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The Action Frame of Reference and The General Theory of Action Systems 7
The Action Frame of Reference and The General Theory of Action Systems 7
The Action Frame of Reference and The General Theory of Action Systems 7
reactions of alter, a conditional standard comes to be set up of what conditions will and
what will not call forth the “gratifying” reactions, and the relation between these
conditions and the reactions becomes as such part of the meaning system of ego’s
orientation to the situation. The orientation to a normative order, and the mutual
interlocking of expectations and sanctions which will be fundamental to our anal-ysis of
social systems is rooted, therefore, in the deepest fundamentals of the action frame of
reference.
This fundamental relationship is also common to all types and modes of interactional
orientation. But nevertheless it is important to work out certain differentiations in terms
of the relative primacies of the three modal elements, the cathectic, the cognitive and the
evaluative, which have been outlined above. An element of a shared symbolic system
which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation
which are intrinsically open in a situation may be called a value.
In one sense “motivation” consists in orientation to improvement of the gratification-
deprivation balance of the actor. But since action without cognitive and evaluative
components in its orientation is inconceivable within the action frame of reference, the
term motivation will here be used to include all three aspects, not only the cathectic. But
from this motivational orientation aspect of the totality of action it is, in view of the role
of symbolic systems, necessary to distinguish a “value-orientation” aspect. This aspect
concerns, not the meaning of the expected state of affairs to the actor in terms of his
gratification-deprivation balance but the content of the selective standards themselves.
The concept of value-orientations in this sense is thus the logical device for formulating
one central aspect of the articulation of cultural traditions into the action system.
It follows from the derivation of normative orientation and the role of values in action
as stated above, that all values involve what may be called a social reference. In so far as
they are cultural rather than purely personal they are in fact shared. Even if idiosyncratic
to the individual they are still by virtue of the circumstances of their genesis, defined in
relation to a shared cultural tradition; their idiosyncrasies consist in specifiable departures
from the shared tradition and are dcfined in this way.
However, along with this social reference, value standards may also be differentiated
in terms of their functional relations to the action of the individual. The social reference
implies, from the motivational side, an evaluative significance for all value standards. But
still the primary relevance of a standard may be to cognitive definitions of the situation,
to cathectic “expressions” or to the inte-gration of the action system as a system or of
some part of it. Hence on the value-orientation side we may repeat the three-fold
classification of “modes” of orientation as cognitive standards, appreciative standards
and moral standards of value-orientation.
A word of explanation of these terms is in order. The classification, as noted,
corresponds to that of the modes of motivational orientation. In the cognitive case there is
not much difficulty. On the motivational side the concern is with the cognitive interest in
the situation and its objects, the motivation to define the situation cognitively. On the
value-orientation side, on the other hand, concern is with the standards by which the
validity of cognitive judgments is assessed. Some of these, like the most elementary
standards of logic or correctness of observation may be cultural universals, while other
elements are culturally variable. In any case it is a matter of selective evaluation, of
The social system 8