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 Combating Arms and Narcotic Terrorism in Afghanistan

1. Introduction to the topic

a. Historical Overview
b. The 20th century
c. Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)
d. Civil war following Soviet departure (1989–1996)
e. The Taliban government (1996–2001)
f. 9/11 and the United States invasion of Afghanistan (2001)
g. Elections (2004)
h. Ashraf Ghani’s tenure
i. Rise in opium production
j. United States Withdrawal (2020-2021)
k. Fall of Kabul (2021)
2. Improvised explosive device (IEDs)
3. Current Insurgency and Terrorism
4. Narcotic spillover
5. Narcotic trafficking 6. The dilemma of Arms Trafficking
7. Case study:
8. Afghan Taliban
9. Narco terrorism in a “Rouge” Afghanistan
10. Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

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Disarmament and International Security
The United Nations (UN) Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was created as the
first of the Main Committees in the General Assembly when the charter of the United Nations was signed
in 1945. Thus, DISEC is often referred to as the First Committee. DISEC was formed to respond to the
need for an international forum to discuss peace and security issues among members of the international
community.

According to the UN Charter, the purpose of DISEC in the General Assembly is to establish ‘general
principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles
governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and also to give “recommendations with regard
to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council.”
Although DISEC cannot directly advise the Security Council’s decision-making process, the UN Charter
explains that DISEC can suggest specific topics for Security Council consideration. Aside from its role in
the General Assembly, DISEC is also an institution of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
(UNODA), formally named in January 1998 after the Secretary-General’s second special session on
disarmament in 1982. The UNODA is concerned with disarmament at all levels—nuclear weapons,
weapons of mass destruction, and conventional weapons—and assists DISEC through its work conducted
in the General Assembly for substantive norm-setting support to further its disarmament initiatives.

In addition, DISEC has passed the very first General Assembly resolution that was co- sponsored by all
the Member States of the time. This resolution, adopted in 2001, reaffirmed all resolutions on the
situation in Afghanistan and confirmed that the United Nations would play an important role in the
country. It also called for the establishment of a transitional administration leading to the formation of a
new government.

Furthermore, given its direct association with the United Nations General Assembly (being a subsidiary
organ as authorised under Article 22), it retains the powers and responsibilities of the General Assembly
as outlined in Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations, including [3]:
● Article 10
“mak[ing] recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or
to both on any such questions or matters.”
● Article 11(2)

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 “discuss[ing] any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
brought before it...”
● Article 11(3)

“call[ing] the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger
international peace and security.”
● Article 14
“recommend[ing] measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation...”

Introduction to the topic

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a country that has prominently impacted global geopolitics for half
a century.

The Taliban’s return to power can be considered one of the most significant events of 2021, one with far-
reaching consequences. The withdrawal of US forces has left a power vacuum in Afghanistan (which has
historically been called ‘the graveyard of empires’), resulting in regional instability. The topic of the
committee is focused on the substantial increase in the prevalence of weapons and (narcotics) non-state
actors due to this instability.

The crisis in Afghanistan not only affects its neighbours in South and Central Asia, but it has political,
economic, and humanitarian ramifications for countries around the globe. Conflict and instability have
pervaded for over half a century; therefore, it is necessary that this issue is approached in a multifarious
and diplomatic manner, with the goal of addressing the predicament of sovereignty and security in the
region, and the world at large.

Historical Overview
The land that is now Afghanistan has a long history of domination by foreign conquerors and strife
among internally warring factions. At the gateway between Asia and Europe, this land was conquered by
Darius I of Babylonia (c. 500 B.C.), Alexander the Great (329 B.C.), Genghis Khan (1221), amongst
others.
However, it wasn’t until the 1700s that the area was united as a single country.

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The 20th century

During the beginning of the 20th century, Russia and Britain were engaged in “the Great Game,” a series
of political, diplomatic and military confrontations with the aim of gaining influence in Afghanistan. In
1919, Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which ended the Third Anglo-Afghan War and
marks Afghanistan’s official date of independence.

Ghazi Amanullah Khan (ruled 1919–29) subsequently established relations with major countries and
introduced his country’s first constitution in 1923. In 1933 Amanullah’s nephew Mohammad Zahir Shah,
the last king of Afghanistan, began a 40-year reign.

After World War II, in which Afghanistan remained neutral, the long-standing division of the Pashtun
tribes caused tension with Pakistan. In 1953, General Mohammed Daud became prime minister, shifting
foreign policy towards the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. However, he was forced to
resign in 1963. A constitutional monarchy introduced in 1964, but that led to political polarisation and
power struggles.

In the decade of the 1970s Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation surged and it became a global supplier of
opiates when other countries in the region banned poppies

On the political front in 1973 Daoud overthrew the king and established a republic. When economic
conditions did not improve and Daoud lost most of his political support, he was overthrown in a pro-
Soviet coup in 1978.

Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)

In December of 1979, the Soviet Army invaded and instituted a communist government. Babrak Karmal
was installed as ruler, backed by Soviet troops. But opposition intensified with various mujahideen
groups fighting Soviet forces. US, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia supply money and arms to the
mujahideen.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan catalysed the cross border movement of weapons and narcotics in the
region. Smugglers took advantage of preexisting routes and developed new ones during the 1980s to

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create the routes that are still in use today. Afghanistan’s prolific poppy fields now produce a massive
outpouring of opiates that smugglers transport to European and other foreign markets. Traffickers use
well developed networks and techniques to convey narcotics from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran and
precursor chemicals to heroin labs near the border through a combination of force, stealth, and corruption.

Between 1979 and 1989, two Soviet-sponsored regimes failed to defeat the loose federation of
mujahideen guerrillas that opposed the occupation. Mujahideen came together in Pakistan, in 1985 to
form an alliance against Soviet forces. Half of the Afghan population was estimated to be displaced by
war at this point, with many fleeing to neighbouring Iran or Pakistan. Starting in 1986, the US started
supplying mujahideen with Stinger missiles, enabling them to shoot down Soviet helicopter gunships.
Babrak Karmal was replaced by Najibullah as head of the Soviet-backed regime in the same year.

In 1988, Afghanistan, USSR, the US and Pakistan signed peace accords and the Soviet Union began
pulling out troops, creating a neutral Afghan state. The agreement ended a war that killed thousands,
devastated industry and agriculture, and created 5 to 6 million refugees.

The Soviet military left behind huge stockpiles when it retreated. Traffickers capitalised on these
stockpiles by transporting them to southern Afghanistan and selling them to the Taliban. The dispersion
of these weapons created the “Kalashnikov Culture,” giving rise to heavily armed tribesmen and
pervasive weapons smuggling along the border.

Civil war following Soviet departure (1989–1996)

Violence continued after Soviet departure as mujahideen worked to overthrow Najibullah and the pro-
Soviet regime. Najibullah’s government falls in 1992, and a destructive civil war follows. Mujahideen
leaders entered the capital but quickly turned on each other. Refugees continued to flee in huge numbers
to Pakistan and Iran. By now, Afghanistan had surpassed Burma as the world’s largest opium producer.

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The Taliban government (1996–2001)
Newly formed Islamic militia, the Taliban, rose to power in 1996 on promises of peace. Most Afghans,
exhausted by years of drought, famine and war, approved of the Taliban for upholding traditional Islamic
values. The Taliban outlawed cultivation of poppies for the opium trade, cracked down on crime, and
curtailed the education and employment of women. Women were required to be fully veiled and are not

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allowed outside alone. Islamic law is enforced via public executions and amputations. Although Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia recognised the Taliban government in 1997, the United States refused.

The warlords and the Taliban government that replaced the Soviets continued to use narcotics for
funding. Regardless of who governed, the warlords relied on poppies to fund their operations, especially
in Helmand province. When the Taliban overran these warlords, particularly in southern Afghanistan, it
encouraged poppy farming as it consolidated power.

By 1997, 96% of Afghan heroin came from Taliban territory. While Taliban banned poppy cultivation in
2000, its unwillingness to proscribe narcotics trading or destroy stockpiles led many to believe that it may
have been more of an attempt to gain international favour while creating scarcity to inflate the value of
its existing stockpiles.

In August 1998, the U.S. launched cruise missile strikes on Khost, Afghanistan, in retaliation for al-
Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 1999, the U.N. Security Council imposed
terrorist sanctions on the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In September of 2001, Ahmad Shah Masood, leader of
the main opposition to the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, was assassinated.

9/11 and the United States invasion of Afghanistan (2001)

The Taliban had granted the Arab terrorist organisation al Qaeda the right to use Afghanistan as a base.
As al Qaeda committed a series of international terrorist acts culminating in attacks on the United States
on September 11, 2001, the Taliban rejected international pressure to surrender al Qaeda leader Osama
bin Laden.

Subsequently, the U.S.-led coalition launched Operation Enduring Freedom, targeting the Taliban and al-
Qaida with military strikes. The Northern Alliance enters Kabul on Nov. 13. The Taliban flee south and
their regime is overthrown. In December, Hamid Karzai was named interim president after Afghan
groups signed the Bonn Agreement on an interim government. The NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force is established under a U.N. mandate.

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The first contingent of foreign peacekeepers - the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) - were deployed in 2002 marking the start of a protracted fight against the Taliban. Amid
increased violence, NATO took control of security in Kabul in August, 2003.

Elections (2004)
In 2004, Loya Jirga adopted a new constitution which provides for a strong presidency – in the
Presidential elections, Hamid Karzai is declared winner. In December 2005, the Parliament opened with
warlords and strongmen in most of the seats. The Taliban seized territory in southern Afghanistan in
2006; therefore, NATO's ISAF assumed command from the U.S. in Afghanistan.

Opium production soared to a record high by 2007 according to reports by the UN.

