Arab Views of the Soviet Role in the Middle East

Author(s): Rashid Khalidi

Source: Middle East Journal , Autumn, 1985, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 716-732
Published by: Middle East Institute

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4327181

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 ARAB VIEWS OF THE SOVIET ROLE

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Rashid Khalidi

Views differ on how the Arab world perceives the Soviet Union. Clearly, there
can be no unanimity on such a subject, any more than there can be in Arab
attitudes and beliefs about what sort of role the Soviets should have.
If we are to believe the Soviets themselves, an active role for the Soviet
Union in the Middle East is welcomed by all right-thinking Arabs, particularly
insofar as it can contribute to the settlement process with Israel, while such a role
is opposed only by a tiny minority inextricably linked to the West. In defense of
this argument, it is often pointed out that the USSR has always supported the
Arabs, and has maintained good diplomatic and economic relations for many
years even with regimes which might formerly have earned the epithet "reaction-
ary"-including states such as Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco-while it has been
actively wooing others, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Another, diametrically opposed, view would have it that the Arabs have little
or no use for the USSR, except in some cases as a source of weaponry. According
to this thesis, often expressed by present and former American policy-makers,
Arab leaders concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict know that only the United
States can play a "constructive" role in Middle East peace-making. In effect, this
is a retreaded version of Anwar Sadat's old "99 per cent of the cards are in the
hands of the Americans" argument. The Soviet Union, this view would have it, is
concerned only with exploiting conflicts in the region, and is perceived extremely
negatively in most parts of the Arab world as a result.
Although many Arabs undoubtedly subscribe to each of these assessments,
both are essentially non-Arab views of how the Arabs see the USSR. Between
what we might call the Pravda and the Sadat views of the Soviet role in the Middle
East lies a broad spectrum of opinion in the Arab world, most of which probably

Rashid Khalidi is Associate Professor, Political Science Dept., Columbia University. Research
assistance for this paper by William Hitchcock is gratefully acknowledged. Part of the work on it was
done while the author was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Washington DC.

716 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, VOLUME 39, NO. 4, AUTUMN 1985.

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is closer to the center than to either of these extremes. This survey of current
Arab views on the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East begins with a brief
historical review of Arab attitudes towards the USSR since the mid-1950s,
followed by an assessment of how the present Soviet stand on a number of
regional conflicts is perceived in the Arab world. It concludes with an analysis of
how different Arab parties today view the Soviet role in the ongoing Middle East
settlement process.
It should be said at the outset that Arab perceptions of the Soviet role in the
region change over time, sometimes dramatically, and often quite rapidly.
Moreover, the way Arabs see the Soviet Union is very much bound up with the
way they see its superpower rival, the United States, and is often affected by the
cordial alliance relations between the United States and Israel. As the cases of
Anwar al-Sadat and other Arab rulers show, close American ties with Israel do
not always, or necessarily, drive Arab regimes into the arms of the Soviet Union.
But there can be little question that the process whereby the Soviet Union benefits
in the Arab world from American support for Israel has been an important
dynamic in the course of Arab-Soviet relations over three decades. This is a sort
of invisible constant, which should be borne in mind throughout what follows.

II

It is often forgotten how physically close the USSR is to the Arab world,
although Soviet writers do their best to highlight this geographic reality.1 In fact,
the trans-Caucasian frontiers of the Soviet Union are only 135 miles from the
nearest Arab country, Iraq, and under 250 miles from Syria; the nearest Soviet
city, Yerevan, is around an hour's flying time from Beirut, Damascus and
Baghdad, far closer than any city in Western Europe; while Cairo is nearer to
Moscow than to either London or Paris.
In spite of this relative proximity, however, there has traditionally been little
sense of closeness to the Soviet Union in the Arab world. While the major
Western European powers were familiar because of cultural and economic
relations going back to the time of the Crusades, as well as their domination of the
Middle East since the 18th century, Russia historically had relatively little to do
with the Arab world. The only exception was its influence over the Orthodox
church, which had many Arab adherents, particularly in Syria, Lebanon and
Palestine, and its consequent involvement in matters relating to the Holy Places
in Palestine and the protection of the Orthodox throughout the Ottoman Empire.2

1. In the words of Dr. Yevgeni Primakov, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the
USSR Academy of Sciences and a leading Soviet Middle East analyst, "One reason why the Soviet
Union is eager to see a lasting and stable peace in the Middle East is because the area is directly
adjacent to its borders." Anatomy of the Middle East Conflicts, (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), p. 311.
2. The standard work on the subject is Derek Hopwood, The Russian Presence in Syria and

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 After the Russian revolution and until well after World War II, little attention
was given to the Arab world by the Soviets, or vice versa, with the USSR
concentrating its Middle East policy on its immediate neighbors to the South-
Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Indeed, until the mid-1950s, it could be argued that
the Soviet Union was almost peripheral to the consciousness of most people in the
Arab world, although in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq the small but active
Communist parties helped engender a certain awareness of its presence. This
awareness was enhanced by the security services of these countries, which
followed the example of their former British and French imperial tutors in
devoting extensive attention to these parties and their links with the USSR.3 As
is well known, it was frustration with the Western powers' support for Israel, their
restrictions on arms purchases, the strings attached to their economic aid, and
Britain and France's unwillingness to give up their old imperial prerogatives in the
region, which drove Egypt and later Syria into a close relationship with the Soviet
Union in the mid-1950s. The leaders who pioneered this new orientation, whether
Gamal Abd al-Nasser, the Baathists, or other Arab nationalists, were as a rule not
particularly sympathetic to Communism, and indeed some were fierce anti-
Communists. Nevertheless, they saw in the USSR a counterweight first to the
traditional imperial powers, Britain and France, and then to the potent new actor
which was supplanting both states during this period, the United States.
During the Suez crisis, this approach was vindicated, as the Soviet Union was
seen as having helped to tip the scales against Britain, France and Israel
diplomatically and via the much-publicized Soviet threats against all three
countries at the height of the war. The Suez war, when both the US and USSR
supported Egypt, also helped to confirm the idea that it was possible to deal with
both superpowers to the advantage of the Arabs, obtaining benefit from each and
exploiting their rivalry with one another. This theory was only disproved in the
mid-1960s, as on the American side patience with the Arab nationalism of Nasser
faded as sympathy for Israel grew, and on the Arab side the Yemen war and the
harsh attitude of the Johnson administration caused relations with the United
States to worsen progressively, until in the wake of the 1967 war seven Arab
states broke off ties with Washington.
For the Soviets, the next few years were ones of seeming success and
advances in the Arab world (whence the titles of many of the American academic
studies written in the early 1970s).4 In fact, the near total dependence of many

Palestine, 1843-1914: Church and Politics in the Near East, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
3. This is ably detailed with reference to Iraq in Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the
Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its
Communists, Ba'thists and Free Officers, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. xxii-xxiii
and 1231-38.
4. E.g., George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, (Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute, 1972); Alvin Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egypt
Influence Relationship since the June War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Jon

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Arab states on the USSR during this period was probably the worst thing that
could have happened to the Arab-Soviet relationship. For the expectations which
many Arab leaders, and much of Arab public opinion, had of Soviet power and
willingness to use it in the Middle East (which had been raised by the 1956
experience) were badly undermined by the shock of 1967. They were thereafter
deflated further as, in spite of all the efforts of the Arabs and their Soviet backers,
Arab territory remained under occupation by an Israel fully backed by the United
States.
In fact, Soviet military aid made possible the relative redressment of the
Arab-Israeli strategic balance evidenced in the 1969-70 war of attrition and the
1973 war. But little of this percolated into the Arab public consciousness, where
the dominant impression was one of rigid limits to Soviet will or capability to aid
the Arab states or to confront the United States in the region. Such a view was
conveyed in a recent comment in a conservative Kuwaiti paper that "the Soviet
horse" always stumbled on Arab tracks, and had never yet won a race.5
The end result and symbol of this process of disenchantment was Sadat's
break with the Soviets and his reorientation towards Washington. This was part of
a trend which, with variations, has been visible in virtually every other Arab state
which formerly had extremely close relations with the USSR. It can be argued
that this is part of a broader socio-economic process in the Arab world, whereby
social stratification, and a decade and a half of regime stability, are inexorably
producing a turn towards the West on the part of the elites of formerly "radical"
Arab states along with those of the more conservative and traditional ones.6
Irrespective of the causes for this development, there can be little question
that the situation of the USSR in the Arab world today is far less favorable than
it was 15 years ago. Since then, once extremely close ties with Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
Algeria, Sudan, Somalia, and North Yemen have given way to a gamut of nuanced
relationships. These range from cool correctness (Egypt, Somalia, the Sudan until
recently); to a balance between East and West (Iraq, Algeria, North Yemen); to
an ambiguous and unconvincing appearance of warmth masking differences on a
number of major issues (Syria). Over this same period of 15 years, the USSR has
developed strong ties with the PLO, only to see it fall into a series of bitter
conflicts with the major Soviet regional ally, Syria, a development deeply
embarrassing to the Soviets. The only Arab states with which the Soviet Union

Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East, (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975).
5. Al-Ra'i al-'Am, July 6, 1985, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Bulletin
[hereafter FBIS], Middle East and Africa, July 8, 1985, p. Cl.
6. For more on this process, see Rashid Khalidi "Social Transformation and Political Power
in the 'Radical' Arab States," in Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World, Vol. III, States,
Issues and Society, eds., Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman, for the Istituto Affari Internazionali,
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, forthcoming).

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has managed to retain ties of a special nature are the relatively unimportant and
isolated Libya and South Yemen.
Whereas from the mid-1950s until the 1970s the Soviet Union was perceived
in the Arab world as the natural ally of the Arab states in their struggle to free
themselves of the remnants of colonial control and in their conflict with Israel, and
as a valuable source of support for their development efforts, things have since
changed. The colonial era is over, most Arab states have cordial relationships
with the United States, and most Arab elites accept and even welcome this,
although they often disagree with US Middle East policy. Soviet aid and the
Soviet economic model no longer excite much interest in the Arab world,
particularly after the oil boom of the 1970s.
The USSR is still seen as an invaluable source of military hardware,
particularly for states with the requirement for massive quantities of inexpensive
weaponry, such as Iraq and Syria, or which the United States will not supply with
weapons. Even from these states, however, there are muted complaints about the
technical inferiority of Soviet arms in comparison with those provided by the
United States to Israel.7 More importantly, after three decades of Arab experience
with the Soviets, the USSR is not perceived in the Arab world to have the same
superpower stature as the United States. Unlike observers across the Atlantic,
who often depict the USSR as an ominous and potent presence in the Middle East,
with forces in nearby Afghanistan, and fleets, bases and military advisors spread
throughout the region, most Arabs see the Soviet Union in a quite different, and
far less menacing, light.
From a Middle Eastern perspective, the Soviet Union appears to be mani-
festly unequal to the United States in power, capability, reach and willingness to
intervene in the region in spite of its much greater proximity to it. This has been
demonstrated to Arab observers in a series of instances, including the 1970
Jordanian crisis, the 1973 nuclear alert, the 1974-75 disengagement agreements,
and a variety of phases of the fighting in Lebanon from the late 1970s onward. In
all these cases, from an Arab viewpoint the US proved far more willing to take
risks than the USSR, and Israel on the whole has received more consistent
American backing than did Arab actors from the Soviets. While this has led some
Arabs to come to the same conclusions as did Sadat, most others are restrained by
the failure of Sadat to obtain American treatment for Egypt on a level even
remotely approaching that of Israel. (This example, and many others like it, have
worked in favor of the USSR in the Arab world, and have helped to prevent the

