change in the next 30 years”, Study & Exploration, (7), 2019.
McKinsey & Company, “An Integrated Perspective on the Future of Mobility”, 2016.
Mckinsey Global Institute, “A new era of coexistence for human and machines: Auto-
mation, employment and productivity”, January, 2017.
Mokyr, J., Vickers, C., Ziebarth, N. L., “The history of technological anxiety and the
future of economic growth: is this time different?” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
29(3), 31–50, 2015.
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Markets, Too?” Policy Research Working Paper 7922, 2016.
Xie, F., “The direction of global governance adjustment in the context of accelerated ex-
pansion of the new industrial revolution”, Economic Research Journal, 36(5), 2, 2019.
6 Global urbanization trends under
the new technological revolution
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-8
116 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
100
90
80
70
Urbanization Rate (%)
60
50
40
30
20
10
leaving limited space for future urbanization (Table 6.1). Technological factor,
one of the many that affect urbanization, will also have limited impact on the
future urbanization in developed economies.
The new round of technological revolution will speed up urbanization in
developing economies whose urbanization level is still rather low, making them
the main engine for global urbanization. Starting with a low urbanization level
compared to advanced economics, most Asian and African countries have
maintained rapid growth in urbanization in recent years. In 2018, urbanization
rate in Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia was 49.9%, 35.8% and 48.9%
2010 0.21 0.22 0.33 0.32 1.19 0.12 0.35 0.17 0.14
2011 0.21 0.20 0.33 0.32 0.28 −0.02 0.35 0.16 0.14
2012 0.22 0.05 0.33 0.33 0.09 −0.09 0.35 0.14 0.12
2013 0.22 0.05 0.32 0.33 0.09 −0.09 0.34 0.14 0.12
2014 0.23 0.05 0.32 0.33 0.09 −0.09 0.33 0.14 0.12
2015 0.23 0.05 0.32 0.33 0.08 −0.09 0.33 0.14 0.12
2016 0.23 0.05 0.31 0.33 0.08 −0.09 0.32 0.14 0.12
2017 0.24 0.06 0.31 0.33 0.09 −0.07 0.31 0.13 0.12
2018 0.24 0.08 0.31 0.33 0.09 −0.05 0.30 0.13 0.13
Source: UN World Urbanization Prospects 2018.
Global urbanization trends under the new technological revolution 117
100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
Urbanization rate %
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
2035
2040
2045
2050
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
World Africa
Asia North America
Europe Latin America and Caribbean
Oceania
respectively. Urbanization rate in Africa reached 42.5% in the same year (Figure
6.2), among which sub-Saharan Africa posted 40% of urbanization rate, with an
annual growth over 1.2% in recent years. Going forward, Asia and Africa, espe-
cially East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia will lead global urbanization.
According to the United Nations Urbanization Prospects, there will be another
2.5 billion people living in urban areas by 2050, nearly 90% of whom will be in
Asia and Africa, mainly concentrated in countries like China, India, Nigeria,
Pakistan and Congo that will account for about 50% of growth in global
urbanization.
The technological revolution spurs new momentum and Asia is leading the
global urbanization. Asia is a powerhouse of the global growth. With the shift
of export-intensive manufacturing from China to other Asian economies, the
acceleration of trade transformation, and growth of intra-regional trade, the
gravity center of the world economy is moving towards Asia. In particular, Asia
is shaping the future of global digital innovation, providing new impetus for
industrialization and urbanization. Therefore, urbanization rate of Asia will be
118 A new round of technological revolution and global urbanization
90
80
70
60
Urbanization rate %
50
40
30
20
10
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
80
70
60
Urbanization rate %
50
40
30
20
10
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Democratic Republic of the Congo Nigeria Global average
80
70
60
50
40
%
30
20
10
0
Real GDP growth Employment growth Population growth
proportion exceeds 80% in the United States, UK, Germany, Japan and other
countries. Since 2000, population in the peripheral communities of metropoli-
tan areas has increased much faster than that in the core metropolitan areas in
most countries. Larger metropolitan areas tend to have faster population
growth in their peripheral communities. Taking OECD countries for example.
Population growth in the peripheral communities was 60% faster than that of
core areas from 2000 to 2015, and population growth in commuting communi-
ties in South Korea, the United States, Chile and other countries was more
than twice that of the core areas.4
The new round of technological revolution improves urban infrastructure,
public services and city governance. Metropolitan areas have grown larger as
integrated labor markets, thanks to reduced commuting time, increased com-
muting efficiency, and consequentially longer commuting distance and range.
As population carrying capacity increases, the equilibrium point between
urban agglomeration effect and cost of congestion, and their critical scale con-
tinue to move up. Metropolitan areas are home to larger population with
higher density, showcasing greater agglomeration effects than smaller cities.
Meanwhile, metropolitan areas, as the main venue for employment, innovation
and economic growth, especially where innovation elements and activities are
highly concentrated (Figure 6.6), are adding new dimensions to cities. Driven
by innovation, there will be more service-oriented metropolitan areas with
growing population. In short, acceleration of global urbanization, catalyzed
by the new round of technological revolution, will significantly improve the
Global urbanization trends under the new technological revolution 121
60
50
40
30
%
20
10
0
Nominal GDP Employment Population
Figure 6.6 Proportion of Nominal GDP, Employment and Population of the 300 Met-
ropolitan Areas (2016).
Source: Brookings analysis of Oxford Economics data.
100.00
90.00
80.00
70.00
60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
As city scale diverges, the technological revolution will deepen the division
of functions along the inter-city value chain more rapidly. Expansion of high-
speed rail and other mobility modes makes inter-city transportation more con-
venient, affordable and time-efficient. Digital technology leads to convenient
and low-cost communication. E-commerce expands the scope of regional
trade and lowers trading cost. Shorter distance and less barriers bring about
stronger connectivity and higher integration. Different population groups and
elements of value chain may be relocated in central and peripheral cities. Cities
of different sizes engage in collaborative agglomeration, with R&D, design,
management and marketing clustered in central cities and manufacturing relo-
cated to peripheral smaller cities. The division of labor along the value chain is
featured with the agglomeration of producer service sectors in central cities,
and manufacturing in peripheral smaller cities.
As a result of the relocation of value chain, knowledge-intensive cities will
emerge more rapidly. Their prominent feature is that they are home to massive
high-skilled workers and leading research universities, turning themselves into
hubs for knowledge creation, innovation, application and commercialization.6
According to a research of Brookings Institution, in 19 knowledge-intensive cit-
ies, 41% of the population over the age of 15 hold a bachelor’s degree or above.
They are home to 20 of the top 100 universities in the world. Their average
Global urbanization trends under the new technological revolution 123
economic output reached $283 billion, and per capita GDP and per employee
GDP stood at $69,000 and $136,000 respectively, ranking first among seven cat-
egories of cities. From 2008 to 2012, these cities contributed to 16% of the
world’s patents, though their population was only 1% of the world total.
Accelerated division of labor along the value chain is featured with the rise
of international consumption cities.7 Center of consumption will be another
core function of international metropolises. Given their rich elements, high-
profile brands, diversified modes and favorable environment of consumption,
and especially a sophisticated market that appeals to consumers worldwide,
they will play a central role in allocating global consumption resources and
championing innovation in consumption. These metropolises will increasingly
be celebrated as world-class consumption portals. Statistics show that con-
sumer spending and GDP in the 140 major consumer cities account for 33%
and 36% of the world total respectively, though they are home to only 13% of
the world population.8
on the impact of smart city applications showed that some well-being metrics
related to security, time, health, environment, social contact, employment and
living cost can improve by 10%–30%. There are other benefits that can’t be
quantified such as freedom of mobility and relaxation in transit.
Cities will be reshaped by further expansion of the new round of technologi-
cal revolution, embracing new mode of perception, connection and response to
internal and external changes. Urban life will become more intelligent, inclusive,
green and secure. Large-scale application of 5G and intelligent driving technol-
ogies makes urban mobility more intelligent and convenient, disrupting the tra-
ditional travel mode. The traffic patterns will be systemically transformed to fea-
ture greater mobility, new working methods and working time, sustainable
mobile solutions (such as self-driving electric vehicles), improved vehicle usabil-
ity (through car-sharing, for one example) and deliberate design of the logistics
system.10 Satellite relay makes Internet connection more convenient and equita-
ble. Full availability of real-time data makes it possible to develop insight, iden-
tify changes in demand, and select more cost-effective and responsive solutions.
Some intelligent applications can not only respond to the needs of users, but also
improve operation through interaction with the public. For example, they
encourage staggered travel by public transportation, adjust driving routes, save
water and electricity, and mitigate burden on the medical system through preven-
tive care. Internet-based applications can deliver real-time and transparent infor-
mation to users to inform their decisions. These smart tools can save lives, pre-
vent crimes and reduce disease burden. They can also save time, reduce waste,
and even improve the social ties of residents, which are conducive to the efficient
operation of cities. The industrial chain of AI cities includes the basic layer, the
core technology layer, and vertical applications, which can be further divided
into product and smart application systems. Looking forward, super smart cities
will be defined by seven interconnected capabilities, namely, real-time percep-
tion, high-speed transmission, self-learning, independent decision-making, inde-
pendent collaboration, automatic optimization and independent control.11
On the other hand, continuous evolution and wide application of the new
round of technological revolution, especially wide adoption of e-government
and digital governance will ensure efficient supply of public resources and
effectiveness of public services, making public utilities including education,
medical care, social insurance and charity more convenient, inclusive and equi-
table. For example, telemedicine will be used more frequently as a common
exercise to make diagnosis and treatment more affordable and accessible. With
the support of AI assistant, it promises to delivery precision diagnosis and
treatment and address the global shortage of medical resources. Development
of online education offers more equitable access to education at all levels, con-
tributing to equality in overall public services. As the urban middle class con-
tinues to grow, they will benefit from wider coverage and equitable distribution
of high-standard medical care, education and other social service resources.
Besides, the new round of technological revolution will speed up the green
and low-carbon urban transformation. Cities today are operating on the
Global urbanization trends under the new technological revolution 125
intelligent interaction will make urban design and planning more intelligent,
rational and effective, and synchronize urban planning, construction and
administration between the real cities and their virtual version.
6.7 Summary
The new round of technological revolution has a profound impact not only on
economic development, but also on the process of global urbanization. While
promoting development, the new round of technological revolution entrenches
the urban-rural gap, especially in some populous countries in Asia and Africa.
It will drive the migration to cities, which will renew the momentum for global
urbanization with developing economies as the engine. Meanwhile, the new
round of technological revolution has improved urban infrastructure, public
services and governance of metropolitan areas whose growing carrying capac-
ity will better accommodate population agglomeration. Measured by its impact
on the urban system, the new round of technological revolution relocates dif-
ferent types of labor force and different elements of the value chain among
cities of different sizes, and accelerates division of function along the inter-city
value chain. The development of digital technology, transportation technology
and low-carbon green technology has made urban lifestyle more intelligent,
inclusive and green, profoundly changing the internal spatial structure of cit-
ies, accelerating the innovation of governance, and significantly improving the
governance capability of cities.
Notes
1 Even though the overdue system reform will offset pulling force of cities to some
extent.
2 Mckinsey Global Institute: The Future of Asia: Asian Flows and Networks are
Defining the Next Phase of Globalization, September, 2019, https://www.mckinsey.
com.cn
3 Henderson, J. Vernon and Kriticos, Sebastian, The Development of the African
System of Cities. Annual Review of Economics, 2018, Vol. 10, pp. 287–314.
4 Sun Zhiyan: China’s future urbanization strategies and policy choices from the per-
spective of technological revolution, Research Report of the Development R esearch
Center of the State Council, No.29, 2019.
5 The Zipf’s Law of urban system states that a country’s largest city is approximately
twice as large as the second-largest city, three times as large as the third-largest city,
and so on.
6 According to Brookings Institute’s research report of “Redefining Global Cities:
Seven Types of global Cities”, 123 global metropolitan economies can be grouped
into seven clusters: global giants, Asian anchors, emerging gateways, factory China,
knowledge capitals, American middleweights, and international middleweights.
7 US scholars including Edward Glaeser first initiated the concept of “Consumer
City” after investigating the consumer markets of major metropolises such as New
York and Chicago.
8 Wang Wei, Liu Tao, “Policy Options for the Construction of an International Con-
sumption Center”, Research Report of the Development Research Center (DRC)
of the State Council.
Global urbanization trends under the new technological revolution 129
9 Mckinsey Global Institute: Smart Cities: Digital Solutions for a More Livable
Future, June, 2018, https://www.mckinsey.com.cn/
10 Mckinsey Global Institute: Smart Cities: Digital Solutions for a More Livable
Future, June, 2018, https://www.mckinsey.com.cn/
11 Deloitte: Super Smart Cities-AI Leading the New Trend, https://www2.deloitte.
com/cn/zh/pages/public-sector/articles/super-smart-city-2-0.html
12 Mckinsey Global Institute: Smart Cities: Digital Solutions for a more Livable
Future, June, 2018, https://www.mckinsey.com.cn/
13 Arthur Gallion, The Urban Pattern: City Planning and Design, New York: Van
Nostrand Rainhold Company, 1983, pp. 14–16.
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Part III
The past seven decades since the founding of People’s Republic of China,
especially the past four decades since the inception of reform and opening up,
has witnessed the most rapid urbanization on the largest scale, with urbaniza-
tion rate soaring to 65.2% in 2022. China is distinctive in its urbanization
model and path as it has realized sustainable and rapid urbanization amid
rapid industrialization. This is highly attributed to China’s economic develop-
ment path and industrial restructuring, reform and opening up and its integra-
tion into the global economic system. Going forward, urbanization will enter
a new stage as the economy and society shift from high-speed growth to
high-quality development. The new stage will be featured with great driving
force of innovation and development deriving from the new technological rev-
olution, as well as challenges entailing unprecedented changes in a century, the
competition of world-class city clusters and the catch-up of major cities in
other developing countries. It calls for a new round of economic restructuring,
incubation of new growth drivers, and improvement of governance. There is an
urgent need to seize the opportunities of the new round of global technological
revolution and the transformation and upgrading of China’s economic and
social structure, pace up the construction of a dynamic system for high-quality
urbanization, promote coordinated development around the core driving
mechanisms of “institution, factor of production, industry and technology”,
deepen reform and promote a high-level opening-up, so as to ensure high-qual-
ity development of China’s urbanization.
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-9
7 Process, achievements, and issues
of China’s urbanization
The past seven decades since the founding of People’s Republic of China,
especially the past four decades since reform and opening up, has witnessed
great achievements of social and economic development in urbanization, with
urbanization rate soaring to 65.2% in 2022. The urban pattern with city clus-
ters as the mainstay has initially taken shape, enhancing the comprehensive
competitiveness of major cities, substantially improving urban landscape and
residents’ quality of life, and steadily reinforcing urban public services and
governance. Meanwhile, sustainable urbanization in the high-quality develop-
ment stage is challenged by less coordinated development among city clusters,
impediments in the flow of factors, gap in innovation capability, unsustainable
investment and financing model, and flaws in the governance system.
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s urbani-
zation development has been progressing with twists and turns. It can be di-
vided into the slow and arduous stage under the planned economy and the
take-off stage during reform and opening up.
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-10
134 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
7.1.1.1 The slow and arduous urbanization stage under the planned economy
China prioritized the development of heavy industry from 1949 to 1957, build-
ing 6 new cities, expanding 20 cities on a large scale, and 74 cities on a moderate
scale to accommodate 694 key construction projects. Its urban population
jumped from 57.65 million in 1949 (urbanization rate: 10.6%) to 99.49 million
in 1957 (urbanization rate: 15.4%). China’s urban development further acceler-
ated from 1958 to 1960, adding an average of 8.33 million urban residents per
year and increasing urbanization rate by 4.4 percentage points in three years.
In general, China’s urbanization was relatively fast and fruitful from 1949
to 1960.
However, China experienced “de-urbanization” from 1961 to 1978 with a
drop in the proportion of urban population. Its urbanization rate dropped
from 24.7% to 17.9% from 1961 to 1965, during which China raised the mini-
mum number of residents in an administrative town from 2,000 to 3,000, and
cut the number of cities from 208 to 171. China suffered a major setback in its
economic and social development from 1966 to 1976, taking a U-turn in ur-
banization. In 1977, China’s urbanization rate dropped to 17.6%, 0.3 percent-
age points lower than that in 1965 (Figure 7.1).
In the age of planned economy, national economy was stagnant due to the
rigid management. Infrastructure was outdated, basic industries couldn’t meet
the needs of national economic development, and a large amount of foreign
20,000 25
18,000
16,000 20
14,000
12,000 15
10,000 10.64
8,000 10
6,000
4,000 5
2,000
0 0
1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1974
1975
1976
1977
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1957
1958
1959
1960
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1978
Proportion of the primary industry Proportion of the secondary industry
Proportion of the tertiary industry
exchange was used to import advanced equipment and technology. During this
period, the industrial policy focused on strengthening infrastructure, develop-
ing basic industries and export sectors. Development from 1952 to 1978 was
dominated by industrialization, during which the proportion of the primary
industry in GDP decreased from 50.5% to 27.7%, while that of the secondary
industry up from 20.8% to 47.7%, and the tertiary industry marginally down
from 28.7% to 24.6% (Figure 7.2). During rapid industrialization, weakening
of the tertiary industry was due to the priority attached to heavy chemical in-
dustry. Urbanization was largely promoted by the construction of industrial
cities, making the tertiary industry a laggard in the national economy.
During the age of planned economy, Chinese cities were mainly established
and located according to the layout of the heavy chemical industry, especially
the layout of projects key to national defense. The population scale and indus-
trial structure of cities were tightly controlled by the planned system. Cities, as
administrative centers, didn’t fully demonstrate their important role in eco-
nomic growth and social governance. This led to an evident mismatch, with
urbanization lagging behind industrialization. Proportion of the secondary
industry increased by about 27 percentage points from 1952 to 1978, but ur-
banization rate increased by only 5.4 percentage points.
In the early years of reform and opening up, China strictly controlled the sprawl
of large cities, encouraged the growth of smaller ones and developed rural
towns. Eastern regions adopted a small-town development model. With the
136 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
40000.00 35
35000.00 30
30000.00
25
25000.00
20
20000.00
15
15000.00
10
10000.00
5000.00 5
0.00 0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
labor and land. The electronic information industry quickly became a pillar
industry in many coastal cities of open economy. During this stage, China still
lagged behind in infrastructure and basic industries and had an urgent need to
upgrade its industrial structure. Industrial policies were focused on strengthen-
ing infrastructure and basic industries, supporting capital intensive industries
and gradually building them into pillar industries. At the same time, China
stepped up opening up and prioritized foreign trade, especially processing
trade. By joining the international division of labor, China gained momentum
for its industrialization and urbanization.
Proportion of the primary industry in GDP continued to decline from 27.7%
in 1978 to 19.3% in 1996. The secondary industry remained relatively stable,
with its proportion slightly dropping from 47.7% to 47.1%. Meanwhile, the
tertiary industry thrived, with its surging from 24.6% to 33.6% (Figure 7.4).
The decline in the proportion of the primary industry was mainly caused by the
farmland contract reform and increase in agricultural productivity. The rapid
rise of the tertiary industry suggested that China’s strategic priority was shift-
ing from heavy chemical industry to labor-intensive industries with compara-
tive advantages. Tertiary industries related to manufacturing and the urban
livelihood (such as transportation, wholesale and retail, catering and hospitality)
developed fast. Measured by industrial upgrading and restructuring, urbaniza-
tion at this stage fared well, mirroring the general law of urbanization worldwide.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
In 1996, China’s urbanization rate exceeded 30%, signaling the explosion stage
of urbanization dominated by industrialization. During this stage, China’s ur-
banization was mainly featured with continuous expansion of urban scale, im-
provement of functions, upgrading of industrial organization and wider range
of hub-spoke effect. In terms of urbanization mode, city clusters started to
develop and draw attention. In 2000, China was no longer torn between the
arguments for “small city first” and for “big city first” and started to prioritize
the development of city clusters. The “10th Five-Year Plan” in 2001 proposed
the concept of “city-and-town concentrated areas”. The “11th Five-Year Plan”
in 2006 proposed to “take city clusters as the main form of urbanization”, and
the “12th Five-Year Plan” in 2011 further proposed to “cultivate city clusters
with great range of influence by relying on large cities and focusing on small
and medium-sized ones”. City clusters became a new trend of urbanization
and regional economic development.
At the beginning of the 21st century, China rapidly emerged as the “world
factory”. Globalization not only promoted China’s industrialization, but also
accelerated its urbanization, which became more pronounced after China
joined WTO in 2001. From 2000 to 2011, China’s urbanization rate increased
from 30.89% to 51.83%, with an average annual increase of 1.9 percentage
points, the fastest since the reform and opening up (Figure 7.5). During this
period, many cities in the east scored explosive growth and rapid expansion.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s urban built-up area
80000.00 60
70000.00
50
60000.00
40
50000.00
40000.00 30
30000.00
20
20000.00
10
10000.00
0.00 0
100%
90%
80% 39.8% 44.3%
70%
60%
50%
40%
45.5%
30% 46.5%
20%
10%
14.7%
9.2%
0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
In 2011, China’s urbanization rate exceeded 50% for the first time, marking
a new stage of urbanization with industrial transformation and upgrading.
140 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
100000.00 70
90000.00
60
80000.00
70000.00 50
60000.00 40
50000.00
40000.00 30
30000.00 20
20000.00
10
10000.00
0.00 0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
100%
90%
80%
45.5% 46.9% 48.0% 50.5% 51.8% 51.9% 53.3% 53.5% 52.8%
54.3% 54.5%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30% 45.4% 44.2% 43.3% 41.1% 40.1% 40.5% 39.7% 38.6% 37.8% 39.3% 39.9%
20%
10%
9.1% 8.9% 8.7% 8.4% 8.1% 7.6% 7.0% 7.1% 7.7% 7.2% 7.3%
0%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Proporon of the terary industry Proporon of the secondary industry
Before reform and opening up, urbanization progressed slowly due to the huge
pressure to create jobs for urban population, acute shortage of infrastructure
in big cities, and the national conditions of urban-rural dual structure. From
1949 to 1978, the urban population grew from 57.85 million to 172 million, or
from 10.64% of the national population to 17.92%, up by less than 0.3 percent-
age points per year. 40 years of reform and opening up witnessed rapid urban-
ization in China, which was a miracle in human history. From 1978 to 2022,
China’s total population increased by 1.5 times, while its urban population
ballooned by 5.3 times. The proportion of urban population increased from
17.92% to 65.22%, up by 1.08 percentage points annually, and the total urban
population reached 848 million. Since the “new urbanization with Chinese
characteristics” was announced at the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012,
China has paid more attention to people-centered development and proper
urbanization of migrant workers amid urban development. By the end of
2022, share of urbanized permanent residents increased by 13.39 percentage
points compared with 2011, an average annual increase of 1.22 percentage
points (Figure 7.9).
Meanwhile, urban area and built-up area in cities have increased rapidly.
The urban area increased from 178,100 square kilometers in 2008 to 188,300
square kilometers in 2021, up by 5.7%, while the built-up area, a better barom-
eter of urban space expansion, increased from 30,400 square kilometers in
2004 to 62,420 square kilometers in 2021, up by 105.3% (Figure 7.10).
China has experienced continuous expansion of the urban economy, opti-
mization of its industrial structure, and enhancement in comprehensive com-
petitiveness, thanks to constant urbanization. The 2019–2020 Global Urban
Competitiveness Report (GUCR) jointly released by the Chinese Academy of
Process, achievements, and issues of China’s urbanization 143
100000.00 70.00
90000.00
60.00
80000.00
70000.00 50.00
60000.00
40.00
50000.00
40000.00 30.00
30000.00 20.00
20000.00
10.00
10000.00
0.00 0.00
1949
1953
1957
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
2005
2009
2013
2017
44561
Urban population (LHS, 10 thousand people) Urbanization rate (RHS, %)
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
04 05 06 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 196 561
20 20 20 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 44 44
Social Sciences and the UN-Habitat listed 1,006 cities with more than 500,000
residents in the world. 103 out of the 291 Chinese cities on the list notched up
their ranking, among which Shenzhen, Shanghai, Hong Kong SAR, Beijing
and Guangzhou were listed top 20.
Since 2011, growth of the manufacturing industry has slowed down in the
wake of rapid urbanization dominated by industrialization. As a result, urban
economy has accelerated its transition to be dominated by the tertiary industry.
The tertiary industry and consumption have become main growth drivers for
China’s high-quality development. At the same time, urban functions have
broadened as many cities transform from traditional centers of manufacturing,
trade and transportation to global hubs of innovation, consumption and factor
allocation. In 2015, Shanghai proposed to speed up the construction of a world-
class science and technology innovation center. Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou,
Wuhan and Chengdu have followed suit, rolling out plan to build innovation
centers. Meanwhile, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Chengdu and
Wuhan are building up world-class consumption center cities, aiming to upgrade
urban consumption and contribute to the prosperity of the domestic market.
Chinese cities continue to grow in number and scale. At the end of 1949, there
were 132 cities in China, including 65 prefecture-level cities and 67 county-level
cities. At the end of 2021, there were 691 cities in China, and the number of
prefecture-level and county-level cities rose to 297 and 394 respectively. At the
end of 1949, there were only five cities with more than 1 million non-agricultural
population. In contrast, measured by residents with Hukou, there were 22 cit-
ies with a population over 4 million, 48 cities between 2 million and 4 million,
97 cities between 1 million and 2 million, and 85 cities between 500,000 and
1 million at the end of 2021 (Figure 7.11).
Cities with population above one million continue to grow at a faster pace,
while smaller cities are in the decline. On the one hand, there have been more
million-resident cities, growing from 90 in 2000 to 167 in 2021. The number of
those home to more than 4 million people increased from 8 to 22, including the
four municipalities directly under the central government and sub-provincial
cities. The number of those home to 2–4 million people increased from 12 to
48, including tier-1 and tier-2 cities. The number of those home to 1–2 million
people increased from 70 to 97, indicating growing scale of economically-
dynamic tier-3 and tier-4 cities. On the other hand, the number of cities with a
population under 1 million decreased significantly from 169 in 2000 to 130 in
2017. Among them, the number of those home to 0.5–1 million dropped 103 to
85, and from 66 to 37 for the 200,000–500,000 notch, signaling that those cities
were out of favor for new migrants.
A new pattern of urbanization is taking shape rapidly with city clusters as
the mainstay and coordinated development of central and peripheral cities as
Process, achievements, and issues of China’s urbanization 145
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
>4 million 2-4 million 1-2 million 0.5-1 million
the theme. City clusters start to play a central role in urbanization. The tree city
clusters of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl
River Delta are ramping up construction. Central cities and city clusters con-
tinue to lead development. The “19+2”2 city clusters have been developing
steadily, with constant optimization of the metropolitan areas at their core.
Statistics show that in 2016, the three major city clusters accounted for only
2.8% of China’s land mass. Yet they were home to 18% of national population
and 36% of the total GDP. Central cities remain the powerhouse for the devel-
opment of peripheral sphere, strengthening division of labor and cooperation
within city clusters.
Regional development is better coordinated amid urbanization. Since the
18th CPC National Congress, China has accelerated the development of peo-
ple-centered urbanization. Great efforts have been made to optimize economic
layout and make regional development more coordinated by drafting and im-
plementing regional strategies for the coordinated development of Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei region, the development of the Yangtze River economic belt,
the construction of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay area, the in-
tegrated development of the Yangtze River Delta, and the ecological protec-
tion and high-quality development of the Yellow River Basin. These flagship
strategies have anchored high-quality development in China and the prosperity
of world-class city clusters.
146 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
9,000.00 180.00%
8,000.00 160.00%
7,000.00 140.00%
6,000.00 120.00%
5,000.00 100.00%
4,000.00 80.00%
3,000.00 60.00%
2,000.00 40.00%
1,000.00 20.00%
0.00 0.00%
Figure 7.12 Economic Density of City clusters in 2018 and GDP growth from
1999 to 2018.
Process, achievements, and issues of China’s urbanization 147
Urbanization has filled the gap in services and infrastructure including water,
power, gas, drainage, sewer, waste treatment and so on, greatly improving ur-
ban mobility and living standard. At the end of 1949, there were 84.32 million
square meters of urban road in China. Only 27 cities provided public transport
service. In 2017, the urban road area reached 7.89 billion square meters. 35
cities had rail transport network by the end of 2018. The 185 rail lines in oper-
ation extended a total of 5,761.4 kilometers, including 4,354.3 kilometers of
subway lines. At the end of 1949, only 72 towns had water plants and there
were only 4 sewer treatment plants across China. By the end of 2017, penetra-
tion of water, gas, sewer treatment, waste treatment and harmless treatment
reached 98.3%, 96.3%, 95.5%, 99.0%, and 97.7% respectively.
Improving housing of urban residents is a hallmark of urbanization in
China. Before reform and opening up, the per capita living space in 190 Chi-
nese cities was only 3.6 square meters. 8.69 million households didn’t have
proper shelter, accounting for 47.5% of the total urban households. In 2021,
the per capita urban living space reached 41 square meters, which was 34.3
square meters more than the 1978 level (Figure 7.13).
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10 6.70
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2016
2018
2019
1978
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2021
1,20,000.00
1,00,000.00
80,000.00
60,000.00
40,000.00
20,000.00
0.00
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
way to go to fully play their role in hub-spoke effect, and improve their ecolog-
ical, security and healthcare functions. Counties and county-level cities are
generally underdeveloped, with limited appeal to the migrants. Overall carry-
ing capacity and functional competence of cities are to be further enhanced.
70.00 67.80
64.95
65.00
60.01
59.58
60.00
56.10
55.00 53.29
56.11
49.95
50.00 52.17 52.92
48.74
45.00 42.79 42.99
45.30
40.00
41.49
36.22
39.07
35.00
34.55
30.00 33.05
28.41
25.00
20.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
gravity to the south. In 2018, the northern regions accounted for 38.5% of total
economic output, down by 4.3 percentage points compared with 2012. From
2012 to 2018, contribution of the Northeast to the national industrial output
decreased from 8.7% to 6.2% and permanent residents in the region decreased
by 1.37 million, mostly young and tech-savvy people. Some cities, especially
resource-exhausted cities and traditional industrial and mining cities lag be-
hind in development.
Third, obvious differentiation is observed within each region and develop-
ment momentum is increasingly polarized. Economic activities and population
are concentrated in big cities and urban clusters. Mega cities such as Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen continue to expand their lead. Large cit-
ies like Hangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Zhengzhou, Chengdu and Xi’an are well
positioned for development, each representing an engine for regional high-
quality development.
Fourth, urbanization rate of 31 provinces (including provincial-level cities
and autonomous regions) in China is closely correlated to their socioeconomic
development. 12 provinces have higher urbanization rate than the national aver-
age, among which Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin exceed 80%, even more urban-
ized than some developed countries. In 2018, urbanization rate was 80%–90% in
Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, 60%–70% in Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Fujian, Jiangxi, Chongqing and Liaoning, 50%–60% in Heilongjiang, Shan-
dong, Hubei, Jilin, Ningxia, Hainan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Hebei, Hunan, Anhui,
Qinghai and Inner Mongolia, less than 50% in Sichuan, X injiang, Guangxi,
Henan, Yunnan, Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet.
China’s large cities lag behind international counterparts in their energy level
of development. The Tokyo metropolitan area is home to 37 million people
and over $1 trillion of economic volume, more than 30% of national total. The
Seoul metropolitan area is home to over 25 million people, representing half of
the national population. In contrast, there is still much room for improvement
in the agglomeration level of China’s large cities. Beijing’s output per square
kilometer is only equivalent to 1/8 of that in the Tokyo metropolitan area and
1/5 of that in the New York metropolitan area. A comparative study of six
large cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu, Tokyo and New York)
shows that Shenzhen has a relatively high population density, yet the popula-
tion density of Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu is much lower than Tokyo and
New York by this measure.
Within a radium of 10 km from the urban center, population density of
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Chengdu stands at 22,200, 37,100, 28,300
and 19,400 people/km respectively, significantly higher than that of Tokyo
(17,200 people/km) and New York (13,500 people/km). It’s the same case from
10 km to 20 km. However, when the radium is extended to 20–30 km, popula-
tion density of Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu drops remarkably to 4,900,
152 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
7,500 and 5,300 people/km, much lower than Tokyo. The trend remains un-
changed for the 30–40 km and 40–50 km circles (Table 7.1).
The density distribution curve indicates a larger population gap between
inner and outer circles of China’s big cities. Taking 10 km as the dividing line,
the curve is steeper in Shanghai and Chengdu, whose population density within
10 km is 2.66 times and 2.41 times that of 10–20 km respectively, and popula-
tion density in circles father away from city center drops sharply. The curve is
less steep in Beijing and Shenzhen, whose population density within 10 km is
1.91 times and 1.47 times that of 10–20 km. When taking 30 km as the dividing
line, Beijing posts the biggest gap between the inner and outer circles, whose
population density of 20–30 km is 1.78 times that of 30–40 km, much higher
than the corresponding circle in international counterparts and other domestic
cities. In contrast, the two international cities have a smaller gap of population
distribution between the inner and outer circles and a relatively flat curve of
the overall population density distribution (Figure 7.16).
According to the Codes for the Administrative Divisions above County Level in
the People’s Republic of China released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in May,
2019, apart from the municipal districts, forest districts and special economic
zones, there are 1,879 county-level administrative divisions in China (excluding
Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR and Taiwan region of China), including 375 coun-
ty-level cities, 1,335 counties, 117 autonomous counties, 49 banners and 3 autono-
mous banners. Among them, the top 100 counties register strong momentum of
development, contributing to 25% of total GDP of county-level administrative
regions and 10% of national GDP with less than 2% of China’s land mass and 7%
of its population. However, most counties and county-level cities below the top
100 are sluggish in development, constituting the weakest link in coordinated
Process, achievements, and issues of China’s urbanization 153
ports, docks, airports, etc.) accounted for about 40% of the total at 7.1 trillion
Yuan. Projects related to real estate development and land reserve (apartments,
renovation of shantytowns and dilapidated buildings, land reserve and others)
accounted for about 20% at about 3.4 trillion Yuan. “New infrastructure” in-
vestment was only 0.5% of the total with an amount less than 100 billion Yuan,
and related projects (rail transit, industrial parks, waste-incineration power
plants, etc.) received 2.6 billion Yuan of investment, about 14.7% of the total,
scoring less than 16% in combination.
Third, the funding mode for urbanization is still government-led instead of
market-driven, amplifying debt and financial risks. Traditional funding mode
for urbanization is led by local governments and mostly financed by land trans-
fer income. Municipal bonds issued by LGFVs create huge contingent liabili-
ties. The underlying risks are passed on to the local governments as they are
guarantors for most of the debts and will have to provide bailout in case of
default (Figure 7.17).
In the next stage of urbanization, it is hard to maintain the government-led
mode for funding and investment. First, land transfer income is becoming inad-
equate and less stable as a source of funding. In the past decade, cost of land
acquisition, resident replacement and urban construction has kept growing in
relation to the total income of land transfer, now close to 80%. Moreover, 30%
of the remaining 20% income is earmarked by the central government for spe-
cial expenditure,3 further reducing the fund available for urban construction. In
addition, nearly half of local government debts are repaid with land transfer
income, which is not an ideal source of funding as the income has fluctuated a
lot with economic cycle and turbulence in the real estate market. Second, issuing
40.00
35.00
30.00
25.00
Trillion Yuan
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
2018-03
2018-06
2018-09
2018-12
2019-03
2019-06
2019-09
2019-12
2020-03
2020-06
2020-09
2020-12
2021-03
2021-06
2021-09
2021-12
2022-03
2022-06
2022-09
2022-12
2023-03
municipal bonds through LGFVs is subject to strict control and regulation. Since
2017, sharp rise of local government debts has become targeted in the battle to
control systemic risks. Local governments can no longer raise fund with munic-
ipal bonds issued by their financial platforms. Instead, they could only entrust
the central government to issue bonds on their behalf, which effectively caps the
scale of debt financing. In the stage of high-quality development, investment
priorities should be adapted to cultivate new growth drivers and fix weaknesses,
innovate the financing mechanism for urbanization, better match government
assets and liabilities, free up government assets to generate income, strive a bal-
ance between the cost and terms of government debts and the cash flow and
return of financed projects, and provide more long-term financing instruments,
so as to finance urban construction with a reasonable cost and matching
duration.
In recent years, China has sped up the relocation of some labor-intensive in-
dustries to other developing countries and emerging economies, indicating
changes in comparative advantages in China’s new development stage of in-
dustrial development. It is not only conducive to the transformation and up-
grading of China’s industrial structure, but also to the economic and industrial
development of other countries. However, if the manufacturing industry goes
offshore too fast in the short term, it may disrupt China’s urban economic de-
velopment, and rapid flow of population and industry will increase the risk of
“hollowing out” of industries. In addition, many large cities in developing
countries are introducing more preferential policies to court multinational en-
terprises and cross-border capital investment. They are also dedicated to the
transformation and upgrading, from OEM hubs and call centers to regional
portals for technology development and premium service outsourcing. The de-
velopment prospect of Chinese cities will be strained with many industrial
fields overlapping with the foreign competitors.
The external environment of China’s urbanization will go through profound
changes including shocks unseen in a century, and competitive innovation amid
the new round of technological revolution. Chinese cities will be exposed to
ever growing pressure to develop world-class city clusters. With intensified glo-
balization and industrial restructuring driven by the technological revolution,
Chinese city clusters will enter a new stage of high-quality development domi-
nated by innovation and the service industry, catching up with leading city clus-
ters of the world. However, the five recognized world-class city clusters (the city
cluster of the US Atlantic coast, the city cluster of the Great Lakes region, the
city cluster of Japan’s Pacific coast, the London city cluster and the city cluster
of northwest Europe) are all dominated by advanced manufacturing and high-
end modern service industries, ranking high on the global value chain with their
industrial structure, and benefiting from rich resources of education, finance
and top notch talent necessary for technological breakthroughs. The five
Process, achievements, and issues of China’s urbanization 157
China’s market of land, labor, capital, technology and other traditional factors
is increasingly dominated by market forces after years of reform. The new
round of technological revolution is boosting the market of new factors such
as data and remarkably improving the efficiency of allocation. However, devel-
opment of the factors market still lags behind the goods market in general,
suffering from limited scope of market-based allocation, stagnancy in price
reform, and institutional barriers to the free flow and allocation of factors in
cities, across cities and between urban and rural areas.
under the central government, provincial capitals and sub provincial cities. In
big cities whose Hukou is most sought after, migrant workers and their families
don’t enjoy the same basic public services as their urban counterparts includ-
ing education, employment, health care, elderly nursery and housing. In this
sense, benefit of urbanization is inadequate for rural migrants, who are not
fully covered by public services and welfare programs. Most of them end up
leaving the big cities where they have worked stayed.
2. Market mechanism doesn’t unlock its full potential in allocating urban and
rural land, leading to a dual structure and low efficiency of land use.
According to the White Paper: China’s Digital Economy Development and Em-
ployment (2019) released by China Academy of Information and Communi-
cations (CAICT), China’s digital economy was worth 31.3 trillion Yuan in
2018, accounting for more than 1/3 of national GDP at 34.8%, and contribut-
ing to 67.9% of GDP growth. It is estimated that the scale of China’s digital
economy will reach 60 trillion Yuan in 2025, becoming a key driver of the na-
tional economy. However, data, unlike land, capital and technology, are a new
factor of production in the technological revolution, still in a nascent develop-
ment stage in China. The market of data is still to be improved in terms of
market allocation, property rights definition and protection mode.
First, it is difficult to define the property rights of data, and a reasonable re-
muneration mechanism is absent. In the era of Internet of Things,
everything is interconnected with each terminal generating various kinds
of data, which makes it harder to define the rights to the sea volume of
data collected by the Internet technology. At present, rules on the prop-
erty rights of data in China are ambiguous as there’s no clear definition
about the ownership of data and their corresponding usage right and
right to proceeds. As the Contract Law, the Law against Unfair Compe-
tition, the Anti-Monopoly Law and other legislation don’t have clear
provision regarding the property rights of data, it is difficult to effectively
protect the right to proceeds. As a result of legislative and regulatory
void and the consequential blurred scope of rights, circulation mecha-
nism of data is poorly established, deterring people from opening data
sources or sharing and trading data. Therefore, it is difficult to set a rea-
sonable market price for data, further undermining the right to proceeds.
Second, public data are not adequately shared, leaving data silos isolated from
each other. Data security, standards and scope of application are still in
infancy in China. Therefore, it is still prudently exploring how to open up
and share data. The market and trading rules of data are not sophisti-
cated, leaving abundant room for improvement in resource integration
and coordinated development and utilization across industries, sectors
and organizations. Scenarios of standardized data development and uti-
lization in agriculture, industry, transportation, education, security,
urban management, public resource trading and other sectors are under
construction. Public data collection, the sharing and exchange need to be
enhanced. Regulations are to be clarified regarding the opening and
effective circulation of public data on business registration, transporta-
tion and meteorology. Government agencies struggle to coordinate, inte-
grate and utilize public data with miscellaneous social data.
Finally, the security protection mechanism of data element is not perfect. The
security protection system and security review system of data classifica-
tion and grading are important institutional safeguards to ensure the
market value of data elements under the big data background. China
attaches great importance to the security protection of data elements and
160 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
social interests. Social tensions are rising in some fields. Many city governments
struggle with ambiguous scope of functions, overlapping roles, and abuse or
absence of authority. Some are assuming functions and duties of social organ-
izations. While others suffer from gaps in social governance.
7.4 Summary
China’s urbanization mode is inherent in its development strategy and evolu-
tion of industrial structure. As the most populous country, China has experi-
enced urbanization of the largest scale in human history, scoring historical
achievements. The transformation from high-speed growth to high-quality de-
velopment marks a key point of inflection for its urbanization. Prominent
challenges include growing disparity in urban development, overdue incuba-
tion of new growth drivers, institutional barriers to the free flow of factors, and
weaknesses in urban governance system.
Notes
1 Report on the Adjustment of Administrative Towns adopted and circulated by the
State Council in November 1984.
2 19+2 city clusters refer to Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze River Delta,
Pearl River Delta, Shandong Peninsula city cluster, West Side of the Taiwan Straits,
Harbin-Changchun megalopolis, central and southern Liaoning city cluster, the
Central Plains, middle reaches of the Yangtze River, Chengdu and Chongqing,
Guanzhong Plain, Beibu Gulf city cluster, Central Shanxi, Huhhot-Baotou-Ordos-
Yulin region, Central Guizhou, Central Yunnan, Lanzhou-Xining city cluster, city
cluster along the Yellow River in Ningxia and the northern slope of Tianshan
Mountain, as well as two urban circles with Lhasa and Kashgar as the center.
3 10% for affordable housing, 10% for water conservancy and 10% for education.
Bibliography
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Publishing House, 2019.
Chen, Y. “Retrospect and Prospect of Urbanization in China”, Management World,
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Development Research Center of the State Council, New Urbanization in China: Pros-
pects, Strategies and Policies, China Development Press, 2014.
Development Research Center of the State Council, Schneider Electric, Leading the
New Normal with Innovation and Green Development: New Strategies of China’s
Economic Development under the New Round of Industrial Revolution, China De-
velopment Housing, 2015.
Development Research Center of the State Council, World Bank, “China: A New Ap-
proach for Efficient, Inclusive, Sustainable Urbanization”, 2014.
Institute of Market Economy, Development Research Center of the State Council, 40
Years of Reform and Opening-Up: Progress and Achievements of Market System Con-
struction in China, China Development Press, 2018.
National Bureau of Statistics, “Urbanization Level Continuously Pushes City For-
ward—The 70th Anniversary of the Founding of People’s Republic of China”, n.d.
Wang, W., Wang, Q. Construction of Modern Market System, China Development, 2019.
Xiao, J., Liu, B. “Retrospect and Prospect of China’s Urbanization in the Past 40 Years
of Reform and Opening-up”, Macroeconomics, No, 12, p. 13, 2018.
Ye, M. “Processes and Ideas about China’s Urbanization since Reform and Open-
ing-up”, Essays of the 16th National History Annual Meeting, September, 2017.
8 Impact of the new round of technological
revolution on China’s urbanization
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-11
164 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
stations and broadband networks in urban and rural areas promotes the spa-
tial interconnection between cities, towns and rural areas. The effective sharing
of information resources, to a certain extent, narrows the urban–rural gap in
industries, talent, technology, and resources. Modern logistics, transportation
and other technologies further reduce the cost of urban–rural communication.
Agricultural production, supply and sales are supported by more information
technology. Thanks to full access to market information, agricultural produc-
ers and operators can optimize resource allocation, which improves agricul-
tural productivity and operational efficiency. Mechanized production based on
big data, 5G, and other information technologies brings new agricultural
machinery and information technologies to rural areas, making agriculture
more technology-empowered, enhancing the scale of agricultural production
and operation, and promoting the modern transformation of agriculture.
Decreasing demand for agricultural labor amid the new round of technological
revolution will channel more rural population to cities, providing sufficient
human capital for urban industrial transformation.
Development of large city clusters and metropolitan areas will enable large
cities to gather and integrate more consumption resources. As a result, con-
sumption structure will further upgrade, generating and expanding new types
of consumption, energizing innovation in consumption and business models,
and spilling over across the country, including rural areas. The top five cities by
the penetration of online shopping are Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guang-
zhou and Chongqing, an order consistent with the level of consumption
upgrading and urbanization (see Figure 8.1).
The new round of technological revolution will make the eastern region more
attractive to high-end talents. The eastern area is more developed, with high
concentration of resources, especially innovation factors, advanced infrastruc-
ture and high urbanization rate. In the new round of technological revolution,
the eastern area is the first to benefit, forming new business models and trans-
forming it industrial structure. Emerging digital and smart technologies have
mainly given rise to knowledge-intensive industries such as cloud computing,
smart manufacturing, and modern service industries, while labor-intensive
industries such as catering, retailing, and production are in decline. Traditional
service industries are turning from labor-intensive to knowledge-intensive,
which in turn leads to growing demand for high-end talents and receding
demand for lower-skilled labor. Meanwhile, urban residents in eastern prov-
inces are the first to enjoy outcomes of high-tech industries. Improvement in
living standards makes the area more attractive.
The new round of technological revolution paces up urbanization in central
and western regions. Smart manufacturing and services fueled by technological
progress relocate labor force, moving low-skilled labor back to central and
western cities for employment and entrepreneurship. Industrial productivity
gain leads to industrial expansion, while transfer of technology and industries
from eastern area generates new job opportunities, in particular in cities.
Meanwhile, cities in central and western regions are more attractive to local
rural migrants, with housing price lower than eastern cities, and more job
openings, higher labor income and better public services than neighboring
rural areas. In other words, urbanization in central and western China is driven
by both inter-city and urban–rural migration.
China’s 14th Five-Year Plan proposes to expedite the development of the new
generation information technology, biotechnology, new energy, new materials,
168 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
30000
25000
20000
100 million Yuan
15000
10000
5000
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
USA and Western Northeast Oceania China Latin South Southeast Eastern Sub- Middle East
Canada Europe Asia America Asia Asia Europe and Saharan and North
Central Asia Africa Africa
This will boost demand for designated energy, which will help reduce carbon
emission. Urban infrastructure and housing will be built in totally different man-
ner, dramatically improving safety and quality and reducing cost.
Intelligent technologies will disrupt the way to monitor, operate, maintain,
and upgrade infrastructure. Operation and maintenance of infrastructure
cover roads, bridges, and other transportation facilities, as well as electricity,
gas, water supply, drainage, and heating that are essential to the functionality
Impact of the new round of technological revolution on China’s 171
As a major engine of China’s GDP, cities are also the leading energy consumers.
In 2017, cities consumed about 3.85 billion TCE, accounting for 88.3% of
national total consumption. To meet the growing energy demand, most pri-
mary energy including coal and natural gas and electricity need to be shipped
or transmitted from where they are produced to load centers. Fossil fuels remain
an important source of energy for urban consumption. Energy consumption in
urban areas is still dominated by coal, while the share of renewables is relatively
low. Distributed solar energy, wind energy and biomass have not reached scale
in application, and their reserve for future development is also limited.
The extensive use of wind and solar energy in traditional industries and the
development of hybrid cars can reduce pollution in economic activities. Tech-
nological development is speeding up the commercialization and civil applica-
tion of green technology. Green transit is passenger friendly, helping reduce
energy consumption in commuting. Some regions adopt dual purpose plan for
both workplace and residence.
Energy-saving and environment-friendly buildings can reduce their stress on
the environment. Green buildings are covered with vegetation and powered
with solar and wind energy. Green building standards for urban development
are formulated to guide systematic projects for energy conservation and emis-
sion reduction. Green technologies and related industries will be developed so
as to promote green buildings on a large scale. Legacy buildings can be refur-
bished with solar panels and other green building materials, while new build-
ings should be planned and constructed as part of a green building system for
residential communities and functional areas according to local conditions
and in a people-centered manner.
16.00 120.00
14.00 100.00
12.00 80.00
10.00
Trillion RMB
60.00
8.00
%
40.00
6.00
4.00 20.00
2.00 0.00
0.00 -20.00
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Online Retail Sales (trillion RMB, LHS)
Growth Rate of Online Retail Sales (%, RHS)
Growth Rate of Total Retail Sales of Consumer Goods (%, RHS)
Internet, big data, cloud computing, AI, and new business models led by plat-
form economy and sharing economy have energized consumption innovation,
profoundly changing the perception and practice of consumption. One typical
case is e-retailing. In 2022, China’s online retail sales reached 13.8 trillion
RMB, and the share in total retail sales of consumer goods has increased from
1.1% in 2008 to 27.2% (Figures 8.4 and 8.5).
30
27.2
25.8 25
24.5
25 23.6
19.6
20
15.5
15
%
12.9
10.6
10
8
6.3
4.3
5
3.3
1.1 2
0.6
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Sports
Gaming
Agriculture
Social network
Advertisement and marketing
Utility software
Tourism
Localized life services
Realtor
Education
Hardware
Culture and entertainment
Logistics
Medical and health
E-commerce
Commercial service
Finance
Car and transportation
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Number of unicorns
Intelligent urban governance can be realized with the help of information tech-
nology. Big data is both an important factor of production and a principal
factor of social governance. First, from the perspective of service supply, big
data is more time-sensitive than traditional data. By capturing and analyzing
real-time information, it ensures that personalized government service is deliv-
ered online in time. Second, unlike traditional fragmented governance model,
big data makes more comprehensive, systematic, and regular governance pos-
sible. Third, accurate profiling of residents at all levels helps better understand
their general needs, optimize risk control, and make urban governance more
people-centered.
China has many success stories in improving effectiveness of urban govern-
ance through technological means. For example, the “grid governance” model
divides a city into cells and, by virtue of digital information platform, responds
to the management needs of individual cells in a timely manner. This model
was first piloted in Dongcheng District of Beijing in 2004 and has been gradu-
ally promoted nationwide under the guidance of the Ministry of Housing and
Urban–Rural Development. Similar cases include “Tianyan Project” imple-
mented by municipal public security departments, integrated e-government
platform promoted in several provinces and cities, and the “System of Citizen
Health Information” implemented in Xiamen and other cities.
Hangzhou is a role model of future smart city with its “city brain”. The
most typical application is in transportation. Alibaba, by taking advantage of
its technical strength in cloud computing, big data and AI, has built an inte-
grated urban platform for computing, data resources and AI open services,
which has instant access to all information over the citywide network from all
video terminals. It combines four AI vision platforms for real-time sensing and
automatic monitoring of traffic events and accidents in Hangzhou. After two
years of operation, Hangzhou City Brain 2.0 covers more than 1,300 traffic
lights and 4,500 cameras to deliver inclusive sensing of the local traffic based
on 7 major signals. It can give command to more than 200 traffic police officers
via mobile terminals. In the ranking of large and medium-sized cities prone to
traffic congestion, Hangzhou has dropped from the 5th place in 2016 to 35th in
2018, with constantly improving traffic efficiency, dropping accident rate, and
higher public satisfaction. In addition to mitigating congestion, Hangzhou
City Brain also helps discover and deal with police affairs, automatically
detecting more than 30,000 events that deserve police attention and interven-
tion on a daily basis, with an accuracy rate above 95% and average response
time of 10 seconds. Quick response to and efficient handling of emergency
situations have remarkably improved urban security.
The new round of technological revolution may bring about two major changes
in the labor market. First, labor skills are more diversified, equipping the labor
force with a complex knowledge system. In the era of intelligence, the techno-
logical infrastructure environment in which people live undergoes significant
changes, with big data and cloud computing growing exponentially. The cogni-
tive system and total knowledge of human beings are constantly updated and
developed, and the structure of the labor force is also transformed. Labor force
of all sectors need to acquire fresh knowledge and skills so as to keep pace with
technological progress and requirement of the new era. The combination of
AI and production has also upended the role of workers, who are becoming
176 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
From 1978 to 2008, the income gap of urban residents widened year by
year, basically apace with China’s urbanization (Figure 8.7). The urban–rural
Gini coefficient shows a similar upward trend. According to calculation by
Bhattacharya (2018) et al. based on data in 2012, resident income varied
among Chinese provinces and was highly polarized within provincial border.
The Gini coefficient of developed provinces such as Guangdong, Shanghai,
Beijing, and Jiangsu is much higher than that of less developed ones such as
Guizhou, Gansu, and Guangxi.
According to the China General Social Survey (CGSS) 2008–2015, China’s
Inequality of Opportunity (IOR) index decreased from 0.254 to 0.176, down
by 30%; while the contribution of IOR to income inequality dropped from
46.36% to 34.88%, a decrease of 12 percentage points. In the rural area, the
contribution of IOR to income inequality declined by 14 percentage points,
while that in cities rose by almost 8 percentage points. Urban–rural gap by this
measure is gradually narrowing (Figure 8.8).
Urban–rural digital divide was first proposed by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce in 1995, referring to the gap between urban and rural areas in terms of
access to and use of information technology typified by network technology in
the transition from an industrial society to an information society, as well as
factors that affect the access and use, such as users’ awareness and access envi-
ronment. In the context of accelerated development of the digital economy,
178 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
0.7 46.36 50
45.44 45
0.6 42.28
38.68 40
0.5 36.52 35
34.69 34.88
31.67
30
0.4
27.08
24.27 25
0.3 20.98 20
16.54 15
0.2
10
0.1
5
0 0
2008 2010 2013 2015
“digital divide” specifically refers to the inequality between groups and regions
measured by their access to and use of the Internet.
Digital divide can first be perceived as a generational gap in the use of infor-
mation technology. The younger generation is the primary beneficiary of Inter-
net amid the new round of technological revolution. They have been the first to
accept and use new hi-tech products and services. Yet lack of knowledge and
living habits have made it take longer for the older generation to adopt new
products and services. Moreover, many products and services are not friendly
to the aged population. For example, there are few mobile phones customized
for the elderly. Many public facilities only grant access through hi-tech means
and approaches. Even IT products and services claiming to be “for the elderly”
are inferior in safety and quality. These only widen the generational gap in the
use and sharing of technology.
Digital divide also exacerbates the isolation between modern cities and tra-
ditional rural community, reinforcing the entrenched social duality. Though
rural community is rapidly embracing information technology, it still lags far
behind the urban area in the penetration and application of technology. This
will further widen the gap in education and cultural activity, hindering inte-
grated urban–rural development. Moreover, urban–rural digital divide is a
barrier for migrant workers, especially the middle-aged and elderly ones to pick
up new skills, undermining the employability of surplus rural labor.
Impact of the new round of technological revolution on China’s 179
8.5 Summary
The new round of technological revolution has all-round, far-reaching and
in-depth impact on China’s urbanization. It will bring disruptive changes to
the operation, management, and construction of Chinese cities. Part of the
impact is not detected yet. In general, however, the technological revolution
presents more opportunities than challenges. It will influence the quality and
speed of China’s urbanization, narrow regional disparity in urbanization and
accelerate the development of metropolitan areas and city clusters. It will also
bring forth a multi-center city network, improve urban governance and reduce
inequality in urbanization. Besides, the new round of technological revolution
will help Chinese cities integrate into the global city system and compete with
international city clusters, guiding China toward high-quality urbanization.
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within China’s provinces”, Chinese Studies, 07, 174–182, 2018, doi:10.4236/chnstd.
2018.72015
Cao, X., Yang, W., Huang, X., “Accessibility and CO2 emissions from travel of smart
transportation: theory and empirical studies”, Progress in Geography, 34 (4), 2015.
Chen, Minxi, “The beginning of “Parity Era” of photovoltaic”, China Power Enterprise
Management 6, 2018.
Jun, W., Gao, Y., “Technological change and the transformation of China’s urban govern-
ance logic and its reflection”, The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute 6, 2019.
Li, Y. “Evolution trend, formation mechanism and mitigating measures of inequality
of opportunity in income distribution in China”, 2019. Research Report, No. 158,
Development Research Centre of the State Council, Beijing, China.
Liu, S. The Ten Year Outlook of Chinese Economic Growth (Build High-Standard Mar-
ket Economy from 2019 to 2028), CITIC Press Corporation, 2019.
Ma, X., Research on the Effect of Industrial Structure Upgrading on Poverty Reduction—
Grouped Data Based on Household Income in Urban and Rural Areas, 2016. PhD
Thesis, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.
McKinsey Global Institute, “Reskilling China: Transforming the world’s largest work-
force into lifelong learners”, January 2021.
Zhang, W., Zhu, Q., Gao, H., “Upgrade of industrial structure, optimization of energy
structure and low carbon development of industrial system”, Economic Research
Journal 12, 2016.
9 China’s urbanization (2020–2050) in the
new round of technological revolution
In 2020, added value of the service industry accounted for 54.5% of China’s
GDP, and the GDP contribution by consumption reached 54.7%. Reflecting
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-12
China’s urbanization (2020–2050) 181
Table 9.2 The Share of Added Value in Major Developed Countries (1997–2017): %
United States
Agriculture 1.34 0.97 1.07 1.16 0.92
Industry 23.13 20.64 21.45 19.16 18.21
Service 71.81 74.88 73.9 76.15 77.37
Germany
Agriculture 1.03 0.9 0.78 0.85 0.83
Industry 28.58 26.38 27.24 27.28 27.44
Service 61.11 63.12 61.91 61.69 61.78
Japan
Agriculture 1.56 1.39 1.06 1.14 1.21
Industry 34.11 30.54 29.88 26.75 29.16
Service 64.2 68.06 69.09 71.59 68.98
United Kingdom
Agriculture 1.04 0.91 0.57 0.66 0.65
Industry 24.05 21.72 19.68 18.63 17.56
Service 65.29 67.35 69.79 70.08 70.93
France
Agriculture 2.34 2.01 1.61 1.63 1.55
Industry 21.53 20.65 19.14 17.87 17.21
Service 65.4 67.41 69.01 70.28 70.3
Source: WIND, original data from World Bank.
structure will gradually take shape, reliant mainly on the producer service indus-
try and with accelerated fusion of the primary, secondary and tertiary indus-
tries. Reflecting on the history of industrial transformation in developed
economies and considering China’s current situation, the baseline scenario pro-
jects that added value share of the tertiary industry will reach 63% and 70% of
national GDP in 2035 and 2050, respectively, up by 8 and 15 percentage points
compared to 2020. The share of the secondary industry will be 32% and 27%,
roughly 6 and 11 percentage points lower than in 2020. The share of the primary
sector will be 5% and 3%, a drop of 3 and 5 percentage points, respectively.
Considering potential fluctuation, uncertainties and risks in China’s future
growth, three scenarios (1%, 1.5% and 2.25%) are set for GDP growth in 2050,
with 1.5% as the baseline, and incremental capital output rate (ICOR, a meas-
ure of capital efficiency) as the main indicator for comparison. Scenario 1 is a
bear case: by 2050, China’s economy will grow at 1% (yoy) with capital effi-
ciency be equivalent to Japan’s current level (ICOR=24). Scenario2 is the base-
line case: by 2050, China’s economy will grow at 1.5% (yoy) with capital
efficiency equivalent to Germany’s current level (ICOR=16). Scenario 3 is a
bull case: by 2050, China’s economy will grow at 2.25% (yoy) with capital effi-
ciency equivalent to the current level of US(ICOR=10).
Table 9.3 shows the projected investment ratio, consumption ratio, net
export and industrial composition in the three scenarios. Overall, when invest-
ment ratio decreases slightly, lower ICOR and higher return on capital can
support a higher growth rate and a larger share of the tertiary industry.
China’s urbanization (2020–2050) 183
Table 9.3 Forecast of Major Economic Indicators in 2050 in the Three Scenarios
Therefore, ICOR will be highly relevant to the size and structure of GDP,
hence a valid metric of the quality of economic and social development.
The total population is expected to decline from about 14.1 billion to 1.368 bil-
lion in 2020–2035, and further down to 1.27 billion in 2050, according to forecast
of different institutions. Urbanization rate will reach 72.4% in 2035 and 81.6% in
2050, with 990 million and 1.036 billion urban population, respectively.
With rapid increase of urban population, family size becomes smaller. Av-
erage urban family size decreased from 3.2 persons in 1998 to 2.85 in 2010, 2.84
in 2015 and 2.62 in 2020 (Figure 9.1). In the medium to long term, average
family size will continue to shrink due to decrease in childbearing age popula-
tion, less desire for parenthood, and continuous ageing. On average, urban
family size will fall to about 2.5 in 2035, and further to about 2.3 in 2050.
Chinese will age faster in 2020–2050. The trend has picked up since 2003. In
2020, over 18.7% of the total population was over 60. The total number and
proportion of elderly population will continue to shoot up. The share of peo-
ple over 60 years of age is expected to rise to 28.3% in 2035, and 36.6% in 2050.
Accordingly, dependency ratio will grow from 40% in 2020 to 50% in 2035 (an
annual increase of 0.67 percentage point), and 65% in 2050 (an annual increase
of 1 percentage point) (Table 9.4).
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1998 2000 2010 2015 2020 2035 2050
Average Urban Family Size
huge human capital provide favorable conditions for further urbanization. The
domestic market will be fully utilized to unlock its potential. Growing urbani-
zation means better jobs, higher income and high-quality public services for
migrants from rural areas, hence motivating and upgrading consumption. At
the same time, there will be constant demand for investment in urban infra-
structure, public service facilities and housing, adding to the momentum of
economic growth.
Unlike the initial period of reform and opening up, China’s urbanization is at
a new stage of industrial transformation and upgrading. It’s already a middle-
income country by GDP. According to international experience, middle-income
countries all have urbanization rate over 50% and high-income countries are all
China’s urbanization (2020–2050) 185
above 70%. In 2035, China is expected to reach 72.4% in urbanization, and its
GDP per capita will reach 36,000 dollars. In accordance with the general devel-
opment pattern, the service industry will be the major powerhouse of urbaniza-
tion. Focus of urban development will pivot from speed and scale to quality,
significantly improving the quality and efficiency of urbanization.
Potential is huge to upgrade industries and develop the service sector in the
next phase of urbanization. In 2020, China’s service industry accounted for
only 54.5% of GDP by added value and nearly 50% of employment, far below
the average of 74% and 75% in developed countries. Upgrading of traditional
industries and development of emerging industries require the concentration
of innovation factors and the dissemination of knowledge to continuously im-
prove the quality of urbanization. The service industry will create most jobs in
the future. As China continues to urbanize, greater population agglomeration,
new lifestyles, and higher living standard will underpin the demand for con-
sumer services. Optimal allocation of factors of production, closer ties be-
tween the three industries and refined division of labor will generate more
186 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
As leading energy consumer and carbon emitter, cities are accountable for en-
ergy saving, emission reduction and green development. Moreover, green de-
velopment will be a strategic priority for China’s future urbanization. In his
speech at the Climate Ambition Summit on December 12, 2020, President Xi
Jinping stated that China would work hard to reach carbon peak by 2030 and
achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. By 2030, China will lower carbon intensity
of GDP by over 65 percent from the 2005 level, increase the share of non-fossil
fuel energy in primary energy consumption to around 25 percent, increase the
forest stock by 6 billion cubic meters over the 2005 baseline, and bring the total
installed capacity of wind and solar power to 1.2 billion kilowatts.
It is predicted that, in addition to traditional hydropower, China will make
far better use of clean energy by 2049, including wind, solar, nuclear, hydrogen
and biomass energy. Large-scale wind/solar/thermal integrated power plants,
pelagic wind farms, ultra-large wind turbines, high-parameter solar thermal
power plants, and large-scale industrialized biomass refinery systems will cut
the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of photovoltaic and wind power gener-
ation by 71% and 58%, respectively (Chen, 2018). The coal-centered energy
mix will be replaced by a new one based on renewables.
The energy revolution can promote the supply and consumption of low-
carbon energy in cities. Energy source will transition from coal to solar, hydro,
wind, nuke and other zero-carbon options. On the consumption side, share of
electricity will surge, and flexible consumption will be advocated to better
match the intermittent supply of renewable electricity. At the same time, roof-
top PV, distributed intelligent charging piles and power-heat-gas cogeneration
and coordination require fundamental changes in power transmission and dis-
tribution, configuration and control of urban energy systems, and how build-
ings consume energy.
China’s urbanization (2020–2050) 187
In 2020–2050, a new spatial pattern will gradually take shape, enabling coordi-
nated development of large, medium and small cities through the rise of city
clusters. In 2035, functional distribution within city clusters will be further op-
timized to create synergy. By 2050, the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River
Delta, and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region are expected to host 30% of na-
tional population and over 60% of GDP. City clusters will also rise in central
and western regions, such as the Chengdu-Chongqing area, the Central Plains,
the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, and the Harbin-Changchun area,
thanks to their resources reserve and environmental bearing capacity. Their
rise will make economic and population distribution more balanced. It’s esti-
mated that by 2050, 19 city clusters will account for more than 80% of China’s
urban population and about 65% of urban construction land. The Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, the
Shandong Peninsula, the West Coast Economic Zone, and the Chengdu-
Chongqing area all report a growing share of the service industry in the local
economy and rising disposable income per capita, signifying collaborated de-
velopment within the clusters. Meanwhile, other city clusters in northwestern
and northeastern China, such as Harbin-Changchun, mid-southern Liaoning,
Lanzhou-Xining and Ningxia city clusters along the Yellow River will fall be-
hind in development with sluggish growth of the service industry and house-
hold income.
Advances in transportation technology have shortened the distance between
cities, lowered mobility costs and increased the capacity of transportation sys-
tems. This will intensify agglomeration effect in city clusters. Motivated by dif-
ferential rent, citizens are willing and able to travel longer distance and more
frequently. The distance between capital-Yangtze River Delta economic circle
and Yangtze River Delta-Pearl River Delta economic circle is mostly above
1,000km. With economy development, business travelers will have growing de-
mand for three-hour fast travel and one-day round trip. The new generation of
high-speed transportation system will provide large scale mobility services
with high capacity, speed and reliability and low cost, promising to expand the
2-hour travel range of cities from 500km to 800–1,000km. This will further
concentrate population in urban clusters, enlarge their footprint and reshape
regional cooperation and competition.
Growing application of autonomous vehicles is expected to significantly im-
prove road capacity, but it will also lead to more traffic flow. It remains unclear
188 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
whether traffic congestion will be eased. Self-driving vehicles will enable the
elderly, children and people with disabilities to enjoy private motorized mobil-
ity, conducive to social equity. Roland Berger, an international consulting firm,
believes that the “Automotive Industry 4.0 Era”, characterized by autonomous
driving, sharing and connectivity, will add 32 million “drivers” in the United
States. Optimists believe that self-driving vehicles will do more good than
harm. Despite the additional vehicle mileages, autonomous driving may help
meet or create new travel demand with the current transport facilities. How-
ever, whether the technology will mitigate congestion remains uncertain. It de-
pends on the strategy of demand management and the balance between newly
induced demand and the marginal benefits of autonomous driving.
Future development will give more priority to the quality of life and sus-
tainability. In this context, transportation should provide more support for
economic and population growth, free mobility, travel speed, safety, system
resilience and environmental sustainability. In other words, it should be safer,
faster, greener and more efficient. Next-generation IT, AI, energy technology
and materials science will be central to the new technological revolution. They
will revolutionize transportation tools, systems and services, making them
smarter, greener and more shareable. IT and AI technologies are making trans-
portation, infrastructure, system operation and management automatic, re-
sponsive and intelligent.
9.5 Summary
China, currently a middle-income economy, will become a high-income country
during 2020–2050. With the moderation of economic growth, its economic and
demographic structure will experience major changes, resulting in higher qual-
ity of development. Its endogenous growth model, which is service-centered
and innovation-driven, will become more entrenched and mature. With fast
ageing of the population, family size will become smaller. This chapter gives
projections for China’s investment ratio, consumption ratio, net export, and in-
dustrial composition in 2050 under three scenarios. The incremental capital-
output rate (ICOR, a measure of the productivity of capital) in China during
2020–2050 will be an important variable for the structural transformation of
the economy. As investment ratio declines, higher ROI will boost economic
growth and increase the share of the tertiary industry.
Impact of the new round of technological revolution on China’s urbaniza-
tion is evident. This, on the one hand, gives rise to new engine of urbanization,
optimizes urban industrial and employment structure, and promotes green and
low-carbon transformation. On the other hand, it will nourish an urbanization
model that coordinates cities of different sizes to enhance urban governance.
Fueled by the new technological revolution, China’s urbanization will gain
more quality and efficiency in 2020–2050, engendering science-based develop-
ment models, building up governance capability, and giving rise to world-class
city clusters and metropolises.
Bibliography
Chen, M., “Energy storage to support more than half of global new energy by 2050”,
China Power Enterprise Management, 19, 90–91, 2018.
10 Strategic path and policies for China’s
high-quality urbanization in the new era
By seizing the dual opportunity from the new technological revolution and
China’s economic and social transformation and upgrading, technology, fac-
tors of production, industries and institutions will be coordinated as an inte-
grated engine for high-quality urbanization. The massive domestic market will
be fully utilized to accelerate the research and development and application of
new technologies, generate a strong spillover effect, and move the manufactur-
ing industry up the value chain through transformation. More rapid develop-
ment of the service industry, mainly driven by producer and consumer services,
will fully empower innovation and development. At the same time, the innova-
tion-oriented institutional reform will be deepened to lift the opening up of
cities to the next level, and remove institutional barriers to urban–rural, in-
ter-city and inter-regional free flow of population, capital, data and other fac-
tors of production. These efforts will further modernize urban governance,
effectively address income disparity and other challenges, and accelerate the
formation of a new pattern of high-quality urbanization mainly typified by
city clusters.
Taking large cities as cornerstone for the development and optimal layout of
R&D institutions, optimize resource allocation and sharing among research
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-13
192 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
Relying the huge market and talent reserve to build new platforms for techno-
logical cooperation and encourage innovation in business model. Helping
large cities with scientific and technological competence to focus on frontiers
such as AI, quantum information, integrated circuit, life science & health
care, brain science, biological breeding, aerospace science and deep-earth and
deep-sea science to implement state-level future-ready projects with strategic
importance.
Harnessing the new round of technological revolution and the industrial trans-
formation, promoting the application of information technology in manufac-
turing, such as AI, 5G and industrial Internet, and realizing digitalized,
network-based and intelligent development of the manufacturing industry by
recalibrating the whole industrial chain. Opening up manufacturing capability
as a platform, leveraging on industrial Internet to share manufacturing re-
sources and production capacity online and optimize allocation, and facilitat-
ing the development of platform economy, sharing economy and other new
business formats.
194 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
10.2.4 Driving the development of the service industry with the dual engine of
producer services and consumer services
The two horizontal axes are the Land Bridge Corridor in the north and the
Yangtze River Corridor. The three verticals are the Coastal Corridor, the Har-
bin-Beijing-Guangzhou Railway Corridor, and the Baotou-Kunming Railway
Corridor. The strategic spatial pattern will be anchored on urbanized areas
prioritized by the state for development, with important contribution from
196 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
other urbanized areas along the horizontal and vertical axes. Further develop-
ing the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and the Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei Region, or even the whole Bohai Economic Rim. Forming large and
regional city clusters in the Harbin-Changchun area, the Jianghuai Region, the
Central Plains, the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, the Beibu Gulf, the
Chengdu-Chongqing area and the Guanzhong-Tianshui Economic Zone, etc.
10.3.4 Improving the urban and rural land system for efficient land use
Allocating land resources flexibly and setting up land reserve for future indus-
trial upgrading, and adapting to diversified and uncertain industrial formats
amid the new round of technological transformation. Complying with space
planning and land purpose control, promoting reasonable repurposing of land
and tentatively increasing the supply of mixed-purpose land. Actively exploring
the system to market rural collectively-owned commercial land, accelerating the
establishment of an integrated market for urban and rural construction land,
unifying the rules and platforms for trading, and improving the system to set and
publish benchmark land price and price of designated land lots according to
market price. Piloting trans-regional trading of land quota to verify a national
system for land quota trading. Increasing land quota for leading cities or those
with substantial potential, mainly for the development of innovative industries.
cities such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing and Hangzhou have acquired the
condition to gather high-end innovation factors worldwide and breed world-
class centers. First, incubating small and medium-sized technology companies.
Germany is home to more than a thousand hidden champion companies in
niche sectors, while over 90% of small and micro enterprises in Tokyo are tech-
nology companies. To benchmark global standard, a favorable policy environ-
ment should be provided for innovation-oriented small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), and synergy created between large and small enterprises in
innovation and commercialization. Second, encouraging open, integrated,
trans-disciplinary and trans-sector innovation. Such innovation is a defining
feature of the new round of technological revolution. China has the world’s
most comprehensive industrial system and strong industrial supporting capa-
bility. New technologies such as industrial Internet help the system to maxi-
mize the effect of convergence and innovation. There are numerous industries
distributed within major city clusters, closely connected along the industrial
chain. Breakthroughs in a single industry or even a single product and technol-
ogy may rapidly spill over into upstream and downstream industries. There-
fore, city clusters should empower open and integrated innovation to seek
breakthrough of choke point technologies and develop common technologies
that underpin multiple industries. Third, encouraging joint and collaborative
innovation across regions. In major innovative city clusters in the United
States, Japan and the United Kingdom, core cities and their periphery consti-
tute regional innovation belts. China’s five major city clusters should learn
from international practice. Innovation capability should be concentrated and
distributed at the regional level rather than the city level. Regional innovation
belts can be set up to promote joint innovation, where neighboring cities can
contribute their strengths and resources, supplement each other in innovation,
and collectively gain global influence.
World-class city clusters and metropolises bear the greatest potential to engen-
der new global industries, products and business models.
First, taking preemptive measures to develop frontier industries such as bi-
otech, recyclable technologies, intelligent manufacturing, and big data infor-
mation platforms. The five major city clusters and central cities should guide
and develop these industries according to their local advantages. Second, en-
hancing competitiveness of the industrial ecosystem. International industrial
competition is evolving from company and product level to ecosystem level.
China has an obvious edge in this regard, and can expand industrial chains in
and among city clusters, so as to form a flat and platform-shaped system for
the division of labor. Third, prioritizing the development of modern service
industry. The service sector contributes to 70% of GDP and employment in in
metropolises. In the service sector, modern urban services have the most
198 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
prominent role to play. Therefore, major city clusters and central cities will
adopt an industrial pattern for integrated development of primary, secondary
and tertiary industries, with a special focus on service-oriented economy. It will
promote the development of modern services such as innovation, finance, edu-
cation and health care.
The urban area, population size, and provision of infrastructure and public
services of each Chinese city is determined based on administrative division. In
order to enhance comprehensive competitiveness and promote further integra-
tion, a series of measures have been carried out in major city clusters such as
the Yangtze River Delta, the Greater Bay Area, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Re-
gion, and the Chengdu-Chongqing Area on infrastructure, industrial layout,
public services, urban planning, land use, etc. However, in general, their com-
petitiveness is still severely limited by administrative division. First, accelerat-
ing the formulation of a unified plan for land use, urban and industrial
development for city clusters. To make that happen, planning and implementa-
tion should escalate to the city-cluster level, so that economically dynamic
large cities can receive a larger quota of new land for construction and devel-
opment. Comprehensive consideration of infrastructure investment will help
to connect dead-end roads and pave the last mile for urban mobility. Second,
offering residents of city clusters equal access to basic public services as soon
as possible. Basic public services, social security, and social governance in city
clusters will be further integrated to provide better and equitable services ac-
cording to the principle of joint contribution and shared benefits. Public ser-
vice resources will be allocated according to the size of permanent population
instead of administrative level. This will promote the sharing of high quality
resources, such as education and health care. Third, establishing a unified and
open market system. Measures will be taken to cope with regional fragmenta-
tion, industrial monopoly and market barriers, revoke regulations and prac-
tices detrimental to the development of a unified market and fair competition,
and create a cluster-wide market environment with open and uniform rules,
commonly acknowledged standards, and free flow of factors of production.
Major city clusters should take the lead in mutual recognition of the accumu-
lated years of residence and social security contribution as a prerequisite to
grant local Hukou. They should also remove the urban–rural Hukou barrier to
facilitate orderly flow and reasonable distribution of the population for social
integration.
for high efficient development. Revising the procedure on repurposing land use
to encourage wholesale land transfer and moderately lifting floor area ratio in
development plan. Centralizing project plan, design, renovation and operation
to maintain financial viability.
Smart cities are characterized by the use of IOT, cloud computing, big data,
spatial geographic information integration and other new information technol-
ogies. As a new concept and model to promote urban planning, construction
and management, it is an integrated platform for the application and demon-
stration new technologies. First, building smart government by integrating and
sharing government information systems. Promoting the model of “Internet
plus government services”, prioritizing targeted governance, and guiding all
regions to upgrade urban governance with the new generation of information
technology including big data and IoT. Advocating a data-based new model of
urban management to deliver precision management, people-friendly services
and better governance. Second, integrating AI, block chain, cloud computing
and big data to strengthen government capability of social governance and
Strategic path and policies for China’s high-quality urbanization 201
China’s experience shows that opening up is essential to the rise of cities. China
has developed a new pattern of all-round, multi-level and wide-range opening
up to the world, a leading contributor to its high-quality urbanization. In the
next stage of development, it should adapt to the new round of technological
revolution and intensified competition among city clusters worldwide, follow
advanced international rules and standards, focus on institutional opening up,
create a favorable environment for the development of open-up cities, and bet-
ter compete with cities around the world.
First, gradually designating more cities to host free trade zones and industrial
parks. Free trade zones and industrial parks enjoy the frontier of open-
ing up in China, essential to the global competitiveness of their host cit-
ies. Drawing on the experience of free trade zones in Shanghai, Tianjin,
Fujian and Guangdong, more pilot policies and reform measures will be
implemented in new free trade zones and industrial parks. Proven experi-
ence and practices from their pilot operation will be replicated in other
cities according to national strategy, so as to lift opening up of Chinese
cities to the next level.
Second, fully implementing pre-establishment national treatment with a nega-
tive list. Streamlining administrative procedures that govern foreign in-
vestment projects and the incorporation and alteration of foreign-fund
enterprises, so as to shift focus to supervision during and post establish-
ment. Improving market access system for foreign investment and the
management system for pre-establishment national treatment plus a neg-
ative list. In accordance with risk assessment and terms of the U.S-China
Economic and Trade Agreement (Phase One), gradually easing restric-
tion on foreign investment in key service sectors, and providing fair, rea-
sonable and non-discriminatory market access treatment in areas such as
banking, securities, insurance and electronic payment.
Third, encouraging urban industries to go global and improving the perfor-
mance and efficiency of outbound investment. Scaling up trade in service
with facilitation and liberalization. Transforming urban service industry
and fostering new competitive advantages with big data, cloud comput-
ing, IoT, mobile Internet and other emerging technologies. Simplifying
the management of overseas investment by adopting a notification-based
mechanism, except for prescribed special circumstances. Encouraging
204 The new round of technological revolution and China’s urbanization
The three secondary indicators of social security, education and medical care,
and infrastructure are compiled to provide an objective and comprehensive
assessment of social development of cities and the welfare of their residents.
Social security is measure by urban employment rate, and the share of urban
workers with basic pension insurance and medical insurance. Education and
medical care is measured by number of full-time teachers per 10,000 people,
number of students per 10,000 people and number of licensed physicians (as-
sistant physicians) per 10,000 people. Infrastructure is measured by number of
broadband Internet subscribers per 10,000 people and number of books held
in public libraries per 10,000 people. With high-quality development of cities,
people will be more aspired for a better life. Joint efforts are needed to address
unbalanced and insufficient development of cities (Table 10.1).
To eliminate incommensurability caused by the design and calculation of
the indicators, it is necessary to non-dimensionalize tier-3 indicators in meas-
urement. Since they are all positive single indicators (higher value suggests bet-
ter performance), equalization method is used to first calculate dimensionalized
value of each tier-3 indicator with the following equation:
x ip
y ip =
xp
yip is the demensionalized value of indicator i of city p; xip is the actual value of
the indicator i of city p; x p is the mean value of indicator i.
The linear weighting model scores each indicator according to the following
equations.
Q w Y
1
i i
Yi w y
1
ij ij
Innovative Innovation input Number of R&D personnel per 10,000 Number of R&D personnel/total
Inclusive Social security Urban employment rate Urban workers employed/(urban workers
development employed + urban workers seeking
employment)
Proportion of urban workers covered by Number of urban workers covered by basic
basic pension insurance pension insurance/number of urban workers
Proportion of urban workers covered by Number of urban workers covered by basic
basic medical insurance medical insurance/number of urban workers
Education and Number of full-time teachers per 10,000 Number of full-time teachers (in higher
medical care people education institutions + secondary
vocational schools + primary and secondary
schools)/total population * 10,000
Number of students per 10,000 people Number of students (in higher education
institutions + secondary vocational schools)/
total population
Number of licensed physicians (assistant Number of licensed physicians (assistant
physicians) per 10,000 people physicians)/total population*10,000
Infrastructure Number of broadband Internet subscribers Number of broadband Internet subscribers/
per 10,000 people total population*10,000
Number of books held in public libraries per Number of books held in public libraries/total
10,000 people population*10,000
Source: DRC IME.
Strategic path and policies for China’s high-quality urbanization 211
10.9 Summary
According to international experience and China’s trajectory of urbanization,
it is essential to make timely and effective institutional and policy adjustments
at different stages of development to meet challenges and ensure healthy
urbanization. As China approaches the advanced stage of urbanization, the
incumbent development roadmap is no longer viable. New drivers of urbaniza-
tion are on the rise, including effective inter-city and urban–rural allocation of
resources, productivity gains from the prosperity of city clusters, potential
demand in the huge domestic market and institutional dividends of reform
and opening-up.
The new round of technological revolution provides a strong impetus for
high-quality urbanization in the new era. We should seize the development
opportunities during the expansion stage of the technological revolution,
transform and upgrade urban industrial structure, optimize the spatial pattern
of urbanization with city cluster as the main form, improve urban governance
system and deepen innovation-oriented institutional reform.
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Chongqing Southwest China Normal University Press, 2018.
Sassen, Saskia, Cities in a World Economy, Fifth Edition in Chinese, Truth and Wisdom
Press, 2020.
Wang, W., Wang, Q., et al. China to Build Modern Market System, China Development
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Future, Truth and Wisdom Press, 2017.
Postscript
Institute of Market Economy (IME) has been one of the earliest institutes
established under the Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Coun-
cil, PRC. It has engaged in policy research programs on market systems, con-
sumption, circulation, service industry, property market, etc. It has played a
vital role in supporting China’s reform and development of pricing, circula-
tion, futures market, housing system, and modern market system with pioneer-
ing intellectual support.
While working on the joint research project Urban China: Toward Efficient,
Inclusive and Sustainable Urbanization between DRC and the World Bank, I
gained a deeper appreciation for the role urbanization in China’s path to mod-
ernization. The research topics of IME, such as consumption, circulation, ser-
vice industry, property market, and market systems, are closely related to
urbanization. In 2016, I became the director of IME and started to advocate
for basic research on urbanization among my colleagues. I strongly believe that
we need deepen our understanding of the laws of urbanization to accurately
capture the mid- to long-term trends of consumption, circulation, service
industry, and property market. This understanding will help us identify the
desired economic and social conditions and institutional environment, refine
policy recommendations, and lay a solid foundation for China’s development.
My proposal to focus on basic research on urbanization was met with
enthusiasm and support by Dr. Long Guoqiang, Vice President of DRC. He
recognized that urbanization was a defining theme of global development, hav-
ing originated from the Industrial Revolution and fueled by episodes of tech-
nological revolution. With the ongoing boom of technology worldwide, it
poses a novel academic challenge to study the dynamics of urbanization in
China and the world in connection with technological revolution. Thanks to
the in-depth communication and joint leadership of Dr. Long Guoqiang and
Mr. Arnoud Balhuize, Chief Commercial Officer of BHP Billington, as well as
the endorsement of President Li Wei of DRC and Mr. Andrew Mackenzie,
CEO of BHP Billington, a three-year cooperative research agreement was
signed in January 2018 between IME and BHP on New Technological Revolu-
tion and China’s Urbanization.
DOI: 10.4324/9781032663180-14
Postscript 213
To conduct this cutting-edge research, the research team, mostly from IME,
held brainstorming sessions to define the research approach and framework.
The goals were to identify the inherent mechanism and trajectory of urbaniza-
tion and its effect on the scale, industrial mix, system, and governance of cities
by reflecting on the interaction between technological revolutions and corre-
sponding chapters of urbanization; shed light on how the new technological
revolution may affect economic and social progress and urbanization by delv-
ing into its main content and evolution, and make a projection on emerging
trends and challenges of the successive wave of urbanization; and contextual-
ize the laws of urbanization and the impact of the new technological revolu-
tion with China’s national condition to highlight the major trends and pros-
pect of China’s urbanization in the new era of development. The findings of
the research were expected to inspire strategic thoughts and policy measures
for high-quality urbanization in China.
Throughout the three years of hard work, we were fortunate to have received
unreserved support and guidance from the DRC leadership, including CPC Sec-
retary Mr. Ma Jiantang, Vice President Wang Anshun, and Vice President Long
Guoqiang. The success of the program wouldn’t have been possible without
valuable inputs from Research Fellow Wu Jinglian and Liu Shijin of DRC, Pro-
fessor Wu Hequan, Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Mr. Xu
Lin, Chairman of the Sino-U.S. Green Fund, as well as experts and leaders
from National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Housing
and Urban-Rural Development, Ministry of Industry and Information Tech-
nology, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Science and Technology, and
Financial and Economic Committee of National People’s Congress, etc. We
would also like to thank Prof. Li Shantong and Dr. Zhang Jin for reviewing this
book and giving revision suggestions. In addition to IME staff, the team also
comprised experts from Research Department of Innovation Development and
Research Department of Industrial Economy of DRC, Rural Development
Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Energy Research Institute
of National Development and Reform Commission, China Center for Informa-
tion Industry Development under Ministry of Industry and Information Tech-
nology, Tongji University, and B eijing Jiaotong University, among others.
From March 2018 to December 2019, extensive field research was con-
ducted at home and abroad, covering Chengdu-Chongqing, Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta (including Hong Kong SAR)
and other large domestic city clusters. They also visited major cities in Singa-
pore, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, Czech Republic, and
other countries. To further enrich the research, the team engaged in interna-
tional seminars and visiting scholar programs, collaborating with fellow
research institutions such as the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Oxford Univer-
sity, the Brookings Institution, and the Development Strategy Research
Department of BHP Billiton for in-depth exchanges. Throughout the research
program, the team hosted eight large-scale seminars and over ten workshops to
214 Postscript
BHP Billiton
World Economic Forum (WEF)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
China Development Research Foundation (CDRF)
Rural Development Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission
China Center for Information Industry Development
College of Transportation Engineering, Tongji University
School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University
School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University
Wang Wei
Director General/Research Fellow, IME DRC
On June 8th, 2023
Index
Pages in italics refer to figures, pages in bold refer to tables, and pages followed
by “n” refer to notes.
acceleration stage 6, 10, 24, 29, 58–61, city clusters 15, 25, 27, 58, 62, 76–77, 81,
149, 153–154 119, 131, 133, 138, 140, 144–146, 146,
administrative intervention 68 148, 153, 156–158, 162n2, 163–164,
advanced robots 83 166–167, 175, 179–180, 187–191, 195,
advanced stage 6–8, 12, 15–16, 21, 25, 30, 199, 202–203, 211, 213
45, 62, 64, 66, 74, 165, 211 Clean Air Act 17
age of electricity 33, 36–37 climate change 84, 92
age of information 33, 37 cloud computing 83, 85–87, 107, 109,
age of steam 33, 37 127, 149, 163, 165, 172, 175, 200, 203
agglomeration effect 15, 28, 120, 187 collective breakthrough 87, 100
artificial intelligence 46, 83–85, 90–92, 95 competition mechanism 65
autonomous driving 84, 95–97, 99, 125, consumer market 9, 128n7, 169, 171, 185
188, 205 coordinated development 76, 131, 133,
144–145, 149, 159, 166–167, 180, 187,
basic research 69–71, 192–193, 212 207, 209
Belt and Road Initiative 140 corporate system 41
big data 81, 84–85, 87–88, 90, 103, 108, cutting-edge technology 97
109–110, 123, 127, 149, 159, 163–164, cyber-physical system 85, 107
168–169, 172–175, 189, 193, 197,
199–200, 203 deployment phase 33–34, 51, 53n1
blockchain 90, 168 Detroit 59, 75
British enclosure movement 39 de-urbanization 134
Brookings Institution 119, 122, 213 digital divide 112–113, 177–178, 204–205
business model 10, 35, 81, 84, 140, 154, digital economy 84, 86, 90, 103–104, 113,
160, 163–166, 168, 171–172, 192–194, 113n3, 114n8, 153–154, 158–159, 163,
197, 206 166, 168, 177, 194, 205
digitalization x, 85–86, 100, 169, 194
capital-intensive 16, 60–61, 139 digital technology 83, 85–88, 103–104,
carbon-free 92 109–112, 118, 122–123, 126–128,
catching-up economies 18 166, 176
catch-up urbanization 18 digital twin 86, 127
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences distributed energy 87, 92–93, 123
213, 215 driving force 13, 66, 76, 115, 118, 131
chip technology 86
Chris Freeman 36 East Asia 18, 116–117, 170, 176
city brain 105, 174–175 ecological protection 145, 148, 161, 199
Index 217
e-commerce 8, 35, 86, 103–104, 106, 109, hub-spoke effect 27, 138, 150–151
113, 122, 168–169, 170, 173, 173, 194 human capital 18, 20, 23, 29, 64, 154,
economic structure 1, 3, 7, 27, 45, 55, 57, 164, 184, 193
60–61, 64, 66, 68, 160, 167, 180 humboldt education system 69
education and research institution 61, 76 hybrid vehicle 97, 99
education system 1, 69–70 hydrogen fuel 92, 95
e-government 125–127, 174
emerging industries 1, 7, 8, 30, 69, 71, ICT industry 36
73–75, 77–78, 84, 103, 113, 115, 157, IMF 113
167, 185, 193 income gap 42–43, 53n11, 11, 113,
employment substitution 111, 113 175–177, 204
energy storage 83, 87, 92, 97 industrial chain 104
energy technology 33, 83–84, 92–93, 100, industrial city 9, 60, 65, 81, 103–104, 105,
110, 113, 171, 188 108, 113, 124, 157, 189, 192–193,
explosion phase 33–34, 46, 51 195, 197
industrialization 117
factor mobility 30–31, 65 industrialization-led urbanization 59, 68
factor of production 86, 103–104, 106, industrialization of agriculture 24
131, 159, 174 industrial research laboratories 34
fair competition 67, 159–160, 188, industrial revolution 3, 6, 8–10, 13, 16, 20,
202, 206 24, 26, 36, 38, 43–44, 46, 51, 56–58, 61,
financial crisis 84 64, 71–73, 83, 85–86, 101n1, 103, 109,
financial liberalization 63 112, 163, 166–167, 212
financing model 61, 133, 188 industrial upgrade 18
financial system 57, 60–61, 72 Industry 4.0 9, 85, 108, 114, 188
5G 86, 88, 124, 126, 163–164, 169, 193, industry Internet 108
199, 205 inequality of opportunity 8, 177, 178
five-year plan 95, 98, 138, 140, 146, 167, information economy 87
169, 180, 185, 214 information industry 13, 137, 213, 215
fourth industrial revolution 73, 85 infrastructure investment 74, 154, 198
initial stage 6–10, 18, 25, 30, 55–56,
general technology 34–36, 41, 51 66, 74, 133
globalization 7, 13, 21, 23, 40, 59, 65, innovation capability 64, 133, 140, 149,
74–75, 106, 113, 128n2, 138, 150, 166, 194–195, 197, 207
171, 207 innovation-driven growth 185
global market 39–40, 55 installation phase 33–34, 51, 53n1
governance capability 21, 49, 73–74, 76, institutional and policy adjustments 24,
78, 126–128, 148–149, 166, 180, 190 29, 31, 211
government-led growth strategy 18 institutional framework 37, 68
great depression 20 institutional innovation 41, 51, 174
green production 188 institutional reform 68, 191, 201–202, 211
ground-breaking scientific intellectual property system 41, 71
discoveries 36, 51 intermediate stage 7, 10, 12, 14, 21, 25,
growth momentum 66, 168 30, 58, 60, 66
international metropolises 65, 123, 189, 196
heavy and chemical industry 7, 10 internet of everything 86–88
high-caliber talent 64, 166 internet of things 83, 85–88, 90, 103, 107,
high-level opening-up 131 108, 149, 159, 168–169
high-quality labor force 64 internet plus government services 200
high-quality urbanization 6, 10, 15–17, intra-city spatial structure 47, 53
20–21, 27, 31, 131, 163, 179, 189, 191,
193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203, 205, 207, knowledge-intensive cities 122
209, 211, 213–214 knowledge-intensive high-tech
high-speed railway 83, 110, 204 industries 12
218 Index