In 2009, Karzai was reelected president, although elections are marred by widespread Taliban attacks,
patchy turnout and claims of serious fraud. The U.S. "surge" begins after President Barack Obama orders
substantial troop increases in Afghanistan. Obama says that U.S. forces will leave by 2011. February
2010, Nato-led forces launched a major offensive, Operation Moshtarak, in bid to secure government
control of southern Helmand province.

In July 2010,Whistleblowing website Wikileaks published thousands of classified US military documents

relating to Afghanistan.

Number of civilians killed since the 2001 invasion hit record levels in 2010, Afghanistan Rights Monitor
reported. In 2012, NATO announced it will withdraw foreign combat troops and transfer control of
security operations to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. By this year, there are 2.6 million Afghan
refugees displaced by war and many live in horrific conditions, including young children and women.

Ashraf Ghani’s tenure

In September 2014 Ashraf Ghani became president after the 2014 presidential election where for the first
time in Afghanistan's history power was democratically transferred. On 28 December 2014, NATO
formally ended ISAF combat operations in Afghanistan and transferred full security responsibility to the
Afghan government.

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Islamic State (IS) group emerged in eastern Afghanistan and within a few months captured a large swathe
of Taliban-controlled areas in Nangarhar province. US President Barack Obama announced in March
2015 that his country will delay its troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, following a request from
President Ashraf Ghani.

Fighting continued between government forces and the Taliban, and attacks attributed to the Taliban and
ISIS convulsed the country throughout subsequent years.

Rise of civilian casualties in the Ghani regime.

Rise in opium production

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan reached an all-time high by 2016, according to a US report. The
Washington Post reported that on 20 November 2017, General John Nicholson announced that US
aircraft were targeting drug production facilities in Afghanistan under a new strategy aimed at cutting off
Taliban funding, saying that the Taliban was "becoming a criminal organisation" that was earning about
$200 million a year from drug-related activities. President Ashraf Ghani strongly endorsed the new
campaign of US and Afghan airstrikes against the Taliban-run narcotic centres

United States Withdrawal (2020-2021)

In 2018, President Donald Trump appointed former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad
as his special representative to negotiate with the Taliban. On 19 February 2020, the US–Taliban deal
was made in Qatar. The 2020 US–Taliban deal was one of the critical events that caused the collapse of
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); following the signing of the deal, the US dramatically
reduced the number of air attacks and deprived the ANSF of a critical edge in fighting the Taliban
insurgency.

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Fall of Kabul (2021)
Soon after the withdrawal of NATO troops started, the Taliban
launched an offensive against the Afghan government, quickly
advancing in front of collapsing Afghan government forces. On
15 August 2021, as the Taliban once again controlled a vast
majority of Afghan territory, they re-captured the capital city of
Kabul, and many civilians, government officials and foreign
diplomats were evacuated. President Ghani fled Afghanistan
that day.

Taliban rule was swiftly restored as its opponents were defeated or left the country. Declaring an "Islamic
Emirate", it is apparently led by supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and acting Prime Minister Hasan
Akhund, who took office on 7 September 2021.

Western nations have suspended most humanitarian aid to Afghanistan following the Taliban's takeover
of the country in August 2021 and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund also halted
payments. In October 2021, more than half of Afghanistan's 39 million people faced an acute food
shortage. The Human Rights Watch reported that Afghanistan was facing widespread famine due to an
economic and banking crisis.

Soon after taking power, the Taliban vowed to crack down on narcotics- they issued a decree that
unequivocally banned the production and sale of illicit drugs. Unfortunately, that decree has been
inadequately enforced, and Afghanistan’s drug trade is booming under Taliban rule.

It will be a challenge for the regime to stamp out an industry which provides so many poor Afghans with
a livelihood, especially amid the extreme economic and humanitarian crisis which has overtaken the
country. The amount of land under poppy cultivation almost tripled between 2002 and 2020, and the
country also started to produce cheap methamphetamine using an abundant local plant—ephedra.

Aside from the narcotics trade, illegal arms trade has increased drastically as well. Approximately $7
billion of military equipment the US transferred to the Afghan government over the course of 16 years
was left behind in Afghanistan after the US completed its withdrawal, according to a congressionally

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mandated report from the US Department of Defense. The weapons are now in the hands of the Taliban
government, or in black market circulation.

Estimates of the number of arms circulating in Afghanistan range from 1.5 million to 10 million. The
country also holds one of the world's largest stockpiles of ammunition - more than 100,000 tonnes
according to some estimates.

Most of the weapons in Afghanistan have come from four main sources over the course of the last 4
decades of Afghan history: Soviet arms after their withdrawal in 1988, US arms left following their
departure in 2021, arms brought to the country by private militias or foreign terrorist agencies, and those
which are locally manufactured.