7. These complaints infuriate the Soviets. Then-Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko expressed
his intense irritation at Syrian claims that Soviet weapons were to blame for Syria's poor military
performance against Israel in June 1982, during a meeting with a PLO delegation in Moscow the next
month, according to the testimony of a senior member of the delegation. See Rashid Khalidi, Under
Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking during the 1982 War, (New York: Columbia University Press,
forthcoming (1985)), p. 210, n. 45.

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reaction to perceived Soviet weakness vis-a-vis the United States from being
greater than it is.)
None of this should be taken to mean that the Arabs perceive the USSR as a
negligible factor in the Middle East. In addition to continued recognition of its
positive role over several decades in the past, its current value as a counter-weight
to the United States in the right circumstances is universally acknowledged, even
by some of the more conservative Arab states whose relations with Moscow are
routine or even nonexistent. Moreover, as has been demonstrated graphically by
both Syria and Iraq over the past three years, Soviet support can be decisive in
improving the position of an Arab power involved in a conflict with a more
powerful regional rival. At the same time, both have shown that such support can
be obtained without any major loss of independence. This object lesson has not
been lost on either friends or foes of these two leading Arab states.

III

The Arab-Israeli conflict has consistently been an important issue in the

Arab-Soviet relationship, and has served as an indicator of the extent of the Soviet
commitment to the Arabs. This was particularly true for Egypt, Syria, the PLO
and Jordan. For most other Arab states, however, problems closer to home,
whether domestic or regional, often took precedence. For well over a decade,
there has been little Soviet involvement in the Arab world on either the economic
level, where with some exceptions what the USSR has to offer is seen as relatively
limited, or the internal one, where Arab Communist parties are still seen as linked
with Moscow, but are regarded with much less concern than before by the regimes
in power. More recently, it has been over regional disputes that the Soviet Union
has most affected these countries.
These disputes have fallen into two categories. The first consists of conflicts
involving only one state with traditionally close relations with the USSR, while
the second includes disputes where both parties have special ties to the USSR.
Examples of the former are the Western Sahara dispute; the conflict between
Libya and Egypt; those between the Sudan and both Libya and Ethiopia (the
former now apparently resolved); the sporadic dispute between the two Yemens
and those between South Yemen and both Oman and Saudi Arabia; the intermit-
tent tension between Syria and Jordan; and the Iran-Iraq war. In the second
category are the Syrian-Iraqi rivalry, and the conflict between the Asad regime
and the PLO. In the past, when the Soviet Union had closer relations with more
Arab states, this category included as many examples as the first.
In many ways, the first category of regional conflict poses fewer problems for
the Soviet Union. This is because normally all that is required of it in such
disputes is to support its Arab ally within certain limits. There nevertheless exists
the possibility that the Soviet Union will thereby be dragged into a conflict not of

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its own making, and even be involved in a confrontation with the US, but in most
cases this is not a serious risk. In the most explosive of the current disputes in the
first category, the Iraq-Iran war, the potential for a US-Soviet conflict by proxy
was obviated by the two superpowers eventually siding discreetly with Iraq, after
some hesitation on the Soviet side. Although the other disputes are a source of
concern to Moscow at times, none has yet led to a major confrontation directly
involving the Soviets and the United States.
Other difficulties can arise however: Soviet support for Algeria over the
Western Sahara issue, for example, has led to complications in its bilateral
relations with Morocco, with which the USSR has extensive, mutually beneficial
trade relations. This is a new kind of problem for the Soviets, since formerly it was
far more closely aligned with its Arab friends than it is today, and cared little
about relations with other Arab states. As the Soviet Union's Middle East policy
has moved progressively further and further away from the Zhdanovite bi-polar
view of the world dominant in the late 1940s8 and as the USSR has developed
working relationships with monarchies like Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco and
former allies and clients like Egypt and North Yemen, it has had to come to grips
with more and more of these contradictions, which are not easily resolved.
A related problem arises with regard to the second category, that of conflicts
involving two Soviet allies. Over the past three decades, Soviet policy-makers
have been caused no end of trouble by quarrels between equally valued Arab
allies, such as Egypt and Iraq in the late 1950s, or Egypt and Syria in the 1960s,
or Iraq and Syria until recently. On occasion, these have led to charges from both
sides that the USSR is not a faithful friend, and that it is guilty of favoritism.9
More recently, this problem has abated somewhat. The USSR has fewer close
relationships of this sort in the Arab world after the split with Egypt; Soviet
relations with Iraq and Syria have stabilized; and both states now apparently
accept that their Soviet ally has every intention of maintaining its good relations
with their Baathist arch-rivals.
Currently, the only serious conflict between Arab allies of the USSR is that
between the PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and the Syrian regime of
Hafiz al-Asad, which has become increasingly bitter since the 1982 war. Although
the Soviet Union was deeply embarrassed by earlier phases of this struggle,
notably the Syrian military intervention against the PLO in Lebanon, which
commenced in June 1976 at the very moment Premier Alexei Kosygin was on his

8. For more on how this world view affected Soviet Middle East policy until 1954 see Walter
Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), pp.
13643; 150-57.
9. For an early instance of Soviet involvement in inter-Arab disputes, see Oles Smola
The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev, (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell Universit
1974), pp 102 if.

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way to Damascus, the past two years of overt hostility have surpassed anything
which preceded them.
Since the shift of Egypt to a pro-Western orientation in the 1970s, Syria has
become the most important Arab client of the Soviet Union, and one of its most
important in the entire Third World. The Soviet investment in Syria, whether in
terms of aid, prestige, or modern military hardware, has been immense, and was
further expanded in the wake of the 1982 Lebanese war. Syria then acquired
SAM-5 missiles manned by Soviet crews and new SS-21 missiles, as well as more
modem replacements for the nearly 90 first-line planes and hundreds of armored
vehicles it lost in less than a week of fighting at the outset of that conflict.
Syria repaid the Soviet Union for such a major expression of confidence-
notably the stationing of Soviet combat forces in Syria for the first time, manning
weapons which improved Syria's strategic position vis-a-vis Israel-with a
high-profile campaign of support for the various forces in Lebanon opposed to
American and Israeli influence. These forces ultimately achieved the virtual
elimination of the influence of both powers from Lebanon. There can be little
doubt that this was primarily due to the ferocious resistance of the Lebanese
themselves to Israeli occupation, and to the explosive Lebanese reaction to US
backing for Israel, and to what was perceived as American support for one faction
in the Lebanese domestic conflict. Nevertheless, in spite of its subsidiary role,
Syria took most of the credit for these victories.
From the Soviet perspective, this outcome had both positive and negative
aspects. On the one hand, the USSR was perceived throughout the Arab world as
having helped Syria in its successful efforts in Lebanon, while the Soviet Union's
rival, the United States, and its primary regional client, Israel, suffered their worst
defeat in recent memory. In zero-sum terms, this was an unequivocal plus for the
Soviets. On the other hand, part of the price of the absolute Syrian dominance
over Lebanon which resulted from this victory was the near-total exclusion from
the country of the independent influence of the PLO. In pursuit of this aim, Syria
sponsored a mutiny in Fath in 1983, supporting a military campaign which drove
Arafat and his forces from Tripoli in December of that year. In May 1985, Syria
backed the Amal movement in a month-long assault on the Palestinian camps in
Beirut and in clashes around the Sidon and Tyre camps. In all three areas, the
efforts of Syria's Palestinian clients, of Syrian military intelligence, and of Amal
had failed to prevent the reemergence of Arafat's PLO as a potent popular force
among Palestinians.
For the Soviets, this aspect of the new situation in Lebanon was far from
welcome. Instead of two important Arab parties with which to deal in Lebanon,
Syria and the PLO, Asad's policy would have presented them with one: Syria.
And in the eyes of Arab public opinion, which found the actions of the Syrian
regime and its Lebanese clients against the Palestinians reprehensible, the Soviet

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Union was at least indirectly implicated, if only by its inability to exercise
influence over the actions of its Syrian ally.
Worst of all, the "war of the camps" in Beirut in May and June 1985, and
more generally the vituperative post-1982 polemics between the Syrians and the
PLO put the Soviets in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between
two allies. Both were vocal in claiming Soviet support for their respective
positions, and were undoubtedly equally insistent in their private demands for
Soviet backing in this conflict. The Syrians pointed out correctly that Moscow had
shown a clear distaste for certain aspects of the Palestinian-Jordanian agreement
of February 11, 1985, and the tendency it indicated towards attempting to move
towards meeting US terms for a Middle East settlement. 10 In their own media, the
Syrians emphasized strongly the closeness of views between Moscow and
Damascus on this and other issues, laying particular stress on Asad's "success-
ful" visit to Moscow in June 1985.11
The Palestinians, on the other hand, did their best to arouse Soviet suspicions
of what they said was a Syrian desire to come to an agreement with Israel over
Lebanon via the good offices of the United States, along the lines of the 1976 "red
line" understandings. In speeches and interviews, Yasser Arafat responded to
Syrian charges that the PLO-Jordan accord was an extension of Camp David by
dubbing what he said was a new Syrian-Israeli-American tacit agreement "Camp
Murphy" (named for US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, who
shuttled several times between Israel and Syria during this period).12
The PLO also made much of Soviet opposition to the Syrian-backed attacks
on the Palestinian camps in Beirut, expressed publicly and semi-officially via the
medium of a May 24 statement by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee
indicating the "alarm and concern" of "the Soviet public" at these clashes.'3
Soviet opposition to Asad's policy of attempting to dominant the PLO was also
clearly implied by the failure of the Soviet media to mention Asad's remarks on

10. Soviet expressions of dissatisfaction with the Amman agreement were delayed and indirect.
Not until March 20, 1985, did Pravda react, reporting an Arab meeting in Aden which denounced the
Arafat-Husayn accord (FBIS, Soviet Union, March 21, 1985, p. HI), although several Arab
Communist parties had condemned it weeks earlier. The Soviet media joined in soon after, generally
quoting Arab critiques of the accord. The Soviets nonetheless avoided taking an official position on the
matter, though they chose not to receive PLO and Jordanian envoys simultaneously, as was
approvingly noted by Damascus Radio on May 28, 1985, reporting a visit to Moscow by PLO leaders
Abu Lutf (Faruq al-Qaddumi) and Muhammad Milhem: FBIS, Middle East and Africa, May 29, 1985,
p. H4. More recently, Soviet comment has been highly equivocal: e.g. the talk by commentator Pavel
Demchenko on Moscow Radio, June 21, 1985, FBIS, Soviet Union, June 24, 1985, pp. H2-H4, which
is implicitly critical of both Syria and the PLO.
11. See for example the article of June 27, 1985, in Tishrin, cited in FBIS, Middle East and
Africa, July 9, 1985, pp. H3-H5.
12. For one of many examples of references by Arafat to "Camp Murphy" during this period
see the Baghdad Voice of Palestine broadcast of July 6, 1985, cited in FBIS, Middle East and Africa,
July 8, 1985, p. Al.
13. Tass report of May 24, 1985, cited in FBIS, Soviet Union, May 30, 1985, pp. HI-H2.

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the PLO made during his official visit to Moscow;14 a Tass account of the
Gorbachev-Asad talks instead noted that "the Soviet side stressed the impor-
tance of preserving the unity of the PLO," an implied rebuke to Asad's policy.15
Reports in Gulf newspapers and in the PLO media indicated profound Soviet
dissatisfaction with Syrian actions against the PLO.16
An important point which emerges from these Syrian-Palestinian polemics is
the way the Soviet Union has been dragged into the dispute by both sides, serving
as an arbiter or referee at times, and as a sort of ultimate moral authority for the
correctness of their actions at others. Thus in the self-congratulatory words of an
editorial in the semi-official Syrian newspaper, Tishrin, asserting the intimacy and
strength of the Soviet-Syrian relationship, "Relations with the Soviet Union
constitute an unerring criterion of patriotism and progress and of seriousness in
confronting imperialist-Zionist plans for hegemony."'97 Such a statement rests on
the implicit assumption that Arab public opinion will be more likely to accept the
nationalist and progressive bona fides of an Arab actor if they are confirmed by the
Soviet Union. That this is a common assumption is confirmed by the PLO's
similar attempts to clothe itself in the legitimacy conferred by Soviet support and
approval of its policies. 18
Two things at least should be clear from these examples. The first is that
regional disputes, particularly between two Soviet allies, can create major
difficulties for the USSR, and have the potential for seriously harming its image in
the Arab world. By the same token, a judicious stand in such disputes can serve
to improve the Soviet Union's regional position. From the number of obviously
leaked reports from Soviet and PLO sources on Syro-Soviet differences, com-
bined with favorable comments on the Soviet attitude to the "war of the camps,"
in the Arab media,'9 it would seem that Soviet policy-makers have consciously

14. Sean Williams, "Moscow Searches for a Role in the Middle East Peace Process," Christian
Science Monitor, June 25, 1985, p. 1.
15. Serge Schmemann, "Asad, in Moscow, Confers on Mideast Issues," New York Times,
June 20, 1985, p. A21.
16. In a seemingly authentic account, the Kuwaiti paper al-Watan on June 26, 1985, reported
an acrimonious discussion of the "camps war" between Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam
and the Soviet Ambassador to Syria. To a Soviet request that Syria stop the fighting (it would end
when the Palestinians "run out of ammunition" Khaddam said), the reply was that Arafat was behind
it, and Syria "can no longer allow" this. The envoy disagreed with this version of events, provoking
Khaddam to attack both the "stupid leaders" of the anti-Arafat PLO factions and the Lebanese groups
which supported them, and to complain that the USSR was supplying these groups with arms. The
ambassador replied stiffly: "The Soviet Union knows the precise facts, and is carrying out its duty
towards its allies and friends . . .": FBIS, Middle East and Africa, May 28, 1985, pp. H3-H4.
17. Tishrin, June 27, 1985, cited in FBIS, Middle East and Africa, July 9, 1985, pp. H3-H5.
18. A good example is a June 28, 1985, interview with Yasser Arafat in al-Watan al-'Arabi,
where the PLO leader refers to the USSR's support for the PLO's position on a Middle East settlement
and for its unity, Soviet differences with Syria over the attacks on the Beirut camps, and the results
of a recent meeting between him and Gromyko. There are many similar statements by other PLO
leaders.
19. E.g. a June 23, 1985, report in the Dubai paper al-Bayan that Moscow desired to return
PLO diplomatic representation in Moscow to the level of Ambassador "in the wake of the Palestinian

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taken such a stand. Their reasons for doing so undoubtedly centered on fears of
a US-Syrian rapprochement over Lebanon, fueled by the outcome of the TWA
hostages affair, but consideration of the Arab popular response was surely not
absent.
The second conclusion from these examples is that on certain key issues,
Soviet approval and support are considered extremely important by some Arab
leaders, while the opposition of the USSR is taken quite seriously. They clearly
have reason to believe that far from ignoring it as a factor of no consequence,
Arab public opinion pays attention to the position adopted by the Soviet Union on
certain critical problems. The validity of these points will be confirmed in the
concluding section, in the course of an examination of Arab views on the role of
the Soviet Union in the Middle East settlement process.

IV

It is a commonplace in the United States (one which has some circulation in

the Arab world) that as far as a Middle East settlement is concerned, only the
United States can deliver peace, while all the Soviet Union can do is contribute to
making war. On the face of it there are some grounds for such a statement: the
United States was the architect of the 1975-76 disengagement agreements, Camp
David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, while the USSR has armed the Arab
states in their wars with Israel since 1956.
But there is another side to the story, one which is more generally accepted
among Arabs. This focuses on the fact that the Soviet Union has been willing and
often eager to participate in joint peace-making efforts with the United States in
the Middle East. In this regard, Arab analysts would point to the initiatives which
ended the Suez and 1967 wars; Security Council resolution 242 of 1967; the Jarring
mission and the efforts surrounding the Rogers plan; Security Council resolutions
338, 339 and 340 during the 1973 war; the Geneva Conference convened after it
ended; and the Soviet-American joint communique of October 1, 1977.
With the exception of the small minority whose views are similar to those of
the late President Sadat, most Arabs do not take as positive a view of America's
peace-making role or as negative one of that of the USSR as do many in the

camps war": FBIS, Soviet Union, June 25, 1985, p. H2; reports in the magazine Afrique-Asie tha
Soviet SAM-5's had been withdrawn from Syria due to Soviet leader Gorbachev's "dissatisfaction
with Syrian President Asad's Lebanese policy" (apparently only the Soviet personnel manning them
were in fact withdrawn): FBIS, Middle East and Africa, July 8, 1985, p. H2; a Kuwaiti news agency
report of a statement issued by the PLO office in Moscow placing responsibility for attacks on the
camps on Syria: FBIS, Middle East and Africa, May 28, 1985; a report in the Egyptian Akhbar
al- Yawm of June 22, 1985, that serious differences emerged during Asad's visit to Moscow (indirectl
confirmed by the strident denials in the Syrian media): FBIS, Middle East and Africa, June 26, 1985
p. G8; and a Kuwaiti news agency report that Assad had been secretly summoned to Moscow to
explain Syrian support for Amal's attacks on the camps: FBIS, Middle East and Africa, May 29, 1985,
p. H1.

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United States. American efforts are seen by most Arabs as dedicated at least as
much to keeping the Soviet Union out of the settlement process, and if possible
the entire Middle East, as they are to achieving peace. The USSR is seen as
obstructing these US efforts, more than it is seen as opposing the principle of a
regional settlement. And it is often noted in the Arab world that in general the
formal position of the USSR is much closer to that of most Arab states than is that
of the United States, which in many important respects is aligned completely with
that of Israel.
Equally significantly, far from praising the US role in the Camp David
process and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, most of the Arab world took a highly
jaundiced view of them, and by extension of their American architects. They were
and still are seen as having allowed Israel a free hand to attack Lebanon from the
spring 1978 through the 1982 invasion, and as removing Egypt from an active role
in the Arab world, thus drastically undermining Arab bargaining and military
power vis-a-vis Israel. These attitudes are firmly fixed in both popular and elite
opinion throughout the region, including Egypt.
Finally, as far as the questions of war and armaments are concerned, far from
there being any grudge against the Soviet Union on the grounds it has over-armed
the Arabs, the quantity and high quality of US arms aid to Israel have led to
complaints from some Arab states that they get too little arms, and of insufficient
quality, from the USSR. Far from being seen as a peace-maker, the American role
during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon has created a strong impression in the
Arab world that it is supportive, or at least highly tolerant, of Israeli aggression.
And quite contrary to the idea that the USSR is a reckless war monger, its striking
passivity in 1982 has created a strong impression among Arabs that it is unwilling
or unable to extend similar support to its Arab allies, even when they are
defending themselves. This was an impression Soviet policy-makers were un-
doubtedly intent on dispelling with their rearmament and support of Syria from
1982-83.
Before ending this discussion of Arab perceptions of the Soviet role in war
and peace in the region, it is necessary to touch on one more issue: this is the idea
of an international conference on the Middle East involving the Soviet Union. It
is an article of faith for many that such a format is unsuited to the business of
settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that the USSR has no place in Middle East
peace-making. Perhaps because of the almost religious fervor with which this
belief is held by American policy-makers, it is assumed that it is shared by their
counterparts in the Arab world. As we have seen, however, most Arab observers
take a much less negative view than this of the contribution which might be made
by the Soviet Union to a settlement. If they have any criticism of the Soviet
position, it would be that it has not pushed its stand on a settlement hard enough,
thus leaving the field to the US.

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 There are, of course, differences of opinion on this subject in the Arab world.
Some Arab states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have evinced no enthusiasm
for a major Soviet role in the settlement process. However, although both are
closely aligned with the United States (and one, Saudi Arabia, does not even have
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union), they have stated on a number of
occasions that they favor some Soviet role in the peace-making process. While
this may be taken as either a cover for their real position, or a weakly-held and
insubstantial opinion, as most American policy-makers apparently prefer to
believe, there is reason to believe that this is not necessarily the case.
Although not directly concerned in the settlement process, and less influential
than it was once thought to be, Saudi Arabia retains a certain importance in the
Arab world. For several years, Saudi positions on the Arab-Israeli dispute and
other key issues of policy have been closely coordinated with those of Syria. This
has been the case at least since the ill-fated Fahd plan of August 1981 was
torpedoed by Damascus and modified to form the basis of the 1982 Fez plan. Bo
Saudi-inspired plans contain references to an international conference involving
the Soviet Union. It can be assumed that this will remain the common denomi-
nator linking the Syrian and Saudi stands on a Middle East settlement as long as
their de facto axis remains the lynch-pin of Saudi foreign policy.
Egyptian policy-makers stress the concept of an international conference for
reasons having to do with basic Egyptian objectives. One is reintegration in the
Arab world, for which a departure from the Camp David approach is a basic
prerequisite. Egypt already has bilateral ties of differing kinds with Iraq, Jordan
and the PLO but it still desires involvement in Arab multilateral relations. It is
clear that as long as the three Arab actors with remaining claims to settle with
Israel-Syria, the PLO and Jordan-all insist on a Soviet role within an inter-
national framework, this must be an Egyptian demand as well. There exists in th
Egyptian case also a realization of some of the failures and limitations of the Cam
David approach, constantly reiterated by the Palestinians and others and accepted
by much of Egyptian elite opinion. A different approach involving the Soviets thus
has its attractions. Finally, Egypt under Mubarak has shown a cautious interest in
improving ties with Moscow, as has already been symbolized by the reestablish-
ment of diplomatic relations and the strengthening of economic links between the
two countries. Since Egyptian leaders no longer subscribe to the demonological
view of Soviet intentions propagated by Sadat, they thus no longer have his
objection in principle to a Soviet role in a regional settlement.
Moving to Jordan, there is scope for divergence on the seriousness with
which an active Soviet role is desired by Amman. In the wake of King Hussein's
visit to Washington in May 1985, the impression left by American statements and
US media reports was that what Jordan desired was merely "an international

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'cover' or 'umbrella' "20 to permit Jordan and the PLO to enter direct talks with
Israel, essentially under US patronage. Yet publicly and formally, Jordan has
never wavered in its call for an international conference with Soviet participation.
The foundation of current Jordanian policy regarding a settlement would
seem to rest on two propositions. The first is that there has to be a modicum of
agreement between Jordan and the PLO if there is to be any movement at all. The
second is that it would be unwise for Jordan to enter into direct talks with Israel
under exclusive US patronage, even if the PLO could be persuaded to go along,
and even if some transparent "international" figleaf such as has been described by
American sources could be found.21 Both of these considerations militate in favor
of an international conference involving the USSR, as has long been demanded in
the Arab world, and which the PLO is firmly committed to, although whether it
would be a "framework," an "umbrella," or something else is not clear.
There are other reasons for adopting this position: one is the certainty that
under any alternative scenario based on the Camp David formula, in which the
United States and its closest ally, Israel, would have a dominant, not to say
decisive, position, there would be little leverage for Jordan, or a Jordanian-
Palestinian negotiating team. The Jordanian regime would thus be exposing itself
to universal Arab opprobrium and strong domestic pressure, so as to enter an
arena where the odds would be heavily stacked against it. It is hard to see what
attraction such a prospect could have for a rational policy-maker, whether
Jordanian or Palestinian.
Of course the pressure of events is operating on both Jordan and the PLO,
which are haunted by the possibility that if certain developments in Israel take
place, the Palestine question will finally be settled as Sharon and the Likud prefer:
on the East Bank of the Jordan at the expense of both Jordanian and Palestinian
interests. In light of these possibilities, the well-known American and Israeli
objections to an international conference with Soviet participation seem all the
more daunting. The problems attendant on such an international conference are
not ignored by either Jordanians or Palestinians, but if such a forum is important
to the former, it is vital to the latter.
From the Palestinian perspective, an international conference with Soviet
participation is an essential component of any settlement. There are several
reasons for this, some involving Palestinian internal politics, and others the logic
of the international and regional situation the PLO finds itself in. On the domestic
side, it would be extremely difficult for PLO leaders to agree to enter peace
negotiations under the sole aegis of the United States (even if several American

20. David Ottaway, "U.S. Cool to Soviet Role in Mideast Peace Parley," The Washington
Post, May 31, 1985, p. A27: the story indicates that Jordan wanted Soviet participation in a peace
conference.
21. Ibid. The "conference" described by a State Department spokesman would include
"Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians and possibly Egypt and the United States."

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allies were also present), without the already fragile unity of the Organization
being jeopardized. This would be the case for at least two reasons. The first is that
Palestinian public opinion would regard it as absurd for the PLO to enter a
negotiating process dominated by two powers, the US and Israel, which refuse to
recognize its legitimacy or the very national existence of the people it represents.
Equally important, there would be the harsh necessity for any Palestinian leader
who advocated such a course of appearing to swallow eight years of violent
denunciation of the Camp David approach. That would be an about face that few
politicians of any nationality could expect to accomplish successfully.
It can be argued that if some form of US recognition of the PLO could be
arranged, some of these objections might disappear. But the basic problem is the
very concept of the United States as an even-handed broker between both sides,
one implicit in the Camp David approach, and rejected by most in the Arab world,
including Palestinians, and for that matter Jordanians. In light of this consider-
ation, the involvement of the Soviet Union is seen by the PLO and others as giving
balance to a process which would otherwise be so skewed in favor of Israel as to
preclude any outcome other than the dictation of Israeli terms, as is seen to have
happened at Camp David.
There is another reason the PLO cannot abandon its demand that the Soviet
Union be a party to the settlement process. This is the fact that in spite of the
many demonstrated limitations of Soviet support for the PLO, there is little
question in the minds of most Palestinians that in the shark-filled seas they find
themselves, any life raft is better than none at all. It is true that the USSR did very
little to help the PLO when it faced Israel in Lebanon from 1978 through 1982. But
it has extended crucial, if limited, assistance to the PLO in its efforts on the other
front of its two-front war, that with its Arab opponents. It is often forgotten that
for decades Palestinian nationalism has had to wage a struggle for recognition
against the Arab regimes which is frequently every bit as desperate as that against
Israel, and that it is in need of all the external support it can get in these
circumstances.
Soviet help during the PLO's conflict with the Asad regime has been
especially important. During all three phases when this smouldering dispute
turned into a hot war, in 1976, in 1983 and in 1985, the Soviets operated within
very strict parameters, refusing to take dramatic actions which would jeopardize
permanently their relationship with Syria, their most important remaining Arab
ally. But they nevertheless exerted strong and consistent pressure on Damascus-
halting arms shipments to Syria in 1976, playing an important role in obtaining a
ceasefire and Arafat's evacuation from Tripoli in 1983, and emphatically adding
their voice to those of Iran, Libya and most Arab states in demanding that Syria
halt the attacks of its Amal clients on the Beirut camps in May and June of 1985.
Palestinian leaders often grumble about the limitations of Soviet support for
them in their conflict with Syria (Syria is a Soviet "ally" Arafat once stated, while

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the PLO is seen as just a "friend").22 But they accept the constraints on what
Moscow can do, and appreciate the fact that in the last analysis the USSR does
not accept Asad's vision of a Palestinian movement totally subservient to
Damascus. Given the fact that if any power has any leverage at all over Syria
the Soviet Union, this is by no means a negligible consideration for PLO
decision-makers. They thus have strategic reasons, in addition to ones of internal
politics, and the desire they share with Jordan and other Arab states for a
balanced framework for a regional settlement, for wanting an active Soviet role in
this context.
Syria also desires such a role for the USSR, for many of the same reasons, as
well as for ones which are related to its own regional objectives. Among them are
the fact that the Asad regime sees a settlement essentially as a function of a shift
in the Arab-Israeli balance of power attendant on Syria achieving what Syrian
policy-makers call a "strategic balance" with Israel. This is seen in Damascus in
primarily military terms, and necessitates a close and continuing relationship with
Moscow, to obtain the quantities and the level of equipment required for this
purpose.
There is evidence that the Soviets have strong reservations about this entire
strategy, doubting Syria's ability ever to stand up to Israel on its own, and
perceiving the important thing to be the "balance of forces" between Israel and
the Arabs as a group rather than a mechanical assessment of the military balance
between Syrian and Israeli forces.23 Moreover, a coalition of Arab energies
against Israel suits Soviet aims better than the go-it-alone approach favored by
Damascus. The former would group the USSR with the Arabs in a situation of
Arab-Israeli polarization, while the United States would be isolated with Israel
and separated from its Arab clients and allies. The latter almost necessarily
implies a situation of division in the Arab world, as Syria tries to impose its chosen
strategy as the only suitable one for dealing with Israel, thus pushing other Arab
actors to search for an alternate approach, and increasing the opportunities for the
US to spread its influence in the Arab world.
In dealing with a headstrong and powerful client like Syria, however, the
Soviets seem to have little choice. They must be grateful that Syria is insistent in
calling for an international conference with Soviet co-chairmanship, although how
Syria by itself can achieve the "strategic balance" with Israel which Damascus
sees as the sine non qua of such a conference is not at all clear to anyone.
In conclusion, it seems evident that in Arab eyes the Soviet role in the Middle
East, and its potential role in regional settlement efforts, is greater than may

22. In a March 8, 1985, interview with al-Watan al-'Arabi, after the first Soviet criticism of the
Amman agreement, but before Soviet differences with Syria over the camps war appeared, Arafat said:
"I accept the fact that the USSR has chosen its Syrian ally and prefers it to its Palestinian friend."
23. These very criticisms of the Syrian outlook were made by Gromyko to PLO leaders in
Moscow in 1982, according to the interview cited in note 7, above.

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appear. But whether it will become more active is very much a function of factors
over which the Arabs, and indeed the Soviets, have little control. As far as peace
is concerned, the USSR is sought after because of the hope it will help balance
American proclivities to favor Israel, and also lend legitimacy to the proceedings,
and long-term stability to the outcome. Some hope that Soviet involvement may
help to bring a recalcitrant Syria into the process.
For all this to happen will require some changes: the heretofore rigid
anti-Soviet views of the Reagan administration will have to soften, at least as far
as the Middle East is concerned, as will those of Israel. It must be realized that US
policy can either work to exclude the USSR from the region or to establish peace,
and that to a large extent the former has been achieved over the past decade at the
expense of the latter. Ultimately, a comprehensive, multilateral framework will
have to be created if there is to be progress, and this will require at the very least
that there be a Soviet-American, a US-PLO, and a Soviet-Israeli dialogue. It is
impossible to tell whether the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, the efforts to get
Washington on speaking terms with the Palestinians, and the ongoing feelers
between Israelis and Soviets will lead to this. These things would amount to a
revolution in Middle East diplomacy, which may seem unlikely; but it is doubtful
whether anything less revolutionary than this can break the regional impasse and
bring peace to the Middle East.

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