Under ART.

1732, CC "Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public for value.

Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as
"a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

1. NO. Marcus, as common carrier, is not liable for the loss.

Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy" are held to a
very high degree of care and diligence ("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well
as of passengers. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This
presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of
private respondent.

The limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force. In short, The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be
regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a
fortuitous event.

In this case, the LOSS OF THE GOODS was DUE TO THE HIGHJACKING THAT IS BEYOND THE
CONTROL OF MARKHUS. Thus, may be regarded as a fortuitous event.

Hence, Markhus is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost
because of an event entirely beyond private respondent's control.

2. I will advise Marites that she is not entitled to damages and that she has no cause of action
against the bus company.

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not,
however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. A tort
committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of
action against the carrier.
 The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have
been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under Article 1763, it is to be noted that when
the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, the degree of care essential
to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a
good father of a family.

The give facts provide that Marites was injured by the stone hurled by a third person while the
bus was in its usual condition. Considerably, the event was not foreseen and the act of the
perpetrator was beyond the control of the bus company’s employee. It was shown also that the
proper diligence of a good father of a family was exercised when Marites was immediately
rushed to the hospital for medical intervention.

Based from the foregoing, the bus company cannot assume liability with the injuries incurred by
Marites fom the stone thrown by a stranger.

3. Phiippine law shuld apply.

The Supreme court ruled in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. IAC, that the law of the country
to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of
their loss, destruction or deterioration.

Applying the above-mentioned rule, the cargoes were transported by Naruto from Japan to
Surigao City, Philippines. Clearly then, it was the Philippines that is the point of destination of
the delivery.

Therefore, the liability for loss destruction, or deterioration should be govern by Philippine law,
regardless of the fact that the said loss, detoriation, or destruction occurred in Hongkong.

4. Yes, a common carrier may still be held liable in such case.

Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE for the safety of the goods &
passengers transported by them. They are bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances. When a passenger dies or is injured in the discharge of a
contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or negligent.

This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence.
 Hence, ordinary diligene and care is not suffient because wha is required by law is the highest
and extraordinary diligence from the common carrier in carrying out its undertaking of
transporting the goods and passengers.

5. No, the contention of Bang Ga is devoid of merit.

To extinguish liability and rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the common
carrier, it must proved that it exercised extraordinary diligence in executing its obligation of
transporting the passengers.

The records show that this obligation was not met by the ang Ga. This can be gleaned from the
fact of admission of Bang Ga that the tires were new, because if such is the case, then the tire
should have not blown up easily unless there were acts or circumstance that triggers such
occurrence. Undoubtedly, what caused for the tire to explode is the fact that the jeepney was
overloaded and Bang Ga was manoeuvring the jeepney at an unreasonably high speed.

Blantantly, Bang Ga has critically failed to exercise extraordinary diligence due to his negligence
and therefore, should be held liable for the injuries sustained by Atong Eng.

6. Yes, Lamos Inc is a common carrier.

In Sps. Cruz v. Sunday Hoiday, the Court ruled that the definition enshrined in Art 1732 of CC for
“common carriers” makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity or as "a sideline; or between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e.,
the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from
a narrow segment of the general population.

From refraining to make distinctions, the intent of the law is thus to not consider such
distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many other distinctions may be concocted by
unscrupulous businessmen engaged in the carrying of persons or goods in order to avoid the
legal obligations and liabilities of common carriers.

the contention of Lamos Inc in this case that it is not offering its transportation service to the
general public but exclusive only to their guest is unavailing because the law does not make a
distinction between services offered to the general public and to a narrow segment of the
general population. Also, it is worth noting that the constancy of its ferry services and the tour
packages it may be availed by anyone who can afford and would want to pay the same. These
service are thus, available to public.
 Verily, it does not matter if not all can afford or avail the services of Lamos Inc., as long as it is
offered publicly, it is considered as offering its sevices to the general public, thus, Lamos Inc.,
is considered a common carrier within the contemplation of Art. 1732, CC.

7. NO. I will not hold Emil and Amor solidarily liable to Marivic.

The law provides for different liabilities for an operator and driver who is a mere employee of
the former. A complaint for breach of a contract of carriage is dismissible as against the
employee who was driving the vehicle because the parties to the contract of carriage are only
the passenger, the bus owner, and the operator. It is the operator that is the direct party to
the contract and not its employee. However, the driver’s liability may arise from Quasi-delict
specifically reckless imprudence.

Since the cause of action is based on a breach of a contract of carriage, the liability of Emil is
direct. The obligation to carry Marivic safely to her destination was with Emil.Although Amor
was driving the jeepney, being merely an employee and driver of Emil’s jeepney, he cannot be
made liable for breach of contract of carriage, as he is not a party thereto. Marivic had no
cause of action against him and the complaint against him should be dismissed.

Hence, . Only Emil may be held liable for breached the contract of carriage, and not Amor.
Although, it is worth noting that Amor’s obligation may emanate from a quasi-delict contract
due to reckless imprudence.

8. A. No, Kabit Corp. is not a common carrier.

In the case of LTFRB v. Valenzuela, the Court ruled that an entity that provides pre-arranged
transportation services fr a fee using an online-enabled platform technology cannot be
considered as common carries as they are not directly engaged in the business of transporting
goodds and passengers, being a mere online-application operator. They only offer
transportation subject to consent of reful of inline subscribers and passengers.

B. YES, THE DRIVERS ARE ENGAGED IN COMMON CARRIER SERVICE BECAUSE THEY ACTUALLY
PERFORM THE ACT OF TRANSPORTING THE PASSENGERS FOR FEE. Hence, they are liable as to
accidents and injuries that their passsenhers might incur whil thy are on transit on their vehicles.

9. Yes, the sps. Peres are liable for breach of contract of carriage.

As repeatedly upheld in a number of jurisprudence, the definition for common carriers

enshrined in ART. 1732, CC refrained from making distinctions as between carriers who offers
their services to the general public and those who offers their services to a narrow segment
class of the public.
 Although Peres as operator of a school bus service has been usually regarded as a private
carrier, primarily because he only caters to some specific or privileged individuals, and his
operation is neither open to the indefinite public nor for public use, the same is immaterial in
classifying them as a common carrier.

The act of transporting the students for a prescribed fair is the primary function of a common
carrier, regardless if only a homogenous class of passengers are catered.

Ergo, being classified as a common carrier the Sps. Pers may be held liable for breach of contract
of carriage.

10. YES, UNITRANS is liable.

Under ART. 1732, CC "Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public for value.

Emphasis must be placed on the fact that Unitrans itself admitted that in handling the subject
shipment and making sure that it was delivered to the consignee's premises in good condition as
the delivery/forwarding agent, Unitrans was acting as a freight forwarding entity and an
accredited non-vessel operating common carrier within the purview of ART. 1732.

As a common carrier, Unitrans is vested with the obligation to deliver the goods to ICNA in good
condition. The damage of the good , it is attributable to UNITRANS as it engendered the
presumption of negligence on his part, being the common carrier.

Therefore, unless UNITRANS proved it employs extraordinary diligence to rebut the

presumption, the damage of the goods is answerable by him.