Large amounts of U.S. supplied weapons were left behind in Afghanistan – many of these could continue
circulating throughout the region via black market exchanges or other means of diversion for years to
come. The question of “who now has, or will soon have, access to” the unaccountable quantities of U.S.-
supplied weapons presents serious challenges for security in Afghanistan and beyond. The consequences
of poor accountability of weapons and ammunition is unfortunately a common story in this context and
others, such as Iraq, and should encourage critical reflections on U.S. foreign policy decisions. The U.S.
would be amiss if it overlooked the elephant in the room: the policy of arming parties in conflict.

Improvised explosive device (IEDs)

An improvised explosive device (IED) is a bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in
conventional military action. It may be constructed of conventional military explosives, such as an
artillery shell, attached to a detonating mechanism. IEDs are commonly used as roadside bombs, or
homemade bombs. [15]

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A U.S. Cougar which was struck by an approximately 90–136 kg (198–300 lb) directed charge IED during the Anbar campaign

Since IEDs are usually made at camps and are manufactured from different parts combined together,
IEDs are extremely diverse in design and may contain many types of initiators, detonators, penetrators,
and explosive loads. Because the components of these devices are being used in a manner not intended by
their manufacturer, and because the method of producing the explosion is limited only by the science and
imagination of the perpetrator, it is not possible to follow a step-by-step guide to detect and disarm a
device that an individual has only recently developed.

In 1979 when Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet Russia, the Afghan Mujahideen were supplied with
large quantities of military supplies by the CIA. Among those supplies were many types of anti-tank
mines. The insurgents often removed the explosives from several foreign anti-tank mines, and combined
the explosives in tin cooking-oil cans for a more powerful blast. By combining the explosives from
several mines and placing them in tin cans, the insurgents made them more powerful.

Afghan insurgents operating far from the border with Pakistan did not have a ready supply of foreign anti-
tank mines. They preferred to make IEDs from Soviet unexploded ordnance. The devices were rarely
triggered by pressure fuses. They were almost always remotely detonated. Since the 2001 invasion of
Afghanistan, the Taliban and its supporters have used IEDs against NATO and Afghan military and
civilian vehicles. This has become the most common method of attack against NATO forces, with IED
attacks increasing consistently year on year

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IEDs are triggered by various methods, including remote control, infrared or magnetic triggers, pressure-
sensitive bars or trip wires (victim-operated). In some cases, multiple IEDs are wired together in a daisy
chain to attack a convoy of vehicles spread out along a roadway.

Current Insurgency and Terrorism:

While 2022 didn’t see any progress in bringing about peace and stability in Afghanistan—sections of
Afghan society did resist and push back against the Taliban. At present, the two biggest challenges that
the Taliban face are from international terrorist groups as well as local resistance groups. While the
conflict with the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) for influence has continued unabated, it is the
presence of other insurgent groups, like the National Resistance Front (NRF), which have ambitious plans
for a post-Taliban government in Kabul, which is also a cause of concern.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP):

ISKP-Islamic State Khorasan Province - is the regional affiliate of the Islamic State group. It is the most
extreme and violent of all the jihadist militant groups in Afghanistan. ISKP was set up in January 2015
at the height of IS's power in Iraq and Syria. It recruits both Afghan and Pakistani jihadists, especially
defecting members of the Afghan Taliban who don't see their own organisation as extreme enough.
ISKP has major differences with the Taliban, accusing them of abandoning Jihad and the battlefield in
favour of a negotiated peace settlement thus considering Taliban militants "apostates", making their
killing lawful under their interpretation of Islamic law.
ISKP directs its deadliest attacks toward religious minorities in Afghanistan— particularly members of
the Shi’a Hazara community. ISKP has been blamed for some of the worst atrocities in recent years,
targeting girls' schools, hospitals and even a maternity ward, where they reportedly shot dead pregnant
women and nurses.
Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021, the Islamic State affiliate has claimed
responsibility for 13 attacks against Hazaras and has been linked to at least 3 more, killing and injuring at
least 700 people. The Taliban’s growing crackdown on the media, especially in the provinces, means
additional attacks are likely to have gone unreported. The United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that recent attacks by the group on Shia gatherings in Kabul killed and
injured more than 120 people.

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The group claimed responsibility for the April 19 suicide bombing at Abdul Rahim Shahid High School
in the west Kabul neighborhood of Dasht-e Barchi – a predominantly Hazara and Shia area – that killed
and injured 20 students, teachers, and staff.
The group also claimed responsibility for the April 21 suicide bombing of one of Afghanistan’s largest
Shia mosques, Seh Dokan Mosque in Mazar-e Sharif, which killed 31 people and wounded 87 others.

Attacks on Hazara and other religious minorities by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province violate
international humanitarian law, which remains applicable in Afghanistan. Deliberate attacks on civilians
are war crimes.

National Resistance Force (NRF):

National Resistance Force is one of the largest “Afghan Resistance Groups”. Led by Ahmad Massoud,
son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, NRF is the most prominent anti-Taliban insurgency claiming to have a few
thousand armed fighters. Since the Taliban’s ascent to power, skirmishes have happened quite frequently
between the two. Focusing on a two-stage insurgency, the group’s emphasis in the short run is on
draining the enemy by conducting targeted strikes followed by liberating regions and accumulating
resources to prepare a full-scale offensive in the future. The Taliban has consistently downplayed the
threat posed by any insurgency but the stationing of troops in the north, reaching 10,000 in February 2022
says otherwise. While they denounce the NRF as warlords taking orders from abroad, the leadership is
well aware of the threat it poses, as was evident by the talks between the two sides in January 2022. But
its
counter-insurgency measures have failed to tame the insurgency in the north due to the ethnic
composition of the fighters on both sides. Taliban soldiers with Tajik ancestry refuse to fight the NRF,
with some even defecting to the latter.
What distinguishes the current anti-Taliban insurgency from resistance in the 1990s is also the presence
of social media and how different resistance groups are leveraging it. While it does help in propagating
their message and keeping people aware of their plan of actions, the tendency of the groups to take credit
for an act that they didn’t do or of two groups claiming to have committed the same attack dents their
legitimacy and raises questions about their claims of their growing footprint and influence in the country.

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The dilemma of Arms Trafficking:
Authorised arms transfer is the term most widely used to refer to the physical or nominal movement of
arms from one owner to another a priori, regardless of any physical movement of the weapons. Without
the adjective ‘international’, the term transfer is widely used in practice to include intra- national
movements and nominal transfers of ownership within the same State jurisdiction. However, when is a
transfer illicit? What constitutes an unauthorised transfer?

According to the Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty, the term arms transfer mostly relates to
international transfers. The Protocol refers to arms transfers as the cross-border movement (import, export
and transit) of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, and their unauthorised movement
from or across at least two State territories, as well as to the movement of firearms without proper
marking as illicit trafficking. However, the Arms Trade Treaty uses the term transfers to refer to the
international trade in general, which comprise a broader category of transfers, namely “export, transit,
trans-shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as ‘transfer’” (Article 2, 2 Arms Trade Treaty). The
dividing line between the legal and the illicit trade is not always easy to draw and depends on national
legal frameworks and international law. Generally identified are three types of market and stages, or types
of transfers of firearms, referred to by the Small Arms Survey (2001) as the ‘Legality Spectrum’:

Legal or regulated transfers:

These include, in general, all legally manufactured arms and international transfers that importing,
exporting or transit States legally authorise in accordance with their respective national law and
international law.

Illicit grey-market transfers:

These transfers have some authorised elements while other aspects may be illicit, such as when authorised
by either importing or exporting country but not both. Grey transfers can also occur when, for example,
governments or their agents exploit loopholes or circumvent national and/or international laws or
policies. These ‘grey market firearms’ can also include largely unregistered firearms (including
‘misplaced, lost or forgotten’ firearms, antiques, souvenirs and battlefield trophies, all of which might
still be capable of live firing, or easy conversion to live firing), “not held, used or conveyed for criminal
purposes but identified as often ending up in the illicit market” (Bricknell, 2012: 23).

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Illegal black-market transfers:

These are transfers in clear violation of national and/or international laws, which take place without
official government consent or control, including cases of diversion and illicit cross-border trafficking.
Black-market firearms include therefore all illegally brokered, traded, diverted or trafficked arms, or
those in active criminal, insurgency or terrorist hands, or stockpiled by such groups. [16]

Logistical process of the trade in illicit firearms

In Afghanistan, the Taliban are already selling these weapons. They are often more valuable to sell than
to buy for two reasons. The most obvious is the economic benefit since they can sell the weapons for
more than what they had bought (or more likely stolen and/ or inherited) them for. The other reason is
strategic: They can control who can buy the weapons, including selling the weapons to arms bazaars
where anyone from local arms dealers, to Afghan and Pakistani businessmen, to potential fighters in al‐
Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS).

There are nearly two million unregistered weapons in the Philippines, many of which are American. The
Philippines are also where Abu Sayyaf, an affiliate of ISIS, has a history of getting its hands on US
weapons. Similarly, the terrorist organisation al Shabaab often raids Somali military bases to steal US
arms. In Mexico, criminal organisations get access to many US weapons via second-hand sales as well as

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poor background checks from American gun providers. This results in US guns being more likely to be
used to kill someone in Mexico than in America. [17]

Narcotics In Afghanistan

The Taliban’s regime accommodates booming illicit markets that generated major revenues for its
insurgency against the Republic. This illicit economy revolves around the opium and heroin trade. While
the US, UK and other international partners determined that poppy cultivation was feeding the
insurgency, many Afghan stakeholders, inside and outside the government, viewed it as a source of
stability—and eradication efforts, a source of instability

Opium:

Opium poppies have been grown in Afghanistan throughout its history. Hearty plants that thrive even
under harsh conditions, they are cultivated for their gummy sap, which is converted into opium paste. The
opium poppy is the key source for many narcotics, including morphine, codeine, and heroin. According
to the United Nations, in 2020, Afghanistan accounted for about 85 percent of global opium production.
Under the former Republic, the drug trade was Afghanistan’s largest economic sector, providing full-time
employment to over half a million people.
While opium poppies have a long history in Afghanistan, the country was not always the world's biggest
opium supplier. At the time of Afghanistan's pro-Communist coup in 1978, Afghan farmers were
producing an estimated 300 tons of opium annually. It was enough to satisfy local and regional demand
and supply a handful of heroin production labs that sold their product to Western Europe.
True, the Taliban movement managed to prohibit narcotics in 2000 during their previous spell in power.
But it took the regime several attempts to stop opium cultivation. In late 2021, reports emerged that the
Taliban didn’t act against the poppy crop.
The Taliban authorities announced a ban on opium poppy cultivation in April 2022, just as the opium
harvest was about to begin. However, a grace period of two months was granted, and 2022’s harvest was
largely unaffected by the ban, although some eradication was reported to have taken place.
The area under opium poppy cultivation in the 2022 cropping season was estimated at 233,000 hectares.
In Helmand province one-fifth of arable land was dedicated to opium poppies. Following drought
conditions in early 2022, opium yields declined from an average of 38.5kg/ ha in 2021, to an estimated
26.7 kg/ha in 2022, yielding an opium harvest of 6,200 tons (10% less than the 6,800 tons in 2021). The
2022 opium harvest can be converted into 350 – 580 tons of heroin of export quality (50 – 70% purity).

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Narcotic spillover:

Drug trafficking has provided funding for insurgency and those who use terrorist violence in various
regions throughout the world, including in transit regions.
The latest findings and trends on the drug situation in Afghanistan clearly outline the Taliban’s
involvement in illegal narcotics trade. With the Taliban takeover of the country, the acres of land for
opium cultivation under their direct control have increased and they have taken full control of the illegal
drug trade business in the country. The drug-related threats stemming from the situation in Afghanistan
have spillover effects in the region and worldwide.
In September 1996, the Taliban took control of Kabul. On September 10, 1997, the Taliban’s Foreign
Ministry banned heroin and hashish. The ruling was amended ten days later with a note outlawing
cultivation and trafficking of opium as well. A year earlier, Afghanistan had produced 2,250 metric tons
of opium, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). That number climbed
to 2,800 tons in 1997, dipped slightly the next year due to widespread drought, and then soared in 1999 to
4,580 metric tons. The Taliban controlled most of the country by 1999, including all of the Pashto south.
Afghanistan’s poppy crop represented about 75 percent of global production. Ninety-seven percent of it
was grown in Taliban-held areas. In the southern provinces, the Taliban began collecting 20 percent
zakat, an Islamic levy, on truckloads of opium as they left farm areas. Following a law enforcement
crackdown in neighbouring Pakistan, heroin refineries previously based in the FATA shifted across the

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border. The Taliban swiftly began taxing their output—charging $50–70 a kilo depending on whether the
final product was morphine base or crystal heroin.
The United Nations (UN) reported that Afghanistan has potentially produced 9,000 tonnes of opium in
2017. Since 9/11, the Taliban have earned profits amounting to US$400 million per year from opium.
Overall, major areas with poppy cultivation are within territories controlled or contested by the Taliban.
These include the Helmand, Kandahar, Faryab, Uruzgan, Nangarhar and Ghazni provinces. The Taliban
are dependent on poppy cultivation for funds due to the increased regulations on terrorism finance since
9/11. As such, there is a nexus between drug dealers and the Taliban that ensures high profits for the
dealers and uninterrupted funds for the terrorist organisations.
The United Nations Committee of Experts on Afghanistan found out that funds raised from the
production and trading of opium and heroin have been used by the Taliban to provide support for
international terrorist activities, including those of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda terrorist network. The
funds are also used by Taliban to buy arms and other war material and to finance the training of terrorists
and support the operations of these extremists in neighbouring countries and beyond.

Drug Use in Afghanistan and How it is Affecting the People:

The high prevalence of illicit opioid use in a nation with one of the world’s worst public health and
socioeconomic indicators and punitive laws often dictated by religion around substance use may lead to
devastating health and social outcomes for people who use drugs in general and PWID in particular.
Afghanistan has high rates of communicable diseases and is endemic for malaria, viral hepatitis, and
emerging concentrated human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) among drug users . Health indicators are
further challenged by a severe lack of social and health infrastructures due to decades of war and poverty.
According to Afghanistan's first ever population-based drug use survey conducted in 2005, 3.8% of the
population reported illicit drug use with the most common drugs being cannabis followed by opiates. In
2009, a follow-up survey reported a drug use prevalence of 8% among adults 15–64 years of age, along
with a 53% increase in the number of regular opium users and an increase of 140% in the number of
regular heroin users since 2005. In 2015, a new survey (Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey) that used
confirmed biological measures found a national drug use prevalence of 12.8% among those 15 years and
older compared to a global rate of 5.3% among adults of the same age in the same year. According to the
Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey in 2015, opioids became the most used illicit drugs in
Afghanistan with a prevalence of 8.5%, exceeding the opioids prevalence in North America (4.42%).
The current humanitarian crisis due to Taliban occupation has worsened pre-existing risk environments
including widespread poverty, displacement, and fragile healthcare systems. Several news reports have

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described rising illicit drug use and a shift towards punitive drug prevention and treatment strategies
consisting of imprisonment and forced, unmedicated detoxification. There is an urgent need for
international aid agencies and their partners to prioritise provision of harm reduction and evidence-based
addiction treatment in Afghanistan.

Narcotic trafficking:

Afghanistan continues to dominate the worldwide opium market. Most of Europe is supplied with Afghan
opiates through the "Balkan route", via the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia and
Albania, which continues to be the most important conduit for heroin trafficking. The total value of illicit
opiates trafficked on the Balkan route is estimated to amount to an average of USD 28 billion per annum,
which is roughly a third bigger than the entire GDP of Afghanistan, while only a fraction of these profits
remain in the source country. The "southern route", through Pakistan or the Islamic Republic of Iran by
sea to the Gulf region and Africa (particularly East Africa), has grown in importance. Then there’s the
"northern route", from Afghanistan to neighbouring States in Central Asia, the Russian Federation and
other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Afghanistan and its neighbours however, are not only affected by trafficking as the drugs are moved to
their key destination markets. Of the globally about 17.4 million past-year users of opiates, particularly
South-West Asia is marked by high levels of opiate use and the highest prevalence of HIV among people
who inject drugs. In Afghanistan alone, 2-2.5 million people are estimated to use drugs. Additionally, an
emerging trend in Afghanistan is the use of amphetamines.
Soon after taking power last August, the Taliban vowed to crack down on narcotics. Fast forward to 3rd
April 2022, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation and the ‘usage, transportation, trade, export and import
of all types of narcotics across Afghanistan’. Unfortunately, this ban has been inadequately enforced, and
Afghanistan’s drug trade is booming under Taliban rule.

Balkan Route:

The Balkan route supplies illicit Afghan opiates to the following 32 countries/territory: Albania; Austria;
Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; France; Germany;
Greece; Hungary; Iran (Islamic Republic of); Ireland; Italy; Kosovo; Luxembourg; Montenegro; the
Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden;

24
Switzerland; Turkey; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey and other countries of South Eastern Europe are mainly transit
countries for Afghan opiates trafficked on the Balkan route.
Afghan heroin ends its journey in the large markets of the final destination countries of Western and
Central Europe. The vast majority of overall consumption is concentrated in four main markets: the
United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy.

The Southern Route:

The furthest reaches of trafficking by land on the southern route appear to be through Pakistan into India
and through the Islamic Republic of Iran to its southern coast.
The major routes in which trafficking by land is dominant are through Balochistan province of Pakistan
and south-eastern provinces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Trafficking by sea remains the transportation method for smuggling larger quantities of heroin. There are
also an increasing number of opiate seizures (mostly heroin) related to the use of the coastal areas in
Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sea and dry ports in South-West Asia have also seen an
increase in general trade. In addition to official ports, traffickers use smaller jetties to move heroin to the
Gulf region, the Gulf of Oman and further south to East Africa.

The Northern Route:

Of the three trafficking routes, the northern route is perhaps the least complex of the major routes used to
traffic opiates out of Afghanistan. Bound by geography, the northern route is heavily dependent on
overland paths, which themselves are based on road and rail infrastructure. Unlike the Balkan and
southern routes, which supply many destination markets, and cross multiple different countries, the
northern route primarily supplies the Russian Federation and, to a lesser extent, markets in Central Asia.
Opiate trafficking along the northern route occurs predominantly over land by private vehicle, truck or
train. The larger proportion of significant seizures of heroin made in baggage, vehicles and on the body of
couriers in Central Asia is consistent with it being a major opiate transit region along the northern route.
Concealment methods vary along the northern route, from basic in the early stages of the route from
Afghanistan into Tajikistan, to increasingly sophisticated methods further along the route. Overall,
increasingly professional concealment and trafficking methods have been reported.

25
Many drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) along the northern route are based on ethnic, clan or family
ties, providing a degree of security in what is largely a trust-based business. DTOs along the northern
route appear to have become smaller and more professional than in the 1990s and 2000s. DTOs now
seem to have the ability to move opiate shipments over greater distances, including beyond national
borders, and to do so in fewer stages than in the past.

Case studies:
Afghan Taliban:
The US withdrawal of troops in August 2020 brought unfamiliar calm to the Central Asia region as
killings majorly subsided in late 2021 across Afghanistan, But all is not well. For decades, predominantly
Russian-made guns were circulating in Afghanistan and are likely to remain the preferred choice of
weapons for the Taliban, in particular among lower-ranking fighters. To familiarise the fighters with the
recent US weapons, the Taliban have persuaded some former members of the Afghan forces to provide
training on how to use these weapons. According to Conflict Armament Research (CAR), the Afghan
forces used to hold workshops on how to repair mainly Russian-made weapons, but still lack the
capabilities to maintain and repair US weapons.38 They indicate US rifles are more difficult to maintain,
and spare parts are not easily available in the region, although gunsmiths along both sides of the Durand
line known for their skills in producing counterfeit weapons, spare parts and ammunition could
potentially fill this void.
The Taliban are fighting two insurgencies – one led by the Islamic State’s local branch and the second
comprising the National Resistance Front (NRF) and other groups aligned with the former government.
Of greatest concern to the outside world is that foreign militant groups that in the past relied on the
Taliban for safe haven remain in the country, as shown by the 31 July U.S. strike that killed al-Qaeda
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul.

When security problems emerge, the Taliban’s first reactions have in some cases made them worse. They
have tended to deny the existence of major issues, including by making absurd claims that al-Qaeda has
no presence in the country. The Taliban issue similar denials about the scale of local insurgencies,
presumably to thwart their adversaries’ publicity and recruitment efforts, while at the same time crushing
dissent with heavy-handed tactics.

A key feature of the new landscape is the Taliban’s own changing force posture, which has visibly
relaxed across much of the country. Hundreds of checkpoints on roads and highways have been

26
dismantled, because the Taliban lack manpower to maintain them and, in any case, do not perceive major
threats from the rural villages that hosted their fighters during the decades of insurgency. At the same
time, they are still struggling to adapt to their new role policing the cities and parts of the north where
they are unpopular. As they settle into Kabul and plan for the future, the Taliban have announced
ambitious plans for a large security apparatus but efforts to build up these forces remain in early stages.
The task is likely to take years. [1]

Narco terrorism in a “Rouge” Afghanistan :

Although violence and narcotics have had a long-standing relationship in Afghanistan, they only became
a threat after 9/11. Undeniably, the US willingly overlooked the Mujahideen’s use of profits from the
illegal narcotics trade to finance their resistance against the Soviets but suddenly became opposed to the
“cooperation” between terrorists and narco-traffickers after the attacks of 9/11. This rapid change of heart
is linked to the Taliban’s refusal to extradite the 9/11 perpetrators. It follows that when the illicit drug
trade is used to finance initiatives that fit the US agenda, it is permissible. Nonetheless, when the drug
trade is used to support anti-American activities, it becomes a security threat. Such reasoning would
almost sound legitimate (from a US domestic perspective) if it did not blatantly use dangerous double
standards. Indeed, it is upon those double standards that US President Bush could construct the War on
Terror as a global security issue.

a) From Counterterrorism to State-building?

Security is undoubtedly the main logic underpinning Afghanistan’s invasion. However, narco-
terrorism is not the only threat to US security. Rosato and Schuessler (2011) propose that the
balance against rival powers is critical to achieving security. Moreover, a state can achieve a
greater level of security by becoming a hegemon. Through a realist lens, because the US was
already a regional hegemon before 9/11, the rise of other potential regional hegemons would
have threatened its position and the international system’s status quo. Because the US aspired to
become a global hegemon, the economic, political, and military rise of China and India in Asia
constituted a threat to US supremacy. Gartenstein-Ross (2014) and Landler and Risen (2017)
explained that China’s plan to exploit Afghanistan’s raw mineral and natural resources was a
direct threat to the US economic interests.

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 The US presence in Afghanistan serves to keep the rise of China and India in check. Specifically,
the US is acting as an onshore balance against China by keeping its troops in Afghanistan with
the intent of state-building; and as an offshore balance against India by supporting Pakistan, its
main competitor. The implications of this offensive realist argument for this dissertation are that
narco-terrorism may not be that much of a pressing threat as it was constructed to be since no
evidence confirms a crime-terror nexus in Afghanistan.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

1. How can the International Community ensure a secure withdrawal \ demilitarisation process,
causing minimum further damage?

2. How can the International Community tackle the armed vulnerable communities, as well as the
threat posed by leftover weapons in the region?

3. What policies can be implemented to ensure more regulation of border security (in terms of
trafficking and smuggling of weapons and narcotics)?

4. What can the International Community do to restore political and economic stability in the
region?

5. What measures can the international community take to ensure the reduction of narcotic spillover
while keeping in mind the sovereignty of a State?

6. Can self-determination be achieved in the form of limited political autonomy within ‘de facto’
states within Afghanistan? How can ‘de facto’ states be given a greater degree of representation
with ensuring minimal collateral damage?

7. What is the proposed law under which Non International Armed Groups may be contained and
their actions curtailed?

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 8. Is regulating Non International Armed Groups equivalent to providing them legitimacy as groups
that can form governments and takeover?

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[3]
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[11]
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[13]
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[15]
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