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MODULE 6: circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
PEOPLE VS TANEO
GR NO L-37673
MARCH 31, 1933
FACTS:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house
of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte.
On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in
the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the
house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis
Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went
to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the
room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried
to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen.
Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis
Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he
wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven
months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her
wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the
mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano
Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by the
trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence,
the defendant appealed.
The conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a
dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
ISSUE:
WON the defendant is liable
RULING:
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into
consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive
for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean
that there are none, but that simply they are not known
to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's
conscience where they may be found, hidden away and
inaccessible to our observation.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of
the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering the
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
a dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in
his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the
supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct
result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict
it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence
does not clearly show this to have been the case, but
that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw
how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not
testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to
have heard her say that she was wounded. What the
evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the
sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room
as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that
he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself
from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was
really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the
judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with
which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be
confined in the Government insane asylum.
PEOPLE VS BONOAN
GR NO L-45130
FEBRUARY 17, 1937
FACTS:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City
of Manila filed an information charging Celestino
Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime
of murder
The defense counsel forthwith objected to the
arraignment on the ground that the defendant was
mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the
Psychopatic Hospital. Dr. Fernandez appeared before
the court and ratified his report, stating that the accused
was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof,
the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the
court that the defendant could be discharged from the
hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a
recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr.
Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had
recovered from the disease.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the
defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased
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Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close
to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the
time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in
Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw
the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a
knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog,
"I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would
kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side.
The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso
Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan
and took possession of the knife.
ISSUE:
The defense set up being that of insanity, the only
question to be determined in this appeal is whether or
not the defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the
commission of the crime charged. (Insane at the time of
commission of the crime, Dementia)
RULING:
To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish
insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from physical
ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity.
In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with
connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the
continuance thereof during the intervening period or
periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated
attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and
ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of. Upon
the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of
record which cannot be overlooked.
From the evidence presented by the defense,
uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the
herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April
11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10,
1926, was confined in the insane department of the San
Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed
as dementia præcox. His confinement during these
periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the
offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a
circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of
the ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is
not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific
foundation.
All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly
to be regarded as having mental disease to a degree
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FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their
actions.
the date when the crime was committed — the
defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia",
which is one of the symptoms of, and may lead
to, dementia præcox.
The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested
and taken to the police station on the very same day of
the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted
were made by detectives to secure a statement from him
(see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t.
s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police department to
the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the
commission of the crime. This is an indication that the
police authorities themselves doubted the mental
normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation
in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the
San Lazaro Hospital.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the
defendant-appellant was demented at the time he
perpetrated the serious offense charged in the
information and that conseuently he is exempt from
criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower
court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant
acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances.
PEOPLE VS FORMIGONES
GR NO L-3246
NOVEMBER 29, 1950
FACTS:
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant
Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao,
Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with
his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there
they went to live in the house of his half-brother,
Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the
same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as
harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay or rather
on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was
sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The
accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and
stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating
the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage
resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent
Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately
followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in
his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor
of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this
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position he was found by the people who came in
response to the shouts for help made by his eldest
daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified
to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo
signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he
admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of
jealousy because according to his statement he used to
have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often
saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he
suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations
because he noticed that his had become indifferent to
him (defendant).
His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of
the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the
effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that
he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he
would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the
presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would
remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he
would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until
forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he
would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even
alone by himself without being asked; and that once
when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly
darted from inside into the prison compound apparently
in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the
appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from
criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code.
According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr.
Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion
that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness
and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from
wrong.
ISSUE:
WON the formigones is exempt from criminal liability.
(No, the behaviour only constitutes a sign of remorse
and not of imbecility.)
RULING:
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile
within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must
be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
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FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his
confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being
feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental
condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that
the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the
evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has
not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as
to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He
regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five
children, and supported his family and even maintained
in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his
work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a
man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent
measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he
suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in
doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions
were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he
believed her faithless.
He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple,
and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been
fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his
wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her
upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for
hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his
loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him.
PEOPLE VS PUNO
GR NO L-33211
JUNE 29, 1981
FACTS:
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the
afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a
jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of
Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was
located in the area known as Little Baguio, Barrio
Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her
by saying: "Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon
kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and
struck her several times on the head with a hammer until
she was dead.
They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look
was baleful and menacing.
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After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio
Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his
second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San
Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the
evening. How he was able to go to that place, which was
then flooded, is not shown in the record.
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had
left, notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal
Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay
sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was
bloody. Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He
took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the
police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer .
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified
about five months after the killing, pretended that he did
not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that
there are persons who are "mangkukulam,"
"mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when one
is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or
his hands might swan. Puno believes that a person
harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a headache or
a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a
quack doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary
to kill the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However,
instead of proving that puno was insane when he killed
Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted
with discernment.
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section
of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom
Puno was referred for treatment ten times between
September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that
Puno was an out-patient who could very well live with
society, although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic
reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he
had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno
admitted to Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his
restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his
financial problem.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a
homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he would have
killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out
Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her
because he thought that she was a witch.
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death
sentence, contends that the trial court erred in not
sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating
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evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard of sex as aggravating circumstances.
ISSUE:
WON the defense of insanity can be given credence.
RULING:
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized
the killing as murder.
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the
light of the strict rule just stated and the circumstances
surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that
Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless
and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the
psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was
not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.
DISSENTING OPINION OF J. MAKASIARS
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the
crime of murder. He was mentally ill when he committed
the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-
year old widow. His medical records, as properly
evaluated and confirmed by the expert testimony of the
three physicians/psychiatrists who examined and treated
him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had
been ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as
chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type. Appellant
was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim.
He previously suffered from a "displacement of
aggressive and hostile behavior" when he got angry with
his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He had
the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting
harm on him. This delusion found its mark on the victim
whom he believed was the "mangkukulam" and fearing
that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her in self-
defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere
consequence of his mental delusion. He killed the
"mangkukulam" as personified by the victim; he did not
kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made
by appellant in defending himself from the
"mangkukulam".
While it has been established that appellant was
"manageable" and was "presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the trial, the
fact remains that at the very moment of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still a mentally sick person.
No evidence was produced to prove otherwise against
the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly
indicative of his mental psychosis.
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As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic
does not mean that he is "cured" (totally recovered) from
the disease.
PEOPLE VS DUNGO
GR NO 89420
JULY 31, 1991
FACTS:
On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the
accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the Department of
Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk,
the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was
carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After
which he departed from the office with blood stained
clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The
autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14
wounds, 5 of which were fatal. Rodolfo Sigua, husband
of the deceased, testified that sometime in February
1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him
why his wife was requiring so many documents from
him. Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the DAR.
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he
was insane at the time of the commission of the offense:
Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife
noticed that he appears to be in deep thought always,
maltreating their children when he was not used to it
before. There were also times that her husband would
inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in
truth they were not.
On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of
stomachache but they didn't bother to buy medicine as
the pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went
back to the store. But when Andrea followed him to the
store, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for
him. On her way home, she heard people saying that a
stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her parents-
in-law's house with people milling around. She asked her
husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino
answered, "That's the only cure for my ailment. I have
cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a
number of days, I would die.” That same day, the
accused went to Manila. Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez
of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per
order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on
the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino
was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the
commission of the alleged crime and classified his
insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat
who treated the
accused for ailments secondary to stroke, and Dr. Lim
who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive
disease, concluded that Rosalino was somehow
rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their
clinic.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was insane during the commission of
the crime charged.
RULING:
No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability,
it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the
least discernment and that there be complete absence
or deprivation of the freedom of the will. Under Philippine
jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for
insanity. However, the definition of insanity under Sec
1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be
applied. In essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a
deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the
nature and consequence of his act. Evidence of insanity
must refer to the mental condition at the very time of
doing the act. However, it is also permissible to receive
evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period
before and after the time of the act in question.
The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward
acts. It is not usual for an insane person to confront a
specified person who may have wronged him. But in the
case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua.
From this, it can be inferred that the accused was aware
of his acts. This also established that the accused has
lucid intervals. Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the
effect that the appellant could have been aware of the
nature of his act at the time he committed it when he
shouted (during laboratory examination) that he killed
Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that
the accused was insane when he committed the act. The
fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where
he hid the fatal weapon, that he ran away from the scene
of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times,
that he fled to Manila to evade arrest, indicate that he
was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts
in stabbing the victim. (This was taken from the TC's
decision). Judgment: questioned decision AFFIRMED.
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PEOPLE VS RAFANAN
GR NO L-54135
NOVEMBER 21, 1991
FACTS:
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27,
1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only
fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the
mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias "Baket Ines"
with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived
with his mother in the same house at Barangay San
Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then
married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita
Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in
their store which was located in front of their house
about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the
time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening,
the accused called the complainant to help him close the
door of the store and as the latter complied and went
near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the
store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse,"
to which Estelita replied, "I do not like," and struggled to
free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo
measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he
pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her
with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to
lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after
unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of
complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of
her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the
sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the
complainant not to report the matter to her mother or
anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately
report the matter and did not leave the house of the
accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the
house of the accused that evening and the following
morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine
work in the house. She only left the house in the evening
of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family
of the accused learned what happened the night before
in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a
quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya
to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother
confronted her and asked her why she went home that
evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and
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cried. It was only the following morning on March 18,
1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was
raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened to
her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately
accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo
Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio
San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is
a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised
them to proceed to the municipal building while he went
to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to
the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which
the accused allegedly used in threatening the
complainant.
The principal submission of appellant is that he was
suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions
upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial court
suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at
the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for
observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case
was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital
on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June
1978.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from
criminal liability. —
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he
shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on
the insanity defense, it was only in People vs.
Formigones that the Court elaborated on the required
standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from the
Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the
Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order
that this exempting circumstance may be taken
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into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts
without the least discernment; that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act
should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant
had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime,
it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.
Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be
voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person
acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability,
on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity
and absence of will are proved.
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly
adopted in subsequent cases. A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests
that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable
tests: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the
test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation
freedom of the will."
In the present case:
The fact that Rafanan threatened the complainant
Estelita with death should she reveal she has been
sexually assaulted by him indicates that Rafanan was
aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault.
In any case, it is the complete loss of intelligence which
must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity
is to be found.
Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing
evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before
and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been
held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused
should relate to the period immediately before or at the
very moment the act is committed. Appellant rested his
case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr.
Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport
to characterize his mental condition during that critical
period of time. They did not specifically relate to
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circumtances occurring on or immediately before the day
of the rape.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of
appellant Rafanan.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that
schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because
it does not completely deprive the offender of the
consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a
mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the
Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness
which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-
power without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been
credited with this mitigating circumstance, although it
would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him
under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases
in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty
(reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed."
PEOPLE VS MADARANG
GR NO 132319
MAY 12, 2000
FACTS:
The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally married and
their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The
accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He
was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In
1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed
there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he
returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and started
a hardware store business. His venture however failed.
Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting.
In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia
and their children were forced to stay in the house of
Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support
his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with
their eight child and was about to give birth.
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused
and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of
another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the
heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the
accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise.
The accused declared that he has absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 8
remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not
know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one
of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a
picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her
death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her
demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he
suffered from any mental illness and did not remember
being confined at the NCMH for treatment.
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH
revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis
known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at
the hospital and was administered medication for his
illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years
of confinement, the accused was discharged from the
NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was
already found fit to face the charges against him.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife,
he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his
criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could
allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident.
Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that
fateful day and must have committed the crime without
the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved
he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited the
testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go
into extremes — he may be violent and destructive, or
very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his
violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife
and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that
they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did
not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to
anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is
peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a
sane person who just committed a crime would have
appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that
what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion
that there was a high possibility that he was already
suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the
crime on September 3, 1993. 17 The defense posits that
his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of
fortune. His hardware business, which he started
through 16 years of working as a seaman, went
bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his
mother-in-law for his family's support and all these may
have been beyond his capacity to handle.
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and
his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day
should be considered. The marked change in his
behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his
wife on that day and suddenly turned violent on her
confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he
committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill
Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth child
three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by
something beyond his control, nobody in his right mind
would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy,
the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse.
ISSUE:
WON the defense of insanity can be given merit. (NO)
RULING:
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more
stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of
the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a
condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means
of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the
mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind
can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is
intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness
who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was
insane based on the witness' own perception of the
accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert,
such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the
accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or
coetaneous with the commission of the offense with
which he is charged.
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be
suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to
the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books
describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy
and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions.
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 9
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant
declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or
simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the
record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or
bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that
fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a
high possibility that the appellant was already suffering
from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also
declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during
which they are capable of distinguishing right from
wrong.
Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that the
appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he
committed the offense. Although the appellant was
diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the
stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact
of commission of the offense may be accorded weight
only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to the commission
of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer
to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the
very moment of its execution.
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the
defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at
the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence
on record to show that the appellant was completely of
unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the
commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by
the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and
non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely
no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a
mere general denial that can be made with facility. The
fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the
sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his
wife does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that
the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant
attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife
an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of
stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance.
Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never
seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself
prove the appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither
can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to
kill a pregnant spouse.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that
he lost his business and became totally dependent on
his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however,
purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre
behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his
fortune and prior to his commission of the crime that may
be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the
appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time
that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her
house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal
in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested
that he was suffering from any mental illness.
PEOPLE VS ROBIOS
GR NO 138453
MAY 29, 2002
FACTS:
Appellant assaulted his pregnant wife.
On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the
morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños was in his
parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling,
Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his
parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim
Lorenza Robiños, who were at the sala, quarrelling.
Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you
come home, why don't you just leave?' After hearing
what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about
five meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife,
stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from
where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor.
Upon witnessing appellant's attack on his mother,
Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his
grandmother's house where he reported the incident.
Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant,
who was lying on his side and holding a bloodstained
double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing
his wife. He was uttering the words, 'I will kill myself, I
will kill myself.' Lorenza, who was lying on her back and
facing upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared
to be dead.
On the police report:
The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months
pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the different
parts of her body.
'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence
of liquor/drunk [who] came home and argued/quarreled
with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double
knife and delivered forty one (41) stab blows.
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 10
the defense interposed insanity. Herein accused-
appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in
their house and there was no unusual incident that
happened on that date. He did not know that he was
charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. He could not remember when he was informed
by his children that he killed his wife. He could not
believe that he killed his wife.
ISSUE:
WON the defense of insanity can be given credence.
(NO)
RULING:
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely
deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at
the time of the commission of the crime. A defendant in
a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental
incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of
insanity at the very moment when the crime was
committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the
crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
considered.
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity
and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every
person is presumed to be of sound mind. Accordingly,
one who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
has the burden of proving it. Failing this, one will be
presumed to be sane when the crime was committed.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that
appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and
wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both
prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial
evidence that appellant was completely deprived of
reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal
killing of his wife.
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation preceded
the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant
attacked his wife for no reason at all and without
knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act
of stabbing her was a deliberate and conscious reaction
to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as
attested to by their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robiños.
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding
law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have
been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a
natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the
killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his
claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just
done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the
clarity of mind of appellant when the latter confessed to
the former and to the police officers, and even showed to
them the knife used to stab the victim.
All the other defense witnesses testified on the
supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had
already been detained in prison.
PEOPLE VS OPURAN
GR NO 147674-75
MARCH 17, 2004
FACTS:
There were 2 instances of attack inflicting stab wounds
to Patrimonio and Dacles. Both attacks, Anacito Opuran
used a bladed weapon.
Murder of Dacles (Allan):
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19
November 1998, at about 6:30 p.m., prosecution witness
Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his
house. His brother and a certain Jason Masbang were
outside sitting side by side with each other on a plastic
chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles, who was lying on
a bench.4
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambi’s house,
shouting: "There’s a long-haired man!" Bambi stood up
and looked through the open door. He saw appellant
Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife while
the latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the
bench. Although Allan had several stab wounds on
different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and
run inside Bambi’s house, with Anacito chasing him.
Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to
prevent Anacito from entering. But the latter tried to force
the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He
also threw stones at the door. After a short while,
Anacito left.
He saw Anacito’s two brothers and asked for their
assistance. But one of them merely said: "Never mind
because he [referring to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced.
Murder of Patrimonio:
Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 11
dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national
highway, near the so-called "lover’s lane," Anacito
emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr.
with a knife about three to four times.
DEFENSE:
he defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant
himself, Anacito Opuran. He declared that on the
evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their
house in Canlapwas, another barangay in Catbalogan,
Samar. He never went out that night. While he was
sleeping at about 8:30 p.m., eight policemen entered his
house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He
was brought to the police station and detained there until
the following morning. He denied being present at the
place and time of the stabbing incidents. He admitted
knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend
whom he had not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never
knew him. He had no misunderstanding with prosecution
witness Bambi Herrera. He asserted that the
accusations against him were fabricated because he
was envied and lowly regarded by his accusers.
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally
to the failure of the defense to present witnesses. Then
on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the
suspension of the hearing on the following grounds: (1)
on 10 January 2000, upon motion of the defense, the
trial court issued an Order authorizing the psychiatric
examination of Anacito.
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical
Report of Dr. Lyn Verona, physician-psychiatrist of the
EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted
on Anacito. She found that Anacito had a psychotic
disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory
hallucinations. She confirmed her medical findings that
Anacito was psychotic before and during the commission
of the crime and even up to the present so that he could
not stand trial and would need treatment and monthly
check-up. Her diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering
from schizophrenia.
ISSUE:
WON Anacito was insane at the time of the commission
of the crime thus exempting him from criminal liability.
(NO)
RULING:
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct. However, not every aberration of
the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. As
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
consistently held by us, "A man may act crazy, but it
does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is
legally so.
The stringent standard established in People v.
Formigones requires that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the
accused acted without the least discernment because of
a complete absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr., we analyzed
the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests:
(a) the test of cognition – whether there was a "complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act"
and (b) the test of volition – whether there was a "total
deprivation of freedom of the will." We observed that our
case law shows common reliance on the test of
cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has
failed to turn up any case where an accused is
exempted on the sole ground that he was totally
deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an
accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence."
This is expected, since a person’s volition naturally
reaches out only towards that which is represented as
desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be
diseased or healthy.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that
Anacito failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only
Bambi’s personal perception that there was no reason or
occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested
against the stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional
silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to himself,
staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-
minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was
insane immediately before or at the time he committed
the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered
as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will
not exclude imputability.
Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the
stringent yardstick established by case law. What it
shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and
evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to remedy "his
lack of sleep and noisiness." As the trial court noted, it
was never shown that these drugs were for a mental
illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito
was just an out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and
Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that
she requested the confinement of Anacito and that the
doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that Anacito
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 12
was never confined in a mental institution. Although Dr.
Verona testified that there was a recommendation for
Anacito’s confinement, there was no indication in the
records as to when the recommendation was made, who
made the recommendation, and the reason for the
recommendation.
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi, we discarded the
confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to the
incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity,
there being no proof that he was adjudged insane by the
institute. Applying this principle to Anacito’s case, we
find another cogent reason to reject his plea of insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not
subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While
Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for
Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was no
proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that
period. In fact, there was no intimation that he needed
the medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought
medicine for Anacito only in April 2000 because he was
"again noisy in the jail." It seems that it was only after the
stabbing incident, when he was in jail, that his symptoms
reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr.
Verona’s examinations on Anacito were based on
incomplete or insufficient facts. For one thing, she
admitted to have examined Anacito for only three
sessions lasting one to two hours each.
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the
earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in the
year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his
defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the
invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that
the accused was in full control of his mental
faculties. Additionally, the trial judge observed that,
during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-
behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded
to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a
plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant
realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear
indication that insanity is a mere concoction or an
afterthought. In any event, Anacito failed to establish by
convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he
killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus
presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his
conviction.
VERDADERO VS PEOPLE
GR NO 216021
MARCH 2, 2016
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
FACTS:
On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father
Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with
Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that
Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation
pump.
After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station,
the three men made their way home on a tricycle but
stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to buy
some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store
near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the
tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw Verdadero
stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of
Ronnie.
Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's
upper back with the use of a Rambo knife. He again
struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right
shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero
attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself
using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in
the chest.
DEFENSE:
Did not refute the alleged information but interposes a
defense of insanity stating that he had been an
outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department as he
claimed to hear strange voices and had difficulty in
sleeping. Sometime in 2001, Miriam Verdadero (Miriam),
Verdadero's sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC after he became violent and
started throwing stones at a tricycle with a child on
board. Verdadero was confined for two (2) months and
was diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression.
On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia
and was given medications to address his mental illness.
Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors as
he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then, in 2009, he was
again confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a
relapse.
He claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in
the proper state of mind when they were at the police
station before the stabbing took place. Further, it
appeared that Verdadero was having hallucinations after
the stabbing incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-
Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 13
that he had a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident
on March 12, 2009.
ISSUE:
WON the defense of insanity can be given credence.
(YES)
RULING:
The Court finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that
he was insane at the time of the stabbing.
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as
1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was
diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was
diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he
was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009
due to a relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric
care from the time of his first confinement in 1999 until
the stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have
suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from
schizophrenia and the only thing left to be ascertained is
whether he should be absolved from responsibility in
killing Romeo because of his mental state.
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized
by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality,
and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. A showing that an accused is suffering from a
mental disorder, however, does not automatically
exonerate him from the consequences of his act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.
It is true that there is no direct evidence to show
Verdadero's mental state at the exact moment the crime
was committed. This, however, is not fatal to the finding
that he was insane. His insanity may still be shown by
circumstances immediately before and after the incident.
Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr.
Pagaddu may also be taken into account.
Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was
suffering a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident.
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was
his neighbor for a long time. He had observed that there
were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound
mind as he would sometimes become violent. On the
day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that
Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover,
he was immediately transferred to the psychiatry
department because of his impaired sleep and to control
him from harming himself and others.
These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's
testimony that drinking wine, poor sleep and violent
behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the
same testimony that was used as basis for his previous
diagnosis.29 The evidence on record supports the finding
that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus,
Dr. Pagaddu reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's conclusion
that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on
that fateful day.
Verdadero already raised the defense of insanity and
remained steadfast in asserting that he was deprived of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the offense.
He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead,
consistently harped on his mental incapacity. Unlike in
previous cases.
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the
Court does not totally free him from the responsibilities
and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC
expressly states that "[w]hen an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals
or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which
he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining
the permission of the same court." Instead of
incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an
institution where his mental condition may be addressed
so that he may again function as a member of society.
He shall remain confined therein until his attending
physicians give a favorable recommendation for his
release.
PEOPLE VS GENOSA
341 SCRA 493
419 SCRA 537
FACTS:
Main witness: Joeph Valida saw tha appellate going out
of there house with her 2 kids, locking the gate and
taking her children at the waiting area to wait for a bus
going to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph
noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 14
Around 2 days after, the neighbors of Steban Matiga
told him about the foul odor emanating from his house
being rented by Ben and appellant.
Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where
the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the
lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered
with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at
the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the
house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his
son's misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the
mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her]
son.
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going
home after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried
that her husband who was not home yet might have
gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin
Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the
marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find
him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the
Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's
request for her to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following
him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly
ignored him and instead attended to their children who
were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed
with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the
use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or
wire to keep her from watching television. According to
appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her
around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for
help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes
because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed
clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a
rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards
a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her 'You
might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.'
Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a
gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key
to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet.
She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant
then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was
about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter
ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of
her husband by shooting him. She supposedly 'distorted'
the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not
die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr.
Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband
Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-
experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to
explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the
trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in
flashes and probably at that point in time that things
happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma
flashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic
'she was more subdued, she was not super alert
anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the
predicament she is involved. (NOTE Marivic also alleged
that there were multiple times that she wanted to leave
her husband but would reconcile eventually. In her
defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to
Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she
received at the hands of Ben.)
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid
criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of
her unborn child.
ISSUE:
WON self defense can be given credence. (NO)
RULING:
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself
her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly
and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her
to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in
any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a
man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such
as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home,
the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to
accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false
hopes that the relationship will improve.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 15
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced
by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we
cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary,
reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident.
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's
viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary,
reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a
person who has been subjected to repeated, severe
beatings may not be consistent with -- nay,
comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a
similar experience.
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is
somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her
partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing
her, and that there is no escape. Battered women feel
unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to
leave the relationship. Unless a shelter is available, she
stays with her husband, not only because she typically
lacks a means of self-support, but also because she
fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt
even more.
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records
for specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to
the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse
over a long period of time, became afflicted with the
battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find
sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion.
More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that
would confirm the presence of the essential
characteristics of BWS.
(a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimated
partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding
the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent
harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At
the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave
harm to the accused based on the history of violence
perpetuated by the former against the latter.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the
"cycle of violence" supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there
were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a
quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben
started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate
detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However,
that single incident does not prove the existence of the
syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at
least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a
relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense.
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court
reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the
state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the
offense-- she must have actually feared imminent harm
from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill
him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the
one who resorts to self-defense must face a real
threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided
must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger. Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense
may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not
continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-
defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the
victim.Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances.
She was however given a mitigating factor.
PEOPLE VS DOQUENA
GR NO 46539
SEPTEMBER 27, 1939
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted
for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing
him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in
the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 16
trying the case, held that the accused acted with
discernment in committing the act imputed to him.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly
thirteen years, nine months and five days old.
Between 1 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon of November
19,1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one
Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province
of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in
said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at
Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of
the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard
and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape.
Said accused then turned against the deceased
assuming a threatening attitude, for which reason said
deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning
immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in
order to continue playing with him. The accused,
offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of
Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he,
looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack
the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he
approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to
ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who
had heard what the accused had been asking his cousin,
told the latter not to give the accused his knife because
he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused,
however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife
which was in a pocket of his cousin’s pants. Once in
possession of the knife, Valentin Doqueña approached
Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him
another blow with his fist, to which the deceased
answered that he did not want to do so because he
(Juan Ragojos) was bigger than the accused. Juan
Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused,
continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared
and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the
accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he
carried.
ISSUE:
WON the accussed acted with discernment.
RULING:
Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused
mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least
for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance.
However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an
exception from criminal liability of a minor under 15
years but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the
difference between right and wrong, and such capacity
may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by
the records in each case, the very appearance, the very
attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said
minor, not only before and during the commission of the
act, but also after and even during the trial.
Taking into account the fact that when the accused
Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in question, he
was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he
was one of the brightest in said school and was a
captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and
during the time he was studying therein he always
obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that the
accused in committing the crime, acted with discernment
and was conscious of the nature and consequences of
his act, and so also has this court observed at the time
said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial
of this case.
Article 12 section 3 of the Revised Penal Code states
that: A person over nine years of age and under fifteen,
unless he has acted with discernment, in which case,
such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally
irresponsible, the court, in conformity with the provisions
of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to
the care and custody of his family who shall be charged
with his surveillance and education; otherwise, he shall
be committed to the care of some institution or person
mentioned in said Article 80.
ORTEGA VS PEOPLE
GR NO 151085
AUGUST 20, 2008
FACTS:
At the time of commission of rape, the accused was only
13 years old, while the victim AAA was 6, both minors. It
was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on
three different occasions in 1996. The lower courts
convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability
imposed. The case was pending when Republic Act
9344 (R.A. No. 9344) or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted amending the age of
criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years
old. Said law took effect on May 20, 2006. At the time of
the promulgation of judgment, the accused already
reached the age of majority. The Office of the Solicitor
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 17
General (OSG) claimed that petitioner is not exempt
from criminal liability because he is not anymore a child
as defined by R.A. No. 9344. The OSG further claimed
that the retroactive effect of said law is applicable only if
the child-accused is still below 18 years old.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9344 should apply in favour of the minor (now
in age of majority) accused. (YES)
RULING:
The rape case was dismissed and petitioner is hereby
referred to the local social welfare and development
officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention
program.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal
liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed against
AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is
no concomitant exemption from civil liability.
penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No.
9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear
lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner.
No other interpretation is justified, for the simple
language of the new law itself demonstrates the
legislative intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years
old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape.
This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by
petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his
mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never
assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and
the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the
commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age.
Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal
liability.
PEOPLE VS MANTALABA
GR NO 186227
JULY 20, 2011
FACTS:
Allen Mantalaba, 17 years old at the time, was selling
shabu at Purok 4 Brgy 3, Agao District, Butuan City. A
buy bust operation was conducted composed of 2 police
officers (PO1 Pajo and PO1 Simon and 2 poseur-buyer).
Around 7 in the evening when the poseur-buyer
approached Mantalaba and handed the 2 pieces of Php
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
100.00 marked bills in exchange of a sachet of shabu.
The poseur buyer went back to the police officers and
told them that the transaction has been completed and
they rushed to the place and handcuffed Mantalaba. In
the presence of barangay officials, the police officers
found a big sachet of shabu and the marked money that
Mantalaba thrown on the ground. The laboratory
examination revealed that the substance recovered from
Mantalaba is an illegal drugs (methamphetamine
hydrochloride).
Thereafter, two information were filed against him for
violation of Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165, selling and
possession of dangerous drugs respectively. The RTC
find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and meted a
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for selling shabu without
considering his minority at the time of the commission of
the crime. He was also sentence for 6 yrs and 1 day, as
minimum, to 8 yrs as maximum of Prision Mayor,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for illegal
possession of shabu.
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested,
this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of his
minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant
was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust
operation took place or when the said offense was
committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the
promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20,
2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this
case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was
no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the
sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D.
603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at
the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the
imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165
is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been
entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections
38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive
application.
ISSUE:
WON Allen Mantalaba may be given the benefit of RA
9344’s retrospective application. (YES, but not to the
suspension only to the penalty.)
RULING:
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 18
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen
(18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of
twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his
suspension of sentence, because such is already moot
and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have
happened if the CA, when this case was under its
jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant.
The records show that the appellant filed his notice of
appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344
became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old,
and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter
should have suspended the sentence of the appellant
because he was already entitled to the provisions of
Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the
penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article
192 of P.D. 603.
A violation of Section 5 RA 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act)
merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death;
however, in Section 98, where the offender is minor, the
penalty of life imprisonment to death shall become
reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that
the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the
technical nomenclature of penalties provided in the RPC.
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that
should be imposed. Applying this rule, Mantalba being
minor, the proper penalty should be one degree lower
than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal.
Necessarily, also applying the ISLAW, the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty
shall be taken from medium of reclusion temporal, there
being no other mitigating nor aggravating circumstances.
The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because
the penalty which has been originally an indivisible
where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty
by virtue of minority. Therefore a penalty of 6 yrs and 1
day of prision mayor as minimum, and 14 yrs 8 mos and
1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum would be the
proper imposable penalty.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
VS QUEZON CITY
GR NO 225442
AUGUST 8, 2017
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
FACTS:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to
strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors
through police operations which were publicly known as
part of "Oplan Rody."[3]
Petitioners,[9] spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of
young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and
just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors[10] - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void
for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process.[11] In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila
Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630.
US VS TANEDO
GR NO L-5418
FEBRUARY 12, 1910
FACTS:
Cecilio Tanedo (accused), a landowner, went with some
workers to work on the dam on his land, carrying with
him a shotgun and a few shells. Upon reaching the dam,
the accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens.
On his way, he met Feliciano Sanchez (victim) and the
latter’s mother and sick uncle. The accused asked the
victim’s uncle for the best place to hunt for the wild
chickens, but since the latter was sick, the victim
answered for him and pointed to a general direction in
the forest. Upon the victim’s recommendation, the
accused then went to the forest to continue his search
for the wild chickens. When the accused saw one, he
shot it, and simultaneously heard a human cry out in
pain. After seeing that Sanchez was shot in the heart
Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one
Bernardino Tagamba (Tagampa) to help him hide the
body. They did so by putting it amidst the tall cogon
grass, and later burying the body in an old well and
covering it with burnt cogon grass. Only one shot was
heard that morning, and it isn’t contested that a chicken
was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were
found at the scene of the crime, as well, and there is no
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 19

enmity between the accused and he victim. Prior to the
trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but
later confessed during the trial that he buried the victim’s
body. The lower court found the accused guilty of
homicide.
The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a
relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no
unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was
made to show any. There appears to have been no
motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The
Government has not attempted to show any. The only
possible reason that the accused could have for killing
the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden
quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is
wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man
were shot at the same time, there having been only one
shot fired.
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of
negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there
any question that he was engaged in the commission of
a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause
the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at
all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his
concealment and denial.
ISSUE:
WON Tanedo is criminally liable.
RULING:
No, The only possible reason that the accused could
have for killing the victim would be a sudden quarrel
between them during the hunt, which is negated by the
fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same
time, there having only one shot fired. According to
Article 8 subdivision 8 of the Penal Code, “he who, while
performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury
by mere accident without liability or intention of causing
it.”
It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or
accident while in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing
harm, there is no criminal liability. In this case, there is
absolutely no evidence of negligence on the part of the
accused. Neither is there any question that he was
engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the
accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the
intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious on
the part of the accused are his concealment and denial,
and no sufficient evidence was found to support the
judgment of conviction.
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO
GR NO 172695
JUNE 29, 2007
FACTS:
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in
Court that in the evening of November 5, 1993, between
9:00 o'clock to 10:00 o'clock, the accused came home
drunk and was in an angry mood. The accused kicked
the door and table, and then threw the electric fan away.
He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But
the accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he
took instead his sling and arrow from the house ceiling
where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo
transferred to the adjacent house of her daughter [in-law]
Yolanda. From there, Guillermo heard the victim crying
and, afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo
concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was
happening inside the house of Consorcia, and Yolanda
obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused carrying
the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused,
and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the hospital but to no
avail. From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction
of the fatal injury upon Consorcia was preceded by a
quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated
the accused's version that he was practicing the use of
the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and
lends credence to the prosecution's contention that the
shooting was intentional.
The accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to do
the fatal harm to his wife. This is the same issue to be
resolved by this Court. Whether or not the fatal injury
sustained by the victim was accidental.
ISSUE:
WON the accussed hitting his wife with an arrow was an
accident.
RULING:
NO. It is not accidental. "Accident" is an affirmative
defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence. The defense miserably
failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential
requisites for this exempting circumstance, are: (1) a
person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care; (3)
he causes and injury to another by mere accident (4)
without fault or intention of causing it. By no stretch of

CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST

CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
 20
imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling
and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act."
Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's defense of
accident must be struck down because he was
performing an unlawful act during the incident.
Furthermore, in the instant case, the following
circumstances satisfactorily established appellant's
intent to kill his wife: (1) The killing was immediately
preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and his
wife. Leticia, the victim's sister, testified that the
deceased suffered from the violent behavior of the
appellant who would often lay hand on the victim during
their marital squabbles. (2) It has always been said that
criminal cases are primarily about human nature.
In the instant case, appellant disappeared after his
wounded wife was rushed to the hospital. This is indeed
contrary to human nature. A husband is expected to lend
comfort to his dying wife up to her last breath. In this
case, however, appellant took flight. It is well-established
that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to
indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in this
case, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt
may be drawn. (3) The location of the wound and its
extent likewise proved appellant's intent to kill the victim.
The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a
punctured wound in the neck, a vital organ, which fatally
lacerated her jugular vein causing massive hemorrhage.
The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the
deceased manifests appellant's intention to extinguish
life. (4) As regards appellant's act of carrying the body of
his wounded wife and bringing her to the hospital, the
same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an
indication of an act of repentance or contrition on the
part of appellant. There is likewise no merit in appellant's
contention that assuming he was the one who killed his
wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The
exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable in
the instant case.
PEOPLE VS RETUBADO
GR NO 124058
DECEMBER 10, 2003
FACTS:
Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone played a
joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant's younger brother
who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted
firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. He
brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining
table as he was having dinner with his father.
Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. The Cañons and the appellant
were neighbors. The matter was brought to the attention
of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation.
It turned out that Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the
culprit. The barangay captain considered the matter
closed. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. On November 5, 1993, at about
9:00 p.m., 50year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab
driver called it a day and decided to go home after a
day's work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the
junction of Rizal and Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion
of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing with
Marcial Luciño saw him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did
something to my brother?" Emmanuel ignored the
appellant. The appellant was incensed and ran after
Emmanuel. He
overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab
which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored
the appellant and pedaled on until he reached his house.
His wife, Norberta Cañon was in the balcony of their
house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive.
Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep.
Undeterred, the appellant continued following
Emmanuel. Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his
house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch.
Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded to
know why he was being followed. The appellant told
Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr.,
but Emmanuel told the appellant that his son was
already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony
and placed her hand on her husband's shoulder to pacify
him. The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from
under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the forehead.
The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away
from the scene. Norberta shouted for help. The
neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived.
They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan District
Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter. The
appellant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that
he was merely performing a lawful act with due care;
hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victim's
death. He testified that when he insisted that Emmanuel
wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and
emerged therefrom holding a handgun with his right
hand. Emmanuel's trigger finger was outside the trigger
guard, and he held the firearm with the muzzle facing
downward. Fearing that he would be shot, the appellant
took hold of Emmanuel's right hand with his left, and
pulled the gun towards Emmanuel's stomach. The
appellant grabbed Emmanuel's free hand with his right
hand, and the old man almost fell on his knees to the
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 21
ground. Emmanuel still resisted. The appellant pulled the
gun to the level of Emmanuel's forehead, and the gun
suddenly went off. The bullet hit Emmanuel's forehead.
The appellant asserts that he was merely performing a
lawful act of defending himself when he grabbed the
victim’s hand which held the gun. The gun accidentally
fired and the bullet hit the victim’s forehead.
ISSUE:
WON the death of Emmanuel was an accident caused
by the appellant.
RULING:
Yes, The shooting was no accident. A number of legal
scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the
accused in a state of necessity
is justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article
12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a "state of
necessity" is a justifying circumstance. The accused
does not commit a crime in legal contemplation; hence,
is not criminally and civilly liable. By admitting causing
the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if
such evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his
defense, the evidence of the prosecution can no longer
be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a
state of necessity is a question of fact, which is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The
facts are clear as established by the trial court that when
Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing
with each other in the porch of their house, she went
down from the balcony towards her husband and placed
her hand on the latter's shoulders. She was shocked
when the appellant pulled out his handgun and
deliberately shot the victim on the forehead. After
shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs
criminis. He surrendered to the police authorities only on
November 6, 1993, but failed to surrender the gun he
used to kill the victim. The appellant's claim that he
placed the gun on the dining table before entering his
bedroom to change his clothes is incredible. There is no
evidence that the appellant informed the police
authorities that he killed the victim in a state of necessity
and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
The appellant never presented the police officer to whom
he confessed that he killed the victim in a state of
necessity.
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.
The victim ignored the appellant as the latter talked to
him at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets, in the
poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant was incensed at the
effrontery of the victim, a mere pedicab driver. The
appellant followed the victim to his house where the
appellant again confronted him. The appellant insisted
on talking with the victim’s son but the victim refused to
wake up the latter. The appellant, exasperated at the
victim’s intransigence, pulled out a gun from under his
shirt and shot the victim on the forehead. It was
impossible for the victim to survive. With the appellant’s
admission that he shot the victim, the matter on whether
he used his right or left hand to shoot the latter is
inconsequential.
POMOY VS PEOPLE
GR NO 150647
SEPTEMBER 29, 2004
FACTS:
Policemen arrested Tomas Balboa, a master teacher of
Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in
Concepcion, Iloilo, for he was allegedly connected with a
robbery. He was brought to the Headquarters of the
Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni in
Iloilo where he was detained. Roweno Pomoy, a
member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company,
directed the latter to come out for a tactical interrogation
at the investigation room. Petitioner had a gun hanging
from his holster. After that, 2 gunshots were heard.
Petitioner was seen holding his .45 caliber
pistol facing Balboa who was lying in a pool of blood.
Balboa died. The version of the defense presented by
accused Pomoy, Erna Basa (eyewitness) and Eden
Legaspi (was sitting with Basa at the time the incident
occured) is that Balboa allegedly tried to grab the handle
of Pomoy’s gun. Balboa was no able to take actual hold
of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him. He
and Balboa grappled in taking control of his gun, then
Balboa was accidentally shot.
ISSUE:
WON the shooting was an accident.
RULING:
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding
that the harm to the victim was not due to the fault or
negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that
could not have been foreseen or controlled. Thus, in
determining whether an "accident" attended the incident,
courts must take into account the dual standards of lack
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 22
of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main
question in the present case: was petitioner in control of
the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were
fired?
Petitioner was not in control of the Gun when it fired.
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it
was Erna Basa who witnessed the incident firsthand.
The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the
weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart
those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the
victim were all over the weapon was categorically
asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling
for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged -
- his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the
weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. It
would be difficult to imagine how, under such
circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively be
able to release the safety lock of the gun and
deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim
grappled for possession of the gun. This frenzied
grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been
finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce and vicious.
The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical
conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the
course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been
accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not
necessarily and conclusively negate the claim that the
shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can
easily be attributed to the mechanism of the .45 caliber
service gun. More significantly, the present case
involves a semi-automatic pistol. . 45 caliber is prone to
accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the
object of a struggle.
Furthermore, the wound inflicted by the accidental firing
does not negate the existence of the alleged grappling.
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused
was at the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2)
the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3)
on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no
intent to cause the injury. From the facts, it is clear that
all these elements were present. At the time of the
incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of
the investigators -- of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions
of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell
for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a
law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly
tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the
law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching
of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a
detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely
to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim
persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised
all the necessary precautions to prevent his service
weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he
so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun
locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster
at all times, especially within the premises of his working
area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused
admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased,
much less kill him.
US VS CABALLEROS
GR NO 1352
MARCH 29, 1905
FACTS:
The defendants have been sentenced by the CFI of
Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as
accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or
murder perpetrated on the persons of the American
school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France,
John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having
taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses
of the victim in order to conceal the crime.
As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to
having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears
that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the
murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the
defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only
eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the
way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says
he was present when the Americans were killed; that
Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who
killed the Americans, but that he was in a banana
plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that
when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was,
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 23
however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of
the band; that the latter called to him and striking him the
butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
ISSUE:
WON the court is right in convicting Caballero as an
accessory of the crime.
RULING:
No, The Penal Code exempts from liability any person
who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par.
9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are
charged against him.
This witness says he was present when the Americans
were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the
group who killed the Americans, but that he was in a
banana plantation on his property gathering some
bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run;
that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the
leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and
striking him the butts of their guns they forced him to
bury the corpses.
PEOPLE VS LORENO
GR NO L-54414
JULY 9, 1984
FACTS:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain
Elias Monge along with his family (2 young daughters)
and some workers of the farm that stayed with the
family. They were preparing to attend a dance held at
the barrio.
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at
the balcony of said house, Francisco Fabie saw at first
four men with flashlights approaching. When they came
near, he heard one of them call Elias Monge saying that
there was a letter from the chief (hepe). Elias Monge
asked them to come inside since he can’t read the letter
properly. When he and the man in dark sweater were
inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter, Monica
to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias
Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA",
which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with
fear, informing her just what she came to know about
their visitors. Cristina Monge attempted to run to the
kitchen to get a bolo but she was held back by the man
in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside
not to make any scandal. When Elias Monge turned to
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
look at him, the man in dark sweater poked his gun at
him, and ordered all those inside to lie on the floor. In the
meantime, outside at the balcony the man in red clothes
asked Fabie for a glass of water, and the latter asked
Mario Monge to get the glass of water, but Mario did not
obey and instead went to the sala. Hence, Fabie himself
went inside the house to fetch the glass of water. But, as
he went inside the sala, he noticed the man in red
clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to the
sala, the man in red clothes poked his gun on Fabie's
back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and
then he was pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside
the sala, which was lighted, Fabie saw and recognized
the man in red clothes to be Eustaquio Loreno.
Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and
Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he
entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in
dark sweater. All the occupants of the house were
ordered by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to
remain lying flat on their stomachs on the floor.
Jimmy Marantal stayed as lookout outside the house.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to
tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno tied them with
rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock
(duyan) and got the ropes with which he and Loreno
used to reinforce in tying the victim's hands together
behind their backs. After Loreno and Fabie returned to
the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica
Monge and dragged her up to a room located above the
balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still tied.
Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the
whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there
was none. He ransacked the room but found none. The
man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly
removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her
parents for help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her
struggle, he was able to remove her panty and
successfully raped her. After that, he dragged Monica
back to the sala and proceeded to do the same to
Cristina. While all of this was happening, the other men
then proceeded to ransack the house and found and
took a lot of valuables including a kulambo and kaserola
tangina nila pati yun kinuha.
Thereafter, Loreno entered the room where Cristina was
still lying on the floor and proceeded to kiss and touch
her vagina. Suddenly, he was called to hurry up because
someone was approaching the house. When he went
back, the dark shirt guy warned everyone not to tell
anyone, got their valuables, and left. They managed to
untie themselves eventually and after positively affirming
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 24
the identities of their malefactors, along with Elias finding
out the sexual abuse his daughters suffered, filed a
report against the robbery-rape incident. After
substantial examination to his daughters and initial
investigation, the accused were detained, charged and
found guilty. Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy
Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion
of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They
admitted that they were in the house of
Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, but they
were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and
his five companions who claimed to be members of the
New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with
the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their
families would be killed.
ISSUE:
WON the accused acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and are therefore exempt from criminal
liability. (NO)
RULING:
A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse or
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt
from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to
a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death of serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
A perusal of the appellants statement of the robbery-
rape incident as summarized in their joint brief (pp. 3-
10), showed that they admitted their participation in the
commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against
Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further
established were facts inconsistent with appellant s
claim of having acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short
firearm when he and the man in dark sweater went up
the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house,
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
Loreno pointed the gun to the victims which enabled the
malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30,
1979 PM).
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater
reached the balcony, Loreno positioned himself next to
the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater
delivered the letter to Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that,
without prior instructions, he immediately positioned
himself near the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an
act which showed his voluntary participation in the
criminal acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan
and thereafter, with ropes of the hammock. Loreno in
fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the
rattan which he got from inside the house (pp. 14-15,
tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for
help from inside the room where she was earlier
dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno’s
immediate reaction was to point his gun to the victims
who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise
if they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn, Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions
Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the master’s
room and the teacher’s room where he made her open
the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the
contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the
sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat
and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the
man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina
Monge in the teacher’s room and seeing Cristina Monge
still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to
kiss and touch her private parts.
PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO
GR NO 127755
APRIL 14, 1999
FACTS:
On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening,
Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita’s
Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when
three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about
one and a-half (1½) meters in front of him was a tricycle
driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point,
Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for
possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 25
the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man
who was trying to help the woman, while the other
snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground.
Soon after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head.
The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of
accused del Rosario where someone inside received the
bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his
companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped
away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate
number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver,
after which he went to the nearest police headquarters
and reported the incident.
Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident:
At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was hired for P120.00
5 by a certain "Boy" Santos, 6 his co-accused.
Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and
warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities
about the incident otherwise he and his family would be
harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the
threat, however, he did not report the matter to the
owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the
police.
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito
del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced him to
death. He now contends in this automatic review that the
court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of
threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his
co-accused Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun"
Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya;
ISSUE:
WON Del Rosario acted upon because of an irresistible
force.
RULING:
Yes, A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is
exempt from criminal liability because he does not act
with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus
actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act.
The force contemplated must be so formidable as to
reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending;
and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act
be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat.
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear
when threatened with weapons, even those less
powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People
will normally, usually and probably do what an armed
man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the
instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He
could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to
help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances
would be more concerned with his personal welfare and
security rather than the safety of a person whom he only
saw for the first time that day.
PEOPLE VS BANDIAN
GR NO 45186
SEPTEMBER 30, 1936
FACTS:
Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the
appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from
her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used to
go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw
her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with
blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly
showing signs of not being able to support herself. He
ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very weak
and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her
house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked
before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened
to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very
dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such
circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom,
who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him
to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which
had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely
gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a
newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket where
the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom
informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body
to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the
baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not,
the appellant answered in the affirmative.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence
showing how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno
himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the
child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites
animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket
where it was found.
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
 26
ISSUE:
WON Bandian committed infanticide.
RULING:
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or
at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and
free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes
are committed through mere imprudence, the person
who commits them, under said circumstances, must be
in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be
conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant,
in causing her child's death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously
or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to
expose it to death, because her affair with a former
lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis
Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her
married life with Kirol — she considers him her husband
as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he
so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was
pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming
such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child
carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he
testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the
birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause
to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in
question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to
respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that
she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by
doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to
her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than that
she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all
happened by mere accident, from liability any person
who so acts and behaves under such circumstances
(art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE VILLAREAL.
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian
not on the ground that she is exempt from criminal
liability but because she has committed no criminal act
or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in
question the accused Josefina Bandian had spent a year
CASE DIGEST BY CLARRIS HARLINE ANGELI EGINA
FROM THE DISCUSSION OF ATTY LYAN JUANICO
of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was
begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover
knew that she was pregnant and both were waiting for
the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love
should be born.
Believing that she did nothing more to respond to an
urgent call of nature which brought her there, she
returned home staggering for lack of strength to support
herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she
was leaving a newborn child behind her, and she only
knew that she had given birth when she was shown the
already dead child with wounds on the body produced by
the bites of pigs.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had
delivered and that the child had been exposed to the
rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be
held that she deceitfully committed the crime of
infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor, because
according to the above-cited legal provision there is
deceit when the act punishable by law is performed with
deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and from
dizziness, the appellant under the circumstances was
not aware that she had given birth and, consequently,
she could not have deliberately intended to leave her
child, of whose existence she was ignorant, to perish at
the mercy of the elements and of the animals. Neither
can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as
already stated, not knowing for lack of experience in
childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly lawful
physiological act, being natural — she might expel the
child she carried in her womb, she cannot be considered
imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who fails
to use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious
consequences of his willful act.
CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST