CHC Presentation - Risk Culture by Cengiz Turkoglu - FINAL

Risk Culture: surely that couldn’t
happen in my company...
Cengiz Turkoglu
Building Safety At Every Level:

Does this start at the top or with front line employees?
1
ABOUT ME
Senior Lecturer &

Safety & Accident
Cengiz Turkoglu Course Director @ Investigation Centre
MSc Airworthiness
VP Technical @ Vice Chairman @
Unless clearly cited and referenced, all views presented in the following slides are my opinion and not
necessarily reflect the views of any of the organisations I am involved in or associated with or work for

2
WE ARE A UNIQUE UNIVERSITY
SPO Operations located at
with an approved design & maintenance organisation

3
4
SESSION AGENDA
RISK CULTURE - THE CONCEPT
RESULTS OF SURVEYS

5
HUMAN ERROR (STILL A CHALLENGE)
“The journey begins with a bizarre absent-minded action slip committed by Professor Reason in the
early 1970s - putting cat food into the teapot - and continues up to the present day.”
Source: https://www.amazon.ca/Life-Error-Little-Slips-Disasters/dp/1472418417/175-9532292-4801809?ie=UTF8&*Version*=1&*entries*=0
6
But this is not
what I will discuss in this presentation.
My focus will be
safety risk decisions made by professionals.

7
Here’s one scenario to demonstrate
how subjective risk can be

8
Flight 268 – Case Study
In 2005, on a night flight from Los Angeles to London, immediately after take off, a banging
sound was heard and passengers and ATC reported seeing flames from the No 2 engine of the
B747. The symptoms and resultant turbine over-temperature were consistent with an engine
surge; the crew completed the appropriate checklist, which led to the engine being shut down.

9
SHOULD THIS FLIGHT CONTINUE ITS DESTINATION?

10
COULD YOU PLEASE STAND UP
IF YOU THINK THIS FLIGHT
SHOULD CONTINUE FLYING TOWARDS ITS
DESTINATION?
NO ONE STOOD UP DURING THE SESSION

11
12
After assessing the situation, and in accordance with approved policy, the commander decided to
continue the flight as planned rather than jettison fuel and return to Los Angeles. Having reached
the east coast of the USA with no indications of further abnormality and with adequate predicted
arrival fuel,
13
SHOULD THIS FLIGHT DIVERT OR CONTINUE?

14
15
The pilots successfully shut down the affected
engine and notified the headquarters. The
management directed Flight 268 to carry on with
the flight to London. Senior Manager of B747
fleet said:
“The decision to continue flying was a customer service issue. The
plane is as safe on 3 engines as is on four and it can fly on two.”
The company quickly assessed the consequences of the failure. If
they had delayed or cancelled the flight, it would have cost the
company up to several hundred thousand dollars in passenger
compensation because of a recently passed European regulation
regarding long flight delays or cancellations.
Source: Regan, Nancy, 2012, The RCM Solution: Reliability-Centred Maintenance, (Page 117, 118), Industrial Press Inc.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UQiDBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA117&lpg=PA117&dq=british+airways+flight+268+engine+failure+2005&source=bl&ots=gidx-s6PdT&sig=HfwN-ao7LunprXzf7La933_z0jA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj4_arnx-
XLAhVEWRoKHXFPBlUQ6AEINDAE#v=onepage&q=british%20airways%20flight%20268%20engine%20failure%202005&f=false

16
A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE
STATE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
IN 2018 AND FUTURE TARGETS

17
ULTRA-SAFE SYSTEM & CHALLENGES
https://youtu.be/IgDyhvXW8jM

18
Global Commercial Air Transport Safety Statistics
900 843
800
700
600 514
500 423
400
272
300
200
101 92 84 119
100
30 34 20 26
0
2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of Accidents Number of Fatal Accidents

Fatalities
Source: Flight Safety Foundation – Air Safety Network Database. The data was analysed by Cengiz Turkoglu and it does not include military
accidents and privately operated aircraft accidents and other non-commercial operation accidents such as fire fighting, state VVIP etc.

19
1000 972
900 843
800
700
600 514
500
400
272
300 423
200
101 92 84 119 97
100
30 34 20 26 21
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Fatalities

20
1000 972
900 843
800
700
600 514
543
500
“What
400
we call here a Black Swan is an event with the following
three
300
attributes. First, it is an outlier,
423 as
272it lies outside the realm of
regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly
200
point to
101 its possibility.
92 Secondly,
84
it 119
carries an97extreme 88impact.
100
Third, in spite
30 of its outlier
34 status,
20 human26nature makes 21 us concoct
12
0
explanations
2010 for its2011
occurrence 2012after the fact, making
2013 2014 it explainable
2015
and predictable.Number
“ of Accidents Number of Fatal Accidents
Source: ‘Black Swan’ by Nassim Nicholas Taleb
Fatalities

21
“We risk becoming preoccupied with high-frequency/low-consequence things:
not wearing safety glasses; having coffee in a cup without a lid. Then we
mistake low counts on these for a safety culture—low counts that we tabulate,
share with stakeholders, and celebrate. The fiction is that we have a safety
culture because we have low numbers on irrelevant things, and the paperwork
to show it.
And then we blow stuff up.”
Sidney Dekker
Source: http://www.safetydifferently.com/safety-culture/

22
1
4
to show it.
Sidney Dekker
Source: http://www.safetydifferently.com/safety-culture/

23
2 1
4 3
to show it.
Sidney Dekker

Source:
Does this start athttp://www.safetydifferently.com/safety-culture/
the top or with front line employees?
24
3 1
4 2
to show it.
Sidney Dekker

Source:
25
to show it.
Sidney Dekker
Source:
26
1000 972
900 843
800
700
600 514
543
500
400
300 423 315

272
200
101 92 84 119 97 88 89
100
30 34 20 26 21 12 17
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fatalities

27
1000 1200
900 972 1000

800 843
700 800
600 514 600

500
543
400 272 400
423 315
300 200
200 57
101 92 84 119 97 88 89 93 0
100
30 34 20 26 21 12 17 15
0 -200
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Fatalities

28
800 1200
700 972 1000
843
600
800
500
514 600
400
543
400
300
423 315 A
272 200
200 57 B
C
101 92 84 119 97 88 89 93 0
100
* As of
30 34 20 26 21 17 15
12 Sep 2018
0 -200
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fatalities

29
800 1200
700 972 1000

843
600
800
500 * As of
514 Sep 600
400
543 2018
272 349*
400
300
423 315
200 57 200
101 92 84 119 97 88 89 93 105* 0

100
30 34 20 26 21 12 17 15 14*
0 -200
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fatalities

30
Contrasting Safety Theories
The competing safety perspectives between Sagan's postulated "High Reliability Theory" and
"Normal Accidents Theory" led by Professor Charles Perrow are listed below. The summary
material provides a framework for thinking about safety and aviation system efficiency.
High Normal
Reliability Accidents
Theory
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Accidents can be prevented through good organizational design and management.
Safety is the priority organizational objective.
Redundancy enhances safety: Duplication and overlap can make "a reliable system out of unreliable parts."
Decentralized decision-making is needed to permit prompt and flexible field level responses to surprises.
A "culture of reliability" will enhance safety by encouraging uniform and appropriate responses by field-level operators.
Continuous operations, training, and simulations can create and maintain high reliability operations.
Trial and error learning from accidents can be effective, and can be supplemented by anticipation and simulations.
Theory
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Accidents are inevitable in complex and tightly coupled systems.
Safety is one of a number of competing objectives.
Redundancy often causes accidents: it increases interactive complexity and opaqueness and encourages risk- taking.
Organizational contradiction: decentralization is needed for complexity, but centralization is needed for tightly coupled systems.
A military model of intense discipline, socialization, and isolation is incompatible with democratic values.
Organizations cannot train for unimagined, highly dangerous, or politically unpalatable operations.
Denial of responsibility, faulty reporting, and reconstruction of history cripples learning efforts.

31
The competing safety perspectives between Sagan's postulated "High Reliability Theory" and
"Normal Accidents Theory" led by Professor Charles Perrow are listed below. The summary
material provides a framework for thinking about safety and aviation system efficiency.
High Reliability Theory Normal Accidents Theory

• Accidents can be prevented through good organizational • Accidents are inevitable in complex and tightly coupled
design and management. systems.
• Safety is the priority organizational objective. • Safety is one of a number of competing objectives.
• Redundancy enhances safety: Duplication and overlap • Redundancy often causes accidents: it increases interactive
can make "a reliable system out of unreliable parts." complexity and opaqueness and encourages risk- taking.
• Decentralized decision-making is needed to permit • Organizational contradiction: decentralization is needed
prompt and flexible field level responses to surprises. for complexity, but centralization is needed for tightly
• A "culture of reliability" will enhance safety by coupled systems.
encouraging uniform and appropriate responses by • A military model of intense discipline, socialization, and
field-level operators. isolation is incompatible with democratic values.
• Continuous operations, training, and simulations can • Organizations cannot train for unimagined, highly
create and maintain high reliability operations. dangerous, or politically unpalatable operations.
• Trial and error learning from accidents can be effective, • Denial of responsibility, faulty reporting, and
and can be supplemented by anticipation and reconstruction of history cripples learning efforts.
simulations.

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“I have read Lord Cullen’s report into the 1988 disaster, and the reports on Deepwater
Horizon, Nimrod, Texas City, Buncefield – the list goes on. While the precise circumstances
and contexts of these incidents differ in some respects, at heart I am left with the feeling
that there are no new accidents. Rather there are old accidents repeated by new people.”
Judith Hackitt, Chair, HSE @ the 25th Anniversary of the Piper Alpha Tragedy

34
Next accident Almost all future
can be predicted accidents will be
“I have read Lord Cullen’s report into the 1988 disaster, and the reports
on Deepwater Horizon, Nimrod, Texas City, Buncefield – the list goes on.
While the precise circumstances and contexts of these incidents differ in
some respects, at heart I am left with the feeling that there are no new
accidents. Rather there are old accidents repeated by new people.”
Judith Hackitt, Chair, HSE @ the 25th Anniversary of the Piper Alpha
Tragedy

35
I SAFETY II
Focuses on Focuses on
what went Hollnagel, E. (2014).
what went
WRONG RIGHT
So keep sharing data, information and intelligence
But don’t forget to learn lessons from accidents/incidents as well as

your partners’, suppliers’ and competitors’ best practice

36
CONSEQUENCES OF OVER-REGULATING

37
CONSEQUENCES OF OVER-REGULATING

38
STATE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY - PARADOXES
What drives the most cost conscious airline to operate
business jets in order to deal with AOG across its network?
BRUTAL
COMPETITION?
http://irishaviationresearchinstitute.blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/ryanair-acquires-new-learjet-45-m-abgv.html
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/ryanairs-fancy-jet-for-engineers-28822767.html
PUBLIC’S
EXPECTATION?
39
Aircraft will achieve a five-fold
2020
reduction in the average accident
rate of global operators.
Aircraft will drastically reduce the
impact of human error.
The occurrence and impact of

human error is significantly
2050
reduced through new designs
and training processes and
through technologies that
support decision-making.
if we want to achieve such goals, we need to

THINK DIFFERENTLY
40
we need to continue ...
making intelligent rules and complying with them
collecting operational data and investigating to learn lessons
but predicting future, based on

occurrence data and past
performance has its limitations
41
!
WHY RISK CULTURE?

42
This is an argument based on some of the
‘Safety Culture’ concepts and models well-
known and applied in aviation.
It aims to add a new dimension to the existing
framework based on the ‘Risk Culture’
guidance material produced by Institute of Risk
Management (IRM), which was developed to
supplement ISO 31000 Risk management –
Principles and guidelines.
43
EUROPEAN PILOTS’ PERCEPTION OF SAFETY CULTURE
In 2016, Future Sky Safety (An EU funded project)
conducted a survey titled 'European pilots’ perceptions of
safety culture in European Aviation' .
7.39% of 7239 respondents in other words over 500
pilots who participated in the survey clearly stated that
they have to take risks that make them feel
uncomfortable about safety. Unfortunately the survey
didn't provide any insight what kind of risks
respondents take.
SO WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THOSE RISKS
ARE TO BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THE CAUSAL FACTORS.
44
REASON DISCUSSED ‘RISK CULTURE’ IN 2006

45
1
# C
U
L
E R S
T T
M A U
R
E
46
“Culture eats
Strategy for breakfast”
Peter Drucker
Drucker’s well known quote sums it up. Achieving results heavily

depends on the organisational culture however good the strategy is.
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Corporate Culture - Key to Success
Employees “CULTURE:
FIRST! Not Definitionally
Customers. ILLUSIVE”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxTFA1kh1m8&feature=player_embedded

48
“Culture is admittedly difficult to
define”
YOU KNOW IT WHEN YOU SEE IT

49
Definition of Culture
YOU KNOW IT WHEN YOU SEE IT

50
# 2
S
D
O
E
R I S K
S

51
LEADERSHIP & RISK ATTITUDE

52
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS &
PREMISES FOR THE ARGUMENT
INTRODUCING
‘RISK CULTURE’
AS A NEW DIMENSION OF
‘SAFETY CULTURE’
53
RISK = SEVERITY X LIKELIHOOD
Safety risk is the projected likelihood and
severity of the consequences or outcomes
from an existing hazard or situation.
(ICAO SMM)
HAZARDS RISKS
(PRESENT) (FUTURE)

54
RISK
UNCERTAINTY
OPPORTUNITY

55
RISK MANAGEMENT
1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
PROACTIVE
PREDICTIVE
REACTIVE
56
RISK MANAGEMENT
2 RISK ASSESSMENT
QUANTIFYING
PRIORITISING
ANALYSING
57
RISK MANAGEMENT
3 RISK CONTROL
MITIGATING
ELIMINATING BALANCING
58
‘acceptable level of safety’
‘perception of risk’
‘risk attitude’
‘risk tolerability’
‘risk appetite’
inevitably subjective
based on many different factors
here are some examples ...

59
TIME NATIONAL
DIMENSION CULTURE
What was acceptable in the past What is acceptable in one country
is not acceptable today is not acceptable in another.
HINDSIGHT PERSONAL
BIAS CHOICES
What is acceptable before an
What is acceptable to one person
accident may not be acceptable
may not be acceptable to another
after the event

60
“Risk management: it’s not rocket science.
It’s more complicated than that.”
Risk management: cutting the CRAP

Psychosis: noun - a severe mental disorder in which contact with reality is lost or highly distorted.
I was recently invited to address a conference of psychiatrists on the subject of risk. They, like the
rest of the medical profession, practice defensively for fear of litigation, and labour under incessant
demands for the assessment of every imaginable risk, however small. I offered for their
consideration a new mental illness that I called obsessive risk assessment disorder. One of them
proposed that the disorder I described was sufficiently serious to merit the label psychosis – hence
Compulsive Risk Assessment Psychosis, or CRAP . There is a lot of it about, and numbers
of new cases are growing rapidly.
http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/crap-for-irm21.pdf

61
Front line operators facing
conflicting goals influenced by external factors and
incentives and penalties to achieve them
are typical characteristics of the airline industry

62
CULTURE
'the unwritten rules
of the social game'
Professor Emeritus Geert Hofstede
Commercial Air Transport: ‘A Complex Socio-technical System’

63
“engineering a safety culture”
(an informed culture)
just culture
1997
reporting culture
Prof. J Reason
learning culture
flexible culture
2016 risk culture?
64
Just
Culture

65
three categories of human behaviour (by David Marx)
Reckless (Negligent) At Risk (Risk Taking) Error (Mistake)

66
paradoxes

67
criminalisation of accidents,
and the litigation culture in society, …
CAN SAFETY & JUSTICE CO-EXIST?

68
does ‘compensation culture’ lead to …
‘risk blindness’ in society?
https://www.change.org/p/airline-pilots-maintenance-engineers-technicians-call-for-a-vote-to-stop-enforcement-action-against-airlines-for-not-paying-compensation-due-to-technical-delays
“Safety is a paradox; people demand safety

once they have taken risks.”
René Amalberti
69
MAIN ARGUMENT

70
In 1900, Wilbur wrote to his father, “Carelessness
& overconfidence,” he said, “are usually more
dangerous than deliberately accepted risks.”
over a century later, I argue differently

71
addressing human reliability and particularly individuals’ attitude towards risk is much more
challenging than preventing errors therefore I believe factors driving/encouraging professionals
to accept certain risks pose more significant threat to flight safety.

72
IF
managing safety = managing risk
SHOULDN’T WE ALSO CONSIDER
RISK CULTURE?
HOW RISK IS PERCEIVED ACROSS THE ORGANISATION AND
HOW RISK DECISIONS ARE MADE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS?

73
The concept of
‘Risk Culture’
evaluation in an organisation

74
?
let’s not try to
measure culture
A quote that is incorrectly attributed to W. Edwards Deming . “You can't manage what you can't measure."
In fact, he repeatedly said the opposite “It is wrong to suppose that if you can’t measure it,
you can’t manage it – a costly myth.” Source: http://blog.deming.org/w-edwards-deming-quotes/large-list-of-quotes-by-w-edwards-deming/
THE SEVEN DEADLY DISEASES OF MANAGEMENT (Item 5)

“Management by use only of visible figures, with little or no consideration of figures that
are unknown or unknowable.” Source: Deming, W. Edwards (2011-11-09). Out of the Crisis (pp. 97-98). MIT Press.

75
SIMPLICITY IS THE ANSWER, WHAT’S THE QUESTION?
“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex...
It takes a touch of genius and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction.”
E.F. Schumacher
let’s not ask

10’s of questions
2 fundamental questions…
76
1 A scenario & decision
‘accepted/acceptable risk’
2 A scenario & decision

‘unacceptable/rejected risk’

77
A PROPOSED MODEL
FOR RISK CULTURE ASSESSMENT
IN AN ORGANISATION

78
stage 1
collect data from front line staff
(dedicated workshops or during recurrent training or
questionnaires)
stage 2
ask the same risk decisions to senior
management
stage 3
analysis of data, which may:
reveal gaps in risk
perception/attitude/appetite
require management action to clarify acceptable
&unacceptable
Does this start at the risks
top or with front line employees?
79
WIIFM
80
WIIFM? - POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
PROACTIVE HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
This rather simple but potentially beneficial
concept/methodology may identify some hazards which
may not be reported through the usual reporting
processes such as ‘occurrence and/or hazard reporting’
It may also identify ‘excessive risk taking’

attitude/practices amongst the frontline operators
Finally it may also identify some systemic issues

driving/encouraging people to tolerate certain risks.

81
WIIFM? - POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
ENABLE MANAGEMENT TO EMPATHISE WITH FRONTLINE
OPERATORS
By identifying such issues, perhaps the top management can
understand the challenges front line operators face.
PROACTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ‘JUST CULTURE’
Ultimately this approach may prevent situations that front line
operators or even their managers take some level of risk, which
resulted with a bad outcome and subsequently a disciplinary
action was taken as part of just culture policy. Because in many
cases, the adverse effect of a disciplinary action on
‘reporting culture’ is inevitable and it may take a long time to
regain the trust of front line operators.

82
WIIFM? - POTENTIAL ACTIONS
Some accepted risks by front line operators or
their line managers may not be acceptable to
senior management. In this case, communication
to clarify ‘what’s acceptable’ and ‘what’s not’ may
be a simple solution so that the front line
operators have the assurance.
PROACTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF JUST CULTURE
Investigating some systemic causal factors may
require policy changes or even investment
decisions to be made.
83
A NEW DIMENSION OF
‘SAFETY CULTURE’
Results of Both Surveys

84
INDUSTRY-WIDE SURVEYS in 2016 & 2017
www.riskculture.org
email@riskculture.org
FOCUS ON TWO FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS & SUB-QUESTIONS

A scenario & decision on most 1. Risk Decision Making
1 significant ‘accepted/acceptable risk’ Individual vs Organisational
2. Factors encouraging /
discouraging people to take
A scenario & decision on most
2
such safety risks.
significant ‘unacceptable/rejected risk’
85
RESPONDENTS’ JOB PROFILE
32% Maintenance Engineer
30 % Captain (Line/TRE/TRI/CRMI) 15% First Officer
20% Managers

86
RESPONDENTS’ AGE PROFILE
%66 between 40-59
Only 7% less than 30 years old
70
60
50 59
52
40
30
20 28
10
11 15
0
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 >60
87
RESPONDENTS’ GENDER & BACKGROUND
Respondents' Gender
(15
Is one gender more
(6) 9)
4% 96 risk averse than the
% other?
Female Male Respondents' Background
(12 (43
2) )
Are civilian pilots 74 26
more risk averse % %
than military pilots? Civil Military

88
TYPE OF ORGANISATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS WORK FOR
At least 8 out of 10 respondents

work for organisations directly involved in Commercial Air Transport (CAT)
Type of Organisations that Respondents Work

CAT (Airlines/LCCs/ACMI - Large Fixed Wing A/C)
Undisclosed
CAT - Business Aviation (Including Medevac)
Regulator
CAT Operator (Large Helicopter)
Retired
MRO Organisation
Military
Business Aviation - Private
Training Organisation
Recruitment Agency
Professional Association
Consultancy
0 20 40 60 80 100 120

89
RESPONDENTS’ NATIONALITY
24%
13%
61%
(100)
23% (40)
49%
6% 6% 2%
(4)
(10) (10)
1% (1)
Respondents were from the following nationalities. American, Australian, Austrian, Belgian, British, Canadian, Chilean, Cypriot,
Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Icelandic, Indian, Irish, Italian, Kenyan, Lebanese, Luxembourger, Maltese, Mauritian,
New Zealander, Norwegian, Russian, South African, Swedish, Swiss, Turkish
1%
(1)
90
RESPONDENTS’ EMPLOYERS
18%
(30)
13%
36%
(59)
26%
(43)
23%
49% 10%
4%
(6)
3%
(5)
(17)
3%
(5)
Respondents were from the following organisations. Aer Lingus, Air Atlanta Icelandic, Air New Zealand, ALITALIA, Alldis Aviation Advisory Services,
Avionord, Borajet Airlines, Bristow Academy, Bristow Helicopters, Cathay Dragon, Cathay Pacific, CTC Aviation, Davcan aeronautics pty ltd, Eastern
Airways, easyJet, Elilombarda s.r.l., Emirates, Etihad Airways, euroAtlantic, Finnair, Jet Time, Kalitta Charters II, Kenya Airways, KLM, Major US airline,
Meridiana fly S.p.A., Monarch Airlines, Neos S.p.A., Ryanair Qantas, RAF, SAS, Shell Aircraft ltd, Sunexpress, Virgin Australia, Xiamen Airlines,

91
Risk Decision Maker_
My Own De-
cision
68, 51%
12, 9%
53, 40%
Possible
Scenario
My observation
of colleagues /
management
92
OPERATIONAL TARGETS & RISK TAKING
2016 2017
Operational targets (such as 'on-time Operational targets (such as 'on-time
performance', 'availability', 'technical performance', 'availability', 'technical
dispatch reliability'), can encourage pilots, dispatch reliability'), can encourage
engineers and their managers to take "EXCESSIVE' / 'UNNECESSARY' risk taking
SIGNIFICANT risks potentially impacting behaviour impacting on flight safety.
on flight safety.
You may not necessarily agree with this statement. For example, some people argue that nowadays, particularly professionals (pilots &
engineers/technicians) in large organisations do not have much discretion any more and considering the strict rules and regulations,
they really cannot take any risks. However the counter argument is that there will always be circumstances that a pilot or
engineer/technician must use judgement based on his/her technical knowledge and perception of risk before making a decision such
as releasing or accepting an aircraft to service.
2016 (n=165) 2017 (n=123)

Strongly Disagree / Disagree 30 18% 16 13%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 33 20% 20 16%
Strongly Agree / Agree 102 62% 87 71%
93
POTENTIAL FACTORS ENCOURAGING RISK TAKING
Media's attitude 17
Legal factors 34
Industry level factors 51
Individual traits 98
Organisational factors 114

Organisational factors i.e. safety0 culture,20 40 attitude
leadership's 60 towards
80 risk 100 120
Individual traits i.e. 'can do' attitude or 'thrill seeking‘
Industry level factors i.e. policies, growth in the industry, competition
Legal factors i.e. litigation, unrealistic expectations about passenger rights legislation
Media's attitude i.e. victimisation of individuals who make mistakes
94
FACTORS ENCOURAGING RISK TAKING
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
“As the pressure mounts on employees due to
constant threats of (further) job cuts, there are
some employees that will show a "can do"
attitude in order to protect their future
employment prospects.
They are more likely to bend the rules to meet
operational pressures, or ignore other ones
they've seen”

95
“Pilots in general are mission orientated, they will try to complete the
"mission" (flight) and rationalize or feel they can handle any situation
some might push their limits especially when there is commercial
pressure.
Commercial pressure is often subtle, it doesn't state pilots should
compromise flight Safety but when management state's that a flight
delay or cancellation will cost the company both money and
inconvenience to passengers, it puts pressure on the pilots to operate.
The company will usually then say that's it's up to you, the Capt., so now
there's a guilt factor. If you say no I won't operate, the company will then
ask another pilot who will operate the flight. Safety policies are not clear.
This has been my experience with a particular LCC airline.”

96
“I personally have not accepted a flight/aircraft which
was not safe. However, I have accepted to operate a
marginally unsafe night flight to an airport that only had
an NDB approach and required circling procedure in
marginal weather and high wind conditions.
Other airlines operating to this airport are not allowed to
operate in these conditions.
Peer pressure can sometimes play a role when Safety
policies are not clear.”

97
NATIONAL CULTURE vs ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE
“As we train up to 26 different nationalities, I

have found that people from different countries
seem to have a greater or lesser appetite for risk
and when interviewed post incident, behave
differently.”

98
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
“Continuing to fly when fatigued in order to

finish the pattern and get back home with
minimal disruption to personal life.”

99
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
“The reduction of fuel by a Captain, well known

for continually doing so, on a Trans Pacific route
such that the only available alternate would be
extremely close despite obvious unease by other
and more junior crew members.
All to prove he could do so and in the mistaken
belief he was impressing management and would
be noticed for doing so.”
100
Risk Decisions – Classification_
Management - Recruitment 2
Loading - Mass & Balance Calculation 2
Carrying Dangerous Goods 2
Management - Post occurrence 3
Tire Wear 4
Take-off Decisions 7
Non-compliance with SOPs 7
Maintenance Practices 7
Maintenance Certification 7
Weather 10
Fatigue 10
Diversion / Fuel / Go-around Decisions 23
Defects / Damages (Release
Building to Service)
Safety At Every Level: 42
101
THE FOLLOWING SCENARIOS SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN INCLUDED TO GIVE
YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFLECT ON YOUR
EXPERIENCE AND CONSIDER IF ANY ACTION IS
REQUIRED IN YOUR OWN ORGANISATION
CAN IT HAPPEN TO YOU?

IF SO, HOW CAN YOU MITIGATE IT?
102
EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED RISKS – DEFECTS / DAMAGES
“An engineer releasing a B737 aircraft with burn-

thru damage after a lightening strike, approx a
dime size hole in pressurized area. The engineer
was sent to a remote station due to AOG.
His motive was that there was no facilities there
and it would be very much easier to repair the a/c
at home base and in addition the pax would get
stranded over night.”

103
EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED RISKS – DEFECTS / DAMAGES
I have represented an engineer that made the decision to cut
a fire detection wire to prevent false alarms in the flight deck.
The pilots and engineering management were also aware of
the decision.
The decision was made to enable an aircraft to return to the

home base the same day, to avoid an overnight stay for the
flight crew and to avoid looking bad to the customer.
Significant pressure was put on the engineer by the
operations manager for the airline.
The LAME has since left the industry to avoid being put in the
same position again.
104
EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED RISKS – DIVERSION DECISIONS
Destination (second main base of operator) had strong headwinds but

runway in use was covered by low clouds on final. After one unsuccessful
attempt we diverted to alternate (main base). Upon arrival to alternate,
the company had already placed a flight plan to return back to
destination. 4 flights in total had diverted. All were "pushed" to try again
even though there was no clear improvement.
After waiting for 2 hours we departed again. Only way to land was by
executing a circling approach with 20kts tailwind and breaking off at less
than 1000ft and turning base at 3 miles. This was at night and in a
mountainous area.
All 4 flights attempted the procedure. Some made it on the first try, some
felt "forced" to try again and again until they made it on 3rd attempt.

105
EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED RISKS – FUEL DECISIONS
“Taking less fuel that might be comfortable is becoming
more normal with half of the flight deck. Winds are
forecast and quite often wrong, or there can be other
reasons, but contingency fuel soon goes. Some pilots are
happy to land close to final reserve fuel with few options
or thinking time. With the introduction of a leader
board, telling pilots how much extra fuel they
carry compared to the company average, some
are keen to be seen at the top. Negotiations for
carrying a few hundred kilos of fuel, on occasion are
drawn out and sometimes dismissed.”
106
EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED RISKS – GO-AROUNDS
“I recently ignored an aircraft generated windshear ahead warning while
making an approach into Gibraltar on a particularly turbulent day.
Obviously the warning comes in an instant and our training is to respond
and go around. I had briefed the possibility to my first officer of a
windshear alert and stated we would delay our response for a brief
moment to assess unless we were close to the ground. As the warning
came at about 500 feet I used my experience and judgement to
determine it was safe to continue. The approach was continued to a
normal landing and a safety report made.
I would add in similar circumstances I have initiated a go around 'before'
the aircraft recognised windshear and carried out the manoeuvre only
for the aircraft to warn me after the event. It must be recognised that go
arounds also carry some risk.”

107
EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED RISKS - FATIGUE
“I was just finished with line training, and flying out of a city far from my hometown. It was an
early morning departure, and with the low salary only being paid per block hour, and I had to
endure all expenses for accommodation, I could only afford to sleep at a hostel. The hostel
had very thin walls and you could hear other people having *** during the late night hours in
other rooms. I woke up having only slept 4 hours, but could not report unfit as this would
result in me losing money on the trip from my home country as a whole. This at a time when
all cash reserves were exhausted.”
“Having flown for ..........., I have witnessed pilots and cabin crew flying when they should not
have been, either being fatigued or sick. Common to all of them is the structure of the zero
hour contracts under which they work for the airline. Only getting paid by the block hour puts
unnecessary pressure on the crew to fly at all costs. In the end if they don't fly, they don't get
paid. Most pilots have massive debt and lots of financial pressure on them to pay that debt
back. The airline will of course claim this is a lie, and it will never be proven otherwise as no
pilots will admit it, as it is against the law to fly when unfit. Also the management style of the
company instils fear in the crews, and no one dares to oppose the instructions coming from
management.”

108
EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED RISKS - WEATHER
“A huge line of thunderstorms blocked our route extending 150 miles to

the left and 5 miles to the right. ATC would not permit any deviation to
the right at all. I ensured the cabin was secured and all passengers and
crew were strapped in and attempted to pick the safest path through the
thunderstorms having asked ATC on numerous occasions for a small
deviation to the right and been repeatedly refused.
During the storm penetration, the aircraft encountered severe
turbulence for approximately 20 seconds and lost 470' in altitude with
the autopilot remaining engaged throughout. There were no injuries to
the passengers or crew and no damage found later on the aircraft.”

109
EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED RISKS
TAKE-OFF DECISION
“At night, in an airport with no traffic, after

wrong taxi out, crew decided to take-off
from a Runway intersection, instead of
returning to the planned take-off point,
without proper take-off data calculation,
estimating that the remaining runway
length was sufficient.”
110
TAKE-OFF DECISION
“Cleared for takeoff from a runway intersection,

realizing during line up that the aircraft is at the
next intersection instead (slightly shorter
runway).
Takeoff performed using TOGA thrust (max)
instead of calculated FLEX thrust, to avoid delay.”

111
TAIL/CROSS WIND LANDINGS
“landing with tailwind and outside of unstable approach criteria -
long runway, daylight, visual conditions made it "acceptable" risk
even though in violation of company policies. This occurs daily, but
in aggregate only 2% of all approaches.”
“Landed with tailwind outside of operational limit.

Considered safer than going around and diverting with low fuel to
busy alternate airport. (huge long runway)”
“Going beyond Company wx related standard limitations

(crosswind limits and gust factors)”
112
WHAT’S NEXT

113
I AM CURRENTLY WORKING
WITH TWO AIRLINES AND ONE
MRO ORGANISATION TO
CONDUCT REVIEWS OF
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE
FROM RISK PERSPECTIVE

114
CASE STUDIES – ORGANISATIONAL REVIEWS
Project Plan & Deliverables
• The results of the initial assessment of safety / risk culture in
the organisation will be presented to the leadership team (i.e.
Safety Review Board) to give an overview of risks that
Phase 1 frontline operators and their line managers face on a daily
basis.
Assessment • This will either give assurance to the leadership that no
excessive risk taking occurs or it may identify areas for
concern, which may be driven by internal or external factors.
• Subsequently a development programme (i.e. workshops) can

be delivered to achieve a ‘Risk Sensible Culture’ [Neither
‘Excessive Risk Taking’ (Unsafe) Nor ‘Too Risk Averse’
Phase 2 (Unprofitable)] across the organisation.
Development • This will ultimately help to achieve the fine balance between
maintaining safety risks at ALARP and keeping costs under
control.
• The final phase will aim to evaluate how/if the

project has achieved its intended outcomes.
Phase 3 • This can be achieved by either interviews or
Evaluation conducting an anonymous staff survey to seek
evidence and understand if behavioral changes
occurred.

115
TYPOLOGY OF ORGANISATIONAL RISK BEHAVIOUR
Based on the concept of “Four States of Man” coined by Hon. Charles Haddon-Cave
EFFECTIVENESS OF SMS
RISK PROTECTION
(Control of Risk Exposure e.g. Safety / Legal / Reputation)
RISK RISK
(Effective Risk Control / Mitigation)
AVERSE SENSIBLE
RISK RISK
IGNORANT CAVALIER
EFFECTIVENESS OF SMS
U N D E R S TA N D I N G O F R I S K
EFFECTIVE (Hazard Identification + Risk Analysis & Assessment)
(KNOWN KNOWNs & KNOWN UNKNOWNs)
116
IF YOU ARE INTERESTED IN
COLLABORATING, PLEASE GET IN TOUCH!
PERHAPS WE CAN FIND OUT TOGETHER
IF YOUR ORGANISATION IS
‘RISK SENSIBLE’ OR NOT?

117
CONCLUSION

118
SMS IMPLEMENTATION & EVOLUTION
Collecting data can be problematic for some organisations,
because the relationship between Just & Reporting Culture
is delicate. So be careful how to handle punitive action.
CAUTION: Risk Assessment is a subjective process. Risk

takers can always assess high risk as acceptable.
“THREE KINDS OF LIES! LIES, DAMN LIES & STATISTICS”

We need to challenge statistics, should not always be slave
to them and consider the big picture.
Let’s not get obsessed about performance. Ironically if we

push people too hard to achieve better performance, they will
take more risks. (The financial mess we are in?)
SMS SHOULD NOT STEAL THE LIMELIGHT FROM

HUMAN FACTORS! WE STILL NEED TO ADDRESS
HUMAN ERROR, RISK TAKING BEHAVIOUR AND
NEGLIGENCE TO ACHIEVE BETTER PERFORMANCE.
MANAGING HUMAN RISK NOT ONLY IN THE BOARD

ROOM BUT ALSO AT THE SHARP END IS THE KEY.
119
SMS IMPLEMENTATION & EVOLUTION
Collecting data can be problematic for some

organisations, because the relationship between Just &
Reporting Culture is delicate. So be careful how to handle
punitive action.
CAUTION: Risk Assessment is a subjective process. Risk

takers can always assess high risk as acceptable.
“THREE KINDS OF LIES! LIES, DAMN LIES &

STATISTICS” We need to challenge statistics, should not
SMS SHOULD NOT STEAL THE LIMELIGHT
always be slave to them FROM
and consider theHUMAN
big picture.
FACTORS! WE STILL NEED TO ADDRESS HUMAN ERROR,

Let’s not get obsessed about performance. Ironically if we
push people too hard to achieve better performance, they
RISK TAKING BEHAVIOUR AND NEGLIGENCE TO ACHIEVE

will take more risks. (The financial mess we are in?)
BETTER PERFORMANCE.
MAKING SENSIBLE RISK DECISIONS NOT ONLY IN THE
BOARD ROOM BUT ALSO AT THE SHARP END IS THE KEY.
120
TAKE AWAYS

121
TAKE AWAYS (FOOD FOR THOUGHT)
• CULTURE IS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE THEREFORE VERY DIFFICULT TO MEASURE
• IF YOU ARE RUNNING SAFETY CULTURE SURVEYS, PLEASE DON’T GET

OBSESSED WITH TENS OF QUESTIONS AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS. THEY CAN
BE USEFUL BUT GO BEYOND THEM TO UNDERSTAND PEOPLE.
• DON’T HESITATE TO ASK YOUR FRONTLINE OPERATORS (PILOTS, ENGINEERS,

CABIN CREW, DISPATCHERS, GORUND HANDLERS) AND THEIR MANAGERS
ABOUT THE RISK DECISIONS THEY MADE. I BET IT WILL TELL YOU A LOT
WHETHER THEY ARE ‘RISK IGNORANT’, ‘RISK CAVALIER’, ‘RISK AVERSE’ or
‘RISK SENSIBLE’
NOT ASKING THEM WHAT RISKS THEY TAKE MIGHT BE AN
INDICATION OF A ‘RISK IGNORANT’ ORGANISATION’?
122
BONUS CULTURE & UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
WITHOUT MONITORING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS,
THE LEADERS CANNOT MAKE INFORMED DECISIONS
BUT BONUSES & PENALTIES CAN

ENCORUAGE RISK TAKING & DISCOURAGE REPORTING
123
NEXT TIME YOU ARE GOING TO USE
THINK CRITICALLY!
THINK ABOUT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
124
PLEASE LET US KNOW YOUR
THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS SESSION
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTION,

PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE
TO CONTACT
cengiz.turkoglu@cranfield.ac.uk
125
?
DO YOU HAVE
A STORY
TO TELL ABOUT
EXCESSIVE OR
UNNECESSARY
RISK TAKING
PLEASE DO GET IN TOUCH
I AM HERE TO LISTEN !
www.riskculture.org
email@riskculture.org
‘£1,700 BURSARY’ DRAW
TO ATTEND A COURSE @
CRANFIELD SAFETY & ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION CENTRE

CHC Presentation - Risk Culture by Cengiz Turkoglu - FINAL

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CHC Presentation - Risk Culture by Cengiz Turkoglu - FINAL

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Risk Culture: surely that couldn’t

Building Safety At Every Level:

Senior Lecturer &

VP Technical @ Vice Chairman @

Building Safety At Every Level:

with an approved design & maintenance organisation

RISK CULTURE - THE CONCEPT

Building Safety At Every Level:

what I will discuss in this presentation.

safety risk decisions made by professionals.

Building Safety At Every Level:

how subjective risk can be

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

NO ONE STOOD UP DURING THE SESSION

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Number of Accidents Number of Fatal Accidents

Building Safety At Every Level:

Number of Accidents Number of Fatal Accidents

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

300 423 315

Number of Accidents Number of Fatal Accidents

Building Safety At Every Level:

900 972 1000

600 514 600

Number of Accidents Number of Fatal Accidents

Building Safety At Every Level:

Number of Accidents Number of Fatal Accidents

Building Safety At Every Level:

700 972 1000

101 92 84 119 97 88 89 93 105* 0

Number of Accidents Number of Fatal Accidents

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

High Reliability Theory Normal Accidents Theory

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

So keep sharing data, information and intelligence

But don’t forget to learn lessons from accidents/incidents as well as

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

The occurrence and impact of

if we want to achieve such goals, we need to

collecting operational data and investigating to learn lessons

but predicting future, based on

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

Drucker’s well known quote sums it up. Achieving results heavily

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level:

YOU KNOW IT WHEN YOU SEE IT

Building Safety At Every Level:

Building Safety At Every Level: