JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE

CITY OF LONDON

The globalisation of the world economy today means that more and more
people are experiencing working in another culture. Focusing on the real
experiences of workers in Japanese transnational finance companies, this
book not only throws light on this specific case, but at the same time
raises timely questions and insights the newly emerging multicultural
work experiences world-wide. Japanese Bankers in the City of London
reflects on contemporary discussions in sociology, anthropology and
cultural studies of individual global movement and cultural interaction.
Whilst there are some studies on Japanese multinational companies in
Europe, they have typically assumed stereotyped differences in
management systems and work cultures. This book, however, breaks the
mould by looking at the culture and individual’s subjective views about
their working lives and also their own world-views; this perspective
illuminates the difficulties in working relationships between Japanese and
Europeans. Junko Sakai reveals, through 100 transcribed interviews, the
influence of power relationships on people of different groups in terms of
gender, class and ethnicity. Japanese Bankers in the City of London shows
uneven transformation of economic and cultural hegemony between East
and West.
This book gives voice to Japanese men and women whose voices are
rarely heard, and to the British who have worked for non-Westerners in
the West. It is also a significant and timely analysis of the increasing
influence of non-Western companies in the City. It will be of great interest
to cultural anthropologists, business historians, sociologists and scholars
in Japanese and Asian studies, as well as those involved in international
finance and management.

Junko Sakai lectures on British society in the English Literature

department at Ferris University in Yokohama, and teaches English
language at Rikkyo University in Tokyo.
 ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN
MEMORY AND NARRATIVE
Series Editors: Mary Chamberlain, Paul Thompson,
Timothy Ashplant, Richard Candida-Smith
and Selma Leydesdorff

1 NARRATIVE AND GENRE

Edited by Mary Chamberlain and Paul Thompson

2 TRAUMA AND LIFE STORIES

International perspectives
Edited by Kim Lacy Rogers and Selma Leydesdorff
with Graham Dawson

3 NARRATIVES OF GUILT AND COMPLIANCE

IN UNIFIED GERMANY
Stasi informers and their impact on society
Barbara Miller

4 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Language, culture and identity in the Japanese diaspora
Junko Sakai
 JAPANESE BANKERS
IN THE
CITY OF LONDON
Language, culture and identity in the
Japanese diaspora

Junko Sakai

London and New York

 First published 2000
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

© 2000 Junko Sakai

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sakai, Junko, 1951–
Japanese bankers in the city of London: language, culture and
identity in the Japanese diaspora/Junko Sakai.
p. cm.—(Routledge studies in memory and narrative)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Financial institutions—England—London. 2. Bankers—England—
London. 3. Japanese—England—London. 4. National
characteristics, Japanese. I. Title. II. Series.
HG186.E542L667 1999
332.1’089’95604212–dc21 99–31071
CIP

ISBN 0-203-16700-7 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-26180-1 (Adobe eReader Format)

ISBN 0-415-19601-9 (Print Edition)
 FOR CHIE AND YOSHIE
AND
IN MEMORY OF MY ESSEX DAYS
 CONTENTS

Figures and tables x

Acknowledgements xi

1 Introduction 1
Japanese transnational companies—an egalitarian or
hierarchical workplace? 3
Culture and identity problems in Japanese financial
companies in the City 6
Life stories—focusing on ‘stories’rather than facts 11
The interviews 14
The position of ‘I’ 20
The structure of the book 21
Notes 22

2 Ambition and withdrawal—Japanese experience in the City 27

The changing City—from gentlemanly club to multicultural
entity 28
The Japanese financial institutions in the City—from
borrowers to investors 30
Cultural barriers in business practice 43
Japanese responses to the criticisms in the interviews 46
Notes 51

3 The Japanese financial community and its people 57

Outlook of the Japanese business community in the City 57
Types of financial institutions and size of companies 62
Portraits of the interviewees 64
Notes 82

4 Segregation and languages of different work cultures 85

Duality of the management structure 85
vii
 CONTENTS

Segregation between Japanese and local staff 90

Languages of different work cultures 95
Language and power 118
Notes 128

5 Competing masculinities and contrasted femininities—

gender relationships between cultures 132
Segregation of the career courses of Japanese female managers 135
Japanese men at the centre 138
Women’s responses to the male world—compromise,
subordination and resistance 146
The British ‘gaze’ on Japanese gender relationships151
The Japanese ‘gaze’ on British gender relationships157
Conclusion—interrelation between gender, ethnic and
class identities 160
Notes 161

6 Floating identities between two imaginary worlds 166

Japanese sense of self and views—two contradictory centres 167
Belonging to the company 167
Towards the world—in the front line of change 168
Dilemmas of international Japanese businessmen 171
Withdrawal into ‘Japanese’ cultural identity 173
Is the ‘Japanese system’ changing? 175
Japanese companies for the British—expansion to the periphery 179
Japanese banks as new career pathways 179
Going international—expansion to the frontier 185
Disappointment and withdrawal into ‘the universal world’ 188
Fragmentation of identities according to gender and
class consciousness 197
‘Floating identities’ between cultures 202
Notes 209

7 Beyond national boundaries 214

Life stories of locally-hired Japanese women 216
How and why did they leave Japan? 217
What did they feel when they first came to Britain? 221
Disillusion about their working lives 222
Disillusion about their private lives 227
‘Floating identity’—regretting and accepting 230
Construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of identities 233
Notes 237

viii
 CONTENTS

8 Conclusion—possibilities of new cultural identities

in transnational working experiences 240
Notes 249

Appendix 1 Japanese glossary 250

Appendix 2 Details of interviewees 253
Appendix 3 Introduction lines for interviews 258

Bibliography 261
Index 271

ix
 FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures
4.1 The structure of a Japanese transnational financial company 91

Tables
1.1 The number of interviewees 12
2.1 Opening of new bank offices outside Japan 33
2.2 The year of opening of offices in the City of London 34
2.3 Evolution and ranking of international bond underwriting
activities between 1986 and 1989 38
2.4 Japanese banks licensed by the Bank of England according
to the Banking Act 39
2.5 Bookrunners of all international bonds, 1995 (March 23 1995) 41
2.6 World’s top ten banks 42
3.1 Japanese people in the UK 58
3.2 Japanese manufacturing companies in Europe in 1993 59
3.3 Number of Japanese financial institutions in London 62
3.4 The numbers of Japanese bank staff in the City 64
3.5 Occupation of fathers of Japanese male managers 66
3.6 Ranking of universities for entrance exams decided by a
cramming school 72
4.1 Turnover of local staff in a city bank in London 95
7.1 Age of locally hired women at time of interview 217
7.2 Years staying in Britain 217
7.3 Marriage of locally-hired women 217

x
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book would not have been born without help from far more people
than I can mention here, but among them, first of all, I would like to
express my gratitude to my interviewees who gave up their precious time
to talk to me about their experiences of being in another culture. Some of
them, although extremely busy business people, patiently explained to me
the international finance business which was completely new to me. Their
names have been changed and some factors have been disguised in order
to ensure anonymity.
My greatest debt is to Paul Thompson who, as a supervisor, gave me
the opportunity to write a thesis, which is the basis of this book, and
taught me how to conduct interviews. Without his guidance and
encouragement I would never have thought that I could write a book. In
addition, while I was studying as a PhD student, he generously included
my research into his and Ian Neary’s research funded by the Leverhulme
Trust. I would also like to thank Ian Neary for his help. I am also grateful
for the Overseas Research Student Award I received at the University of
Essex. Without this financial support I would not have been able to study
in Britain.
I am also indebted to a number of staff members in the Sociology
Department at the University of Essex who offered suggestions and
comments. Anthony Woodiwiss, Catherine Hall and John Scott suggested
references to me and gave me comments in the supervisory board
meetings while I was a PhD student. When I was doing an MA in Social
History, I was able to attend seminars by Leonore Davidoff and Michael
Roper. My understanding of social history was, I believe, greatly
enhanced by these seminars. I was also able to discuss this topic with
Roger Goodman when I was doing my MA, which helped me to
understand ethnographic methodology and Japanese society. Jean
Dancomb and Dennis Marsden listened to the difficulties I had
experienced in interviews. Brenda Corti, Mary Girling, Sue Aylott and
Diane Streeting have shown me nothing but kindness and support. Brenda
Corti generously gave me time and was a good listener. I will never forget
her warm heart. I would also like to thank Gillie Burrell who allowed me

xi
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

to live in her comfortable flat in Wivenhoe while I was writing up my

thesis. In addition, I would like to express my thanks to the people who
allowed me to join their walks around Colchester, which gave me great
pleasure. The department has a friendly atmosphere for overseas students,
where I made many friends. I would like to thank them for their
friendships and will never forget my Essex days with them.
My thanks are not only to the people at Essex. In the various stages of
fieldwork and writing up my PhD thesis, I was fortunate to be able to talk
about my work with Kathleen Burk, David Kynaston, Kaoru Sugihara,
Cathy Courtney, Kirsten Refsing and Arne Kalland. When I started to
rewrite the thesis in book form, Michael Roper and David Kynaston’s
comments as examiners gave me direction. Eyal Ben-Ari kindly gave me
his comments on my conference paper. Roger Goodman also kindly read
the thesis and gave me comments on it. In the final stage of rewriting, it
was stimulating to be able to talk to Richard Whitley and Glenn Morgan.
I gained enormous help with writing English from many people at the
various stages of writing drafts, preparing a PhD thesis and rewriting it
for a book. Reading and correcting a non-native’s English is extremely
difficult and time consuming. I am indebted to the enormous help of
Laura Swash, Jo Kingsford, Margaret Rees, Helen Hannick, Susie Scott,
Deborah Dukes, Tanya Grassly, Martin Barr and Natasha Burchardt.
I would like to thank Rikkyo University in Tokyo, where Takane
Matsuura and Yasushi Aoki had guided me with my study of British
history before I went to Britain, and I believe my interest in British history
is the underlying groundwork for this book. I would also like to thank
Ferris University which gave me an opportunity to lecture on British
society after I came back to Japan.
I would not have been able to maintain my efforts in writing this book
without correspondence with friends in England. I would like particularly
to thank Laura Swash, Katherine Holden, Janet Fink, Nirmal Puwar and
Margaret Rees for their warm letters to Japan. Natasha Burchardt
encouraged me especially during writing up the thesis and rewriting it in
book form by reading my manuscript many times. Without Natasha, I
would not have been able to write up this book. However, my thanks are
also due to those who have helped me produce this book, including
Elizabeth Brown, Craig Fowlie, James Whitting, Cathryn Waters, Richard
Cook, Bill Down and Marie-Louise Logan. Moving between cultures
often creates a sense of loss and feelings of uncertainty. It is therefore the
emotional support from Chie and Yoshie that has been invaluable for this
book and for myself.

Junko Sakai
Tokyo, August 1999

xii
 1
INTRODUCTION

Only recently, and for the first time, have Japanese bankers begun to think of
themselves as equals of Anglo-American bankers in the City of London and
that Japan has caught up with the West in its own unique way. The Japanese
actively participated in the international financial businesses of the City of
London in the 1970s and its boom in the 1980s, based on the high value of
the yen. They bought properties aggressively, invested in internationally
syndicated loans, tried to finance local companies, and participated in new
financial businesses such as options and swaps. Japanese bankers felt as if
Japan had finally become a member of the Western élite. Some Japanese
leaders felt they no longer needed ‘to catch up with the West’ and that they
were now respected in the world. They thought that they had realised their
aim of equality with the West to which they had aspired since the late
nineteenth century when Japan came out of isolation. Their active participation
in international financial businesses in the 1980s was looked upon as another
Japanese economic miracle like that of manufacturing industry of the 1960s.
However, their illusion did not last long. Since the early 1990s, the Japanese
economy has been suffering a serious recession, and Japanese banks now
have huge debts which threaten the country’s economy. For the first time
since the end of the Second World War, some Japanese banks, which had
been believed to be protected by government policies, have gone bankrupt or
been nationalised, and weaker banks are now being merged with larger banks.
Even the latter are struggling to bail themselves out of their losses. As a
result, they are now withdrawing from their overseas businesses. In the City,
some Japanese banks have already closed their offices, and some of their
British employees have lost their jobs.
How did Japanese financiers come to join the rapidly changing environment
of international financial business, which is characterised by the speed by
which information is disseminated, deregulation of markets, and active
investment beyond national boundaries? How have they adjusted to the pace
of change in 1990s’ globalisation? How will Japanese bankers continue the
process of integration into the networks of global financiers as they develop
in the future? And what can they contribute to the financial business of the

1
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

new era as investors and as employers of local staff? The experiences of

Japanese bankers and financiers in the City in the 1970s and 1980s seem to
show their limitations in joining international networks. How should we
analyse the experiences of Japanese bankers and financiers in the Anglo-
American-dominated financial world?
In order to answer the above questions, this book explores the narratives
of people who have worked in Japanese firms in the City of London since the
1970s. Despite their active participation in the City, the voices of the people
who have experienced the transnational working environment in Japanese
banks have not yet been heard. How have Japanese bankers found the
experience of working in the British business culture, and how have British
employees1 found the experience of working within Japanese corporate culture,
especially in the banking sector? In both countries there exist strong banking
traditions. It was therefore a new experience, both for the Japanese and the
British, to encounter on a large scale people working in the financial services
sector of another culture in their daily work.
This investigation represents a study of ‘local’ phenomena in a globally-
dependent economy and the way individuals move between East and West.2
In spite of its borderless character, the international banking business does
depend on ‘local’ cultures. Japanese bankers, their local employees in the
City, and the Anglo-American bankers who do business with the Japanese
are all bound to their own cultural values and systems. Their encounter, on
the one hand, can be seen as a part of the process of multiculturalisation of
the City of London, which was beginning to lose the legacy of Empire by the
1970s3 and take on a more Americanised way of doing business; and on the
other hand, from the Japanese financiers’ point of view, as the
internationalisation of Japan in the global business world following its post-
war economic growth. For both British and Japanese, the testimonies in this
book show modern life in the context of an emergent global business world,
the repercussions of which have not yet been thoroughly investigated. Indeed,
despite the importance of the Japanese influence on the world economy, very
little has been published about the people behind the phenomenon.
The global expansion of Japanese companies, and the problems arising
from it, have been addressed in the fields of economics, business and
management studies, from the point of view of the rapid expansion of the
Japanese manufacturing industry after the Second World War. In the present
study, however, those established explanations for the global expansion of
the Japanese company are challenged, with special reference to Japanese
financial institutions.4 In previous studies, Japanese global expansion is usually
portrayed in terms of either an economic miracle,5 or more recently, in terms
of failure to adjust to universal values as defined in the Western world.6 Thus,
it has been customary for the Japanese business world to be defined as ‘the
Other’ in Western literature. However, in this book, those interviewed are
seen as subjective ‘agents’ in a micro-world, which includes both British and

2
 INTRODUCTION

Japanese employees in Japanese firms. It is hoped that, by examining the

individual and his and or her world-view as recounted through life stories,
we may gain a unique insight into the nature and effects of the globalisation
process of late twentieth-century capitalism—in which more people than
before encounter other cultures in their everyday lives, and in which it is vital
to seek improved communication between people with such different
world-views.

Japanese transnational companies—an egalitarian or

hierarchical workplace?

Previous evaluations of Japanese transnational companies have rested upon

two opposite assessments. Such companies have been viewed as either
multinationals in which hierarchical human relations prevail, or as egalitarian
workplaces. A commonplace assumption of the first assessment is that the
Japanese company treats local staff, especially managers, in unfair ways,
based on ethnocentric ideas.7 In such analyses, it is considered that Japanese
companies emphasise Japanese ways of working, which are difficult for local
workers to adjust to. A presumption based on the second assessment is that
the Japanese company places its local staff on the same egalitarian footing as
exists between managers and shop-floor workers, in which there is a flat
management structure, a single cafeteria, the same type of uniform for
management and workers, an open-plan office, and so on.8 In fact, these
evaluations are not contradictory but merely partial: the latter description
refers to manufacturing industry and factory workers, and critical assessments
often come from educated local managers in Japanese transnational companies
whose experience is quite different. Japanese transnational practices have
clearly been less successful in the management of local white-collar workers
than with factory workers.
There are, in fact, three patterns of multinational enterprise, according to
Perlmutter.9 There is the geocentric model, in which managers move from
country to country, promoted on a global basis, and management is integrated
within a global organisation. This he considers the best practice for
multinational companies. By contrast, in polycentric multinational companies,
local firms and companies are managed by local staff according to guidelines
established by headquarters. The third is the ethnocentric model in which local
firms are strongly controlled by the headquarters of their countries of origin,
and management is therefore dominated by headquarters. Giddens has claimed
that Japanese multinationals continue to adhere to their own ethnocentric
corporate culture, while Western multinational companies are moving to a
geocentric from a polycentric model.10 In contrast to the evolutionary change
among Western multinationals, the seemingly static nature of the corporate
culture of Japanese transnational companies is criticised in the West.

3
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Despite this criticism of the management of the Japanese transnational

company, popular images of the Japanese company that provides secure
lifetime employment and offers egalitarian treatment to its local staff are
widespread. Indeed, the ‘myth’ of this aspect of the successfulness of Japanese
companies—attracted to Britain by tax incentives—was strengthened during
the Thatcher years when job security became less certain in Britain.11 The
same ‘myth’ circulates among Japanese managers, who defend their corporate
culture as superior to that of Western companies.12 The Japanese in interviews
repeatedly talked about the unique style of Japanese management which is in
harmony with their own cultural backgrounds.
Reflecting on the myth of Japanese corporate culture, there have been
discussions since the 1980s as to whether or not the Japanese system of
production, especially in the car and electrical industries, can be transplanted
to Western society. In other words, serious consideration has been given to
the question of whether ‘the Japanisation of work’ and Japanese styles of
production could be adopted in the West. In 1988, Oliver and Wilkinson argued
that it was possible for the Japanese production system to be adapted in other
countries.13 On the other hand, Ackroyd et al. pointed out, perhaps more
realistically, that the Japanese ways of working are only possible where the
economic and social structures are similar to Japan,14 and Elger and Smith
pursue this theme in their book, Global Japanisation?—adding their contention
that the Japanisation of work was the Thatcher government’s project to change
work culture in Britain.15 Oliver and Wilkinson, in the latest edition of their
book (1992), pointed out that ‘Japanisation’ was in fact hindered by the
constraints of social and economic conditions in Britain. They further
questioned the use of the word ‘Japanisation’ itself, because the word has been
used in two ways; firstly to describe characteristics of the Japanese production
system, and secondly to describe a change in British work culture, with the
tightening of work discipline in order to improve the competitiveness of British
manufacturing industry. The two phenomena are not necessarily equivalent.16
Against the caution of Oliver and Wilkinson, however, John Bratton has argued
that ‘the Japanisation of work’, namely, just-in-time and group work structure,
was already widespread in British factories by the 1990s.17
Yet, it seems that these academic discourses, which created the normative
concept of ‘Japanisation’, may not be firmly grounded in reality. Indeed, these
authors may be using ‘the story of Japanisation’ as a convenient explanation
of the changing work culture in Britain. These discussions have all been based
on stereotypical images of the Japanese company which have arisen from
such scholarly discourses on Japan-based Japanese companies. Since the 1970s,
in fact, Japanese companies have been studied as alternative models for late
capitalism. In his pre-eminent study on Japanese firms, Ronald Dore drew
comparisons between models of the Anglo-Saxon and Japanese patterns of
capitalism, demonstrating that Japanese companies operated an alternative
model to Western ones. Rodney Clark, in contrast, has seen Japanese

4
 INTRODUCTION

companies as oppressive organisations located in a company-centred society.18

Similarly, contradictory evaluations of management underlie more recent
analyses of the Japanese transnational company.
These views have further expanded into discussions on the difference in
capitalist or business systems between East and West. In such discussions, the
origins of the problems involved have been traced back to differences between
the capitalist systems in the two countries. The British economy is often
described as being based on the free market system and that of Japan on the
protected economic system. However, such views seem to be static and to
have ignored historical interactions between East and West. The two systems
are changing and never have been, nor will they remain, ‘essentially’ different.
The paradigm lacks the dynamism of change. Discussions of alternative models
of capitalism and ‘Japanisation of work’ originated in the observation that
Japan’s manufacturing industry in the 1970s and the 1980s was successful,
due to its production methods, the success of which was in turn attributed to
its management style. But it is difficult to apply these approaches to the analysis
of Japanese transnational companies located in the West. For, as we will see
below, it is unlikely that a transnational company brings exactly the same
company structure and exactly the same working practices to host countries.
In parallel with the de-industrialisation of the Japanese economy, Japanese
companies have begun to engage in more direct foreign investment. As a
result, there has been more contact between Japanese management and the
local managerial class, which in turn has led to criticisms of the management
of local staff in Japanese transnational companies.19 Some studies of Japanese
transnational companies have claimed that Japanese companies are beginning
to give more responsibilities to local staff,20 but other studies have rejected
this idea.21 It is now being questioned whether or not Japanese companies are
trying to adopt Western values in their management abroad. In other words,
the Japanese transnational company is being asked to adopt Western-style
management for globalising its organisation.
Japanese transnational firms in the City of London are invaluable sources
for information in examining the globalisation of Japanese management and
business. First of all, despite its importance, there have been fewer studies
made of the Japanese financial sector abroad than of its manufacturing
counterparts. Moreover, since the Japanese are newcomers to international
finance, Anglo-American institutions and the associated business culture still
have a stronger influence on the ways things are run. The difficulties that
both British and Japanese staff of Japanese financial houses in the City
encounter are therefore different from those faced by employees in
manufacturing industry. Japanese companies participating in international
finance additionally have to cooperate with well-educated, local managers in
their overseas subsidiaries. The potential for misunderstanding between
Japanese managers and local staff in this sector is greater than in Japanese
manufacturing companies abroad, where English-speaking managers have

5
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

tended to follow the Japanese-style systems of production; or in Japanese

companies elsewhere, such as in developing countries. Japanese firms in the
City thus provide a valuable base for the study of working relations between
different cultures.
My purpose in using life-story interviews has been to explore the experiences
of these cross-cultural organisations. This is a new approach in the
investigation of Japanese transnational companies in the financial sector. Most
studies on transnational companies have examined organisational structures,
company policies, or strategic politics based on more ‘official’ company
narratives. However, such ostensibly objective studies have not been able to
analyse the difficulties in communication between business people. Instead,
this book examines the subjective views of Japanese bankers and their local
employees in order to analyse cultural interaction in the City since the 1970s.

Culture and identity problems in Japanese financial

companies in the City

There is an urgent need to examine cultural aspects of the global movement

of the Japanese. This phenomenon has taken place in parallel with economic
globalisation since the early 1970s, and the beginning of both movements
coincided with the abolition of the restriction on the amount of dollars a
Japanese person could take abroad. In the 1980s, Japan’s global presence was
highly visible, partly due to the strong yen. Even in the midst of the recession
in the 1990s, according to statistics, around 700,000 Japanese are now living
outside Japan22 and many more Japanese are travelling or living temporarily
outside Japan. Every year, the Japanese community abroad grows larger.
Expansion of the Japanese economy and the spread of Japanese culture
has followed a pattern similar to that of other cultures which have created
diasporas. Although the word ‘diaspora’ was originally used to denote the
movement of Jews all over the world as stateless and victimised refugees,
black communities have begun to use the term—without the connotation
of victim—for evaluating their cultural expansion around the Atlantic
Ocean.23 Robin Cohen further expanded the meaning of diaspora in using
the term to denote different types of transcultural communities in
Britain.24 Although one can doubt whether it is appropriate to apply the
term diaspora to Japanese expansion, his categorisation indicates the
ways in which Japanese globalisation is perceived in the ‘metropolis’. In
addition, although the Japanese global movement may not warrant the
use of the term, ‘diaspora’, in terms of size, I would argue that Japanese
transnational communities fit the description in terms of the way in which
they have dispersed around the world, building up in the process both
emotional and practical-support networks. They have strong connections
with their home country, and create strong ties with other Japanese

6
 INTRODUCTION

abroad and perhaps for these reasons they have become viewed as ‘others’
in host countries.
The Japanese financial business community in the UK presents an
opportunity to examine a new part of the Japanese diaspora. Globalisation
was particularly evident among financial institutions in the 1980s. It is certainly
true that the post-war movement of the Japanese has been led by Japanese
economic success, first in the manufacturing industry and then in the financial
sector. However, Japanese globalisation cannot be seen simply as an economic
phenomenon: it is also a function of the movement of people, and it is this
unprecedented global movement of Japanese people that has received scant
attention from academic research. The global presence of the Japanese cannot
be explained from a purely ‘inhuman’ economic perspective, nor by previous
accounts of a fixed Japanese national identity. This book tries to explore the
Japanese business community in London, mainly focusing on identities of
individual Japanese people who have been involved in finance, and who are
at a vantage point for comparing their impressions of the West with those of
their own country. This book also looks at British bank managers in the
Japanese business community who have first-hand experience both of British
society and of Japanese values in their working lives.
In this section of the Japanese ‘diaspora’ in the City, how far do the ‘different
cultures’ of the local employees and Japanese expatriates affect working
relationships? Previous studies of Japanese white-collar workers questioned
whether specific cultural conditions are essential to the Japanese style of work
and management.25 If they are, does this imply that there are ‘essential’ cultural
differences between the two national groups? The question of ‘cultural
differences’ is critical when we examine working relationships in Japanese
transnational companies in the West. Discourses which emphasise ‘cultural
differences’ in Japanese transnational companies can be viewed from the
perspective of multiculturalism at work, but this leads to a tautology: if British
and Japanese work cultures are different, then problems in their business and
work relationships must have arisen from these differences and consequently
are inevitable. However, ‘culture’ can be seen as not merely consisting of an
unchanging essence, but something in a continual process of (re)construction,
a process of discursive formation. Culture is formed by repeated ‘talks’. There
cannot be a so-called Japanese work culture in the City without repeated
‘talk’ by the people involved. Furthermore, the idea of a ‘British work culture’
is defined differently according to a British or a Japanese perspective. In this
book, rather than trying to delineate ‘essential’ cultural differences, I explore
how the cultures are narrated by each group of employees. In other words, I
examine the process of how the ‘essential cultural differences’ have been
defined.
We need to consider what culture is, before examining the ‘cultural
conditions of Japanese transnational companies’. I shall therefore try to define
the term here. We all start from the notion that culture has boundaries and,

7
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

therefore, ‘our’ culture is not ‘talked’ about without referring to ‘their’ culture.
This means that culture is shared imagination within a group in terms of
lifestyle, religion, arts, morals, and so on. People who share similar values
feel that they belong to the same cultural group: Japanese culture, women’s
culture, working-class culture, and so on. I therefore think that culture can
be considered as a means of defining groups rather than consisting essentially
in the contents of the shared imagination of a group. The expression of ‘culture’
should be investigated as ‘language’ rather than essential and unchanging
differences based on each ethnicity. In Japanese transnational companies,
there is the ‘language of Japanese culture’ and the ‘language of British culture’,
as if the two cultures were essentially different.
This also suggests that culture is defined within power relationships between
groups. The so-called Japanese culture was described in the narratives of
Japanese interviewees as the source of the expansion of the post-war Japanese
economy, and as deriving from the strength of Japanese ethnicity. Japanese
bank managers, at the same time, depicted British, or Western, culture as
superior. In fact, there have been contradictory stories among the Japanese
since the Second World War: on the one hand, that Britain has been a model
for the modernisation of Japan, and, on the other, that British culture has
been responsible for the decline of British industry.26 In contrast, British
managers talked about their culture as ‘universal and standardised’ and had
the expectation that the Japanese would have to acclimatise to it. The ways
in which cultures are narrated represent the notions of power relations between
the groups. Japanese banks in the City are at the contemporary frontiers of
cultural talk, where people of different nationalities meet in their everyday
working lives. Therefore, culture is ‘talked’ of as the reason for segregation
between ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Culture in transnational companies is a category for segregation. Culture
is defined by our sense of belonging, in other words by our cultural identity;
where we belong, who I am and where I am located in society. Cultural
identity is formed by stories about belonging, in other words, by individuals’
declarations of where they stand in their imaginary worlds. I use the word
‘imaginary’, since culture and society are narrated through stories which are
not necessarily absolutely ‘true’, but nevertheless represent the perspective of
the narrator. Said pointed out that ‘identity has been the core of cultural
thought’:27 both groups in Japanese banks turn to their own cultural identities
when they face ‘others’. They confirm their own cultural identities in defining
what financial business should be, what ideal management should be, how
gender identity ideally should be; and by what the world order is like—all
issues which will be explored in this book. Segregation between groups of
different employees within the banks led to the development of stories of
different cultures, and accumulated academic knowledge was used to validate
the stories. Again, I would like to stress that academic knowledge has been
well circulated among the bank managers and developed to support their

8
 INTRODUCTION

understanding of culture. For example, the so-called unique Japanese

management system is used as an excuse for preventing the creation of a
unified promotion system for British and Japanese staff. The stories of different
cultures themselves re-emphasise segregation between groups, which
segregation, in turn, re-emphasises differences in cultural identities.
It is crucial to notice that cultural identities are, however, not homogeneous
within an ethnic group. Men and women, and people with different positions
in society talk about and demonstrate different types of identity. Therefore,
not only are dominant discourses in the West not necessarily shared by
Japanese men in the core of Japanese society, but in turn discourses of Japanese
men are not necessarily shared by all Japanese. Although men at the centre of
Japanese or British society talked about cultural identity in terms of national
characteristics, women talked in a different way about their cultural identities.
Japanese men spoke more about their identities as Japanese, suggesting all
Japanese were homogeneous. Japanese women, by contrast, tended to deny
their ‘Japanese culture’. Thus, it is important to bear in mind that cultural
identity is not unified within one nation. We should be careful not to generalise
a culture in which one ethnicity is said to predominate as a homogeneous
one; rather, it is diversified according to subcultural groups divided along the
lines of class and gender. Nevertheless, the Japanese staff continue to talk
about themselves as ‘we Japanese’, and the British staff as ‘the English’, or
‘Scots’. In each ethnicity, the dominant language of culture is often taken to
represent the cultural essence of the ethnic group, or national group. In
Japanese transnational companies, the dominance of men of each ethnicity
has meant that their language too has prevailed over that of the workers. The
voices of subcultural groups are rarely heard in the talk of ‘culture’.
Between dominant ethnic or national groups, psychological competition
for cultural hegemony accompanies economic or political competition. Each
dominant group is proud of its ‘culture’ and talks about its culture as superior
to that of others. The language of Japanese national culture used by Japanese
men has been criticised as ‘Nihonjinron’.28 Nihonjinron talk tends to refer to
the Japanese as homogeneous, but in fact ‘represents the ruling class in Japan’.29
Also, it represents a new form of cultural nationalism in an era when Japan
seems to have attained economic power. This can be compared with the British
national identity, which has also been criticised as representing the dominant
ideology of white male, and middle class, identities.30 Although in an influential
study of Japanese companies, the strong cultural identities of male managers
are criticised,31 this book suggests that both British and Japanese staff conceive
of their identities—although informed by their gender and position in society—
as national identities, and that those national identities are used for creating
imaginary homogeneous groups. It is important to explore the process of
making such stories.
The languages of Japanese culture and British culture in this transnational
working place can be seen as contributing to their construction of the

9
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

boundaries between East and West. Said described how the ‘West’ has
continuously constructed images of the ‘East’.32 The Japanese have been
described as ‘others’, and the language within transnational companies reflects
such popular views of what ‘Japaneseness’ and ‘Britishness’ is, as notions of
‘us’ and ‘them’. It is certainly true that the West asserts its cultural hegemony,
as Said described. Nihonjinron, namely the discussion of what ‘Japaneseness’
is, can be seen as a response to this assertion of Western cultural hegemony in
order ‘to differentiate themselves from the universal’ Westerners.33 So-called
Nihonjinron is a common stance taken in stories circulating among Japanese
bank managers, and is used to promote segregation inside their organisations.
One peculiar phenomenon in Japanese transnational companies is that
power relations existing within the company may be reversed once outside.
Within companies there is competition between Japanese and British managers
for management control. Outside, the Japanese have had difficulty in joining
the City business culture. Nihonjinron and the British equivalent of an assumed
universalism in managers’ identities may be a defence when ‘others’ are faced.
These expressions of identity reflect the power relations between East and
West. The reversal of cultural hegemony is unlikely to occur in a brief period.
The particular problems of these financial companies may be explained by a
misfit between Western cultural hegemony and the emerging globalisation of
the Japanese economy, since different aspects of hegemony—political,
economic and cultural hegemonies—are transformed unevenly in history. When
we look at the current state of ‘globalisation’, it seems as if economic hegemony
moved from East to West to some extent in the 1980s, though economic
troubles in Asian countries in the late 1990s suggest that the transformation
may not have happened at all. Cultural hegemony is still assumed in
universalism in the West. Other societies and other cultures are always
evaluated according to Western criteria. Interactions with people from different
countries re-emphasise the notion of what ‘our culture’ is. If the Japanese had
not gained economic power, or if they had not been involved in global economic
competition, they might not have needed to defend their ‘own culture’.
Difficulties have arisen for the Japanese because in fact they gained certain
economic power. The particularity of the problem of Japanese identities seems
to arise from the fact that the country gained significant economic power in
the absence of any cultural hegemony, or cultural obedience. Thus, the Japanese
have gained power within companies in their business operations, but are still
surrounded by a Euro-centric atmosphere. In this sense, Japanese people might
be thought to have a rebellious attitude towards the West.
Is it possible to create hybrid identities between cultures in order to create
a new transnational working environment for both the Japanese and the
British, or more broadly for people in both East and West? New identities,
which are not ethnocentric, or based on the dominance of one particular
group within the multicultural unit would have to be found. This book
examines the narratives of the Japanese bankers and their employees in order

10
 INTRODUCTION

to explore the question, which is particularly important from the point of

view that the Japanese represent a people entering the global community
without having been a former colony of Europe. In order to examine this
phenomenon, this book looks at the cultural identities of both Japanese and
British, which are never fixed in one society, but rather float somewhere
between the two nations. My own hope is that it will prove possible to
construct new identities which facilitate new attempts at communication
between East and West rather than emphasising the cultural uniqueness of
the East. New identities may come from the peripheral identities of younger
men and women who are marginalised from the dominant discourses of
national identities. I do not intend to argue in the book for the convergence
of Western and Eastern cultures, but I hope to show the possibility of forming
cultural hybridity in transnational business communities.

Life stories—focusing on ‘stories’ rather than facts

This book analyses testimonies gathered through interviews with employees

of Japanese financial institutions as ‘stories’ rather than as evidence of facts.
I employ this approach, first, because of the severe competition between the
Japanese and British, in which both groups of managers seemed to have
developed biased views in order to defend their culture. Second, the world in
which the interviewees operate means that people espouse official stories
which are not necessarily based on their own observation or experiences.
Finally, their stories have proved invaluable in the investigation of the
relationships between cultures, since the talk in companies consists in the
exchange of values and views of the employees.
When I started my work in this field, however, I had the naive preconception
that the more people I interviewed the more I would know about Japanese
banks in London and the people within them. In addition, I thought that if I
continued to meet people I would eventually find a clear focus.
Ultimately, I conducted 100 recorded interviews and five unrecorded
interviews between 1991–2 and 1994–5. Most interviews were between one
and two hours long, though 11 interviewees talked for up to three or four
hours. The number of interviewees is shown in Table 1.1. In addition to this,
anthropological observation was added to some extent, since my interviews
were conducted both in the workplace and at home, which provided an
opportunity to observe both work and home lives. I also thought I would be
able to uncover the details of their activities if I met more interviewees, and I
would be able to write a kind of economic and social history of the
development of Japanese banks in the City of London. However, I encountered
difficulties when I came to look for an integrated story from my interviews.
The stories I collected were biased by the viewpoints of the interviewees,
layered from superficial opinions to deep unconscious feelings, and distorted

11
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Table 1.1 The number of interviewees

by their stereotypical images of themselves and others.34 One disadvantage

of my interviews was the difficulties involved in analysing the context in
which people had said things, and what meaning was intended.35 Therefore,
it proved much more difficult than I had first thought to draw a reliable
picture of what, in reality, was happening in this community. It also proved
difficult to gain objective statistics about the financial state of companies,
since Japanese bankers would not openly discuss their business. I respected
their convention that Japanese men and women do not talk about their
companies.36 I therefore did not pursue discussions in the areas they were
reluctant to talk about such as business activities, since I was interviewing at
a time when Japanese banks had begun to be criticised for their huge bad
debts. The bank managers I talked to were especially cautious when talking
about business issues. As a result of these methodological constraints, this
book is based on stories of their global working life.
Nevertheless, the analysis of stories rather than pursuing ‘facts’ turned
out to be a distinct advantage. The central method I have used is the oral
history-life-story method, which has the advantage of allowing the possibility
of obtaining people’s views of the world at the same time as revealing their
position in the ‘imagined community’. They see the world from their own
perspective. As Benedict Anderson argued, the community to which we belong
is only an imaginary construction,37 and Paul Thompson and Raphael Samuel
have pointed out in their book, The Myths We Live By, that narrative stories
are the result of a ‘construction’ of history by the storytellers. Elizabeth Tonkin
has similarly argued that the oral form of history is a result of the construction

12
 INTRODUCTION

of the past,38 which can be examined as such and analysed for the light they
shed on the construction of culture. Since the enquiries of social historians
encompass history in terms of space as well as time, oral testimony is
particularly useful as a means of exploring the collective world-views which
constitute ‘cultures’. On an individual level, distortions, misunderstandings
and biased emphases indicate the kinds of power relationships that exist
between individuals or between groups. For example, jealousy of somebody
may lead to that person being described as a ‘bad’ person, or, when an
individual has been excluded from a group, they may claim that their exclusion
was irrational. These emotional conflicts may distort stories. When people
are happy their stories emerge as positive, but when they are low they are
negative. These discoveries by oral historians are relevant to the studies of
cross-cultural organisations. Difficulties in the business, and competitiveness
between managers from the two countries, may have emphasised their different
values, and if interviewers enter into the emotional geography of the
interviewee, they can begin to understand the storytellers’ emotional world.
At the same time, the interviewer’s discovery of common stories may reveal a
collective construction of cultures. We can see how these managers, who are
involved in international business, perceive their cultures, including their
values, ways of thinking, lifestyles, attitudes to work and religion, a sense of
belonging, and so on. This is the great advantage of life-story interviews,
which could open up a new approach to organisation studies in this era of
globalisation.
Despite the expectation that this qualitative research method could provide
new insights into the multicultural working place, it took time to build up
my questionnaire. I continued to develop questions during the process of my
fieldwork. Almost like an anthropologist suddenly finding herself in a strange
land, I started my interviews with people unknown to me and developed a
dialogue. The answers of interviewees led me to develop my questions further.
Although I had prepared an interview guide, interviews tended to be led by
each interviewee rather than sticking to the guide. The result was a joint
explanation arising from my own and their experiences of being in another
culture: for the Japanese, like myself, working in Britain, and for the British
working in Japanese companies. It is important to recognise the critical role
of subjectivity as central to oral history methodology. In this case, my own
understanding of the transnational working experience of my interviewees
was informed by my own experiences of studying in Britain. If I had been a
young hopeful male student, or an established academic, I would have
probably understood their experiences differently.
I, therefore, do not claim that this is the only true story of Japanese banks
in the City, but rather that my study represents one among plural realities.
This said, the picture in this book is the product of more than 100 interviewees
and myself, and therefore to some extent represents an alternative to the
established accounts of Japanese companies and their people. Moreover, my

13
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

study overcomes the limitations of analyses of formal company strategies, or

the sort of observations that outsiders coming into the working places are
able to make. The Japanese in such studies have always been depicted as
‘others’. Here, their own views are presented without being cast in such a
role. Indeed, their life stories of cross-cultural working are claimed to be
‘true’ stories. This is the first collective story by Japanese bankers in the West
of and by themselves.
Autobiographical stories may give voice to people whose accounts of life
would not otherwise be heard. Here, by using the life-story interview method,
the voice of workers in Japanese banks affords us an insight into changing
ethnicity in the City of London. It also allows us to listen to how people recount
narratives of dominant people, and how different groups construct their own
stories of the world, its history, and their self-identities. Historically, the
anthropological approach observed ‘others’, usually people in the Third World.
In contrast, contemporary anthropology often uses autobiographical stories
to reveal the views of people who have been observed, talked about, and
evaluated by the observers. The life-story approach also makes use of this
advantage in using autobiographical narratives which have ‘the power of the
individual voice’.39 Although some of the Japanese I interviewed were from
the contemporary Japanese élite, their voices had not been heard previously.
Nor had those of Japanese women. Listening to these women helped towards
understanding their collective consciousness, and has additionally, in some
cases, been part of a process of empowerment through the opportunity to
express themselves. The life-story method is now opening up new ways of
analysing the experiences of newcomers to the globalising West.

The interviews

The interview process itself revealed the nature of stories and relationships
between interviewees, as well as the relationships between interviewees and
interviewer. It also raised questions of language used for interviews in the
case of cross-cultural research. Most research on Japanese companies based
on interviews is conducted in the English language. Even when the research
is done in the Japanese language by non-native Japanese researchers, the
responses elicited tend to fit with cultural values which the English language
embodies. Stories are confined within a language used only in interviews.
The responses of Japanese businessmen interviewed by researchers in the
West seem to be based more on official company policies which conform to
cultural values embodied in English than to their own personal views. But
my interviews done in the Japanese language created a feeling of shared
cultural values between the interviewer and interviewee.
Conversely, interviewing British participants using the English language as
a non-native English speaker, may have limited my ability to enter into a deep

14
 INTRODUCTION

dialogue with them. I tried to compensate for this disadvantage, using my

position as a woman, as a student, and even my position as a non-native speaker.
They tried to teach me, and they tried to make me understand the importance
of cultural convergence. It was a great advantage for this research. Further, it
made me think of the great possibility of observing the English-speaking people
as ‘others’. Anthropology nowadays talks of the importance of eliciting the
views of the people who have previously only been observed by researchers
coming from the cultural centre. The unevenness between observers, usually
Westerners, and the observed, usually non-Westerners, could be corrected by
non-Western researchers joining social science research in the English language.
Despite the differences between interviewing in my own language and in a
second language, both the Japanese and the British enjoyed talking about
themselves. I soon discovered that, despite the popular image of the Japanese
as reluctant to talk about their inner selves, those I interviewed tended to
give the lie to this stereotype, once they had begun to talk. I found the British
to be similarly forthcoming, once they had begun to talk, in freely giving
their views about life and work. Cross-cultural working experiences in offices
made them talk about their expectations, disappointments and, again, hopes
of creating new working environments. Of course it was difficult to gain
intimate knowledge about their experiences when I interviewed these people
in their offices, and some individuals were more secretive about their business
and about personal matters than others. However, it seemed that the reluctance
depended more on personality than on national characteristics. Difficulties
also tended to relate to where interviews took place, limitations of time, and
an individual’s position in the company.
Both Japanese and British expressed their shock at the different behaviours
and morals they encountered in the transnational workplace. Their
disappointment after working several years in ‘another’ working environment
led them to make up stories of cultural dissonance. Their stories also illustrated
how they saw the world and themselves.40 For example, the Japanese talked
about how hard they worked, and the British talked about how the Japanese
work environment was male-dominated. However, their constructed stories
tended to be based more upon the stereotypical images which they held rather
than on the ‘discoveries’ they had made through their own personal
experiences. Thus, they formed and circulated ‘collective’ stories, which
provided an opportunity to examine dominant discourses—whether in terms
of gender, ethnicity or class—in the transnational company.
Interviewing Japanese financiers also provides an opportunity for
demystifying this group, whose position in society differs from that of Anglo-
American financiers. Their calm but aggressive image is sometimes exaggerated
in the eyes of Westerners and at other times played down. The interviews
revealed them as ‘company men’ employed by large corporations after their
graduation, and not successors in family businesses. Despite the fact that
they are mere employees of large companies, they are part of the company

15
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

global hierarchy. The Japanese managers, especially bank managers, are

considered more ‘élite’ than managers in manufacturing industry. They are
not in the top rank of the global hierarchy to which they belong. Nevertheless,
they are proud of their sense of belonging to their company and of contributing
to the development of Japanese society.
My interviewees were business people, whose working lives shaped the
interviews in particular ways. For instance, interviews were sometimes stopped
by urgent matters, such as telephone calls from head office. Once, an interview
which should have taken place in London was cancelled at the last moment
because the bank manager had to deal with a crisis arising from the sudden
rise in the value of the yen. In addition, although the managers I interviewed
seemed to be emotionally stable, the business world they were involved in
was highly competitive and stressful, and the ‘ups and downs’ of their working
lives, therefore, often affected the ‘tone’ of the interviews. In one example,
the interviewee was cheerfully talking about his personal experiences, and
promised to be interviewed again. The next time, he was extremely low, and
could barely speak. I later found that there had been a merger of rival banks
on that day. Of course, no explanation was given as to why he was low that
day, but his changed attitude aroused my curiosity.
It proved difficult at first to gain the necessary introductions to potential
interviewees. Writing letters directly to Japanese financial companies proved
not to be useful—not a single company replied. I therefore resorted to the
‘snowballing’ technique; in other words, I used as many connections as
possible, through my own friends, and relatives, and through academic people,
in order to make contact with interviewees.41 Entering into the business
network was, in the beginning, almost impossible. Continuous refusals made
me think I might have to give up this research.
However, the difficulties themselves turned out to be rewarding. The
introduction process revealed that there was segregation among the
interviewees, according to ethnicity, status and gender. Men and women,
Japanese and British staff, and the managerial classes and clerks had different
human networks, and it was rare to gain an introduction beyond the
boundaries of each group with the exception of introductions by Japanese
bosses to their subordinates. Japanese employees acted as a close-knit group.
First, I was introduced by a journalist to a group of senior managers who
were in their thirties and forties. This first group formed a friendship network
of Japanese male employees from head offices in Japan. Japanese female
managers and locally hired Japanese women were introduced by these male
groups as their subordinates. Women introduced me to their friends, but
female Japanese managers did not extend any introductions. This in itself
may indicate their isolation from the male world. The different lines of
introduction demonstrated the social segregation of the people I interviewed.
The introduction process brought to my attention some networks of
friendship and family. Japanese male banking staff have strong relationships

16
 INTRODUCTION

within the occupational group which are, in terms of their emotional ties,
more like friendships than relationships between colleagues or business
acquaintances. Conversely, women sent by their companies from Japan had
their own society for exchanging information and helping each other, but
their friendship ties were not as strong as those of the men. Female managers
were relatively isolated and their ties were more individually connected to
male bosses. Locally hired Japanese women had strong friendship networks
and were sympathetic to other women. It seemed to me that the women in
Japanese companies in the City were positioned as divided around men, as
female managers, wives or support staff.42
Equally, in gaining introductions to the British staff of Japanese companies
I encountered many refusals. It was slightly easier to meet City bankers who
were specialists in Japanese-related business. One British senior manager was
introduced to me by an academic. This manager introduced me to some other
British managers in British organisations. Like Japanese male managers, British
senior managers also had their own networks which were more like
friendships, through university connections and business in the City. However,
in general, it was difficult to make contact with British managers and specialists
inside companies. A few were introduced by their Japanese bosses. As far as
I observed, the British had less clear gender segregation in terms of networking
than the Japanese. For example, British female managers introduced me to
some of their male acquaintances. The process of finding British interviewees
made me notice the segregation between Japanese and British staff. Both
British men and women were cautious about the interviewer’s position. Their
main worry was that I might report their views on Japanese bosses. At the
same time, I felt that they had a hidden expectation that I would convey their
complaints to Japanese bosses, or even that I might reveal their problems to
Japanese society at large.
Problems also arose in establishing trust between the interviewees and
myself, as it was difficult to gain the trust of a group to which I did not
belong. Thus, it proved more difficult to obtain men’s stories than women’s,
and the British staff’s stories were harder to obtain than those of the Japanese.
The most difficult group proved to be the British senior male staff. In particular,
when I was introduced to them by their Japanese bosses they were extremely
cautious, fearful that I might report their views to their Japanese bosses. It
was always easier to interview the British when I was introduced to them by
their British colleagues or friends.
One way of gaining trust was to focus on the similarities between their
experience and my own. Japanese male managers were sympathetic towards
a student who had come to this country and who was experiencing difficulties
in another cultural atmosphere. We shared the same feeling that it was not
easy to live and work in another country. They helped me by talking about
their own cultural experience in their business world. However, it was difficult
to gain much information about their personal lives: for example, stories

17
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

about their family lives. Female Japanese managers were even more cautious
than their male counterparts towards me as a mature student, perhaps in the
belief that I had feelings of inferiority towards them with their good career
prospects. Young Japanese women sent to Britain from their companies, on
the other hand, introduced their friends to me, and they talked to me more
openly and without any feeling of competition. Despite such differences, I
found it easier to gain the confidence of both the British and the Japanese
women than the men. Women tended to be more sympathetic than men to a
female research student, even though some female delegates displayed
toughness. However, I gradually understood that their defensiveness came
from the difficulties they experienced in working in a male world. In contrast,
locally hired Japanese women were sympathetic to my fieldwork and wanted
to talk about their experiences both in Japan and in Britain. I felt I had given
them a satisfactory opportunity to talk about their views of the world, which
had been gained through their experience of moving between the two cultures.
Difficulties also seemed to arise from my social status as a mature student
from a British university unknown to most Japanese male managers. If I had
been a young male student studying economics at a prestigious university, I
might have found it easier to conduct the fieldwork in this hierarchical,
financial world. It was almost unthinkable for these male managers to conceive
of a Japanese ‘housewife’ studying away from home and studying Japanese
bankers abroad. One interviewee thought I was a lecturer at a Japanese
university: it was embarrassing to see his response when I corrected this
misconception. It is easier if the interviewer belongs to the same social group
as the interviewees.
I had difficulties in gaining access to the top echelons of the Japanese
financial world in London. However, I was fortunate to meet one managing
director who was exceptionally open-minded. He said that his principle was
to meet everybody who wanted to see him. He did not ask about my
background, saying that if the topic was interesting and the person seemed to
be reliable after he saw him or her, it should be all right. After I had met this
manager, he introduced me to a group of managing directors who had spent
many years abroad and had a wider knowledge about company policies.
Interviewing top management added to my eliciting of official views on
company policies rather than on cross-cultural everyday working life.
In the end, I found that, for me, it was easiest to gain introductions to, and
the trust of, locally-hired Japanese women. My position as a student overlapped
with theirs, as women who had migrated individually to Britain. We could
exchange personal experiences of being in another country. We spoke about
what had happened to us, what kind of misunderstandings made our lives
more difficult, where we could live between the two nations, and so on.
Among those who refused to be interviewed, I found differences in cultural
attitudes between the Japanese and the British, between men and women,
and between clerks and senior managers. The Japanese I approached

18
 INTRODUCTION

unsuccessfully tended to refuse directly when they did not want to be

interviewed, but the British staff I asked often said, ‘I will phone you later’.
Yet, the phone calls did not come. When I phoned three or four times, some
agreed to be interviewed. Yet others just said, ‘I will fax you next week’. One
British manager sent me several letters and said that he would help me and
would let me know when he could meet me. He never directly refused, but I
came to understand that I had been refused. I began to wonder which was
less painful, being refused directly, or being dismissed with nice smiles and
promises. As a language learner, it took me time to understand that English is
a language in which words do not necessarily represent their meaning.
Gradually, I realised that I had to pick up the implications behind words
through the context and the attitudes I encountered during conversations.
The smiling refusals of some British staff left me deeply depressed. The
Japanese are often discussed as people who hide behind tatemae (‘ideology’
or official talk) and honne (practice or real feeling), but I gained the strong
impression that the British people who refused to be interviewed were the
more sophisticated in terms of hiding their real feelings when they wanted to
say ‘no’. For them, it appeared to be too embarrassing to refuse directly and
they found it more acceptable to refuse by the implications underlying their
words and behaviour. In this sense, they were using tatemae and honne, just
as the stereotypical Japanese are believed to do.
During my interviews, I learned to play a different ‘self’ for each group,
though it took time not to feel guilty that I was saying what I did not really
believe from the bottom of my heart. I started from the assumption that I had
to be consistent in what I was saying, but I found that it was necessary to
adjust to interviewees’ values. I felt depressed at this chameleon role I adopted
for my interviewees. To the Japanese male managers, I was a humble female
student admiring the success of the Japanese economy and the work attitudes
of Japanese culture. I also showed sympathy for their difficulties in doing
business in the Western world. I empathised with the female managers when
they complained of how difficult it was to work in Japanese, male-dominated
workplaces. To the male British staff, I said that the Japanese would have to
give more responsibilities to the local staff to be fair and if they were to do
better in their business. I also went along with the British female staff’s opinion
that Japanese men are anti-female. In the end, I realised that we all play
ourselves differently when facing different people. This discovery relieved
me from the depression I had experienced at the outset of the fieldwork.
I was affected by my own experience of moving between cultures when
interviewing people who were from my own culture (i.e. Japanese and female)
and those who were not from the same culture as me (i.e. British and male).
Interviewing men was also a new experience for me, and seeing things from
a different viewpoint afforded me insights which greatly surprised me. The
business world of men was new to me. My fieldwork interviews proved a
painful experience in adjusting to discourses from other cultures, but at the

19
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

same time this was a valuable experience from which I was able to learn
about different worlds from that in which I live. It was like seeing a play. I
was fascinated every time for two or three hours by their life dramas. Going
home after the interviews felt similar to going home after the theatre. On the
way home, though I was exhausted and influenced by their stories, I recalled
the stories, characters, the meanings, and their performances, and then I
thought about my own life. I interpreted their lives through my own life
experience, and vice versa.

The position of ‘I’

Both gaining introductions and the interviewing process made me think about
myself, but the whole process of writing about interviews also made me think
about ‘who I am’. As Stuart Hall pointed out, ‘we all write and speak from a
particular place and time, from a history and a culture which is specific.
What we say is always in context’;43 and I have had to face the question of
where to locate myself between cultures. When we look at existing studies on
Japanese companies, Japanese society, and so on, the Japanese are examined,
talked about, and constructed by Western academics, though I do not deny
that Japanese academics have responded to these constructions with a pride
in themselves as ‘unique’ and special. However, responses vary between men
and women. Japanese male academics are often proud of the productivity of
Japan’s manufacturing industry, while female scholars criticise the male-
dominated hierarchical culture of Japan.44 However, I have found that I am
not sure where I can locate myself, being neither a Westerner who can criticise
Japan, nor a Japanese who can share academic discourses inside Japan. In
contrast to Western researchers who sometimes criticise themselves for using
their interviewees’ personal experiences to promote their own success in the
academic world, I have felt powerless in relation to most of my Japanese
interviewees whose futures inside Japan seemed to be guaranteed. Before I
came to Britain, I had had an illusion that there would be no problems in
being Japanese and studying in an English environment. Soon, I realised that
I needed to gain an understanding of how to think in English and wished that
I had been a non-Japanese, shortly followed by a realisation of the impossibility
of gaining a similar perspective to that of Westerners. I realised that I could
not criticise the problems in Japanese transnational companies in the same
way as Westerners might do, as I did not share the same values as Western
scholars. So, where could I locate myself? I continued to swing forwards and
backwards between cultures, just as my informants were doing.
This book is based on research which I undertook for my thesis, and is
therefore ‘aimed’ at English-speaking academics. Academic research might
be considered as making stories for imagined ‘readers’. I have had to produce
acceptable stories for English academics. For Japanese students in the West,

20
 INTRODUCTION

it has often proved to be easiest to locate themselves in Western values, and

to look at Japan as a country coming historically from behind. Writing a
thesis is to produce arguments which can be ‘consumed’ by the reader.
However, I have found it impossible to ignore my own cultural identity, as a
woman, as Japanese, as a member of my family, and as a middle-aged person
who was educated in post-war Japan.
I therefore do not claim that this is a neutral and objective book which
represents the ‘true story’ of Japanese financial firms in the West. Rather I
would say that this is a story constructed from narratives made by my
interviewees and ‘I’, and a story constructed by my own analysis from my
own standpoint from in between the two cultures. We need to be aware that
there can be stories, other than dominant ones, which have an equal claim to
represent part of the truth. The ‘otherness’ of this book will stand as testimony
to the multicultural nature of the City of London, and to the changing stories
of globalisation.

The structure of the book

In the following chapters I explore the narratives of culture and identity in

Japanese financial firms in the City, taking different aspects in turn. The aim
of Chapter 2 is to clarify the economic and historical context of these people.
Both in Britain and in Japan, drastic changes in financial business occurred
during the 1970s. The City had become more dependent on the Euro-market
and its increasing number of foreign houses. Having recovered from the
damage of the war, Japan’s direct foreign investment began in the 1970s.
This chapter discusses Japanese participation in international financial business
in the City since the 1970s, the aggressive activities of the Japanese in the late
1980s, and their withdrawal in the 1990s. As there were problems in obtaining
objective evidence, the chapter is based almost entirely on interview material.
I conclude that it is unlikely that ideas about the finance business in different
capitalist countries will change rapidly in spite of the current rapid global
economic change.
Chapter 3 describes the setting of this study and provides a profile of each
group of interviewees. First of all, the Japanese financial business community
is overviewed. Then, I categorise the interviewees into eight groups; Japanese
male managers, British male managers, Japanese female managers, British
female managers, British clerks, locally hired Japanese, wives, and experts in
the City on Japanese business.
Chapter 4 explores how the Japanese developed management practice in
relation to local staff in the period of expansion in the 1980s. In the developing
Japanese transnationals, gender relationships became an important factor in
cultural communications. Indeed, gender is a decisive topic when people talk
about cultural identities. Chapter 5 reveals how gender relationships in each

21
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

of the cultures became polarised in this multicultural situation and explores

cross-cultural gender relationships at work.
Chapter 6 looks at people’s inner world and their sense of self. Although
more and more people move globally and interact with different cultures in
their everyday lives, such as these business people, there are still difficulties in
understanding one another and exchanging views. Each individual has a
different identity, and power makes some people more talkative and often
more positive, but others more silent, often creating negative views of
themselves and of the world. There is dislocation and displacement in people’s
sense of self in this small Japanese business community. However, dominant
discourses still belong to male senior managers who have core positions in
their own culture and companies, although British and Japanese male
managers compete. One question which remains unanswered is whether the
Japanese system will converge with that of the West, or whether cultural
differences will remain as essential differences. In this chapter I consider how
the financiers I talked to look at this question.
Chapter 7 questions whether it is possible to go beyond cultural boundaries
by analysing the life stories of Japanese women, who have decided not to
return to their own culture, but have, however, not been able to integrate
fully into British society. Most of the Japanese women, talking about their
lives—often in tears—displayed the emotional conflicts which they experienced
as a result of being ‘between cultures’. They had finally found workplaces on
the periphery of the Japanese business community in London. Their lives
contrasted with those of their male counterparts who had tended to gravitate
to the Japanese male-dominated company world. However, I found that
human beings living on the cultural boundaries between men and women,
between classes and between nations gained strength from these experiences
and could testify to the potential for creating cultural hybridity.
In the concluding chapter, I return to the core questions of the cross-cultural
identities of these transnational workers, both British and Japanese, and how
their business and working environment on the boundary between East and
West has been unexpectedly influenced by their diverse cultural identities.
How could we establish new ways of cultural communication for making
hybrid working cultures in this globalising world? Is there any evidence of
emerging new identities in this climate of globalisation in the ‘stories’ of
employees in newly emerging Japanese global financial companies?

Notes
Japanese names are written in the English style in this book with the given name first,
in order to avoid confusion, as both British and Japanese names occur in this book.
I use macrons to express long vowels in Japanese words. However, some geographical
names (e.g. Tokyo, Osaka) and the names of certain Japanese authors and Japanese
universities which are already known in English (e.g. Shusaku Endo, Keio University)
are exceptions to this rule.

22
 INTRODUCTION

1 The local staff in Japanese financial firms are not only British, but also Europeans
from other countries, and people with other cultural backgrounds. However, I
eventually interviewed only British staff, though I tried to meet other groups as
well.
2 It is questionable whether we should use the word ‘West’ with a capital letter. In
my interviews, I found the interviewees still hold on to the notion of differences
between East and West. I, therefore, use capitals, but this does not mean I accept
the differences as fundamental.
3 For more about the City and imperialism, see P.J.Cain and A.G.Hopkins, British
Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914–90, 1993.
4 For more about the economic activities of Japanese banks in London, see Yasuyuki
Hamada and Takashi Sawada, Hogin London Shiten: Kinyu Saizensen no Jitsuzo
(The London Branches of Japanese Banks: Practice in the Forefront of Finance),
1992; J.Thorsten Düser, International Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European
Perspective, 1990; Bill Emmott, Japan’s Global Reach: The Influences, Strategies
and Weakness of Japan’s Multinational Companies, 1992; Toru Iwami,
‘Internationalization of Japanese Banking: The Factors Affecting its Rapid
Growth’, Journal of International Economic Studies (Institute of Comparative
Economic Studies, Hosei University), no. 3, 1989, pp. 85–110; Takashi Kiuchi
and The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., ‘Japanese Investment Strategies
in EC Banking Industry’, presented at the Japanese Direct Investment in a Unifying
Europe: Impacts on Japan and the European Community Conference, INSEAD
Euro-Asia Centre Fontainbleau, 26–7 June, 1992; Gabriel Hawawini and Michael
Schill, The Japanese Presence in the European Financial Service Sector: Historic
Perspective and Future Prospects’, presented at the Japanese Direct Investment
in a Unifying Europe: Impacts on Japan and the European Community
Conference, INSEAD Euro-Asia Centre Fontainbleau, 26–7 June, 1992; Ryuzo
Sato, Richard M.Levich and Rama V.Ramachandran, Japan, Europe and
International Financial Markets: Analytical and Empirical Perspectives, 1994;
Henry S.Terrell, Robert S.Dohner and Barbara R.Lowrey, ‘The US and UK
Activities of Japanese Banks: 1980–88’ (unpublished paper), International Finance
Discussion Papers, September 1989; Adam Tickell, ‘Banking on Britain?: The
Changing Role and Geography of Japanese Banks in Britain’, unpublished paper,
School of Geography, Leeds University, 1993; ‘Japanese Banks in London’, Bank
of England Quarterly Bulletin, November, 1987, pp. 518–24; H.S.Terrel, ‘The
Activities of Banks in the United Kingdom and in the United States, 1980–88’,
Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1990.
For studies of the management problems of Japanese banks, see Carolyn L.
Evans, ‘Human Resource Management in the Japanese Financial Institution
Abroad: The Case of the London Office’, British Journal of Industrial Relations,
vol. 31, no. 3, September, 1993, pp. 347–64; Malcolm Trevor, ‘The Overseas
Strategies of Japanese Corporations’, Annals, AAPSS (Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science), vol. 513, January, 1991; Malcolm Trevor,
Jochen Schendel and Bernhard Wilpert, The Japanese Management Development
System: Generalists and Specialists in Japanese Companies Abroad, 1986;
Stephanie Jones, Working for the Japanese: Myths and Realities, British
Perceptions, 1991.
5 For example, see Charles McMillan, The Japanese Industrial System, 1985;
Toyohiro Kono, Strategy and Structure of Japanese Enterprises, 1984; Masahiko
Aoki, Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, 1988.
6 Bill Emmott, The Sun Also Sets: Why Japan Will Not Be Number One, 1990;
Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a
Stateless Nation, 1989; Jon Woronoff, The Japanese Economic Crisis, 1993.

23
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

7 On the subject of unfair treatment of local managers, March and Elashmawi

pointed out that local managers in Japanese multinational companies felt they
were discriminated against in terms of promotional opportunity, exclusion from
decision-making, salary, and so on. See, Robert M.March, ‘Western Manager
and Japanese Boss’, PHP Interest, vol. 8, no. 8, 1 January, 1992, pp. 11–16;
Farid Elashmawi, ‘Japanese Culture Clash in Multicultural Management’, Tokyo
Business Today, vol. 58, no. 2, February, 1990, pp. 36–9.
8 R.Florida and M.Kenny, ‘Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese
Industrial Organization to the US’, American Sociological Review, vol. 56, 1991,
pp. 381–98.
9 Howard V.Perlmutter, ‘Towards Research on and Development of Nations,
Unions and Firms as Worldwide Institutions, in Hans Günter, ed, Transnational
Industrial Relations: The Impact of Multi-National Corporations and Economic
Regionalism on Industrial Relations, 1972, pp. 21–50. According to Perlmutter,
multinationals of polycentric models also have problems, because managers of
local branches conduct business without global integration.
10 Anthony Giddens, Sociology, 1993, p. 545.
11 John Bratton, Japanization at Work: Managerial Studies for the 1990s, 1994,
pp. 3–12.
12 Even academic knowledge is not free from its cultural position. It seems to be
that Japanese academics stress the advantages of the Japanese management style.
For example, Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore, eds, The Japanese Firm: The
Sources of Competitive Strength, 1994; Kazuo Yoshida, Nihongata Keiei System
no Kouzai (Advantages and Disadvantages of the Japanese Management System),
1994 (first published in 1993).
13 N.Oliver and B.Wilkinson, The Japanization of British Industry, 1988.
14 S.Ackroyd et al., ‘The Japanization of British Industry?’, Industrial Relations
Journal, vol. 19, no. 1,1988, pp. 11–23.
15 Tony Elger and Chris Smith, eds, Global Japanization? The Transnational
Transformation of the Labour Process, 1995.
16 N.Oliver and B.Wilkinson, The Japanization of British Industry: New
Developments in the 1990s, 1992.
17 John Bratton, Japanization at Work, 1994.
18 Rodney Clark, The Japanese Company, 1979; Koji Baba also depicts Japanese
society as company-centred, in ‘Gendaisekai to Nihonkaishashugi (The
Contemporary World and the Culture of Japanese Companies)’ in University of
Tokyo, Social Science Institute, ed, Gendai Nihon Shakai-Kadai to Shikaku
(Contemporary Japanese Society—Problems and Perspectives), Tokyo, 1992,
pp. 29–83. The working life of workers in a Japanese auto company was illustrated
by Satoshi Kamata. He worked in the factory as a seasonal worker in the 1970s.
What he observed was that workers’ lives were strictly controlled and overwork
caused accidents. In addition, discussions of quality control were nominal. See
Satoshi Kamata (translated and edited by Tatsuru Akimoto), Japan in the Passing
Lane: An Insider’s Account of Life in a Japanese Auto Factory, 1983. Furthermore,
the film Rising Sun repeatedly explains the ideas of men in Japanese companies.
There are also business handbooks which stress hierarchical Japanese business
customs, such as Diana Rowland, Japanese Business Etiquette: A Practical Guide
to Success with the Japanese, 1993. Oliver and Wilkinson cited an opinion, ‘Faced
with the choice of going on the dole or working like the Japanese, the men so far
would prefer the dole. It’s as simple as that’ (N.Oliver and B.Wilkinson, The
Japanization of British Industry: New Developments in the 1990s, 1992, p. 340).

24
 INTRODUCTION

19 There are about one million local employees working in transnational

manufacturing subsidiaries. Hiroyuki Itami, ‘The Globalization of Japanese Firms’,
in Nigel Campbell and Fred Burton, eds, Japanese Multinationals, 1994, p. 34.
20 JETRO (the Japan External Trade Organisation) reported that the ‘localisation’
of Japanese transnational companies, which means giving more responsibilities
to the local staff members in Japanese transnational companies, is progressing.
Nihon Bouekishinkoukai Kaigaijouhousenta- Zaiou Nikkeikigyou(Seizougyou)
No Keieijittai, Dai 10 Kai Jittaichousahoukoku- (JETRO Overseas Information
Centre, The Practice of Management in Japanese Manufacturing Companies in
Europe—the Tenth Report), 1994. Also see, Carolyn L.Evans, ‘Human Resource
Management in the Japanese Financial Institution Abroad: The Case of the
London Office’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 31, no. 3, September,
1993, pp. 347–64; Vladimir Puick, ‘The Challenges of Globalization: the Strategic
Role of Local Managers in Japanese-owned US Subsidiaries’, in Nigel Campbell
and Fred Burton, eds, Japanese Multinationals: Strategies and Management in
the Global Kaisha, 1994, pp. 218–39.
21 Schon Beecher and Allan Bird, ‘The Best of Both Worlds? Human Resource
Management Practice in US-based Japanese Affiliates’; Schon Beechler and Sully
Taylor, ‘The Transfer of Human Resource Management Systems Overseas: an
Exploratory Study of Japanese American Maquiladoras’; Vagelis Dedoussis, ‘The
Core Workforce—Peripheral Workforce Dichotomy and the Transfer of Japanese
Management Practice’, in Nigel Campbell and Fred Burton, eds, Japanese
Multinationals: Strategies and Management in the Global Kaisha, 1994, pp. 125–
56, pp. 157–85 and pp. 186–217.
22 Statistic Bureau, Japan Statistical YearBook, August, 1998.
23 Paul Gilroy, Black Atlantic, 1993.
24 Robin Cohen, Global Diaspora: An Introduction, 1997, pp. 159–60.
25 Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy,
1988; Thomas P.Rohlen, For Harmony and Strength: Japanese White-Collar
Organization in Anthropological Perspective, 1979 (first published in 1974).
26 The relationship between British culture and the decline of its industry has been
discussed, for example, in Martin Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of
the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980, 1981. This book is widely read in Japan.
27 Edward W.Said, Culture and Imperialism, 1993, p. xxviii.
28 For more on the criticisms of Nihonjinron, see P.N.Dale, The Myth of Japanese
Uniqueness, 1986; Mouer, Ross and Yoshio Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society:
A Study in the Social Construction of Reality, 1986.
29 Roger Goodman, ‘Ideology and Practice in Japan: Towards A Theoretical
Approach’, in Roger Goodman and Kirsten Refsing, Ideology and Practice in
Modern Japan, 1992, p. 11.
30 Catherine Hall, White, Male and Middle Class: Explorations in Feminism and
History, 1992.
31 Tomoko Hamada, ‘Under the Silk Banner: The Japanese Company and its Overseas
Managers’, in Takie Sugiyama Lebra, ed, Japanese Social Organization, 1992.
32 Edward W.Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, 1995.
33 Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological
Enquiry, 1992, p. 11.
34 Steven Kvale has written about the difficulties in interpretation of layered
interviews in his article, ‘Interpretation of the Qualitative Research Interview’,
in Florence J.van Zuuren, Frederic J.Wertz and Bep Mook, eds, Advances in
Qualitative Psychology, 1987.
35 One of the most difficult stages of oral history is establishing the context within
which an interview has taken place. See Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past,
25
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

1988, Chapter 9. See also Matthew B.Miles, and A.Michael Huberman,

Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook, 1994 (2nd edn).
36 For this reason the names of companies have been removed from quotations,
and I have used pseudonyms for individual informants. In order to hide their
identities, some facts have been deliberately changed.
37 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1983.
38 Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson, eds, The Myths We Live By, 1990, p. 2.
Although initial questions about the reliability of memory were prominent in
questioning the use of oral history, since the late 1980s discussions about memories
and narratives have asserted that myth, silence and distorted memories can be
considered as evidence for examining the process by which people construct
their own history; Elizabeth Tonkin, Narrating Our Past: The Social Construction
of Oral History, 1992.
39 Judith Okely and Helen Callaway, Anthropology and Autobiography, 1992, p. xi.
40 The popular image that the Japanese tend not to talk about themselves is
maintained even in an article which discusses oral history. However, interviewing
the Japanese outside Japan for this research may have made them more talkative
than they would have been in Japan. See Hiroko Tomita and K.D.M.Snell,
‘Japanese Oral History and Women’s Historiography’, Oral History, vol. 24,
no. 1, 1996, pp. 88–95. The oral history method has great potential for re-
writing histories of contemporary Japan.
41 The introductory lines are shown in Appendix 3.
42 See Appendix 3.
43 Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’ in Patrick Williams and Laura
Chrisman, eds, Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader, 1993,
p. 392.
44 For Japanese women’s criticisms of Japanese societies in which companies are
central, see Mari Osawa, Kigyo- Chūshin Shakai wo Koete: Gendai Nihon wo
Gender de Yomu (Beyond the Company-centred Society: Reading Contemporary
Japan from Gender Perspectives), 1993.

26
 2
AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

Japanese experience in the City

Now, in the late 1990s, the Japanese economy is suffering serious recession,
and the huge bad debts of Japanese banks are one of the causes of that
recession. The activities in the late 1980s which eventually caused the business
failure of Japanese banks were seen as the sunrise of the power of the ‘yen’ in
the international financial market. However, passionate participation in
international finance has resulted in serious business losses for Japanese banks.
In the City of London—the most vigorous place for international finance
businesses—Japanese bankers and financiers took part in investments and
speculations in the late 1980s. How did Japanese bankers and financiers talk
about their experience of joining the international business in the City of
London? Have they expressed their feelings about the business?
The Japanese banks1 started to participate substantially in international
financial business during the early 1970s. At this time, both in Britain and in
Japan, drastic changes occurred in finance businesses as a result of changes in
the world economy. The City changed in character from a monocultural entity
to a multicultural market, becoming more dependent on the Euro-market
and on increasing numbers of foreign banks.2 In Japan, the 1970s were a
time of direct foreign investment following recovery from the damage of the
Second World War. As a result, Japanese banks began to increase their
subsidiary companies in the City.
In the 1980s, as the biggest capital suppliers in the world, the Japanese
banks, securities companies and insurance companies participated more
enthusiastically in business in the City, following Western banks in not
restricting their business to Japanese customers only. However, as newcomers,
Japanese financiers had difficulties with their business in the City. The
difficulties seemed to be caused by the fact that their purpose in staying in the
City was two-fold: first, the aim of their stay was supporting Japanese
manufacturing companies, which had started their investment in Europe;
second, these Japanese banks participated in the new financial business of
syndicated loans, and they were also involved in UK domestic lending in the
1980s. For the former type of business, Japanese banks had to follow Japanese

27
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

business customs even though they were outside Japan, but for the latter,
Japanese bankers had to learn, adjust to, and enter into City business culture,
which was unfamiliar ground for Japanese financiers.
In the early 1990s, following recession in Japan, Japanese financiers in the
City became less active and lost the larger portion of their investment. For
example, their investment in property turned out to be a failure because of a
fall in market prices. This raised questions as to whether or not Japanese
financiers could be successful in the City as ‘international bankers’, and
whether or not Japanese financiers were bound to adhere to their own Japanese
customers in future business strategies. In general, European economists and
City bankers were of the opinion that as long as Japanese financiers continued
to stick to their own Japanese customers and their business culture, they
would not succeed in international financial business, and emulate the success
story of Japanese manufacturing industries.
This chapter explores the businesses which Japanese bankers and financiers
have joined in the City since the 1970s. As a background to this study, the
first section looks at the City, now developed from a mono to a multicultural
entity. The second section describes how Japanese financial institutions have
developed their business in the City. The third section explores cultural
problems of Japanese international financial business in the City, underlining
the difficulties for the Japanese and the British in these Japanese financial
institutions. Based on interviews, the two different ideas of financial business
found in Japan and Britain, respectively, are compared as basic problems of
their business.

The changing City—from gentlemanly club to multicultural

entity

Despite the emergence of a single European currency, the City of London still
remains the most important financial market in Europe, although its character
has become more globalised. The City of London was once part of the core
of the British Empire and was unrivalled before the First World War. Although
Britain had gradually lost its imperial power by the 1970s, the City has not
only survived as an international financial centre, but its importance in this
arena had increased more than ever by the late 1980s.
Internationalisation of businesses since the late 1980s was not a new
phenomenon in the City. The financial centre has long had two faces; one as
the domestic centre of British finance, the other as the international financial
centre. The City was, historically, at times introverted while at others it was
more international. One of the reasons why the City became more
international in the 1960s and 1970s was the presence of Euro-dollars. In
addition to this, with the encouragement of Margaret Thatcher, who did not
like the ‘gentlemanly elements’ of the City,3 the Conservative government

28
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

liberalised the City. Exchange control was abolished in 1979. In 1986, the
Big Bang desegregated jobbers and brokers, and stock exchange dealings
were subse-quently transacted over the telephone and through electronic
screens.4 This financial revolution allowed more foreign banks to come to
the City. As a result of deregulation, the flourishing international finance in
the City was supported by foreign banks—American banks, European banks,
and then Japanese banks.5 Especially since the 1970s, Japanese banks have
taken over the leading position, in terms of quantity, from American banks
in the international lending market in London.
After the City became more dependent on foreign capital, the City of
London lost its monolithic, gentlemanly character. For example, in the 1980s,
the Accepting Houses Committee was changed to a new organisation called
the British Merchant Banks and Securities Houses Association, which included
foreign securities companies. In addition, the new technology made it easier
for foreign financiers to participate and communicate in the City. Once the
development of communication had changed City people’s means of contact,
it began not to be necessary to meet to talk. Telephones, faxes and computers
could now substitute for face-to-face meetings, which also made it easier for
foreign institutions to join in City business. Economic actors in the City have
now become more diversified, including the non-Western banks and investors.
Change in the City took place not only ethnically: the social backgrounds
of City workers also changed.6 There were now more opportunities for young
people to join financial institutions in the City. New technology also provided
young people with opportunities to gain high salaries as dealers. Furthermore,
numerous women who had gained professional jobs began to participate in
the male world of merchant banking, though there is still segregation in the
workplace according to gender.7
In addition to the change in the social profiles of people, the City of London
changed geographically, expanding outside the ‘Square Mile’. Some financial
firms have moved their back-up offices outside the City to avoid high rental
costs. Architectural change has occurred in the City. Besides new edifices
such as the Lloyd’s building, Japanese banks have contributed to the changing
appearance of the City. In the 1980s, Japanese financial firms supported
redevelopment: for example, the Japanese invested in the Broadgate
development,8 and also invested in the buildings for their financial houses
during the late 1980s, though the presence of the Japanese is scarcely noticeable
in visual images.
American banks introduced different methods of business culture which
made business in the City more competitive. Japanese banks also
introduced their own business methods, though it is questionable whether
these influenced the business culture of the City. They were criticised in the
1980s for lending money at low interest rates. This led to the BIS
regulation, which tried to restrict lending at low interest rates by Japanese
banks.9 The regulation indicates that the Japanese business method of low

29
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

interest rates led European and American banks to conclude that Japanese
banks do business in ‘unfair’ ways.
This book analyses the presence of Japanese financial institutions as one
aspect of the multiculturalisation of financial business in the City which has
occurred since the 1970s. International banking business may be seen as
borderless, but, in fact, it is local in terms of ideas of business, ways of
communication, the relationships between banks and their customers, and in
terms of working lives.

The Japanese financial institutions in the City-from

borrowers to investors

The relationship between the City and Japanese banks has reflected the
historical relations between the two countries over the last 100 years. When
Japan met the West and opened its doors to the country in the late nineteenth
century, Japanese banks came to the City. The first Japanese bank in the City,
Yokohama Specie Bank (which was later called the Bank of Tokyo, and now
Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank) opened an office in 1881, and it became the first
branch of a Japanese bank in the City of London in 1884.10 The main business
of the bank was to finance the export of raw silk and tea which were the
main sources of foreign currency for Japan at that time. The bank was also
the first overseas branch of a Japanese bank.11 Since that time, Japanese banks
have continued their activities in the City for more than 100 years except for
the period during and immediately after the Second World War (1939–52).12
As a latecomer among the modern capitalist countries, the Japanese banks
raised capital from the City during the first stage of its modernisation and
Japan was on the fringe of the areas where the British Empire wanted to invest.
In 1889, the Japanese government issued sterling bonds (£10m) in the City for
the first time.13 In January 1902, the British government concluded the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance to contain Russian expansion in the East. For the Japanese,
the alliance was for the purpose of expanding their power into North China.
In 1902, the bank successfully sold ¥50m Japanese government bonds. During
the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), the bank also sold £107m government bonds
to finance the war.14 After this, the Japanese government raised money to
develop the Japanese economy before the Second World War. At the beginning
of this century, Japan was a country for investment for City business.
Another main reason for Japanese banks staying in the City was to collect
business information. For this purpose, three zaibatsu banks (Mitsubishi, Mitsui,
Sumitomo) opened their branches just after the First World War, and continued
their business until 1939.15 During the Second World War, they were closed,
but London branches reopened between 1952 and 1956. While their offices in
the City were reopened, the main activity of Japanese banks was still to collect
information, and only small numbers of people worked in the branches.

30
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

Until the 1960s, the Japanese were not active in the City, because the
Japanese economy was in a period of recovery from the Second World War.
The country was suffering from lack of capital in the 1950s and the 1960s,
and it had to depend on the Bretton Woods system16 to solve the shortage of
capital. The role of Japanese city banks was carefully to deliver limited capital
provided by the World Bank to promote industry according to the guidance
of the Ministry of Finance. During this period, the purpose of overseas Japanese
banks was to look after trading between Japanese and European companies.
Japanese banks also supported Japanese manufacturing companies who built
factories in Europe.17 These activities outside Japan on behalf of domestic
customers were based on characteristics of the Japanese financial system which
promoted long-term relationships between banks and their customers.
The 1960s was also the period during which the Euro-market was
established, giving Japanese companies the opportunity to raise capital from
the new capital market, thus avoiding the high interest rates involved in lending
capital from banks in Japan. The Japanese government itself issued sterling
bonds for the first time in 50 years in 1963. The Big Four Japanese houses,
namely, Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi (though Yamaichi closed its
business in 1997 and Nikko restructured its business in 1998), opened their
offices in the City in 1964 in order to sell Japanese equities and bonds to
British investors.18
The internationalisation of Japanese banking in the 1970s emerged for
several reasons. First of all, there were increasing international pressures. The
Nixon Shock in 1971 made the Japanese currency stronger against the US
dollar, and the Nixon government stopped the gold convertibility of the US
currency. As a result, the Japanese government was able to allow Japanese
banks to open overseas branches more freely to lend additional funds from
overseas. Table 2.1 shows how rapidly foreign offices of Japanese banks
increased in the 1970s, and Table 2.2 illustrates the increasing number of
Japanese banks in the City. The Japanese government also liberalised the
quantity of direct foreign investment. In 1972, the Ministry of Finance allowed
Japanese banks to lend to non-Japanese entities. In consequence, Japanese banks
became active in internationally-syndicated loans in the 1970s. According to
Düser, between 1970 and 1973, syndicated loans by Japanese banks rapidly
increased from $24m to $3,000m.19 For this international lending in the early
1970s, the Ministry of Finance initiated the founding of three joint banks in
Paris to gain experience of how to join international syndicated loans.20
When the Japanese first started their international lending, they experienced
difficulties, the first of which was the first oil crisis. Mr Miyazawa recalled:
It was the hardest time in my experience when the first oil shock
happened. In 1974, I was in charge of the dealing in London Branch,
and the Japanese banks were not able to lend money in inter-bank
loans, because there was the ‘Japan Premium’, which meant the

31
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Table 2.1 Opening of new bank offices outside Japan

Source: Ministry of Finance, Annual Report of the International Finance Bureau, 1994,
pp. 126–7.

32
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

interest rate was more expensive for Japanese banks. Therefore, we

did not have enough pounds, so we were really afraid that some of
the Japanese banks might collapse. If I look back now, the oil shock
meant that money moved towards oil countries, but the Japanese
government still had to borrow money, and Japanese industry had
to buy oil, therefore, we had difficulties in lending money. It was the
first experience for us.21
The second main reason for coming to the City was regulation within Japan
by Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law (enacted in 1948), which
did not allow the same organisation to handle both banking and securities
business, apart from the issuing of and dealing in public bonds inside Japan.22
Japanese banks rushed to found subsidiary companies in the City in order to
operate their securities business outside Japan.23 Their main securities business
was to underwrite the issue of bonds of Japanese companies in the Euro-
market. However, because of sankyoku goui (consensus between the three
Bureaux of the Ministry of Finance, i.e. the Banking Bureau, the Securities
Bureau and the Insurance Bureau), these subsidiary companies of Japanese
city banks were not able to be leading managers of a syndicated group for
underwriting bonds for Japanese companies in the Euro-market. Therefore,
they acted with UK merchant banks. The purpose of these joint ventures was
to learn about the markets, to join the Euro-market, to attract better
investment clients, and to connect Japanese and international investors.
However, these joint ventures gradually became 100 per cent Japanese capital
companies.
Protected by sankyoku goui, the Big Four securities houses had an
advantage, compared to the subsidiary brokerage companies of Japanese city
banks, in underwriting and issuing bonds in the Euro-market. As a result,
Nomura changed their representative office to the London Branch in 1970.
In 1972, it became a London Branch of Nomura Europe and expanded
throughout Europe. Daiwa took the same path as Nomura. Nikko and
Yamaichi also established subsidiary companies in London between 1972
and 1973 and specialised in the underwriting and brokerage business.

Table 2.2 The year of opening of offices in the City of London

Source: The Japan Centre of International Finance in London.

33
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Although, internationally-syndicated loans and issuing bonds in the Euro-

market were new financial businesses about which Japanese financial firms
in the City had to accumulate knowledge, it was also important to look after
Japanese manufacturing factories established in Europe and to finance the
trading business of Japanese customers. Also, collecting information from
the City was still important for the Japanese financiers.
By the 1980s, pressures from outside made Japan increase its cross-border
financial transactions. In July 1980, the Ministry of Finance underlined the
importance of international banking as an industry in Japan. In December
1980, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was revised to
update activities across borders. However, a huge trade surplus led to the
Plaza Agreement,24 which corrected the undervaluation of the yen and the
overvaluation of the dollar. As a result, the dollar fell rapidly against the yen.
In 1985, the Ministry of Finance allowed banks more freedom and flexibility
overseas to respond to the rising yen so that the international profit of Japanese
banks rose to 15 per cent, though it had been only 10 per cent in the early
1980s.25 The flow of money was from the oil countries to the developing
countries in the 1970s, but after the debt crisis in 1982 the flow of money
was from Japan to the US. In the US, the current account deficit was $130
billion between 1984 and 1988, and Japanese investors continuously bought
40 per cent of US Treasury Bonds.26 In the late 1980s, the US was the world’s
largest debtor nation and Japan had become the largest provider of capital.27
In parallel, Japanese investors were rapidly involved in the whole range of
financial business in the City in the 1980s. A British merchant banker recalled:

Twenty years ago, there was a small number of Japanese financial

corporations…. Now they are doing a whole range of activities…
This was unthinkable twenty years ago. Now a hundred, not a
handful, many banks, either branches or representative offices
including regional banks are in the City. The situation has changed
very dramatically. The banks are doing banking business very actively
here in the London market within the domestic market, not in retail
but in corporate business…. So, you’ve got a huge range of different
activities. Twenty years ago, it was unthinkable.28

The expansion of Japanese financial institutions is noticeable in terms of the

quantity of their business. According to an interview with a Japanese bank
manager, at the peak of the boom in the 1980s, they provided a quarter of
the assets in the UK.29 The Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin showed that
Japanese banks lending to UK residents was 8 per cent in August 1987. In
international loans, the Japanese constituted 38 per cent of all lending in
1987. Japanese banks became the biggest capital provider in the late 1980s
in the City of London as well as in New York.30 We can see that the financial
relations between the two countries had been changing throughout this

34
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

century. Since the early twentieth century, Japanese financial firms had changed
from being borrowers of capital to becoming the largest investors in the City.
Not only the quantity of investment, but also the businesses were much
more diversified than before. Branches of Japanese city banks in the City
were involved in:

• finance for trading;

• lending to Japanese companies in Europe;
• lending to non-Japanese corporations—sovereign loans, non-British
organisations, and British companies;
• lending to local councils in the UK;
• merchant banking; mergers and acquisitions, derivatives (swaps and
options);
• aerospace finance;
• syndicated loans, and
• project finance.31

In addition, currency exchange was also important as a means of profit for

the branches.
These expanded businesses were divided into three categories: business
with Japanese customers, lending to non-Japanese, and strategic business.
According to interviewees, when we looked at business within branches,
business with non-Japanese customers in London nowadays is bigger than
that with Japanese customers; for example, in one bank the rate was 2:1, and
in another bank, 7:3.32 Nevertheless, although the quantity was not large, it
was still important for Japanese banks to look after their Japanese customers
in Europe, after Japanese manufacturing companies rushed to set up their
factories abroad in the 1980s.33
Lending to non-Japanese customers expanded enormously in the 1980s.
Sovereign loans declined after the debt crisis in 1982, but Japanese banks
were still lending money to southern European and Nordic countries. As
for lending to British and European companies, the Japanese banks’ share
of UK domestic corporate finance doubled between 1977 and 1987. In
order to develop new domestic customers, some banks opened
representative offices in Manchester and Birmingham in the late 1980s.
Despite their aim of expanding customers, Japanese banks preferred to
lend to large companies such as those nominated in Footsie. This was
criticised by UK customers, but Japanese banks attempted to be ‘core
banks’ for large companies, emphasising ‘relationship banking’ rather than
‘transaction banking’.34 A Japanese bank manager emphasised that they
were telling their local staff that it was important to have long-term
relationships, even when they were lending money at low interest. They
might not have any profit at the present time but they were thinking of ten
years ahead.35 In other words, despite their intention of being part of

35
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

British financial business, they brought from Japan their ideas of what
banking business should be.
It was difficult to penetrate large UK companies, and Japanese banks were
not patient enough to deal with smaller companies during the recession in
the UK.36 A British senior manager in a Japanese bank said, ‘It was a myth
that Japanese banks supported customers’.37 Japanese banks could not uphold
the myth that Japanese banks would have long-term relationships with British
manufacturing companies. Another British manager commented on the
difficulties of their business:
We have no mandate in the UK or Europe. We should therefore be a
very junior bank. We only have 200 people in the bank in London.
So, everything is against us—in size and position. And people do not
trust the Japanese sometimes in business. People fear them and see
them as too powerful.38
In order to overcome these difficulties, the Japanese conducted these businesses
with a very low-cost margin. Therefore, the Bank for International Settlement
required Japanese banks to have capital equal to 8 per cent of risk-adjusted
assets. This regulation made it difficult for Japanese banks to expand their
lending aggressively.
According to interviews, most lending to non-Japanese business turned
out to be at a loss. The Japanese banks invested in properties in the UK, and
the rapid fall in property prices caused huge bad debts. As for lending to
local councils, the Japanese banks thought it was a safe investment, but it
resulted in other bad debts.39 Project finance also resulted in problem loans—
notably, 39 Japanese banks provided 23 per cent of the total cost for the
Euro-tunnel,40 which resulted in disastrous business failure. All of these
investments, in property, in non-private sectors, and in big projects, were
considered as safe transactions according to Japanese ideas. We can see that
even when Japanese banks lent to non-Japanese clients, they applied ideas of
banking business imported from Japan.
With regard to strategic business, Japanese bankers were not innovative
in new financial business such as swaps and options. In addition, as for
syndicated loans, Japanese banks had difficulty in becoming leading managers
who could gain commissions for arrangements, because they were not part
of European business networks. They had to endure being in a junior position.
Mr Aoyama commented, ‘We are cheap money suppliers, but we are not
respected by Western bankers’.41 As we have seen, Japanese banks were actively
participating in business in the City. Their activities were noticed because of
the amount of money they supplied, but they were preoccupied by their own
ideas of ‘financial business’ rather than gaining new ideas of financial business
in the City.
Not all Japanese business failed in London. In addition to the success of
the development in the Broadgate area, Japanese banks were successful in

36
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

aerospace finance, using the strength of Japanese banks with their huge trade
surpluses in Japan.42 Again, the success was basically founded on the business
networks among Japanese companies. In the Broadgate area, Japanese
construction companies had taken the development work and Japanese banks
rented the buildings as offices. In aerospace finance, the business was led by
Japanese investors. Thus, successful businesses were among Japanese networks
and did not go beyond these networks. In general, Japanese banks had
difficulties in the 1980s: as a manager of a big commercial bank commented,
they did not know how to make a profit in London.43
Another reason for Japanese banks being in London was related to the
requirement from outside, gaiatsu,44 to open the Tokyo market, led by the
American and European bankers and their governments in the 1980s.45 The
Tokyo market had been protected by laws and strong guidance from the
Ministry of Finance. The Bank of England disapproved and stated that it
ought to be a reciprocal matter to open up the Tokyo market as Japanese
banks enjoyed free activities in London. Therefore, gradually, though very
slowly, the Japanese government began to open the Tokyo market in respect
of the liberalisation of interest rates and the relaxing of the boundaries between
banking and securities businesses. However, when the Tokyo market was
made more open, Japanese financial firms had to compete with Western banks
who have more experience in international money markets. Japanese managers
see Tokyo as just a provincial market, even if the scale is big. They said they
were learning in London to prepare for free competition in the Tokyo market
in the future.
Another reason to stay in London was to realise the national policy of
Japan in finance areas. For this reason, in addition to these city banks, some
governmental banks such as the Japan Development Bank or the Japan Import
and Export Bank were in London to bring government policy into effect. For
example, the Japan Development Bank was encouraging British and European
companies to export to Japan in order to reduce trade friction, providing
cheap and long-term capital from postal deposits.46 The bank also issued the
Japanese government’s bond. Another governmental bank, the Export and
Import Bank was also lending money in London to British companies and
projects. Again, the business very much reflected Japanese views of economic
policy.
Securities businesses might have been viewed as more international than
banking businesses. Yet, again, the business relationships were confined to
Japanese investors and Japanese securities companies. In the 1970s, Japanese
companies started to issue bonds through the Euro-market directly without
going through their main banks, and this business expanded greatly in the
1980s. Financial companies of trading companies conducted this business in
Europe with Japanese securities houses.47 As a result, underwriting business
by the Japanese Big Four securities houses rapidly increased in the 1980s, as
Table 2.3 shows. With Japanese investment in the Euro-market increasing

37
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Table 2.3 Evolution and ranking of international bond underwriting activities

between 1986 and 1989 ($m)

Source: Mitsuo Sakurai, Yūro Bondo Shijō to Nihon (Euro Bond Markets and Japan), Toyo
Keizai Shinpō, Tokyo, 1990, p.122.
Names in bold are those of Japanese securities companies.

enormously, as Table 2.4 shows, the other smaller securities companies came
to London, and Nomura and the other Big Four houses gained banking
licences.48 The subsidiary companies of securities houses in London expanded
their business to buying the British government bonds and the equities of
British companies for Japanese investors. A Japanese manager in a Japanese
securities house recalled business in the 1980s:

In the 1980s, the businesses diversified into various currencies, various

types of products, such as futures, options and swaps. At the same
time, Japanese banks developed new areas such as advising mergers
and acquisition of companies. The number of customers also increased
and we had both Japanese and European investors. At the same time,
each subsidiary company in New York, or Europe became more
independent, and our business expanded.49

Banks also participated in underwriting business using subsidiary companies,50

but, as in the 1970s, because of sankyoku goui, these subsidiary companies
had to develop business with non-Japanese clients and depended on local
staff, which was not as easy as business with Japanese customers.
Japanese life insurance companies also became big institutional investors
in the world of finance. They also opened representative offices, or subsidiary
companies in Europe, and they invested in properties and US treasury bonds,
which resulted in huge losses. The merit for insurance companies in Europe
was low tax, and more information about European business.

38
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

Table 2.4 Japanese banks licensed by the Bank of England according to the
Banking Act

However, insurance companies could not use inter-bank loans which were
prohibited by sankyoku goui. Therefore they had to do business using their
own currency, so the exchange rate was decisive. If the yen became expensive
they lost profit.51 The high price of the yen in the late 1980s and early 1990s
led to such a loss of profit, and investment started to shrink. In addition,
investment in property turned out to be disastrous. Life insurance companies
as well as other Japanese financial institutions experienced difficulties in
businesses in the City.
In addition, trading companies and big manufacturing companies had their
own financial subsidiary companies for issuing bonds and also investing their
profits in the capital market. According to the lists of members of the Japanese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the United Kingdom, for example,
there are financial subsidiary companies of Komatsu and Brother, which are
both subsidiary companies of Japanese manufacturing companies. Financial
arms of credit companies, for example JCB International, also came to the
City.52
Non-life insurance companies were also active in the 1980s, although in
the 1950s and 1960s these companies only sent their representatives to the
City to get reinsurance from Lloyd’s underwriters through insurance brokers.
In the 1960s their main business was to insure the Japanese companies’ trading
transportation. In the 1970s and 1980s, they expanded their business to insure
the buildings and facilities of Japanese direct investment in Europe. Recently,
they have also insured new technology, or the environmental cost for Japanese
companies in Europe. They have gradually acquired big funds, and have
themselves begun to reinsure risks as underwriters, like Lloyd’s, in London.
However, since the late 1980s, their investments and reinsurance have been

39
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

unsuccessful. They have lost a huge amount of investment and they now
think it difficult to make a profit in that area. A Japanese manager said that
the main profit of Japanese non-life insurance business still comes from
premiums on their policies in Japan. So, if the Tokyo market is opened up to
insurance business, Japanese insurance companies would be unable to compete
with foreign insurance companies who could offer policies with lower
premiums.
As we have seen, in the late 1980s, there were various types of Japanese
financial institutions coming to the City of London and getting involved in
various types of financial business. A Japanese bank manager recalled:

Nowadays the share of Japanese banks in the market has expanded

enormously compared with the 1970s. We cannot say it is now easier
to do business here, because there are different types of business we
have to cover.53

In spite of this awareness of the difficulties, Japanese financial firms in London

have aggressively attempted to enter various sectors of business in the City,
including more profitable areas such as mergers and acquisitions, fund
management, derivatives and becoming the leading manager in internationally-
syndicated loans.54
In February 1992, the Tokyo market crashed and the bubble economy
come to an end in Japan. The decline in the stock market was nearly 50 per
cent from December 1989. This caused a reduction of the capital of Japanese
banks, which meant that they had greater difficulty in pursuing the BIS
regulation. Officially, 21 big Japanese banks had bad loans of 13.7 trillion
yen at the end of September 1993,55 but an unofficial estimate puts their bad
bonds at three times this figure. The decline in issuing bonds on the Euro-
market by Japanese companies caused serious damage to Japanese securities
houses in the City. As Table 2.5 shows, the underwriting of the bonds by
Japanese securities companies declined rapidly in the 1990s.
Japanese banks felt they had failed in the UK domestic financial market.
UK domestic loans and big-project finance such as the Euro-tunnel and Euro-
Disney had resulted in bad debts. The fall in property prices also hit Japanese
banks. In the 1990s, Japanese financial firms in Europe have become less
active in their transactions. The number of Japanese banks in London has
declined. Some regional banks have already returned to Japan. Smaller
securities companies are known to have been taken over by larger banks in
Japan. Some companies made local staff redundant, which shocked British
staff who had believed in the myth of lifetime employment in Japanese
companies.
There were different responses to the difficulties of doing business in the
City. According to an analysis by a Japanese research centre, Japanese banking
is to some extent withdrawing from Europe and transferring to Asia.56 On

40
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

Table 2.5 Bookrunners of all international bonds, 1995 (March 23 1995)

Source: Euro Week, no. 395, 24 March 1995.

Names in bold are those of Japanese securities companies.

the other hand, some big banks and securities companies are positively
preparing for the next expansion. For example, Mitsubishi Bank and the
Bank of Tokyo merged in May 1996. The president of Nomura Europe
described the company’s global strategy. He declared that Nomura Europe
would become more free from controls from Tokyo and become more
European-based. He also suggested that this global strategy become the model
for all overseas Nomura.57 Larger financial institutions are considering
becoming global financial institutions. As Table 2.6 shows, nine out of ten of
the largest banks in the world are still Japanese. At the same time, in the City,
the Japanese banks are still trying to penetrate UK domestic business.
Japanese investors are now careful about their investment. Life insurance
companies are trying to invest in European governments and local authorities,
which they consider to be safer clients. They now invest using the yen in
order to avoid the uncertainty of the exchange rate, and they choose low-risk
business. Fund management was a new area for Japanese banks to expand
their business, with the advantage of access to Japanese investors. However,
Japanese financiers had not gained enough knowledge of the business.

41
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Table 2.6 World’s top ten banks

Source: The Economist, 27 April 1996, p. 6.

Therefore, they were keen to employ skilled local fund managers and to have
Japanese fund managers working alongside them. Big non-life insurance
companies are now trying to form mutual reinsurance networks in Europe
with European insurance companies, though Tokyo head offices consider
that business abroad makes a deficit and loses the profit they have gained
inside Japan.
Foreign pressure is still an important factor in pushing Japanese financiers
to become competitive with Western financiers in the Tokyo market. A British
fund manager who had responsibility for investment in Tokyo was very
enthusiastic about using Japanese pension funds in Tokyo: for example, postal
savings which are now controlled by the Japanese government.58 In April
1993, the Financial System Reform Act was passed in the Diet in Japan to
lessen the boundaries between banking and the securities business. This
allowed banks and securities firms to participate in other business segments
such as banking, securities and trusts through subsidiaries in which they had
a majority equity stake. In July 1993, the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan and the No¯rinchu¯kin Bank founded subsidiary
companies in Japan for securities business. In October, the Bank of Tokyo,
Nomura Securities, Daiwa Securities, Nikko Securities, and Yamaichi
Securities also founded subsidiary companies for trust funds in Japan. In
November, the Sumitomo Trust Bank and the Mitsubishi Trust Bank founded
subsidiary companies for the securities business.59 Japanese bankers prepared
to open the Tokyo market and sought to strengthen Japanese financial firms
in order to compete with Anglo-American and other European financiers.
Despite these efforts, Japanese banks in the late 1990s are now suffering
through their huge debts, and Yamaichi have gone out of business, while
Nikko Securities decided to carry out their investment business on their own
and to team up with an American investment bank. There are now differences
between the larger banks, almost all of which came to London, which have
developed all kinds of businesses and specialised banks that have chosen

42
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

businesses which they believe can be advantageous. In other words, larger

banks merged and are trying to become ‘global’ banks, and smaller or regional
financial firms are specialising their business within Japan. In the late 1980s,
Japanese bankers and financiers thought it time that all Japanese financial
firms had branches in major financial centres such as the City of London and
Wall Street in order to internationalise their businesses. The Japanese financial
system is now being restructured.

Cultural barriers in business practice

In spite of the observable presence of Japanese banks in the late 1980s,
Japanese bankers remained something of a mystery in the eyes of City bankers.
How have Japanese financiers been viewed in the City? How did Japanese
bankers perceive their business in the City? As we have seen in the previous
section, although Japanese bankers and financiers participated passionately
in business in the City and contributed to the financial world in terms of
quantity, if we look at the quality of their business, they were less successful
than their image suggested. A British senior manager commented:
I’m not sure if the Japanese have been successful in this financial
field generally. They have been very successful internationally in
manufacturing, but I don’t think the existing system would allow
success in the future… Yes, I have to say this, though I don’t want
necessarily to criticise the Japanese. Japanese bankers have made
disastrous decisions. Japanese financial systems have been disastrous
over the last five years. If you look at the amount of money they lent
in Japan, that has been lost. They made mistakes like that. They
made enormous mistakes abroad. Lending to the wrong people,
lending money on bad investments. Paying for too many things,
getting involved in things they haven’t quite understood, which have
gone wrong. This cost a lot of money.60
The difficulty for Japanese managers was, first of all, that they were strangers
to Western bankers, even in the 1980s. Their business behaviour was seen as
peculiar by Western bankers, as the next extract from a book on the financial
business in the 1980s indicates:
There was always something cryptic in their methods. The phone
would ring at your desk and on the other end of the line would be
Mr Yamamoto, whom you had seen off the previous night in a
drunken haze, asking: ‘How Now Rong Bond?’ This was the Japanese
way of asking for the price of thirty-year US government bonds.
‘Ninety-six bid,’ you’d say.
‘I buy $100 million’, he’d say, then hang up. A friend for life.61

43
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

In this example, the Japanese dealer is depicted as one who cannot pronounce
the word ‘long’ properly. It is common among Japanese to pronounce ‘l’ as
‘r’. In addition, probably because of limited English, he stopped speaking
without proper goodbyes. His English and his manners on the phone were
unsuitable for communicating with Anglo-American bankers. He was a
stranger to this author. Furthermore, Japanese bankers were not only strangers
seen through Western bankers’ eyes: they were in practice isolated from Anglo-
American business networks:
They, partly because it’s the Japanese way, do not want to be different.
They would like to do the same thing. Partly, I think, because the
markets have been rather strange and unfamiliar to them. And,
therefore, they were a bit like a herd of cattle. They wanted to stick
together. So, they’ve done all things together.62
This merchant banker also pointed out that Japanese bankers failed to create
the world-wide networks that British bankers had established. The Japanese
inclination to stick together among themselves was also recognised by their
local staff:
We have to be seen as good as, if not better than, the bank which
came from the same region in Japan… We have not lost as much
money as some of the American banks, (because)…we do business
with a daughter company, or cousin Japanese company.63
Japanese financial firms were then the biggest foreign investors in the City.
However, Dūser commented that Japanese banks played a minor part in the
international financial market and were not strong in the on-shore market.
He pointed out that Japanese banks had few opportunities to develop new
financial business because of their strong relations with Japanese companies.64
The expansion of their business had been dependent on the expansion of
Japanese manufacturing industry and the surplus of their export. Bill Emmott
also pointed out that Japanese securities companies issued bonds only for
Japanese companies and sold them only to Japanese investors in the Euro-
market.65 It can be said that Japanese financial business was segregated from
international, or non-Japanese business. Dūser suggested that if Japanese banks
want to be successful they will have to become more localised.66 It is
questionable whether Japanese banks will become more international or will
choose to strengthen their connections with Japanese companies.67
However, British City commentators judge that it would be very difficult
to globalise the Japanese securities business. A merchant banker, who helped
Japanese companies in the Euro-market in the 1980s, said it was good that
the Japanese were not keen to invest in Europe now. According to him, once
the Japanese had decided to buy, they bought even if it had become a bad
buy. So the Japanese repeatedly lost their investment.68 Another British
merchant banker said that global business must be based on the global

44
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

networks of banking specialists, but that the Japanese always make their
decisions in their head offices in Tokyo. Therefore, they cannot do their
transactions in time. He thinks that this is a decisive defect of Japanese
international business.69 Other City commentators said that Japanese banks
bought non-fixed repayment bonds all at the same time, which inevitably
caused the price to fall.70 A Japanese woman, who worked for an American
investment bank and sold bad property bonds to Japanese investors, told me
that the Japanese had such huge reserves in the late 1980s that they had to
invest money in the City with insufficient knowledge. The Japanese were
then sold bad bonds by the Americans. She commented that Japanese financiers
were ‘fools’ during the boom in the 1980s.71
Why did Japanese bankers and financiers not learn from the City bankers?
Apart from the fact that decision-making was done in Tokyo, they had different
ideas about finance. The financial system in Japan is different from that of
Britain. Japanese banks have close relationships between banks and other
companies and they form kigyōshūdan, or companies’ groups.72 Each group
contains one city bank, one trust bank, one life insurance company, one casualty
insurance company, one trading company, plus manufacturing companies. One
of the most characteristic features of kigyōshūdan is cross-shareholdings, which
bind the companies very closely into a group. This system arose after the
dissolution of the zaibatsu group to protect against a take-over. The groups
also have regular presidential meetings, exchanging board members. A bank
is usually the largest lender to companies in a group. In addition to this, the
Ministry of Finance’s guidance is strong, and the close ties between the Ministry
of Finance and banks are called gosōsendan hōshiki, in other words, armed
convoys. A core bank of each group is called a ‘main bank’. Although there is
now discussion about whether or not the kigyo¯shu¯dan system is declining,
the ideology of relationships between banks and manufacturing companies is
still strong among bankers.73 The fact that Japanese companies have raised
money from capital markets without going to their banks is an indication that
the relationship between banking and manufacturing industry has become
weaker, but the old ideology of the Japanese financial system remains
unchanged and persists in these Japanese bankers’ ideas, which are regarded
critically by local staff and City bankers alike.
In contrast to the ideology of Japanese financiers, American and British
financial institutions have influence as investors or fund managers on other
companies. British financial firms in the 1960s and 1970s have been criticised
by British left-wingers for being more interested in short-term profit than in
supplying long-term credit for domestic manufacturing industry.74 On the
other hand, British financiers are proud of their financial skills: making
international connections, quick decisions by individual managers, high risk
and high return, and so on. Mr Chambers, a senior manager in a Japanese
bank said, ‘The Japanese do not know what “finance for finance” is. I do not
understand why they are here and what they are wanting.’75 On the other

45
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

hand, Japanese bankers say that banking business should support the
production of goods, and the whole society. Therefore, for Japanese banking
managers, long-term relationships with customers, and supporting
manufacturing industry is more important than pursuing profit. However,
international banking business by Japanese institutions is seen as unskilled
by British and American financiers. Japanese financial firms have come to
the City of London and Europe with different ideas of finance from those of
City financiers.
Although Japanese financial firms had different methods of business, the
Japanese government suggested in 1980, as we have seen, that the
internationalisation of Japanese business was necessary for the future. In
fact, Japanese banks have been important members of international syndicated
loans and the Euro-market since the 1970s. However, Japanese financial
institutions have been considered important only as money suppliers, and it
is questionable whether they could become more ‘international’ as financiers
and bankers in the City.

Japanese responses to the criticisms in the interviews

Having experienced such difficulties in the City as newcomers, how were

Japanese bankers and financiers viewed in their business experiences and
global strategies? They have been looked on as ‘Others’. How do the Japanese
respond to these Western criticisms in their subjective views? Their views
differed according to whether they worked for banks or securities companies,
according to age and their responsibilities in the City. Bank managers were
stuck more to the image of the Japanese post-war banking system; in other
words, the main bank system. Older generations also recalled the period
when the main bank system worked well. Managers in securities companies
were less nostalgic about the post-war system in Japan. Younger generations
see the City as a function rather than viewing it as a symbol of the Western
banking system. There responses are categorised into three types overall.

Type 1: Learning from the West

The first kind of response was that the Japanese should learn from Western
business:
The Japanese have to adjust to London or New York. New York is
an originator of new products, but Tokyo is far behind in terms of
new products. I have a lot to learn in London, and New York.76
Their sense of learning was emphasised as a cultural tradition of the Japanese.
Japanese bank managers were proud of their attitude towards learning.

46
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

Our attitude is to learn from others. This is our tradition from the
Meiji Restoration…. If we are considering only the size of assets,
Japanese banks are big, and maybe nine out of ten of the largest
banks in the world are Japanese. The Japanese economy has now
expanded incredibly, which is also due to the currency exchange rate.
Now, Japanese banks are very big in terms of quantity. However, if
we look at quality, they are less profitable…. This means a narrower
profit margin and a larger sales volume. As for financial skills, or the
development of new banking business, Japanese banks are not
excellent and not respected. We are still at the learning stage. We are
running after Western banks.77

This manager contrasted Japanese and Western banks using the catch-phrase
datsua-nyūō, which means that Japan has to join the Western world by ridding
itself of being an Asian country, by catching up with Western technology and
skills. He has a world map on which the West is in an advanced position. In
his opinion it is important for Japanese bankers to learn and to imitate Western
business styles in order to adjust to business in the City. This type of manager
thinks that Japanese banking cannot survive without changing its business
methods and customers. According to such managers, international business
is essential for survival following the rapid growth in post-war Japan:
In the 1970s business became much more difficult. Economic growth
rates were low. And interest rates were deregulated, so business
became more competitive. In the 1970s and the early 1980s,
syndicated loans such as sovereign loans were our main business. In
the 1980s, we began to do business with local companies, and we
were involved in project finance.78

He described the development of Japanese finance as that of international

finance businesses. Another bank manager clearly stated that the post-war
economy, which depended on manufacturing industry, was changing:

Japanese banks were cheap money suppliers. But I think that period
has finished. If we are still just cheap money suppliers, we cannot
survive when the Japanese economy loses its power. We have to create
innovative power. I think we are still behind. Japanese banks have to
be more competitive with blue-chip banks in the City. We do not
need to overwhelm them, but my task is to lead Japanese banks to be
competitive. That’s also the task of all Japanese banks. We have an
advantage as Japanese. We have good human resources training,
and long-term investment views. We think relationships with
customers are important. We are different from short-run, deal-
oriented American banks, different from managers who gain a big
bonus and leave companies.79

47
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

In his way of looking at things, he still emphasised Japanese ideas of business

as a means of creating innovative ideas to penetrate City business. They are
trying to enter the core of the international finance business by learning new
skills and new knowledge, and they perceive this is exactly the tradition of
Japanese business.

Type 2: Aggressive perseverance of Japanese ways in the City

However, the second type of response showed sentiments different from those
expressed by the first type of manager. They claimed that the City is not a
place of business dominated by English business culture.

The City, now, only has its own tradition and past legacy. The City
will survive, but British houses will not remain at all. Most of them
are now being taken over or becoming weak. There are many English
merchant banks, but now they are called ‘museums’… They are not
innovative and not in the forefront of knowledge and skills needed
at the frontier. The City is extremely valuable, but English houses
are declining in the long run. In reality, there are American houses,
Japanese and continental banks in the City….80

For these Japanese managers, the City of London is nowadays a multicultural

entity dispossessed by the British bankers, and the Japanese are contributing
to the City by their own business methods. For example, a young female
Japanese manager said, ‘I have no feeling about the City. The City is an
inhuman place and just a function for money trading’.81 A senior manager
also asserted that Japanese banks had contributed to the City in terms of
quantity of assets, and in terms of Japanese business methods, i.e. long-term
relationships with low interest rates, and that therefore Japanese banks should
be respected. He talked about the strategies of Japanese banks. According to
him, there would only be two or three Japanese banks which will survive as
‘global banks’; therefore, other banks will return to Japan. As the 1990s are
a hard time for Japanese banks, so now, he said, is the time for investing for
the next stage of growth.
Their attitudes may be seen as arrogant in that they say they already have
power in international finance businesses in terms of quantity of capital. For
them, it is not time for the Japanese to learn from the West and follow their
ideas; it is time for Japanese financiers to contribute and to compete as a
power equal to the West.

Type 3: Withdrawal to the Japanese economy

A withdrawal from the City was the third response. A Japanese manager
who was dealing with bad debts in the City remarked:

48
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

The financial business should be based on manufacturing industry.

It is important to improve on new financial skills, but I do not think
it is good to sell and to buy bonds too much.82

These Japanese managers are critical of business in the City and look back
regretfully at the banking system in Japan during the post-war period. These
people are not enthusiastic about getting further involved with the business
of international finance which had caused troubled loans for Japanese banks.
Even Japanese investors, who are finding opportunities for investment in
Europe said:

Japanese companies only have an advantage within Japan. There

are no advantages away from Japan. It is impossible for our company
to have a better reputation in Britain than in Japan. It is certain that
the foundation of business for Japanese companies must be within
Japan.83

Japanese managers of this type think that as long as the Japanese economy is
fine they can survive in Japanese networks without joining Western networks.
As to competition with American and European banks, a manager in a
securities house commented:

When we dealt with Japanese customers, they trusted us to look

after them always. We had high liabilities with them. When they
issued bonds they trusted the big Japanese securities houses. When
Japanese investors bought US treasury bonds, they trusted us.84

Bankers in zaibatsu banks also said that dealing abroad was only 10 or 15
per cent of their total business, so business in Europe was not as important as
that within Japan. In general, the global strategies of Japanese financial firms
are centred in Tokyo. Even new financial businessmen see Tokyo as the centre
for their global expansion. However, the Tokyo market has not
internationalised rapidly because of regulation by the government. A senior
manager in a securities company said:

The Japanese company’s system is not conducive to innovation. I

think the strategies will differ according to each company’s decision.
Some companies will stick to Japan, and others will expand globally,
but the base is in Japan.85
In the 1980s, Japanese investors bought US treasury bonds,
and the rapid rise of the yen caused a huge deficit for Japanese
investors. Therefore, they want to invest in the yen. So, we can
sell products through the Tokyo head offices. As long as Japanese
investors are the main customers, we will not leave Japanese ways

49
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

of business. Even foreign banks have employed the Japanese who

previously worked together with us. We can gain information from
these Japanese who are now working in foreign banks. As long as
we deal with Japanese products, we have merit. We can explain
the Japanese political and historical situation to foreign investors.86

This type of manager keeps strong ethnic identities and business networks
among the Japanese. For them, it is enough if they can protect themselves
and it is too dangerous to expand their business abroad. The Japanese,
according to them, can have an independent economic area on their own.
These three types of narrative illustrate different views of their future
business strategies in the City. However, if we look at the quotations, we can
see there are some common feelings running through them. All of these
Japanese managers expressed difficulties in communicating with and
penetrating the Western financial business world.
This difficult situation made these Japanese financiers think that they were
in essence ‘Japanese’. The Japanese financiers emphasised their cultural
identities to explain the difficulties they had encountered while conducting
their business in the City. They are creating an ‘imagined community’87 of
Japan, which is ‘unique’ and whose cultural values are incompatible with
Western values. They said that Japanese society has different values, a different
life style, a different work ethic and a different business culture.
These Japanese bankers and financiers involved in business in the City of
London are caught between two business cultures; one British, the other
Japanese. The Japanese bankers can be criticised for their behaviour towards,
and poor communication skills with, Western business culture. Yet it is
impossible to separate their cultural identities from their business activities.
The Japanese may remain in the City, but unless they either change their
cultural identities, or Western business people change their way of looking at
Japanese bankers, the Japanese financiers will be the ‘Others’ for ever.
International banking business has an image of being borderless by dint of
the newest technology. However, the new international finance business is
very culturally bound up with national interests. In fact, economic activities
are based on emotional views. The Japanese financiers look at their business
from the point of view of their own cultural identity. Their activities are
supported by their motivation. Both Japanese and British bankers are looking
at each other from their own perspectives. British bankers are looking at the
Tokyo market which is still protected by the linkage of the government with
financial firms. Western bankers are trying to push the Japanese government
to open up the Japanese market. However, Japanese bankers look at London
as an international market where they want to compete with Western bankers,
and envisage the day when they will open up the domestic Tokyo market.
As we have seen, the City has changed its character dramatically since the
1970s. There are still images of the City as an English entity, but it has been

50
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

important for the City to attract these foreign houses in order to continue to
be the centre of the Euro-markets. Because of these factors, since the 1970s,
Japanese banks and other financial institutions have developed their business
using their trade surplus. They were especially active in the late 1980s in
various activities, but their investments resulted in bad debts. This caused
some Japanese financiers to withdraw.
City bankers and European economists analysed the problems which the
Japanese experienced in terms of cultural problems. They concluded that the
reasons for failure were, first, that the Japanese did not trust their local staff
and controlled their business from Tokyo head offices; and second, that they
would only deal with Japanese clients.
Japanese bankers admitted the difficulties that they experienced in their
business in the City. Although bigger institutions remain enthusiastic to
encroach further, the perceptions of individual Japanese members of
international financial business are various. Some think that they have
themselves to be ‘internationalised’ and to learn from the West, but others
think they must stick to their own business culture and to their own customers
within Japan. Both types of managers highlighted cultural barriers in doing
business in the City, and from their viewpoint, the City bankers continued to
regard the Japanese as ‘Others’.
International financial business may be considered as one of the most
borderless of all businesses, but in fact the stories of these financiers’
experiences tell us that international financial business continues to be
culturally bound in late capitalism. However, to sum up, the existence of
different ideas of financial business suggests that the City of London is no
longer a monocultural British entity, but a multicultural place with plural
values in business.

Notes
1 According to Suzuki, there are seven different types of Japanese banks: 1)
commercial banks for short-term finance; 2) long-term credit banks and trust
banks for long-term credit; 3) a specialised foreign exchange bank and finance
for trading, the Bank of Tokyo; 4) sogo banks and shinkin banks for small
business; 5) the financial institution for agriculture, the No¯rinchukin Bank; 6)
securities companies which are considered different from banks in Japan; 7)
government financial institutions such as the Japan Development Bank and the
Export and Import Bank of Japan. Yoshio Suzuki, ed, The Japanese Financial
System, 1987, p. 163. In addition, the Central Bank (the Bank of Japan) also has
a London office. This research also included financiers in life insurance, non-life
insurance, and other financial companies, since Japanese managers of all of these
firms have networks in the City.
2 For the changing culture of the City, see Paul Thompson and Cathy Courtney,
City Lives: Changing Voice of British Finance, 1996; Paul Thompson, ‘The Pyrrhic
Victory of Gentlemanly Capitalism: The Financial Elite of the City of London
1945–90’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 32(3), 1997, pp. 283–304.

51
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

3 P.J.Cain and A.G.Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914–

90, 1993, pp. 291–6. It is questionable whether or not the City has ‘survived’
the financial revolution. There is criticism of the policy of the Thatcher
government. See Jerry Coakley and Laurence Harris, ‘Financial Globalisation
and Deregulation’, in Jonathan Michie, ed, The Economic Legacy 1979–92,
1992, pp. 37–57.
4 For financial revolution in the 1980s, see Adrean Hamilton, The Financial
Revolution, 1986.
5 Jerry Coakley, ‘London as an International Financial Centre’, in Leslie Budd and
Sam Whimster, eds, Global Finance and Urban Living: A Study of Metropolitan
Change, 1992, pp. 73–95. However, it is questionable whether internationalisation
which invited foreign banks encouraged competitiveness. Jerry Coakley and
Laurence Harris, ‘Financial Globalisation and Deregulation’, in Jonathan Michie
ed, The Economic Legacy, 1979–92, 1992, pp. 45–9. Coakley and Harris argued
that foreign banks coming to London did not encourage the competitiveness of
the City of London.
6 Sam Whimster, ‘Yuppies: A Keyword of the 1980s’, in Leslie Budd and Sam
Whimster, eds, Global Finance and Urban Living: A Study of Metropolitan
Change, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 312–32.
7 Linda McDowell, Capita; Culture: Gender at Work in the City, 1997.
8 J.Thorsten Dūser, International Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European
Perspective, 1990, p. 121.
9 In 1987, Bank for International Settlements, which functions as a central bank
for all the central banks in the world, required every bank to have 8 per cent of
assets as capital by 1992.
10 The Bank of Tokyo merged with Mitsubishi Bank in May 1996.
11 Source: Japan Centre of International Finance in London.
12 The Bank of Tokyo reopened its office in 1952, which was the first branch of
any Japanese banks in the City after the Second World War.
13 Source: Japan Centre of International Finance in London.
14 Ibid. In an interview, a Japanese manager described how his great-grandfather
had issued government bonds for the war.
15 ‘Japanese Banks in London’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, November,
1987, p. 518.
16 In July 1944, there was a conference (the official title was the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference) at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire, USA.
The conference discussed the post-war organisation of international monetary
relations, and decided to establish the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
17 The first factory of a Japanese company in Europe was YKK which was built in
the UK in 1966. Gabriel Hawawini and Michael Schill, ‘The Japanese Presence
in the European Financial Service Sector: Historic Perspective and Future
Prospects’, presented at the Japanese Direct Investment in a Unifying Europe:
Impacts on Japan and the European Community Conference, INSEAD Euro-
Asia Centre Fontainbleau, 26–27 June 1992, p. 5.
18 Interview 79, with a locally hired Japanese male manager (at a securities company),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
19 J.Thorsten Dūser, International Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European
Perspective, 1990, p.94.
20 The Ministry of Finance supported three groups of banks as pilot firms. The
branches of these banks concentrated on business supporting trading, and these
joint banks were involved in syndicated loans to the Third World and helping
Japanese manufacturing companies abroad (Interview 81).
52
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

21 Interview 89, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
22 This is similar to the Glass-Steagal Act of 1933 in the USA.
23 The Banks of Tokyo, Sanwa, Sumitomo, Fuji, Mitsui, Tokai, Dai-ichi Kangin,
The Industrial Bank of Japan and The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan founded
their securities subsidiary companies.
24 A meeting was held at the Plaza Hotel in New York in September 1985 by the
Group of Five—the USA, the UK, Japan, France and Germany—to establish
international currency stability.
25 J.Thorsten Dūser, International Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European
Perspective,1990, p. 100.
26 Bill Emmott, Japan’s Global Reach, 1993, p. 146.
27 Richard M.Levich, ‘Introduction and overviews’ in R.Sato, R.M.Levich and Rama
V.Ramachandram, eds, Japan, Europe and International Financial Markets, 1994,
p. 2.
28 Interview 42, with a British merchant banker, interviewed in London in 1994.
29 Interview 38, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
30 ‘Japanese Banks in London’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, November,
1987, pp. 518–24.
31 Yasuyuki Hamada and Takashi Sawada, Hogin London Shiten: Kinyu Saizensen
no Jjitsuzo (The London Branches of Japanese Banks: Practice in the Forefront
of Finance), 1992, pp. 45–120.
32 Interview 44, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994; Interview 84, with a Japanese male manager (at
a branch of a bank), in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
33 J.Thorsten Dūser, International Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European
Perspective, 1990, p. 12. For example, Nissan opened their factory in 1984. The
reasons why these companies founded factories in Europe were to avoid high
labour costs inside Japan, the strength of the yen, and difficulties in export.
34 Yasuyuki Hamada and Takashi Sawada, Hogin London Shiten: Kinyu Saizensen
no Jitsuzo (The London Branches of Japanese Banks: Practice in the Forefront
of Finance), 1992, p. 51. ‘Relationship banking’ is a method of banking which
focuses on long-term relationships between borrowers and banks rather than
pursuing short-term profit. Japanese bankers think this brings more profit to the
bank in the long run.
35 Interview without recording, with a senior Japanese male manager, in his 50s, in
1995.
36 Interview 41, with a City specialist on Japanese business.
37 Interview 44, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
38 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
39 Yasuyuki Hamada and Takashi Sawada, Hogin London Shiten: Kinyu Saizensen
no Jitsuzo (The London Branches of Japanese Banks: Practice in the Forefront
of Finance), 1992, pp. 66–7.
40 Ibid., pp. 144–7.
41 Interview 9, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
42 In aerospace financing, airlines in Europe bought aeroplanes from the makers,
sold them to lease companies which were mainly Japanese and borrowed them
again from the leasing companies. The leasing companies sold bonds to other

53
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

smaller investors. Normally, the makers were American and British. The aerospace
team in Japanese companies connected a maker, a buyer, and investors. These
new businesses in Japanese banks were all intended to reduce the huge surplus in
Japan in the late 1980s. Aerospace finance was a successful financial business
for Japanese banks. At first sight, it looks as if it was a non-Japanese business.
Yet, the investors were Japanese and the final decisions for the transactions were
decided in their Tokyo head offices. And the Japanese preferred to lend aeroplanes
to big national flag carriers.
43 Interview 16, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
44 For gaiatsu (foreign pressures) on Japanese financial markets, see J.Robert Brown,
Jr., Opening Japan’s Financial Markets, 1994.
45 Interview 39, with a Japanese male manager (at a non-life insurance company),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
46 Postal deposit comprised the largest savings by individual depositors in Japan.
Its management is controlled by the government. It was a great advantage for
post-war Japan to control its limited capital to encourage targeted industries.
47 In this area, European investment banks and British banks could not become
leading underwriters. A manager in a British merchant bank said non-Japanese
investment banks could underwrite only a few per cent when Japanese companies
issued bonds. He said there were strong barriers to non-Japanese investment
banks.
48 Although there were about 100 banks, securities companies and insurance
companies, only 36 gained authorisation from the Bank of England according to
The Banking Act 1987: The Banking Coordination (Second Council Directive)
Regulations 1992. Although many banks rushed to come to London, these banks
were authorised by the Bank of England to accept deposits in the UK. Other
Japanese banks, which were not authorised by the Bank of England and could
not accept deposits, had limits on their business.
49 Interview 79, with a locally hired Japanese male manager (at a securities company),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
50 In the 1980s, six commercial banks (Daiwa, Mitsubishi, Taiyo-Kobe, Saitama,
Kyowa, Hokkaido-takushoku), six trust banks (Sumitomo, Yasuda, Toyo, Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, Chuo), one long-term bank (Nihon Saiken ginko), and No¯rinchukin,
founded subsidiary companies in London.
51 For example, if $1=100 yen, and the interest was 6 per cent, the Japanese could
expect 106 yen as a return, but when the yen fell to 90 yen, they could only get
95 yen. Therefore, they had lost 5 yen. The rise of the yen caused problems for
Japanese institutional investors.
52 Sarah Fairbairn, ed, Japanese Business in the United Kingdom, 1993.
53 Interview 89, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
54 Interview 9, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
55 ‘The Banks Feel the Pain’, The Banker, January, 1994, p. 49.
56 Minoru Nakamura and Haluhiro Tsutsui (Nomura Research Institute),
‘Diversification of International Strategies into Three in the 1990s: How Much
Should Localisation be Advanced’, Kinū Zaisei Jijō (Financial Affairs), 1 June,
1992, pp. 26–34.
57 ‘Taking Japan out of Nomura International’, Financial Times, 14 April, 1994,
p. 30.
58 Interview 57, with a British fund manager specialising in Japanese business
interviewed in London in 1994. A postal savings investment system is operated
54
 AMBITION AND WITHDRAWAL

by the Postal Saving Bureau, under which deposits up to 3 million yen had been
free of tax. The tax-free advantage was abolished in 1988, but by then there
were some 300 million deposits valued at 286 trillion yen, mostly held in ten-
year deposits. The postal savings system is still important for individuals’ deposits,
and the capital is used for long-term lending.
59 ‘The Banks Feel the Pain’, The Banker, January, 1994, pp. 52–5.
60 Interview 36, with a British male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
61 Michael Lewes, Money Culture, 1989, p. 183.
62 Interview 42, with a British merchant banker interviewed in London in 1994.
63 Interview 58, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
64 J.Thorsten Du¯ser, International Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European
Perspective, 1990, pp. 137–8.
65 Bill Emmott, Japan’s Global Reach: The Influences, Strategies and Weakness of
Japan’s Multinational Companies, 1992, pp. 151–60.
66 J.Thorsten Dūser, International Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European
Perspective, 1990, p. 139.
67 Gabriel Hawawini and Michael Schill, The Japanese Presence in the European
Financial Service Sector: Historic Perspective and Future Prospects’, presented at
the Japanese Direct Investment in a Unifying Europe: Impacts on Japan and the
European Community Conference, INSEAD Euro-Asia Centre Fontainbleau, 26–
7 June 1992.
68 Interview 76, with a British merchant banker, interviewed in London in 1994.
69 Interview 42, with a British merchant banker, interviewed in London in 1994.
70 Interviews 40, 41, with City specialists on Japanese business.
71 Interview 45, a locally hired Japanese woman, who later moved to an American
investment bank, in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
72 There are 6 big kigyoshūdan: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyō (Fuji Group),
Sanwa and Daiichikangin groups. They originated from the zaibatsu group before
the Second World War.
73 Takeo Hoshi, The Economic Role of Corporate Grouping and the Main Bank
System’, in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore, The Japanese Firm: The Sources
of Competitive Strength, 1994, pp. 285–309.
74 For criticisms of the City from the left wing, see, for example, Anthony Hilton,
City within a State: A Portrait of Britain’s Financial World, 1987.
75 Interview 36, with a British male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
76 Interview 85, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
77 Interview 9, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
78 Interview 84, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
79 Interview 85, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
80 Interview 6, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
81 Interview 11, with a Japanese female manager (at a subsidiary company of a
bank), in her 20s, interviewed in London in 1992.
82 Interview 81, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1995.

55
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

83 Interview 80, with a Japanese male manager (at an insurance company), in his
40s, interviewed in London in 1995.
84 Interview 91, with a Japanese male manager (at a securities company), in his
50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
85 Interview 83, with a British merchant banker, interviewed in London in 1995.
86 Interview 86, with a Japanese male manager (at a securities company), in his
50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
87 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism, 1983.

56
 3
THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL
COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

Ethnicity is the sense of belonging to a group who share the same cultural
heritages, language and values. In each ethnic community, there are people
who strongly hold to their ethnic identity, and others who, having a less strong
sense of ethnicity, more readily mingle with the host community. In the Japanese
transnational community in the City, there are complex relational maps of
ethnic identities of different groups. People living in the core of each community,
British merchant bankers in the financial community of the City of London,
Japanese expatriate managers in the Japanese business community within the
City, have a strong sense of their ethnicity. The sense of ethnicity is considered
to be based on what kind of culture they have or to which cultural group they
belong. The cultural identities of the interviewees—especially the Japanese
respondents—are shaped by the relationships between Japanese expatriates
and settlers, and the location of interviewees in Europe and their relationship
with Japanese society. In this chapter, the outlook of the Japanese financial
business community and its different groups of people there are investigated.

Outlook of the Japanese business community in the City

The number of Japanese in the UK who were registered at the Japanese
Embassy in London, including all family members, on the 1st of October
1992 was 54,415 (male 26,803; female 27,612). Their purpose of stay is
classified in Table 3.1.
This table shows that about 60 per cent of Japanese people in the UK were
company staff and family. Numerically, students came next. There are very
few self-employed and permanent residents in the UK.1 I therefore concluded
that the Japanese community is centred around large companies and
government and people belonging to these organisations.2
According to the survey by the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)
in London, most Japanese manufacturing companies in Europe are in the
UK3 because the English language is relatively familiar to the Japanese
compared with other European languages. In addition to this, the Thatcher

57
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Table 3.1 Japanese people in the UK

Source: Japanese Embassy in Britain, Zaieihoujin no Jittaichousa ni Tsuite (Survey of

Japanese in the UK), 1993.

government encouraged Japanese companies to invest in the UK. Thus, the

Japanese financial business community in the City has become the centre of
Japanese business networks in Europe. The London branches of Japanese
financial companies are also their business head offices for Europe.
The Japanese bankers and financiers I interviewed were those who were
at the centre of the Japanese community in this country and in Europe.
However, Japanese expatriate managers do not represent all the Japanese in
this country, such as Japanese settlers who have found job opportunities arising
from the needs of this expatriate community. Employment agencies, news
agencies, estate agencies, private education, and removal firms, and so on,
are all based around this community.
Besides the expatriates and settlers, there are also students who attend
English-language schools and, at the same time, work in these companies or
in shops as part-time workers. Although there are not many Japanese
permanent residents in this country, there are more and more Japanese students
who hope to become permanent residents though this is severely restricted
by the Immigration Acts in British law.
There are also huge numbers of Japanese tourists in Britain. As you near
Piccadilly Circus, you will see many Japanese tourists with bags of souvenirs
which they have bought in Harrod’s, Burberry’s, Scotch House, and so on. In
February and March, and in the summer vacation, many university students
can be found enjoying themselves travelling in Europe in groups. Female office
workers also enjoy travelling with friends in London, visiting famous museums,
shops, theatres, on one-day excursions to Stratford-on-Avon, and so on. To
them, these places and activities represent the ‘Englishness’, in which they find
an ideal lifestyle. In fact, tourist pamphlets in Japan exaggerate the middle-

58
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

Table 3.2 Japanese manufacturing companies in Europe in 1993

Source: Nihon Bouekishinkoukai Kaigaijouhousenta,—Zaiou Nikkeikigyou (Seizougyou) no

Keieijittai, Dai 9 kai Jittaichousahoukoku—(JETRO Overseas Information Centre, The Practice of
Management in Japanese Manufacturing Companies in Europe—the Ninth Report), 1993, p. 7.

class lifestyle in Britain such as gardening, afternoon tea and the country life
depicted in English landscapes. There are lots of package tours to see such
images. The Japanese are not from a former British Empire colony, but the
images of Englishness are an ideal for these tourists. They might later become
students in English-language schools or British universities.
Although the Japanese have no precise geographical location for their
community, they are connected with each other personally, and one of their
geographical centres is the Japanese school in London, previously in North
London and now in West Acton. Japanese company men and their families
therefore tend to live in North or West London.4 Japanese shops and
restaurants are near these people’s houses, and the biggest Japanese
supermarket, Yaohan, which supplies Japanese food and books, was built in
North London in 1993. Sogō was a Japanese department store in Piccadilly
Circus, one of the centres of tourism in London, though the department store
was closed because of the recent recession within Japan and the Japanese
business community in London. Around Piccadilly Circus there are also
Japanese restaurants, food shops, bookstores, and travel service offices. In
addition to this, famous English shops in Regent Street now have Japanese
shop assistants for Japanese customers. Many Japanese families enjoy buying
Wedgwood china. The third, and perhaps most important centre for the
Japanese community, is the City of London. There are many Japanese banks,
securities houses and insurance companies in the City of London. Around
these Japanese companies there are also Japanese restaurants, job agencies,
interpreting and translation companies, and so on.
Inside this Japanese community in London the delegates and their families
enjoy luxurious lives compared to Japanese settlers. The families of Japanese
company men are provided with comfortable houses by their company welfare
systems. Their children either go to the Japanese school in London or to the
local school, though some families send their children to boarding schools or
Oxbridge to give their children the ‘best’ education in Britain. Their wives

59
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

send their children to school by car, and enjoy flower arranging with other
Japanese wives living nearby, and they shop together. Wives help each other
in their everyday lives, having close contact. Children attend English lessons
with other Japanese children. These people have close relations with each
other. They express the opinion that their lives are better than they were in
Japan, as companies pay double salaries to those working abroad, and houses
are provided by the companies.
When we look at the relationships between the Japanese community and
British society, the Japanese have always had difficulties. Following Japan’s
economic global expansion in the 1980s, the sudden increase in the numbers
of Japanese people in Britain may have been part of the problem. This core of
people in the Japanese community established some organisations to promote
a better and more respectable community in London. The President of the
Japan Club, which is the principal organisation for the Japanese in London,
commented thus:

Last year, I had to attend the entrance and graduation ceremonies of

the Japanese School in London. I had to make speeches. I had to
manage the Japanese Clinic (the advice centre for health for Japanese
in London), and so on. My work for the Japanese Community has
now reduced a bit, but I spent a tenth of my time on this last year.5

We may call the present period ‘the age of migrations’, or ‘the age of travelling’
in the globalised era. The Japanese community in London may also be
considered as a migrant community in Britain and Europe. However, there
are some unique characteristics of the community. First, most minority
communities in this country are composed of people from the ex-colonies,
whereas the Japanese community is not from a country formerly colonised
by the West. Second, the core people of the community are mainly company
men and their families who came to this country along with the expansion of
the Japanese economy in the world. The core people came as a group and
returned after several years. They came to this country and moved freely all
over the world, but they have always gone back to Japan.
Although there are some individuals who give up lifetime employment in
Japanese financial companies and move to Western companies, they are still
exceptional. Around these key men there are students, women and people
who have come here on their own. They tend to stay here longer than do the
key people. Migration has been based on the international division of labour.
However, the Japanese began to go abroad because Japan became the biggest
capital supplier. The movement of the Japanese throughout the world was
based on the economic prosperity of Japan. Even the increasing number of
students who study in Europe was based on the strength of the yen in the
world economy in the 1980s. After the abolition of the fixed link with the US
dollar between 1971 and 1973, the Japanese began to enjoy going abroad. In

60
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

the early 1970s, 1 dollar was 360yen, 1 pound sterling was about 1,000yen,
but in the late 1980s, 1 dollar was around 100 yen and 1 pound was about
150 to 170 yen when the yen was at its highest value. When the exchange
rate was controlled before the Nixon Shock, individual Japanese could bring
in only $500. Now Japanese bring much more money over from Japan. More
ordinary people enjoy travelling and living in Europe, and all over the world.
As a result, a new type of community has emerged in this country, which is
culturally outside the Western world. Japan was once an enemy of the UK
during the Second World War, and especially citizens who were prisoners during
the war are not satisfied with what they believe to be an insufficient apology
from Japan. However, Japan is now powerful in terms of economy. The
President of the Japan Club said, ‘I was keen on doing charity activities. I did
as much as I could. This year is a difficult time, because of the 50 years’ memorial
of the VJ Day’. Although the Japanese community is now expanding in terms
of population and influence, it is still difficult for Japanese business people to
be understood and to communicate within the UK. When commemorating VJ
Day in Britain, the media were selective, showing cunning and harsh images
of the Japanese. Mr Hoshino said how difficult it was when he first came to
Britain for his business assignment in this country in the 1950s.
At that time there were few Japanese. There were only the Bank of
Tokyo, Fuji Bank, Mitsubishi Bank and Sumitomo Bank, I think.
Daiichi Bank and Kangyo Bank had only a representative office with
only one representative.6 They were not doing any business. In
addition to this, I strongly felt anti-Japanese feelings. For example,
there was an exhibition of Japanese cruel behaviour during World
War Two. And, there was a cinema hoarding about ill treatment of
war prisoners by Japanese soldiers. Nowadays, there are many
advertisements of Japanese products around Piccadilly Circus, but
at that time there was a big board of a picture in which a Japanese
soldier raised his big Japanese sword to threaten a sitting British
soldier. I think there was no Japanese businessman who was not
blamed by the British people in pubs…. I remember that I met a boy
when I was walking in England. The boy said straight out that the
Japanese beheaded British soldiers.7
Surrounded by such an environment after the Second World War, the Japanese
had great difficulty at first in reopening their businesses in the UK and in
Europe, but gradually they were admitted as a powerful economic community.
Nevertheless, culturally, they still have difficulties. One recent article in a
newspaper suggested that British images of Japanese are still hostile.8
These characteristics make for unique relations between people within the
Japanese financial community in Britain. The financial people I interviewed
are part of these core Japanese, but have received less notice than the Japanese
in manufacturing companies. However, these financial companies were

61
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

recognised and attracted British staff who wanted to work in the City of
London, providing new job opportunities in the 1980s.

Types of financial institutions and size of companies

The number of Japanese financial institutions peaked in early 1992. Following

the boom in the late 1980s, even smaller regional banks within Japan felt
they had to have offices in London to catch up with the newest information.
The number of Japanese financial institutions in the early 1990s is shown in
Table 3.3.
In the late 1980s, as a result of the increasing number and size of banks,
the number of employees increased enormously. According to Nihon Keizai
Shinbun (The Japan Economist Newspaper), the number of employees in
Japanese banks in 1990 was 5,402, while British staff numbered 4,815 (89.1
per cent). According to Hamada and Sawada, there were about 3,000 local
staff for the 24 commercial banks in 1991.9 According to the supervisor of
the Bank of England, branches of Japanese banks employed around 3,000, of
whom over 600 were Japanese.10 The British Bankers’ Association keeps
statistics of employees of banks. According to these statistics, which only
record employees of Japanese banks from 1990, there were 3,700 in 1994.11
These figures do not include some Japanese financial institutions which do
not have a banking licence in the City. We may conclude that British or
European employees in Japanese banks probably number between 4,000 and
5,000, and there has been a drop in the number as a result of the recession of
the Japanese economy in the 1990s.
There are four types of Japanese financial institution. First, there are
branches of Japanese financial companies. All large Japanese city banks have
London branches, belonging to Japanese banks in Japan. Therefore, they do
not need to produce annual reports of their activities in London. Usually the
managing directors are ‘global’ members of the Board of Directors in Japan,
though they appear to hold much higher positions than they had in Japan.12
The second type comprises subsidiary companies which are companies
established in this country. They, therefore, have to submit annual reports in
Table 3.3 Number of Japanese financial institutions
in London

Source: ‘A List of Members of the Japanese

Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the UK’,
Japanese Business in the UK, 1993.

62
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

conformity with the laws in the UK. All Japanese city banks have subsidiary
banks for securities business or other new banking business such as derivatives
and leasing business. Securities houses also have subsidiary companies in this
country doing banking business. The Japanese interviewees said that these
subsidiary companies have more autonomy than branches, and more local
staff. However, the subsidiary companies also have managing directors from
Japan, and the majority of executive board members are Japanese.13 The
third type comprises representative offices. They are small in size, about five
to ten people conducting less business, and collecting information about
business in the City. Most life insurance companies have representative offices
in the City. When other financial companies first came to the City, they started
by establishing representative offices. The fourth type of organisation is made
up of joint companies which are backed by both Japanese and British
companies. In the early period when Japanese banks first participated in
international banking business, they set up joint ventures with British merchant
banks, to learn how to do international business. Now they are 100 per cent
Japanese-owned subsidiary companies, but it is still considered useful for
Japanese financiers to have joint companies in new areas for Japanese banks
such as fund management.
The size of the companies is difficult to define precisely, because these
Japanese financial companies are nominally divided into several companies
such as banks, securities companies, fund management companies, companies
to deal with gilts, and so on. Some informants counted the number of the
staff of the whole group of companies, and others counted the number in
each company. Numbers of employees, from information gained from
interviews, are shown in Table 3.4. Usually each big city bank has about 200
to 300 employees. Each regional bank has 30 to 40 employees. Non-life
insurance companies are smaller in terms of the number of employees than
city banks. Insurance companies, lease companies and some government banks
have small representative offices in London.
The number of Japanese personnel sent from Japan is decreasing because
of the recent recession in Japan, and because it is more expensive to send
them from Japan to London than to employ locally. The ratio of Japanese to
British is lower in large companies than smaller companies. Subsidiary
companies have fewer Japanese personnel compared to branch companies.
Certainly, a minimum of Japanese staff is always required, such as managing
directors, deputy managing directors and some senior managers for each
section. When companies expanded, they employed more local staff, with
the result that the Japanese proportion decreased. Subsidiary companies are
doing more new business which Japanese staff do not know well, so there are
more local staff.14
Human relations differ according to the size of companies. Bigger
companies have more organisation by management, whereas there is more
personal interaction between Japanese and local staff in smaller companies.

63
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Table 3.4 The numbers of Japanese bank staff in the City

Sources: The numbers in this table are based on interviews conducted in 1991–2 and 1994–5.15

The present managing director of a city bank who had also been in London
in the early 1970s described the change following the expansion:
As a social event, we have a Christmas party every year, but personal
relationships are not the same as they were. Now, we do not have
enough time, and human relationships are very weak. Our bank
expanded and now there are many who do not know each other
though we are working in this London branch building together. It
was not like this before. We did not have more than 40 or 50 people,
so everyone was on first-name terms. It’s the same as in any
organisation. Even in Japan, in the small companies, we even know
each other’s families, but the bigger the company becomes, the more
difficult it is to know each other.16
As this extract describes, the number of employees in branches of Japanese
banks expanded rapidly in the mid-1980s. A large city bank, in terms of
employees, had about 250 employees and, of those, 30 to 40 were Japanese.
The economic boom in London and the expansion of Japanese banking
business increased the staff in Japanese banks, and changed relationships
between the Japanese and British staff. In the smaller organisations, Japanese
staff and British staff kept more personal contacts.

Portraits of the interviewees

When we work in international workplaces, it is often difficult to know the

social backgrounds of people from different societies. Every difficulty tends
to reduce to ethnic differences. Ascribing all cultural dissonance to ethnicity,

64
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

should be avoided—there are also differences of gender and class to be found

in the workplace. This section, therefore, examines the backgrounds of the
interviewees before moving to the analysis of their narratives.

Japanese male managers

Japanese businessmen have not been studied as much as Japanese companies.
T.P.Rohlen described the lives and work of Japanese bankers in the early
1970s. He tried to explain how Japanese bankers were trained to work ‘for
harmony’ within their companies.17 Although Rohlen depicted post-war
Japanese company men as passive and hierarchical, they had to adjust to
new environments after the rapid economic growth. From the 1970s, they
had to ‘go international’ more than before. This caused identity problems,
and Merry White explained how difficult it was for Japanese businessmen,
who had worked abroad in a Western atmosphere, to readjust to the Japanese
environment.18 Hamada, in her study of Japanese managers in the USA,
explained that the difficulty arose from their strong perception of core and
peripheral relations between head offices and subsidiary companies abroad.19
Kosaku Yoshino thought that the problems of Japanese businessmen lay in
their culturally nationalistic identity, examining the discourses of the Japanese
business leaders in contemporary Japan in articles in newspapers.20 In this
section, I focus on the following sociological factors: family, education and
the career paths of Japanese male managers in financial firms, in order to
look at how these factors are related to their identities in later chapters.
Forty-seven Japanese businessmen in financial firms in London cannot be
representative of all Japanese businessmen in Japan, but they can offer pointers
to certain types of Japanese banker and financier, that is, a stereotypical élite
of company men—especially men in banks—with more conservative ideas
than men in manufacturing companies.
The core of employees in Japanese financial companies are Japanese male
managers, sent from their head offices in Japan. The senior managers usually
stay in the City for three to five years and then return to Japan for promotion.
Managing directors of the companies have experience of working abroad
more than once, and often for more than ten years, returning from time to
time to Japan. Therefore, British staff are aware that Japanese bosses are
always changing. Younger managers stay longer in the City to gain knowledge
of the new financial business.
These managers had a better quality of life when they were growing up
than the average Japanese person. Their life stories reveal that they had happy
family lives and more leisure activities. Mr Yamada, who was in his forties,
said that when he was a child they used to go to the cinema and had dinners
in restaurants once a month. This was at a time when Japan had still not
recovered from the war. So, he said that his childhood had been much better
than most peoples’.

65
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

The parents of Japanese male managers had been supportive during their
education and at critical times of decision-making in their lives. Most of the male
managers said they had had few conflicts with their parents except for some
whose fathers had been teachers in provincial areas. They said their fathers
encouraged them to be independent and competitive. Almost all of them said
that their mothers had been housewives. However, some whose parents had
been in agriculture said their mothers’ work had been important for their
household economy. But in families with fathers who had worked for companies
in big cities, mothers had concentrated on housework and child care.
These Japanese male managers were able to go to private secondary schools
or top high schools in their region, which helped them to be successful in
their entrance examinations to universities. It was taken for granted for some
bank managers from urban middle class families that they would go to
prestigious universities, because their fathers, brothers and male relatives had
also graduated from such universities. Some managers who were born in the
countryside were sent to a big city for their secondary education in order to
be successful in their university entrance examinations. Some had private
tutors to get them through their examinations.
As Table 3.5 shows, most of their fathers worked for large companies,
including banks. One of the managers interviewed was from a noble family
of the pre-war period, and two of them said their ancestors were big landlords
in the pre-war period. Although these people were originally upper class,
most of the male managers were from middle-class backgrounds, though
class distinction is not clear-cut in post-war Japan. In general, the existence
of class is rarely discussed among the Japanese, compared to how it is discussed
in Britain.
The managers interviewed graduated from the most prestigious universities
in Japan. The percentage of Tokyo University graduates among these male

Table 3.5 Occupation of fathers of Japanese male managers

Sources: Interviews.

66
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

managers was extremely high: 11 of the 47 male managers interviewed. Among

17 managing directors in Japanese institutions in London, six were from
Tokyo University; three were from Keio and Waseda, and the others were
from other national universities. No Japanese expatriate bank managers were
from more ‘popular’ private universities or national universities in the
countryside which are not considered as prestigious as the universities from
which they had graduated.
Managers in securities houses came from less competitive universities than
bank managers. Some Japanese managers from provincial universities went
to regional banks where their universities were located. Some companies have
strong links with particular universities. For example, Japanese managers in
the Sumitomo group22 whom I interviewed were all from Osaka University.
All the informants except one in Tokio Marine & Fire Company were
graduates of Hitotsubashi University. In one city bank, a large proportion of
the interviewees were from Keio University. I noticed a link between Keio
University and this particular bank. Some people from less competitive
universities gained entry to their companies through their relatives’ connections
with the banks, not through university connections.
Some of these managers commented that it was unusual to be promoted
to the position of senior manager if one was from a less competitive university.
If managers were from Tokyo, Kyoto, or other competitive national
universities, or competitive private universities such as Keio and Waseda,
employees felt they had a good chance of promotion. Mr Yamada explained
this feeling:
It is difficult to explain: to sum up, if people are of equal capabilities,
someone who graduated from Tokyo University is definitely promoted
first. Yes, if there are the same salaried employees, who get the same
results, if there are only these three candidates for one position,
basically the one from Tokyo University is promoted. So, it is
advantageous to graduate from Tokyo University in this sense.
If the three are all equal, why is the one from Tokyo promoted first?
Because, all the executives are from Tokyo University. In this bank
there is friction between the Tokyo University Group and the Keio
University Group. Basically the Tokyo University group has more
power.23
This sense of rank makes Japanese male managers who are not from
prestigious universities feel that it is difficult to climb the career ladder. For
example, Mr Hoshino said he had wanted to enter the Bank of Japan, the
Central Bank, when he graduated from a high school, but in the end he was
unable to find employment there. Then he went to a provincial university
and paid his fees by working as a private tutor for high-school students.
After he graduated from the university he entered a big sōgō shōsha, a trading

67
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

company, and then he eventually became an executive of the company.

He said:

I joined this trading company by accident, but I think that I was

lucky to have gained the opportunity to work in this trading company.
For example, if I had joined the Bank of Japan, it is a workplace
with strong discrimination by educational background. For example,
someone who graduated from a provincial high school probably
would have had to work in a very low position. I would like to
thank them for having refused me at that time. I would feel horrified
if I had been accepted by the bank. What a workplace it is!24
I interviewed a manager who graduated from a high school. His position as
chief cashier was that of assistant manager, and was almost the same as the
locally hired Japanese women. He praised the equality of promotion in the
bank, but after the recording he said that if possible he wanted to clarify the
criteria for promotion in the bank. He did not show unhappiness with the
system of promotion, but said that he would have liked to make promotion
fair. On the other hand, I heard an ironic tale about managers who were
ironing bank notes in the Bank of Japan though they had graduated from
Tokyo University, because they did not have enough ability for the practice
of business. The managers, who were not graduates from prestigious
universities such as Tokyo University, circulated stories of incompetent Tokyo
University graduates in prestigious banks.
The sense of university ranking and the companies for which these men
are working, are strongly connected in their ideas, especially among employees
in the city banks. Mr Honda recalled his experience of finding a job in his
final year at university.

I visited azaibatsu Bank for job hunting, and I was told, ‘Mr Honda,
you are very good, but you have come to this company a bit late. We
have already chosen the number, which we have decided, of students
from Hitotsubashi, but there might be a vacancy, so would you please
stand by’. Then, I visited this bank which had strong relations with
the government on the way home. If I wanted to work for a bank, I
should choose this bank, I thought. Nowadays this bank is a favourite
bank for students who seek jobs, but even at that time, this bank
was very popular with students at universities such as Tokyo
University or Hitotsubashi. This bank was not popular for students
at private universities such as Nihon University, or Housei University.
If students at Tokyo University voted for the most favourable bank,
I think this bank would be the top bank. I had been looking at senior
students’ job-hunting, and found that the students who joined this
bank were excellent. So, I thought if I wanted to work for a bank I
preferred this bank. This is the reason why I visited this bank. I

68
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

visited this bank once, and I thought it would be difficult to be chosen

by the bank. However, after one week I received a phone call from
this bank to come to the bank with a certificate of my results at
university. Then I brought it and I met executives of the bank and I
was told in that meeting, ‘OK. Come and join our bank’. Then, I
immediately phoned that zaibatsu, the personnel of which had asked
me to stand by, and said I was chosen by this bank. Then they said,
‘Congratulations!’ People in the zaibatsu Bank must have also known
that this is more difficult than the zaibatsu bank for students to join.
Probably, they had not thought that I would be chosen by this bank!25

We can see how this bank manager who was refused by the zaibatsu bank
was delighted to be chosen by a more prestigious government-related bank.
His pride was saved and satisfied by his success in joining this bank.
Conversely, students who thought their position in education was not so
good as that of top-ranking students chose less prestigious companies. Mr
Koike commented:
If I speak frankly, there were about 30 students in the same class
under the same tutor, and four of them said that they were joining
Mitsubishi Bank, then four went to Fuji Bank, two to Sumitomo
Bank, and so on. I was the only one who chose this bank. If there
were three or four in the same bank from the same class, I thought,
I did not want to compete with them again in the workplace as well
as at university. I wanted to join a bank which no classmates joined….
I graduated from Keio, which is OK, but I did not graduate from
Tokyo University. And my mark was not so good that I could have
gained a gold watch. And I did not think that I was extraordinarily
clever. As such an ordinary person I wanted to try and work hard,
but I wanted to work at a place where I was evaluated fairly, not
according to university status or family network.26

He said his choice had been right and that he was now enjoying his senior
position in his bank in London. These Japanese managers chose the ‘right
banks’ according to ‘their positions’ at university. As these extracts show, the
bank managers were extraordinarily sensitive about their locations in their
imaginary hierarchical ranking.
People who went to securities houses said they had chosen the companies
because they wanted to be ‘original’. They did not say that they had chosen
their companies according to rank. Mr Ito who was in his forties and graduated
from Keio University said, ‘I wanted to choose a job which reflected trends in
the contemporary world, so I chose the securities business…. I did not think
that working for a bank would suit me’. Mr Tanaka who was in his fifties in
a securities house said, ‘I tried to get into medical school, or to a pharmacy
department of a national university, but I could not. So, I studied politics at

69
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Waseda’. For him, going to a private university was a second choice. When
he tried to find a job in his fourth year at university, he did not pass an
entrance examination to join a newspaper agency, though he had thought he
could. Then he missed visiting other companies. His only possibility was to
join a securities house. The only one among the Japanese interviewees who
changed his job after working for a company for years was working for a
securities company. He first worked for a shipbuilding company, but that
closed, and he had to find another job. Then he joined a securities firm. As
far as these interviewees are concerned, the educational background of
securities company men is relatively less competitive than that of banking
people. In addition, people who worked for city banks said it had not been
considered as good to work for securities firms until recently. This can be
contrasted with the images of securities businesses in Britain where banking
business is not so tied to the authority of the government as in Japan. Mr
Yamada in his forties, a graduates of Tokyo University and working for a
city bank, explained:

The image of securities firms was really bad 20 years ago. To be

frank, securities business is stockbroking. What they are doing is in
fact the same as before, though their images have changed
considerably. Securities companies were in the world to get profit by
cheating people before. The social image of securities firms was
completely different from now. So, I thought I had to choose a city
bank rather than securities houses. My father also recommended
that I join a bank rather than a securities firm.27

For the people in non-life insurance companies, the Tokio Marine & Fire
Insurance Company28 was the best in this area. So people who joined this
company were happy when they were accepted. In contrast, a managing
director in a small non-life insurance company said that as he was one of the
few graduates from Tokyo University in his company, he was expected to be
a top executive in the company from the beginning of his career. A male
manager in an insurance company emphasised that the reason he had joined
the company was ‘by accident’. He had not wanted to work when he was in
his final year at the Law Department of Kyoto University. He took his law
examinations but failed and therefore had to find a job.29 He emphasised
that it was by chance that he had joined the company.
Although interviewees did not tell me directly, I found that they had a
strong sense of the ranking of financial companies. Although this ranking is
very subjective, they showed a sense that government-related banks such as
the Bank of Japan and the Industrial Bank of Japan are in the highest rank.
Then come the zaibatsu banks such as the Mitsui Bank or Mitsubishi Bank.
Among non-life insurance companies, the position of Tokio Marine & Fire
Insurance Company, which is a member of the Mitsubishi corporate group,

70
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

is extremely high. Then came other city banks. Securities companies, regional
banks and trading companies are considered as low-ranking.
Through recruitment, the ranking of companies and universities knit
together, and students and recruiters of companies choose their companies
and new employees alongside this ranking process. This process emphasises
even more the ranking of universities.
This sense of rank can still be seen now in a list which is published by
cramming schools. Table 3.6 shows the ranking list of universities constructed
by a cramming school in Japan.
I must emphasise these figures are not to be viewed as purely objective,
but the cramming school which drew up this table said that the figures are
based on mock examinations and the examination results of about 470,000
students. The numbers show the relative values of universities. The ranks are
shown in great detail by these figures. The book said that students refer to
the figures and the results of mock exams when they decide which university’s
exam to take. According to the book, universities are ranked by these figures,
not by their characteristics.
The Japanese male managers whom I interviewed had a strong sense of
ranking except for one: Mr Ogata said that he never asked about the
educational and family background of other people. This manager, who is
from the ‘baby boom’30 generation and experienced the student revolts around
1970, said: ‘I am interested in a person’s job and his or her opinions or way
of life. I have never asked about the past or how they entered their companies’.
However, his statement was an exception among those of my informants.
The book also gives the image that every high-school student can gain
access to these competitive universities and the image that Japan is a
meritocratic society. People judge students’ competitiveness according to the
university from which they graduated. Japanese male managers, especially
managers in Japanese banks, had been successful in these competitions. They
referred to their universities when they talked about who they were. Most
male managers went to private or national high schools from which most
students go to high-ranking universities. Then, they could gain entrance to
these competitive universities through their high schools. For example, Mr
Aoyama and Mr Shimazu, senior managers of city banks, said that most
classmates at their private high schools took the exam for Tokyo University,
so they also took it.
Ronald Dore and Mari Sako point out that 40 per cent of students in
Japan go to university, and gain general knowledge, but in Britain more
students go into vocational education. 31 However, these managers’
conversations show that what is of importance is which department of
which university they graduated from rather than the fact they went to
university. Dore and Sako argue that Japanese education is based on more
open competition, but as far as the interviews with this Japanese business
élite are concerned, it appears that the reason they could enter into these

71
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Table 3.6 Ranking of universities for entrance exams decided by a cramming school

Source: Yoyogi Zeminaru ed, Anata wa Kono Seiseki de Gōkaku Dekiru:Nyūshi Nani Ranking
Hyō(You Can Pass the Exam If You Reach These Marks: Ranking Table of Difficulty of Entrance
Exams), 1994.

competitive universities was through the advantages they had from their
family background and high-school education. Opportunities for
education in post-war Japan have been looked on as egalitarian as has the
education system which was introduced by the American Occupation
forces, but the interviews suggest that there were, in practice, narrow paths
for access to better universities in terms of reputation and better
opportunities. By means of these paths, most of my informants went to
universities which were ranked as over 65 in the list published by the
cramming school.

72
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

The sense of ranking was strong and is still strong even among younger
generations. It was what motivated their competitiveness. I would like to
quote Mr Honda’s words again to show how he looked at things by ranking.
He said, ‘In this subsidiary company, there are 28 Japanese expatriates. I
think my English is the seventeenth best’. How could he rank his English
ability so accurately?
The sense of ranking is of overriding importance because employment of
these people is generally for a lifetime. All the Japanese male interviewees in
banks and insurance companies joined their companies just after they had
graduated from their universities, although securities companies are not so
rigid about lifetime employment. For instance, as I mentioned before, one
manager in his thirties joined a securities company after the former ship-
building company in which he worked went bankrupt. A managing director
of a securities company said he tried to employ staff who were not new
graduates.
Most Japanese managers studied law or economics at university. They
commented that they are not from engineering or science departments at
university, so if they went into the manufacturing industry their work would
be limited to personnel management or administration, whereas if they went
into banks their possibilities would be much better.
Japanese male managers chose their university departments as paths to
companies, but some of them emphasised that they had enjoyed their studies
at university very much and thought that they could continue their interest in
their jobs. Mr Tomita studied where each industry ought to be developed in
Japan, in order to ascertain the conditions for each industry’s development
potential. In Japan, industry was strongly guided by governments, local
authorities, banks and corporate groups. Therefore it was important to study
the theories of such policies. He joined the bank because of the reputation
the bank had for being good at research. These Japanese managers are proud
of their knowledge of their subjects. A senior Japanese manager in a bank
said that he was proud of his knowledge of law and the French language
which he had studied at university. Although for Japanese managers specific
subjects at university are related to their particular selection of jobs, choice
of university is more related to images of the university as a step on the
course of life.
The activity of choosing companies starts at the end of the penultimate
year, or the beginning of the final year. First, candidates meet senior students
who have already joined the companies, which gives them an impression of
the companies and what kind of people are working there. New company
men recruit their juniors. This senior-junior relationship at university was a
key to their recruitment.
Employees in banks had decided on their jobs in the early period of the
final year. However, employees in securities houses and insurance companies
had decided on their jobs later. This means that in the recruitment system in

73
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Japan, prestigious companies choose graduates first, and then other graduates
try to find second-, or third-best companies. The link between university
ranks and company rank is clear in the minds of these people. Those who
chose securities companies may have had to do with second or third best,
though the social recognition of securities companies rose in the 1980s.
These Japanese male banking managers working abroad had common
career paths as ‘generalist’ managers in Japanese banks. For the first two or
three years after joining their companies, they did routine work with colleagues
who had just graduated from high school. However, after one or two years
of this period, they had opportunities to show their abilities. For example,
some went abroad to get an MBA, others were sent to Western banks to be
trainees. Some were allowed to go to English schools without doing routine
jobs. Then they were assigned to the section for international financial business,
with further working abroad and in Tokyo head offices. However, this does
not mean they concentrated only on international business. They would have
had experience in regional branches or personnel departments as well as in
the forefront of international business.
Managing directors had experienced being abroad two or three times.
First when they were in their thirties they were sent abroad as middle managers,
then as senior managers, then as managing directors. As a result of this
experience, they are now different from Japanese businessmen who have spent
their whole career within Japan. They are called kokusaiha, ‘international’
businessmen, and the younger generation who are now middle managers are
worried about becoming ‘international’, because most Japanese male managers
in Japanese banks have the conventional idea that banking business with
Japanese customers is the most important business. Therefore, managers who
have spent most of their career in head offices, who are called kokunaiha, the
‘domestic’ businessmen, have the most potential for becoming board members,
and can gain important information about the strategies of companies. These
‘domestic’ people believe that Japanese banks should support Japanese
manufacturing industry as ‘main banks’. So, these people do not want to be
‘international’ but want to be ‘domestic’ Japanese businessmen. They want
to have conventional careers as ‘generalists’, in other words, experiencing
different sections every two or three years and then taking senior positions.
They want to gain the maximum experience in their companies in order to
become executives. They are scared of becoming ‘specialists’ in one section.
Those who became ‘international’ businessmen, in other words kokusaiha,
who have been abroad for more than ten years are considered to be ‘specialists’.
As I have discovered, Japanese bankers and financiers in the City can be
characterised as middle class in background, born in post-war Japan,
graduated from among the most prestigious universities in Japan, joining
banks they deserved, and on the middle of the promotion ladder, though they
are worried about being thought of as specialists of the international banking
business.

74
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

Japanese female managers

In Japanese banks in the City there are only a few Japanese female managers
sent from Japan.32 When I interviewed these people in 1991 and 1992, there
were more female expatriates than in 1994. The economic recession in Japan
reduced the number of these female expatriates abroad. I met seven Japanese
female managers. They fell into three types. The first type were managers
who were in their forties and had been working in their banks for more than
20 years. They were from middle-class families and had been well supported
in their education. Ms Oki’s father was a bureaucrat and Ms Akamatsu’s
father was a company man. They both graduated from women’s colleges in
Tokyo, and joined a bank through an introduction by acquaintances of their
fathers. When they joined the bank they needed references from their fathers’
acquaintances. At first, they worked as clerical workers as if they had
graduated from high schools. Though most of their colleagues had resigned
from their companies, they remained without complaining about being in
such low positions for many years. Unexpectedly for them, the Equal
Employment Opportunities (EEO) Law was passed in 1986, and it introduced
two career paths for women: one is sōgōshoku, the other is the ippanshoku
course. Usually, male university graduates are employed automatically as
sōgōshoku staff, but if women choose sōgōshoku as their career course they
are treated as the equals of male sōgōshoku staff in principle. However, if
women choose sōgōshoku, they have to move geographically every two or
three years, like the men, and have to work until late at night. Therefore
some women preferred to be ippanshoku as their career course, which meant
they did not have to move geographically, but had to work as women clerical
workers in supportive roles.33 Women who had worked for many years had
opportunities to move to the sōgōshoku course. These female managers in
their forties were promoted to be sōgōshoku managers, which gave them
great opportunities to show their abilities. Ms Akamatsu was given
opportunities to work in London as a deputy managing director, and Ms Oki
was also given responsibility for lending to Japanese customers in London.
Both of them were promoted to a position which they had not expected,
because of the EEO Law and the working environment in London.
The second type of female managers were younger sōgōshoku managers
employed according to the EEO Law after 1986, since banks complied with
the Law immediately. They were around 30 years of age, and their family and
educational backgrounds, and language abilities were much better than those
of their male counterparts. All three I interviewed had graduated from top-
ranking national universities, and studied abroad. However, their career paths
had tended to be more as ‘specialists’ than those of their male colleagues. They
had tended to be assigned to the research section rather than to the dealing
sections. The EEO Law did not in effect give them exactly the same career
paths as their male counterparts. Also, these female managers, as the first

75
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

generation oisōgōshoku managers, had difficulties in finding role models in

their companies. They showed their anxiety about their future career prospects.
In addition to uncertainty about their future career paths, they said that it
was incompatible to continue to work in their company and to have a family.
Miss Ono said if she married a company colleague she would have to resign
from the company, an unwritten rule in her company. Ms Yano said she wanted
to bring up her children by herself, and that children should be looked after by
their mothers. Therefore, she was thinking of resigning from the company,
and working as a freelance consultant. Even for these highly qualified female
managers, the ideologies of motherhood and being a competitive manager are
incompatible with the work culture they had. Both of them said that about 90
per cent of their female sōgōshoku colleagues who had joined their banks in
the same year had already resigned from their work.
There was the third type of Japanese female manager sent from Japan,
ippanshoku, whose roles were more supportive than those of the second type.
I met two of these female staff sent from Tokyo. Compared to those from the
second type, they had graduated from private universities, which are
considered less competitive than national universities. Their fathers were also
company men, but they had been recommended by their fathers to choose
these supportive jobs in companies because their fathers judged that it was
impossible to break the barriers to advancement in Japanese companies. Miss
Hosokawa found she could conform to the role required by a supportive job,
but Miss Kawakami, who had studied in the US, felt hostile to the idea of
working in a supportive position.
The EEO Law divided younger women graduates into two categories:
sōgōshoku managers who could be competitive with their male counterparts,
and ippanshoku staff who would be doing supportive jobs. The former have
to endure the situation of being assigned to a specialist course, while the
latter have to accept that they are of inferior status, both to male managers
and to ‘élite’ women. The EEO Law not only hardened divisions between
women graduates, but did not improve the situation of women working in
large Japanese companies.34
Although these female Japanese staff had different career paths according
to their age and their choice of career, all of them had been encouraged by
their family to study and to continue their jobs in contrast to the locally hired
Japanese women (whom I will describe later). This suggests that family support
is enormously important for women in keeping their motivation to continue
their work in Japanese companies.

British male managers

Since the rapid expansion in the late 1980s, Japanese banks have employed
more British managers for their business in the City. However, the British

76
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

staff are frustrated by lack of promotion, exclusion from final decision-making,

the different attitudes to work of their Japanese bosses, and so on, though
there are some studies that suggest Japanese companies are changing their
attitudes towards local managers.35
British male managers working for these Japanese companies varied in
terms of their educational and family background. Among 12 British male
managers, the most senior was a managing director in a securities company.
He was born into a family in business, went to Oxford, and joined a British
merchant bank. He had worked in the Japanese business section of the bank
since the 1970s, and was then asked to join the Japanese bank to develop its
securities business in London. In Japanese financial firms, there were typically
some British managers recruited for their knowledge of City business, and
their good connections with British financiers, or European customers. They
had been invited into these Japanese firms to give advice to the Japanese,
who were newcomers in international financial business. The main motivation
for Mr Chambers to move to the Japanese company had been that the
merchant bank he had worked for had been taken over by a European bank,
and he did not like the change from the English atmosphere of the bank.
Senior managers, like Mr Chambers, were extremely disappointed by the
fact that they found that they did not enjoy similar status to their Japanese
colleagues who could gain promotion to head offices in Japan. They thought
that they could help the Japanese, but they felt excluded from the final decision-
making in their companies despite their nominally high positions. When they
felt disappointed, these senior managers left the Japanese companies, and the
Japanese accepted their resignations as they had learned enough from the
British managers. The Japanese also recognised that they could not supply
these senior managers with the positions they wanted. Several Japanese
managers said, ‘The people we want to keep tend to leave our companies’.36
The second type of British managers were middle-aged managers who
came to Japanese banks after working for other foreign banks in the City
such as American, French, Swiss or Arabic banks. They also have middle-
class family backgrounds, and some had gone to boarding schools, supported
by their fathers’ companies, and had graduated from university, but not
Oxbridge. From the beginning, they did not try to work in British banks,
thinking they would find more opportunities in foreign companies. In the
late 1980s, they moved to Japanese banks when the Japanese companies
became more prominent and offered good salaries. These managers came to
Japanese banks through job agencies, and they thought that Japanese banks
were ‘pastures new’. They expected that they could show their abilities and
get promotion in relatively new companies.
There were also personnel managers who had had several jobs before taking
such positions in Japanese banks. Some personnel managers’ family
backgrounds seemed to be lower than the managers who were involved on
the dealing side. They had gained their qualification from the Institute of

77
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Personnel Managers. On the other hand, there were personnel managers who
had been lawyers and who had worked in law firms for Japanese companies,
and had been invited to the Japanese companies to establish the management
structure for local staff. In contrast, in smaller companies of 40 or 50 people,
there were personnel managers without such qualifications. The qualified
personnel managers were proud of their role in establishing British
management structures in Japanese companies here, but their status was lower
than that of their Japanese counterparts. Japanese personnel management is,
in general, more integrated in business, but these British managers were
isolated from the financial business of their companies.
Personnel management in Japan is different from that of British companies.
The positions of personnel manager are circulated among male key workers,
and one of the important tasks of the personnel department is how to promote
key workers to the next rung of the ladder. Personnel management is more
centralised in the head offices, and the personnel departments have great
power. Most Japanese managers I interviewed had experience of working for
a personnel management department as well as on the dealing side, whereas,
according to my interviews, British personnel management in this country is
more dependent on each manager’s skills. The differences in their careers
struck me. They started their career without the personnel management
qualifications. Some were university graduates, others were not. Mr Harding
left grammar school when he was 17, and until 21 he did many jobs including
farming, telecommunications, clerical work and airline work. Even after he
specialised in his career as personnel manager, he ran a shop. The other
difference I found was that there were many female personnel managers in
the list of the group of personnel managers in Japanese banks in London.
The status of personnel managers in this country seems to be lower than that
of their counterparts in Japan.
There were also young specialists who had graduated from prestigious
universities such as Oxbridge and joined Japanese banks to be trained. My
understanding from the interviews was that these people were the most
frustrated, because of the different working attitudes in Japanese banks. These
managers found it especially difficult to follow Japanese ways of working,
and the lack of opportunity for individual responsibility in Japanese companies
was unbearable for them.
British managers showed less concern with rank than Japanese managers.
They may have thought that, as a foreigner, I was unable to share this notion
of rank, or they may have wanted to hide it. However, when I looked at the
educational background of British managers in Japanese banks, I found some
relationship between their university and their job status. Although British
staff talked about hierarchy in Japanese companies, it seemed to me that they
have structured status related to family and educational backgrounds.
The subjects these managers had studied were history, the classics or
literature, in contrast to almost all Japanese managers (who had studied law

78
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

or economics). Mr McLead and Mr Chambers said that it was not necessary

for bank managers to study economics or law. As far as these managers were
concerned, it was strange that all the Japanese managers had graduated in
law or economics. British managers saw this as the reason why Japanese
managers could not engage sufficiently in general discussions.
Japanese managers told me about their images of British male staff who
considered their family life as more important than their working life.
However, what was striking was that, with the exception of senior British
managers, most British male staff I met were single.
Japanese managers said that when they had started their business in
London it had been difficult to find first-class British staff, but as Japanese
banks gained better reputations, some managers said they could find better
British staff. Yet now these British managers are extremely frustrated by
working for Japanese financial firms. In addition to this, the salary in
Japanese companies is now comparatively less than that in other foreign
banks in the City.37

British female managers

Two types of British female managers are represented in the interviews.

The first type comprises personnel managers who gained their qualification
after they began to work. They play a mother-figure role and mediate
between Japanese managers and British staff. They gained the qualification
after being married as a mature student, or after working in different jobs.
Gaining the qualification and joining new companies in the City gave them
a great opportunity. The other type comprises young specialists who
graduated from Oxbridge or London University. Interestingly, these young
female managers were married, and two of them had babies. This contrasts
with the young Japanese female sōgōshoku managers who had delayed
marriage in order to be competitive bank staff. These young British female
managers were doing new financial business in the late 1980s, and
enjoying developing their knowledge and skills in the finance business.
Young specialists can be considered as new ‘yuppie’ graduates. Compared
to female personnel managers, they had better family and educational
backgrounds and were younger than the specialist managers. Sylvia Walby
pointed out that there are gaps between women in the 1990s according to
their ages and educational backgrounds.38 The two types of British female
managers I interviewed in Japanese banks may have been the reflection of
women’s situation in Britain.
These British female managers did not say that they were treated unequally
compared to their male counterparts. They were sympathetic, however, to
Japanese female managers and locally-hired Japanese women who had to
put up with disadvantages on gender grounds.

79
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

British clerical workers

Most clerical workers in Japanese banks are British women, though there are
some male clerical workers. They have working-class family backgrounds,
especially from East London. They have been working longer in Japanese
companies than the managerial classes.
The clerks were not encouraged to study hard. They left school at 16. Mr
Gibson39 told me how he was brought up in the East End. His father was a
docker, and he was educated in a very rough school. He passed five subjects at O-
level at school, which he said was very good for his school’s standard. He said he
was a good student. He was proud of himself, because he had become an office
worker and was earning a much better salary than his friends. He had been a
clerical worker in Japanese banks for more than 20 years. Sue had been also
working in Japanese banks for more than 20 years after she left school when she
was 16. Mary failed her A-levels and began to work in a high street bank, then
moved to a Japanese bank. Sue, Laura, Mary and Amanda are now planning to
further their careers by gaining more educational qualifications. Mary is
regretting that she did not repeat her A-levels. Sue is studying physics with the
Open University. Laura wants to be a dealer and is studying finance by herself.
Amanda wants to be a personal secretary rather than a secretary of a section
doing photocopying and other menial work. British female clerical workers in
these Japanese banks wanted to open up their opportunities.

Locally hired Japanese personnel

There are some Japanese staff who are employed as local staff in London.
They are included in the local staff, but they are not members of the union.
They cannot be promoted to Tokyo head offices. Some of them had married
British partners and some of them had been working in Britain and had been
granted permanent residence or British passports.
Some had come to Britain before the Immigration Act of 1971 tightened
regulations. They had tried to find better opportunities in Western countries
where they believed there was more freedom than in Japan. However, the
workplaces they eventually found were Japanese companies in London. They
were working somewhere between the Japanese and the British staff, in the
most insecure positions.
Most of them were women and their family and educational backgrounds
were much lower than those of either the male or female core workers.
Although when they left Japan they had personal crises, they also wanted to
find alternative career routes outside Japan. This is similar to British middle
managers and clerical workers who could not get into prestigious British
banks and tried to find careers in foreign banks.
There are also a few locally hired Japanese men. Their status is higher
than locally hired Japanese women, but they suffer the penalty of having

80
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

given up the company men’s career course in Japan, which may be much
greater than that of Japanese women, who had given up living in Japan to
find more opportunities. If the men had not given up their careers, they might
well have had core positions within Japanese companies.
Most locally hired Japanese women in their forties and fifties had graduated
from high school. They especially thought English would help their career
plans. They had a strong sense that they had lacked opportunities when they
were young. Fuyuko wanted to be a lawyer and Tatsuko wanted to go to
university, but they were not allowed to go to university because they were
girls and their families were not able to afford it, though their brothers went
to university. Sachiko also wanted to go to university to be a teacher, but she
entered a bank. They said they had done very well at school, and if they had
had opportunities, they could have gained high qualifications.
These are now more and more Japanese women coming to London to find
better jobs which they think they could not obtain within Japan. The younger
generation have better educational qualifications than those who came to
Britain in the 1970s. All of the younger women I interviewed had European or
British partners. This younger generation did not have personal crises when they
left Japan. They stopped working and came to Britain to find new career paths.

City experts on Japanese business

These are experts in Japanese business in the City, following the development
of Japanese business in the City and the expectation that financial markets in
Japan will open up. The interviews were focused more on their business than
on their personal lives. These people seemed to be different from the local
staff in the Japanese financial firms, and held more central positions in the
City. They had graduated from Oxbridge, and socialised with people in British
institutions of the City. The reason why they had become specialists in Japan
was that Japan was an important business place for the City in the 1980s.
Once Japan became less important for the British economy, these specialists
moved to other positions, such as within EU businesses.

Wives of Japanese male managers

I met two types of wives of Japanese male managers: one comprised wives
who had married after working in the same banks; the others were those
who had met their husbands while at university. In comparison, the former
were the older generation and the latter the younger. Mrs Ueno married her
husband when she was working in the same branch after she graduated from
high school. According to Mr Chiba, in his bank, one-third of males marry
female staff from the same bank, one-third marry friends whom they met
while at university, and the rest marry by arranged marriages. Mrs Ueno

81
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

married when she was 25 years old, and has not worked at all since then. She
now has one daughter and is looking after her in London, and the rest of her
life comprises socialising with other wives of Japanese male managers. She
feels her life is now very restricted in London. Surrounded by families of
other bank managers in the same bank, she feels that her everyday world has
become narrowed. Another wife, in her late twenties, met her husband through
social activities at university. She went to a women’s university and joined a
tennis club. Membership of the tennis club was affiliated to Tokyo University,
so she played tennis with the students of Tokyo University.40 Thus she met
her husband. After graduation she worked for a company for a while and
married, and then came to London. She thought being in London gave her a
good opportunity to gain a higher degree. She was avoiding contact with
other wives, and was studying for a higher degree. Her hope is to teach at
university when she returns to Japan with her husband.
The male Japanese managers and their families are core people in the
expanding Japanese community, and they are separated from the locally settled
Japanese. The Japanese, especially male delegates from Tokyo, are the ‘élite’
company men in post-war Japan who graduated from top universities. Female
managers sent from Japan are few, but their educational and family
background is even better than that of their male counterparts. However,
their position is lower than male managers, and they have not been trained in
the same ‘generalist’ courses as their male counterparts. Furthermore, the
EEO Law was counterproductive in that it provided two career paths for
women, which divided female staff into two. Young female graduates became
divided into ‘élite’ women and ‘supportive’ women.
The British staff working for Japanese financial firms in the City were not
necessarily ‘élite’ bankers in the City, except for some senior managers who
were invited to the Japanese banks. In particular, personnel managers in general
had lower educational and family backgrounds than managers in dealings.
British clerks came from the working class and seemed to be happier to work
in Japanese banks, which offered secure jobs.
Between the Japanese and British staff there were locally hired Japanese,
who were segregated both from Japanese and British staff. Some of them had
previously had difficult lives in Japan.
It is clear that we cannot easily generalise Japaneseness and Britishness in
work culture, since each group has different subgroups within their ethnic group
in their company. The relationships between groups and between the employees
and the society to which they belong have influenced their cultural identities.

Notes
1 Another point that appears from Table 3.1 is that there are more female permanent
residents than male permanent residents. There are two ways for Japanese
immigrants to gain permanent residence. One is to request permanent residence

82
 THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND ITS PEOPLE

after working for a certain number of years in this country as a person who has
a special skill not held by people in this country; the other is to marry a British
partner or European partner from an EU country. Table 3.1 suggests that Japanese
women are more likely than Japanese men to find partners and to gain work
permits in this country.
2 There are also people who never tell the Embassy that they are in the UK, such as
students and tourists.
3 There are no statistics in JETRO on Japanese financial institutions in Europe.
4 Some Japanese families prefer to live in South London in a more English
environment in order to avoid mixing only with Japanese expatriates.
5 Interview 85, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
6 Both banks merged and became DKB which is now one of the largest city banks
in Japan.
7 Interview 71, with a Japanese male manager (at a financial subsidiary of a trading
company), in his 50s, interviewed in Tokyo in 1994. As for apologies for the
cruelty of the Japanese during the war, the Japanese government has not resolved
this issue nor the matter of compensation, and the country still stands accused.
In addition, a new emerging nationalism is pointed to, ‘Japan and the War: The
Japan That Cannot Say Sorry’, The Economist, 12 August, 1995, pp. 59–61.
8 Guardian, 19 August 1995.
9 Yasuyuki Hamada and Takashi Sawada, Hogin London Shiten (The Branches of
Japanese Banks in London), 1992, pp. 36–7.
10 A letter from the supervisor of Japanese banks at the Bank of England, 16 June
1995.
11 British Bankers’ Association, Annual Abstract of Banking Statistics, May 1995.
12 In Lisa Williams, ed, Who’s Who in the City, 1993. Japanese bankers and
financiers’ names are included, but there are few which include personal details,
because these Japanese executives in London are global members of Japanese
financial firms based in Tokyo.
13 For example, in a subsidiary securities company eight board members are Japanese
and seven are British or European. So the Japanese do not control the board.
14 According to the interviewees, compared to financial institutions, Japanese
manufacturing factories in Europe and USA have far fewer Japanese employees.
15 Numbers are relatively correct, but staff are changing every day. It is also probable
that informants do not remember exactly how many employees they have. When
I interviewed a managing director and a personnel manager in the same bank
through a different route of introduction, the numbers they gave were different.
Japanese-born local employees are included in British staff in this table.
16 Interview 89, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
17 Thomas P.Rohlen, For Harmony and Strength: Japanese White-Collar
Organization in Anthropological Perspective, 1974.
18 Merry White, Japanese Overseas: Can They Go Home Again?, 1988.
19 Tomoko Hamada, ‘Under the Silk Banner: The Japanese Company and its Overseas
Managers’, in Takie Sugiyama Lebra, ed, Japanese Social Organization, 1992.
20 Yoshino Kosaku, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, 1993.
21 One of them mentioned that his family had been influential landowners in the
region. In Japan, big landowners lost their lands as a result of the post-war
reform by the Occupation.
22 The Sumitomo Group is one of the biggest corporate groups which was originally
zaibatsu, and the head office is in Osaka. Most Japanese banks have their head
offices in Tokyo, but both Sumitomo and Sanwa have their head offices in Osaka.
83
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

23 Interview 6, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),

in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
24 Interview 71, with a Japanese male manager (at a financial subsidiary of a trading
company), in his 50s, interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.
25 Interview 98, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
26 Interview 38, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
27 Interview 6, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
28 ‘Tokio’ is the official spelling of the company’s name.
29 Recruitment of new graduate students starts in the spring. Students in their final
year start visiting companies and go to interviews. Large and prestigious companies
decide on their new employees first, then students who have not been chosen by
these companies have to continue visiting other companies. Then they have to
take up a second or third choice.
30 After the Second World War, male soldiers came back from abroad, and the
birth rate increased in late 1940s’ Japan. The generation who were born in this
period are called ‘baby boomers’ or ‘dankai no sedai (generation of a mass)’.
When they were children they were educated by the new ‘democratic’ education
system which was introduced by the American Occupation. When they had to
take exams, they had to compete more than any other generation because of
their large numbers. Eventually they were at the centre of the student revolts at
university in the late 1960s, though not all of them were involved in the revolts.
Among my male Japanese interviewees of this generation, only Mr Ogata said he
joined the reform movement at university.
31 Ronald Dore and Mari Sako, How the Japanese Learn to Work, 1989, pp. 13–15.
32 For example, in a City bank with 35 Japanese employees, there was only one
female manager sent from Tokyo.
33 For the EEO Law in Japan, see Alice Lam, Women and Japanese Management:
Discrimination and Reform, 1992. Alice Lam, ‘Women and Equal Employment
Opportunities in Japan’, Nissan Occasional Paper Series, No. 16,1992.
34 Masumi Mori et al., ‘Kintouhou 5 Nen: Joseiroudou ni Okeru Seisabetsu no
Genjou (5 Years after the EEO Law: The Present Situation of Sex Discrimination
in Women’s Work)’, Chingin to Shakaihoshou (The Wage and Social Security),
no. 1074, January, 1992.
35 Stephanie Jones, Working for the Japanese: Myths and Realities: British
Perceptions, 1991. Jones’s study is an exception, but it is based on quantitative
research on 100 British executives, so that her study is more about policies than
the subjective feelings of the managers or their backgrounds before they joined
Japanese companies.
36 Interview 89, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
37 ‘Boom Times Back for City Salaries’, Evening Standard, 17 May 1994, p. 32.
38 Sylvia Walby, Gender Transformation, 1997, p. 2.
39 I called him Mr Gibson, though he told me I could call him Matthew. I could call
female clerical staff Sue, Amanda or Mary, but I could not call Mr Gibson
Matthew. This must be a gender bias from my own cultural background.
40 Tokyo University, and other universities such as Keio, Waseda, and Hitotsubashi,
have some clubs which have female students from other women’s universities.
At the beginning of the academic year the male students go to women’s universities
to recruit new members. Some clubs only accept female students from other
universities.
84
 4
SEGREGATION AND
LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT
WORK CULTURES

Within Japanese transnational banks, there was segregation between the

Japanese sent from Japan and their local staff, and within both groups
languages of different national work cultures were ‘used’. Despite the existence
of various groups in terms of gender, ethnicity and class, relationships between
groups are regarded as between national cultures: the British and the Japanese.
Between them, there were antagonisms, jealousy and competition, and there
were clashes, negotiations, and ignorance of each other, which led to the
notion of ‘Otherness’ in their working lives.
These phenomena are often seen as a peculiar ethnic problem of Japanese
companies. However, cultural essentialism only contributes to creating the
discourse of what is ‘Japaneseness’, or ‘Britishness’. To avoid essentialism,
this chapter is concerned with the ‘talk’ about differences rather than trying
to define essential cultural differences between the two. The ‘Japaneseness’,
which I do not believe exists in reality, can be understood as the way in which
the differences are defined in the everyday interaction of these people. For
analysing the process of constructing both ‘Japaneseness’ and ‘Britishness’, I
attempt to explain why conflicts occurred, how people responded to them
and how they talked—or did not talk—about their notions of ‘Otherness’.
I explore how people talked about why segregated management was
introduced in these Japanese financial companies and how they tried to solve
conflicts between Japanese and local staff through the management structure.
Second, I examine how people talked about the differences in work cultures
as a way of exploring how our understanding of culture is based on notions
of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Finally, I examine how these people confront problems of
language, which itself constitutes an important part of cultural identity.

Duality of the management structure

The management structures of Japanese overseas companies are not integrated

in one line, despite their intention of creating hybrid global companies,
especially those of white-collar managers. The difficulties became apparent

85
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

when Japanese companies began to expand in the West. When Japanese banks
first entered international financial business in the early 1970s, the problem
for the Japanese was how to adjust to the environment in British banks. Mr
Endo, who had been working for a non-life insurance company, described
what it was like when he came to London in the late 1970s, ‘My company
sent only one representative to London, and our company did not have a
licence in London, so we rented a room in a British insurance broker company
and there was nothing but a desk in the room’.1 When they went out for
meals, they did not know how to order and had to find a way to assimilate
the ways of the City. These Japanese businessmen, the first to establish their
business in the City, struggled alone in the British environment. Even now, in
some joint venture companies of fund management, Japanese bank managers
are surrounded by an excessively English environment. In this early stage,
dual management structures were not so clearly established as now.
However, Japanese management began to insist on having Japanese
environments when the Japanese banks expanded rapidly, especially in the
1980s. They employed more local people, and as a result, clashes between
the Japanese bosses and the local clerical staff occurred. Sue, a clerk who had
been working for a Japanese bank since the mid-1970s, described how the
bank changed in the 1980s.

About ten years ago, it wasn’t working out. In our department we

had many girls, young girls. Probably about 10 to 15…. There were
a lot of bad feelings. The Japanese manager upset the young girls….
Some of the young girls weren’t properly trained. They weren’t doing
their jobs properly. It really wasn’t their fault. They just hadn’t been
trained. A Japanese boss often threatened them with the sack, this
kind of thing. He used to behave badly towards them. And we had a
big argument. Then they decided it would be better to have an English
manager. They brought somebody in. In the end we borrowed a
manager from an English clearing bank. And everything calmed down.

The clash was about how to deal with the clerical work. Japanese managers, in
general, were not satisfied with the British way of doing clerical work, which
was ‘slow’, ‘incorrect’, and ‘irresponsible’ according to the Japanese managers’
ideas of clerical work. Whenever Japanese managers complained about how the
British clerks carried out their work, troubles occurred. Then, the Japanese
found a solution for avoiding the clashes by employing a British senior manager.
As a result this story about ‘the Japanese manager’ became a legend:

He was very strict with them. They got very upset. He was rude to
them. I mean, one young girl… She made mistakes. Just a clerical
error, but it cost the bank about a hundred pounds. The bank lost a
hundred pounds. So he took her in a room and he told her she was

86
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

doing her job terribly. Would she leave, that kind of thing. And then
she complained. And then actually he talked to a number of other
people in the same way. She wasn’t the only young girl he spoke to.
This girl was seventeen, you see, this man was in his late thirties or
forties. He’s supposed to be an authority. He was really using his
power over the girls by frightening them. So, she left in the end, after
a few months. He was Japanese. It was his personality. Anyway he
got sent back. Eventually he upset lots of people…. After he left we
had an English manager…. It was quite successful. At that point the
bank expanded. I think the staff doubled. They continued to have
English department managers. We don’t have any Japanese in our
department at the moment’.2

In Sue’s version of the story, the Japanese boss was an ill-natured and harsh
person, but the young British clerk was an innocent girl.
The reason for the clashes seemed to be, first, the increasing number of
Japanese expatriate managers. More Japanese came to the City, including
more ordinary Japanese, who had not been exposed to Western cultures
before. When there had been only a few Japanese, the personnel
department in head offices had sent expatriates who had had more
experience of the English environment, and knew the cultural gaps.
Sometimes, local staff met upper-class Japanese, especially in the zaibatsu
banks such as the Mitsubishi Bank or the Mitsui Bank. Sue worked for a
relative of the Japanese emperor in the 1970s, and she explained that the
clerks had ‘been treated very well’ by the Japanese who had come before
the expansion. Sue thought that the Japanese sent from Tokyo before the
expansion of the 1980s had been more cosmopolitan in outlook, and from
important families. However, when the number of Japanese managers
increased, ‘things got changed. When we had this awful manager, that was
about the time when we got a distinct change in the class of person being
sent over’. Then, she said, ‘We had more clashes’.3
Second, when the purpose of the bank being in the City had been for
gathering information and doing banking business following trade between
Japan and Europe before the expansion, the work had not been so rigorous
for either Japanese or local staff. However, when Japanese banks and
securities houses started more substantial business, they had to have higher
productivity. It was at this time that Japanese staff began to insist more on
their own work ethic.
Third, when there had been very few Japanese, they had tried to learn
from Western culture, but after their numbers increased, they tended to gather
together, and it was easier to insist on their own ways of working. The older
generation, who worked in the City in the 1960s and the early 1970s, pointed
out that it is now easier for the Japanese in the City because of their increasing
numbers. It may also be said that recognition of the economic power of Japan

87
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

might have made Japanese managers more confident in insisting on their

own work culture.
The Japanese banks had to find a solution to these clashes between Japanese
managers and local staff. Mr Jinbo, working in London in a city bank,
experienced the expansion. When he was assigned to London in the early
1980s there were 23 Japanese and 47 British staff in the bank. They only had
one branch and did not have subsidiary companies. In the mid-1980s, the
bank set up a subsidiary company. As a result, they now have up to 240 local
staff in the branch and 200 local staff in their subsidiary company. Within
ten years, the local staff had increased ten-fold:

In the early 1970s, important sections were occupied only by Japanese

staff. The procedures which might have caused substantial risk were
double-checked by the Japanese every time. Anything could have
happened if we had given local staff responsibilities. The quality of
local staff was really bad. When I first came to London in 1982,
what all the Japanese were saying was that the quality of local staff
was really bad, their standard was the lowest. That was the common
complaint among Japanese staff…. To sum up, the bank did not
employ good staff, the bank did not give responsibility, and the bank
did not train local staff. There were some reasons for this. First of
all, the status of Japanese banks was very low, so Japanese banks
weren’t able to recruit good staff. In the period of strong trade unions
when the Labour Party had power, such staff had bargaining power.
If we had increased such staff, the Japanese would have been
overwhelmed by them. So, in the 1970s Japanese banks increased
Japanese staff to respond to their business expansion.4

The expansion in the 1980s was bigger than that of the 1970s. What happened
first was that they had to increase the number of local staff rapidly. There
were regulations in Britain that if there was a vacancy, people within the
company had to be given the first chance for promotion:

New staff were blocked by these people who had no abilities in

management. Newcomers were disappointed by these old local staff.
New staff thought there were so many low-level people, and so few
responsibilities in Japanese banks, that it was hopeless to work for
Japanese banks. New staff did not stay in Japanese banks long. Then
we realised the staff who had been here since the mid-1970s were a
problem. We tried to give the old staff the same status as they had
had previously.5

The bank decided to make its own company regulations, and then, what they
finally imposed was ‘indirect rule, like the British Empire had done in their

88
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

colonies’.6 They employed graduate trainees and taught them ‘the corporate
philosophy of the company’ and these graduate trainees were promoted to
senior managers. The Japanese had to find a way of gaining more capable
local staff to do new financial business. At the same time, the Japanese staff
began to avoid direct contact with local clerical staff as much as possible. Mr
Gibson, a clerk who was involved in the trade union activities in Japanese
banks, said that he was assigned to the busiest section in order to stop his
union activities. However, the assignment was made by a senior British staff
member:

I must add that the person responsible was English. Not Japanese….
The person responsible for this move, was the Number One English
manager. In other words, I want to make sure that you don’t blame
the Japanese for it…. And he was acting, obviously, on, probably…
he was probably keeping the Japanese managers happy. But although
they didn’t directly instruct him to do it, he probably did it so that he
could tell the Japanese bosses what he had done. So I suppose,
indirectly, you could say….7

Other Japanese banks followed these large banks, and employed British
personnel managers in the late 1980s, and started to establish personnel
departments in their banks, following the British custom and its
employment laws.
As a result of this structural change, what happened was that Japanese
staff and British staff became segregated. Yet, Japanese managers call this
separation ‘localisation’ or a ‘hybrid’ culture. Mr Jinbo commented on the
dilemma:

It doesn’t work if Japanese ways are applied to Japanese companies

here. It also doesn’t work if British ways are adopted, because in that
case corporate identity would be completely denied. Therefore, it is
necessary to establish a middle way, a ‘hybrid’ culture which is neither
Japanese nor British. It is very important what kind of ‘hybrid’ culture
is created, and the company changes according to the ‘hybrid’ culture.
If the people who established the culture move every three or four
years, the culture will change rapidly. If there are many who want to
establish a ‘hybrid’ culture, it works very well. Both Japanese and
British cooperate in that. Yet, Japanese managers return to Japan after
two or three years, then new Japanese staff come, and the awareness
that we need a ‘hybrid’ culture disappears. In order to maintain that
‘hybrid’ culture, we tried to employ local senior managers for
continuity. We selected very good human resources taking many years,
educated them, and invested in them. They still stay in this company
as senior managers. They are responding to our expectations.8

89
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

As a result of this new policy, there emerged, according to Mr Jinbo, a new

culture which is ‘a culture that is neither British nor Japanese. It stands on
the compromise line where our bank can be our bank and the British staff
can be British. The culture is very fragile in some sense’.9 Another Japanese
bank manager was also proud of the hybrid culture:
The Japanese have long-term views, can consider the standpoints of
others, and are familiar with lifetime employment. However, local
staff are individualistic. They assert their opinions strongly. And they
have a shorter rather than long-term perspective. They think their
business is more deal oriented than relationship oriented. They do
not have long-term views. My most important task is not to judge
which is better, but to integrate both cultures and how to ‘Aufheburen’
the two cultures.10
As these two extracts demonstrate, it was a big task for the Japanese senior
management to establish an environment in which the two groups could
work together. However, their solution was to establish a segregated
management for Japanese and British staff. And this policy was termed
‘localisation’, namely giving responsibility to local workers to some extent.

Segregation between Japanese and local staff

As a result of so-called ‘localisation’, relatively large Japanese financial
companies such as city banks had certain structures in common. In each
company, there was a top manager called a managing director or a chairman.
The top managers were all Japanese, and they were usually members of the
board of directors in head offices in Japan. Under these managing directors,
there were some deputy managing directors including both Japanese and
British managers. The structure of management presented here is based on
information from the interviews. All the management of internal matters in
the companies and Japanese-related business such as transactions with
Japanese customers in Europe were controlled by Japanese managers.
Controlling the structure of organisations, operating the budget and making
final decisions were also the responsibility of Japanese senior managers.
Business with British domestic and European customers was conducted by
British senior managers. Normally they were among the top senior managers
in British management. New financial business such as ‘derivatives’ or ‘project
finance’ was also taken on by British managers. Yet, according to British
managers, Japanese head offices began to distrust British senior staff after
the losses from lending which occurred in the late 1980s. In addition, every
transaction had to be agreed to by head offices before being contracted. This
made local staff, who believed that individual responsibility and achievement
were the most important values, demoralised and unable to work to the
maximum of their abilities.

90
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

The personnel management for Japanese managers, sent from head offices
in Japan, was undertaken by a Japanese joint managing director in London
and personnel offices within Japan, not by British personnel managers at all.
British personnel managers only had responsibility for the personnel
management of local staff, including locally hired Japanese women. Despite
their responsibility for the personnel management of local staff, they had few
powers. For example, a personnel manager said that even if she wanted to
spend ten pounds she had to ask her Japanese bosses.11
Clerical staff in back-up offices were British, mostly women, and had few
direct contacts with their Japanese bosses. They reported to their British bosses
and worked with local staff. Therefore, ‘localisation’ seems to have been
successful in their management.
Between the Japanese staff and the British staff were locally hired Japanese
women who did intermediate jobs such as secretarial work for Japanese bosses,
translations and work in cashiers’ offices. These Japanese women knew both
the Japanese and English language, and did some work not undertaken by
British female staff, such as looking after Japanese bosses when they first
came to Britain. The calculation of Japanese bosses’ salaries was also
undertaken by these Japanese women. Fuyuko said that salaries of Japanese

Figure 4.1 The structure of a Japanese transnational financial company

91
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

bosses and British staff were very different so that they did not want the
British staff to know about the gap. These women were considered very useful,
but their position was insecure.
The management structure looked integrated, but in practice it was
segregated between British and Japanese staff. As a result, there were two
lines of control: one, the official line for reporting from lower workers to
their bosses, according to official orders in the companies; the other, the
unofficial reporting path among Japanese staff. For this purpose, Japanese
middle managers were located between British and Japanese reporting lines.
Ms Ono said, ‘My direct boss is British, but I also report to my Japanese
bosses as well’. Mr Honda said, ‘I often said to the young Japanese that it is
important to make sure their British bosses are comfortable and working
hard’. This duality of management is not officially admitted, and Japanese
bosses said that they were trying to create anew ‘hybrid’ culture. The structure
of companies seems to be integrated in the multiethnic companies, but, in
fact, it was dually structured in reporting lines and responsibilities. Mr Yates
explained:

It’s almost like there are two banks in this building. There’s a
European bank and a Japanese bank. We work in the same building,
sit alongside each other, but there’s very little intermingling, if you
see what I mean. We have Europeans that work in a European style,
with European customers, and European products. These people
arrive at 9 a.m., and go home at 5.30/6.00 p.m. Now, the Japanese
bank, that deals mainly with Japanese customers, and dealing with
Japanese administration, this part of the bank comes into work at 9,
and leaves at 9/10 o’clock at night—traditional Japanese, very
hierarchical, saying, ‘You will do this’, ‘You will do this’, ‘You will
do this’. So we have a strange balance of, if you like, two, almost
totally separate banks, within a bank.12

There was little communication between the two groups inside Japanese
financial companies. A clerk observed the situation as follows:

There’s a big communication chasm, if you like, there’s a big gap

between what’s going on and what we’re told, which is…you can
always find some Japanese person who will feel they should tell you
what is really going on. I mean, the last restructuring, we didn’t
know about it until the… It happened on a Monday, and we knew
about it on the Thursday, but only because we were in a taxi with
one of our Japanese colleagues. We knew something was going on,
and we told him we weren’t going to let him out of the taxi unless he
told us what it was! But only jokingly! And so he just started laughing,
and he said, ‘Oh, they’re going to move all the departments round’….

92
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

So…we never know, we don’t know till the last minute… I mean, in
my opinion, by not communicating, you create uncertainty and
resentment, and all bad things, because people know that something’s
going on, because lots of people are rushing off to meetings, and
carrying lots of bits of paper around, and so you know something’s
happening. So if someone just said to you, ‘There’s going to be a
reorganisation of the branch’, you know, ‘it may involve this, it may
involve that’, then you could think, ‘Oh well…’.13

Her comments showed how lack of communication had caused uncertainty

among local staff. There was then a strong belief in Japan that ‘localisation’
of Japanese transnational companies was necessary.14 But it was still difficult
to localise Japanese financial companies. The dual structure between parent
companies and subsidiary companies has been considered as a contribution
to ‘the successful Japanese system’ in previous research on manufacturing
industry. However, in Japanese financial institutions in London, the duality
of the structure caused problems both in business and in the management of
companies.
In parallel with the segregated management structure, there were differences
of salary systems and promotion between Japanese and British staff. The
Japanese managers were given salaries based on the seniority payment system in
Japan. Also, they were given an additional payment for working abroad, so that
they could double the salary they got in Japan. In addition, they were given
bonuses twice a year, in summer and in winter, which are considered as part of
the normal salary structure in Japan. They were also provided with a house by
the company because of being abroad. It can be said that the high standard of
living in Tokyo may have underlined the different levels of salaries for Japanese
managers who are Tokyo-based, and locally hired staff. In contrast to the
Japanese salary system, British staff received salaries according to the contract
which they signed when they joined the company, though some British specialist
managers had been head-hunted and offered extremely high salaries.
Locally hired clerical workers had been given some seniority payments,
and were relatively satisfied. Mr Gibson, Sue and Jane had become senior
clerks after working for some years. Mr Gibson said that his salary was better
than that of any of his friends.
However, specialists in new financial skills tended to feel that they would
have had higher salaries if they had gone to other companies. Salaries for
financial specialists in Japanese banks in London, especially since the recession,
had become lower compared to other foreign banks.15 Japanese bosses said that
they could not afford to pay high salaries like American companies, given the
restrictions of the Japanese seniority payment system. They argued that
Japanese seniority payments offer salaries for a lifetime of work. According to
their arguments, the salaries of Japanese middle managers are not high in
relation to their work, and bonuses are not paid according to achievement but as

93
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

a supplementary salary. Japanese management argued that this was why

Japanese companies could not pay a high salary to middle-aged staff.
The most serious frustration for the British managers was the lack of
promotion prospects. By contrast, Japanese managers in the firms were
assigned to work in London as a step in their global promotion as lifetime
employees of the company. Usually, Japanese managers who went back to
Japan were promoted to higher positions in Tokyo head offices. Then they
became more important managers in that area. They are sometimes sent to
another important financial market such as New York, Hong Kong, and so
on. However, local staff are employed within London branches, and therefore
have almost no possibility of being promoted to head offices in Japan or to
other financial markets. Local staff have to stay within branches or subsidiary
companies unless they resign from these Japanese banks. This is especially
hard for the ambitious male local staff. Mr Walker said:

I am thinking of asking, can I go and work in Tokyo? For maybe two

years. So if I get that, because I like this bank, I like Japanese culture,
and I’m happy. So I think it would be a good thing for me to do. And
if I want to progress any further, I think it is something I will have to
do. My big problem is the language. So, anyway, I have to talk to my
boss about that. I asked him three years ago, and he said, ‘Anything
is possible, but nothing is guaranteed’. So…. Maybe.16

British managers had to see young Japanese colleagues coming over to their
offices and going back to head offices with promotion. It was particularly
difficult for local staff members confident in their skills or knowledge of new
financial businesses. Local managers thought their Japanese colleagues did
not know enough about business in London, but the Japanese staff were
nevertheless promoted to head offices. The British staff felt this was unfair.
Mr Green expressed his bitter feeling:

I would never be on the board of this bank. I know that. The situation
may change and I hope it does. The highest position I could attain is
probably the head of syndication. There are two banks. There is the
Japanese which is the career bank and controls, and there is the local
bank which is for local staff.17

On the other hand, the Japanese managers expressed mistrust of their local
staff. They said that local staff move to other companies and that Japanese
companies are just stepping stones for the local staff. Against this, local staff
said they had come to Japanese companies to contribute to them. Besides,
they had been seeking securer jobs. However, they had not been treated as
equals with the Japanese staff, so they might have to leave. Table 4.1 shows
the rate of turnover in a city bank.

94
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

Table 4.1 Turnover of local staff in a city bank in London

Source: from a branch of a Japanese city bank in London

Table 4.1 shows how rapidly this bank had expanded from the late 1980s,
and how the rate of turnover declined, which seems to suggest that Japanese
banks have been successful in ‘localising’ their banks. However, this table
includes the clerical staff who stay relatively longer in Japanese banks; the
turnover of specialist managers is higher than this table indicates. The
frustration of the British staff began to appear as accusations of racial
discrimination in Japanese companies in the 1990s when Japanese companies
had also begun to make staff redundant as a means of survival in the severe
recession after the boom.18
As we have examined above, Japanese financial firms had established
segregated management under the guise of ‘localisation’ by the 1990s. When
these Japanese firms expanded they thought it was best to avoid contact with
local staff as much as possible. Segregation affects management structures,
everyday contact, promotion and salary systems. The question will be how
these employees perceived this segregation.

Languages of different work cultures

In these Japanese companies, people have different views on work attitudes
and lifestyles. It struck me that individuals with different views had not
exchanged them directly. If they could exchange ideas and share knowledge,
they would create a new working environment for this new ‘globalised’ era.
However, both the Japanese and the British staff talked to me about their
different views of work and life. Exchanging ideas and getting closer to
working together seemed unlikely to happen in these companies. Furthermore,

95
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

what was happening was that people made contact with each other on the
borders of ‘different’ cultures but this only served to emphasise differences:
the ‘others’ were being defined in their everyday working lives.
It would be more important to examine how people talked about or
emphasised the differences between the two than trying to define what the
essential differences were between the two groups. The schemata I have chosen
are often talked of as ‘the unique Japanese work attitudes’, or ‘the uniqueness
of Japanese corporate culture’.

Specialist versus generalist

Specialist and generalist managers are defined in Japanese companies. In

Japanese financial firms, the distinction between British managers and Japanese
male managers was talked of as the difference between being ‘specialist’—those
on the move for better opportunities and ‘generalists’—those working as lifetime
employees. According to the typical Japanese management system, core
Japanese male generalist managers are recruited only from among new
graduates of high-ranking universities, and they are trained upwards, from the
bottom position in their firms. They move around different sections of the
company in order to learn as much as possible about the whole situation of the
company. The Japanese bank managers interviewed for the book themselves
used the term ‘generalists’. Because of this policy, there were sometimes Japanese
male managers in Japanese financial firms in London who had had no experience
of international banking, but who had been assigned in order to experience the
business of the City for a while. As they were described in Chapter 3, they are
called kokunaiha, in other words, ‘domestic’ businessmen. They shared a sense
of solidarity among themselves. Mr Aoyama commented on the group:
People in Japanese banks are a group who have a homogeneous
culture. To put it in an extreme way, workers in Japanese companies
work without any orders from above. Our organisation is not an
organisation which consists of people who work for their
remuneration here and now. People do not work for their present
interest, but for their long-term prospects; for example, if people
think that it might be useful for their future or it would be good to
learn something, they are willing to do so. If I compare this with
agriculture, we need both harvest and seeding and ploughing. The
advantages of a Japanese corporation is that we can cover many
aspects of activities within it. In this sense, stability of employment
may be effective.19
As this extract shows, these Japanese managers are trained for the long run.
So, they did not worry about doing relatively menial jobs in the first few years
after they joined banks, because they knew they would move up from the

96
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

initial positions. Mr Yasuda spent two years reading telexes in his London
branch in the 1970s. He did not complain about this, because he knew it was
a temporary responsibility. Furthermore, he said it was a good job, because it
gave him the opportunity to learn about all the important matters in the branch
through reading telexes. The expected promotion for ‘generalist’ managers
gives them stability and trust of the organisations to which they belong.
Japanese managers consider British managers to be ‘specialists’, employed
for their ‘special skills’ to do business in the City. British managers are not
asked to move around the company, but work according to contracts made
with companies when they joined. Their salary does not vary with seniority.
Japanese managers accepted that they then had ‘excellent specialists from
Oxbridge’, but said that their British staff would not stay in their companies
for years.
It is difficult to judge whether the British leave the companies after two or
three years because they are following their own career strategy, or because
they are not expected to stay in the companies longer. British staff emphasised
their ‘skills’, ‘expertise’ and ‘experience’ in comparison to their Japanese bosses.
Mr Harding, a British personnel manager, explained what personnel managers
should know:

Well, I think you need to understand human psychology, to some

extent. On a practical level, you also need an understanding of
employment law on pay and remuneration generally, on training
methods and values, and good personnel practice generally.20

He said, Japanese management is ‘fairly unstructured, in a way, because people

are expected to grow into jobs, and be generalists, to some extent’. However,
in London, British staff ‘require a specialist training, or come in with specialist
knowledge and experience’. He also explained how British staff expectations
differ from those of Japanese managers in their career courses:

We recruit small numbers of graduates here, maybe six or ten a year,

and they lead a more independent existence. They specialise more
than would be the case in Tokyo. They specialise by product, and by
function, and by department, whereas in Tokyo, they would work
their way through a number of departments before specialising, as I
understand it, and their progress would be fairly slow and measured
over a number of years. However, graduates joining this branch in
London, would expect to be fully effective and working with the
minimum of supervision after one year. And they, and the company,
would not really be making a lifetime commitment to each other,
unless the rewards and the career progression were seen to be very
swift and effective. The expectation of graduates in London, short-
term, are much greater than those of graduates in Japan.21

97
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Mr Harding thinks British managers develop their skills, but the Japanese
are behind in this matter:

Well, my experience is, it’s mainly the English and American way,
and the Japanese are beginning to learn that way. I don’t think
Japanese managers have much formal training in managerial skills
in Japan… The Japanese philosophy, to date, has not been for a
comprehensive and organised training programme to develop local
staff, or even Japanese staff, to provide them with a clear career
structure, and to improve the skills, the managerial skills, of the people
working in this company. And that’s something that, under the
chairman that we have now, we’re beginning to address and to deal
with. But that hasn’t been my experience, up until now, that there’s
been any real commitment to providing that level of training and
development. Now, I think that’s changing.

Japanese managers looked to be lacking not only in expertise in personnel

management but also business skills. Another senior manager also complained
that his Japanese boss was not knowledgeable, which caused problems in
business. He commented, ‘We achieved a lot but not as much as we could
have because he (his Japanese boss) did hold things back’:

He wanted a report every day and it did not matter what the report
said. He just wanted a report. He wanted to show that he was in
charge. However, he did not know what he was in charge of. He
wanted to control but did not know what he was controlling.22

There seem to be two incompatible values held by the two groups, which
local staff have already noticed:

My Japanese colleague was employed for a long-term senior career

at this bank. I am employed to support this bank in London or in
Europe, in specific areas with certain specific skills.23

Although the two values were perceived as essential differences of management

systems in the two countries, the distinction between two ideal career paths
for managers is ideological rather than ‘real’ in each country. For, in Japan,
career paths for ‘generalist’ managers are limited to only core workers in
large corporations. Second, this career course does not apply to female
managers, or to lower-level managers.24 Although lifetime employment is
considered as one of the three characteristics of the Japanese management
system—lifetime employment, seniority payments, and consensus decision-
making—male workers and female workers nowadays leave their jobs sooner
and change their places of work within Japan. Therefore, only 16 per cent of

98
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

workers are employed as lifetime employees in Japan.25 Yet, as I have

mentioned previously, the Japanese male managers in Japanese banks in
London are ‘élite salary men’ and are employed as lifetime employees.
Therefore, they hold to the idea of lifetime employment in Japanese companies
more strongly than other Japanese.
As has been pointed out by Dedoussis, the way local staff in Japanese
transnational companies are being marginalised is the same as the way
employees in subsidiary companies in Japan and female workers in Japan
have been marginalised. These workers are sidelined as peripheral managers.
Japanese transnational companies apply the same employment system to
women and workers in subsidiary companies within Japan as to local staff in
London.26I am in agreement with this analysis, but I would also emphasise
the role of discourse of essential cultural difference, and that Japanese
managers are applying the discourse in order to legitimise different career
tracks for local staff. Japanese managers strongly believe that local staff like
to have ‘specialist’ career tracks but do not want to be integrated in the
Japanese management system.
In Britain, generalist training was in fact common in the past, and still is in
large corporations. Trevor et al. have already pointed out that the ‘generalist’
and ‘specialist’ dichotomy is merely a ‘popular view’ among managers. In
both the British and the Japanese work cultures, there are ‘generalists’ and
‘specialists’ in management. In the British Civil Service there are both
generalists and specialists, and in big British companies, such as ICI, people
have tended to be loyal to the company for many years. In the banking
business, and in large high-street store companies, careers have sometimes
taken the generalist pattern. Trevor also pointed out that both Japanese and
European managers think that the higher-position managers need to have a
broader perspective than that of the generalist managers.27
It can be said that the tendency to prefer being ‘specialists’ was strengthened
in Britain in the 1980s, because the development of new financial business
emphasised the need for new financial business skills. Young City workers
wanted to be specialists in this new international financial business. Ms
Nicholson, who graduated from Oxford, first joined a high-street bank and
gained training of a generalist nature. She moved to another section every six
months. She enjoyed training for project finance, but was asked to move to
another section. She resigned from her job at the bank, and joined a Japanese
bank, which wanted to employ a young specialist for project finance. According
to her, most of her colleague trainees in the high-street bank resigned from the
bank in order to become new financial business specialists in the 1980s. Pursuing
a speciality may be a comparatively new phenomenon in the City.
In response to the British managers’ requirements of promotion, Japanese
male managers said that local staff members were not patient enough to wait
for promotion, but that the Japanese were willing to accept assignments
without demanding too much. However, in reality, the Japanese chose their

99
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

career according to their own strategies and often likewise expressed their
hopes for promotion:

I came to London, because this company asked me to go. That’s all.

The company send you anywhere by one official letter of
appointment. I always said that I do not mind working anywhere,
but I always also said that I was interested in working abroad. It was
not a strong expression of interest, but I said I preferred to work
abroad. I had no strong hope that I would be able to do this.28

It is preferable not to express aggressive personal strategies openly, but, instead,

put everything down to fate:

I am a ‘salary man’, so if my company asks me to do something I will

do it. I have told them what kind of jobs I want to do, but I have
rarely revealed my hopes. I always say that I am happy to do any
job… It is fate. I think 90 per cent of human matters are fate. It is
valuable to make some effort, but for example, like historical heroes,
the heroes could only become heroes when they happened to coincide
with events in the world, if they had a little ability… I did not have a
difficult time as a salary man, but almost all of my business life has
been lucky.29

In spite of what they said, they did try to make career opportunities for
themselves. They applied to take exams within their companies to go abroad
to get an MBA. Mr Ogata also said he worked as hard as he could. He said
that he had always worked more than the value of his salary would demand.
They talked unofficially to their bosses about their hopes. These Japanese
bosses have carefully worked out strategies for gaining opportunities inside
their companies. They knew that they were members of the companies from
the time that they began work. Yet, they still maintained that they accepted
their fate.
In contrast to these discourses of Japanese managers, British managers
think that Japanese beliefs display a lack of freedom. Mr Walker said:

In England, if you give someone a job they don’t like, they’ll leave,
yes? So in Japan, that doesn’t happen. So you can give someone
experience for four years, and they’re absolutely miserable and hate
it, but they will never leave the company, whereas if you try and do
that in England, they would leave, you know, straight away… I think
it’s caused by, perhaps, the lack of individual freedom in the
employment market. So if you have more individual freedom, then
you have to treat your staff better. You have to reward the good
people, and maybe not reward the bad people.30

100
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

As the above extract shows, opening up a career through individual effort

and speaking out about hopes for the future is appreciated by the British.
However, these attitudes are not approved of by their Japanese bosses.
According to the values of Japanese bosses, local staff should be ‘patient’.
The expectations of British staff were two-fold; they wanted to be
promoted, but they did not want to wait, as Japanese managers did. They
came across as extremely anxious about their future. First, they could not
understand why their expertise was not valued for what it was. Second, they
felt it unfair that only the Japanese could be promoted globally. They
emphasised their expertise, but nevertheless they wanted to be promoted
globally. Yet, they thought that if there was no chance of promotion in the
near future, they would move to another company. This was freedom of
employment according to their norms. At the same time, they wanted their
future to be secure. Yet, the intentions of Japanese senior management were
not clear to the British staff. The Japanese did not consider British staff to be
members of the core group, but they wanted to keep good ‘specialists’. This
made the British staff extremely anxious.
To solve these problems, the Japanese have introduced another level of
segregation. They think that they can promote local staff in wholesale, but
not in retail, in their branches abroad, but not in Japan. Mr Miyazawa said:

We could separate our bank into wholesale banking and retail

banking. And in the wholesale part it might be possible to ask
foreigners to join the board. As for retail banking it is not necessary
to ask foreigners to join us. In wholesale banking, we need the
expertise, so, we likely to employ experts so as to be competitive
with American and European banks.31

At the same time, they are also training young Japanese ‘specialists’ for the
new financial business, such as fund managers. Yet, key Japanese male workers
are still apprehensive about becoming specialists. Even a young manager in
his twenties said he had been advised not to choose a ‘specialist’ career.32 Mr
Taguchi described his colleagues who decided to choose ‘specialists’ careers,
because they were fascinated by the skills required for the new financial
business:

I know two features. One worked for a sister company in the United
States for five years, and thought his speciality very exciting. So he
decided that his professional work was more valuable to him than
his career path in a Japanese company. The other did not have a
clear idea that he would have to give up his career path, but he did
think that his professional job was exciting, so he wanted to do the
same job within a Japanese company… The first one was 38 and the
other 32… They made their choices on their own… They decided

101
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

before other people talked to them. Japanese companies, or Japanese

banks weighted their choice too far towards giving up their career
paths as ‘generalists’. Companies force these people to give up hopes
for the future which many want to have. These people who made
these decisions made up their own minds. So, I was not able to tell
them anything.33

Mr Hoshino, who was an executive in a trading company was invited to move

to an American bank by a head-hunter. However, he decided not to go to the
American bank because he thought that it would be too insecure to give up a
career in his company. Mr Yamada also considered whether he ought to move to
an American or European bank to make the maximum use of his ability and to
maximise his salary potential, as he was one of the very few Japanese managers
who had new financial experience. Yet he was still hesitant about giving up his
hope of becoming an executive in a prestigious Japanese bank. We can see that
the ideology of the career paths of generalist managers was strong among these
Japanese managers. The ideology made the core workers feel safe and those who
were excluded from the categories felt insecure.
To sum up, although differences between ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ career
courses were talked of as essential in Japanese work culture, in fact they
functioned as a means of excluding local staff from this core group. One of
the British staff used the discourse of Japanese managers about belonging to
a company, but he was not sure that he could persist in his hope for promotion:

I do not feel I just work for this bank. I feel I am a part of this bank.
I feel this bank cares about me—almost like a family. I don’t feel that
I am going to lose my job. There are many times that I have made
mistakes yet I don’t feel insecure. In the American bank, what you
have done yesterday does not matter today.34

Being treated as ‘specialists’, local staff felt that they could not become real
members of the organisations in which ‘generalists’ work for a lifetime period.
A sense of being excluded made local staff less motivated. One ironical point
is that those who had spent their working life mostly abroad (in other words
kokusaiha) were, in a sense, specialists who were not considered as the core
group—in other words, kokunaiha who constituted the main staff in the
head office contacting bureaucrats and executives of other companies.
Japanese ‘international’ male managers themselves were marginalised by the
‘domestic group’, and they themselves were marginalising the local managers.

Individualism versus groupism

It is also ‘talked’ of that the Japanese work as a group, whereas British or
European staff work individually. Different types of work—groupism and

102
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

individualism—often become apparent through decision-making. Whereas

the form of decision-making in Britain is often individualistic, that of the
Japanese is in general consensus-based. They use the ringisho system, which
means if a core worker in a Japanese company wants to make a suggestion,
he has to write a proposal about the issue. Then, he has to canvass opinion
from his colleagues and people who he thinks would be affected by his
proposal. He has to gain as many ‘hanko’ (seals which function as signatures)35
as possible. After a manager has collected ‘hanko’ on his proposal, he gives it
to his direct boss, who passes it to his boss. Then, finally, the proposal reaches
the top of the branch. When the director of the branch looks at it, almost
everyone has already agreed to the proposal. Then the director just does a
final check on it. If he agrees with the proposal, he sends it to head office.
The final agreement will be made by head office in Tokyo. If the proposal is
not judged to be to the company’s advantage, it is returned to the proposer
for rethinking.
Japanese managers call their method of decision-making from the ‘bottom
up’. It takes time to make a final decision, but during the process of collecting
‘hanko’ almost all those involved in any way with the proposal get to know
what is going on. Thus, as many people as possible can check the proposal
and there is no one who does not know about it. In addition, they share
responsibility for it. Mr Matsuda told me that it was also regarded as a skill
for a worker in a Japanese company to decide whose agreement would be
necessary for a proposal. From the Japanese point of view, although the
Japanese procedure takes time, in this way many people can be involved with
every idea. However, if decision-making takes place according to the British
model, all the work is separate and if someone makes a mistake no one else
can follow it up and remedy it. Accordingly, the Japanese consider that British
decision-making is done from the ‘top down’. Usually it is impossible for the
top manager to know the practical problems, so the ‘bottom up’ way is much
better than the ‘top down’ way. In one bank they have compromised and
made rules that British managers have to collect a certain amount of ‘hanko’
as proof they have consulted with certain people and they have to write a
proposal not ‘to someone’, but ‘about the issue’.
Local managers found difficulty in accepting this as a meaningful process
of decision-making. They tend to report only to their direct bosses. The British
or Western way of decision-making is, spoken of as more individualistic. This
is another point on which Japanese managers and local managers clash. This
time-consuming style of decision-making, namely the ringisho system, is very
frustrating for the British managers, who think it a waste of time, whereas for
their part, Japanese managers think the British staff do not know how to work
as members of a group. One British senior manager accepted that ‘the ringisho
system is very important in manufacturing industry’ and ‘it is terribly important
why you are making a decision and how you are going to do it. And that if
anything is going wrong any number of people can put it right’.

103
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

However,

I do not believe that it serves the Japanese financial sector terribly

well. It produces lots of very bureaucratic people who spend lots of
time reporting about what is going on without understanding, or spend
a very long time understanding it. I do not believe that group decisions
made in Japan are actually better decisions than decisions made in
the Western environment. And if you look at the results of the banks
and insurance companies, these trading companies, leasing companies,
even the construction companies in the overseas markets, in the last
five years they have made many mistakes, and many mistakes I think
were to a large extent the fault of the system of making decisions.36

However, a Japanese manager in the same company insisted that the Japanese
had their own way of decision-making:

They think according to theory, but we think according to rules. We

know this rule is wrong, because it was decided ten years ago. It is
too old, but it is still our rule. If we want to change it, it takes time to
get agreement from all the people who have responsibility for the
rule. Then we have conflict between British and Japanese staff.37

Some Japanese managers accepted that they need more ‘top down’ decision-
making. Mrs Akamatsu said:

There is some business which is likely to be successful if the decisions

are made by ‘bottom up’ decision-making, and there are other matters
which ought to be decided by ‘top down’ decision-making. It depends
on the speed of the market they are in. It was good to decide slowly
when we did business in the Japanese islands, where the speed is
slow. It was also good that there were fewer banks. So we could
decide on the dealings. In that case, we could research with enough
time, and listen to everybody’s opinion like, ‘Do you also think so?
But I think…’. It was good. Yet, now all the money in the world
moves as quickly as a flood. By the time we would have listened to
everybody’s opinion the situation of the market would already have
changed. So in that situation if people in a higher position who know
the market well make the decisions and give orders to their
subordinates, the company can be more profitable…,38

She pointed out the ironic problem of slow decision-making in Japanese banks:

Yet we now have lots of new things which we do not know. So we

tend to think about and argue about those matters more. We know

104
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

we have to make decisions from the top down, but this is new for us.
So, we think we have to learn first…,38

So, they spend time discussing how to learn ‘top down decision-making’. It
seems that the core Japanese managers believe strongly in group decision-
making. But it was difficult to judge in practice how much they had to decide
by consensus decision-making, or how much the top managers in London
had to have authority to make decisions. Yet, it was often said that top
Japanese managers in London are very Westernised and want to change how
things are done, but that they do not have enough power to change the method
of decision-making. Some British managers said that their proposals for dealing
had been refused by head offices in Tokyo. Head offices have strong powers
in respect of final decisions.
The method of decision-making seems to be related to a way of thinking.
Mr Harrison commented:

I think the British way is to be very much more focused on a certain

project, and to be very specific about certain items, whereas I think
the Japanese way is to look at all the possibilities on a more general
basis, and to try and imagine, ‘What if this happened?’ ‘What if that
happened?’ and to look at all angles, and to cover every possibility,
whereas I think the British staff would be more focused.39

Mr Harrison said that the Japanese way of thinking loses focus, and that it
was extremely disadvantageous to show their Japanese ways of presentation
to local customers. Whereas, Japanese managers said that their British
colleagues do not know how to think about ‘the whole situation’.

Assertiveness versus ‘for the company’

Not only the way of decision-making, but also work attitudes were ‘talked’
of as different between the two groups. The Japanese have an image of the
British staff as very self-assertive, very aware of salaries, and of going home
without thinking about urgent work for the company. Mr Jinbo analysed the
situation as follows:

The biggest difference is in the sense of work. Japan rapidly became

a company society from a village society, so for the Japanese, a
company is like a village… Japanese company culture is like a village
culture. The reason why the Japanese work hard is the fear of being
excluded from the village. And they want to rise in the village. The
village is always their reference. The village is now replaced by the
company. So, people live with the criteria of how high they are

105
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

promoted in the company, and how much the company itself is

prestigious in society. So, people want to join as big a company as
possible, and want to be president of the company, though only a
few people can be top of the company, most people have to give up
in the middle of their promotion. In such a society like a pyramid,
people want to work to get status in society… The final purpose of
people’s work is to want it to be said that the person is promoted to
a very high position by the other people around them. It is like an
animal instinct to want to be promoted higher than colleagues, even
if by only one or two rungs on the ladder.40

He, however, said that British graduate trainees in his company work for
salaries and fringe benefits, not for social status. He believed that in this
country social status had been decided at birth, so, British staff want to
maximise their potential in one company, but if it proves difficult, they leave
the company.
In contrast to Japanese views on British work attitudes, most British staff
expressed the opinion that they wanted to contribute to the Japanese company.
Mr Chambers left his company because he found he could not contribute to
it. He felt that he had been excluded from decision-making among Japanese
senior managers. Mr Milligan said he was happy when he found he had been
remembered by his Japanese colleagues who had worked with him in London
and went back to Japan. He said he was happy when he was treated like a
family member of the company. Had these people been promoted to Tokyo,
or other branches, they would have shown similar loyalty to their companies
as the key Japanese male workers. Yet, as they were not given the same
opportunities, it is impossible to decide whether the local staff are loyal to
their Japanese companies or not. Nevertheless, these criteria are used by the
Japanese to describe the British staff.
It may be important that some locally hired Japanese women showed an
extremely strong sense of loyalty, though they clearly knew they do not have
much possibility of being promoted to high positions. Fuyuko, a locally hired
Japanese woman, once said that she was happy when she was told by her boss,
‘You are like an important pillar supporting the bank in London. If you were not
in this bank, this bank would not work. So, I hope you will stay in this bank for
ever’. Fuyuko said that this was really high praise from her boss, so she decided
to work much harder than before. Tatsuko, also a locally hired Japanese
woman, said she worked very hard, though her salary as a cashier was very low.
Then she described how the company accounts contained many mistakes, so she
checked the figures, and corrected every mistake for the company, working until
very late every day. Both Tatsuko and Fuyuko were in their fifties and showed a
strong sense of loyalty to their companies. They used the word meaning ‘for the
company’ repeatedly. Both of them were trained in Japan as bank clerks when
they were young, so they may have internalised the phrase in their work

106
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

attitudes. ‘For the company’ is a forceful expression which is evaluated as ‘good’

in Japanese employees’ talk. In general, the Japanese who are older have the
sense of ‘for the company’, but the younger generation of Japanese, especially
younger locally hired women, show less enthusiasm for the phrase.
In contrast to Japanese clerical staff who expressed a feeling of ‘for the
company’, local clerical staff did not share such a sense. They seemed to know
that this was a false image which offered them no reward. Sue, a British clerk,
said that she hung up her personality when she hung up her coat on entering
the company office. She said she did her job just for the salary. Laura, a British
clerk in her twenties, now studies banking business independently. She wants
to be a dealer, which could give her the opportunity to gain a higher salary.
Jane now has responsibility for signing the cheques which are issued from the
bank. She is proud of her job and has been working for the company for more
than 20 years. None of these women has been especially happy working for
Japanese companies as clerks, but they have been to some extent satisfied by
their positions and their salaries. They have worked as much as possible to
gain promotion and higher salaries, but not ‘for the company’.
‘Loyalty’ is a word favoured in the language of Japanese work culture but
not given such high esteem in the English work vocabulary. Instead of the
word ‘loyalty’, English senior managers use the word ‘contribution’. Both
words suggest a sense of belonging to their companies, but the degree of
belonging differs according to the positions of the employees and their
understanding of the term. British clerks give the least sense of belonging to
their companies. By contrast, Japanese male managers, female managers and
even locally hired Japanese women very much emphasised their sense of
belonging to their companies.
British senior staff showed that they felt excluded, though they also wanted
to be core members of their companies. Both Japanese and British can have a
sense of belonging to their companies. It would not be true to say that the
Japanese essentially have a stronger sense of loyalty than the British. The
strength of their loyalty is related to their distance from the core positions in
their companies. Yet, some locally hired Japanese like Fuyuko and Tatsuko,
who were considered the lowest grade by both the Japanese and the British,
showed the most extreme sense of belonging, as if they were imitating the
core people in the companies. Their illusion might be seen as a driving force
of the Japanese economy, though it is questionable how long such false images
can remain in Japanese society.

Work efficiency versus ‘work until late’

The ‘long working hours’ is one of the issues most talked about by interviewees
and is recognised as being part of the Japanese work culture. It has also been
proved statistically that the Japanese work longer than Westerners, even

107
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

though the recent recession reduced the working hours of the Japanese.41 In
addition, a White Paper published by the Japanese government pointed out
that the working hours of male white-collar workers have not declined in
Japan. For example, in the service industries, 23 per cent of male workers
work more than 60 hours per week, with 75 per cent of the work after 5
o’clock being done voluntarily, and only 10 per cent on the orders of bosses,
or planned.42 Therefore, although the working hours of blue-collar workers
are decreasing, and the government aims to reduce them to 1,800 hours per
year, white-collar workers’ working hours in Japan are not decreasing.
The extreme example may be the working practices in Japanese trading
companies. A senior manager in a trading company, who has responsibility
for the finance of the company, told me that newcomers to the company had
not gone home for two weeks when the company had been busy. The young
subordinates slept in a meeting room of the company. The manager was
proud of these subordinates.43 These Japanese male managers are proud of
their long working hours, although problems arising from the long working
hours, such as karo¯shi, or sudden death caused by the stress of extremely
long working hours, are considered to be a serious problem in Japanese work
culture. Key Japanese male workers think their long working hours prove
that they work harder than Westerners. Mr Taguchi, a Japanese managing
director, in his forties, said:

That is the only reason why the speed of economic development in

Japan and Britain has been so different, isn’t it? …For example, if
someone is asked to do something in two days, the Japanese do it the
best. The Japanese manage to finish it within two days, even if they
have to work about three hours after 5 o’clock. Then, they feel
satisfied. British staff say that they will do it, but they cannot. They
say, this happens, that happens, so and so, then it takes four days.
This response may be common in Britain, and British people respond
like this. So, as a result, the Japanese can do something in two days,
but the British can only do it in four days. So, the pace is half in this
country. We must consider what would happen if this continued for
30 years. It’s not an issue of the value of a human being, but I think
the speed of material, economic development is clearly shown in
these kinds of facts.44

As Mr Taguchi’s words indicate, from the Japanese viewpoint, Japanese work

discipline is much more task-oriented, with less demarcation between life
and work, but the British work ethic is more time-oriented. In order to finish
their tasks as soon as possible, these Japanese managers even work weekends.
Mrs Akamatsu said that she left her house between 6.30 a.m. and 7 a.m.,
arriving at work before 8.00 a.m. She went back home around 10 p.m. She
often came to work during the weekend, because she could not finish her

108
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

work during the week, and she said that she could concentrate more on her
work during the weekend. She added that she had not been sightseeing and
had had no leisure activities since she came to London two years previously.
In contrast to their self-image of being hard-working, the Japanese regard
the British as being time-oriented. Mr Hoshino said:

I did not hear it directly, but it is said that a British member of the
staff queried, ‘Why do you work until so late at night? If some work
remains to be done after 5 o’clock, you could go home and continue
it the next day, couldn’t you?’ The Japanese do not have such a
concept.45

However, the British staff’s own self-image is of being hard-working with a

task-oriented attitude towards work. Mr Miller, a personnel manager in his
fifties, claimed:

I come to work at about a quarter past eight in the morning. In fact,

I was here shortly after half past seven this morning. I seldom ever
leave the office before 7 o’clock at night. Sometimes, I’m here longer
than that. I am dealing with the salary review. On this salary review,
we are working here until 11 o’clock at night. So, it’s not true to say
simply that the Japanese do work long hours, and the local staff
don’t. That’s not correct. Yes, the Japanese do work long hours, but
sometimes socialise during those hours, and the local staff do leave
early sometimes, but quite often we work for long hours in this
branch. Both of us can, and do, work very hard.46

Not only did these British managers claim they were as hard-working as
Japanese, they looked at the long working hours of Japanese in a completely
different way from their own work disciplines. Mr Miller said:

Japanese tend to work very hard. This is the idea…. The Japanese
are here for long hours. But they don’t work all of the time. They
socialise here as well. Because you have to remember they are
foreigners. So, they get together, socialise where groups of them are,
which is at work primarily. They may want to try to please their
boss, and want to show that they are working hard, and sometime
they will work very hard. Because head office makes these demands.
The Japanese head office can only be satisfied with Japanese members
of the staff because of language, and therefore the Japanese staff
have to stay for long hours in their offices. There is this pressure on
them. And of course there is the additional pressure on the Japanese
staff—how they perform here affects their future. They must work
hard, very determinedly with a strong sense of commitment, because

109
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

their next assignment will be affected by their assessments in this

branch. The local staff also work long hours here, and the difference
is that the local staff actually have to do that.47

As Mr Miller’s comments on the long working hours of the Japanese indicate,

the British staff deny that the Japanese managers are hard-working. Because
of my own cultural bias as a Japanese, I was very surprised when I was told
by the British staff that the Japanese are not efficient because they cannot
finish their work by 5 o’clock. I had never doubted that the Japanese work
very hard and efficiently. Furthermore, I was told that the Japanese work
until late at night because they fall asleep in the morning, or read newspapers,
without doing any substantial work in the workplace. Sometimes, even, the
Japanese practise their golf swings in the office! British managers also
complained that their Japanese bosses started meetings just before 5 o’clock.
What a difference there is between the self-image of Japanese managers as
hard-working people, and the local staff’s view of the Japanese which is of
inefficient, lazy workers! From the Japanese managers’ point of view, ‘long
working hours’ means task-oriented hard work, with their life being dedicated
to work. They even think that work enhances their personal lives. However,
the British staff hold a different view: that the Japanese do not make efficient
use of their time, and stay late at work in order to please their bosses.
These are two contrasting evaluations of the long working hours based
upon different concepts of work and life within the same companies. In
addition, the two evaluations are emphasised in the power relationships of
the groups. The Japanese male managers are the most powerful managers
inside the organisations, and their praise of their own attitudes towards long
working hours are signs of their expressions of powerfulness. Moreover, the
Japanese and the British leave in accord with the office hierarchy, with the
less senior members being the first out of the door.
British staff had been afraid that they might be asked to work like the
Japanese company men before they joined Japanese companies. Yet, they
were not asked to work like Japanese male managers. Long working hours
are neither expected of local managers nor of Japanese female staff or local
clerical staff. Miss Ono, a young ambitious female manager sent from Tokyo
head office, said, ‘When I was working at head office, I had to work late at
night, but I had a limit. Women had to leave the office by 9.50’.48 The bank
Miss Ono works for did not allow women to work as late as their male
counterparts, though in another bank, Miss Tomoda stayed in the office until
after the last train had departed. British managers are expected to stay in the
office until 6 or 7 o’clock. Elaine said:

My Japanese manager does not think that I am working hard unless

I am in the office till half past six every night…. My British manager
told me about my appraisal mark and he told my colleagues as well.

110
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

And my response was that I would work when I have work. If this
bank wants to get rid of me because they think that I am not working
properly, then that is their decision. In fact, there is more to life than
exhausting oneself working for the bank. I know that when I am tired
I don’t work effectively or efficiently. I think that is a very difficult
concept for the Japanese people. In my view, if I have lots of work
then I will work until very late, but when I do not have much work,
then I will leave the office earlier. However, the Japanese do not think
like this. And when they do not approve of me leaving the office at
five, they do not tell me directly but tell my British boss instead… He
said if I want to be promoted to a manager in October this year, then
I have to do what is expected of me. To be honest, if they do not think
that what I am doing is good, then I do not want to be a manager.49

In contrast to British managers, local clerks are not asked to work until late
at night. They leave their offices at 5 o’clock. Mr Gibson, a clerk who had
worked for his bank for more than 20 years, said, ‘I sometimes take revenge
upon my employers, I steal working hours. I go home before five o’clock’.50
These clerks have very clearly divided their life from their work. Japanese
managers think these clerical staff do not work hard, and they do not ask
these clerks to work until late at night.
As we have seen above, there is a time sequence in these Japanese companies;
first clerks go home at 5 o’clock, then British managers at 6 or 7 o’clock.
Female Japanese managers, though there are not many in London, leave their
companies before male Japanese managers. Finally, Japanese male managers
are left to themselves.51 Although there were stories that Japanese bosses
tried not to stay in the offices in order to avoid making local staff feel excluded,
or that local staff stayed in their offices to be like the Japanese managers, the
main stories are about this sequence of leaving times from the offices. This
could represent the power relation of the different groups: from the most
powerless, the British clerks leaving their offices at 5 o’clock, to the most
powerful: the Japanese male managers, sent from Tokyo, staying until the
last. Although the local staff did not accept the Japanese idea that staying in
the offices demonstrated hard work and dedication to the companies, the
main reason why they claimed that the Japanese are lazy might be that they
knew about this sequence. The local staff, like Elaine, thought that it was
threatening to be forced to follow this custom.

Importance of private life versus work-oriented life

Another strong stereotypical image of the Japanese is the work-oriented

lifestyle. The Japanese are talked of as people who do not consider their
family, whereas the British staff or European staff have more personal lives

111
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

or family lives. Both of them are proud of their lifestyles. Mr Aoyama

commented:

In Britain, there are a very few, special, people who think work is the
centre of their being. Their private life is the most important thing
and work is just to make a living for the majority of the people,
though if the work is interesting it may be better. Contrary to this,
the Japanese overwhelmingly think that work is at their centre and
other aspects of life are around it…. British people think that
individual lives are important. This is a big difference. We are
inevitably company men, and the centre of our lives is the company,
at least for men. In Britain, even key people in companies make much
of their families, or they think that their own personal hobbies are
important. In this sense we have a lot to learn from them.52

Although he said the Japanese have to learn the British way of life, he still
considers that work is the centre of their lives and their family’s lives. He
thinks that he is not a man who is just a workaholic, but:

I cannot say that I can locate myself midway between the typical
Japanese and typical British. I am still among the Japanese. However,
if I used a magnifying glass and looked at the group of the Japanese
I may not be in the centre of the group. I can just say that among the
Japanese I am not typical of the Japanese but a little bit of a different
type of Japanese. Yet, the difference is not big.53

Even a young Japanese manager held the ideology that work ought to have
been the centre of his being:

For me, my private time is my main time. But it does not mean work
is just to pay my living expenses. Personally, if I can find a job in
which I can find confidence as a professional, I think I can concentrate
on the work…but I haven’t found such a job yet.54

Mr Katano mentioned that people in Britain have more community lives:

In this country, people seek their roles in the community in addition to

their status in companies, for example, to be a juror as in the US. They
can live in two systems of values. It is completely different from Japan.
In Japan business men only seek promotion in their corporation.55

Just as Mr Aoyama said that he had to learn from the people in this country,
Mr Chiba showed envious feelings about the people in this country using
stereotypical images:

112
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

The weather is mild. And people do not need much money (because
of the welfare system and non-commercialism). We can say this
country is a mature society. People have less tension than in the USA
or Asian countries. People do not get too concerned over tiny things.56

On the other hand, local staff expressed their pity for Japanese staff who do
not have personal lives. Miss Harris said that her Japanese male colleague
was not able to have leave when his wife gave birth and his mother came
over to help her daughter-in-law. Most British staff said their Japanese
colleagues’ wives were to be pitied because their husbands were not at home
enough. Elaine said that when she returned to her work after she gave birth,
her Japanese boss asked again and again about who was looking after her
baby. When she said that her husband who was working for a Swedish
company had leave for their baby and was looking after him, her Japanese
boss showed surprise and did not say anything.
Most of the Japanese male managers whom I interviewed were married
and lived in London with their families. The Japanese were proud of their
working attitudes, which were at the expense of their family lives, and said
that the British were more family oriented, and went home earlier than the
Japanese staff. The reason for this comparison was a sign of their feelings of
competitiveness. Japanese staff also enjoy their home life and think their family
important. Yet, even so, work is more central to there lives. Mr Matsuda said:

When I was in Hong Kong and Beijing, I left my family in Japan. I was
lonely and always felt I lacked something in my life. I always worried
about my family. But now my family live with me in London. It took
about one year for my family to get used to life here, but now my wife
can drive in London, go shopping and go to hospital by herself. So, I can
work as if I were in Japan and I can concentrate on my work.57

Again, lifestyles are very individually different, but in general, for the Japanese,
the institution of marriage is so strong that women who want to be equal to
men tend to be single, or work like Ms Akamatsu at the expense of children
and family lives. Japanese male managers could work more easily than women
through the support of their wives. In my interviews, British staff had more
varied lifestyles. Some male British managers were single, and other managers
had family lives with children but their wives were also working. Despite
differences between individuals, lifestyle difference was strongly tied in with
difference in attitudes to the institution of marriage in Japan and Britain. The
lifestyle of some Japanese women who are single is also tied in with the
institution of Japanese marriage. Such women had their own beliefs about
marriage, and therefore they would have hated to live in Japan. Being outside
Japan, they thought they could free themselves from the ‘ideal’ way of life for
Japanese women.

113
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Leisured life versus working without break

British workers taking long holidays are disapproved of by Japanese managers

who interpret this a sign of a lack of dedication. Indeed, British staff do have
longer holidays than the Japanese, and enjoy their leisure. I was sometimes
very surprised when I phoned British staff to be told that they were on holiday
for three weeks or so. I wondered who took over their responsibility if they
were away during a busy season such as April.58 By contrast, Japanese managers
sent from Japan do not take the full leave to which they are entitled. It is an
unwritten custom in Japanese companies that it is not appropriate to use all
paid time off. One manager told me that it is disadvantageous to promotion
prospects to take sick leave in Japanese companies, so people take paid time
off when they are ill. So, they need to preserve their right to paid leave in case
they are ill. Japanese managers usually take one week’s holiday in the summer
and one week in the winter in London. However, they think that this is long
compared to the holiday time they took when they were in Japan.
In the evening, British staff leave earlier and enjoy entertainment,
community life and family life as well as at weekends. On the other hand, the
Japanese do not have as much entertainment as their British counterparts
and sometimes even have to work during weekends. However, the younger
generation enjoy going to the theatre and playing tennis with their wives,
though sometimes this merges with socialising with their colleagues or
customers.

Job description versus overlapped responsibility

The ways of clerical work was another topical point when the two groups
talked about work cultures. It is often said that job descriptions are not clear
in Japanese companies. Japanese managers always have their minds on what
they should be doing as members of the company. British staff by contrast
have clearer ideas of their particular job responsibilities. However, this
difference does not cause direct problems, because British staff are given clearer
job descriptions when they sign their contracts. Japanese expatriates are never
given such clear definitions of their jobs.
Generalised job descriptions are related to ideas of group work. A Japanese
manager told me it was a great advantage for Japanese management, because
if responsibilities were overlapped, it was more secure. If more people knew
and thought about the issues, one issue could be discussed by many people,
and could be checked again and again. All the people in the same section,
therefore, could know everything that was happening. On the other hand, it
could be dangerous because sometimes nobody knew who had responsibility
for what. This was also related to the Japanese way of decision-making—
consensus decision-making.

114
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

However, this was another work attitude with which the local staff had
difficulty. Linda did not understand what the responsibilities of her boss were:

There was a Deputy General Manager of the bank. I don’t know

what he was doing! He sat here… Always there… He went to
meetings and things… Yes. So he, I mean, he did, he went, I mean,
he met customers and he went to meetings and whatever. He did,
you know, he did things. But…59

In the eyes of many of the British staff, the Japanese were not doing anything:
they talked, they had a chat, they read newspapers, they practised golf, and
they smoked. In the view of local staff, Japanese bosses were not working
properly, and did not know what they should be doing in their work.

Unavoidable mistakes versus correct and quick clerical work

The Japanese method of clerical work done by women is well known for its
severity. When I was a high-school student, one of my classmates decided to
become a bank clerk, because her father had died and her family could not
afford to send her to university. At that time banks were a good workplace for
high-school graduates. Banks were stable workplaces and provided girls with
good opportunities for finding marriage partners. Yet, the other classmates
thought it was really pitiful for her. They said, ‘Oh, poor girl, she will not be
able to go home until all the calculations are correct. Banks do not allow their
clerks to go home even if they have missed only one yen’. I said, ‘If only one
yen is missing, we could use our pocket money. One yen is not a lot’. ‘No, you
should not do that. It is the same as stealing money from the bank. You have
to do the sums again and again until everything is correct.’ I still remember the
conversation, and I have retained an awful image of clerical work in banks.
Most British clerical staff complain that Japanese bosses are too fussy,
whereas Japanese bosses are very unhappy with the standard of clerical work
of the British staff. As Sue said before, there were clashes because Japanese
bosses were angry with mistakes in calculation and mistakes in written figures.
Japanese bank managers have the idea that clerks must do jobs correctly and
quickly. If they cannot, they should be ashamed. Japanese clerks trained in
Japan are considered to be able to do this kind of work. Japanese male
managers said that the Japanese female clerical worker worked as hard as
two or three British put together. However, British clerical workers thought
mistakes could not be avoided. If they made a mistake, they just corrected
it—that was good enough. In addition to this, they felt that their bosses
exercised too much control. Furthermore, they thought this was a waste of
money and time. Mr Gibson explained why small variations in calculations
happened. It was because of decimal places:

115
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

The Japanese way of working in London is a very safe way of

working. It would be…rather reduce profits and make sure that
everything was just right…. They asked us to do it again and make
sure it was correct, even again. You’d do things twice rather than
once. All the systems in my bank, are systems, and more systems to
check systems. Everything we do is geared up to making sure there
are no mistakes, even though it is not cost-effective. Because
sometimes, you’re better off making £1 or £2 of mistakes, and losing
that, than taking ten hours’ work.60

British staff think the requirement to do clerical work so precisely gives too
much control to the local staff. Yet, Japanese bosses think that ‘accuracy’ is a
kind of corporate identity of Japanese banks.

Socialising with families and friends versus socialising

within the company

Japanese male managers are seen by British staff to have friendships only
within their companies. Playing golf and going drinking are infamous Japanese
work cultures. However, Japanese male managers said they had made friends
when they were high-school students and university students, but it was
difficult for them to have real friends in their companies. There was
competition between them for promotion. However, Japanese managers stuck
together in companies and went drinking. What does this mean? It was to
exchange information, but sometimes it was considered an obligation. Yet,
Mr Taguchi explained that it was not necessary to follow this manner of
socialising to gain promotion. Evaluation for promotion in Japanese
companies was primarily based on the results of work. Mr Hoshino said:

I wanted to think about socialisation rationally. For example, while

I was a head of the department of foreign exchange, I did not play
golf, in principle. I was unusual. In our company they had golf
competitions twice a year with people in securities houses since the
time of the previous head. I thought these competitions were an
obligation as a head of the department, so I played golf in that
competition. But I did not play golf except for this occasion. I think
playing golf with customers is a ridiculous custom.

In spite of his worry about his decision, he knew that he was appreciated:

One day I was chatting with the man who was president at that time.
He said, ‘Our company has staff who show strength of mind by not
playing golf. For example, you and…’ Then I thought I was OK.61

116
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

Mr Hoshino spent his time more on his own hobbies and writing, but he also
tried to socialise with many foreign businessmen more personally. Mr Ogata
enjoyed visiting historical places as much as possible while he was in London.
When he was a young student in his home town in a provincial area in Japan,
he liked to read Western novels and dramas. He was delighted to have
opportunities to go to the theatre in Europe. Mr Tamaru enjoyed having
vintage cars which he liked very much. Mr Miyazawa said it was impossible
in Japan to enjoy swimming and tennis so conveniently. Mr Kishi appreciated
more time with his wife in Europe, because he had more opportunities to
bring her to social occasions.
As these people show, Japanese managers had developed their own
hobbies and friendships in Europe, but still said it was difficult to make
friends in Britain. It was much easier for them to make friends with people
who were also foreigners. Their social and leisure time was spent with
Japanese people in their companies and with Japanese customers.
However, British staff had their friends outside the companies. It was rare
for either group to invite those from the other to their houses. The Japanese
said this was because the British lived far away from the area where the
Japanese lived, or because their wives felt it was too burdensome to invite
their British colleagues. Mrs Ueno emphasised her notions of differences
between Japanese and British as follows:

It is difficult to invite them to your house… People in my husband’s

bank do not have the custom of inviting British colleagues into their
houses. I only know them through my husbands’ eyes, but these
people have a radically different way of thinking from us. My husband
told me that they insist only upon their own rights. I do not know
whether this is true or not, but I have heard that they are too
demanding.61

It could be said that images of Japanese managers socialising among

themselves are, to some extent, results of segregation from local people in
their transnational working lives. It also can be said that such socialising in
order to collect information is a kind of rational behaviour and cannot be
considered unique to the Japanese.
In conclusion, as we have seen, various stories about how different their
work cultures are circulate among the Japanese and British staff. Both groups
consider their work culture to be superior to others; both claim they are
morally superior to others. The Japanese trained their managers as generalists,
worked as a group, were very loyal to their companies and worked longer
than local staff, devoting their lives to their companies, while the British or
other European staff trained themselves as specialists, worked individually,
were eager to contribute to their companies, finished their work by 5 o’clock,
and thought that their personal lives were more important than their working

117
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

lives. Both groups, especially male managers in each group, competed to

prove they were better at gaining initiatives for the business and management.
When different groups encounter different cultural values, each group
interprets and evaluates the others according to their own frame of reference.
However, when there are power struggles between groups, one idea becomes
dominant, and the other idea tends to be denied without there being any
exchange of ideas. The Japanese wanted the British staff to understand the
Japanese work ethic and to accept the hierarchical order which was represented
by the different leaving times. However, the British staff refused to accept
this hierarchical order, expressing the cultural superiority of their own attitudes
to work.
Previous comparative studies of Japanese work culture explained Japanese
work attitudes as essentially or historically different. But in fact, in this
multicultural situation, the discourse of different work attitudes was intended
to be used as ‘symbolic power’ when employees from different cultures
encountered each other. Stories of ‘different’ work cultures are used as topics
for emphasising differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Language and power

In addition to problems which arise from different concepts of work culture

in these Japanese companies, language has formed another communication
barrier between the ethnic groups. Language is always a big issue in
multinational companies, both in doing business and managing local staff.
How much was language a barrier for Japanese and British staff? Did the
Japanese especially have a problem with English?63 Why did the British staff
not want to learn Japanese?
It is said that Japanese multinational companies ask local staff to speak
Japanese in Asian countries, but in the United States, in Britain, and in other
European countries, the Japanese speak English.64 Does this mean that English
has more power than the Japanese language? Just as working-class people in
Britain may wish to adopt a middle-class way of speaking in order to climb
the social ladder, or as people who knew Latin had more power in early
modern Europe,65 being able to speak English may be a key factor for success
for Japanese businessmen in international financial business.
Although the Japanese bosses had studied English at school and at
universities, they had not learned functional English, only English for reading
and for grammar. On the other hand, local staff were not familiar with
Japanese. Japanese-language classes for local staff were offered in Japanese
banks, but British staff soon gave up attending.66
This section examines how people talked about language problems.
Although I could not judge from such stories how bad the Japanese bosses’
English was, almost all Japanese staff mentioned their ability in the English

118
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

language in their interviews. Some British staff mentioned the poor English
of their Japanese bosses, but others said their bosses had no problem with
English at all. It would be impossible to examine how much language was a
barrier in these companies, but I attempt to examine how people talked about
language as a barrier to communication.67
Speaking English was stressful for many Japanese male managers, especially
for those who had had few experiences of being abroad and were suddenly
asked to work in London; in other words, kokunaiha (the domestic group),
found it difficult to express their ideas in English. Mr Aoyama had worked in
the head office of his company for more than 20 years:

I found it very difficult. After I graduated from university, I did not

use English for my work, so it is difficult to get used to English now
… I cannot sufficiently explain what I want to say. I am fed up with
my English in which I cannot express sophisticated matters. For
example, when I talk with the British, I am afraid of what they will
think about the content of my speech. I can say what I have to say to
them directly, but I cannot make intellectual conversation. There is a
complete difference between what I think and what I say.68

As this quotation shows, Mr Aoyama expressed his irritation at not being

able to express his ideas in a sophisticated way. Mr Ogata, who had also
worked in the head office of his company and had been working in London
for two and a half years said:

I thought that communication was difficult, but the reason is clear.

It is because I am not good at English at all. I started English when I
was 44, so I think I cannot improve at all… I have no talent for
learning English. I am a tone-deaf person, and I think I have no
talent for learning a foreign language. So, I cannot improve my
English… It is unavoidable to feel frustration. But I have to accept it.
Just as it is impossible for someone who can run 100 metres in 12
seconds to run the same distance in 10 seconds, we cannot do what
we cannot do… I explain by using pictures when I cannot explain by
words. Difficulties are unavoidable. I cannot communicate as I can
in the Japanese language.69

Some Japanese senior managers were extremely frustrated when they were
angry with their local staff. Mr Nishikawa said that it was really difficult to
communicate in English. He said he was trying not to force his criteria as
being 100 per cent right and tried to look at things relatively, but he still felt
angry with his local staff, though he said he was trying not to. He explained
that when he was angry English words did not come out at all.
It is not only lack of vocabulary or knowledge of the language but the
way of expressing oneself that is different in the two languages. Japanese

119
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

bosses tended to instruct their British subordinates using indirect

expressions. When they found that they had not been understood, they said
nothing more. Ms Oki also said that when she had asked her British
subordinates to do some work, they had not done it in the way she had
expected. She said that she had not said anything about it, but that since
then she had been doing that kind of work on her own without asking her
British subordinates. Mr Ichikawa also said he had wanted his British
subordinates to clean his desk which had been done when he was in Japan.
He said to his young British staff, ‘This desk is dirty, isn’t it?’ He had meant
to ask the British staff to clean his office before he arrived for work. But he
had only received the answer, ‘Yes, it is’. Then he had realised that the
British staff had not understood what he had meant. Then, he decided to
clean his desk himself. Mr Nishikawa, Miss Oki and Mr Ichikawa had
expectations based on their ideas of how to work in an office, but their
expectations were not understood by local staff. However, they decided not
to explain what they had meant to their local staff.
Mr Yasuda, who had worked in Britain for about ten years in all, said Japanese
staff had to explain exactly what they wanted to say in English. He said:

It is impossible to ask people in this country to understand our orders

without telling them exactly. We have to use proper and precise
English. It is impossible to ask them to understand our feeling by
ishindenshin, which means to understand each other without words,
but from heart to heart.70

However, it took time and energy to explain what Japanese bosses wanted to
say in the English language. This brought about a reduction in communication.
Ms Akamatsu said:

In our meeting, a Japanese manager used an expression, ‘high-quality’

business. This made American staff extremely angry. They said, ‘As
the staff who do not deal in ‘high-quality’ business, are we doing
‘low-quality business?’71

The Japanese had used the word ‘high-quality’ as meaning ‘of less risk’, but
this expression is ‘Japalish’ (= Japanese+English), in other words, gairaigo,
which means words originally taken from a foreign language. But
sometimes meanings have been changed from their original meanings in
English. Sometimes Japanese use ‘Japalish’ and it causes confusion in
conversation with English-speaking staff. In this case, the American staff,
who had responsibility for the higher-risk business, felt that their dealings
were being looked down on by Japanese staff as ‘low-quality’ business.
These misunderstandings were always happening in companies. Again, Ms
Akamatsu said:

120
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

It [the difficulty of localisation] is a problem of language. It is not

that language is a problem, but all the problem stems from language…
I think the story about Babel is the story which expressed our situation
exactly. It is a fascinating story. J.P.Morgan and Deutsche Bank can
easily do ‘globalisation’, because they have fewer problems with
language… We are not good enough at English and local staff are
not good enough at Japanese. There are these two reasons. Anyway,
we have very few means of communication. It is a lot of bother for
Japanese to communicate in English rather than in Japanese, especially
if the topic is very complicated. When we have enough time, we
explain until they understand…72

Her story illustrates how language problems reduced communication in doing

business for a company.
When they had to do substantial business with local customers, this was
more serious. Mr Tomita talked about a bitter memory:

I went to an English school, for two or three months, before I came

to the City for the first time in the 1980s, but it was useless. After
coming to the City, I brushed up my English on the job, because I
had no time to go to an English school. Once I started to work in the
City, I tried to learn through my job, newspapers, the radio and the
television. It was really hard for me… When I went to see my
customers, I was not able to understand what they said. I took a
member of staff with me, because anything could have happened if I
had gone to see them on my own. It would have been better if it had
been only the details that I did not understand, but I did not even
understand what topic they were talking about. After I came back to
our office, and I received written reports from my British colleague,
I finally understood what they had been speaking about the day
before.73

Language problems prevented him from developing more business in the City:

There was no inconvenience at all, as far as I received written reports

from local staff members. However, I think if I could have understood
English, I would have done better. Although it was a difficult time to
do business, if I had understood English, I would have done a little
better. I achieved little while I was in the City.74

Even kokusaih, international businessmen, said they had experienced

difficulties in communication in English. A Japanese male boss who had
already become a kokusaiha after working abroad for more than ten years,
also said that if he had been able to speak English better, his business

121
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

would have been going much better. Mr Yamazaki, who had had individual
tuition in English conversation since he was a teenager and had spent most
of his working life in New York and London, still emphasised his difficulty
in English. When he first went abroad he read English newspapers and
listened to the radio. But he admitted that, generally speaking, the Japanese
are not good at the English language, or in understanding foreign people’s
feelings.75
Some Japanese emphasised general difficulties in communication between
different cultures rather than mentioning the language ability of Japanese
managers. Mr Ito said:

I do not find difficulty with English in my work, but language and

communication are difficult… We often talk about ‘reference points’.
Do you know this expression? Among us, Japanese, what we do and
what we think when we talk are almost the same. Yet there are about
40 nationalities in this company. Every nationality has different
‘reference points’. There are differences, but we do not know what
they are. For example, there is a Lebanese and myself, and we talk,
but I do not know how he was brought up and what kind of values
he has. He is unlikely to have the same values and background. We
Japanese have common reference points among us to some extent,
but I do not know what are the differences between his and mine. If
he said, ‘Uhm, Yes’, I do not understand how much he has agreed
with me. We communicate as if we had to choose between black and
white. Then conflicts between us are unavoidable.76

Mr Ito suggested that language was not independent of a cultural set of

meanings and values which made communication at work difficult between
people from different cultures.
The degree of difficulty they experience in speaking English differs
according to how necessary these managers perceive it to be. One manager
said that there was no problem with communication in English, because when
he had to talk to the English outside his company, he was a customer, so the
English business people respected him. When he spoke inside his company,
he was in the top position in his office, so he said he had no problem in
communication. These kokunaiha (domestic) Japanese managers said that
they had to accept that they could not speak English well.
As I had expected, some of the younger generation, by contrast, said that
they had no difficulty in communicating in English. A fund manager in his
early thirties, who had spent most of his career in New York and London,
said that he had no difficulty in communicating in English. He had only
learned his English on the job after he had joined the company. It was difficult
to judge whether his English was better than that of the older generation or
whether he has felt less pressure to speak better English.

122
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

The older generation emphasised how much effort they had made to
improve their English. When they were young in the 1960s and early 1970s,
they had no model for learning how to develop their business in a hostile
environment after the Second World War. Some senior managing directors
said that the younger generation were not making enough effort to improve
their English, because nowadays there were more Japanese and more
information about other countries compared to the period when they had
been young.
It was discovered that men and women spoke differently about their
difficulties in communicating in English. Most women said they spoke better
English than their male counterparts. In fact, female managers I interviewed
were kikokushijo, young returnees who had studied abroad when they were
children, and they were proud of their prowess in English. Miss Tomoda in
her twenties emphasised that she had lived in Hong Kong and the US, so her
grasp of English was much better than that of her male colleagues, and she
expressed irritation that as a result of this she had not been given better
opportunities for promotion to which she had felt entitled. An ability to speak
English is considered a ‘gender-biased’ qualification in these Japanese
multinational companies. Whereas the ability to speak English was not a
priority for Japanese male managers, female managers had gained
opportunities through their experience of being educated abroad. This was
also linked with the attitudes of these managers towards their children’s
education. These managers tended to educate their daughters abroad,
especially in English-speaking countries, and their sons in Japan, to allow
them the opportunity to follow the ‘élite course’ in Japan.
Locally hired Japanese came to Britain to study English and to try to find
better opportunities in their working lives. In addition, these women studied
English in order to gain advantage in their careers in Japanese companies.
When Japanese informants talked about the English language, there were
two symbolic meanings in ‘facility in the English language’. First, English as
a means of communication with English customers and local staff, and second,
English as a means of showing how competitive they were. And so, top
managers, who were respected by their customers because of the powerfulness
of the companies they represented, did not emphasise their difficulty in
communication in English. However, senior and middle managers who had
to work with the British staff often said that they had had difficulty with
English.
I interviewed these Japanese people in Japanese. Although I did not hear
them speaking English, their facility in English was talked about differently
according to their different positions in their companies.
There are thus different degrees of difficulty for Japanese people in
communicating in English. How did local staff in Japanese multinational
financial companies talk about their communication with their Japanese
colleagues in the English language?

123
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Only a few local staff spoke the Japanese language, though Japanese head
offices and senior managers thought it was essential to speak Japanese to be
a top manager or to be promoted to Tokyo. As Mr Miyazawa said:

Language is the biggest problem in promoting local staff to Tokyo. I

do not think we would expect Americans or British to speak the
language when we employ them. We may employ people who know
marketing even though they are not able to speak Japanese and ask
them to participate in our management. But I think it would be
difficult to promote them to Japan.77

However, British staff did not think it was essential to speak Japanese in
order to work in Japanese companies. Mr Milligan, a senior British manager,
did not speak Japanese:

That’s actually embarrassing, because I’m working for a Japanese

bank, and probably I should speak Japanese. In a sense, the advantage
that Japanese people have is, you learnt some English at school, didn’t
you…at least you had, what I would call, a ‘head start’. I did no
Japanese at school, none at all, and, in order to learn Japanese now…
I could do, we have Japanese lessons if we want, but it would be
extremely difficult. And the reason why I don’t is, first of all, my
clients speak English, and secondly, all the Japanese people that I
work with speak pretty good English.

He said it was not necessary to speak Japanese, but he was frustrated:

You learn to be patient if someone’s English is not so good, because,

you know, communication is crucial. But, you know, the senior
management of the bank communicate in Japanese over something,
sometimes. Sometimes no problem, but other times, you feel…sort
of threatened. It’s like in any situation, if somebody is speaking about
you, and you don’t understand what they’re saying, you automatically
feel nervous… The way that I personally deal with it, if I find it’s
bothering me, I just say, ‘Come on, what are you talking about?’ I
just ask. But I think you, you have to be reasonable, that this is, this
is a Japanese bank, and there are many Japanese people in it, and it’s
stupid to say that everybody must speak English. It’s just efficient to
allow Japanese to be spoken.78

In his comment there are contradictions. He said that the Japanese bosses’
English was all right, but also that the Japanese bosses’ English was poor. He
also felt that he was excluded when the Japanese staff spoke Japanese among
themselves, but did not want to study Japanese.

124
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

Mr Milligan tried not to blame his Japanese bosses, but he still claimed
that Japanese bosses could not speak English well:

Japanese people, they may be very bright, they may be very good
bankers, but their English is poor, and they suffer as a result. And
that’s, and this is just prejudice… Yes. You look at that person, and
you think that person is stupid, just because they can’t communicate,
but that’s not fair.79

Mr Milligan’s comments on the English of his Japanese bosses are

controversial, and from them we can see his feelings towards his bosses. He
tried to respect his Japanese bosses, but he did not think their ability in global
financial businesses was good enough if judged by their use of the English
language. Another manager also described how to solve the problems in
practice:

They are a bit embarrassed about their spoken words. As for me I

have no Japanese at all. I never judge them because I think it is
fantastic that they speak English so well. Grammatically, they write
so well… Normally, though on the phone, what I do is I usually
speak slightly slower than I do normally and I make sure that I am
very concise with what I want. If I am not getting through to them,
what I do is I will write to them or fax them and ten minutes later, I
phone them and we discuss the facts. I tend not to have a problem
with them.80

A secretary, who did not here show respect to Japanese senior managers,
talked more straightforwardly about problems with the English of her Japanese
bosses. Ms Harris commented:

When they speak to you, when they speak to people in English, then
they try and do as little as possible, with as few words, whereas if
they spoke more English, it would be better for them, more beneficial
for them, and certainly more beneficial for me… When I worked for
the Swedes, unless your English was of a certain standard, you were
not allowed to work outside Sweden. You had to have English up to
a certain standard to be able to go and integrate. And this is what
happens, so why do so many Japanese stay together, because they
feel, perhaps feel safe together, you know and they don’t have to
venture out into the English language or anything… They are not
going to better their English. I mean, people go back to Japan after
spending two or three years here, and their English is exactly the
same as when they came, whereas if they spoke more English, they
would improve.81

125
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Here we can see clearly that there was a strongly held belief among the British
staff that the English language was a common language throughout the world,
and that the Japanese had to accept this idea. However, the Japanese thought
Japanese was essential for doing business in Japan as well as for understanding
Japanese culture. We can see aspects of cultural hegemony of language in
these perceptions.
When British staff were happy in their work, they said that the English of
their Japanese bosses was all right. Yet when they had work difficulties and
were uncertain about their future promotion in Japanese banks, they talked
more negatively about the ability of the Japanese staff to speak good English.
Local staff in lower positions were more forcible in criticising the English of
their bosses compared with the criticisms by senior managers. Senior managers
were more inclined to emphasise differences in culture rather than language.
It is difficult to judge which came first, distrust or problems in communication.
However, there was definitely a problem of communication between Japanese
and British staff. Language problems were responsible for a reduction in
communication, as Ms Akamatsu mentioned. Japanese bosses tended not to
try to express themselves. It was easier for them to take problems on themselves,
rather than to spend time in trying to communicate with local staff.
In today’s world, English is the universal business language. However,
most Japanese staff I interviewed had not had enough education to speak
English fluently. Although they said that they had made enormous efforts to
improve their English, it was still difficult for them to communicate in English.
They were not confident in speaking English. Some said it was not necessary
to improve their English because the Japanese economy was becoming stronger.
However, for most Japanese staff, English was a barometer of
‘internationalisation’ and was talked of differently according to their positions.
The way these people regarded English did not only reveal their facility in the
language, but highlighted differences in relations between men and women,
between kokusaiha and kokunaiha, between generations, and between
Japanese and English native speakers. There is no objective measure of facility
in English, but it was talked of as a symbol of internationalisation for the
Japanese and as a goal to strive for. The Japanese women who realised that
they were marginalised by the Japanese men wanted to use English as a symbol
of another measure which could be more standardised.
Fortunately, or unfortunately, Japan was not colonised when it came into
contact with Western powers in the late nineteenth century. The Japanese
were able to keep Japanese as their official language, and English remained a
foreign language. This history affected how people talked about the English
language in Japanese transnational companies and what the situation
represents. In today’s world, Japanese is a ‘vernacular’ language. The Japanese,
especially senior managers, are, therefore, not good at English, and few local
staff speak Japanese. Although Japan has become renowned as the largest
capital supplier in the world economy, it has not gained cultural hegemony in

126
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

today’s world. If the Japanese economy had remained continuously successful,

the Japanese language might have been more widely used and might have
become a universal language, like English. This has not happened, and few
local staff want to learn Japanese. The Japanese are powerful within companies
but, in terms of language, local staff do not feel powerless. The power
relationship embodied in the universal language and the vernacular language
makes communication between these groups more difficult.
Ways of talking about language problems represent relations between
people. Japanese male managers who wanted to be international businessmen
were not satisfied with their language facilities. They thought that it was not
good enough that they could not speak sophisticated English. Conversely,
those managers who gave up improving their English felt it unnecessary to
continue as it was enough for them to communicate by means of body language
and writing on paper. Some British staff solved these language problems by
being patient and using confirmation in writing. Others sometimes felt
frustrated by the English of their Japanese bosses. When they were anxious
about their future in the companies, they felt that the poor English of their
Japanese bosses represented a lack of general ability. Japanese bosses were
frightened when they could not understand English conversations in their
business, and British staff members felt threatened when meetings involving
decision-making were conducted in Japanese.
As for my first question—how far language was a barrier to communication
in these companies—there is no objective evidence in my interviews to prove
that the problem of language was a reason for poor communication, but
nevertheless the problem of language was talked of again and again as a serious
one for people in these Japanese multinational companies, and it prevented an
exchange of ideas between people in the two groups. Talking about language
was also an expression of power, and of cultural identity as Japanese or British.
In addition, lack of communication and feelings of exclusion for the Japanese
from the British business community, and for local staff from the promotional
system in the Japanese companies, may have led both groups to choose the
problem of language to explain their feelings of desperation.
The expansion of Japanese financial business in the City of London enlarged
the Japanese organisations in the City. As a result, Japanese companies
introduced more formal management structures, employing British personnel
management, and establishing segregated management. This caused yet more
problems of communication between the two groups. Senior local staff had
particular difficulty in accepting their exclusion from Japanese ‘global’
promotions.
Although individuals interacted in their everyday working lives, they
exchanged few ideas, and created images of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The characteristics
of the two working cultures were emphasised, and used to legitimise the
segregation. Stories which circulated in the workplaces can be analysed as
stories of ‘others’.

127
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

In addition, language was an important factor in poor communication

between two competing groups, Japanese men and British men. We can see
how language was an important factor in their competitiveness.
I wanted to analyse problems of working cultures in Japanese transnational
companies from a ‘humanistic’ viewpoint. I wanted to look at how people
exchanged ideas as a result of the ‘global’ interaction of ordinary workers.
However, I found that it was difficult to exchange ideas when there was
cultural competition. It seems to me that people who stick to their own culture
appear to be more at ease than people who have tried to reach beyond their
own culture.

Notes
1 Interview 70, with a Japanese male manager (at a non-life insurance company),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
2 Interview 32, with a British female clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
3 Ibid.
4 Interview 43, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Interview 65, with a British male clerk (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
8 Interview 43, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
9 Ibid.
10 Interview 85, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
11 Interview 77, with a British female manager (at a securities company), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
12 Interview 78, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
13 Interview 60, with a British female clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
14 ‘New Phase of Anglo-Japanese Interchange: Symposium about Japanese
Management’, Yomiurishinbun Europe, 1 April 1995, p. 8.
15 ‘Boom Times Back for City Salaries’, Evening Standard, 17 May, 1994, p. 32.
16 Interview 54, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
17 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
18 ‘A Love Affair at Work Turns Sour’, Independent, section two, 15 May 1996,
pp. 1–3.
19 Interview 9, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
20 Interview 46, with a British male manager (at a securities company), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
21 Ibid.

128
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

22 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
23 Ibid.
24 For the careers of female managers, see Alice Lam, Women and Japanese
Management : Discrimination and Reform, 1992.
25 Kazuo Yoshida, Nihongata Keiei System no Kouzai (Advantages and
Disadvantages of the Japanese Management System), 1994 (first published in
1993), p. 29.
26 Vagelis Dedoussis, ‘The Core Workforce-Peripheral Workforce Dichotomy and
the Transfer of Japanese Management Practices’, in Nigel Campbell and Fred
Burton, eds, Japanese Multinationals: Strategies and Management in the Global
Kaisha, 1994.
27 Malcolm Trevor, Jochen Schendel and Bernhard Wilpert, The Japanese
Management Development System: Generalists and Specialists in Japanese
Companies Abroad, 1986, pp. 255–8.
28 Interview 89, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
29 Interview 80, with a Japanese male manager (at an insurance company), in his
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
30 Interview 54, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
31 Interview 89, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
32 Interview 27, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 20s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
33 Interview 93, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London.
34 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
35 Chinese characters are used for hanko, therefore, local staff cannot even read
who has agreed to the proposals. A locally hired Japanese woman told me that
Japanese banks should use hanko written in the Western alphabet.
36 Interview 36, with a British manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank), in his
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
37 Interview 2, with a Japanese manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank), in his
30s, interviewed in London in 1992.
38 Interview 100, with a Japanese female manager (at a subsidiary company of a
bank), in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
39 Interview 75, with a British male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 30s, interviewed in London in 1994.
40 Interview 43, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
41 Ministry of Labour, White Paper on Labour, 1994, pp. 65–7 and pp. 236–40.
Japanese manufacturing workers work 2,017 hours per year compared with
Americans 1,957, British 1,911, French 1,682 and Germans 1,570 hours.
42 Ibid., pp. 241–2.
43 Interview 74, with a Japanese male manager (at a financial subsidiary of a trading
company), in his 50s, interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.
44 Interview 93, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1995.
45 Interview 71, with a Japanese male manager (at a financial subsidiary of a trading
company), in his 50s, interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.

129
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

46 Interview 48, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
47 Ibid.
48 Interview 11, with a Japanese female manager (at a subsidiary company of a
bank), in her 20s, interviewed in London in 1992.
49 Interview 58, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
50 Interview 65, with a British male clerk (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
51 Although Japanese managers go home late at night, they are required to come to
the office without being late.
52 Interview 9, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
53 Ibid.
54 Interview 27, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 20s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
55 Interview 2, with a Japanese manager (at a subsidiary of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
56 Interview 24, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
57 Interview 12, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
58 Japanese companies make annual reports in April, and have general meetings of
shareholders in June.
59 Interview 99, with a British female clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in Colchester in 1995.
60 Interview 65, with a British male clerk (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
61 Interview 71, with a Japanese male manager (at a financial subsidiary of trading
company), in his 50s, interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.
62 Interview 30, with a housewife of a Japanese manager in her 30s, interviewed in
London.
63 A meeting between bureaucrats from Japan and Germany was held in 1985. At
the meeting, the Japanese bureaucrats asked the German bureaucrats not to
interview Japanese managing directors in branches of Japanese banks in Germany
using German. This suggests that Japanese managers have more difficulties in
other Western languages than in English. Ministry of Finance, ed, The Annual
Report of the International Finance Bureau, 1994, p. 51.
64 In Japanese companies in Singapore, local staff are expected to address their
Japanese colleagues in the Japanese manner, for example, Sakai-San. (See Eyal
Ben-Ari, ‘Golfing Culture: Organization and “Consumption Careers”, Among
Japanese Business Expatriates in Singapore’, presented at the European
Association of Japanese Studies Conference, August, 1994.) It is also said that
the Japanese method of management can be followed in Japanese multinational
companies in Asian countries. Whereas Japanese multinational companies in the
US cannot continue with their methods, and are obliged to adopt more American
methods of management. I was told that Britain is in the middle (Interview 79).
65 For the social history of language, see Peter Burke, History and Social Theory,
1992, pp. 96–8; Peter Burke and Roy Porter, eds, Language, Self, and Society,
1991; Pierre Bourdieu (edited and introduced by John B. Thompson), Language
and Symbolic Power, 1991.
66 Yasuyuki Hamada and Takashi Sawada, Hogin London Shiten (The London

130
 SEGREGATION AND LANGUAGES OF DIFFERENT WORK CULTURES

Branches of Japanese Banks), 1992, p. 42.

67 For language problems of the Japanese, see Jiri V.Neustupny, Communicating
with the Japanese, 1987.
68 Interview 9, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
69 Interview 80, with a Japanese male manager (at an insurance company), in his
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
70 Interview 16, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
71 Interview 100, with a Japanese female manager (at a subsidiary company of a
bank), in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
72 Ibid.
73 Interview 84, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
74 Ibid.
75 Interview without recording, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a
bank), in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
76 Interview 83, with a Japanese male manager (at a securities company), in his
40s, interviewed in London in 1995.
77 Interview 89, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1995.
78 Interview 44, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
79 Ibid.
80 Interview 58, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 30s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
81 Interview 67, with a British clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 30s, interviewed
in London in 1994.

131
 5
COMPETING MASCULINITIES
AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES
Gender relationships between cultures

Differences in gender relations exacerbated the problem of communication

between the two cultural groups. Additionally, it can be said that segregation
emphasised different gender identities between the two. Differences could have
been reduced through communication and the exchange of ideas. However,
what was in fact happening was that gender identities, like the ideology of
work cultures, which we looked at in Chapter 4, were becoming closer to
stereotypical images of ‘us’ and ‘others’. It is essential to look at gender when
we examine cross-cultural relations. This chapter therefore examines the inter-
relation between gender and culture in Japanese transnational companies.
Gender identities, both masculinities and femininities, are no longer
considered as homogeneous or unchanged, but rather as diversified or
changing. Recently, masculinities have been examined in terms of plurality.
Ideas of masculinities have been constructed through academic discourses
and they have been changed historically.1 It has also been recognised that
masculinities have been culturally constructed, and have been differently
constructed across classes and ethnicities. Femininities have also been explored
as cultural construction. It has been recognised that ethnicity or religion also
affect the ways femininities are expressed. In addition, recent studies in non-
Western societies, have begun to make claims for their own views based on
their cultural identities. Voices of ‘the other’ are beginning to be heard in
English literature and given truths have now become ‘partial truths’.2 Gender
identities and cultural differences have become more and more clearly
recognised. Anthropologists presented different forms of masculinities
according to different cultures.3 Femininities are nowadays looked at not
only through Western eyes, but there has also been an indigenous assertion
of femininities. It is clear that Western white middle-class gender identities
cannot be normative gender identities in other cultures of the present world.
In parallel with the collapse of unified normative gender identity, the
relationships between gender and hierarchy in the workplace have also received
much attention in organisation studies. In addition, competitive masculinities
in multicultural workplaces have been examined as urgent issues by academics

132
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

of work organisations. For example, Cheng explored how masculinities are

competing in multiethnic companies in the USA.4 Gender relationships in
increasingly multicultural workplaces also provide examples of how plural
masculinities and femininities are constructed through everyday interactions.
Deconstruction of essentialist ideas of gender could bring new insights into
gender relationships in multinational workplaces. Transnational workplaces
are now being examined as case studies to look at how interrelationships of
gender and culture operate through their everyday interactions. For instance,
in newly emerging Asian overseas companies, Euro-American masculinities
are now being challenged.5
The problems of Japanese transnational companies can also be explained
as the competitions of gender identities between Japanese, who came to the
West from a latecomer industrial country, and Western managers, who still
hold ideas of cultural hegemony in the present world. The management of
transnational companies cannot be considered only as a matter of management
skills, but needs to be considered within the wider context of the present
world both geographically and historically. On top of that, psychological
competition between male managers was expressed through gender identities,
through their differing masculinities. Japanese and British men and women
saw the femininities of each culture as different, and the men of both cultures
viewed these femininities as in opposition to their own masculinities.
This chapter looks first at gender-segregated career paths in these Japanese
financial firms, which are among the most hierarchical of workplaces in Japan,
using life stories of Japanese female managers. The previous chapter focused
mainly on what interviewees said about the differences between the working
practices of the Japanese and the British, and the discussion of both Japanese
and British career paths was based on the typical careers of men. As Alice
Lam has found while looking at the divergent career paths of men and women
in a department store, the ideology of the generalist career path of Japanese
men does not apply to Japanese female managers.6 This, therefore, prevents
Japanese women who are well educated from entering the male management
world, and produces core-periphery relationships between men and women
in large corporations.7 On the other hand, British female staff in Japanese
firms did not seem to find the problem as severe as Japanese female staff. In
the interviews, British female managers talked about their difficulties in
connection with cultural rather than gender problems. They said that their
career paths were closer to those of their male counterparts, though there
was gender segregation between male and female British staff. In consequence,
it was ‘talked’ about that there were two different gender career paths for
women in one company—Japanese and British. This emphasises gender
identity in each of the groups.
Second, this chapter looks at male dominance and women’s responses to
that dominance in the Japanese financial companies. The gender segregation
in Japanese companies has already been considered in terms of economic

133
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

functions, or social and cultural conditions in Japan.8 However, previous

studies have not explained sufficiently how and why male dominance remains
in large Japanese companies.9 Nor have they explained how and why Japanese
men maintain such great power in these large corporations. As far as my
interviews are concerned, there seem to be two main reasons for male
dominance in Japanese management. First, male networks were formed among
bureaucrats, bankers and other company men in large corporations. These
networks were developed through family, education,10 and also through
friendships and training in the workplace. Women could also use family and
education networks, but it seemed to be impossible for women to penetrate
male networks. Second, male dominance was part of the collective
consciousness of men, although it is questionable whether this collective
consciousness is a reflection of reality or the cause of the male dominance. I
would like to look at the latter aspects: Japanese male managers have a self-
image which identifies them as men at the centre of their family, company,
and even their country. This psychological self-perception supports their core
positions in their companies.
The third purpose of this chapter is to explore how Japanese women in
peripheral positions respond to the dominance of Japanese male managers.
There are widespread popular images which suggest that Japanese women
do not attempt to enter the male world in more assertive ways. Of female
Japanese graduates, only a minority became managers. Japanese female
managers who had worked for more than ten years, internalised the ideas of
Japanese gender relations by which they had been surrounded, suppressing
any conflicts. My interviews suggest that those who could not internalise the
dominant ideas of gender relationships left their companies in the early stage
of their careers. Can this be explained as a passive attitude towards male
dominance, or an individual’s strategy for their lives?
Fourth, this chapter explores how the British staff perceived gender
relationships in these Japanese financial firms, since gender relationships also
influenced the degree of workplace satisfaction for local staff. As recent articles
in newspapers show, gender relationships in Japanese financial firms in London
are not approved of by local staff.11 The interviews revealed that in contrast
to the Japanese women’s response to male dominance, British women did
not show conformity.12 They showed a more assertive response, though the
degree of their discontent varied according to their status. British men showed
a more contradictory response to Japanese male managers; they did not blame
their Japanese male bosses directly. However, British men questioned their
career prospects, and had more inner conflicts than had British female
managers, because for them there was more severe competition between males
from different cultures.
Finally, I examine, in response to the British ‘gaze’, how the Japanese talked
about British gender relationships, and their own masculinity and femininity.
Despite my expectation that they might have changed their gender identity

134
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

as a consequence of encountering a different gender identity, these Japanese

managers emphasised instead the superiority of their gender relationships in
Japanese society. Gender is a decisively important aspect in the formation of
cultural identity.13

Segregation of the career courses of

Japanese female managers

Strongly structured male generalist career paths caused difficulties for Japanese
female managers, as Lam explains in her book on management in Japan.14 In
order to resolve pressures against discrimination in the system, the government
passed the Equal Opportunity Law (EEO Law) in 1985. The law was
implemented by government and employers’ organisations. In consequence,
two career courses for women were legitimated by the law; sōgōshoku (a
career course for female graduates who work in the same condition as their
male counterparts), and ippanshoku (a career course for female staff who
have only supporting roles).15 The new law came into force in 1986, and
since then young female graduates have had to choose their career courses
between sōgōshoku and ippanshoku when they join companies. For example,
Miss Hosokawa in her twenties chose ippanshoku from the beginning, because
‘it would be better to make a decision about my career after I know whether
or not I will marry, or what kind of married life I will have’. Although her
post is subordinate to male managers, she thought ippanshoku was the more
realistic choice in terms of Japanese ideas of gender. If she had chosen
sōgōshoku, she would have had to work in the same way as men. She would
have had to work until late at night and move all over the world, which
would have prevented her from having an ideal married life. Her parents also
advised her to work only until marriage.
The expectations and training of sōgōshoku and ippanshoku are different
from the beginning. As Miss Kawakami, who was also educated in the US and
spoke English confidently, said, ‘the training and expectations of us, ippanshoku,
and that of the sōgōshoku women are radically different’. Although women
who chose ippanshoku could change their career some years later, just as the
older generation was able to gain opportunities for promotion when the EEO
law was passed, these younger ippanshoku women were segregated from the
careers of women who chose to become managers like their male counterparts.
This implies that the EEO law officially legitimated women’s subord—nate
positions in these companies under the guise of equal employment.
The segregation between the two courses for women divided young female
graduate trainees. This made sōgōshoku women feel isolated. The number of
sōgōshoku is smaller than that of ippanshoku. Miss Ono said that only ten
sōgōshoku women had been employed when she joined the bank. They
expected to work like men, but they tended to be assigned to research sections,

135
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

because customers preferred to talk about business with male staff. I met
three young female managers of this type. Despite their better qualifications
and a better family background than their male counterparts, their career
paths so far indicated that they would not reach the core of management, but
would be ‘specialists’ in research sections, or in international business. These
young female managers could be trail-blazers, but they have no appropriate
role-models for their career strategies.
The EEO law benefited older women in subordinate positions. When the
law was passed, female graduates who had worked in banks for more than
20 years were able to move from ippanshoku to sōgōshoku later in their
career lives. They had at first worked as clerical workers alongside workers
just out of high school, and they had seen their female colleagues resigning
because of marriage or having children. Most graduates were initially assigned
to clerical or other menial work. Male graduates were promoted to more
senior positions within one or two years, but their female counterparts spent
much longer in junior posts. For example, Ms Oki stayed in a section for 12
years. They saw their male colleagues being promoted while they remained
in the same section, repeating the same clerical work. Ms Akamatsu envied
her male colleagues, despite the harsh training they received:

One day, my young male colleague had a report he had written

rejected by our boss. The boss threw the form back towards him. I
really envied him, because he was being trained… I was learning by
myself, but I was not trained like him.16

They had put up with this situation until the EEO law was passed in 1985,
which allowed them to move out from the section they had been in for many
years and the law gave them opportunities to work abroad. However, young
ippanshoku women are separated from the beginning from young female
candidates for managers, so they may not have the opportunity to become
‘élite’ women later in their careers.
Conventional ideas about working lives in Japan—men work until late at
night and devote their lives to the company, while women look after their
children at home—prevent women from entering the male arena. Young female
managers have to make a choice between incompatible ideals: a good family
life or a fulfilling working life. This makes young female graduates uncertain
about their future career plans, and many of them resign from their workplaces
after a few years.
Because of the number of female graduates who resign, women are spoken
of as unreliable workers by their male counterparts. Mr Yoshino said, ‘female
graduates were given opportunities by the law but they soon resigned. We do
not know why these women betrayed our trust’.17 Male management argued
that women frequently resigned before long, even if they were trained for
lifetime employment.

136
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

If international financial business becomes more important for the Japanese

economy, and Japanese management became more influenced by Western
culture, these women might gain more opportunities for promotion to high
positions in large companies. Nevertheless, the segregated career courses of
sōgōshoku and ippanshoku indicate that the position of the majority of women
will continue to be on the periphery.
In my interviews, I did not find British women in high administrative
positions in these Japanese banks. I heard that there were some specialists in
high positions, such as legal advisors, and I did find some British female
personnel managers in Japanese banks in London. Although there were a
few male clerical workers, most of the clerical jobs were performed by women.
The situation in Japanese financial firms in London cannot be generalised to
that in Britain. However my observation was that there was also gendered
job segregation among British staff.18 Yet, what is interesting is that they did
not talk to me about gendered segregation in Britain. The career plans of the
British women were not spoken of in terms of gender problems. This might
be because they were interviewed by a Japanese interviewer, and they might
have wanted to show me how progressive Britain was. Or it might be that it
is the culture in the UK to show an ability to break through barriers between
men and women, or that a person’s career is more related to their qualifications
than in Japan. If women believed that their career paths were based on
individual merit, they might make an effort to gain higher qualifications and
greater skills, and deny the importance of gender in determining their future.
Yet, in the languages of the so-called Japanese work culture, the careers of
men and women are strictly role-divided. In addition, most Japanese I
interviewed did not think that personal qualifications could help them break
through this structure, even for male core workers. It is therefore unlikely for
women to break the glass ceiling by gaining higher qualifications. Mr Chiba
who gained an MBA in Europe said:

The MBA means nothing in our company. It just means you were
chosen in the exam which decided who among young male staff was
to be sent to a business school abroad. I am seen as a winner of the
competition in this bank, but nobody considers what I learnt in the
business school.19

Career courses for expected core workers (usually for men) and the courses
for staff on the periphery (usually for women or employees in subsidiary
companies) made female graduates uneasy, as it did local staff in London.
Among those Japanese women who believed the rhetoric that careers and
personal opportunities are based on individual effort, such as young female
graduates who were not given opportunities in companies, some left Japanese
companies and joined Western banks when the Japanese economy expanded
globally in the 1970s and 1980s.

137
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Japanese men at the centre

Japanese expatriate banking managers have a strong sense of being at the

centre at home, in companies, and in their own country. Their emotional
feeling of being leaders may be energy for their work and life but, on the
other hand, the feeling prevents them from being sympathetic to people on
the margins. In the career paths of conventional Japanese companies, and in
the core-periphery employment system between men and women, and between
head offices and subsidiary companies, key male workers located themselves
at the centre, and marginalised both local staff and women. Since their images
of core-periphery relationship were firmly rooted in their societal and cultural
values, Japanese male managers were able to enjoy their strong positions
without really being challenged.
There seemed to be two main devices for maintaining male power. First,
as I realised through the introduction process for my interviews, these men
had strong ties through their family, schooling and company. Around these
male networks, women were allocated to marginal positions as wives, and
supportive and temporary workers. Second, the male centredness cannot be
analysed without examining the way masculinity is structured in Japanese
society.
First of all, these Japanese managers were expected to be high-flyers in
their family and they were well supported by their fathers. I found male bank
managers talked more about their fathers than their mothers. Mr Yoshino, a
young bank manager, was taught how to be a man by his father:

My father said that I must not be a coward as a man, I should not be

afraid of anything, and I must walk with a dignified attitude… I was
afraid of dark places. Then he told me to go to an old shrine at 10 or
11 o’clock a long way from my house—about three kilometres. I
was five or six years old. He said, ‘If you tell a lie, I will know it. I
will be waiting here’. I might have been able to tell a lie and to come
back after 30 minutes or so, but I couldn’t. So, I went to the shrine
along a dark path. At that time there were no lights at night in my
home town.20

Others were taught about masculinity less severely. Mr Hoshino recalled his
father who had been an officer during the Second World War:

He wasn’t strict. When I was in the final year of primary school, the
war ended and Japanese society changed. One day I had to write an
essay at school about what I wanted to be. So I consulted my father.
He said, ‘Uhum, probably a businessman would be good’. I didn’t
know what a businessman was, but I said at school that I wanted to
be a businessman.21

138
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

Mr Hoshino knew he was very much loved by his father. Even his sister envied
him and told him that his father had thought that he had always been good,
but that she was not. He observed how society had changed and how his father
had been condemned because of his pro-war propaganda during the war. This
helped Mr Hoshino to understand how difficult his father’s life had been. Yet,
in his mind, his father was never a harsh Japanese military officer. In his memory,
his father was a gentle and balanced man. The images of his father governed
Mr Hoshino’s feeling towards his own son. Mr Hoshino’s life was like an
economic ‘officer’ in post-war Japan. He worked strictly for his company for
all his working life, but in his private life he was never a harsh man. He showed
his affection to his son and other young people. For instance, when Mr
Hoshino’s son went abroad to study he wrote a short poem, ‘On a Spring Day,
My Son has Left Home and I am Working in the Field’. Mr Coleman, a young
bank manager in a British merchant bank, told me that when he had been in
Japan, Mr Hoshino had helped him in his business.
Although Mr Hoshino’s image of his father was rather emotional, most
bank managers said their fathers had been very considerate towards them.
Mr Yamada said that every month his father had taken him to the cinema
and for a meal in a restaurant. Before the economic recovery from the Second
World War, their standard of living had been higher than that of ordinary
Japanese. His father did not force any morality on him, but he had been
guided by his father’s example:

I was not influenced by my mother. She is a housewife and she does

not have an especially strong character. She is not strict, nor
affectionate to me. I was more influenced by my father, I think. I was
not influenced at all by my mother, though she said that I should do
this, this and this.22

Mr Kishi, in his fifties, recalled his father:

My father was a typical company man, but he was thinking of his

family. Although we could not have supper together during weekdays,
at the weekend he was with his family. He took us to see baseball
when I was a primary school pupil… My father did not say very
much, but when I had to take my exams, he recommended me to go
to Tokyo University…. My mother was more strict about how to
behave in my everyday life.23

When they had to make a big decision, these company men were given advice
by their fathers. Mr Koike said,

My father was always saying, ‘Be the head of a rooster rather than
the tail of a bull’. He often said that it was important as a man to be
a leader of a group even if it was a small group.24

139
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Men were expected to be competitive both by their relatives and their

neighbours. Mr Sano, who was in his fifties and whose family could be traced
back about 300 years, said that he was expected to maintain the family honour.
He had to be a high achiever as a male successor in his family line.
The importance of the relationship between father and son was seen not
only among Japanese male managers but also among British senior managers.
Mr Chambers, a British manager, asked his father’s opinion when he was
deciding whether to work for a Japanese company:

When I was ready to go to Japan, he was quite sick at that stage. I

said to him that I hoped he didn’t mind. If he had said yes I probably
wouldn’t have gone. He said, ‘No, no, no, you must go. We must not
fight yesterday’s battles. Japan is an important industrial country,
and you must understand this’. His view was very much international.
His view on trade and politics, it was very important indeed.25

Here we can also see the close relationship between a father and a son. Mr
Green, who was in his thirties, also asked his father’s advice when he made
big decisions in his life. His father expected his sons to be good at school, but
not his daughter. According to Mr Green, his sister was ‘the apple of his
father’s eye’. Mr Green said, ‘My parents wanted me to do my best at all
times. My father was very ambitious for me concerning school. He wanted
me to be number one all the time’.26 In spite of pressure from his father, he
always asked his father’s opinion when he had to make a decision. When he
chose his job, he also listened to his family friends who were working in the
City. When he resigned from the previous bank he had worked for, he sought
his father’s advice:

He would have preferred me to go to a German bank. Up until then

I would discuss everything with my father and he was very influential,
although he did not have any experience in the City, but I listened all
the time.27

Like the Japanese male managers, the senior British male staff expressed a
strong relationship with their fathers, though Mr Chambers and Mr Green
had very conventional lifestyles.
It was a great advantage to have fathers and relatives in high positions in
Japanese companies. Mr Yasuda’s great-grandfather had had a bank and his
grandfathers, his father and his uncle had had, and still had, high positions in
banks. This helped him not only practically but also emotionally. He compared
his work with that of his great-grandfather who had issued bonds in the City
for the early stage of the modernisation of Japan. A relative of Mr Aoyama
was also in a high position in his bank and his father had known people in
the bank when he joined. He commented, ‘I could have joined the bank without

140
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

having had any connections, but my father talked to someone in this bank
when I wanted to join’.28
Having no connections through fathers and relatives made male managers
feel there were difficulties. Mr Toda, who was in his thirties, commented that
in his bank there were strong blood and marriage ties between managers in
high positions. He confessed it would have been difficult to climb to the top
level with his family background. His family owned a small family business in
a local town and he had married a friend at university. This, according to him,
would have been a disadvantage for becoming a top member of the bank.
Female managers also needed connections through their families and
relatives. Female managers were asked to provide references from someone
in their bank when they joined banks. Ms Akamatsu recalled, ‘It is not allowed
now, but when I joined the bank I needed to use my father’s banking
connection in order to gain a reference from someone in the bank’.29 Women
needed their fathers’ networks to enter the male world. Men were the
gatekeepers excluding women from the public sphere. When women wanted
to enter into these networks they needed help from the men around them.
It seems to be the same in Britain, although it is said that male power in
Britain is declining. Mr Chambers explained that he had joined a British
merchant bank where his father knew some people, although he felt that it
was not relevant to his joining the bank.
Losing one’s father was an emotional disadvantage. Mr Honda’s father
had died when he was a child, and his mother had supported him by running
a small business. When he entered university, his mother had asked him if he
wanted to inherit the family business. He said that he wanted to enter the
‘wider world’ and he wanted to ‘know more people’. We can see that the
‘wider world’ indicated the male world, and ‘knowing people’ meant making
male networks. Mr Honda wanted to enter the male outer world, in other
words, the public sphere rather than inheriting the small family business,
which was a rather insular sphere.
At school, the bank managers had made lasting friendships. Mr Igarashi,
in his late forties, talked about his close contact with the male friends he had
made in a 400 metres running team. Mr Sano mentioned the friends he had
studied with at university. Both of these men still met their friends, and
sometimes exchanged information about business. However, primary school
friendships seemed less relevant to these businessmen because the friends
remained in their own home town. School friendships were important for
male businessmen, which meant that women had to make extra efforts to
survive in the male world. In contrast to the networks developed among the
males, Ms Oki, in her forties, recalled that when she was at high school she
was one of only three girls among 40 male students. She had to work in this
male environment without the male friendships which men could enjoy. Ms
Ono, who was around 30, told me that she had had difficulty in making
friends both with girls and with boys since her childhood, because she was an

141
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

exceptionally high achiever at school. She has been an exceptional girl and at
the same time alien among boys.
Older managers act as mentors towards younger male managers. Mr
Aoyama’s boss was a high-school graduate and had remained in the same
section for many years. In contrast to his boss, Mr Aoyama was expected to
be promoted to a senior manager’s position from the beginning, because of
his family and educational background. Sometimes his boss asked him to go
for a drink after 5 o’clock, and behaved as if he were the mentor of the young
hopeful manager. This satisfied the older man’s sense of pride and status, and
was accepted by Mr Aoyama. Mr Yoshino, a young manager, also said that
he often received strategic career advice from his bosses.
Socialising among Japanese male managers is well known as being intrinsic
to Japanese company culture. Japanese male managers go drinking and they
play golf and tennis together, after 5 o’clock, or at the weekend.30 A male
manager said that Japanese company culture might be seen as a ‘monosexual
culture among men’.31 Men came to companies early in the morning and
went home late at night. Men spent most of their company lives together.
This makes company life more difficult for women. For instance, Ms Yano
said it was difficult to gain enough information, because she, as a woman,
was not able to join in the male drinking after 5 o’clock.
As we have seen, Japanese male managers developed their networks, but
their acquaintances were not always friends. They said it was difficult to
make friends after they had joined companies because although, as has been
emphasised, Japanese managers worked as a team, there was strong
competition between them. In this sense the Japanese are not unique. They
work together, but are competing with each other for further promotion.
Male managers developed a trust and understanding with their customers,
which was another important aspect of networking. Mr Toda, in his thirties,
confessed that he was very frustrated by the fact that he had been abroad for
several years, though it was ‘important for Japanese businessmen to make
the acquaintance of customers’.

By the time we have risen to high positions in the bank, the customers
whom we have met in our middle careers would also have reached
high positions. We can become long-term acquaintances. We can talk
about what happened when we did business together. It is invaluable
for Japanese bankers. I have to develop my network, but I am now in
London, so I cannot get to know many customers in Japan.32

Mr Toda’s feeling was particularly related to the Japanese banking system.

In conventional business in Japanese companies, the relationships among a
corporate group are strong. Mr Toda’s bank was a main bank of one of the
biggest corporate groups in Japan; if he had gained strong networks with
people among the group—manufacturing companies, trading companies,

142
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

securities companies, insurance companies, construction companies and so

on—his strong connections could have helped him to achieve a high position
at the bank. Mr Toda’s worry was that while he was in London he would
lose opportunities to establish his networking with these important bank
customers. Even in regional banks without a strong corporate group, relations
between banks and business people in the area were personalised. Bankers in
relatively small banks also needed to establish their networks with customers.
They promoted relationships with customers by attending important marriage
ceremonies and festivals in their regions. This they could not do in London.
However, being in London enabled them to make networks with their
counterparts in other companies, since the Japanese community is a close
business community, and they needed to exchange knowledge to overcome
difficulties in doing business in London. Networking was a common worry
for many Japanese male managers who had to stay abroad for many years.
Hamada, in her work regarding managers in a manufacturing company,
explained the desire to stay in Japan, as the people who had been sent abroad
for many years risked missing out on the newest technological knowledge.33
In contrast to managers in manufacturing industry, bank managers are
concerned about human relations within a corporate group.
Senior Japanese banking personnel also have important links with the
bureaucrats. Mr Aoyama said that when he was young he was trained in the
Ministry of Finance with other bankers from other companies. They studied
economics together in the Ministry of Finance building. Mr Aoyama pointed
out that the most important task for him was to get to know people there.
After that he worked as a negotiator for his bank with the Ministry of Finance.
The most interesting point is that the people he met during his training in the
Ministry of Finance were the acquaintances he knew at his high school and
in the law department at Tokyo University. Mr Aoyama’s story demonstrates
how closely the banking people and bureaucrats are personally connected.
There were also other examples of these links. Mr Harada, another graduate
in law from Tokyo University, now working in London, also worked with
the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance to develop financial business
policies. In London, he is learning how to respond to pressure from Western
countries to open the Tokyo financial market. Mr Ogata, who has been
working in London for two or three years, previously worked at policy making
with bureaucrats and other insurance company men. Mr Ogata and Mr
Harada have come briefly to London to analyse the market and the state of
international financial business and then they will go back to Japan. There
they will prepare the next stages of the Japanese economy and will work
with bureaucrats to develop financial policies. Although local staff expect
their Japanese bosses coming to London to be skilled financial businessmen,
Japanese managers sent from Tokyo are often this type, and therefore not
specialists in business in the City. The purpose of their stay in London is not
to develop their specialist knowledge or skills. This causes local staff to be

143
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

disappointed with their Japanese bosses. These financial negotiators enjoy

influencing policy making in Japan, and socialising with the Japanese élite.
Mr Tamara said to me with great pride, ‘We are marudome, entirely domestic,
aren’t we?’34 These financiers are kokunaiha, namely domestic bank managers,
but to some extent they can gain international knowledge in London without
losing their internal networks and status in Japan.
Japanese bank managers who work abroad have a strong ideology about
the perfect career person. They are concerned about being away and also
dream of becoming ‘entirely domestic businessmen’. However, for some of
them this is unachievable. Their career paths have already taken them away
from Japan for many years. Therefore, they have already lost their internal
network links. And furthermore, most of them have no acquaintances to
help them in the Ministry of Finance. Managing directors who have spent
more than half of their careers abroad, in London or New York, may already
have lost their Japanese domestic connections, though some said that
nowadays all Japanese companies need international business, so they can
keep good connections with them. They are appreciated by local staff because
of their understanding of international business and their Westernised attitudes.
However, despite being board members at head office, connections with the
core people in Japan for these managing directors are weaker than those of
the ‘entirely domestic’ people. If international financial business becomes
more important for the Japanese economy, the position of these international
managers, kokusaiha would become more important.
These Japanese managers mainly socialise with other Japanese. 35
Consequently, Japanese specialists in the City of London said that Japanese
business would not benefit from international networks for information. Yet
this does not mean that Japanese men do not wish to mingle with Westerners.
Mr Aoyama joined a golf club to make friends with British business people.
Mr Hoshino made acquaintances through personal effort. Yet, most of them
said that it was difficult to join the business world in the City. We have been
looking at male networks among the Japanese, but the City of London is
itself also a ‘male’ world, which the Japanese find difficult to enter. There are
competing male networks of different cultures.
Male managers see themselves as being central within their companies,
their families and their culture. Their world is so egocentric that this prevents
them from thinking of others who also want to maximise their capabilities.
Most of my Japanese informants were married, and their wives concentrate
on caring for the family, while many of the male British staff in my interviews
were single. All the Japanese females who transferred from Japan to Britain
were single with one exception who sent her daughter to a boarding school,
which is not usual in Japan, and she had left her husband in Tokyo. Those
who were sent from Japan have more conventional family lives than the local
UK staff. Mr lagarashi, who was in his late forties, described his feelings
about family:

144
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

If the value of work is not equal to the value of life, I cannot live.
The value of work is not only in the office but should be more total.
Working should include private life. My work is the core of my life,
so even if my private life is sad and difficult, this sorrow is only one
of the fringes of my life. If the master of a family has no joy in his
work, the family is like a stagnant pond.36

Mr Igarashi locates himself at the centre of his family and he believes if he is

happy in his work, this makes his family happy. In addition to this, he still
uses the word ‘shujin’ for the meaning of a husband, which means a master.
The managers also use the word ‘kanai’ for their wives, which means a person
inside their homes. These words construct images of the relationship between
a husband and a wife among these people. During my interviews at
interviewees’ homes, husbands talked about their passion for work, while
wives tended to listen to their husbands’ talk.
The younger generation of men, in their thirties, said that they helped their
wives with the housework, for example, playing with the children or making
breakfast on Sundays. Yet, they were still more passionate about their work
than their private lives. They were sharing their lives with their wives more
than the older generation, but the husband’s working life still came first. Mr
Koike, in his forties, met his wife when they were at the same high school. His
wife’s educational background was the same as his. She became a high-school
teacher, but when Mr Koike was assigned to work in the US he asked his wife
to quit her job to go with him and she agreed despite her unwillingness to
leave her job. There was a strong ideology that women should quit their jobs
after marriage among these bank managers. The female staff of banks resigned
when they married husbands who worked in the same bank. Ms Oki said she
sometimes meets her previous female colleagues who had married male bank
managers when their husbands were assigned to work in London.
Mrs Ueno, who met her husband in the bank where she worked as a clerk,
was now at home in London caring for her child. Her husband went to his bank
early in the morning and came back late at night. She spent most of her time
taking her child to school and socialising with other Japanese wives in London.
I cannot tell whether or not family lives are changing among the Japanese
in general, but as far as the Japanese male informants I interviewed were
concerned, Japanese bank staff still ‘talked’ about a conventional family
lifestyle. Husbands concentrated on their work for long hours and wives waited
at home for them, looking after the children. Mr Tamaru said that his wife
now lived in Japan because of his son’s entrance exams, but that she sometimes
visited her husband and put food in the freezer. As these stories indicate, these
‘élite’ men were still enjoying their lives at the centre of their families.
Compared with these Japanese men, British male local staff seemed already
to have lost their central position in the family. Mr Gibson was divorced
from his wife and was concerned for his son, whom he said he rarely saw. Mr

145
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

McLead did not want to be assigned to work in France, because his wife did
not want that. The husband of Elaine, a young female manager, took paternity
leave to look after their baby. I was also very struck by the fact that most of
the male local staff were single. This was in contrast to the stories of Japanese
male managers’ lives. For them, marriage was the norm, being single a
disadvantage. Mr Chiba was asked by the personnel management department
to marry before going to London and was introduced to several women by
his bosses and customers to accommodate this request.
The Japanese male managers’ image of themselves as core people in both
their family and their companies invariably expanded to become an image of
being at the centre of Japan. They talked about Japanese culture and Japanese
company culture using homogeneous images. This tendency was stronger
among ‘entirely domestic’ people, in other words, kokunaiha. Mr Jinbo said
‘We are agricultural people, though the Westerners are hunting people. We
stay in the same place and they move around’.37 He used the image of Germanic
hunting people to contrast with the character of the Japanese who endure
difficult situations. The language of a unique Japanese culture is circulated
among men at the core in order to defend their policies. Mr Sonoda also said
that ‘We are enduring this difficult situation, but we will get through it’.
They are emotionally ‘representing’ their own national culture.
Japanese business specialists in the City talked about the difference between
‘we British’ and ‘they Japanese’. British male staff, especially those in the
senior managerial classes in Japanese companies, also talked about ‘we’ in
Britain or England. Although they may not have been at the centre of the
core people in the City, they had some feeling for ‘we’ when they had to face
the dominance of Japanese men in their companies. Both groups of men were
competing for cultural superiority as if they were representing their cultures.
As we have seen, Japanese male managers located themselves at the centre
of the family, companies and their state, whereas Japanese women tended to
be more silent. The next section will examine women’s responses to this male
dominance in human relations and to the male image of centredness.

Women’s responses to the male world—compromise,

subordination and resistance

Confronted by the male world, Japanese female managers I interviewed did

not show their discontent directly. Miss Hosokawa told me that women must
not show their aggressiveness in the workplace. Compared to the British staff,
Japanese female staff showed stronger conformity. Japanese women sometimes
used words in the same way as men, as if to show allegiance. Women who
voluntarily chose a supportive job, ippanshoku, said that this career was by
choice. They had had the chance to choose the same career course as men, but
they did not choose sōgōshoku, because they thought it was not a good career

146
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

course for them. Miss Hosokawa told me that she had chosen ippanshoku
herself because it was more suited to her lifestyle; for instance, she did not
have to relocate by order of her company. Furthermore, if she still remained
single in the future she could move to sōgōshoku, but if she married she could
continue to work as an ippanshoku worker. However, far from it being her
own free, independent choice, Miss Hosokawa was, in fact, following the male
managers’ dominant discourse about sōgōshoku and ippanshoku.
Japanese female managers were also trying to follow the male idea of
‘excellent workers’, who did not want to marry. Female managers in Japanese
banks were trying to be more efficient and harder workers than their male
counterparts, though they could not expect to be rewarded. Miss Oki, who
had worked in the same section in a bank for 12 years, told me:

I did not want to be a manager when I was young… I never thought

about strategies to gain promotion… I did the same clerical work for
three years with women who had just graduated from high school.38I
was very busy. From 8 o’clock to 6 o’clock with no time for rest except
my lunchbreak. I even felt there wasn’t time to answer the office phone.
So, I had no time to think about the difference between male and
female staff… I just worked harder and harder every day.39

She seemed not to emphasise her self-esteem. However, it cannot be said that this
was what she really thought. She told a ‘perfect’ story of the ‘ideal workers’ in the
company, that is, workers who do not demand promotion or work conditions.
In addition to bearing being excluded from promotion for many years,
these women tried to further their careers without any encouragement from
their male bosses by studying in their spare time. Yet, sometimes their
aspirations for the future were unrealistic compared to the future prospects
of male core workers, which were pointed towards senior positions. Miss
Hosokawa studied English on her own, though most male workers went to
English schools in their company’s time and with financial support from
their company. Miss Kawakami was now studying new financial business on
her own, though her job was merely a support post. These women could not
expect any reward for their effort. Furthermore, it may be no use for them to
reveal their expectation clearly, since she might be considered too aggressive.
Young sōgōshoku women did not talk about their marriages, because they
knew that they could not fulfil the two ‘ideal’ roles of women, as wives and
as excellent workers. Furthermore, if they talked about marriage they would
have been treated as women who gave up careers. They just talked, as
expected, about how they were trying to work hard. Yet Miss Ono told me
that she was uncertain about what would happen to her and how male
managers would treat her. Miss Yano revealed the conflict in her heart after
the recorded interview. She told me that it was not good for a human being
not to have a family, but it was impossible to achieve the ideals set for women

147
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

as wives and mothers. She also told me that she thought it was very important
for children to be brought up by their own mothers. She wanted to play two
roles as an ‘ideal’ mother and as an excellent worker in a Japanese company.
She was aware of these inner conflicts which she could not resolve by herself.
Women, who followed ideals which are incompatible, had to rationalise
their subordination. Ms Oki told me:

It is a shame that men have to move to different places so quickly.

They have to do work which is not familiar to them. And they have
to order their subordinates to work without having experience. But
when I became a middle manager, I knew the work the best among
us. So, it was easy to have subordinates. For women, it is better to be
managers after they know the job very well.40

She justified the fact that women cannot get promotion as all-round staff like
men. She even tried to convince herself that the situation of women is better
than that of male managers. Miss Hosokawa also justified why ippanshoku
was better for her career:

There are examples of ippanshoku. I know some female managers.

They became managers about ten years after they entered this bank.
They can be my models when I think about my future. I can follow
the way they have gone. However, sōgōshoku women have no models
to follow in their career course. They cannot know how to conduct
their strategy in companies.41

These women also followed stereotypical ideas of femininity. Miss Hosokawa

was a pretty woman with a nice smile, who believed that in her bank she
worked as a supporter for male managers. She said that she could use her
kind and soft manner to support men, so men could work more effectively.
She thought that men and women were different, and that women could use
their tenderness and caring attitude at work to help their male colleagues.
She was careful about her clothes and behaviour. She said that she wore a
tidy suit every day. Even though she was an ippanshoku woman, she still
believed that she met bank customers as a representative of her bank. Her
idea of work seemed to demonstrate the false images in Japanese work culture
that all workers work with responsibility as if they are a homogeneous group.
They showed the conformity to the gender stereotypical images created
by men, but they have some conflict in their minds, in spite of following the
dominant male ideology. They have to rely on favours from male bosses. Ms
Oki told me that she had been lucky because she had met some good bosses,
who had encouraged her and had given her the chance to show her abilities,
so she could get promotion. She did not think that female colleagues who
had not been able to get promotion were inferior to her, but rather that their

148
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

bosses had not given them the opportunity. Ms Akamatsu said that it was
important to like your work. She said, ‘If you are happy, your bosses and
colleagues will be happy. It is important that both workers and their colleagues
are happy’.42 It was important for women in the male world to keep male
managers happy and untroubled.
Some women failed to conform to male ideas. Miss Kawakami, also an
ippanshoku woman, told me about tea time. When she was in Japan if men
said, ‘Let’s have tea’, it meant she had to make tea for everyone in her section.
She had been educated in the United States, surrounded by a more egalitarian
atmosphere, and she thought that this was unfair, but she also thought it
inevitable in Japan for women to make tea. Her mother had told her that she
could behave freely in the US, but she could not behave in the same way
when she returned to Japan. When she came to Britain, male workers asked
her whether she wanted a cup of tea. She knew that this was a social
convention, but she was still surprised and felt that men in this country were
kinder than men in Japan. Miss Kawakami was regretting choosing
ippanshoku, because it was clear that women of ippanshoku are not given
the same chances as male core workers and sōgōshoku women. However she
repeated that now she still had to conform to the present situation in Japan.
She thought women in Japan had to follow men and should not show
aggressiveness, and that they must think of men’s feelings. When she returned
to Japan, she would make tea for male colleagues every day, though she
would try to find her own way of working in her company. Compared to
Miss Hosokawa, Miss Kawakami could not internalise male ideas of women.
Her inner conflict is apparent.
Emotional conflicts could cause a lack of confidence. Mrs Ueno, the wife of
a bank manager, thought she could not go out by herself. She was 36 years old,
but she behaved as if she were a girl in a frilly dress. She believed she could not
speak English. She was unwilling to make friends by herself. Mrs Ueno was
typical of some Japanese wives I met. Their clothes, hairstyles, and manner of
speaking were girlish, but they had two conflicting feelings they wanted to be
dependent on their husbands and be safe, but paradoxically they hated being
dependent. They felt that they were powerless, or that if they showed their
power they would lose their ‘ideal’ family life. Mrs Ueno could not stay at
home with confidence, and she knew, or at least she felt deep down, that her
‘ideal’ family life was false but she was trapped within this lifestyle.
There is evidence of a generation gap concerning what is the ‘ideal’ mother.
Most Japanese female managers told me that they had been encouraged by
their mothers to be independent, although their mothers had stayed at home
as housewives. Ms Akamatsu explained why she continued working. When
her father had financial problems her mother was not able to do anything
except visit Ms Akamatsu’s grandparents’ house to ask to borrow money.
She said, ‘I observed that and I thought I should have financial independence.
My father told my mother that she could not do anything, when my mother

149
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

wanted to work outside home to help my father’.43 She had thought from the
time of her childhood that it was necessary to be independent financially. I
also asked Ms Oki, in her forties, why she continued her job, though most of
her friends and colleagues resigned from her bank. She said, ‘It is probably
because I saw my mother’s life. There were conflicts between my mother and
my grandmother on my father’s side who lived with us. Although my mother
graduated from jogakko (girls’ secondary school),44 she entered my father’s
houses’.45 Ms Oki had thought that her mother had been powerless in her
family in spite of her high qualifications for a woman at that time.
Is subordination a special characteristic of Japanese culture? Or is the
subordination the result of the power relations between people in the banks?
I cannot say whether those educated, but still subordinate, interviewees
indicated that there were still strong ideas about women’s roles in
contemporary Japan. These female managers were, as trail-blazers in large
Japanese corporations, using personal strategies rather than using collective
power, since they were located around male networks. However, this did not
mean, I believe, that they were accepting the situation of women. They showed
conformity to hegemonic male discourses, but they were in practice trying to
find their own pathways.
Japanese women expressed their discontent in their own ways. For example,
female Japanese clerks, who the Japanese male managers said worked twice
as hard as the British, expressed their hostility towards male managers in
their everyday working lives. Mr Nishikawa told me that when he entered
his bank he was ignored by routine female workers and how hard this was
for him. He said:

Men who had graduated from university were impertinent, although

they did not know their work well. So the women attacked us on
that point. It is natural in the psychology of human beings. They
were enjoying it.46

Small acts of resistance could be considered as the women’s way of expressing

their discontent at the unfair segregation in companies, but some women
showed their discontent by resigning from companies. This was also a kind
of resistance to Japanese otokoshakai, that is the male world. Female managers
who worked in financial firms showed their conformity and tried to hide
their internal strength, but they did not form the majority of women entering
the same firms in the same year. The majority of female workers had already
resigned a few years after joining the companies. The motivation of Japanese-
born local employees to leave companies, which will be described in Chapter
7, was similarly related to discontent in the workplace. If discontented, they
resigned from their workplaces and tried to change their lives. Sachiko, in
her forties, described how work for high-school graduates in the bank was
segregated between men and women.

150
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

I felt discriminated against after I entered the bank, although my

family had traditional ideas, which would have been more obvious
if I had had brothers. As I only had sisters, we were all treated
equally… After I entered we were trained for about one or two years
as bank workers. We were trained for the work that women had to
do. It was not bad, but there were already differences between men’s
work and women’s work. The work for men was outside our bank
and was concerned with getting deposits, and women’s work was
clerical work inside the bank. It was of course important, but I was
more ambitious at that time. So, I wondered why women could not
go out. Female workers had limitations on their work.47

We have seen that these Japanese female staff had attempted to find their own
paths in their situations by showing conformity as a personal strategy or,
alternatively, they had resigned from the male world, showing their discontent.
Although in their stories they come over as women perhaps lacking in
assertiveness, they are in fact trying to find their own space within and outside
male-dominated Japanese society, and furthermore, they are trying to find
another ‘story’ or vehicle through which they can express their self-esteem.

The British ‘gaze’ on Japanese gender relationships

It might be seen that Japanese transnational companies have applied their

original gender relationships to their local staff. However, as the management
was divided between two work cultures, career courses for Japanese women
within Japan did not apply to the British female staff, and they were treated
differently from their Japanese counterparts. For example, while Japanese
female managers thought it was incompatible to work for a bank and to be a
mother, pregnancy and maternity leave was not a problem for Elaine:

My view is that they think I am British and they also think that I am
a woman… I have no problem because of being a woman… When I
gave birth to my son, I had maternity leave, and the British
government paid for it, and the company did not replace me, and
after the maternity leave I came back to the same position.48

Despite Elaine’s assumption that women have no difficulties in working for

the Japanese company, British managers perceived that Japanese financial
firms generally had gender problems. For instance, Mr Green said:

The bank is not reluctant to recruit women as long as they are good.
We had a woman recruited here not long ago, but now she has left
due to personal reasons, that is, her husband moved. I do think there

151
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

is a reluctance among Japanese management to consider women to

begin with. They much prefer to have men than women because
Japanese men have difficulty dealing with women as equals. If they
have to deal with British women and the conversation becomes
confrontational, they would have a problem, I feel.49

He thought the reason for the problem was that ‘Japanese men have a very
different view of women, whereas women who are working to pursue a career
do not have a traditional view of women. The British women have a much
more modern view of women. I think there would be a clash between the two
views’. According to him, Japanese banks:

…are prepared to recruit women. I have seen it in the past. But one
of the problems is women are not prepared to come and work here.
We tried to get some women but they won’t come. The British women
see no career advancement for women in Japanese banks. They say
that if they go to a Japanese bank, they have no potential for
promotion, etc. We have no evidence to say no. It is a vicious circle.
Because if they don’t come, we don’t have any evidence.50

He gave me an example of Japanese men’s conventional ideas about women:

One night he asked whether I would go to karaoke and I said, ‘Yes

but I have to phone my wife first’. He asked me why I needed to do
so. So I told him that I had to ask her whether I could be late. He
asked me why again. He said he never had to ask his wife. To me, if
I don’t ask my wife, when I get home, the door will be locked and I
will not be able to get into the house. It was a different relationship
and he could not understand this because he sees his wife as ‘I come
in at 2 o’clock in the morning, if my wife is in bed, she has to get up.
If I want something to eat, she must get me something to eat. In the
morning, she must wake me up, get my breakfast, get my shirt and
everything and I am at my work at the right time. That is her job’.
He was only 36 or 37. To me he was a very traditional Japanese.51

When I heard this I could not accept his story at face value, because this
Japanese boss may have been trying to show his strong masculinity to his
British colleague in order to claim his superiority. Here, we can see the images
of arrogant Japanese husbands.
As we have seen, management was segregated into two. British staff were
therefore treated according to British employment laws. However, segregation
in working practice between British and Japanese, and between men and
women, constructed stereotypical images of gender such as the arrogance of
Japanese male managers and the weakness and powerlessness of Japanese

152
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

women. These images were continually created through everyday working

practice. I cannot say which came first: the images, or the reactions which
supported these images.
Although Mr Green suggested that the Japanese were reluctant to employ
women, there were some female local staff in managerial positions. However,
because of adverse stories about Japanese work cultures, and especially British
images of gender roles in Japanese companies, they hesitated to work for
Japanese companies before joining. Ms Roberts recalled when she was about
to come to the bank:

I was asked if I was interested and I said, ‘No’, at first, because I

thought that from all the stories I’d heard that the Japanese were
fairly anti-female, I have to say.52

Ms Morris remembered when she came to the bank to be interviewed for

herjob:

My second interview was the first time I’d really spoken to a Japanese
person. I remember distinctly, he said, ‘Do you think you will leave
and have babies?’ I said, ‘Possibly, but I have no immediate plans for
a few years’, which was true, not for a few years. He replied, ‘Ah,
right, yes. Very good’. That was the main thing that I remember,
because I thought, ‘You’re not allowed to ask me that!’ Under British
employment laws, I don’t think you’re allowed to ask such a question.53

Such questions to female job seekers are not unusual in Japanese job interviews.
Probably the Japanese managers did not know it was illegal in Britain to ask such
a question, which male applicants would not be asked. However, this lack of
knowledge and male Japanese behaviour has encouraged the construction of the
British view of Japanese male managers as anti-female. Through everyday
business, Japanese male managers or Japanese customers reinforce this anti-
female image. Jennifer Morris also recalled from her experiences:

It’s not so much a Japanese company, some of them do react

unfavourably to women. My English colleague is not a graduate, and
he’s quite a few years older than I am, although we do exactly the same
job. But (Japanese) people assume that he is my boss, which he’s not.54

She was annoyed by the stereotypical images held by Japanese men that young
women must be support workers. She was trying to get through this situation:

They assume that he’s my boss. If you start talking in a meeting, you
can make it very evident that he’s not my boss… But I was doing a
lot of the talking to the Japanese gentleman, and he was talking to

153
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

my colleague, who was silent. Then I would talk again. And he was
asking my colleague. I found this really annoying, actually. But that’s
only happened once. I don’t know whether that’s because the Japanese
man was just not used to having an English woman to speak to. You
assume that the English gentlemen will do the work, and you just
make the tea or something. I don’t know!55

Her strategy is in contrast to that of Japanese female managers we have seen,

and her way seems successful. She said:

I remember once, it was a late meeting he was in, and I offered him
and his guest a cup of coffee. When I brought it into the meeting
room, my manager said to his guest, ‘Please understand, this is my
colleague, she has offered me coffee’, which was nice of him.56

Furthermore, she mentioned a story heard from this manager:

There are very few professional women in the London Branch, but
one of them is a barrister, very well qualified… When they recruited
her, my Japanese manager said they especially went for a woman as
a lawyer, because they felt that she would have had to achieve more
to become a barrister than her male counterparts. They thought she
would be more dedicated and conscientious.57

She analysed the above as positive signs that Japanese male managers were
changing in their attitudes towards women. However, her story could be
interpreted in different ways. First, she may have been flattered by her Japanese
bosses. Second, she may have not wanted to point out her direct boss’s anti-
female attitudes. Third, the British barrister may have had a ‘nominal position’
in the company.
Mary Chapman, a young female clerk, suggested that the existence of
women in high positions was indeed nominal:

There’s a woman who is in charge of… I don’t know what she does….
We tend to think of her as more or less like a token. Sort of a one-off,
just so that they can say, ‘Oh, we do have one senior woman’.58

The two opposing opinions could be interpreted in two ways: Japanese men
were learning Western ways towards women, or they may be trying to deny
that Japanese companies were anti-female. In both analyses, we can point
out that it was certainly true that Japanese men were stereotyped by British
women as anti-female.
Ms Roberts, a personnel manager of a subsidiary company, remembered
one Japanese manager who had always had problems with British staff:

154
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

There is one particular person who is very Japanese and causing a

constant problem, because he just thinks in a Japanese way still, and
he does directly supervise a group of local staff, and that does cause
a lot of problems still.59

Personnel managers such as Ms Jones needed to teach Japanese staff how to

behave towards women:

We still have problems, when delegates come straight from Japan. I

have had one recently. He looked on the girls as being sex objects.
He would make comments about their clothes or their figures, or
their legs, or parts of their body. And this isn’t acceptable to
Europeans, and I had many complaints, and so I had to speak to the
gentleman concerned, and tell him that this was not the way we did
things in London, and he’s been fine since.60

She said that the personnel management department used English classes to
teach the Japanese English ways of behaviour:

If I hear there is a problem, I will say to the teacher, ‘Mr So and So is

not saying “please” and “thank you” and is treating his staff badly,
please could you talk to him about this?’ And so the teacher brings it
into the lesson. ‘When you want someone to make a cup of coffee,
you say to them, “Please will you make a cup of coffee?” …They
don’t realise it’s a criticism, but, nevertheless, they learn the correct
way to do it. And we’ve had a few like that.61

These Japanese ways of speaking by men were taken as evidence of their

arrogance, whereas some female managers like Ms Jones said it was
changing. It is difficult to judge the Japanese men’s attitudes from the
stories. I found that British female managers who were satisfied with their
positions took more positive attitudes towards the changes in Japanese
bosses’ attitudes, whereas women who were generally unsatisfied with
their situations in Japanese companies had negative views about the
Japanese men.
Japanese men had a different analysis to the anti-female charge. Some of
them said to me in the interviews that they had to be careful about ‘sexual
harassment’. They said that some behaviour considered as sexually harassing
in the UK would not be considered as such in Japan.
These stories demonstrate how the anti-female attitudes of Japanese men
were talked about by the British women62 and how the Japanese male
managers were trying to negate these images.
British staff seemed to regard Japanese women as subordinate. None of
the British women knew of the existence of sōgōshoku, and saw Japanese

155
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

female staff working in very low-status positions in spite of their language

ability and qualifications.
British personnel managers said that Japanese women were very
subordinate even if they were married to European husbands. Mr Hunt, a
personnel manager, made this observation:

The Japanese women are less inclined to have a frank discussion

with me. The British staff, a British girl may come to me and say, ‘I
am not very well. I’m having problems with my period’, or ‘I’m having
problems with my boyfriend’, or those sort of things… They will
also discuss and argue more, whereas Japanese girls will certainly
not discuss such private matters, they will not argue or…or persist,
or you know, counter-claim. They are much more compliant. And, I
mean, there are other things as well, like, I notice that Japanese girls
will talk to the British staff in a certain way, perhaps almost one-to-
one, equal, but if they are then spoken to by a Japanese man, they
will adopt a different attitude, they will, as you probably know
yourself, adopt, often, a higher-pitched voice tone, because that is
the training, to speak in a higher-pitched tone. So all of those, I think
they are more subordinate. It seems to be breaking down somewhat,
but again, a long process I think.63

Another personnel manager, Mr Rogers, said that Japanese locally hired

women had difficulties in solving many problems in their lives:

Usually when they lose their husband or whatever, they have all kinds
of problems. Tax, doctors. They will pretend until they get really
stuck. And then they come and ask for help. They leave things too
long. Until they are really in a mess… They don’t like other people
to think they are in trouble. An English woman who has trouble, she
has brothers, mother or sisters. When a Japanese here is in trouble,
she’s got nobody to turn to for help. And if you live here many,
many years, even if your English is quite good, you will still never,
ever become as a native English speaker. English is full of intonation,
and so many things they miss. So many forms to fill in. The trouble
is, if you have trouble with the gas board, the electricity board, or
British Telecom or something you have to sort it out, they are often
in trouble like that.64

British personnel managers have stories about Japanese women who do

not want to speak about their troubles and do not want to ask for help
from others.
The stories told by British staff about Japanese employees construct cultural
stereotypes about male dominance and female subservience in Japanese society.

156
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

It was clear that sexual stories in companies reflected power relationships

between Japanese male bosses and British staff. Japanese bosses, who
monopolised power in the companies, were described as sexist, especially by
British staff in lower positions. On the other hand, locally hired Japanese
women were talked of as the most pitiful and powerless group. British male
personnel managers showed patronising attitudes to these women in their
‘talk’ about them. Gender images of other groups were more like stories of
power relationships.

The Japanese ‘gaze’ on British gender relationships

It was a surprise to discover that Japanese staff considered gender relationships

of the British to be unsatisfactory and less suitable than their own. They also
had gendered stereotypes of the British staff. Japanese bosses talked about
British male staff:

They had an extremely high level of education. The important

members of this company and those doing difficult jobs are from
Oxbridge, other universities, and polytechnics where they studied
physics or natural science. They individually have high abilities.65

However, they did not recognise them as competitors:

The people whom Japanese financial firms could employ before were
of a low level. From the point of the view of the people in this country,
to work for a Japanese bank means working in a foreign company.
The best people will work in major companies in this country. The
scale of our bank was small, so excellent people did not come to our
bank before. The size of this bank has gradually become bigger, and
we can now pay for these excellent people. However, the top people
do not come to our bank, I think. People who join our bank are just
below the top.66

In contrast to these Japanese images of ‘excellent’ British male staff, they had
stories about ‘lazy’ and ‘unreliable’ British female clerks. For explaining such
images, Japanese managers used contrasting images of classless Japan and
the class society of Britain:

We have middle sort of workers in Japan, but in Britain they do not

have. I think this is a basic difference between Britain and Japan. In
Britain they have only unskilled workers and secretaries.67

Mr Katano also had an image of working-class clerks:

157
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

I think the specialist managers in this company are middle or upper

class, but the staff who are in the backup office are from the lower
class.68

These managers talked about contrasting images of well-educated male

managers and lower-class female clerks. The story of class society in Britain
was well circulated among Japanese bank managers, and they used the story
for switching the issue of gender to one of class.
In spite of the problems of gender talked of by the British, Japanese
managers denied the existence of such a problem. Mr Katano ignored the
existence of any female managers:

We have few female financial ‘specialists’ in our company. In general,

there are few women in the securities business in Britain, or in other
countries. Women may be able to manage banking business, but the
securities business needs more energy which women cannot manage.69

He seemed to be angry when I asked about the problems:

You say that employment in Japan is unfair to women. This country

has problems of class, which is pre-modern. The group of specialists
in the City are exceptional. In Japan, both women and men, who
graduated from university also do clerical work as well. In this sense
our country is a more egalitarian society.
Do you have any problems related to women?
No, we do not.
So, do women in this company contribute to this company?
We do not have female financial specialists.70

Even a younger male manager denied the existence of gender segregation:

I do not consider myself as a man. I am an individual, and other

people look at me as an individual as well, but not a man.71

These Japanese male managers made gender invisible. However, there were a
few who suggested that their ideas about women had changed since they had
begun to work abroad. Mr Koike, whose wife was a freelance journalist, was
more progressive:

When I was in the US, there were many women in high positions,
and they spoke about business very well. Outside Japan, banking
business has become a women’s arena. However, if you attend a

158
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

meeting of the board of directors in a director board in a Japanese

bank, they are all men. Men with suits! I wonder why… In this sense,
Japan is very behind. We have to create a society in which able people
fulfil their abilities without limitation of age and sex.72

However, such progressive views were exceptional.

In spite of my expectations that the Japanese female managers would say
that gender relationships in Britain were much better than those of Japan,
they said that British women were too assertive. Ms Kawakami said:

I feel that British men are kinder than Japanese men. For example,
they make tea for us, but I know this is only superficial kindness, but
still I feel they are kinder than Japanese men… This country has a
custom of ‘Ladies First’, so it is natural if a secretary throws things
at her boss’s desk, though it is surprising in Japan. In Britain, it is
natural if a husband prepares a meal for his wife… [But] I think
women need to be good at work and also need to be considerate.73

Ms Hosokawa also illustrated stereotypical views:

I think British women are strong, and British men are ‘gentlemen’,
though not all of them. In general, British women are strong, but I
do not think they need to be so strong. The people who returned to
Japan said to me, ‘In Britain, food is not tasty, women are threatening,
and British men are pitiful. Women do not smile. There are few
amiable women’. I feel all the British women are curt, though if I
become close to them, they may become more friendly.74

Here, we can see the feeling of competition as women who are ‘others’ for
men. She was proud of her femininity as Japanese. Locally hired Japanese
women, who did not like the sexual discriminations against women in Japanese
corporations, were competing with British female clerks in terms of being hard-
working at work. Nevertheless, they still held conventional ideas of the family
life. They cooked for their husbands and had responsibilities for housework
and children. Mami, in her twenties, talked about her British husband:

As you can imagine, men are the same everywhere. They are spoiled
by their mothers. My husband does not do any housework. I do all
the housework after I come home every day.75

More surprisingly, Ms Oki told me after the recording that the reason why
the feminist movements had arisen in this country might have been that British
women had been in a worse situation than women in Japan. She said that
women in Japanese organisations were in the better situation, because they
could be promoted if they were supported by their male bosses.76

159
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

The discourses of Western feminism had not circulated among these female
managers who had remained in large Japanese corporations. For both Japanese
men and women, being in another culture did little to influence their gender
identities. It rather emphasised their cultural ideology of masculinity and
femininity both at work and in society generally. Japanese male bosses
respected their local male managers because of their educational background,
but the Japanese did not perceive the British as the best in British society. The
sense of competition could be detected in the interviews. Japanese women
showed their sense of competition towards the British female staff by
emphasising their excellence at work as well as their femininity. Despite my
expectations before the fieldwork, any discourse of Western feminism seemed
to have failed to reach their agenda.

Conclusion—interrelation between gender,

ethnic and class identities

Despite my expectation that Japanese transnational workers must have gained

new ‘progressive’ gender identities, most Japanese men and women who were
sent from Tokyo expressed the superiority of their gender identities whereas,
on the other hand, the British staff talked about the backwardness of the
Japanese gender identities.
Gender identities are an important topic in the stories of cultural
relationships. And gender identities tended to be exaggerated in these
multicultural situations. Segregation in working practice between British and
Japanese, and between men and women, constructed stereotypical images of
gender. As we have seen, Japanese men are described as sexist and Japanese
women are depicted as subordinate by the British staff. By contrast, most
Japanese men and women expressed the superiority of their gender identities.
British staff argued that the Japanese should adapt in terms of culture, and
that Japan is behind historically. Both groups created their images of ‘self in
defence towards ‘others’, focusing on gender relations. These images were
continually (re)created through everyday working practice.
These gendered stories were the result of the power relationships in
companies, and they constructed the segregation between the two cultural
groups. Men of the two cultural groups, especially the well-educated managers,
showed competitive feelings not only in terms of business knowledge, efficiency
or hard work, but also in terms of the perceived superiority of their own
masculinity. In English literature concerning masculinity, the hegemonic
masculinity is usually that of the white, middle-class male. However, in the
Japanese transnational companies, the ranking of masculinities was confused.
The Japanese have strong power in terms of management, but local staff feel
culturally hegemonic. The strong ethnic culture of the Japanese companies
did not allow the British staff to participate in the final decision-making of

160
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

the Japanese managerial group. However, the Anglo-American culture

dominated financial business in the City, which excluded Japanese businessmen
from their international networks. As a result of these inner and outer power
relationships around the corporate culture, men of different cultures were
competing psychologically for hegemonic masculinities. On the other hand,
the femininities were contrasted and compared by both men and women.
Male managers especially commented on the femininities of women from
their own and other cultures. Contrasted femininities were used in order to
patronise women. Women also talked about their femininities in contrast to
those of other cultures.
Competition between men from different ethnic groups created stories of
whose masculinity could be deemed to be hegemonic. However, competitions
have not reached a conclusion, and are ongoing. As part of the expression of
their masculinities, these men also commented on femininities of ‘their’ women
and ‘other’ women. Although gender identities were talked of as ethnic
characteristics, stories of caricatured gender identities were expressive of power
relationships. When Japanese men were challenged over identities they
mentioned class relations in Britain. Gender, ethnicity, class were all used for
expressing power.
Different gender identities are obstacles for communication between the
different cultures and, at the same time, gender identities are used for defending
and supporting their cultural identities. The gender identity of each group,
which often became a stereotype, was exaggerated in their talk in order to
differentiate their cultural identities. This also suggests that the discourses of
gender in Western middle-class culture can be understood in a more relativistic
way as particular cultural discourses. I do not intend by this that Western
cultural discourses should be rejected, or gender identities which were
described by some of the Japanese transnational workers are not contestable.
There can be different cultural discourses in different cultural contexts. In
addition, when we look at cultural identities in multicultural situations, gender
identities are indispensable factors. And gender identities tend to be
exaggerated in such situations. Gender identity is one of the most important
factors in contrasting cultural identity.
Although it is important to define clearly what is meant by sexual harassment
and gender discrimination in the transnational workplace and for these issues
to be treated seriously, it is also important to clarify the problems of power
relationships inside companies that use exaggerated gender images of others,
in order to find rational solutions for communication between cultures.

Notes
1 R.W.Connel, Masculinities, 1995.
2 James Clifford, ‘Introduction: Partial Truth’, in James Clifford and George E.
Marcus, eds, Writing Culture: Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, 1986.

161
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

3 Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne, eds, Dislocating Masculinity:

Comparative Ethnographies, 1994.
4 Cliff Cheng, Masculinities in Organizations, 1996.
5 Tomoko Hamada, ‘Unwrapping Euro-American Masculinity in a Japanese
Multinational Company’, in Cliff Cheng, ed, Masculinities in Organizations,
1996.
6 Alice Lam, Women and Japanese Management: Discrimination and Reform, 1992.
She also pointed out that the ratio of female managers is markedly lower than
that of the Western industrial countries; for example, the US 39.8 per cent, former
West Germany 18.4 per cent and Sweden 21 per cent, whereas in Japan it is only
8.8 per cent. See Alice Lam, Ibid., p. 15.
7 As for women’s employment in Japan, Mari Osawa pointed out that after the oil
crisis the male-centred social policies were strengthened to keep economic
competitiveness. Mari Osawa, Kigyō Chūshin Shakai wo Koete: Gendai Nihon
wo Gender de Yomu (Beyond Company Society: Reading Contemporary Japan
from Gender Perspectives), 1993.
8 For literature written in English about women’s work in Japan, see Janet Hunter,
ed, Japanese Women Working, 1993; Mary Saso, Women in the Japanese
Workplace, 1990. Jeannie Lo, Office Ladies, Factory Women, 1990; Dorinne
Kondo, Crafting Selves: Power, Gender and Discourses of Identity, 1990.
9 Alice Lam pointed out how the EEO Law was implemented by guidance from
government and pressure from the employers’ organisation. Alice Lam, Women
and Japanese Management: Discrimination and Reform, 1992, pp. 117–40.
10 See Chapter 2. For networks of bureaucrats and company executives, see, Ulrike
Schaede, ‘The “Old Boy” Network and Government-Business Relationships in
Japan’, The Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 21, no. 2,1995, pp. 293–317.
11 ‘A Love Affair at Work Turns Sour’, Independent, 15 May 1996 (Peter Popham);
‘Japanese Sex Bias Forced Me Out, Says City Dealer’, Daily Telegraph, 3 August
1995, p. 3.
12 This is also reported in Mary Saso’s study on Japanese electronic companies in
Britain and Ireland, though the study is about manual workers on the shop-
floor. Female workers showed more discontent than male workers, though the
shop-floor in electronic companies is a more female workplace than the managers’
world in banks. Mary Saso, Women in the Japanese Workplace, 1990.
13 The relationships between gender and cultural identities are important to examine.
For gender and Muslim women, see Valentine M.Moghadam, ed, Gender and
National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies, 1994.
14 Alice Lam, Women and Japanese Management: Discrimination and Reform, 1992,
pp. 200–17.
15 For sōgōshoku and ippanshoku, see Chapter 2.
16 Interview 100, with a Japanese female manager (at a subsidiary company of a
bank), in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1995.
17 Interview 27, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 20s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
18 As for British women in companies, Michael Roper described female managers
in the post-war period talking about obstacles they experienced in their
workplaces. Michael Roper, Masculinity and the British Organization Man since
1945, 1994, p. 190.
19 Interview 24, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London, in 1992.
20 Interview 27, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 20s,
interviewed in London, in 1992.
21 Interview 71, with a Japanese male manager (at a financial subsidiary of a trading
162
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

company), in his 50s, interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.

22 Interview 6, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
23 Interview 88, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
24 Interview 38, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
25 Interview 36, with a British male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
26 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
27 Ibid.
28 Interview 9, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
29 Interview 100, with a Japanese female manager (at a subsidiary company of a
bank), in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1995.
30 For the socialisation in the Japanese corporate culture, see Eyal Ben-Ari, Sake
and ‘Spare Time’: Management and Imbibement in Japanese Business Firms,
Papers in Japanese Studies, no. 18, Department of Japanese Studies, National
University of Singapore, 1993.
31 Interview 17, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
32 Ibid.
33 Tomoko Hamada, ‘Under the Silk Banner: The Japanese Company and its
Overseas Managers’, in Takie Sugiyama Lebra, ed, Japanese Social Organization,
1992.
34 Interview 97, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of an insurance
company), in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1995. ‘Marudome’ is a jargon
word among the Japanese managers which indicates Japanese businessmen who
do not change their ideas and attitudes even when aboard.
35 Japanese businessmen are written of as people who are always together as a
group. See Anthony Sampson, The Money Lenders, 1988, p. 208.
36 Interview 22, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
37 Interview 43, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
38 Even though she graduated from a competitive university, her clerical work was
the same as that of women who graduated from high school.
39 Interview 29, with a Japanese female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
40 Ibid.
41 Interview 26, with a Japanese female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her
20s, interviewed in London in 1992.
42 Interview 100, with a Japanese female manager (at a subsidiary company of a
bank), in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1995.
43 Ibid.
44 In the pre-war period girls went to a primary school, and after that some girls
could go to jogakko, which meant their family was able to support these girls
well.
45 Interview 29, with a Japanese female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
46 Interview 10, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
163
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

47 Interview 14, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
48 Interview 58, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
49 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Interview 61, with a British female manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
53 Interview 62, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 `Interview 62, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
58 Interview 60, with a British female clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
59 Interview 61, with a British female manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
60 Interview 77, with a British female manager (at a securities company), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
61 Ibid.
62 On the other hand, young Japanese men were looked upon sympathetically by
some British women. Ms Harris, a secretary, was sympathetic to her male Japanese
colleagues’ complaints about long working hours. She said that when she tried
to say ‘hello’ to her Japanese colleagues at the office, Japanese men began to say
hello to her. She also said that some of them were nice people. Ms Morris also
mentioned her young Japanese colleague, who had decided to work for an MBA
after 5 o’clock. She thought he was more Westernised than the Japanese who
just stayed in their offices after 5 o’clock.
63 Interview 68, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
64 Interview 47, with a British male manager (at a securities company), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
65 Interview 6, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London, in 1992.
66 Interview 9, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
67 Interview 6, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
68 Interview 2, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Interview 27, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 20s,
interviewed in London, in 1992.
72 Interview 38, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
73 Interview 31, with a Japanese female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her
20s, interviewed in London in 1992.
74 Interview 26, with a Japanese female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her
164
 COMPETING MASCULINITIES AND CONTRASTED FEMININITIES

20s. interviewed in London in 1992.

75 Interview 50, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 20s, interviewed in London in 1994.
76 Interview 29, with a Japanese female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1992.

165
 6
FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN
TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

Why is segregation between cultures maintained, and how do people react to

their multicultural situations? We need to look at their inner selves, and at
their view of the world, in order to explain the multicultural situation and
the difficulties that arise in communication between two cultures. The
construction of their self-identity as being different makes them keep to their
own way of life and work, rather than allowing themselves to be influenced
by the ideas of a different culture.
Identity can be defined as an expression of ‘who I am’, ‘where I belong’ and
‘how I belong there’.1 In multicultural situations in Japanese banks in the City,
individuals were always locating themselves between cultures, and their sense of
belonging was always being challenged; therefore, both personal and collective
identity were at the forefront of interaction between the different cultures. The
Japanese had power inside their companies, but they had less power culturally in
the Anglo-American environment of the City. This was the opposite of the
relationship which prevailed in Western multinational companies, where power
relationships within companies reflected the environment outside.
This chapter examines the collective identity of different groups in turn,
focusing on their sense of belonging and their world-view. I first explore
what the Japanese said about themselves and about their world. Second, this
chapter focuses on the British staff. We look at the self-image of the British
who chose to work for the Japanese. Third, I discuss how these collective
identities cannot be seen to apply to everybody within a culture. Diversification
of identity suggests that those who located themselves at the core of their
society talked about themselves as if they were representative of the culture.
Japanese on the periphery tried to identify with this ‘core’ identity more than
the British. There were even efforts in this regard made by women, or lower-
status workers. Identity was in fact diversified according to gender and status
within their own community. Finally, I look at how such identities moved in
time and space. In this period of globalisation, both individual and collective
identities were and are changeable and fragile, moving between past and
present, and between countries. People’s identities were less and less fixed in
any one culture.2 In other words, individuals were floating between different

166
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

value systems, presenting different selves. However, dominant discourses still

emphasised different national cultures. This affected the understanding of
others, and created and perpetuated segregation between groups who thought
of themselves as belonging to different cultures.

Japanese sense of self and views—two contradictory centres

The Japanese have been considered as holding a unique position in modern

world history. They came to join the modern Western world in the late
nineteenth century, but they were not colonised by Western powers; indeed,
they themselves colonised other Asian countries until they were defeated in
the Second World War. They created their own psychic world-views in relation
both to the West and Asian countries.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, being—emotionally—in the centre
of Japanese society, Japanese bank managers have been taught at school and
at home stories of the world and their location in that world. They also
circulated such stories among themselves and friends. In their stories talked
of in the interviews, we can see these bank managers occupied two
contradictory centres in their world: in the West, and in Japan as a leading
country in Asia. For the Japanese, modernity is joining the Western power as
a latecomer, but they have been ethnically and culturally ‘other’. Trying to
assimilate to the West as if they have always been members of such an élite
club caused emotional conflicts for the Japanese, and all the while they
continued to emphasise the superiority of their identity. Vacillating between
the core of the West and their own uniqueness, these Japanese leaders floated
emotionally between the two, occupying a space in the middle.

Belonging to the company

Japanese bank managers whom I interviewed had a strong sense of belonging

to their companies. Loyalty to the company was stronger in those companies
which took more care of their employees. A bank, a corporate culture,
demanded that its employees were hard-working, and introduced retiring
employees to two further subsidiary companies before they retired at 65,3
though other banks introduced a retired employee to only his next workplace
in a subsidiary company. These introductions made employees feel safe and
want to work hard for the company.4
Well-cared-for employees perceive themselves as part of their company.
The Japanese who were sent from Tokyo expressed the view that each of
them represented their company. Mr Toda said he had worked under the
company’s kanban, i.e. the logo of his company. He described how his life in
a large company had been more secure than the life of his father, who had

167
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

had a difficult time when he was running a small family business. Ms

Hosokawa was smartly dressed and said that she met the bank’s customers,
as if she had been president of the bank. Fuyuko was delighted when she had
been told that she was like a pillar of the bank. Both Fuyuko and Ms Hosokawa
were segregated from key positions in the company, but they had internalised
the ideology of ‘homogeneous Japanese companies’.
The sense of being part of the company also creates the images of
homogeneity among company employees. Despite such images, in fact, there
was fierce competition among key workers, and only male graduates from
top-ranking universities could compete for top positions in the company. Mr
Yamada was laughing at himself when he said that the working lives of
Japanese male managers were like horses racing with carrots in front of their
noses, and that this lasted for 30 years in the same company. Such competition
caused bitter feelings among retired people and employees who found that
their careers had not been as successful as they would have wished, and that
they had not ended up on the company board.
Although there was a strong sense of belonging to the company, and fierce
competition among key workers, this did not mean that all company men
had a strong identification with the company, or that they were blindly obeying
hierarchical orders. Mr Ogata was from the generation of ‘baby boomers’5
who were considered more liberal than the older generation, and he thought
his sense of belonging did not arise from his being a passive hierarchical
person. He thought he had always tried to find his own way.

I do not like to be told that I am a ‘salary thief’, so I want to work

harder than this company expects me to. I think a ‘salary man’ is
also a professional job, so I have to work hard, but I would like to
work in my own way, but the result should be that my way is a big
plus to the company… I have to gain results. That’s the way of work
for a professional… I do not worry about what other people think
about my method.6

Although the strategies of individuals vary between companies, and there are
differences between discourses and practice, ‘belonging to the company’ is
an essential factor in these company men’s stories of the ‘self’.

Towards the world—in the front line of change

These managers were proud of having been in the forefront of the

development of the Japanese economy during the high-growth economy in
the 1960s and de-industrialisation of the Japanese economy in the 1970s
onwards. Mr Tanabe, in his fifties, was about to retire and recalled his
working life:

168
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

My most exciting work experience was that I was always in the

middle of change in Japan. One period of change was when I was in
Kabutocho (the centre for stock exchange business in Japan). It was
the time of the Nixon Shock in 1971… The government could not
do anything to stop these investors buying yen, and the yen rose
higher and higher every day… I spent such a period of change in
head offices for five years… I think I was happy to be involved in
such changes in Japan. I have been working for 30 years, and I am
now old. I feel Japan has changed a lot.7

A younger manager than Mr Tanabe, who started work in the early 1970s, also
viewed his career in parallel with the rapid growth of the Japanese economy:

I was successful as a salary man, but I think most of my success was

luck. I was lucky to have good bosses, and to be a salary man in a
good period. In other words, the Japanese economy was expanding,
and the companies in this business have expanded in parallel with
the growth of the Japanese economy.8

During the period of expansion of the Japanese economy, these bank managers
moved towards the capital, and chose careers in Western financial markets. It
can be said that they moved towards the ‘centre of the world’. Mr Matsuda’s life
represented such a move. He was born into an agricultural family in a provincial
area as a youngest child, and was expected to work outside the family:

My father’s intention was that the eldest son should succeed the
family line as a natural matter, his daughter would marry into another
family and look after her parents-in-law, and the younger son should
live independently outside the family. They did not have much money,
but they were willing to spend money for our education.9

His father recommended him to seek a secure life, but:

I was against such suggestions and wanted to do more challenging

work. And working in a foreign country was my longed-for job, and
I liked to study English. I had such a simple dream.10

For him, going towards the perceived centre of the world was the most
challenging and invaluable move he could make. Mr Nagase was also born
in a provincial town as the oldest son in his family and went to Tokyo
University. After graduation, he began to work in Tokyo, and then worked in
New York and London.11 Both Matsuda’s and Nagase’s families wanted one
of their sons to stay at home, and the other sons to go out and find
opportunities. Although these Japanese company men had a strong sense of

169
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

membership of a Japanese company and Japanese society, at the same time,

they had a strong admiration of the Western world and culture, and thus
they were eventually assigned to work abroad.
Their longing to go abroad had been planted at home and at school. Mr
Shimazu explained:

My grandfather was a scientist and studied and worked abroad…

The private high school I went to was established imitating public
schools in England. I spent six years there and the education gave me
access to the Western world. The principle of the school was to bring
up leaders of Japan to the level of the Western world. The ideal of the
school was firstly to harmonise Western and Eastern cultures, secondly,
for students to go abroad, full of ambition, and finally for students to
study on their own. The school also emphasised language education,
so a relatively high number of classmates are now working abroad.12

These managers, who are now working abroad were interested in studying
English literature and Western history. However, their fathers and teachers at
school did not recommend such impractical subjects for study, which they
also considered unsuitable for men.13 When Mr Sano was young, he liked
English poetry, but his father did not allow him to study English literature,
which his father considered had poor potential for earning income. He followed
his father’s advice and studied economics at university, but he continued to
like Western history and English literature. Mr Yoshino, a young manager,
also wanted to study Western history, but was strongly advised against this by
the teacher and his father. He had to choose law for his first degree. Mr Ogata
said, his only enjoyment in his teenage years was reading Western literature as
much as he could in a library in his hometown. Such admiration and curiosity
about the West grew from the time of their adolescence.
Although these managers were not able to fulfil their hopes of studying
Western culture in their formal education, their interest in the West led them
to choose careers abroad. Mr Koike expressed how he wanted to be at the
‘centre of the world’ more directly:

I did not mention London, but I told the personnel management that
I would like to work abroad again, if possible in New York. I had
worked in Los Angeles, which is abroad as well, but it is not an
international financial market… I said to them that I wanted to work
in the atmosphere of the centre, I would like to be involved in business
at the centre with the professionals of the centre.14

When Mr Yoshida was first asked to work in London as a trainee in a British

high-street bank in the late 1960s, he was delighted to have the opportunity
to see what Europe was like. He recalled:

170
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

I worked from 10 to 4 o’clock, but during weekends I travelled to

the continent. At that time, in every aspect, Britain was better than
Japan, and I had eagerly wanted to see Europe. I wanted to see outside
Japan. Then, I felt I understood Europe.15

However, during the post-war period, their task of developing Japanese

financial business in the West was hard. Mr Yamano also said that when he
had been in the Southern US to open a new branch, he had repeatedly phoned
the local bank asking them to lend his bank money. Local staff thought his
business attitude was too aggressive. Mr Sano said that he had known he had
insisted too strongly on the New Yorkers lending money to his bank, and
that some New Yorkers had complained to his Japanese head office. These
Japanese bankers in the 1970s had strong attitudes, but knew that Japanese
banks did not have good reputations.
When Mr Sano recalled his life, he repeatedly said that he was not a
‘corporate soldier’, but had always worked in the front line of new business
development for his bank. Since the 1970s, he had spent almost all his working
life abroad and had always been at the forefront of international business in
his bank. In spite of his insistence that he was neither a company man in
career terms, nor a corporate soldier, his career showed that he had dedicated
his working life to the bank. Mr Shimazu had also devoted his working life
to international business. He wanted Japanese banks to be more competitive
with Western banks. It was like a mission for the company and for the country.
He said, ‘I did not think Japanese banks should become like British banks,
but I thought we had to bring Japanese banks up to the same level’.16
However, the business ventures in which Mr Sano and Mr Shimazu were
involved had failed, because the booming financial bubble of the late 1980s
had burst (and with it their prospects of becoming members of the board).
After working in international business in the US and Europe, the area they
had specialised in had not become mainstream company business.
These Japanese bank managers’ sense of being in the centre of the world
was reminiscent of a catch-phrase of the Meiji intellectual Yukichi Fukuzawa,
datsua-nyūō, which means ‘entering into the Western world, and being freed
from Asian countries’. They worked according to the slogan which was fixed
in their minds. Born into a country which was a latecomer in the capitalist
world, these Japanese financial managers followed the constructed images of
their ‘ideal country’.

Dilemmas of international Japanese businessmen

As we have seen, Japanese male managers had a strong sense of ‘belonging’

to their company, and a longing to be at the centre of Japan and the world.
However, these managers had subtly different identities from those male

171
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

managers who spent their careers mostly in head offices. As we have seen in
Chapter 3, there were two different career paths in these Japanese financial
companies; one kokusaiha, and the other kokunaiha. Although all Japanese
businessmen I interviewed in London were to some extent kokusaiha, there
were still differences between those who for many years spent their career
abroad, such as managing directors in London branches or young specialists
in the new financial business, for example, fund managers, and those who
spent their careers mostly in head offices and were now doing administration
in London or business with the Japanese in Europe.
However, in spite of these subtle differences, neither type of Japanese male
managers had many identity crises in their working lives in London. They
had clear ideas about who they were and where they belonged. In particular,
the happiest people were kokunaiha, and their purpose in staying in London
was simply part of their experience as ‘generalists’. Of all the Japanese male
managers, these people suffered the least from instability. In contrast to these
‘stable’ managers, senior Japanese managers in London who had spent most
of their careers abroad, knew of dangerous situations in their companies. Mr
Jinbo expressed the positions of kokusaiha in the company as follows:

Do you know the words, ‘Heike,17 Navy18 and Kokusaiha’? To sum

up, Kokusaiha, people who know the outer world will be defeated
completely by the ultra-nationalistic group. When you look at
ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has less power. After all, if
you do not have a base within Japan, you are weak. If you only
think of factors within Japan it is easier, but if you have to do business
abroad you have to take account both of factors within Japan and
abroad. Therefore, you have to consider an enormous number of
possibilities. That is how to do business abroad…

Here, we can see conflicts of transnational Japanese managers who fell between
Western values and Japanese values in businesses. Mr Jinbo expressed his
contradictory feelings about the two value systems:

There is unhappiness and happiness which was caused by the fact

that you have known the other world like Urashima Tarou.19 I had
been seeing the world using only the X-axis, but after I came abroad
I began to see the world using the Y-axis as well. There are now
more factors to consider when I have to make decisions.20

Mr Jinbo thought that doing business abroad gave him more knowledge, and
widened his perspective, yet, he predicted his position would be weaker in
head office in Japan. He had contradictory views of the centre. The West was
‘the centre’ of the world and was a more sophisticated place, but head office,
which was controlled by people who had stayed there without knowing much

172
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

about the outside world, was also ‘the centre’. He had progressive ideas so
that he understood the values of the Western business world, but this created
a dilemma for him. He said:

After all, you are happier if you only know the one, aren’t you?
Happiness means that you do not know unhappiness. For example,
when you come here, you find that Japanese ways have many
problems…and doing business abroad makes you see yourself in
comparison with others. You can see yourself from all angles. This is
a happy situation, but at the same time, it is an unhappy situation to
some extent. In other words, we notice the ugly aspects of ourselves
as Japanese, and of course we can also know good aspects of
ourselves. I think the people who do not know this are to be pitied
from my point of view, but they do not know that they are ignorant,
so they must be happy people.21

Tomoko Hamada has examined the dilemma of being abroad for Japanese
managers in manufacturing companies in the US. She found that managers
she interviewed thought that technology in Japan was more advanced and
that therefore being abroad for many years had great disadvantages. Thus,
for these managers, the core of their imagined world was only within Japan.22
Whereas, in international financial business, Tokyo was never the centre of
the world, though gaiatsu, i.e. the pressure from the Western bankers to open
the market, had been strong. Japanese international financiers thought that
the Tokyo market was just a provincial market, though it was huge in terms
of turnover. In the imagined world of these financial managers, the core of
the world in terms of their business was New York or London, but their head
offices were the core in terms of their human networks.
The relationship between a company man and his company was delicate.
International financial business was thought necessary for the Japanese
economy in order to survive surrounded by changes in the world economy
and pressure on the yen and these banks, but people who had dedicated their
working lives to this new business found that they had deviated from successful
Japanese career paths when their companies eventually became more reluctant
to expand their business in Europe in the 1990s. The sense of being at ‘the
centre of the world’ which these Japanese financiers had experienced and
which had been fostered during the period of high growth, had now become
the opposite after the boom finished.

Withdrawal into ‘Japanese’ cultural identity

Although these managers longed to be at the centre in the West, they also had
the feeling that they would never have views like those of the West in terms

173
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

of business, management, gender relationships and way of life. They tried to

keep their own original cultural identity, derived from their own group. Mr
Yamano explained:

The raison d’être of our business is to help Japanese enterprises, or

their subsidiary companies, which have become international… We
are here to advise such Japanese companies. I do not know how long
I will be here, but I want to do at least one meaningful piece of
business showing that we, this bank, have helped some Japanese
enterprises to become international. I would like to do such work.23

The difficulties they met with in international finance business, especially in

the 1990s, made the Japanese withdraw from their intention of putting
themselves at the centre in the Western world. They thought that the expansion
of the Japanese economy abroad was among Japanese corporations alone
with a minimum of integration in the business of other nationalities. Mr
Ogata, as we have seen in Chapter 2, explained that ‘advantages for Japanese
companies are only within Japan, there are no advantages away from Japan’.
Mr Sonoda also explained that finance business was very domestic
everywhere. Therefore, only a few Japanese banks would be ‘global banks’,
but the rest of the Japanese banks would concentrate on domestic business.24
Mr Toda had a more pessimistic view of their international business:
‘International business for Japanese banks comprises only 10 to 15 per cent
of the whole business. Business with Japanese companies is still much more
important for Japanese banks’.
Inside these Japanese banks, Japanese managers withdrew into themselves:

This is a 100 per cent subsidiary company of a Japanese bank… It

would be impossible for anyone British to become head of this
company, because this is a Japanese company. There is a limitation
to promotion, but salary becomes higher without limitation…
Probably the British staff have already given up ideas of getting to
the top and understand what it means to work for a Japanese
company… Yes, it does. There are many who want to be promoted
further. However, this is a Japanese company, therefore, outstanding
British workers do not come to this company. There are second-class
people who want to come to a Japanese company, even though they
are graduates from Oxbridge. We also think so… They partly
understand this themselves. They only expect their salary to rise.25

Not only in the company’s policy, but also in their personal interactions,
these Japanese managers withdrew from more positive interaction. Mr
Yamada, who himself was wondering if he would move to another foreign
bank, explained:

174
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

In the office I am reserved with the British staff, because I have to

assess them. It is me who decides their annual salaries, bonuses, and
promotions. So I do not want to socialise with them privately… In
my private life, I only know the British in the tennis club to which I
belong. I play tennis there every Saturday, and after that we go to a
pub. That’s all.26
This emotional withdrawal can be regarded as one of the reasons for
segregation between Japanese and British staff. Japanese bank managers
wanted to be at the centre of the world and wanted to join the international
business world to learn about another business culture, though there were
different levels of willingness between kokusaiha and kokunaiha. Yet, most
Japanese bank managers I interviewed talked about difficulties in adjusting
and joining a new business environment moving between cultures. As a result,
they established stories of difficulties in understanding between cultures and
legitimated the segregated management for the local staff.

Is the ‘Japanese system’ changing?

The dilemma of being a kokusaiha businessman was an effect of the language

of ‘the Japanese system’, in which business and management were conducted
differently from the other world based on different values in the West. They
talked of Japan differing from the West and its values. Their physical bodies
were abroad, but they were tied to Japan in their minds. However, the recent
severe economic recession raised a new question of whether or not the so-
called Japanese system was changing. In addition, de-industrialisation in the
Japanese economy and pressures for free competition inside Japanese markets
were remarkable. For example, Mr Koike had the idea that Japan would
change in the future:

What is common sense in Japan may be necessary to form Japanese

society, but it is not common sense in the world. Therefore, Japan
has to open the gate and to be international. I have changed through
my experience of working abroad, and I think there will be an increase
of such people because more people go abroad now… Japan is very
far behind the West… The social system, school system, and the
relations between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
and companies were useful in the process of high growth in Japan,
but such a system is now out of date, and there is a need for alternative
ideas, and the system may be changing but I think the system is still
preventing necessary change. In this sense, the experience of being
abroad opens our eyes. I am hoping more young people will go
abroad, and know that the old system is out of date, and Japan will
change. I have been thinking this recently.27
175
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

As a kokusaiha manager, Mr Koike emphasised progressive views on Japan.

However, Ms Akamatsu’s interpretation was that changing the system was
in order to support the survival of the Japanese economy in international
competition:

I think, probably, it is a matter of whether or not a ‘perfect’ capitalism

is good for an individual’s happiness. To sum up, the company can
survive in a free-market capitalist system. So, from the company’s
viewpoint, payment based on ability, redundancy of inefficient
workers, even efficient workers, such policies are better if the company
is to survive. However, for an individual, it doesn’t mean being happy.
Therefore, I think it would not bring happiness to an individual
Japanese if Japan became an American-style capitalist system…. I
think the Japanese system is declining, but unevenly according to
different industries… Banking business, especially securities business
is being globalised. So, this industry is more influenced by foreign
cultures…. If I think about myself I would wish the lifetime
employment system to last longer, since I am older. Personally it is
very sad, but I think lifetime employment will not last in Japan. The
company may use a discourse of ‘a fair system’ in order to make
redundancies.28

Ms Akamatsu was now in charge of redundancy for local staff in a securities

company in London. She admitted that the Japanese banking business could
not adhere to old-fashioned business practices, which meant business within
corporate groups, guided by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Trading and Industry. Mr Taguchi also pointed out that Japanese banks had
had to become more competitive since the 1970s. However, he argued that
lifetime employment for Japanese managers was inevitable. As the present
key workers, Japanese managers said that the Japanese employment system
should be kept, though redundancy might be necessary for survival. However,
other managers believed that Japan would continue to have its ‘old-fashioned’
system. As Mr Jinbo’s story about Urashima Tarou demonstrated, these
managers believed that Japan had a culturally unique system. When these
international businessmen came back to Japan, they had to face different
business practices and different values from those they had found in London
or New York. Mr Hoshino, who was personally very open-minded, also
emphasised that Japan was not changing:

I think Japanese society has not changed at all. The Japanese financial
market is closed, and the Ministry of Finance controls business more
than it is allowed to by law. It is extremely strict when we have to
issue new bonds for companies. Therefore, it is expensive to issue
bonds in Japan. I think there must be cultural problems, after all. We

176
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

cannot judge values, but there are different criteria in different places.
It is difficult to make the judgement that this way is good and that is
bad. So, there is more control by the Ministry of Finance than allowed
by law, and companies are afraid of the ministry’s control, or
sometimes the Ministry of Finance works for private companies.
These phenomena are not changing. There is already gaiatsu
(pressures from the West), but I do not think Japan is changing.
There must be something at the core in Japan which prevents it from
changing.29

Mr Hoshino also said that the working culture, in addition to the closed
nature of Japanese business, was not changing:

I may be exaggerating. If I was asked if it was not changing at all, I

would admit that there are certainly slight changes. I am exaggerating,
but Japan is not changing… The reason is, people are doing the
same things continuously, so Japan is not changing. There are now
many young people, who are called shinjinrui, in other words, new
human kind, but they are affected by the culture very soon. Young
people call us kaseki which means fossils and when we older
generation are talking, young people wonder what fossils are talking.
So, there are slight changes but the changes are few. For example,
there are some companies, which have a corporate culture of
messhibōkō (working for the public at the expense of the private
lives of workers). New graduates are affected by this corporate culture
soon after they join the companies. Therefore, you can see that the
corporate culture is not changing.30

Furthermore, Mr Shimazu thought that the Japanese banking system might

suit the Japanese economy. He said:

Yet, it is necessary to change this generalist system to compete with

the Anglo-American banks. However, I am doubtful if the system
here is better than the Japanese system. It is effective if we pay based
on ability and fire people who do not have enough ability, but I
think it needs to be considered if it is really a good idea to fire 5,000
people if business is collapsing… I do not know how rapidly the
trends will change. I think it depends on our cultural belief. It is a
matter which we as a whole like. Therefore, I feel that the movement
is not in the way that it should be. Japan is a country of islands. If
Japan had been located on the Continent, we would have had different
behaviour, but it is not so simple. This is my impression from my
working experience of more than thirty years… I do not think Japan
will change so easily.31

177
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Mr Sano also said that finance for short-term interest was not healthy for the
economy of a country, and he thought that a national economy should be
based on the production of goods, which implied that corporate groups guided
by the bureaucrats in Japan should remain.
As we have seen, Japanese male bank managers had worked in parallel
with the economic expansion of Japan after the war, especially since the
1970s. Unlike the successful manufacturing industry, international
financial business required them to enter Western business networks, which
dominated financial business in London, and to associate with well-
educated, middle-class local staff. Consequently, these banking managers
had two contradictory centres to their imagined worlds. They had admired
and longed for the Western world as more civilised and more progressive,
but, on the other hand, they continued to claim their own cultural
superiority and constructed their identity in order to be competitive with
the Western economy and their Western counterparts. These Japanese
managers were going backwards and forwards between two centres, but
their minds did not go beyond the boundaries of Japanese society even
though they were physically abroad.
Mr Hoshino expressed his ideas of the two different worlds as follows:

My wife still says to me that I am happier when I speak to English

people than when I speak to Japanese. For when I speak to Japanese,
I mainly speak to people related to my company. There are many
occasions that I speak to bosses, to subordinates, or to business-
related people. I have to be cautious with these people in Japan, but
I do not need to worry when I speak to my English friends. So I seem
to be happy.32

He admitted that he was happier in English culture, but he did not think
that Japanese society is changing. These managers’ views might be
anachronistic if we compare their opinions with those of a wider range of
Japanese people. Bank managers had better family backgrounds than
average, had been educationally successful, and had worked for the
financial centres of large corporate groups in Japan which meant that they
had more conventional ideas.
To sum up, Japanese bankers and financiers in London still talked about
the so-called Japanese system as an unchanging system. It is difficult to
know which comes first: their language of the Japanese system or the
unchanging system itself. As a result of business failures in London and the
economic recession in Japan, the language of the Japanese system among
the élite company men is still popular compared to the language of
abolishing the Japanese system. The sense of bitterness and the withdrawal
from the centre of the West was a common theme in the stories of Japanese
managers.

178
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

Japanese companies for the British—expansion

to the periphery

Japanese companies were welcomed as employment opportunities for Britain

in the 1980s, though before then they had not been well-educated graduates.
The reputation for good products and for investment in Europe as well as
evaluations of Asian economic success, made British white-collar workers
seek jobs with Japanese companies. For a number of well-educated British
employees it was the first encounter with non-Europeans in their everyday
working lives. Although Britain had expanded throughout the world in the
modern period, Japan, which had not been colonised by the West, together
with its culture, was a new area they began to understand. In other words,
for the first time, Japan became the ‘other’ within Britain from among
‘outsiders’ of British society. Because of this new encounter, British staff in
Japanese companies constructed their identity in relation to the Japanese
who were the outsiders in the Western world, but were at the same time
economically successful. It was a new, learning experience that made them
confirm and reconfirm their positions. Encountering Japanese bankers, in
turn, provided a vehicle for constructing British identities towards Japanese.

Japanese banks as new career pathways

The deregulation and multinationalisation of the City of London in the 1970s

and 1980s resulted in more foreign houses in the City, which gave British
white-collar workers who wanted to work in financial companies
opportunities for working in the City. In the late 1980s, Japanese banks were
a new job opportunity for British people who wanted to work in the City.
In contrast to their Japanese counterparts, these British managers did not
have a strong sense of belonging to the company. Most of the British staff,
especially the managerial class, had moved around companies seeking better
salaries, securer jobs and promotion. I have found several patterns informing
their choice of Japanese firms. For some British staff, these Japanese firms
provided a pathway to social advancement in British society, in other words,
the means for climbing up the ladder in British society. For example, Mr
Hunt, a personnel manager, told of his childhood:

My father was a miner, and had traditional views. My mother, whose

parents had been stockbrokers in London, had a more broad outlook
on life… When I was old enough to leave school, he wanted me to
leave school and take a job in mining. And my mother was very much
against that, and wanted me to go further and develop, and have
more education and more opportunities… He said it was good to be
employed in a long-term, stable working sector. But my mother took

179
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

a different opinion. Well, she said, oh, mining was okay, but there
were other opportunities, there were other choices, there were different
things to do, and further education would provide the opportunity of
having a greater choice, and choosing something different…33

Mr Hunt himself did not want to be a miner, although his father did not
change his mind:

I knew my father wanted me to go down the mines, and I knew I

didn’t want to go down the mines. So the way of getting out of that
was to study hard, get the qualifications, and find a different path…
I think being a miner is an awful job. It’s not a very pleasant job. I
used to see my father coming home very late at night, going to work
very early in the morning. Not a very good standard of living. Not a
very open way of life.34

He chose subjects not because he liked them, but because he could gain better
marks. He chose a university far away from home, and only went home once
a year after he became a university student. After graduation, he gained a
personnel manager’s post in a local council, and he gained a qualification
from the Institute of Personnel Managers. He had then worked in the public
sector for more than ten years and tried to find jobs in private companies.
Then he found a job in a Japanese company in a magazine for personnel
managers:

When I told my superiors at the County Council, they were surprised

that I was able to make the move, and I suspect, also, perhaps a little
bit jealous…my Head of Department had been…ex-public school,
ex-very good public school, ex-Cambridge, found himself in the public
sector, and I think he would have preferred to work in the City,
because he felt he had a better background, a more suitable
background for the City, than I had. He didn’t actually say anything
as such, but he did say, ‘Well, I think you’ve done very well to find
that job in the City, and I shall just think of you walking over London
Bridge, into the office, from time to time’. But it was obvious that,
you know, he would have quite liked the same opportunity.35

The envy of his boss who graduated from Cambridge confirmed his success
to him. He rose in society using the Japanese company. Mr Gibson, a clerk,
also found working for the Japanese was a good opportunity:

My sister worked for a high-street bank, and I remember now that

she told me that I should work for an international bank, because
they paid more money. I can now remember that… So I wrote to this

180
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

big international bank… I didn’t give it a second thought. I had no

preconceived ideas. So that is maybe not the answer you were looking
for, but I never even thought about it… This Japanese bank was the
first to say yes. They simply wrote straight back, and said, ‘Come
for an interview tomorrow’. And I went for an interview. They said,
‘You have got the job’, and I said, ‘I’ll take it’.36

Since that time he had become an office worker, which gave him satisfaction:

My father was a dock labourer, he worked on the docks. He had a very

poor education. He had no aspiration to do anything. We lived in a very
small house and we were very, very poor, as children. And so the last
place I expected to work was in the City of London. And I went to a
very rough school, a very poor school, with a very bad academic record,
and I had no intentions, at all, of working in any office job. My parents
think I am great, because of the humble upbringing, they think I’ve
done very well. Especially my father… Because I work in the City, and
have an office job, and I don’t get my hands dirty.37

These Japanese companies were green fields for British jobseekers and the
companies seemed to provide secure jobs for managers who had lost their
previous jobs. Mr Rogers, a personnel manager, had lost his job in a
construction company in the North when he was in his twenties in the 1970s.
Since then, he had had to earn a living abroad, on the continent, in the Middle
East, in Japan, and in the USA. In the late 1980s, he came back to Britain:

I thought I must find a job somewhere in London. So, I got on the

train, came through Colchester, down to Liverpool Street, I had
nowhere to go, honestly speaking, I hadn’t been in England for many
years. In the tube, I saw the advertisement from a Japanese
recruitment agency. I thought, you know, I’d worked a long time
with the Japanese. I just went in there. I didn’t even think that this
was the financial sector. Anyway, the agency was looking for
somebody for this company, who was familiar with working with
Japanese, who was old enough to control their British staff. Sometimes
it is difficult for the Japanese management to control young British
staff. So, they needed someone to do that. I needed money, and I
needed to eat. So, I said, I’ll do it.38

Mr Rogers emphasised that employment in this country, especially in the

manufacturing industry in Britain, has been extremely insecure, and this was
the reason why he was delighted to join the Japanese company. Not only Mr
Rogers but also other male managers had come to Japanese companies seeking
job security. Such people had worked for foreign banks or foreign companies

181
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

before coming to these Japanese banks. For example, Mr Harding, a senior

manager, came to the Japanese bank after working for an Arab company and
having his own unsuccessful business. The idea of job security also influenced
more senior managers in their decision to come to Japanese banks. Mr Green,
a senior manager, first joined an American bank, and then a French bank,
but was fired for accusing his boss of dishonest behaviour. He ‘had a cheque
in my bank from being laid off which I knew would only last a few months.
I came back to look for a job in the City and it was very difficult to begin
with but then I was offered three jobs’. The reason he chose the Japanese
bank was because ‘it was a green-field site’, and job security:

What they wanted me to do was to start something new. So I was

not coming into something established but starting from square one
and building. I came to this bank and for the first time I stopped
trying to make as much money as possible and I thought that I have
a family and have to now build my career. I have to stop ‘just playing’.
So I chose the job that would offer me the best career opportunity,
the best challenge and that was this bank… We discussed it at
considerable length… Coming to this Japanese bank, my wife was
100 per cent behind me. Her primary requirement was for security.
So I came to this bank with her full support.39

Mr Yates, a specialist manager, came to the Japanese bank after he was made
redundant:

Well, the situation at the American bank had been horrible, for a
year. I had been made redundant and reinstated on the same day. We
didn’t know what the future held. We’d operated very well, and they
just shut down the department because they didn’t want to do it any
more…. And so I really didn’t have a lot of trust in or respect for the
bank any more. And the Japanese bank, I thought, might offer me a
bit of job security for some time, because the Japanese are not
renowned for firing people for no apparent reason, which Americans,
I’m afraid, can do at times. That was one of the reasons that I took
the job, because I thought that I might be safe in a Japanese bank,
because I could see that there was going to be a time of hardship
within the banking industry, within the City of London.40

We can clearly see how the myth of job security in Japanese business culture
influenced these decisions of British male managers.
Japanese banks especially gave opportunities for middle-aged female
managers who gained qualifications after they had been working. Ms Jones
had been a housewife, and gained the qualification of personnel manager
when she was 36 years old. However, she could not find a job until she was

182
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

40. She eventually joined the personnel management department of a company,

but her position was of very low status. Then she ‘went into a small
organisation, where I was starting up the personnel department, and so I was
able to bring all my own ideas to it, you know’. However, after that, because
of redundancy, she moved again to the Japanese securities house:

I’ve always been very interested in other cultures. It was exciting, no

… I wasn’t worried about it… I knew that Japanese companies,
generally, were very successful, because, especially at that time, their
success, particularly in manufacturing, was well known. And so I
knew that I was likely to be going into a successful company, and
that was my major concern, you know, having left a company that
hadn’t been successful.41

Working for a Japanese company was an opportunity to give her better

opportunities and job security as well. Another female personnel manager
also thought this was an opportunity in a green-field site:

It was worth it, because it was an opportunity. It was a good

opportunity to create a personnel department from scratch, and you
don’t often get that opportunity. So I took the risk! [laughs]42

Opportunities were given not only to middle-aged managers, but also to young
managers who were doing new financial business and were interested in success
in the City. Young graduates, so-called ‘yuppies’ in the 1980s, were interested
more and more in getting into the City. Mr Harrison, a fund manager,
explained:

Why did I choose to work in the City? My sister had, before she was
married, she had a boyfriend who was working in the City, and I
saw what he was doing, and, you know, his salary and everything,
that sounded quite exciting. And also, I’d read things in magazines
about people in the City, and the jobs they do, and lifestyles, and,
and I came across other people as well. So that’s really what I targeted,
just because it seemed to be an exciting place to work.43

Ms Nicholson, a young specialist manager, worked for a high-street bank. In

spite of her education in classics at Oxford, she was one of many trainees there:

Well, the people that controlled the training, they had so many
graduates, because they took 90 every year, that they were just
numbers. Even if they lost good people, bad people, they didn’t mind,
because they just calculated, ‘Right, every year, we will lose 25 per
cent’. Everything was done on numbers.

183
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

She felt that she would not achieve the career she wanted by undertaking
general training in a high-street bank:

In a recruitment magazine, they advertised the job, and it was just a

job that I was interested in. It didn’t say it was a Japanese bank, I
didn’t know who the bank was, and the job was exactly what I
wanted. So I went to a recruitment consultant that was advertising
it. And he said to me, ‘Well, this is the job. You fit the job very well.
And the organisation is this Japanese bank’. So I thought, ‘Well, I
don’t know. I’ve never heard of them!’ This small, little bank. So he
told me that he had dealt a lot with the bank, and he told me quite a
lot about the organisation, and at the time, this bank was recruiting
a lot of new people, expanding fast, and it, it seemed quite exciting.
And I was quite happy to try a Japanese bank, because, I mean, I’m
always interested to try new things.44

Ms Morris also came to her Japanese company from another high-street bank,
where she found the job was boring. She said, ‘I felt I was a bit more special.
I wanted to do something a bit more unique’. She was also unhappy with the
training she had received in the bank, which had asked her to move around
different sections every six months. She said, ‘I wasn’t offering anything.
That’s why I wanted to leave’:

And I was offered an opportunity to come back into aviation, which

I enjoyed. The level of responsibility was very different then. Much
more autonomous. It’s a small team, there’s only three of us compared
to 40, so I’m completely exposed to everything. And I just felt it was
a very good place to move to.45

These young managers who were well educated, and had had secure jobs in
the City, wanted better opportunities which would satisfy their ambitions,
and the Japanese banks were there when they wanted to specialise in the new
financial business in the late 1980s.
In contrast to those managers who sought job security, or green fields in
Japanese companies, more senior managers thought it was a drawback to
come to Japanese banks. Mr McLead recalled:

I was approached by an agent. An agent approached me, to say,

would I be interested in joining this bank… I initially had some
reservations. But I’d had lots of interviews. I had five or six interviews,
and, I talked to a lot of people who were, who knew more about it
than I did. And then I made my mind up quite quickly. Initially,
when I was first approached, I’d never thought of joining a Japanese
bank. So, initially, maybe…46

184
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

Mr Miller, who had been a lawyer for Japanese companies in London, also
hesitated to come to the Japanese bank he is now working for:

They asked me to come… It took me three months to decide to come

… It’s a different lifestyle… I had to focus my attention purely on this
bank. That took me some time to think through. I had no problems
with the Japanese, because I had worked with the Japanese for maybe
20 years. Most of the big Japanese companies I’ve worked for, in the
sense I advised them on employment things like this. So, I was not
concerned with it being Japanese. I had a number of Japanese friends.
So, it was not a concern to me. When they asked me to join, it was not
a question of whether I should join a Japanese company or not, but it
was more a question of whether I change the type of work I did. That
was the big question. I decided that I would. That was a new challenge.
So I thought I would do that. So, I agreed to come.47

In spite of their initial hesitations, these senior managers thought they could
find more opportunities to widen their abilities in these Japanese banks.
The motivation for British staff in taking up positions with Japanese banks
differed according to class, gender and age. Although there were various
attitudes from delight to hesitation in coming to Japanese companies, all
these people thought ‘going Japanese’ gave them good opportunities; for some
it was for social advancement and rescuing themselves from insecure job
situations in Britain, and for more senior managers, it was a great opportunity
to fulfil their ambitions. These people did not show their sense of belonging
to the core of British society. Some, who had never thought they would work
for prestigious British houses, thought that the Japanese firms would give
them great opportunities. Those who had already been satisfied with their
previous jobs thought they would have many more possibilities in these
Japanese companies. The Japanese banks in the 1970s and 1980s, especially
in the late 1980s were a ‘new frontier of the City’.

Going international—expansion to the frontier

In comparison to the inner conflicts expressed by Japanese managers about
being ‘international’, these British staff saw ‘going international’ as positive,
and a new challenge. For them, working for foreign companies was an
expression of ‘being international’, which did not imply contradictions in
terms of identity. The British and the Japanese took different perspectives on
the implications of ‘international’.
One reason for this difference might be the longer history of ‘being
international’ in Britain, since the country gained world hegemony earlier in
the modern world. For Mr Chambers, being international has been his family
tradition:

185
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

My family background goes back two or three hundred years. My

family were Quakers, and Quakers were very much involved in
trade from the North of England. This tradition continued right up
to my father. He was brought up in South Africa. His father was in
business. Their family were interested in diamond mines and so
forth in South Africa. And this was all part of the Quaker
tradition. They had been forced into trade… The Quaker trade
tradition continued until my father died. His business was in India
until after the war.48

Because of this background of Quaker family business, he said that his father
held an international view:

Two features which remain: my father did not believe in narrow

Empire’s, or this country’s views. It was 19621 think when he said
that England had to be a part of Europe. Having been in India, he
was very international. It was a very strong influence on me at a
very early stage.49

For some managers, being international meant that their fathers were working
for the British multinational companies after the war. A young officer, Mary’s
father was working in a British multinational company:

And so through his job, we used to travel around the world, and we
lived in the Falkland Islands, the Yemen, Middle East, Bermuda…
You know, we always travelled when we were little, you get used to
it, and you want to travel around now you’re older… I think it makes
it easier to understand different cultures and different races.50

Because of her experience of being abroad in her childhood, she said, she was
confident with understanding other cultures. Mr McLead’s father was working
for a British multinational company as well.51 Like his father, he chose an
international bank for his first job. He said, ‘The bank gave me opportunities
to work abroad, and I wanted to work abroad’.52
Even staying in Japan made some feel they could understand other cultures.
When Linda, who worked as an assistant, had to find a job, she thought her
stay in Japan as an English teacher for a year would help her understanding
of Japanese culture:

I thought, ‘Well, because I’d enjoyed being in Japan, or whatever,

maybe I should think about working for a Japanese company’. So,
because I was just…and also, because it was some, some kind of,
because I’d been in Japan, and because I spoke a little bit of Japanese,
and had some knowledge of Japanese culture, I thought it would be,

186
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

I thought it would make it easier to get a job. So then I went to some

agencies, which specialise in Japanese companies in the City…53

Other British staff justified their decision to work in a Japanese company by

their rather vague opinions that they could understand another culture. Mr
Harrison, a young specialist manager, was offered a job in a Japanese securities
company:

I think, at that time, I just found the Japanese banks and Japanese
financial institutions, more interesting. At that time, I mean, I had
no knowledge about Japan, or no connection with Japan. I mean,
my parents were living in Bangkok in Thailand, so I had some sort
of vague, you know, vague idea…it just seemed to be interesting
and, and unusual, and exciting, and it’s nice too, it’s nice for me to
work amongst, not necessarily Japanese people, but people from the
Far East, if you know what I mean, rather than work in a British
firm, where I might be surrounded by other British people… I wanted
to have a sort of Far East influence about my work, I think.54

For these people, their sense of ‘going international’ was based on family
tradition, and their parents’ experiences, or they themselves had travelled
around. Japanese banks were inside the City, but for these people the Japanese
were new ‘outsiders’, recent arrivals. In addition, if we look at the history of
the City, it has a tradition of accepting foreign banks. The City has been a
bridge for people, providing an outward-looking pathway. Thus Mr Chambers:

The City is no longer the British or English essence at all. One or two
houses, but the majority of the people, particularly senior people in
the City who work either for foreign companies, or non-English
companies—the English themselves—have non-English origin… And
the number of purely English banks are few. Even English houses,
what about Baring, what about Benson, what about Warburg, most
of them were not English by origin. They were mostly continental
Jewish houses. Rothschild and Warburg were also classically
continental Jewish bankers who came to the City. And so, the City is
a very un-English place. That’s part of the reason for its great success.
It’s very much international. If you look for a job in the City, I think
you will be much more appreciated according to your ability and
your general intellectual level, your formal education and your
background.55

For most of them, coming to the Japanese companies is a challenge that they
encounter without knowing much about Japanese working culture and
management structures in companies, as Mr Hunt thought:

187
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

It was interesting. I thought it was a challenge. Something, something

unknown, something interesting, and, therefore, a challenge. I mean,
moving from the public sector to the private sector was a challenge
anyway, and the fact that it was Japanese, made it an even more
attractive challenge.56

Yet, Mr Hunt’s knowledge of Japan is ‘Only, of schoolboy history. Nothing,

no detail, really’. He thought ‘it was a good opportunity to join something
that was, for me, new,…because it was brand new, a green-field site,
basically’.57 Japanese companies were the new frontier for these people. Going
international was, for these local staff, seen as expanding their own British
identity, without anticipation of conflicts.
Many of them had had experience of working for other foreign banks such
as American, or European or Arabian companies before they came to Japanese
companies. Therefore, they did not feel afraid of coming to companies from
other cultures. Or they came to Japanese companies because of the myth of
job security, like Mr Rogers. Even some senior managers, who had had contact
with Japanese companies through their previous jobs, had not predicted the
difficulties they were to encounter. For these people, Japanese companies were
merely another new opportunity, another new frontier inside their territory of
cultural hegemony; they thought they could find something there.

Disappointment and withdrawal into ‘the universal world’

Because of the huge bad debts which ensued from the economic bubble
bursting, these Japanese companies began to reduce their numbers of local
staff in the 1990s. Local staff began to realise that the myth of job security in
Japanese companies did not apply to them. Mr Rogers explained this:

Five years ago, yes, lots believed this myth. But not so much now.
And one of the reasons is the recession of the last two or three years.
So, when Japanese companies have dismissed their own staff, myths
pretty well get around; people begin to understand. There was a
time that everybody trusted Japanese employers in the City, that
doesn’t happen any more….
The securities company he was working for had had huge debts and the
company had already lost autonomy and was controlled by the main bank
which was planning to merge the company. His position was already nominal
and his responsibility was taken by the person sent from the main bank. He
expressed his deep disappointment with his working life:

I was too old to believe anything, because I’ve been around lots of
countries and lots of places, in a lot of companies, lots of employers.

188
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

And I realised, in fact, a long time ago that cash is the king and
companies are basically heartless entities. Companies actually don’t
have a heart. And if things are going badly, the companies always
take the easy way, which is to cut costs by losing staff. And, you know,
I had no grand ideas. I came to this industry because I simply needed
money at that time. And it has been reasonably economically good
for me over this period. And I have a quite good job. I feel quite boring.
I only came in, because that time I needed money, I always knew that
one day they would leave me. Sayonara Peter san (Goodbye, Peter),
and it is in fact true. This company now has major financial difficulties.
It really has much financial support from a Japanese bank. And we
now owe them so much money. They control us. And inevitably one
day, this office will no longer exist. And we will become part of the
bank. And when we become part of the bank, they will not need me,
because they already have somebody to do my job.58

We can see his deep disappointment with the British manufacturing industry
and Japanese firms.
When they faced different cultural values and barriers for promotion, local
staff felt confused. Why do they speak such poor English? Why do they keep
themselves to themselves? Their main questions were: should I still stay here?
Will I get the opportunity for promotion to top manager, or to head office?
Am I trusted by the bosses? Why do Japanese bosses exclude me from final
decision-making? Especially they wonder why Japanese don’t understand
Western standards. Mr Chambers reflected:

And I am always struck, unfortunately I have to say, when I talked

to Japanese senior businessmen, about how incapable they are of
getting involved in discussion on a general level. If you ask them
general questions about economy and politics, and so forth, very
rarely do you get an interesting answer. And I think it is partly that
they are not trained to think speculatively, they are not trained to
give a sort of answer about general questions. They do specifics.
And I found always through my time in Japan, with one or two
notable exceptions you do not get involved in general discussions in
Japan in the way you would naturally here. I am not on about the
meaning of life itself, but the broad philosophic, political questions.
And that’s a very real cultural difference…

Mr Chambers’s assumption was pessimistic:

I think that must be from a totally different way of questioning. It is

not right or wrong, good or bad, just different. That’s all true again
in China, Korea and not just in Japan. I think it’s serious to the

189
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

extent we are looking at Japan playing a much bigger role in the

world, especially with economic power. It’s going to have to happen.
It’s going to have to be changed. Japanese people want to get help to
learn to be international organisations…

He suggested that the Japanese should urgently change their ways of thinking:

We are saying to Japanese people you are going to have to adapt to

Western attitudes and thinking, and we are not going to adopt Eastern
ways of thinking. It’s up to you, but the Japanese, Chinese, Koreans
must still tune to our wavelengths. Effectively, the West, in the largest
sense, is saying to Japan, there is only one wavelength. That’s the
Western wavelength. You must tune into that. We are not going to
tune into the Oriental wavelength. And therefore, we are saying to
people to a large extent they must take the ‘Western form’ which we
use in debates.59

In the end he resigned from the Japanese company and went back to a British
organisation. He expressed his deep disappointment as follows:

I would not deny that I have found that to work for Japanese banks
is much more frustrating than I thought. I think I am making much
less contribution than I could or I would like to. I would like to see
myself making a real contribution and being trusted. I am gaijin (an
outsider), somebody who is not much part of this bank composed of
Japanese staff.60

The Japanese bank lost this senior manager who had a profound knowledge
of business in the City.
Japanese companies also lost young hopeful managers who could be core
staff for the business in the City. Mr Harrison eventually found a job in a
British house. He talked about how he had resigned from the Japanese company:

I was not particularly happy, and, you know, salary and bonuses
were very flat, and morale was starting to come down because, even
though it was a Japanese company, there were some redundancies
being made, and people just being told to stop working and to leave.
And so all that sort of feeling made me think I must do something.61

Yet, before resigning he checked his boss’s expectations of him, only to find
that he was not being encouraged to stay in the company any longer:

Well, it was not really, not so much like that, because I knew my…
after four years, I knew people in the firm very well, and we had

190
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

discussed, maybe, for a few months, you know, what I should do,
whether moving around the firm, and the idea came up that I would
go away and study on a course, and they said that, ‘If you want to
do that, we will give you encouragement and, you know, we will not
ask you to stop working now, but we will give you encouragement
to go away, to go away and do that’. So I, you know, I did not come
in and say, ‘Okay. I’m sorry, I want to resign’.62

Because of the serious recession within Japan, Japanese securities companies

began to make local staff redundant. Mr Harrison was deeply disappointed:

Japanese companies never sack people, never make people redundant,

so that the whole system was breaking down a little bit, in London,
and so, even though, yes, they probably felt inside, you know, they
knew me well, and etc., etc., but they probably wanted me to stay,
yes. They were, you know, obviously sorry to see me go. But, as I
say, I was not moving to another company, I was going, going to a
course. I never, never intended, or never said to them, ‘I want to
move to another company’, so it was a different situation,
really…very, very sad and shocked, and disappointed.63

We can see how much Mr Harrison’s disappointment arose from discovering

that his illusion that he was a member of the core group was false.
Moreover, his undoubted illusion that he was a lifetime employee of the
company also evaporated. Thus, he left the company, and the Japanese
company lost another young graduate, who could have contributed to
developing business in the City.
Ms Morris, a young specialist manager, was also thinking of moving:

A little bit, I have a regret now, is the way that this new job has
panned out, has developed, because for the first two years, it was
very good, I learnt a lot very quickly, and we were very busy, and we
had a very high profile, doing a lot of new deals. And it suddenly
went quiet, and it sort of died…because of the recession in Japan.
My education, my learning process, was very steep for two years, I
learnt a lot very quickly, and it’s just like that, at the moment. So, at
the moment, I’d like to be looking to move onto something different.
So I’m ready for a new change, a new challenge.64

Other senior managers were also wondering if they should give up their jobs
in Japanese companies. Mr Milligan was extremely anxious about whether
he was trusted by his Japanese bosses. After the recession, Japanese head
offices, in general, began to distrust local staff more than previously. Mr
Milligan’s responsibility for European business was now shared with a new

191
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Japanese manager delegated from Japan. He said that he had been happy to
hear that his Japanese colleagues still remembered him after they had gone
back to Tokyo, but that he was thinking of leaving because of the glass ceiling
blocking his promotion:

I think the…one of the things that I worry about, and one of the
things…examples of difference in culture that is not being dealt with
terribly well yet is, if you’re Japanese in a Japanese business, you
have this relative certainty of a long career.65

He understood that the Japanese management system would not apply to

local staff. He said, ‘that system works if you’ve got black hair and brown
eyes … But it doesn’t work if you’ve got blond hair and blue eyes… And, and
that’s because, relatively speaking, the Japanese, certainly the Japanese banks,
not so much Japanese industry, but the Japanese banks are still quite young
in… in being international businesses’:

I mean, I speak better English than you, so when I’m talking to ICI,
ICI will understand me better. So that’s, that’s quite logical. And
also, it’s quite logical that ICI will see, ‘Ah, good. This bank is
promoting local employment’. So that’s, that’s good, healthy, and
logical. But we haven’t yet made the next step, which is, ‘What
happens to Kenneth Milligan in five years time?’ ‘What happens to
the guys who report to me, in five years time?’ Then, I have got a
Japanese guy working in my group. In five years time, he’ll be…maybe
in Tokyo, maybe in New York, maybe in Osaka, maybe in Paris.
There’s a system and a structure to deal with that. And it’s, it’s very
organised, actually, extremely organised. There is not yet a system
and a structure to deal with local staff.66

There were some local staff who have tried to come to terms with Japanese
cultural ideas. Mr Green said that the Japanese culture was better than that
of American or other European banks, and that he himself as Scottish could
adjust to the hierarchical Japanese working culture:

The culture suits me because the structure reminds me of being at

school and it is familiar to me. There is a hierarchy, seniority and
everything else. I feel I have much more freedom to do my job without
question. Because the underlying assumption from the Japanese
management point of view is ‘you know what you are doing so do it’
whereas in an American Bank or Swiss Bank it is ‘you know what you
are doing but we don’t trust you’. So you are always restrained. In this
bank, you don’t appear to be restrained. You are of course restrained
within certain parameters but the parameters, are set much wider.67

192
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

Although Mr Green was struggling to find a compromise he still considered,

‘Until they start to have senior management who are not Japanese, and start
to lose their Japanese identity in order to become international, they will
always have a problem’:

I think that the problem that they had is their different business
philosophy and their culture. It is so far from that of the Western
world which they are comparing with. The basis of what I am saying
is that the Western way of developing international banking is
correct.68

In spite of this strong belief, he was desperate to reconcile himself to Japanese

corporate culture:

The Japanese way is keeping the Japanese identity. That in a way gives
them great strength of cultural integrity within the organisation. As
long as other people from other cultures can fit in with that cultural
identity, it works all right. And that is what we seem to have just now.
What we need within the bank now is the next step. Whether the
international bank with headquarters in Japan becomes like an
international bank with headquarters in America such as Citibank, or it
stays a Japanese bank with a Japanese culture—developing the
international market using its strengths. I hope the latter. I don’t
actually believe that the Western way is the way international banking
should develop. In the Western world, it is right. I think that much of the
Japanese philosophy of relationships is long term, of honour and of not
getting maximum profit for every deal. The Japanese bank sees itself as
a citizen within a community in which it works. It is not trying always
just to take everything. It wants to give back to the community as well.
It wants to behave in an honourable manner. It wants to be respected as
an institution in its own right as opposed to just being respected for
being popular. A Japanese bank wants to have good profits but also
wants to be respected by its customers. American banks want to make
maximum profits this year, but Japanese banks want to ensure that it
has good profit for the next ten years. I think that is much better. It
allows the establishment of a rapport with customers and a trust with
customers that is much more lasting. It allows the banks to develop
more slowly, however, than the American way or the European way. It
is more slow, more considerate, more conservative but when it moves,
it moves with a great force, having thought about it for very long, very
hard and with dedicated resources, it does it.69

Mr Green tries to internalise the Japanese corporate cultures, but he still

hopes to change the corporate culture:

193
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

I work for about 12 hours a day, from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. I am really

tired always and my colleagues are the same. We are not paid very
well. But again we are trying to change—myself and other colleagues
are trying to change the culture. In the Japanese culture it is
‘Confucius’-based.70

Mr Miller is also trying to find compromise in his work for the Japanese.
First, he told how he had found working practices to be different from what
he had understood them to be:

I knew the bank, because I had advised the bank. I had an idea of
what it was. So, I used to come in to the bank and meet people. I had
an idea. When I actually worked in the bank, I realised that my idea
was not right. That was the big change for me. We should change
the staff rule book we have which I wrote before I came to the bank.
When I came to this bank, I saw the rule book in the real workplace.
I realised that changes had to be made. Because it wasn’t the same
structure that I thought it was when I was outside. That was the
biggest change.71

He mentioned difficulties as a senior manager in working with two differing

working practices, such as slow decision-making among the Japanese and
quick decision-making among the British:

Um. I mean there are times I enjoy the slower way, but there are
also times that I realised particularly for my legal background, you
have to move quickly. Because you will miss the advantage, or you
are disadvantaged by virtue of somebody else taking what you
would have taken yourself if you moved quickly. So, you know, I
am in the middle, I mean I am in the middle because it’s easier for
me having dealt slowly with clients some of them are Japanese,
and quickly with some who are not Japanese. So, I’ve actually
worked well in both camps. So, I can see the advantages and
disadvantages. And I feel able to make a judgement myself
whether I should go quickly or slowly. But other people feel they
should always go quickly, or always go slowly. It is very difficult to
try to balance. It is very, very difficult to do.72

He did not want to talk about his future aspirations,73 but he mentioned that
he was contributing to the struggle to find the middle way in the company, so
I gained the impression that he would continue to work in the bank:

My honest view is that I think the people in this branch, both Japanese-
delegated staff and non-Japanese staff have worked very well together,

194
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

and have produced a joint effort to make a change to the hybrid culture
I was telling you about. So, people have made a determined effort to
work together, to make changes to support the branch and to get the
job done. So, my feeling is that myself and other colleagues, both
Japanese and non-Japanese have contributed to that.74

Mr McLead even believed that at some time there would be British top
managers in Japanese banks in London:

Well, I enjoy, increasingly, I enjoy the management side. I enjoy

managing people, and motivating people, and organising people.
That’s what I really enjoy, and so I’d like to do that. And obviously
the, the top job in this organisation, is general manager. That’s his
job, to manage people. So that’s what I’d like to do, management.
Are there any British general managers?75
Not a general manager, no. There are joint general managers, but
not a general manager, no…That’s what I’d like to be, yes.76

His view can be contrasted with the Japanese managers’ views that there
would never be British top managers in Japanese overseas branches, especially
in financial companies, since the control from head offices was absolute.
Those managers, who believed that Japanese companies could be changed,
chose and liked to work in the City. As Mr Hunt said:

It’s still very enjoyable, it’s a very unique… Well, because it’s, you
know, the Square Mile, and the status, and the internationalism of
three hundred and whatever banks. It’s a very special environment.
It’s still very, very enjoyable. I was, I think I was very fortunate,
because without banking experience, and without business
qualifications, and with public sector experience…they were all
disadvantages in terms of getting a job like this. I think for someone
with that sort of background that I have, trying to come in now,
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to actually make that move,
from public to private.
Do you like the City?
Yes, I do. It can be improved in a number of ways, I think. But,
generally, yes, because I like the accent on performance and efficiency,
and achievement.77

For Mr Hunt, the Japanese bank brought him luck. Other clerical workers
did not say that they wanted to resign from Japanese banks. Mr Gibson, who
has been a double checker for more than ten years, also said:

195
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

I think that my salary is good enough, I would like to travel round

the world, whenever I want to, I’d really like to do that… I have a
very good pension as well. And most people, most of my friends
can’t believe that I went to work for the same company for so long,
and they think it’s really boring. But at least my salary is okay, so I
don’t mind.78

Female personnel managers also showed their satisfaction with working for
Japanese banks:

I’m very happy here, and I hope I will be allowed to stay here for
some years to come, because I think that this bank has a very big
future in London, and we may merge with, maybe merge with the
bank, which I think will be very exciting. So I would be very happy
to stay here, for the moment. Maybe when I have been here ten
years, I will want to change, and then I would very much like to use
the knowledge that I have gained here, to help other companies, on
a consultancy basis. If they have problems, management problems,
or some other human resource problems, to be able to go in and
look. I think working, particularly in a company like this, where we
have had these cultural difficulties, they have given me the ability to
look at the problems within the company, and to try to find a solution.
And I’m hoping to be able to use that in other companies later on.79

Satisfaction and dissatisfaction with Japanese companies depended on the

position of local staff in British society. Those who could go back to British
organisations left Japanese companies, while clerks remained in Japanese
companies. Middle managers, on the other hand, were hoping that Japanese
banks would change their corporate culture to a Western style.
Mary, a young British officer, explained the hostility of local managers to
the Japanese:

I mean, I’m sure there’s a certain amount of racism amongst the

Western staff here, against the Japanese, you know, if someone’s
upset someone… Not, oh, nothing, nothing really severe, just the
usual staff like, you know, you get some people who just don’t like
working here, but don’t have the opportunity to get anywhere else…
But then you ask yourself, why are they here? Why do they work for
a foreign bank, if they feel like that?80

There were differences of attitude to the Japanese among the British staff,
but all held the view that Japan had to change, or was now changing, and
these views were in contrast to the Japanese view that Japan was not changing
and that it remained different. Mr Green expressed his progressive views:

196
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

I think there are problems in management within the Japanese system,

but it is undoubtedly changing. With the recession in Japan, and
companies changing, various things are happening. People really need
to perform. Before, they had a job for life no matter what they did.
Now there is a chance that they will lose their jobs or there will
always be a certain age group promoted to a certain level and getting
a certain salary. However, if the company is shrinking or not growing,
there are fewer positions. So now, even after reaching a certain age,
they may not get a higher position because the number of positions
are less if the company is not growing. So they will become
disillusioned, they do not know what to do and become very scared.81

A City figure also talked more generally about the historical gaps between
Britain and Japan:

The way Japanese society operates may be more similar to Britain

50 or 60 years ago than it is now. It might have been very similar 50
or 60 years ago. And so sometimes I think that the timing may be
different, more different than the fundamental ideas. But if you
compared Britain of 50 years ago with Japan now, and the sort of
changes that are happening in Japan now. And then they may be
very similar to Britain maybe 30 or 40 years ago. So, I think that’s
more a timing difference. It’s not a fundamental difference in the
way people think … On the business side, there are quite a lot of
similarities between the British and Japanese.82

In comparing the characteristics of the two collective identities, i.e. those of

the British and the Japanese, it could be said that the British have one centre
to their imaginary world and tend to think that Japan should have a course
of convergence, whereas the Japanese have two contradictory centres: one in
the West, and the other in Japan.

Fragmentation of identities according to gender and

class consciousness

As the previous section demonstrates, almost all the British held a progressive
view of the world, whereas the Japanese had the idea of a rigidly structured
world emanating from multiple cores. However, although we found national
characteristics in the collective identity of these people, there were great
diversities within each national group according to an individual’s class and
gender within their own culture. As a result, there emerged more complex
relationships between different groups; between men and women, Japanese
and British, senior managers and clerks, and different generations. In other

197
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

words, there is diversification within ‘us’. Although people talked about ‘us’
and ‘them’, categorisation of the groups was not always the same.
First of all, the cross-cultural identities among British staff were diversified
according to status in the company. For a trade unionist clerk like Mr Gibson,
the Japanese banks were, of course, seen as exploiters in the present capitalist
world. When he was involved in trade union activity, he was assigned to a
very busy position, and then his promotion completely stopped. However,
his hatred was directed towards his British boss, not the Japanese managers.
He did not include senior British staff in his category of ‘us’.
The structure of Mr Rogers’s imagined world is complicated. He was
waiting to be made redundant from a securities house, which was going to be
taken over by a Japanese bank. He criticised finance business in the City
which is not based on production of goods:

I’ll soon return to engineering, because I think this company is quite

depressing. In this industry, literally all we are doing is passing money
around in big circles. And taking a profit like an agent each time.
The size of this was demonstrated by Lloyd’s who lost two and half
million, it just seemed to me sad. Too many people in this country
try to make money out of money. You know… You can lose a fortune.
In this industry, you can make enormous salaries, you see. And who
are benefiting? Lots of young graduates are attracted by the City
and they want to join in the money grabbing. They want to join this
industry. They can make fortunes… Yes, it is important, you know,
in a service industry, he who controls the cash is always the king.
And on the other hand, it’s not put to useful use. You can’t create an
infrastructure, an industrial infrastructure which maintains us through
the bad time in the future. In that sense we are very weak here…
Although we need our financial service industry, that industry cannot
maintain or help the rest of the country.83

Mr Rogers linked his left-wing views—that the City did not support British
manufacturing industry—with his views on the Japanese economy, where he
thought that the manufacturing industry had been protected. However, he
also blamed the Japanese economy which was involved in money games in
the late 1980s. He hated both the financial sector in the City and the Japanese
financiers, both of whom deprived him of secure jobs. He expressed his feeling
as an ‘engineer’:

And you should also notice this, if you are someone like me, I am on
my passport as an engineer, travelling alone, you can see numbers of
British engineers working outside Britain, it’s almost criminal, the
waste of British talent, supporting other countries’ economies, not
our own.84

198
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

In the past, he had worked abroad to find jobs. He had once spent time in
Japan delegated to a Japanese manufacturing company. He now yearns for a
lost place like his hometown, which was ‘the real heart of the industrial
revolution’,85 in spite of the reality that he had been obliged to leave Britain
because of the depression when he was young.
British staff who had difficult lives in Britain did not blame the Japanese
strongly, but showed their feelings about their difficulties in British society.
Mr Rogers expressed his feeling of fatalism. Mr Gibson similarly felt that he
would not find motivation through work. He talked about his son, whom his
ex-wife allowed him to see only once a month. He was saving for his son’s
education, and he repeatedly said that he, himself, had not been encouraged
to carry on into higher education. By contrast, Mr Hunt still thought that the
City was the place for finding opportunities. He had a great longing to climb
up the ladder of British society. These people had the feeling that they had
been marginalised in British society, or in British company lives. Other British
staff in these Japanese companies, even senior managers, did not think that a
British organisation would give them opportunities, which led many Japanese
managers to the view that British staff who came to Japanese companies
were not ‘first class’.
These people did not have a strong sense of belonging to British society,
nor to the Japanese company. They no longer belonged to the community
into which they had been born. Mr Gibson and Mr Hunt did not think of
themselves as working class now, although Mr Gibson talked about dog racing
which he enjoyed very much as part of working-class culture. Mr Rogers
talked about the industrial North, but he was thinking back to the North as
it had been, rather than how it had become. They moved between British
society and other cultures, or between different levels of class consciousness.
Their feelings contrasted with those of senior managers and young yuppies
who had graduated from Oxbridge and other prestigious universities in Britain.
When British staff talked about how they saw their identity in Japanese
companies, their stories varied according to their positions in British society.
Cross-cultural identity differs also according to gender. As we have seen in
Chapter 5, women’s antagonisms towards men were interwoven with their
concepts of their own society. British female staff felt antagonism towards
both their Japanese bosses and British senior managers, who were obsequious
to the Japanese bosses. However, some British female staff did not show their
anger towards their British bosses, but did express anger with their Japanese
bosses. For example, Elaine was angry when her Japanese boss told her off
indirectly through her British boss:

My Japanese manager does not see that I am working hard unless I

am at the office till half past six every night… Instead my British
manager told me about my appraisal mark, and he told my colleagues
as well… His opinion is that when you get the work done, you can

199
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

leave the office. He said if I wanted to be a manager in October of

this year, then I would have to behave in the way expected of me. To
be honest, if they do not see that what I am doing is good, then I do
not want to be a manager. I believe the British manager has defended
me in conveying that I am an efficient worker, but he is in a difficult
position as much as I am. It is difficult for him to go against the
system.86

For Elaine, British male staff were on her side, but Ms Nicholson said she
was treated better by her Japanese bosses than her British boss:

I think I actually get treated better by my Japanese boss, than my

English boss, one particular one. I wouldn’t like to make
generalisations. My boss is very, I think he’s very…yeah, I think he
treats me very well, my Japanese boss. I think my English boss treats
me well when it suits him.87

Diana Nicholson, and some other British female staff, said that they were
treated better than the Japanese female staff by their Japanese bosses:

I think it’s okay for Western women. For me, for example, in our
department, I always felt that the Japanese female manager was
treated much, was treated differently, because she was Japanese…
She was asked to do things that I don’t think an English person, at
the same level, would be asked to do, like making coffee, buying
presents at lunch time, that sort of thing, which… I get the feeling…
I feel that they asked her to do things that they wouldn’t ask an
English person of the same level, to do… Because they think that
Japanese women will do it, maybe, and an English woman wouldn’t.
I don’t know. I mean, she wasn’t happy doing some of the things,
which is why she left. But I think an English woman would maybe
have said ‘No’, rather than, rather than doing it unhappily, and then
leaving. I mean, maybe the culture, maybe, culturally, it’s more
difficult for them to say no. To say, ‘That isn’t my job’. Because
that’s quite a hard thing to say, and maybe, culturally, it’s not
something that they do.88

In contrast to these managers, a British female clerical staff member showed

her feelings towards her British bosses more directly:

I think there’s a certain amount of what I’d call ‘posturing’, you

know, where they…because they know they don’t really have any
authority, they try and act, you know, start telling you to do things.
And you think, ‘Well, I’m in the same boat as you are. I’m a Western

200
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

person in a Japanese bank, you know, don’t pick on me! It’s not my
fault that you chose this job! And it’s not your fault I’m here, either!’89

As we have seen in Chapter 5, Japanese women’s feelings towards men were

not openly articulated, like British women’s. Japanese female managers,
though there were very few in the London branches,90 tended not to talk
about the discrimination against women. However, Japanese female managers
showed strong feelings of rivalry towards their Japanese male counterparts,
whereas they said that they thought that British male staff should be pitied,
because British women were too strong. These Japanese women tried to break
down the barriers against Japanese female managers, and emphasised their
competitiveness in the company; however, they emphasised their femininity
when they talked about their British counterparts. Japanese women who were
in the most supportive positions emphasised their femininity even more.
Locally hired Japanese personnel, most of whom were women, tended to
emphasise their efficiency and hard-working practices as well as their
femininity, which meant that they were the most vulnerable to exploitation.
Their sense of identity was the most complicated among the groups in these
companies.
In contrast to British staff and locally hired Japanese, the Japanese male
managers who were sent from Japan were almost all from middle-class
backgrounds with a successful educational background; some were even from
an upper-class background. They were the core people in their national culture,
and they adhered to their own cultural values, and defined themselves as if
they were representative of their own culture. However, in their minds, there
were still conflicts in terms of their position as international businessmen.
They considered that they were not at the centre of the core in Japanese
companies, because of their inferior position in relation to the more ‘domestic’
élite. In spite of their feelings that they were marginalised by the more
‘domestic’ élite, they still belonged to these Japanese companies, which were
now well-known in terms of their assets. Their feelings of being at the centre
of the society made them talk about what Japan is like, and about how the
Japanese think. Therefore, the diversity of Japanese society tended to be
invisible in their discourse. Although Japan had gained economic power in
the late 1980s, these Japanese who identified with a national Japanese identity
still felt they were behind the West in cultural power. Their emotional view of
the world was, on the one hand, of still ‘lagging behind the Western world’,
and, on the other, they continued to insist on their cultural uniqueness.
Though the British were confident that Britain was a more historically
advanced country than Japan, they had chosen to move into these ‘less civilised’
companies. And as far as the locally hired Japanese personnel were concerned,
although they had once dreamed of entering the more democratic and
advanced British society, they now found themselves looking at this world
from the bottom, and straddling two cultures.

201
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Compared to British workers who joined Japanese companies, City

specialists in Japanese business in British institutions were more confident
and stable than local staff in Japanese banks. They may have been nearer the
core of British society than the local staff. They viewed the Japanese completely
as ‘others’, and inadequate.
Power relationships were complex around the axes of gender, class and
ethnicity in transnational companies. Indeed, identity was not only shaped
by national culture, but it also had a base in gender and class relationships.
Men and women from different class backgrounds had different ways of
seeing themselves. Identity was positioned along these different axes of gender,
class, ethnicity and age. Therefore, there was no homogeneous collective
national identity, no typical gender identity for all men or all women.
Individuals could not identify their sense of self with a dominant expression
of collective identity. They felt, ‘I am different from them…and why? The
process of defining ‘us’ from ‘them’ prevailed throughout the companies.
However, categories of ‘us’ were not always the same, but were always
changing. A single individual might define herself in multiple ways—as
Japanese, as a woman, as a well-qualified person, as a young person, as such
and such…. She could also behave differently according to her own self-
definition. She could also define herself as a more masculine woman than
other women, or she could conceive of herself as Japanese but not like other
typical Japanese. Therefore, it was impossible to arrive at a definition of the
‘typical Japanese’ person.
Yet, there were still dominant languages of ‘We the Japanese’, or ‘We the
English’. Some spoke of such nationally characteristic identity more than
others. Others hesitated to present themselves using such languages, thinking
of themselves as belonging to sub-cultures, or to nowhere at all. The excuse
of excluding local staff from global promotion in Japanese transnational
companies used by Japanese top management was the language of such
nationally characterised company culture, which in turn enhanced the cultural
identity of Japanese core managers.

‘Floating identities’ between cultures

Fragmentation of identity was seen not only between groups, but also within
the individual. Individuals found themselves floating between different value
systems when they faced the frontier of their cultures. The interviewees
measured their positions in the hierarchy, and located themselves between
cultures; however, their locations were not fixed, and were constantly
examined and relocated. Their memories of the past were sometimes
reinvented and romanticised, and they saw their present through their
reconstructed past. Present unhappiness, or hopes for the future influenced
their view of the past. The ‘floating’ was not only between past and present,

202
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

but also in space. When they had hoped to move to another culture, they had
been more positive about cultural boundaries, but when they encountered
difficulties, their notion of cultural boundaries came to the fore. When they
came back to their own culture, like the Japanese returnees, they settled on
the explanation of Japanese culture as an ever-unchanging culture. Individuals
moved between cultures, although the degree of fixedness to a culture of
origin was variable.
The most stable people were the Japanese male managers. In their notions,
they located themselves at the centre of their family, their company and their
own country. Even so, they doubted their own fixed identity, since they had
encountered different values through their business and their interaction with
local staff. They knew there were different cultural values outside Japan.
However, in general, they adhered to their culture of origin, though some
said that the so-called Japanese system was changing, while others said the
system would not change easily. They were afraid of leaving their companies,
though they thought they might have more opportunities if they moved to
Western companies, using their knowledge and skills. They were also afraid
of becoming marginalised on their return to Japan because of their long-term
absence from head offices where Japanese employees, who adhered exclusively
to Japanese values, controlled business and the management of their
companies. In addition, life in Japan was more constricted than in Britain.
However, they concluded that they were ‘inevitably’ Japanese. Furthermore,
Japanese managers expressed a strong sense of their own cultural identity.
They talked about the myth of Japaneseness, as an agricultural, patient, and
stable nationality. Even though they were finding that business was now
difficult, they believed that they would overcome their difficulties at some
time in the future in their own ways of business. They knew that they would
always remain a minority in the West, if they moved to Western companies.
European or American companies might need Japanese, but they would not
have any guarantee of stability in employment for the future. This notion
prevented them from moving to non-Japanese companies. When they returned
to Japan, they confirmed that changing the Japanese system was not so easy.
Although their identities were fixed to so-called Japaneseness, they still
experienced some sense of floating while they faced other values in the West
through their working lives in the City. However, almost all of them did
return happily to Japan.
All the returnees whom I interviewed in Tokyo said that the Japanese
people and the so-called Japanese system were not changing. Identity itself
was changeable, and therefore, they could be different when they found
themselves in a different culture. When they came back to their own culture,
they adjusted to the values of their culture of origin. I was introduced to Miss
Kazue Tomoda by a British female manager. Elaine said Kazue had been the
best at understanding British culture of all the Japanese employees. Yet, in
Tokyo, she did not talk about the situation in London. She was more concerned

203
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

with her competitiveness in relation to her Japanese male colleagues in head

office. She was clear that British managers would never become top managers
in the London branches of these Japanese banks, because the British did not
understand Japanese business culture. Her opinions I heard in Tokyo
completely typified those Japanese who stuck to Japaneseness. Some Japanese
male managers also said that the Japanese employment system would not
change, and that therefore, local staff would not be guaranteed lifetime
employment like Japanese employees. These people’s ideas were changing
while they moved around. They were concerned with their own culture which
they were now in once again, but not with the culture which they had left
behind. When they were in London, they were doubtful about the so-called
Japanese culture, but in Tokyo, their language returned to that in Japan.
Female Japanese managers sent from Japan had already internalised the
discourses of Japanese male managers about what was Japaneseness. However,
they expressed conflictual attitudes towards being exceptional women in the
world of the Japanese male managers. They rarely expressed their discontent
towards their male bosses, in contrast with their British counterparts. For
them, being assigned to London gave them another exceptional opportunity
in their career course in their companies, and so, they conformed to the order
of their society as ‘honorary’ Japanese men.
British managers were also faced with conflicts between two value systems
in their working experiences in Japanese financial firms. They took risks in
order to maximise their potential in the newcomer firms in the City. However,
what they found was an unexpectedly large gap between their culture and
that of the Japanese. In respect of working practices, the manner of decision-
making, ways of evaluating achievements, and practices of socialising, working
hours, and so on, what they had assumed to be common sense was denied in
the companies. They wondered why their expertise was not sufficiently
recognised by their Japanese bosses, and why the Japanese did not accept the
hegemony of British business and work culture. In addition, the Japanese did
not allow them substantial power in management, and global promotion of
the British staff was unlikely. This led to British staff being extremely anxious
about their personal strategies. Some British managers returned to, or thought
of going back to British organisations, being deeply disappointed. They had
attempted to contribute to Japanese companies, but thought that their efforts
had not been recognised by the Japanese. Others showed inner conflicts
between their own values and those of their bosses. Some managers, like Mr
Green, tried to internalise Japanese work culture and Japanese business
methods, although they were not sure if their efforts would be rewarded.
Their hopes of making a hybrid work or business culture might sometimes
have been realised, or it might have been an illusion on their part.
The British in lower positions in the companies were another group of
stable people compared to other groups of British employees. It seemed that
their inner conflicts focused on the class system in Britain. On this point,

204
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

Japanese banks gave them opportunities to gain decent office jobs in the
City, which had the image of being middle or upper class. However, this does
not mean that they were more sympathetic to the Japanese bosses. As we saw
in Chapter 4, they were segregated from the Japanese and they had less contact
with the Japanese, so they were free to invent their own stereotypical images
of the Japanese. The Japanese thought that avoiding contact might have been
a good solution to cultural misunderstanding, but in fact it allowed the creation
of stereotypes. In addition, though Japanese banks gave them slightly higher
salaries, they did not find what they had hoped for in the way of self-fulfilment.
The people who had the worst identity crises were the locally hired
Japanese. They had at the time completely denied their origins in Japanese
society and had moved to Britain to try to gain new identities. However,
the people I interviewed had eventually returned to the Japanese
community and had found jobs in Japanese companies. This group had
vacillated the most between the two cultures. A male, locally hired
Japanese showed deep psychic uncertainty, since he now had difficulty in
finding a place in which he could locate himself. Mr Ushio had been
working for a Japanese company, and had been sent to Oxford by the
company, but he had not returned to Japan:

If I had gone back to Japan I think I would have been successful to

some extent. So, it was wasteful that I did not go back to Japan. I
could have enjoyed the prosperity of Japan over the past decades
within Japan. I would probably say, arrogantly, that the British are
not as good as the Japanese. I did not receive the benefit of the
prosperity of Japan at all. I have been the loser.91

His regret contrasted with his decision not to go back to Japan. I asked him
why he had not returned to Japan as he could have expected promotion
there:

Yes, this is interesting, the reason is individualistic and philosophical.

Britain is the world of individualism in our popular images. In other
words, we can do what we cannot do in Japan. An individual is an
ego. It is possible to look at the self, or to confront the self in the
world of individualism. Yet, it is not possible in Japan. In Japanese
philosophy, there is no idea of the ego in a European sense.92

He thought he could not reach self-fulfilment within Japan:

However, in general, we can look at ourselves outside Japan. We can

have ‘ego’ in our lives in Britain, though it is impossible in Japan.
You are obstructed, and if you are different you will be excluded.
Japan was such a society, and I think it is the same now.93

205
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

His ideas of the contrast between Japan and Britain were exaggerated by
progressive ideas. What he did in this country was to try to adopt a British
identity. He talked about his experience as follows:

When I was in Oxford, I was completely separated from the Japanese

community, and did not use the Japanese language at all. I decided
to use only English and live only with British people. I entered into
the world of English and became a part of the English language…
There was a surface of water. Usually the Japanese look at British
society, which is under the water, from over the water. I entered into
the water. Then I could see Japanese faces from the water. There is a
huge difference between looking at British society over the surface
or from inside the water. It was no good half floating on the water,
and half sinking in the water. You have to completely sink your body
in the water.94

His feelings now lie between Britain and Japan, and for him understanding
another culture is like drowning. I asked him if he wanted to go back:

Um, I do not know. But I do not want to live in most parts of Japan.
Nor do I think I can live there… I cannot go back to Japan. First, it
is impossible, and second, I do not have the will to go back to Japan.
The second reason may be more important. It is very difficult in
practice.95

He expressed the view that he would not be useful to Japanese companies:

My knowledge would not be useful in Japan. If I tried to use it, it

might be possible in some ways. My experience and knowledge about
Britain might be useful. For example, if I teach English at university,
though it is another matter whether or not it is possible, I can
contribute to the teaching of how to acquire the English language. It
is also useful, for example, for English conversation schools. I think
I would be useful in this area. But my knowledge in financial areas is
not useful, because finance is not a matter of language, it is a skill,
though English is the most common language for communication in
the business. Yet, my experience and knowledge is not relevant to
this area. It is like driving. You can drive a car in Japan even if you
learn in France or Germany. The skill of finance is not relevant to
the understanding of the society. The Japanese may need to learn
something about English literature, English thinking, or British
politics, such areas which are related to thought may be the subjects
that the Japanese need to learn, but….96

He even thought that he could not live in Japan:

206
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

The reason that it is impossible to change myself is not only to do

with work. It is also to do with family life, shopping, friendships, and
so on. All aspects of life would have to change if I returned to Japan.
I would not be able to live in that society at all, in respect of family
life, friendships, working relationships with colleagues, and so on….
If I was disrupted so fundamentally, I would no longer survive.97

The fear of not being able to find a job in Japan made him frightened to
return there. His story can be contrasted with that of Japanese male managers
who worked for the company until retirement as lifetime core workers, and
helped to explain the Japanese managers’ fears of moving to other companies,
thus giving up core positions.
Locally hired Japanese women also expressed their ‘in between-ness’, which
I will explore in Chapter 7. In contrast to these women, the experience of Mr
Ushio was less likely. Men, in contrast to women, usually adhered to their
original culture. First, for men, it was more difficult to return to their original
track in their companies, while if they stayed in their position in Japan there
was more promise of opportunity. However, once they had left Japanese
society, their experiences may have been harder than those of women, because
what they might have lost was more than that lost by women.
Although there were differences in degree of vacillations between cultures,
all those I interviewed experienced moving between cultures, and also between
classes, and between gendered barriers. Those who had tried to break through
restrictions in their own societies met with sorry experiences; by turning to
other cultures, they had unsuccessfully sought to break down barriers. Whereas
those who adhered to their original value system unquestioningly had found
greater security. Akiko, a locally hired Japanese woman, told me about a
farewell party for a locally hired Japanese woman in her bank:

She is around 30, and recently divorced her English husband. Then
she decided to return to Japan. It is not too late for her to go back to
Japan now and to try to find a job in Japan. She could find a full-
time job because she is under 35 years old. And she said she wanted
to find a Japanese husband. We all celebrated the start of her new
life in Japan.98

Although these locally hired Japanese women did not themselves say that
they could return to Japan, they encouraged and celebrated this young
woman’s return to Japan. Of course, those attending the party were all locally
hired Japanese women; neither other Japanese employees nor British staff
were there.
In the late twentieth century, it has become common for ordinary people to
move beyond their original boundaries, not only national boundaries, but also
boundaries of gender and class. People travel more widely, and they challenge

207
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

the limits of their cultures. Women have entered male spheres, and vice versa.
Class differences have become blurred. These movements have caused problems
of identity, feelings of uncertainty, displacement and a sense of loss.
As Anthony Cohen had said, culture can be defined as an expression of
collective identities and their common norms.99 Both the Japanese and the
British in Japanese financial firms experienced being confronted with another
culture in their everyday working lives. Through this encounter they defined
their own culture and the culture of others. When they faced different norms
and values which they could not understand, individuals sometimes became
confused.
As we have seen, Japanese transnational businessmen had identity problems
when they did business abroad. They had two imaginary cores for the world.
Therefore, it was necessary for them to manage two value systems. On the
other hand, British staff did not experience such contradictory feelings. For
them, the ‘core’ of the world was in Britain, but they were not themselves
‘core’ people. They were eyeing the core, and Japanese banks were a possible
route for them to climb up the social ladder in their society. Regarding this,
Japanese male managers vacillated more between two value systems, in
contrast to the British who had difficulty in understanding that there were
any cultural values and orders other than their own.
Although we could see conflicts between the two cultural groups, their
power relationships were changing in parallel with the changing world
economy. We could say that their emotional map of the world would never
be fixed and that the maps would change, as would their power relationships.
The basis of cultural identity in ethnicity was clear, but there were also
diversities in cultural identity between men and women and between groups
from different social backgrounds. Identity crises did not occur equally among
the various groups of those who encountered other cultures. Individuals who
were located at the core of their own culture tended to adhere to their own
cultural values, or in the mainstream of their norms. This may have been
because they enjoyed their prestigious position in their own culture, or it may
have been a way of defending themselves and their position within their own
culture. Marginalised people tended to deny the values of the dominant culture
in the society where they ‘belonged’, and they tended to transgress the
boundaries and to hold the illusory belief that there might be more
opportunities for them in other worlds.
However, these marginalised people, both British and Japanese, were still
in peripheral positions after they had tried to enter into another culture, and
to gain new identities. Some fell into black holes between cultures. It seemed
to be difficult to see them as ‘free travellers’. In contrast, ‘core’ people could
enjoy travelling without changing their identity or cultural values. Those
who had wanted to join another culture might have been ‘cosmopolitan’ in
terms of understanding other cultures, but in terms of material life they were
poorer, and could not move freely between cultures. In contrast, those who

208
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

belonged to the core of their society could travel a lot, but they stuck to their
own cultural values. So we might ask, who are ‘local’, and who are
‘cosmopolitan’? Locally hired Japanese and local staff like Mr Rogers, who
felt that they had been betrayed by both British and Japanese companies,
were familiar with plural values, though their opportunities in life did not
reflect the breadth of their understanding.
Cultural identities were based on people’s ideas of worlds. If culture is
self-constructed, we do not need to be worried about our ‘sense of belonging’,
and we can be free from fixed values and the sense of longing for the core.
We can see the world from the periphery between cultures, and can be happily
invisible. Have Japanese women, who attempted to change their identities by
moving across national boundaries, been successful with their projects? The
next chapter examines their life stories.

Notes
1 There are many differing definitions of the term ‘identity’. The word has a Latin
origin. The word is particularly used in the psychology and sociology contexts.
Identity has sometimes been seen as the root cause of the problems of individuals
(Gordon Marshall, ed, The Concise Dictionary of Sociology, Oxford University
Press, 1994). In this thesis, I use the word to explain the inner conflicts expressed
by people having to locate themselves between different cultures.
2 As for ‘unfixed’ identity, see Stuart Hall, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, in Stuart
Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew, eds, Modernity and Its Future, 1992, pp. 273–
325; Stuart Hall, ‘Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities’, in Anthony
D.King, ed, Culture, Globalization and the World-System, 1991, pp. 41–68.
3 These large companies introduced their core employees to their next jobs, usually
in their subsidiary companies, after employees had retired. This could give
opportunities to those who had reached a bottleneck in the companies, and also
gave job security after they had retired from the first company. If employees
worked in large companies, there were more vacancies in subsidiary companies.
4 Although these employees in big companies had a strong sense of membership of
their companies, once they had retired from their first company, they did not have
the same feeling as they did when they were young. They knew their working life
was finishing, and that they would never be part of the company in the same way.
5 After the war, the birth-rates in Japan increased and this generation was called
dankai no sedai (a generation of a mass). As a generation of ‘baby boomers’,
they experienced mass education in post-war Japan. They were also brought up
in the environment of post-war democracy.
6 Interview 80, with a Japanese male manager (at an insurance company), in his
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
7 Interview 28, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
8 Interview 80, with a Japanese male manager (at an insurance company), in his
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
9 Interview 12, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1992.
10 Ibid.

209
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

11 His father wanted his younger brother to remain in the area and did not allow
him to go to university in Tokyo. The brother was now working for the local
authority in that area and looking after their parents.
12 Interview 81, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
13 All the Japanese male interviewees studied law, economics, or international
relations at university, whereas the British staff studied classics, history, linguistics,
and so on.
14 Interview 38, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
15 Interview 87, with a Japanese male manager (at a securities company), in his
50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
16 Interview 81, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
17 About one thousand years ago the Heike, Taira family fought with the Minamoto
family for power. At that time Japan was divided into two: those who supported
the Taira family and those who supported the Minamoto family. Heike had strong
connections with noble people in Kyoto, which was the capital. The Minamoto
family were supported by new emerging provincial families. In the end, the Heikes
were defeated, and most members of the family died in battle. The Heike family
represents ‘the centre’, and the Minamoto family the ‘periphery’ in this story.
18 The leaders of the Navy in pre-war Japan were against starting a war with the
West, because they knew more about the international situation, but they were
defeated in disputes with the more nationalistic leaders of the Army, who mostly
came from the provincial areas but did not know the Western world. The result
was that the Emperor decided to start a war with the West. Mr Kuwahata used
the analogy between the Heike family, the Navy and the Kokusaiha business
men as those who know the ‘centre’ of the world.
19 Urashima Tarou was a fisherman in an old story for children. He once helped a
big turtle which was being tormented by children on the beach. Then, he met the
turtle again and was invited to a palace under the sea. He met a beautiful princess
and had nice food and danced every day. He enjoyed the palace without thinking
of time passing. Finally he decided to go home, and the princess gave him a box,
and told him never to open it. He came back to the fishing village and could not
find his mother and his friends. Nobody knew him at all. He felt sad, and opened
the box. Fumes came out of the box, and soon covered him in smoke, turning
him into a very old man. Then he realised that he had spent very many years
under the sea.
20 Interview 43, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
21 Ibid.
22 Tomoko Hamada, ‘Under the Silk Banner: The Japanese Company and its
Overseas Managers’, in Takie Sugiyama Lebra, ed, Japanese Social Organization,
1992, pp. 135–64.
23 Interview 23, with a Japanese male manager (at a securities company), in his
40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
24 Interview without recording with a Japanese managing director of a bank.
25 Interview 2, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 30s, interviewed in London in 1992.
26 Interview 6, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
27 Interview 38, with a Japanese male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
210
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

28 Interview 100, with a Japanese female manager (at a subsidiary company of a

bank), in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1995.
29 Interview 71, with a Japanese male manager (at a financial subsidiary of a trading
company), in his 50s, interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.
30 Ibid.
31 Interview 81, with a Japanese male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1995.
32 Interview 71, with a Japanese male manager (at a financial subsidiary of a trading
company), in his 50s, interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.
33 Interview 68, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Interview 65, with a British male clerk (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
37 Ibid.
38 Interview 47, with a British male manager (at a securities company), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
39 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
40 Interview 78, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
41 Interview 77, with a British female manager (at a securities company), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
42 Interview 61, with a British female manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
43 Interview 75, with a British male manager (at a securities company), in his 30s,
interviewed in Tokyo, in 1994.
44 Interview 52, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
45 Interview 62, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
46 Interview 56, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
47 Interview 48, with a British male personnel manager (at a branch of a bank), in
his 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
48 Interview 36, with a British male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
49 Ibid.
50 Interview 60, with a British female clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
51 The British staff who went to boarding school were sent with support from their
fathers’ companies.
52 Interview 56, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
53 Interview 99, with a British female clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in Colchester in 1995.
54 Interview 75, with a British male manager (at a securities company), in his 30s,
interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.
55 Interview 36, with a British male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
56 Interview 68, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
211
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

57 Ibid.
58 Interview 47, with a British male manager (at a securities company), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
59 Interview 36, with a British male manager (at a subsidiary company of a bank),
in his 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
60 Ibid.
61 Interview 75, with a British male manager (at a securities company), in his 30s,
interviewed in Tokyo in 1994.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Interview 62, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
65 Interview 44, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
66 Ibid.
67 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Interview 48, with a British male personnel manager (at a branch of a bank), in
his 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
72 Ibid.
73 I was introduced to this manager by his Japanese boss, and he was very cautious
about what he told me. The British staff I was introduced to by their Japanese
bosses were reluctant to express their feelings.
74 Interview 48, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank) in his 50s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
75 There are various titles for top managers of Japanese financial companies in
London, for example, chairman, president, general manager, managing director,
and so on. In this case, a general manager means a top manager of the branch.
76 Interview 56, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
77 Interview 68, with a British male personnel manager (at a branch of a bank), in
his 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
78 Interview 65, with a British male clerk (at a branch of a bank), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
79 Interview 77, with a British female manager (at a securities company), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
80 Interview 60, with a British female clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
81 Interview 53, with a British male manager (at a branch of a bank), in his 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
82 Interview 41, with a City specialist of Japanese business in her 30s, interviewed
in London in 1994.
83 Interview 47, with a British male manager (at a securities company), in his 40s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Interview 58, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 30s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
87 Interview 52, with a British female manager (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
212
 FLOATING IDENTITIES BETWEEN TWO IMAGINARY WORLDS

88 Ibid.
89 Interview 60, with a British female clerk (at a branch of a bank), in her 20s,
interviewed in London in 1994.
90 After the recession, the Japanese companies reduced the number of female
delegates from Japan. This indicates that the costs for long-term training of female
managers tends to be cut first.
91 Interview 79, with a locally hired Japanese male manager (at a securities company),
in his 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
92 Ibid.
93 His ideas were very much influenced by the nineteenth-century novelist, Soseki
Natsume, who studied in Britain and became neurotic and was sent back to
Japan. It is interesting that this Japanese man still holds a nineteenth-century
view of Japan. Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Interview 33, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
99 Anthony Cohen, ed, Belonging: Identity and Social Organization in British Rural
Cultures, 1982.

213
 7
BEYOND NATIONAL
BOUNDARIES

As we have seen in previous chapters, Japanese expatriate managers had two

cores in their imaginary map of the world. When they were assigned to the
West, they experienced emotional conflicts between two different cultural value
systems. However, almost all of them located themselves within the so-called
Japanese system, though there were subtle differences between kokusaiha (the
international group) and kokunaiha (the domestic group). Some of them even
emphasised the uniqueness of Japanese culture1 in order to defend their business
practices and the management of their transnational companies in the City.
Although they said that Japanese society had too many constraints, that Tokyo
was too crowded, and that their working lives were much harder than those of
the Westerners, they still enjoyed their ‘élite’ position within Japan, and
identified entirely with the Japanese identities in their life stories.
In contrast to these men, locally hired Japanese women, and a small number
of men, who came to Britain through choice, located themselves between the
two cultures. In their eyes, Japan was like ‘dystopia’, where they could never
live. They, especially the older generation, came to Britain after having
experienced personal crises, which had led them to attempt to live and work
beyond national boundaries.
Japanese women who sought job opportunities in Japanese communities
abroad had been recognised as a group by journalists in Japan, but had not
been studied as a social phenomenon.2 Disappointment with their working
environment and family constraints, even after the Equal Employment
Opportunity Law in Japan which came into force in 1986, was a driving
force for these Japanese women to go abroad to learn English, to gain further
education, and, in addition, to attempt to find job opportunities where, they
believed, women were less discriminated against in the workplace than in
Japan. These Japanese migrants after the 1970s might be called ‘spiritual
migrants’,3 as distinct from ‘economic migrants‘ when Japan was a poor
country after the Second World War.4 The distinguishing characteristic of
this new migration was that the motivation of these female migrants was not
based on economic reasons, but on a constructed illusion about the West and
Japan. In other words, the idea that women could have more freedom in

214
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Western countries than in Japan was their main motivation. These women
came to Britain to gain their freedom when they were young, which they
thought was impossible in Japan. They thought that they could not bear to
live with the situation of women as it then was in Japan.
The global movement of these Japanese was highly gendered.5 The
migration of these women contrasts clearly with the global movements of
Japanese male businessmen abroad which has been observed since the so-
called miracle success of the Japanese economy. As we have seen in Chapter
2, Japanese direct foreign investments had expanded from the 1970s, which
had caused this global movement of Japanese company men. They formed
the core of the expatriate community in London and other Japanese business
communities, and they enjoyed more security in being abroad than individual
Japanese migrants. On the other hand, as a result of the cessation of restrictions
on taking dollars abroad in 1971, there was more foreign travel among
ordinary people.6 In the 1970s, it was a new fashion among young students
to go overseas with little money. They often worked as manual workers in
restaurants and hotels, or stayed in a kibbutz, only travelling when they had
saved enough money from casual jobs. Young women also went abroad. Far
less secure than Japanese managers who had been supported by companies,
the Japanese women I interviewed had found opportunities for work in these
Japanese transnational companies as locally hired employees. Global
movements of contemporary Japanese took different forms for men and for
women. Although global expansion of Japanese companies and the presence
of their businessmen had been noticed in Western commentaries, the global
movements of these ordinary people, as travellers, tourists and migrants,
have not been recognised.7 This phenomenon is continuing, with more
Japanese women going abroad to work, study or marry. They are not large in
number, but their existence demonstrates the relationship between the Japanese
and the British, and between Japanese expatriates and the locally settled
Japanese in Britain. Locally hired Japanese live and work among the Japanese
business community, but never gain entrance to the centre of the community
in London, nor do they enter very far into the host society.
This chapter examines how these women attempted to live between
cultures. Most of them, especially those from the older generation, when
talking about their lives—often in tears—showed the emotional conflict which
they have experienced in finding themselves ‘between cultures’. There may
be some Japanese women who have experienced the dreamed-of freedom in
their lives, but the women in this study were working between the Japanese
employees and local British staff in hierarchical financial firms. How did
they perceive their ‘between-ness’? Male Japanese businessmen moved freely
as ‘cosmopolitans’, described by Hannerz as free individuals living across
cultures,8 but these Japanese male managers, as we have seen, tended to keep
their sense of belonging to their own ‘local’ culture. It has been pointed out
that in the process of ‘globalisation’, rather than the emergence of a

215
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

homogeneous identity all over the world, different ethnic groups tend to
emphasise their own cultural identities. Anthony Cohen also argued that
individuals tended to emphasise the identity of their own local communities
when they faced outsiders.9 Post-colonial studies have highlighted ‘new
identities’ being free from the ‘old identity’ which remained fixed on one
culture.10 Have these women gained new identities because they have been in
between cultures, or have they been trapped by falling down a hole between
cultures?
To try to answer the above questions, the first part of this chapter looks at
how they had perceived their stay in Britain from the time that they arrived
until now. Then, their contradictory feelings of acceptance and regret about
their stay in Britain are explored. The final part analyses how their constructed
images of Japan and the West have affected their personal strategies, and
how stories have been made and remade through time and space.11

Life stories of locally-hired Japanese women

When I first started to interview the Japanese businessmen in the Japanese

banks I did not have the intention of seeing the locally-hired Japanese women.
They had been hidden in the previous studies of Japanese multinational
companies. During my field work, I heard life stories about being in the City
that were different from those of the male managers, which greatly surprised
me. Women working for Japanese banks in the City had different motivations
from men and stayed for different periods of time in Britain. I have gradually
become confident about the importance of their life stories. I finally
interviewed, and recorded, 13 locally-hired Japanese women who had become
permanent residents by marriage or by working for the required number of
years in Britain.12 In addition, I interviewed a few women who were willing
to talk about their personal experiences, but only without being recorded.
The women were between 20 and 50 years in age, and came to London
from the early 1970s onwards (Tables 7.1–7.3).
The profile of these women was that they remained in Britain for much
longer than the Japanese employees who were sent from Japan. There were
two main types: women aged over 40 who had come to Britain because of
personal crises, mainly concerned with work or family life, and who had a
strong work ethic; and the younger generation who had come to Britain with
better educational backgrounds and less out of personal crises. They settled
through marriage. Not all Japanese female migrants fitted neatly into these
two categories as some were well-educated Japanese residents in their forties
and fifties in Britain. However, Japanese women who had come to Britain in
the early 1970s without higher education and were now working in these
Japanese companies, were being replaced by those from the younger generation
with better education or by local British staff.

216
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Table 7.1 Age of locally-hired women at the

time of interview

Table 7.2 Years staying in Britain

Table 7.3 Marriage of locally-hired women13

How and why did they leave Japan?

Their life stories revealed that the main reason for leaving Japan was their
perception that life as a woman was unbearable, both at work and in the
family, and especially life as a middle-aged woman. When women in their
forties and fifties were younger, Japanese workplaces were worse than now.
Yuki, in her late forties, who had graduated from an English-literature
department in a national university, had found that her responsibility in the
company had not increased at all:

I had worked for the company for about five years and it was
gradually becoming boring. The work had changed little by little,
until finally I was only filing catalogues… I became tired of the work.
I wanted to have a rest. During this rest, I wanted to study English.
I wanted to be able to speak English.14

It is repeatedly said in management studies and by Japanese male managers

that the Japanese employment system means lifetime employment, and that
companies and workers are mutually dependent. This is considered as a

217
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

strength of the Japanese system, but for women this very lifetime employment
means their complete exclusion from core working positions. Good-quality
women workers are easily replaced by cheap younger workers. Yuki said,
‘When I told them that I would resign, they did not try to persuade me to
stay. So, I resigned immediately’.15
As we have seen, work in banks had been strictly structured according to
education and gender. Sachiko told how she had felt while working in a bank
as a young woman in the late 1960s and early 1970s:

It was many years ago, so my memory has faded. However, when I

was about 18 or 20 years old, if I took a seat, I was told that I had to
take a seat in the lowest position. When I was in front, my male
colleague would tell me that I had to be at the back, because I was a
woman. I still remember his words. He said, ‘Women should not
behave in a noticeable way’. In addition, I found during my training
that my male counterparts’ tasks were assigned to collect deposits
from customers. But female staff had to stay in the bank and were
given no opportunity to show their ability. I thought there were still
feudalistic ideas in Japan. So, I really hated Japanese society, and I
thought every day about leaving Japan.16

Tatsuko, in her fifties, also worked for a bank after she graduated from high
school. She recalled:

I worked harder than men who joined the same year as me, but
those men who were not able to work as well as I could earned a
higher salary. I did not know seken (the society), so I complained to
the top manager of the branch. He said men would work for their
lifetime, but women would resign when they married. He said this
was the reason for the different salaries of men and women… I found
I could not do anything there and therefore I had to resign… I worked
harder than others, but they did not admit it. So, I thought I must do
something else.17

Even the younger generation thought that workplaces within Japan were still
male-dominated. Mami, in her twenties, graduated from a competitive private
university in the late 1980s, and could have had good job opportunities within
Japan. If she had been a man she could easily have joined a big Japanese
company as a candidate for a key worker position. Yet, she chose to join a
British bank in Tokyo:

I thought Japanese companies had customs that limited opportunities

for women. There was already the Equal Employment Opportunity
Law, but I did not think the law was influential. Women had been

218
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

doing conventional jobs, therefore even if we suddenly joined

companies under the new law, I did not think that the situation would
change. If I had wanted to change my situation as a woman, I would
have had to have the courage to alter the situation, and I did not
want to be brave and break with the custom. On the other hand, I
had images of freedom for women in foreign companies. In addition
to this, I wanted to go abroad.18

Mami worked for a foreign bank for two-and-a-half years, and resigned from
the bank in order to study in Britain; at the same time she married an English
man whom she had met while being trained in a British bank. After one
year’s study in Britain she joined a Japanese bank in London as an assistant
researcher which involved minor secretarial work. It was ironic that she had
not wanted to do supportive work in Japan, but that she was now making
coffee in a Japanese company in London, which she thought was a more
advanced place for women. How can we interpret this situation?
The discontent of these women is not only related to work but also to
family problems. Chizu, in her forties, did not get on well with her stepmother,
so she had wanted to leave Japan. First she went to a kibbutz in Israel; then,
in the early 1970s, she joined a hippie group in Cyprus, and came to Britain
with them. She worked on a hop farm and then travelled around Africa, later
returning to London where she met a young English man. He worked for a
while, and then they travelled for a period. She lived with him, and finally
decided not to return to Japan. These women, in their forties and fifties, told
me how difficult it was to get on well with their family. As daughters in the
family they had experienced the difficulties of living in Japan. These women
felt that they had been abandoned by their own family.19 For example, Sachiko
had felt that it was extremely hard when her mother had said that daughters
were expensive to bring up, because they did not contribute to their family in
terms of income. This was another reason why these women wanted to leave
their country. Even young women suffered from this situation to some extent,
as Mami’s case demonstrated. Her brother had graduated from the same
university as Mami, which meant that he was in a position to join one of the
largest companies in Japan, but he returned to their hometown to live near
their parents. He may have thought he had a duty to look after his parents,
but he could also expect to gain family property and support, while Mami
had to find a place to live outside the family, either through marriage or by
finding a job which would allow her to be independent.
Sachiko explained how she had hated Japanese society and had decided to
come to Britain in the 1970s:

Women’s lives were just for marriage, to stop working, and to have
babies—that was all. Wives had also to be obedient to their husbands.
It is according to the old saying fusho-fuzui, which means wives should

219
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

follow what their husbands say. I hated such a saying. I also hated the
word for a husband, ‘shujin’, which means the master. I thought a
husband was not a master. I felt it after I came to Britain. I came to
Britain, because I wanted to come to the country I had admired, I
wanted to study English, and I wanted to get a better job.20

Furthermore, they thought that the norms of Japanese society were oppres
sive. Aiko, in her thirties, contrasted the two societies as follows:

I do not feel pressurised here in Britain. In Japan there are too many
role models which we have to follow. There are models which, if we
do not follow, mean we are bad, aren’t there? …I feel best if I can
shut out the gaze of relatives and neighbours.21

Fuyuko also explained that she would never live within Japan:

When we reach a certain age in Japan, people talk about us, especially
about women, saying this person is still single, or this person wears
dresses which are too showy, or this person enjoys herself too much
for her age. People decide what we should do according to age. Of
course we had to follow it, but I still feel bothered by those ideas… I
feel that I could not live in Japan any more. It may be strange, but I
feel that I can live freely here. There is more freedom in this country
than in Japan, where we are strictly tied to social rules… I especially
feel the lack of freedom at work. If we work in companies in Japan,
women especially have no freedom. If a woman wants to give her
opinion, she must have graduated from a first-class university and
have the same status as men. If a woman wanted to get such a position
she must follow this life course. Even if a woman wanted to get
inside this life course from outside, she could never enter it. She has
no chance of even giving her opinion. She has no chance of showing
her ideas. If a woman has no opportunities, she cannot do anything.22

Yuki also commented:

If I had stayed in Japan, I think I would have felt awkward, because

people treat women who become older as nuisances, especially in
the workplace. And women who are single feel uncomfortable. I
think I would not be talked to by young people, because they would
think I am a middle-aged woman… I would be isolated from men
and young people, wouldn’t I? But in Britain I need not feel my age
all the time … My mother has asked me again and again to come
back to Japan, but the reason why I do not want to go back is that I
cannot find a job. Even if I could find a job, I would be living just to

220
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

work. I could not take holidays for my pleasure. And I could not
find friends, because most women of my age are married, so I would
feel lonely. As young people cannot be my friends, I would just go to
work and come back home. It would be very lonely. I do not want to
work in companies in Japan again. I could not bear it again… Of
course I do not think I could find a job in Japan. But if I could find a
job in Japan, they would order me, with an arrogant attitude, to
make photocopies or to make tea, I suppose… In Britain the job
description is clear, so even though I am working in a Japanese
company, I need not make tea. I do not know the present situation in
Japan, because now I am not working in Japan, but I suppose if I
worked in Japan they would ask me to do insignificant and
unimportant work.23

Through these testimonies, we can see a clear dichotomy in their perception

of the world: ‘the advanced West’ and ‘unbearable Japan’. Although there
were various reasons, spoken and unspoken, most of them had been
discontented with their lives in Japan, both in terms of work and family life.
They thought they could not continue to live in Japanese society, and that the
West would give them better lives. Fuyuko said, ‘When I was 43 years old, I
wanted to have a rest, and I just came to Britain, because I liked Europe and
the tradition of England’.24 In the eyes of these women, Britain was seen as a
place of refuge. And then they started to study English in Britain.

What did they feel when they first came to Britain?

These women felt excited when they first came to Britain. Fuyuko said, ‘When
I came to Britain, I enjoyed it a lot. I felt my youth had returned’.25 Sachiko
gave a vivid account of her feelings in the early 1970s:

At that time I was happy. I was young and ambitious. I had nothing
to be afraid of. I had dreams and I had a future. Now I am horribly
wornout by household cares. At that time I had freedom. I could do
everything I wanted. My parents were in Japan and I was alone. I
was brave, and although at that time there must have been rapes and
murders, I did not think of such things. When I had no friends, I
went to the cinema and went back to my lodgings on foot, by myself,
at midnight.26

Although Sachiko said she had been happy, her life was that of a lonely
traveller without friends in a foreign country. Megumi also said she had
enjoyed leisure activities which were impossible in Japan, especially in the
provincial city in which she had lived.

221
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

As mentioned before, most of these women had come to Britain to study

English. Originally their plan was to stay in Britain for one year, their savings
not being enough to stay longer. Yet, they had not returned to Japan. Why
was this the case? Sachiko:

I used up the money that I had brought with me after one year, then
I found a job in a bank… I did not want to go back from the beginning
… I was young. I did not feel afraid. I did not knowseken (the society)
… Life in Britain was more stimulating than that in Japan. I was
interested in the many people of different races when I walked in the
streets… There were many different people, and different ways of
thinking… I could not meet anyone in Japan who had the same way
of thinking as me. But I found here newer, and more progressive
women, than me. I felt empathy with them when I came to Britain. I
felt that these were the ideas and the world that I sought… Since
that time Britain has become a melting pot of races. I felt wonderful
when I got on the train and found people of different races. I felt
empathy with the fact that women are strong in this country.27

Sachiko’s story demonstrates to us what images she had of Britain. In her

story, she had then become a ‘cosmopolitan’ in the capital city of Britain,
where women had freedom and ethnic minorities lived alongside white British
people. However, she had failed to notice that both women and ethnic
minorities also had difficulties in this country, as she had been looking at
Britain with a ‘tourist gaze’. Her use of the phrase ‘melting pot’ is interesting,
though an anthropologist, Eriksen, has pointed out that the word can evoke
a false image.28
Some of them went back to Japan before they finally decided to settle in
Britain. Reiko, now in her forties, was asked to return to Japan to meet some
men for an arranged marriage. However, as she was by then already in her
thirties, she would have had to have chosen either a divorced or a bereaved
man, and she did not want this. Although these women hesitated before
making their final decisions, eventually ideas of ‘oppressive Japan’ stopped
them from going home.

Disillusion about their working lives

After they had decided to remain in Britain they had to find jobs, and they
took the opportunity of working in a Japanese bank. Especially in the 1970s,
these banks would apply for work permits for them. The banks needed
Japanese women who were able to speak both Japanese and English, and
who knew the Japanese work culture. At the time, the women had the illusion
that if they worked hard, they would gain better opportunities. For example,

222
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

because of her traditional Japanese work ethic, Fuyuko, in her fifties, was a
loyal and hard-working employee:

I have always worked conscientiously, even though nobody oversaw

my work… My responsibility was expenditure, and I did not have
time for lunch and I even felt bothered if people talked to me. During
the busiest time, I worked until 9, 10, or sometimes until 11 o’clock
at night. I felt that I went home just to sleep… I worked because
there was too much work to do. I had two British junior clerks, but
it took more time if I explained to them how to do it.29

Yuki, in her late forties, also worked hard when she first entered a bank two
years after she came to Britain:

In total, I was in the bank for nine years. But the money-market
work made me ill, because, for example, if I wrote down expenditure
as one hundred million and then made a mistake and added another
zero, it would cause big problems. I sent many expenditure telexes a
day, so inevitably I made mistakes, and the daily interest was then
enormous. I often woke up at midnight, because I was worried about
whether I might have made mistakes.30 Then I lost weight, became
ill, and entered hospital. After that I asked them to move me to another
section, but it was not a good section and the boss of the section was
hard on me, so finally I resigned from the bank… Now, I do not
want to get promotion in a company. In the beginning when I was in
the Japanese bank I wanted to get promotion. I thought that if I had
worked hard I would get promotion.31

Tatsuko, in her fifties, told of the long hours and hard work which she had
been involved in, in the most eccentric way:
In Britain, everybody’s responsibility is clearly described. Therefore,
the British staff say, ‘That’s not my work’. Then, I found I was doing
everything which did not belong to anybody else in the department.
Everything came to me, so, at one time I was not going home until
midnight. This lasted until I became ill. Even after I had damaged my
health, I had tasks to do until midnight. In 1989, or 1990, I worked 160
extra hours a month. The regular working hours were from 9 to 5, so,
it was as if I had worked another working day after 5 o’clock again.32
These women, at first, held on to the illusion that long working hours would
bring better opportunities, an illusion arising from their cultural background.
At the same time, these women also emphasised their skills, qualifications
and knowledge of special areas, in order to prove that they were as valuable
as the Japanese male employees as workers. Usually, Japanese male employees
did not emphasise the importance of specialist areas, skills and efficiency, as

223
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

they thought that cooperation among key staff was the most important quality
for management. Therefore, there was a contrast in ideas between Japanese
male employees and locally hired Japanese personnel over what constituted
quality in workers. It might be said that the discourse of locally hired Japanese
was more like that of the British staff in respect of work skills and specialist
areas. In addition, Fuyuko emphasised the importance of accuracy in work
and personal ability, rather than educational background:

In order to be a good worker, you should have common sense, be

good natured, and be able to be accurate, though I do not know if I
can call this skill. For the work I’m doing now, I need to be very
‘accurate’, and have a good memory. The most important points are
‘correctness’ and ‘conscientiousness’… Japanese companies ask for
a curriculum vitae, and we have to provide information about which
school we graduated from, and what level we gained at school, our
family background, marital status, partner’s occupation. But they
do not consider each individual’s ability, and a curriculum vitae is
just a piece of paper. I hate this the most. The Japanese ask about
age, the place you live, which school was attended… I was not able
to go to the type of school that I wanted to, so I may have an inferiority
complex. Women employees from head office often talk about their
educational background, but I think the most important point is
personality, and ability. That’s what I think.33

Tatsuko also emphasised the importance she attached to honesty and

conscientiousness in her work, though she found that British clerks and other
younger Japanese were not able to work like her. However, she found that
her salary was lower than that of younger Japanese women with better
qualifications.
Megumi continuously pursued qualifications in Britain one after another,
as if she wanted to prove that she was competitive. First, Megumi passed the
Cambridge First Certificate Examination during her first year in Britain.34
Since that time she continued to gain certificates. After three years, she passed
the Cambridge Proficiency Examination, the Banking Diploma after another
four years; and then the International Banking Diploma.35 Finally, she was
promoted to the position of senior manager in a Japanese securities house in
the late 1980s. However, the business she was involved in collapsed after the
recession, and she lost her position. She was working in the same securities
house, but she had nothing to do every day. She said, ‘It is painful just to wait
for lunch time to come with nothing to do. It was much easier for you if you
are extremely busy’.36 She now thought that her qualifications were not good
enough for her work and wanted to be a lawyer. Her ideas about qualifications
contrasted with those of Mr Chiba who thought qualifications did not mean
anything in Japanese companies.37

224
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

These women also enjoyed the longer holidays they were able to have,
though usually Japanese employees had only one week’s holiday in the summer
and another week in the winter. They had gained more Westernised ideas
about holidays, and changed their jobs in order to obtain higher salaries. In
addition, some of the women, especially those from the younger generation,
did not feel the same sense of belonging to the company as did the Japanese
who were sent from Japan:

I would have the sense that ‘I’ represented this bank, if I had been a
Japanese sent from Japan. They think they have a responsibility for
the name of the bank. However, the locally hired British, including
me, never talk about the name of this bank, as a ‘face’ of this bank.
They do not have such a feeling.38

Compared to the younger generation, middle-aged Japanese locally hired

women worked hard, even at the expense of their health. I asked Reiko about
why they worked so hard. She answered, ‘We were at the bottom of the heap,
so the only thing we could do was to work hard’.39
These women are now full of resentment. Tatsuko recalled:

I think I was used by the bank. Although I didn’t realise it at the time,
I could have refused to work until midnight. The bank could have
employed more people. However, my boss wanted to be promoted by
increasing the output of each member of staff. They could have
employed more people. I did not recognise it, and I became ill. I was
asked by a doctor if I sat all day. He thought I was sitting from 9 a.m.
to 5 p.m., but he could not have realised that I have been in my chair
from 9 a.m. until midnight. I did not tell him that I worked until
midnight. I had an operation, but I still have pain when I sit.40

Tatsuko wanted to work long hours to prove she was a good clerk. Besides,
her low salary forced her to work extra hours in order to support herself and
her children. She was now questioning why she worked so hard, even though
her salary was still low.
Yuki now works for another Japanese company which is not so
conventionally structured as the zaibatsu banks:

I think Japanese banks believe Japanese women are useful because

they think that they work hard, but they do not pay us well, because
they know our situation; we need jobs in order to survive. They think
that Japanese women can use both Japanese and English, but they do
not think of paying us more, even though they feel we are useful…
They pay the lowest possible salary. But if we compare ourselves with
the British, the Japanese who came here are much older than them,
but they do not consider our education or work experience.41

225
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

She now thinks it is impossible to gain promotion in a Japanese company,

and she said that for her the aim of life was just for enjoyment:

After some years I gave up trying to work hard. As far as my work in

a Japanese company in Britain was concerned, I was inferior in the
use of English compared to British staff. As for work, a woman is
not valued unless she is much better than men. I do not want to
work hard now. As long as I can do some work, I prefer to enjoy my
life in my spare time.42

Yuki’s story shows us how she had been disappointed by her Japanese
workplace, both in Japan and in London. These women, who showed their
discontent with the Japanese companies’ images of women’s work, and
idealisation of marriage, came to Britain to find their freedom, but they still
had to work on the periphery of the Japanese male world. Their dream of
finding better opportunities in a Western country seemed to turn into an
unfulfilled illusion.
There were Japanese women who bravely moved to Western banks in
London in order to see what they could achieve. In the late 1980s, these
women, both from the younger and older generations, found opportunities
to work in non-Japanese banks in London, because Western banks needed
Japanese to do business with Japanese companies. They were delighted when
they were first invited to prestigious Western banks. They felt this was a
pathway to realise their ability. Reiko described the day she told her Japanese
male bosses:

They were really surprised when I told them, and said to me, ‘Will
you be all right?’. They had not expected a clerical girl to be asked to
join a prestigious American bank. They thought I could not work
for the American bank. If I stayed in the Japanese bank I would have
been the same clerical worker forever.43

In spite of her delight, Reiko found that the three months of training were
extremely difficult:

I made a desperate effort to survive in the American bank. It was

difficult in the beginning even to answer the phone. My colleagues
were all malicious. It was like an apprenticeship. It was the first time
I had been surrounded by such ill-natured people… They did not
give any information. It was like abuse. It was certainly because I
was Japanese, though nobody said this clearly. I was unable to do
anything but had to put up with the abuse. I think this is the reason
I have become strong and survived. I felt I had been thrown to a
pack of wolves.44

226
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Despite the difficulties, Reiko survived to become a senior manager, selling

securitised bonds to Japanese investors. She knew she was selling bonds which
would result in bad debts for the Japanese investors. She confessed, ‘I felt
guilty, but it was my task’. In spite of her feeling of betraying her own country,
she was made redundant when the boom of the late 1980s collapsed, and the
bonds she sold became bad debts. She was called ‘a geisha girl for the American
bank’ by Japanese businessmen.45 She is now unemployed. Yoko, also despite
her pride in working for a European bank, moved back to a Japanese bank:

I did not hesitate to come back to a Japanese bank. When I was

working for a European bank, there were 200 or 300 staff for the
equities business, but the number who were doing business with
Japanese customers was only two or three, and there were about ten
people selling Japanese equities to European investors. Among them
there were only two Japanese. Therefore, our position was extremely
weak, and there was no possibility for promotion within the company
… When I had learnt enough, I thought I would see how much I
could develop my career in a Japanese company.46

Both Reiko and Yoko thought they could break through the so-called
coreperiphery employment system within Japanese companies by moving to
Western companies, where they imagined there was free competition.
However, they were only useful while Japanese businesses were flourishing
in the late 1980s. Once the Japanese markets went down, their roles finished
as well, in accordance with the free-market system in the labour market. In
Japanese banks they had been excluded from promotion, but in Western banks
they were an ethnic minority. Both Reiko and Yoko now had negative views
of British people.

Disillusion about their private lives

These women were reluctant to talk about their personal lives, though the
fact that 10 out of 13 interviewees were married to British or European
husbands indicated that marriage was one of the key issues involved when
they decided to stay in Britain. Sachiko recalled how she married in the 1970s:

I met a British man who was interested in zen. At that time it was the
first time that this country had begun to look at Japan. He was also
interested in oriental women. Then we lived together, and without
an engagement we were married. I cannot tell whether my marriage
has been good or not. I married him when I was too young. I was 24
years old. I should have done more of what I wanted to do. For I did
not come to Britain in order to marry. Part of the reason for my

227
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

marriage was loneliness. I fell in love, at the same time, I was receiving
many phone calls from Japan asking me to go back soon. I felt
pressurised by these phone calls, so I got married.47

Their marriages were often not approved of by their families in Japan. Chizu
did not tell her family in Japan about her marriage for a while, even though
she knew this was unusual. When they found out about Chizu’s marriage,
they were very angry, because they thought it was shameful to marry a Western
man without their agreement. When Aiko decided to marry her British
husband, even though her ‘parents reluctantly accepted it after a while’, her
relatives ‘tried to intervene in the marriage’ and blamed her. Her relatives
thought that they could not accept a British man as a member of the family.48
On the other hand, the older generation said they had found more sexual
freedom in Britain. Fuyuko said it was, and still is, difficult in Japan for a middle-
aged woman to marry. She had met her European husband, who was nearly 20
years younger than her, and said also that most of her friends were married to
younger men, which was unusual in Japan. Fuyuko said their marriages were
happier than in Japan. Although, while on tape, Fuyuko talked about her happy
married life, when the recording was finished she spoke of her husband’s
behaviour with other women. She described how one day, undetected, she had
followed her husband who was walking with his young female friend. Even
while telling this story, she smiled throughout as if trying to deny her
unhappiness. Aiko also talked about her married life after the taped interview
was finished. When she had met her husband he had been interested in Japanese
culture. This was one reason for their marriage. Now, however, she said that she
did not like him very much, and she added that she could not explain why she
had married him. Now her husband does not want to work, so she has to work.
She has to leave home about 6.30 a.m. in the morning and gets back about 8 p.m.
Her conditions of work as a contracted worker are now much worse than when
she was a full-time teacher in Japan. She was unhappy not only in her work but
also in her family life. She felt that she could not bring up her children by herself.
Her husband now looks after them at home, but she thinks that children should
be with their mother. However, she has to work as a breadwinner for the family.
Aiko told me about the pain in her stomach again and again during her
interview, which probably demonstrated her unhappiness. Despite their saying
that they had more equality at home than Japanese couples, these women still
had responsibility for housework, as well as being major income earners for the
family. Even young Mami, in her twenties, said she did all the housework.
They were reluctant to talk about their husbands’ lives and situations. I
met two of them. Unlike Fuyuko’s story that Japanese women married younger
husbands, both of these husbands were elderly and seemed to me to be having
difficulties with unemployment. According to a British personnel manager,
these women needed to gain British citizenship to stay in Britain, and therefore
married lower-class men without giving the matter enough consideration.

228
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

However, I cannot say for certain that all of these husbands were not well
educated, or were financially insecure.
Another reason that these women were working was that their husbands
controlled the whole family expenditure, so they needed a source of income
for themselves.49 Akiko said, ‘I think men in this country are mean. My
husband does not want to buy me something which I want to buy. So, I can
say to my husband that I will buy this coat with my income. This is the
reason why I am working here’. Tatsuko was also surprised when she was
first told by her husband, ‘Why do I need to give you the money I earn?’ She
commented, ‘Most of my friends who have married British husbands complain
about money. I think Japanese wives are better off as they can control the
family budget’.
As these stories have demonstrated, these women now to some extent
regret their married lives in Britain. Sachiko explained:

My second eldest sister has a very obedient character, and is a typical

Japanese woman. She graduated from high school and prepared to
be a bride, learning sewing, and then got married. If I look back
now, those women are happier than I am. They need not work and
they only look after their children and do the housework. In addition,
they can maintain a good standard of living in Japan.50

Sachiko was against traditional ideas of women when she was young, but
she still has a traditional idea of the ‘ideal family’, and is suffering from it.
She wants to look after her children by herself and she has uncertain feelings
about working in this country. Once Sachiko had the chance of promotion to
be a dealer, but at that time she had a baby so she gave up the idea of promotion
and her ambition, and moved to clerical work in order that she could be with
her baby after 5 o’clock. She told me, again and again, that if she had accepted
the promotion she would have been in a higher-status job. Sachiko does not
know her present status exactly, but wants to continue to work in her bank
peacefully until she reaches retirement.
For all these women, it remained difficult to change their ideas about
women’s role into which they had been socialised while in their culture of
origin. This left them with dual burdens at home and at work.
There were unspoken stories behind their spoken stories. They did not
talk very much about their experiences of love. Additionally, it was also
difficult to ask about their private lives in their offices. However, some of
them talked about their private lives off tape.
Haruko, in her fifties, was a ‘modern girl’ in Japan in the 1960s, who
would not talk to me in her office, but arranged to meet me in a pub after
work. As a young woman, she went to the ports to see young Westerners
while she was working in Tokyo. She recalled how she was an attractive girl
and was liked by Western men. Her stories of working life in Japanese

229
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

companies were full of tales about competition for the love of men. She showed
hostility towards Western women when talking about competing with them
in terms of attractiveness in the working environment. She said that Western
women were jealous of her when she was admired by British staff, and she
resented that Japanese men were kind to white women.
Some other locally hired Japanese women talked about the competition to
gain a male boss’s favour. Tatsuko told me how she felt that her boss had
blamed her because his lover, who was also her colleague, had passed on bad
stories about her. These stories were uncomfortable to hear, but they also
reflected relationships in this multiethnic working environment.
Stories of these women’s private lives told of how they fitted into the
structures of both societies. Because of their social background, because of
being ethnic minority women, because of the images of obedient Japanese
women held by Westerners, and of course because of their financially insecure
situations, these women were easily exploited. In spite of their primary images
of ‘freedom for individuals in the West’, their stories in fact revealed the
storytellers’ powerlessness. They experienced hardships both in their private
lives and at work, though their voices have been rarely heard.

‘Floating identity’—regretting and accepting

As we have seen in the swing of identity between cultures in Chapter 6, these

women were also floating between cultures. These women had chosen to live
in Britain rather than Japan. However, their positions now were of the lowest
in their companies. Megumi said:

When I was working in a Japanese bank, there was a strict order among
the employees. The top was Japanese male employees, the second were
the British staff, and then we, the locally hired Japanese women were at
the bottom. We were lower than the British staff, who were not well
educated, even though we had graduated from university.51

As we have seen, they tried to overcome their disadvantageous positions by

working long hours, and by gaining higher qualifications and by moving to
Western banks. Yet, their status remained low. In this regard, they could not
cross the boundaries between cultures. Their attempts to pass from the strictly
structured Japanese society to another society had not seemed successful.
They remained locked into the order of Japanese society, even in London. On
one occasion when I visited an office, I was taken to a meeting room by a
Japanese woman. I asked her if she was an employee from Japan, to which
she whispered, as if talking to herself, ‘I wish I were a delegate from Japan’.
We can see here again the distinction between Japanese sent from Tokyo and
individual migrants.

230
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

What do these women now think about their decisions, and what do they
want for the future? They still said that they did not want to return. In practice,
it was difficult to go back after living outside Japan for many years. Megumi
and Reiko told me that they would only get pensions in Britain. In addition,
if they left Britain for more than two years, they would lose their right to a
pension. Megumi was ill, and wanted to have an operation in Japan, but it
would have cost her about £5,000, as she had not paid into the National
Health Insurance System since she had left Japan. Therefore she was obliged
to have the operation under the NHS system in Britain. Being no longer
entitled to benefits under the Japanese welfare system made it impractical for
these women to return. In addition, most of those from the older generation
did not have a family network in Japan to support them emotionally. Some
of them who had already lost their parents thought they no longer had ties
with Japan.
However, these women had few friends here, and almost none had British
friends, even women who were married to British husbands. Probably they
spent most of their time in the office. As a consequence, they did not have
enough time to improve their English or social skills in order to socialise with
local people.
Yuki told me that once she had had a British boyfriend, but now her few
friends were only Japanese and Chinese. Yuki also said that she would not go
back to Japan even when she retired from her present company. Finally,
however, she told me that if all of her friends here died and she was left
completely alone, she might go back. Haruko had returned recently when
her parents died, and was encouraged by her relatives to come back to live in
Japan. She discovered that she now appreciated the warm, close, relationships
in her home village, which she had thought interfering when young. Mitsuko,
who had married a Japanese settler, said she wanted to go somewhere else
rather than to Britain or Japan, for example, to Spain.
Some were still trying to find their paths, like Megumi, who in her late
forties was now trying to be a lawyer. However, most of them said that they
have given up any hopes of improvement in their working lives. Yuki expressed
the feeling that work was for earning a living, and that was all for her. Fuyuko
expressed ambivalence about her desire just to carry on her work until
retirement:

If I were a professional worker, for example, a dealer, I would be

more ambitious, but I am just a clerical worker. The work that I am
now doing is work that everybody can do. I will work in this bank
faithfully until the age of retirement.52

Despite this statement, she showed her anger over her lack of promotion to a
manager’s position. She wanted to be a manager. For those of her generation,
the Japanese work ethic is deeply embedded.

231
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Compared to their passion to come to Britain, feelings of regret have

surfaced. Sachiko narrated:

I do not think I could work with the British all day without speaking
Japanese. If I look back now, the reason why I have not suffered
from home sickness was that I have been working with Japanese in
Japanese banks since I started to work here. So, I did not feel in
particular that I wanted to go home.53

Despite her strong dislike of Japanese society, loneliness has been one of the
most difficult matters she has had to overcome.
Not only do these women still live among the Japanese community and its
culture, they emphasised how they had become more identified with their
own Japanese culture. Haruko and Fuyuko told me that they had enjoyed
Japanese arts films in Britain more than when they had been in Japan. Some
emphasised their Japanese looks by growing their black hair very long and
outlining their eyes with black eyeliner. They seemed to be more Japanese
outside Japan than when they had been in Japan. Although most of them still
kept their Japanese nationality, Chizu told me how she had felt when she
changed her nationality to British:

Until I got British nationality, I was Japanese. Since I got British

nationality, I have been British. Now I can use my British passport all over
the world. If something happened I would be treated as British. I need no
work permit to work. But I did not think about my nationality for these
reasons… In fact, I do not feel that I am either British or Japanese. I feel I
am different. Probably, if people live overseas for many years, they feel
like this, I think. My way of thinking has changed. Even when I was in
Japan before I came to Britain, I did not feel that I was Japanese. Since I
came to a foreign country, I felt the foreign way of thinking was more
suited to me. And when I went back to Japan I met many obstacles. I felt
discontented with my family and relatives’ ideas.54

She gained British nationality and she thought she did not feel Japanese, but
she still uses the word ‘foreign’ country, when she talks about Britain. Fuyuko,
who had married a French man, also thought that she was neither Japanese
nor European:

I am not Japanese nor European. I am in the middle, but I feel I like

the Europeans more, because the Japanese lack humour. My husband
is French, and we enjoy joking from morning till night. Japanese
male managers cannot understand joking. My joking is sometimes
received seriously by the Japanese managers and I am misunderstood,
then I feel I may be a European.55

232
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

These locally-hired Japanese women who hated to stay in Japan, had the
contradictory feeling that they did not want to return to Japan, but that they
were lonely in Britain. They were living as Japanese in the country they had
once admired. Yet, they were marginalised both by the Japanese and the
British community, though they talked about plural values which they had
gained through their lives in Britain. In addition, they had missed out on the
economic prosperity of Japan since the 1970s. Although material lives are
not important for everybody, they might have had a better standard of living
if they had returned and followed a conventional lifestyle.

Construction, deconstruction and reconstruction

of identities

Are they ‘cosmopolitans’ in the globalising period, or ‘locals’ who are still
tied to a vernacular value system? Are they people who are trapped between
cultures haunted by the idea that Japan is like a ‘dystopia’, or are they people
who live freely without being bound to one national culture? It was certainly
true that they were ‘cosmopolitans’ in the sense that they had plural values
derived from both Japanese and British, although their financial situation
did not allow them to move freely like the Japanese male managers who
could travel and enjoy tourism. These women had less fixed identities than
Japanese men. The women’s ideas of work were based more on speciality
and they had less loyalty to their companies than both the male and female
managers sent from Japan. However, these women were still living as Japanese
on the periphery of the Japanese expatriate community in London. They
were regarded as Japanese by British society and its people. Therefore, they
had to work out strategies as Japanese: they emphasised their appearance as
Japanese women; they worked as Japanese. They had had to learn that they
were not competitive with the British as workers. They socialised with few
British friends, nor did they socialise with Japanese expatriates. They had
constructed their identities as marginalised people from the two groups.
They had not foreseen their present situation when they left Japan. They
had had images of an advanced Britain, that they had constructed during
their socialising in Japan. When they had first come to Britain, they
reconstructed and emphasised their images of a feudalistic and male-dominated
Japan through their ‘travellers’ gaze’ in Britain. They held the popular images
of ‘the progressive West’ where individuals can have freedom, and ‘oppressive
Japanese society’ where women cannot fulfil themselves. When they had found
themselves in emotional crises, the contrast had become, according to their
imaginations, like a dichotomy between ‘utopia versus dystopia’. Thus, their
resistance to the Japanese male world was expressed through their refusal to
return to Japan, through their glimpse of Britain and through constructed
visions of opportunities to live here as free women. They dreamed of new-

233
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

born lives and new identities, even though they worked in Japanese companies
as marginalised workers. The fantasy gave them the energy to escape from
their homeland and to live and to work in another culture.56
As we have seen, their illusions had collapsed before many years passed.
Both in their private and working lives, their only choice was to live as Japanese
women pretending to adhere to the Japanese men’s images and the British
images of them. They could not break away from these images. They were
unreliable workers in the eyes of Japanese from Japan. They were weak and
vulnerable women from the British point of views. The only way they could
survive was to pretend to fit into the image and to work and live within these
images. Those who could not bear the images left their companies in silence.
They had found they had not got rid of the structure of Japanese society
so long as they remained in Japanese companies. They never gained the same
positions as Japanese delegates who were from better families and educational
backgrounds, and were mainly men. For those who moved to Western
companies, the environment was more severe. As a result, like those Japanese
businessmen who constructed the idea of ‘unique Japaneseness’, those women
constructed that of the superiority of being Japanese. For they had to compete
with local people both for work and in their private lives, as Japanese women.
However, once they began to think about their future, because they had lost
pensions, insurance and family support in Japan, and because the cost of
living in Japan was higher, they encountered difficulties in going back to
their homeland. Then, again, they constructed images of the unbearable
oppressive Japanese society. And they denied being Japanese, and expressed
themselves as neither Japanese nor British (or European).
Their floating identities were between imaginary spaces and between times.
They continually constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed their own
identities, and their images of society. For some of them, their ‘imaginary
Japan’ was that of 20 years ago. They had kept and referred to the unchanging
image of Japan through time. It could be said that if they had been able to go
back to Japan with the possibility of finding a job, or with some support
from the government, they might have said that they would like to return.
Yet, surprisingly, they continually maintained that they hated Japan, and
that Japan was not a country where women could live. Their imaginary Japan
haunted them repeatedly.
Even the younger generation, who had a freer choice, still thought that
Japan was a difficult society for women. Yet, they still regard Europe
through Japanese images of Europe. Mami talked about her images of
Britain and Europe, but I found that her images of Britain and the West had
not changed much:

I think it is good to work in Britain. I only miss my family. I can see

the satellite TV from Japan, and I like to see Western culture through
Japanese eyes. I like Europe, especially, the Continent which the

234
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Japanese are constructing. I feel as if the Continent were far away

from Britain. To sum up, I feel the Eurasian continent, which is
between Britain and Japan, is narrower than the Channel between
Britain and the Continent. I liked France when I was in Japan. I
could gain information about France in Japan. I could watch the
news programmes from France through satellite TV. Marie Claire
sold in Japan provided us with lots of information on France, but
Marie Claire in Britain rarely talks about France. In Tokyo, I can see
the cinema from France, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and such minor
countries more easily, but it is difficult to see such cinema in London.
I feel the Continent is far away from Britain, though the real distance
is nearer. I think the British are not interested in the Continent. I
think we can gain more information from Tokyo.57

Here, we can clearly see an imaginary map of the world in her mind. In
addition we can notice that living in another culture did not necessarily
mean gaining another map of the world. Different maps of the world are
possible, just as the centre of the world in maps sold in Japan is not Europe,
but Japan.
The attempts of these women to go beyond the structure and to cut
through Western cultural hegemony did not seem to be successful. They
seemed to be suffering from their marginal position. What can we
understand from this? Is it impossible to go beyond cultural boundaries to
escape from the structure? It seems to me that the structure was
constructed through their previous and current images. Unless they had
created their identities beyond the structures prevailing in both Japan and
in Britain, they would remain in marginalised positions. In this sense, they
might still be ‘the locals’ who were floating between cultures, repeatedly
constructing images of Japan and the West. However, they certainly
challenged the prevalent stories of their own society and of the West,
though they were now neither ‘Japanese’ nor ‘British’. Reiko was now
trying to be a painter who could sell paintings of Western images to
Japanese delegates. She recalled:

I experienced a hard time in the English environment in the

American bank, but my satisfaction from my work was greater. I
think the sense of satisfaction was slightly bigger than the
hardship. If I had stayed in a Japanese bank, I would not have been
given any opportunities. Japanese banks have their own system.
Banking business in Japan is still male work, especially the
securities business. Only exceptional Japanese women, who have
special connections with Western customers, might have the
opportunity to find good jobs, but Japanese banks may refuse even
such women….58

235
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Again, we could hear stories of Japanese society as dystopia. Have they gained
free space in their minds being in between cultures? Although cultural identities
of origin were strong, when they gave up the idea of promotions within
companies, and accepted that they were neither Japanese nor British in their
life course, we can see that they had found some strengths:

If I look back now, I realise that Japanese women are stronger, and
more flexible and more able to adjust to another culture.59

This chapter has focused on the cultural identities of locally hired Japanese
women in the financial firms. Unlike the dominant stories of Japanese male
managers of ‘Japaneseness’, these women had tried to escape from Japanese
society, and had wanted to find new identities in another culture. As for the
question about whether they had gained ‘new identities’ and whether or not
they were free nomads who were free from only one particular value system,
the answer seems to be ambivalent.
On the one hand, their attempt to gain new identities had seemed to be
unsuccessful, since they were isolated both from the Japanese community
and from British society. In their stories, their location of themselves had
swung between cultures. They had left Japan with feelings of crisis, and soon
after coming to Britain had been full of dreams of gaining new lives. However,
after experiences of hardships both in their working and in their private lives,
and isolation from both cultures, they sometimes regretted their decision to
stay in Britain. At the same time, they tried to re-evaluate their decision as
correct since Japan, in their eyes, was still an unbearable place, even though
their image of Japan was, in fact, that of 20 or 30 years ago. Since they did
not live in Japan now, their images of Japan were imaginary, and since they
did not mix fully with British people, their images of Britain were also
imaginary. Their identities were floating between two cultures which they
had constructed in their minds.
On the other hand, they had experienced another culture, and they had
tried to find better lives as far as was possible. They had never been
women who were obedient and passive, since they had tried to change the
reality in which they found themselves. Although they still held strong
cultural identities as Japanese; for example, the Japanese work ethic, or
the ideology of femininity, they had also gained other discourses, for
example, skills and qualifications for work, the enjoyment of personal
lives, living without ties to family or relatives, and so on. In this sense
they had absorbed plural values. They might have missed the economic
prosperity of Japan since the 1970s, and they were as a group at the
bottom of the companies. However, as Reiko said, their satisfaction with
their projects might still be slightly greater than the hardships of being in
another culture. We can see a different identity from that talked about by
Japanese expatriate managers.

236
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Notes
1 Concerning the uniqueness of Japanese culture, see Chapter 1.
2 In the study of contemporary migration, Japan is considered to be a host country
for migrants from other Asian countries. Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller,
The Age of Migration, 1993, pp. 159–60.
3 Machiko Sato, Shin Kaigai Teijū Jidai—Australia no Nihonjin (The New Era of
Migration—the Japanese in Australia), 1993.
4 The migration of Japanese has a long history. Since the Meiji Restoration in the
19th century, the Japanese have had a long history of migration to California.
After the Japanese invasion of North China, Japanese farmers immigrated to
North China. After the Second World War, Japanese agricultural labourers
emigrated to South America and California. As for this old type of migration,
Yoshimi Ishikawa described the hardships well in his autobiographical novel.
Yoshimi Ishikawa, Strawberry Road, 1992.
In contrast with those migrations for better economic opportunity, Japanese
migrants after the economic recovery in the 1970s sought individual opportunity.
See Machiko Sato, Shin Kaigai Teijū Jidai -Australia no Nihonjin (The New Era
of Migration—the Japanese in Australia), 1993.
5 Rina Benmayor and Andor Skotnes pointed out that between one-half to two-
thirds of migrants between the South and the North, the East and the West were
women and children. On this point, the pattern of Japanese migration may not
be special. See, Rina Benmayor and Andor Skotnes, eds, Migration and Identity,
1994, p. 2. The féminisation of migration is also pointed out in Stephen Castles
and Mark J.Miller, The Age of Migration, 1993, pp. 8–9.
6 Before this change, Japanese travellers were able to take 500 dollars at the most.
7 In historical studies of immigrants to Britain, Asian and black immigrants have
been studied less than Irish or Jewish immigrants, but there has been nothing
about Japanese immigrants to Britain. See Colin G.Pooley and lan D.Whyte,
eds, Migrants, Emigrants and Immigrants: A Social History of Migration, 1991.
8 Ulf Hannerz, ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture’, in Mike
Featherstone, ed, Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity,
1990, pp. 237–51.
9 Anthony Cohen, ed, Belonging: Identity and Social Organization in British Rural
Cultures, 1982.
10 Stuart Hall, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, in Stuart Hall, David Held and
Tony McGrew, eds, Modernity and Its Futures, 1992, pp. 274–80; Stuart Hall,
‘Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities’, in Anthony D.King, ed,
Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for
the Representation of Identity, 1991, pp. 42–68.
11 Illusions and disillusion experienced by migrants have also been mentioned in
studies of Caribbean migrants to Britain. See, Winston James, ‘Migration, Racism
and Identity: The Caribbean Experience in Britain’, New Left Review, no. 193,
July, 1992, pp. 15–55.
12 In accordance with The Immigration Act 1971, Japanese banks applied for work
permits for these women, and after working for four years they were allowed to
apply for permanent residence. However, only two single women gained
permanent residence in this way; others gained permanent residence through
marriage.
13 As for nationality, some said to me that most of these women still kept Japanese
passports.
14 Interview 3, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
237
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

15 Ibid.
16 Interview 14, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
17 Interview 51, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
18 Interview 50, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 20s, interviewed in London in 1994.
19 Their feelings towards their families can be contrasted with those of Japanese
female managers sent from Tokyo, which we looked at in Chapter 4, who were
well supported, encouraged, and protected by their families. This could be seen
as evidence of the class system in Japan.
20 Interview 14, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
21 Interview 20, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a securities company), in
her 30s, interviewed in London in 1992.
22 Interview 13, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1992.
23 Interview 3, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
24 Interview 13, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1992.
25 Ibid.
26 Interview 14, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
27 Ibid.
28 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological
Perspectives, 1993, pp. 19–20.
29 Interview 13, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1992.
30 The ideas about mistakes in clerical work are different between Japanese banks
and those in Britain, according to Japanese managers. The Japanese believe that
there should be no mistakes at all in clerical work. This often caused problems
between the Japanese and the British staff. See Chapter 3.
31 Interview 3, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
32 Interview 51, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
33 Interview 13, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1992.
34 These women tried to gain certificates in English. Most passed the First Certificate
which is considered necessary for working using the English language. However,
only Megumi and Aiko, who had been English teachers in secondary school in
Japan, among the interviewees passed the Proficiency examination, which means
that holders can teach English in a foreign country.
35 Both are qualifications which can be gained while bank staff are working for
banks. If they gain them, clerical staff can become managers. Yet, Mitsue’s
qualification was not taken into consideration in a Japanese city bank she first
worked for. After she moved to a securities house, her qualification was more
useful. As we saw in Chapter 2, work culture in securities houses was less
hierarchical.
36 Interview 59, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a securities company), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.

238
 BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

37 Mr Chiba mentioned that gaining an MBA did not mean a better position within
companies. See Chapter 5.
38 Interview 50, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 20s, interviewed in London in 1994.
39 Interview 45, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
40 Interview 51, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1994.
41 Interview 3, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in her
40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
42 Ibid.
43 Interview 45, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Interview 64, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
47 Interview 14, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
48 Interview 20, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a securities company), in
her 30s, interviewed in London in 1992.
49 It is often said that although the position of women is low in Japanese society,
they can control the whole family budget. See, Norman Stockman, Norman
Bonney and Sheng Xuewen, Women’s Work in East and West, 1995.
50 Interview 14, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
51 Interview 59, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a securities company), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
52 Interview 13, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1992.
53 Interview 14, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
54 Interview 15, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a subsidiary company of
a bank), in her 40s, interviewed in London in 1992.
55 Interview 13, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 50s, interviewed in London in 1992.
56 The life stories of these women demonstrate an example of how constructed
gaze changes their reality. See John Urry, The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in
Contemporary Societies, 1990.
57 Interview 50, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 20s, interviewed in London in 1994.
58 Interview 45, with a locally hired Japanese woman (at a branch of a bank), in
her 40s, interviewed in London in 1994.
59 Ibid.

239
 8
CONCLUSION
Possibilities of new cultural identities
in transnational working experiences

The past three decades have seen the expansion of Japanese financial
institutions in the City of London and their subsequent withdrawal. Since the
abolition of fixed exchange rates for the yen in the early 1970s, Japanese
bankers and financiers have needed to develop international business to
support Japanese factories built abroad, and to take part in internationally-
syndicated loans. In Europe, especially, Japanese financiers began to raise
capital in newly-emerged Euro-dollar markets. After the Plaza Agreement in
1985, which resulted in the rapid appreciation of the yen, they began to
invest their excess capital, spiritedly joining new financial businesses with
which they were not familiar.
They began to learn about the ways in which Anglo-American or European
banks do business in order to prepare for the deregulation of the Tokyo market.
As a result, as I have described, almost all Japanese financial institutions
including small regional banks and small securities houses opened branches
and established subsidiaries in London in the late 1980s. Gosou sendan
houshiki resulted in these banks and other financial firms coming to London
almost simultaneously, once the Ministry of Finance declared that the era of
international banking had arrived. In the initial stage of the late 1980s, the
presence of Japanese bankers in London was looked upon as an indication of
the new economic partnership that was growing up between Britain and
Japan.1 However, as I have illustrated, these Japanese bankers ended up acting
in unity since the market was unfamiliar to them and they encountered barriers
in entering the world of international finance. As some Japanese bankers
explained in the interviews, Japanese financiers were judged solely in terms
of the value of their assets, and not for their skills or knowledge in business.
It was thus not easy for them to become full participating members of the
City. In addition, Japanese business practices were criticised on the ground
that Japanese banks lent their assets at low rates of interest. The defence of
Japanese bankers was that they sought to establish long-term relationships
by offering low interest on the assumption that it would eventually be more
profitable for them than seeking short-term profits. Larger-scale lending with
low interest rates was their way of breaking into a new market. However, as

240
 CONCLUSION

we have seen in Chapter 2, this tactic led to the implementation of the BIS
regulation, which restricted the total lending of Japanese banks.
Emmott and Düser have both pointed out that the failure—or at least
limited success—of Japanese banks in the City was aggravated by their
reluctance to make use of the knowledge and skills of their local staff, and
that they preferred to do business with Japanese company groups even in
Europe. They also argue that if Japanese banks had wanted to globalise they
would have had to have given more responsibility to local staff who were
more familiar with markets in Europe,2 yet Japanese financial institutions
continued to make all decisions at head office. As I have illustrated in previous
chapters, Japanese bankers’ ideas about management procedures and the way
to conduct business were different from those of local staff, and since the
Japanese wanted to be in control of their new operations, the ideas of local
staff were not welcomed. However, we should at the same time recognise
that Japanese bankers were not just content to work with other Japanese in
the City. Rather, they genuinely wanted to enter the core of the City of London.
They joined the local golf clubs, sent their children to boarding schools, and
attempted in various ways to understand British culture. For their part, then,
they have made great efforts to contribute as members to City business culture.
It is important to recognise such contributions.
Despite their efforts, Japanese financiers have had to accept that they were
not as successful in business as they had expected they might be. Japanese
banks now have debts that they have to face openly and be bailed out of. The
financiers have witnessed the collapse of Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi
Securities in 1997. The Japanese government began to inject public funding
to the Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank and nationalised the
two banks in 1998. Following investment failures, many Japanese banks are
now closing their overseas branches. In retrospect, the strong yen and
accompanying economic successes of the late 1980s take on a dream-like
quality. Joining a bank was once considered to be among the most prestigious
career paths for ambitious young graduates of the best Japanese universities,
but nowadays little of the formerly perceived security remains. Bankers’
salaries may no longer rank with the highest among Japanese company men
and women. In addition, the myth that the Japanese financial convoy system
steels banks against collapse is no longer credible. The story circulated during
the period of Japan’s high growth, that bureaucrats and corporate groups
organise the whole economic system in order to develop the Japanese economy,
is now being challenged. The whole story of the post-war Japanese economy
is now being questioned, both outside and inside Japan.
My work has not set out to examine the finance business under an
economist’s microscope but, rather, has looked at the lives and careers of
people who work, or have worked, for Japanese banks in the City of London
since the 1970s. The ensuing narratives have been interpreted and analysed.
As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, their memories of this period

241
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

tell us how it was difficult for the Japanese and British, or their European
staff to communicate with one other in their everyday working lives. As one
British male manager recalled, the organisation for which he worked was
divided into two: one for Japanese, and another for local staff. There were
two types of business: business with the Japanese, and another with the
international markets. There were also two types of management: one for
Japanese; and another for local staff. The lack of true communication between
the two groups created segregation within the organisation. This study revealed
some of the reasons why it was that within companies the Japanese controlled
the management, but outside the company structure they felt isolated from
the international business community.
The debates about Japanese transnational companies have previously been
based on comparative studies informed by notions of East and West
‘difference’. In the studies of the financial sector, especially, financial systems
have been discussed as the key to understanding the variations between the
organisational structures of different nations. The Japanese banking system
has been evaluated as a support system for the Japanese manufacturing
industry in the post-war period. The system was characterised by the strong
lead given by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trading
and Industry and through the main banking system supplying stable capital
to companies within corporate groups. This cooperation between the
government, banks and corporate groups was known as ‘the convoy system’,
and was thought to be one of the secrets of the success of the post-war Japanese
economy. In the convoy system, limited capital was carefully delivered to key
industries. However, this paradigm no longer seems applicable to the study
of Japanese overseas financial companies.
The so-called Japanese management system, which is chiefly characterised
by seniority structure and lifetime employment, was considered to be the
advantage of the Japanese economy, but that too is now in question. As a
result of globalisation in the economic sphere together with de-
industrialisation, these kinds of national business systems are now undergoing
restructuring and the ties within a corporate group are weakening. Now,
more than ever, it is important to examine the globalisation process and how
transnational businesses interact with their host countries rather than
examining the characteristics of business systems in each country as though
they operated as discrete units. The present study of narratives about the so-
called Japanese system is part of this re-evaluation process.
Such comparative studies are usually based on a discussion of ‘essential’
differences rather than looking at similarities, and they tend to focus on finding
alternative models for the West to adopt—which sometimes degenerates into
the mystification of ‘others’. The Japanese economy and its rapid growth in
the post-war period supported such views. The Thatcher government wanted
to examine working attitudes in British society, and discussions on the Japanese
system and its work culture provided such an opportunity.

242
 CONCLUSION

Accordingly, as we have seen in previous chapters, it is necessary to take

into account the globalisation of the present economy. The flow of money is
huge and rapid, and increasingly transnational companies and the deregulation
of national economic systems require perspectives from which to analyse
these companies. It is necessary to look at multinational organisations in the
context of global climates of change.
The alternative, which this book offers, is an interpretation of ‘languages’
which were spoken by both Japanese and British within and around the
Japanese finance business community. Language often does not represent
reality, but it still illustrates how people perceive the reality of their situation.
Narratives were examined in order to shed light on what people thought of
their lives and work. What they talked about was business, management
systems, various work practices, communication difficulties in a second
language, gender relations, and how they saw themselves in the world at a
particular moment in time. This book is an interpretation of these narratives.
The experiences of people in the Japanese financial community have been
analysed from various points of view, especially for the light that these
experiences can shed on cultural identities. Furthermore, this book has offered
an analysis from an alternative viewpoint—a viewpoint existing in between
the two respective nations. The personal histories we have looked at were
told by both Japanese and British in their own language, and the interviewer
moved between countries during the research process. The underlying objective
of this book is to offer a ‘global’ interpretation of the lives of Japanese bankers
and the people around them, not a purely British or Japanese interpretation.
During the course of this research, I have made several findings about
Japanese bankers. First of all, it has become clear that Japanese bankers are still
on a steep learning curve in their understanding of international finance. Despite
technology and the computerisation of finance, the transfer of important
information still relies on face-to-face human relations based on mutual trust.
Japanese bankers were isolated from such information and were also behind in
their business. Even their best efforts could not bridge all the gaps sufficiently.
Japanese expatriate managers were sent to London for a while, usually three to
five years, after which they returned to head offices in Japan. The more
successful the bank manager, the shorter the time he would remain overseas. On
the whole, a spell in London was only one stage in their generalist career path.
They had a limited time available in which to deepen their understanding of the
various types of business in the City which, moreover, change quickly. There
were exceptions: some Japanese bank managers, known as the ‘international’
group (or kokusaiha), remained overseas longer than those managers whose
careers had been developed mainly within Japan, known as the ‘domestic’ group
(or kokunaiha). However, the ‘international’ group were less powerful than the
‘domestic’ group at head office. It therefore proved difficult to introduce the
change in the Japanese global management systems of Japanese finance
companies from London or other overseas branches.

243
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Another difficulty faced by management in Japanese transnational banks

came from what we perceived to be class differences between Japanese bank
staff and local employees. Japanese bank staff were, until recently, recruited
from high achievers from prestigious universities, as a career in banking was
considered to be highly desirable. Their family backgrounds tended to be
correspondingly privileged. They therefore tended to have a strong sense of
being part of an élite, of being at the core of the company. As previous chapters
demonstrate, this sense of being at the core discouraged them from delegating
responsibilities to the local staff and to women. Their sense of rank was
extremely strong and they did not hide the satisfaction they derived from
their working lives and their pride in the efforts they had made for the
company.
‘Different’ working practices and the lack of communication were talked
of as reasons for the segregation between the two groups. However, as Japanese
managers did not expect exactly the same standard of work from their local
staff, different working practices were talked of as evidence of the superiority
of each group. The narratives clearly illustrate that there was emotional
competition between the two groups, and that work practices and the use of
language figured largely in this competition. For example, Japanese employees
were proud of their long working hours, loyalty to the company, and the
bottom-up decision-making, while the British staff criticised them for
inefficient long working hours and slow decision-making. The use of the
English language was also at issue when people spoke about their abilities at
work. For the Japanese, using English made them feel that they were not as
sophisticated as when they used their own language. Almost all senior Japanese
managers expressed bitterness when they spoke about language. They
sometimes used the Japanese language among themselves, and this made local
staff feel excluded. The local staff claimed that they could work better because
of their use of English, but they wondered why they were not promoted over
their Japanese counterparts who did not speak such sophisticated English.
Thus, language tended to be viewed as an indicator of personal ability rather
than being discussed as a source of difficulties in communication.
The peculiarity is that a number of levels of hegemony appear to exist in
these companies, in terms of economy and culture. Japanese companies in
the West seem to have unusual power relationships within which the Japanese
have economic power, but their local staff do not feel inferior to their employers
in terms of cultural hegemony. The oral testimonies discussed in this book
illustrate that there is competition between the Japanese and British managers
over universality and locality in work ethics, in work practices, in way of life,
and in the use of the two languages. It could be argued that in these Japanese
companies there is confusion in the East and West power dynamics. We are
witnessing a transformation in which we cannot discern the global from the
local. Power becomes a function of situation inside or outside the organisation,
rather than being permanently located in certain individuals.

244
 CONCLUSION

The most important focus in this book has been the examination of the
cultural identities of the transnational business people. The cultural identities
of minorities in multicultural society are often examined, but those of business
people, who often express the dominant ideology of the society to which they
belong, have been under-researched. However, it is worth studying cultural
identities of people at the core of society as well as at the periphery, since
their self-perception will help to explain cultural construction, which
legitimises their being at the centre. This construct of masculinity offers fertile
ground for an exploration of patriarchy. When these élitist men spoke about
their business and working lives, they were in fact expressing their cultural
identity very strongly. It was clear that the conduct of business in this period
of globalisation was very much bound to cultural identity. Furthermore, it
has become apparent that cultural identity is a decisive factor when we
examine cross-cultural business situations.
Unexpectedly, the interviewees, both British and Japanese, talked more
about culture than business per se. I recognise that business and culture cannot
be analysed separately, and that business is a cultural activity in itself.
International financial business may be viewed as one of the most rational
and unemotional activities, but it is very much an emotional and irrational,
and, in short, a human matter. Both Japanese bank managers and their local
employees emphasised their own cultural locations in relation to their
multicultural environment. They talked about the finance business,
management problems, gender relations and history and the world, but they
also talked about themselves: who they were, where they belonged. Almost
all of them talked vividly about their life stories and the world they imagined.
While they talked about their working lives, they constructed their definition
of what culture consists of, and how the world should be. This research
gained a great deal from such candid revelations.
It should be noted that both Japanese and British male managers talked
about their cultural identity as that of an ethnic group, but their notions of
ethnicity and culture were not shared by women or people in lower positions
in companies. As this book has demonstrated, dominant people are more
loquacious about their ethnic identity, whereas less powerful people tended
to be reticent about their ethnicity or culture. The ethnic identities of both
cultural groups were decisive factors for the international businesses in which
they were involved. Cultural identities were talked of as if they were
homogeneous within an ethnic group, but in fact, as we have seen, their
identities were actually more fragmented than was represented in their stories.
Furthermore, it was clear that identities were never fixed, but rather changing
and ongoing. As Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate, when these business people
move between nations, they change their locations between cultures. Even
the most stable ‘domestic’ male managers tended to look at things differently
once outside Japan, finding themselves to be living in between two sets of
cultural values, or between two cores of their imaginary world maps. Japanese

245
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

male managers noticed the distances between the cores, but tended to adhere
to the core of Japan rather than the alternative. Since they were life-time
employees of prestigious working places, they needed to follow the values of
their group. But in London, the self-confidence they had previously derived
from the shared values was contested, and they had a certain degree of
uncertainty, despite being among the most stable people I interviewed.
Compared to them, Japanese women who migrated to Britain on an individual
basis had unfixed identities, floating between East and West in their
imaginations. What they talked about was sometimes factually unreliable,
but the vulnerabilities of their stories tell us how they were moving backwards
and forwards between cultures. The most unstable identity was that of a
male Japanese migrant who had decided never to return to Japanese society
and its culture, but had nevertheless found himself working for a Japanese
company in London. His experiences are graphically narrated in Chapter 6
in terms of ‘drowning’ between cultures. British staff as well, facing values at
work different from those to which they were accustomed, and neglected
within the global promotion system in Japanese transnational companies,
showed their uncertainty and tried to explain their situations; some with
hope, others with pessimism. Yet, they seemed to return to claim the so-
called universal values of the West; some expressed their belief a little, others
strongly declared it in the interviews.
One aspect of the transnational working experience, which should not be
neglected, is the decisive role that gender relationships have on shaping cultural
identity. As Chapter 5 illustrated, cross-cultural communication led to the
construction of stereotypes of men and women in their own culture and of
the ‘other’. Men at the centre of each cultural group competed for their images
of masculinities and claimed superiority to those of the other group. They
also talked about images of femininities of women with reference to the women
they emotionally possessed in their own group compared to those of the
other group. It was meaningless to compare the status of women, as facts,
between British and Japanese society on the evidence provided by the
narratives of the cross-cultural world. British staff were proud of the
progressiveness of gender relationships in their culture, but the Japanese
defended their ideology of gender relationships as an alternative model. This
book argues for the importance of examining gender relationships, especially
the process of constructing narratives of gender identities in cross-cultural
contexts.
The merit of examining the cultural identity of Japanese bankers in London
rather than examining the economic process is thus clear. First of all, as I
have already mentioned, business and culture could not be examined
separately. ‘Global’ finance business was strongly tied to ‘local’ business
cultures. Second, examining the previous chapters, we have reached an
understanding that Japanese managers, who were from a country outside the
West, had a strong sense of being outside of the ‘West’, and this sense led

246
 CONCLUSION

them to construct languages of ‘Japaneseness’. Despite the fact that Japanese

was perceived as unique, it was criticised as a form of ‘cultural nationalism’
in Yoshino’s work;3 their language is not unique, but part of a pattern of the
expression of ‘cultural identity’ like other non-Westerners living in a Western
society. Yet, the language would not have been expressed without being viewed
as uniquely Japanese. The Japaneseness is in fact a relational identity with
the West, with women, and with people on the periphery in society. It is
necessary to look at the business they were involved in with the relation to
such an identity formation. Otherwise, it would be impossible to analyse the
business activities.
The question still remains as to the possibility exists of creating new
identities for the Japanese, especially business leaders, and their partners in
host countries. How could this aim be realised? Or is it unrealistic for Japanese
business people to construct new identities? People’s accounts of
communication within Japanese transnational workplaces are generally not
positive. Despite appearances of open-floor offices, people’s accounts of their
working lives did not reflect the intermingling of Japanese and British at the
workplace or the development of a hybrid culture, but rather suggested
segregation and misunderstandings. We have examined how ‘essentialist’
discourses about differences in work and life are dominant in the workplace.
The language of essential cultural difference, in reality, constructs segregation.
We can argue that the language of essentialism is an underlying reason why
people working on the front lines of international business have not yet been
able to create a ‘third space’, but in the face of the existence of dual cultures
inside companies supported by different groups who do not mix well,
possessing different ideas and different ways of work and life. Although the
world is ‘globalised’ and more ordinary people now have the opportunity to
meet one another, the essentialist language of difference still prevails in
everyday working lives. Inside Japanese financial institutions, difficulties in
communication created disappointment and distrust among workers,
especially for those who attempted to surpass cultural boundaries. One
wonders whether it is possible to create hybridity in Japanese transnational
working environments; to create identities that do not adhere to one place.
The individuals who adhered to the ‘local’ culture tended to seem emotionally
stable, while those who tried to enter the other culture gave an impression of
instability. It might be possible to argue that their feelings of anxiety, which
were illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, are evidence of emerging new identities.
As Homi Bhabha discussed, there are in such contexts ‘always…certain
strategic ambivalence and ambiguities, and…those who were oppressed, were
actually empowered, by being able to use these ambivalence and ambiguities,
instead of representing power as a kind of homogeneous, hegemonic block’.4
Yet, even if this is so, the emotional price they pay is high.
The experiences of Japanese bank staff can be considered as one stage in
the process of Japan’s extension of global influence. Their experiences also

247
 JAPANESE BANKERS IN THE CITY OF LONDON

form part of a global economy that extends beyond national boundaries.

The City of London in the 1980s was one intersection for this flow of people
and money. In this context, Japanese business communities can be considered
as a diaspora in the West. Rapid globalisation has led to increased mobility
of goods and commodities and a world-wide circulation of information which
is leading to ordinary people encountering other cultures in their everyday
lives, a phenomenon referred to as ‘the global village’. The globalisation is
not a new phenomenon—the ‘modern’ world has been expanding and human
beings have been interacting between different regions for hundreds of years.
The present movement of people is, however, much larger than ever before.
The post-modern era is now characterised by two large movements of people
and information beyond national boundaries. The narratives expressed by
the Japanese in this book demonstrated how they perceived their movement
between cultures.
It could be argued that the history of modern Japan has been an informal
process of expansion to the core of the world as a latecomer to the global
community through trading, exporting products, investing capital, according
to the Western model, travelling all over the world and buying goods from
everywhere. The Japanese overseas community in London is a part of this
expansion. From the 1970s, following the beginning of de-industrialisation
in Japan, Japanese banks inevitably had to look for business abroad. I was
surprised to find the extent to which I share the stories talked about by the
Japanese bank staff. I often realised we had been listening to the same stories
at school, at home and through the media. Japanese citizens are working
hard, and therefore we can join the world community, and so on. This was
one of the themes of post-war education. Bank staff may be considered to be
among those who digested such stories well and internalised them as their
own thoughts.
Whether Japanese culture is changing is still a moot point. Although the
dominant stories told in this book have been about the unchanging nature of
Japanese culture and the cultural dissonance between Japanese and British
staff, there were some who tried to go beyond cultural boundaries. This is
how transcultural movements create new cultural identities. The Japanese
are not exceptional, and it is therefore predicted that new cultural identities
will appear within the Japanese diaspora. As we have seen, there have emerged
new types of managers who stay outside Japan for most of their careers and
develop specialist skills. Furthermore, some Japanese move to non-Japanese
companies, giving up their generalist careers. More strikingly, there were
numerous Japanese women who have sought careers outside Japan. In the
City of London such women have developed careers for themselves in finance
businesses. These people may still be in a minority in Japanese society, but
new types of people are certainly emerging, expressing new identities,
emancipated from one fixed value system or from the dominant language of
cultural identity. Japanese bankers, who have talked about ‘we Japanese’

248
 CONCLUSION

and have continuously talked about ambitious but protective business policies,
will face Japanese people with new identities as well as more foreign people
coming into Japan. I believe that this change is coming up behind us, although
it might not yet have been noticed.

Notes
1 Paul Newall, Japan and the City of London, 1996.
2 Bill Emmott, Japan’s Global Reach, 1993; J.Thorsten Düser, International
Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European Perspective, 1990.
3 Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological
Enquiry, 1992.
4 Homi Bhabha interviewed by Paul Thompson, ‘Between Identities’, in Rina
Benmayor and Andor Skotnes, eds, International Yearbook of Oral History and
Life Stories, Volume III, Migration and Identities, 1994, p. 190.

249
 APPENDIX 1
Japanese glossary

dankai no sedai: the generation of baby-boomers, who were born just

after the Second World War when soldiers came back from the war.
datsua-nyūō: The principle of modernisation in Japan since the Meiji
period, which means getting away from Asian countries and
reaching to the level of Western countries.
fushō-fuzui: the conventional idea of the relationship between husband
and wife; in this way the husband makes decisions and his wife
follows them.
gaiatsu: pressures from foreign countries.
gaijin: a foreigner
gairaigo: a word which was originally foreign language but is now being
used as a Japanese word.
gosōsendan hōshiki: the original meaning of the word is an armed convoy
system. The word refers to the Japanese banking system in the post-
war period. If all banks compete against each other they are
vulnerable with regard to foreign banks. Therefore, the Ministry of
Finance strongly guide all banks and other financial institutions to
ensure they work together to compete against foreign rivals. This
system can be compared to an armed convoy for a naval battle.
hanko: a seal, which is used for signature.
Heike: a family of about one thousand years ago. The Heike, Taira family,
had strong influence in the capital Kyoto. They made their
daughters marry emperors and controlled politics through these
relationships. However, they were challenged by the Minamoto
family. The Heike had strong connections with noble people in
Kyoto. The Minamoto family were supported by newly emerging
provincial families. In the end the Heike were defeated, and most
members of the family died in the battles. The Heike family
indicates the ‘centre’, and the Minamoto family indicates the
‘periphery’.
honne: one’s real feeling which people do not want to show.
ishindenshin: communication without words. Japanese people, especially
those from the older generation, often say they can understand each
other from heart to heart.

250
 APPENDIX 1

ippanshoku: see the sōgōshoku

Japalish: description of some words used by Japanese with wrong
meanings. Japanese are sometimes unaware that the meanings have
changed. Japalish causes confusion when Japanese communicate
with English-speaking people.
jogakko: the girls’ secondary school before the Second World War.
Kabuto-chō: the centre of the stock exchange in Tokyo.
kanai: a person who is inside a house; which means a wife.
kanban: a signboard of a company.
karaoke: a tape of recorded music without words. People can sing with
karaoke as if they were with an orchestra. The tape is usually with
video, and people can see the words on the screen. It is an
entertainment for Japanese company men drinking with colleagues
after 5 o’clock.
karōshi: death caused by hard work. The relationship between karōshi
and hard work had not been accepted until recently, but if a
worker’s death can be proved to be karōshi, the family can ask for
compensation.
kaseki: The original meaning is a fossil, but the word refers to people who
achieved a lot when they were young but have become old and are
no longer innovative.
kigyōshūdan: large corporate group; they were originally the zaibatsu
group.
kikokushijo: Japanese who have experienced education in foreign
countries, usually because of their fathers’ assignment to work
abroad.
kokunaiha: (jargon in Japanese financial companies) male key workers in
Japanese banks who have mainly worked within Japan.
kokusaiha: (jargon in Japanese financial companies) male key workers in
Japanese banks who have worked for the international banking
business.
local: (jargon in Japanese banks) workers in Japanese banks who are
employed in London.
marudome: (jargon in Japanese banks) Japanese managers who have a
strong sense of being Japanese in terms of food, lifestyle, values,
language, socialising and so on.
Meiji: the period governed by the Meiji Emperor from 1868 to 1912.
messhibōkō: a working attitude, devoting one’s whole life to work
without spending much time for private life.
Nihonjinron: discussions on Japaneseness, which claim that Japanese have
a fundamentally different culture and mentality.
otokoshakai: the male society. In Japan it is often said that all aspects of
society are controlled by men.
ringisho: a paper which is for decision-making in Japanese companies.

251
 APPENDIX 1

sankyoku goui: consensus between the three Bureaux of Ministry of

Finance, i.e. the Banking Bureau, the Securities Bureau and the
Insurance Bureau.
sayonara: a word for greeting. Goodbye.
seken: the society to which people belong.
shin-jinrui: the new young generation who have different values of life
and work. They are considered not to be hard workers and they seek
to enjoy their own life.
shujin: master, husband.
sōgōshoku: a career course aiming at being a manager in large Japanese
companies. This course was introduced after the Equal Employment
Opportunity Law in 1986. Usually male university graduates are
employed as sōgōshoku staff, but if women choose sōgōshoku as
their career course they are treated under the same conditions as
male sōgōshoku staff in principle. If women choose the sōgōshoku
career course, they have to move geographically every two or three
years and have to work until late at night, like their male
counterparts. So women tend to choose ippanshoku as their career
course, which means they do not need to move geographically.
Women who choose ippanshoku have to work as women clerical
workers in supportive roles.
sōgō shōsha: trading companies which deal with all kinds of goods.
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Marubeni and Ito-chu are the big four trading
companies. Sōgō shōsha is known by its hard work culture.
tatemae: the opinions which people officially express.
zaibatsu: families who monopolised the pre-war Japanese economy in all
areas. Zaibatsu were dissolved after the Second World War by the
Occupation, but they still group according to the original zaibatsu
groups. Banks now form the core of these groups.
Yaohan: a Japanese supermarket store which has developed in Japanese
communities abroad.

252
 APPENDIX 2
Details of interviewees

253
APPENDIX 2

254
APPENDIX 2

255
APPENDIX 2

256
APPENDIX 2

257
 APPENDIX 3
Introduction lines for interviews

JMM=Japanese male manager; JFM=Japanese female manager; BMM=

British male manager; BFM=British female manager; BMC=British male
clerk; BFC=British female clerk; LJM=Locally hired Japanese man; LJW
=Locally hired Japanese woman; City=Specialists on Japanese business in
the City of London.

f=friend, c=colleague, a=acquaintance, b=acquaintance through business,

s=subordinate, JSC=a Japanese Studies Centre

258
APPENDIX 3

259
APPENDIX 3

260
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Official publications

Japanese Embassy in Britain, Zaiei Hojin no Jittaichousa ni Tsuite (The Survey of

Japanese in the UK), 1993.
Ministry of Finance, Dai 18 Kai Okurashō Kokusai Kinyūkyoku Nenpō (The 18th
Annual Report of International Finance Bureau), Tokyo, 1994.
Ministry of Labour, The White Paper on Labour, Tokyo, 1994.
Statistic Bureau, Japan Statistical Year Book, August, 1998.
The Banking Act 1987: The Banking Coordination (Second Council Directive)
Regulations 1992, (BA162), 12 May, 1995.

Newspapers

‘A Love Affair at Work Turns Sour’, Independent (Section 2), 15 May, 1996,
pp. 1–3, (Peter Popham).
‘Boom Times Back for City Salaries’, Evening Standard, 17 May, 1994, p. 32.
‘Japan Must Face Need for Change’, Independent, 4 July, 1995, p. 20 (McRae Hamish).
‘Japan Pressure Relieved as Economy Shows Signs of Recovery’, Financial Times,
Survey, 19 July, 1996, pp. I-X.
‘Japanese Sex Bias Forced Me Out, Says City Dealer’, Daily Telegraph, 3 August,
1995, p. 3.
‘New Phase of Anglo-Japanese Interchange: Symposium about Japanese Management’,
Yomiurishinbun Europe, April, 1995, p. 8.
‘Still Hated After All These Years’, Guardian, 19 August, 1995, p. 25 (written by
Scott Lucas and Richard Hope).
‘Taking Japan out of Nomura International’, Financial Times, 14 April, 1994, p. 30.
‘The Flip Side of Success’, Financial Times, 13 August, 1996, p. 12.
‘Western Culture Defies the Rising Eastern Sun’, Sunday Times, 13 November, 1994,
pp. 10–12.

Articles and books

Ackroyd, S., G.Burrell, M.Hughes and A.Whitaker, ‘The Japanization of British

Industry?’, Industrial Relations Journal, vol. 19, no. 1, 1988, pp. 11–23.

261
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread

of Nationalism, Verso, London, 1991 (first published in 1983).
Aoki, Masahiko, The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1984.
Aoki, Masahiko, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
Aoki, Masahiko and Ronald Dore, eds, The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive
Strength, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
Aoki, Masahiko and Hugh Patrick, The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance
for Developing and Transforming Economies, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1994.
Baba, Koji, ‘Gendaisekai to Nihonkaishashugi (Contemporary World and Japanese
“Companism”)’, in University of Tokyo, Social Science Institute, ed, Gendai Nihon
Shakai—Kadai to Shikaku (Contemporary Japanese Society—Problems and
Perspectives), Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1992, pp. 29–83.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Thinking Sociologically, Blackwell, Oxford, 1995 (first published
in 1990).
Ben-Ari, Eyal, ‘Sake and “Spare Time”: Management and Imbibement in Japanese
Business Firms’, Papers in Japanese Studies, no. 18, Department of Japanese Studies,
National University of Singapore, 1993.
Benmayor Rina, and An dor Skotnes, Migration and Identity: International Yearbook
of Oral History and Life Stories, vol. 3, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
Bourdieu, Pierre (edited and introduced by John B. Thompson), Language and
Symbolic Power, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.
Bratton, John, Japanization at Work: Managerial Studies for the 1990s, Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 1994 (first published in 1992).
British Bankers’ Association, Annual Abstract of Banking Statistics, May, 1995.
Brown, J.Robert, Jr., Opening Japan’s Financial Markets, Routledge, London, 1994.
Budd, Leslie and Sam Whimster, eds, Global Finance and Urban Living: A Study of
Metropolitan Change, Routledge, London, 1992.
Burgess, Robert G., In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research, Routledge,
London, 1990 (first published in 1984).
Burke, Peter and Roy Porter, eds, Language, Self, and Society, Polity Press, Cambridge,
1991.
Burke, Peter, History and Social Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Cain, P.J. and A.G.Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914–
1990, Longman, London, 1993.
Campbell, Nigel, and Fred Burton, eds, Japanese Multinationals: Strategies and
Management in the Global Kaisha, Routledge, London, 1994.
Castles, Stephen and Mark J.Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population
Movements in the Modern World, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1993.
Cheng, Cliff, ed, Masculinities in Organizations, Thansand Oaks, California, 1996.
Clark, Rodney, The Japanese Company, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1979.
Clarke, William M., Inside the City: A Guide to London as a Financial Centre, Allen
and Unwin, London, 1979.
Clifford, James and George E.Marcus, eds, Writing Culture: Poetics and Politics of
Ethnography, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986.
Coakley, Jerry, ‘London as an International Financial Centre’, in Leslie Budd and

262
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sam Whimster, eds, Global Finance and Urban Living: A Study of Metropolitan
Change, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 73–95.
Coakley, Jerry and Laurence Harris, ‘Financial Globalization and Deregulation’, in
Jonathan Michie, ed, The Economic Legacy 1979–1992, Academic Press, London,
1992.
Cohen, Anthony, ed, Belonging: Identity and Social Organization in British Rural
Cultures, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1982.
Cohen, Robin, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, UCL Press, London, 1997.
Connel, R.W. Masculinities, Polity Press, Oxford, 1995.
Cornwall, Andrea and Nancy Lindisfarne, eds, Dislocating Masculinity: Comparative
Ethnographies, Routledge, London, 1994.
Dale, Peter N., The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, Routledge, London, 1986.
Dedoussis, Vagelis, ‘The Core Workforce-Peripheral Workforce Dichotomy and the
Transfer of Japanese Management Practices’, in Nigel Campbell and Fred Burton,
eds, Japanese Multinationals: Strategies and Management in the Global Kaisha,
Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 186–217.
Donald, James and Ali Rattansi, eds, ‘Race’, Culture and Difference, Sage Publications
in association with the Open University, London, 1993 (first published in 1992).
Dore, Ronald Philip, British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National
Diversity in Industrial Relations, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973.
Dore, Ronald Philip, ‘Financial Structures and the Long-term View’, Policy Studies,
vol. 6, part 1, July, 1985, pp. 10–29.
Dore, Ronald Philip, Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading
Economic Issues, The Athlone Press, London, 1987.
Dore, Ronald Philip, ‘Equality-Efficiency Trade-Offs: Japanese Perceptions and
Choices’, in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore, eds, The Japanese Firm: The Sources
of Competitive Strength, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 379–91.
Dore, Ronald Philip, ‘Japanese Capitalism, Anglo-Saxon Capitalism: How Will the
Darwinian Contest Turn Out?’, in Nigel Campbell and Fred Burton, eds, Japanese
Multinationals: Strategies and Management in the Global Kaisha, Routledge,
London, 1994, pp. 9–28.
Dore, Ronald Philip and Mari Sako, How the Japanese Learn to Work, Routledge,
London, 1989.
Düser, J.Thorsten, International Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European
Perspective, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1990.
Elashmawi, Farid, ‘Japanese Culture Clash in Multicultural Management’, Tokyo
Business Today, February, 1990, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 36–9.
Elger, Tony and Chris Smith, eds, Global Japanization?: The Transnational
Transformation of the Labour Process, Routledge, London, 1994.
Emmott, Bill, The Sun Also Sets: Why Japan Will Not Be Number One, Simon and
Schuster, London, 1990 (first published in 1989).
Emmott, Bill, Japan’s Global Reach: The Influences, Strategies and Weaknesses of
Japan’s Multinational Companies, Arrow, Reading, 1993 (first published in 1991).
Endo, Shusaku, Foreign Studies, Sceptre, Reading, 1990 (first published in 1965).
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives,
Pluto Press, London, 1993.
Evans, Carolyn L., ‘Human Resource Management in the Japanese Financial Institution
Abroad: The Case of the London Office’, British Journal of Industrial Relations,

263
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

vol. 31, no. 3, September, 1993, pp. 347–64.

Everett, E.James and Brace W.Stening, ‘The Overseas Assignment Preferences of
Japanese Managers’, Environment and Behaviour, vol. 21, no. 2, March, 1989,
pp. 151–74.
Fairbairn, Sarah, ed, Japanese Business in the United Kingdom, James W.R.Spickernell,
London, 1993.
Featherstone, Michael, ed, Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity,
A Theory, Culture, and Society Special Issue, Sage Publications, London, 1990.
Florida, R. and M.Kenny, ‘Transplanted Organizations: the Transfer of Japanese
Industrial Organization to the US’ , American Sociological Review, vol. 56, 1991,
pp. 381–98.
Giddens, Anthony, Sociology, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993 (first published in 1989).
Gilroy, Paul, Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, Verso, London,
1993.
Goffman, Erving, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Penguin, Harmondsworth,
1959.
Goodman, Roger, Japan’s International Youth: The Emergence of A New Class of
Schoolchildren, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993 (first published in 1990).
Goodman, Roger and Kirsten Refsing, eds, Ideology and Practice in Modem Japan,
Routledge, London, 1992.
Hall, Catherine, White, Male and Middle Class: Explorations in Feminism and History,
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Hall, Stuart, ‘Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities’, in Anthony D.King,
ed, Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for
the Representation of Identity, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991, pp. 41–68.
Hall, Stuart, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, in Stuart Hall, David Held and
Tony McGrew, eds, Modernity and Its Futures,Polity Press in Association with
the Open University, Cambridge 1992, pp. 274–80.
Hall, Stuart, ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman,
eds, Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader, Harvester Wheatsheaf,
London, 1993.
Hamada, Tomoko, ‘Under the Silk Banner: The Japanese Company and Its Overseas
Managers’, in Takie Sugiyama Lebra, ed, Japanese Social Organization, University
of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992.
Hamada, Tomoko, ‘Unwrapping Euro-American Masculinity in a Japanese
Multinational Company’, in Cliff Cheng, ed, Masculinities in Organisations, 1996.
Hamada, Yasuyuki and Takashi Sawada, Hogin London Shiten: Kinyu Saizensen no
Jitsuzo (The London Branches of Japanese Banks: Practice in the Forefront of
Finance), Tokyo Keizai Shinpousha, Tokyo, 1992.
Hamilton, Adrian, The Financial Revolution: The Big Bang Worldwide, Viking,
Harmondsworth, 1986.
Hannerz, Ulf, ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture’, in Mike Featherstone,
ed, Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, Sage Publications,
London, 1990, pp. 237–51.
Hilton, Anthony, City within a State: A Portrait of Britain’s Financial World, Tauris,
London, 1987.
Hoshi, Takeo, ‘The Economic Role of Corporate Grouping and the Main Bank System’,
in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore, eds, The Japanese Firm: The Sources of

264
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Competitive Strength, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.

Hunter, Janet, ed, Japanese Women Working, Routledge, London, 1993.
Ishikawa, Yoshimi, Strawberry Road, Bungeishunjū, Tokyo, 1992.
Itami, Hiroyuki, ‘The Globalization of Japanese Firms’, in Nigel Campbell and Fred
Burton, eds, Japanese Multinationals: Strategies and Management in the Global
Kaisha, Routledge, London, 1994.
Iwami, Toru, ‘Internationalization of Japanese Banking: The Factors Affecting Its
Rapid Growth’, Journal of International Economic Studies (Institute of
Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University), no. 3,1989, pp. 85–110.
Iwami, Toru, Japan in the International Financial System, Macmillan, Basingstoke,
1995.
James, Winston, ‘Migration, Racism and Identity: The Caribbean Experience in
Britain’, New Left Review, no. 193, July, 1992, pp. 15–55.
‘Japan and the War: The Japan that Cannot Say Sorry’, The Economist, 12 August,
1995, pp. 59–61.
‘Japanese Banks Are Still Major Force Overseas, Despite Doubts About the Quality
of Some Assets’, The Banker, vol. 139, no. 758,1 April, 1989, p. 38.
‘Japanese Banks in London’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, November, 1987,
pp. 518–24.
JETRO (the Japan External Trade Organisation), Nihon Bouekishinkoukai
Kaigaijouhousenta—Zaiou Nikkeikigyou (Seizougyou) no Keieijittai, Dai 10 Kai
Jittaichousahoukoku—(JETRO Overseas Information Centre, The Practice of
Management in Japanese Manufacturing Companies in Europe—the Tenth Report),
1994.
Jones, Stephanie, Working for the Japanese: Myths and Realities, British Perceptions,
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991.
Kamata, Satoshi (translated and edited by Tatsuru Akimoto), Japan in the Passing
Lane: An Insider’s Account of Life in a Japanese Auto Factory, George Allen and
Unwin, London, 1983.
Kynaston, David, The City of London, Volume 1: A World of Its Own 1815–1890,
Chatto and Windus, London, 1994.
Kynaston, David, The City of London, Volume 2: Golden Years 1890–1914, Chatto
and Windus, London, 1995.
Kondo, Dorinne K., Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a
Japanese Workplace, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.
Kono, Toyohiro, Strategy and Structure of Japanese Enterprises, Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 1984.
Krauss, Ellis S., Thomas P.Rohlen and Patricia G.Steinhoff, eds, Conflict in Japan,
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984.
Kvale, Steven, ‘Interpretation of the Qualitative Research Interview’, in Florence J.
Van Zuuren, Frederic J.Wertz and Bep Mook, eds, Advances in Qualitative
Psychology, Swets Publishing Service, 1987.
Lam, Alice C.L., ‘Women and Equal Employment Opportunities in Japan’, Nissan
Occasional Paper Series, no. 16, 1992.
Lam, Alice C.L., Women and Japanese Management: Discrimination and Reform,
Routledge, London, 1992.
Lebra, Takie Sugiyama, ed, Japanese Social Organization, University of Hawaii Press,
Honolulu, 1992.

265
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lewis, Michael, Liar’s Poker: Two Cities, True Greed, Coronet Books, Hodder and
Stoughton, London, 1989.
Lewis, Michael, The Money Culture, Coronet Books, Hodder and Stoughton, London,
1992 (first published 1991).
Lo, Jeannie, Office Ladies, Factory Women; Life and Work at a Japanese Company,
M.E.Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1990.
March, Robert M., ‘Western Manager and Japanese Boss’, PHPInterest, vol. 8, no. 8,
1 January, 1992, pp. 11–16.
McDowell, Linda, Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City, Blackwell, Oxford,
1997.
McMillan, Charles J., The Japanese Industrial System, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/
New York, 1985.
McRae, Hamish, and Frances Cairncross, Capital City: London as a Financial Centre,
New and Revised Edition, Methuen, London, 1991 (1st edn, 1973).
Michie, Ranald C., The City of London: Continuity and Change, 1850–1990,
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1992.
Miles, Matthew B. and A.Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An
Expanded Sourcebook, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1994 (2nd edn).
Mills, Wright, ‘The American Business Elite: A Collective Portrait’, in Irving Horowitz,
ed., Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills, 1963,
Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 110–49.
Moghadam, Valentine M., ed, Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in
Muslim Societies, ZED BOOKS, London, 1994.
Mori, Masumi et al., ‘Kintouhou 5 Nen: Joseiroudou ni Okeru Seisabetsu no Genjou
(5 Years after the EEO Law: The Present Situation of Sex Discrimination in Women’s
Work)’ Chingin to Shakaihoshou (The Wage and Social Security), no. 1074, January,
1992.
Mouer, Ross and Yoshio Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society: A Study in the Social
Construction of Reality, Kegan Paul International, London, 1986.
Nakamura, Minoru and Haluhiro Tsutsui (Nomura Research Institute),
‘Diversification of International Strategies into Three in the 1990s: How Much
Should Localisation Be Advanced’, Kinyū Zaisei Jijō (Financial Affairs), 1 June,
1992, pp. 26–34.
Neustupny, Jiri V., Communicating with the Japanese, The Japan Times, Tokyo, 1987.
Newall, Paul, Japan and the City of London, Athlone, London & Atlantic Highlands,
N.J., 1996.
‘Now You See It, Now You Don’t’, The Banker, March, 1994, pp. 68–9.
Okely, Judith and Helen Callaway, Anthropology and Autobiography, Routledge,
London, 1992.
Okimoto, Daniel. I. and Thomas P.Rohlen, eds, Inside Japanese System: Readings on
Contemporary Society and Political Economy , Stanford University Press, Stanford,
California, 1988.
Oliver, Nick and Barry Wilkinson, The Japanization of British Industry, Blackwell,
Oxford, 1988.
Oliver, Nick and Barry Wilkinson, ‘Japanese Manufacturing Techniques and Personnel
and Industrial Relations Practice in Britain: Evidence and Implications’, British
Journal of Industrial Relations, 27, pp. 73–91, March, 1989.
Oliver, Nick and Barry Wilkinson, The Japanization of British Industry: New

266
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Developments in the 1990s, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992.

Omura, Masaki, ‘Kokusai Kinyū, Nikkeikinyu¯kikan soshite Nihonkeizai (Inter—
national Finance, Japanese Financial Institutions and Japanese Economy)’, Finance,
vol. 29, no. 10, January, 1994.
Osawa, Mari, Kigyō Chūshin Shakai wo Koete: Gendai Nihon wo Gender de Yomu
(Beyond the Company-centred Society: Reading Contemporary Japan from Gender
Perspectives), Jiji Tsūshinsha, Tokyo, 1993.
Patai, Daphne, ‘U.S. Academics and Third World Women: Is Ethical Research Possible?’
in Sherna Berger Gluck and Daphne Patai, eds, Women’s Words: The Feminist
Practice of Oral History, Routledge, New York, 1991, pp. 137–53.
Paxman, Jeremy, Friends in High Places, Who Runs Britain?, M.Joseph, London,
1990.
Perlmutter, Howard V., ‘Towards Research on and Development of Nations, Unions
and Firms as Worldwide Institutions’, in Hans Günter, ed, Transnational Industrial
Relations: The Impact of Multi-National Corporations and Economic Regionalism
on Industrial Relations, Macmillan, St Martin’s Press, London, 1972, pp. 21–50.
Phizacklea, Annie, ed, One Way Ticket: Migration and Female Labour, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, London, 1983.
Plender, John, The Square Mile: A Guide to the City Revolution, Hutchinson Business,
London, 1986.
Plummer, Ken, Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds, Routledge,
London, 1995.
Pooley, Colin G. and lan D.Whyte, eds, Migrants, Emigrants and Immigrants: A
Social History of Migration, Routledge, London, 1991.
Pucik, Vladimir, ‘The Challenges of Globalization: the Strategic Role of Local Managers
in Japanese-owned US Subsidiaries’, in Nigel Campbell and Fred Burton, eds,
Japanese Multinationals, Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 218–39.
Reid, Margaret, All-Change in the City: The Revolution in Britain’s Financial Sector,
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988.
Rosaldo, Renato, Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis, Beacon Press,
Boston, 1989.
Rohlen, Thomas P., For Harmony and Strength: Japanese White-Collar Organization
in Anthropological Perspective, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 1979 (first published in 1974).
Roper, Michael, Masculinity and the British Organization Man since 1945, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1994.
Rowland, Diana, Japanese Business Etiquette: A Practical Guide to Success with the
Japanese, Warner Books, London, 1993.
Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism, Vintage, London, 1993.
Said, Edward W., Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1995 (first published in 1978).
Sako, Mari, ‘Training, Productivity, and Quality Control in Japanese Multinational
Companies’, in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore, eds, The Japanese Firm: The
Sources of Competitive Strength, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 84–
116.
Sakurai, Mitsuo, Yu¯ro Bondo Shijō to Nihon (Euro Bond Markets and Japan), Toyo
Keizai Shinpo¯, Tokyo, 1990.
Sampson, Anthony, The New Anatomy of Britain, Hodder and Stoughton, London,

267
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1971.
Sampson, Anthony, The Money Lenders, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981.
Sampson, Anthony, The Essential Anatomy of Britain: Democracy in Crisis, Hodder
and Stoughton, London, 1992.
Sampson, Anthony, Company Man: The Rise and Fall of Corporate Life,
HarperCollins Publisher, London, 1995.
Saso, Mary, Women in the Japanese Workplace, Shipman, London, 1990.
Sato, Machiko, Shin Kaigai Teijū Jidai—Australia no Nihonjin (The New Era of
Migration—the Japanese in Australia), Shinchōsha, Tokyo, 1993.
Sato, Ryuzo, Richard M.Levich and Rama V.Ramachandran, Japan, Europe and
International Financial Markets: Analytical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
Schaede, Ulrike, ‘The “Old Boy” Network and Government-Business Relationships
in Japan’, The Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, 1995, pp. 293–317.
Smith, Robert J., Japanese Society: Tradition, Self, and the Social Order, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
Spence, Donald P., Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation
in Psychoanalysis, W.W.Norton, New York, 1982.
Stockman, Norman, Norman Bonney and Sheng Xuewen, Women’s Work in East
and West, UCL Press, London, 1995.
Suzuki, Yoshio, ed, The Japanese Financial System, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
Taylor, Russel, Going for Broke, How Banking Mismanagement Lost £Thousands of
Billions, Simon and Schuster, 1993.
Terrel, H.S., ‘The Activities of Japanese Banks in the United Kingdom and in the
United States, 1980–1988’, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1990.
‘The Banks Feel the Pain’, The Banker, January, 1994, pp. 49–61.
‘The Rehearsal is Over’, The Banker, April, 1989, pp. 39–46.
Thompson, Paul, The Voice of the Past, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988 (first
published in 1978).
Thompson, Paul, ‘Between Indentities: HOMIBHABHA interviewed by Paul
Thompson’, in Rina Bennmayor and Andor Skotnes, eds, Migration and Identity,
1994.
Thompson, Paul, ‘The Pyrrhic Victory of Gentlemanly Capitalism: The Financial
Elite of the City of London 1945–90’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol.
32(3), 1997, pp. 283–304.
Thompson, Paul, and Cathy Courtney, City Lives: Changing Voice of British Finance,
Methuen, London, 1996.
Thompson, Paul, and Raphael Samuel, eds, The Myths We Live By, Routledge, London,
1990.
Tomita, Hiroko and K.D.M.Snell, ‘Japanese Oral History and Women’s
Historiography’, Oral History, vol. 24, no. 1, 1996, pp. 88–95.
Tonkin, Elizabeth, Narrating Our Past: The Social Construction of Oral History,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Trevor, Malcolm, Japan’s Reluctant Multinationals: Japanese Management at Home
and Abroad, Frances Pinter, London, 1983.
Trevor, Malcolm, ‘The Overseas Strategies of Japanese Corporations’, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 513, January, 1991.
Trevor, Malcolm, Jochen Schendel and Bernhard Wilpert, The Japanese Management

268
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Development System: Generalists and Specialists in Japanese Companies Abroad,

Frances Pinter, London and Wolfeboroi, N.H., 1986.
Urry, John, The Tourist Gaze Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies, Sage
Publications, London, 1990.
Walby, Sylvia, Gender Transformation, Routledge, London, 1997.
‘What’s Killing Japanese Business?: Japanese-Style Management’, Tokyo Business
Today, vol. 61, no. 24,1 July, 1993.
White, Merry, The Japanese Overseas: Can They Go Home Again?, Free Press, New
York, 1988.
Whitehill, Arthur M., Japanese Management: Tradition and Transition, Routledge,
London, 1991.
Wiener, Martin J., English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850–
1980, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1985 (first published in 1981).
Wilkinson, Endymion Porter, Japan versus Europe: A History of Misunderstanding,
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983 (first published in 1981).
Wilkinson, Endymion Porter, Japan versus the West: Image and Reality, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1990.
Williams, Lisa, ed, Who’s Who in the City, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1993.
Wolferen, Karel van, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless
Nation, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989.
Wright, Susan, ed, Anthropology of Organizations, Routledge, London, 1994.
Yoshida, Kazuo, Nihongata Keiei System no Kouzai (Advantages and Disadvantages
of Japanese Management System), Toyokeizaishinposha, Tokyo, 1994 (first
published in 1993).
Yoshino, Kosaku, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological
Enquiry, Routledge, London, 1992.
Yoyogi Zeminaru, ed, Anata wa Kono Seiseki de Gōkaku Dekiru: Nyūshi Nani
Ranking Hyō (You Can Pass the Exam If You Reach These Marks: Ranking Table
of Difficulty of Entrance Exams), 1994.

Unpublished papers

Ben-Ari, Eyal, ‘Golfing Culture: Organization and “Consumption Careers”, Among

Japanese Business Expatriates in Singapore’, paper presented at the European
Association of Japanese Studies Conference, August, 1994.
Ben-Ari, Eyal, ‘Globalization, “Folk Models” of the World Order and National
Identity: Japanese Business Expatriates in Singapore’, unpublished paper.
Capie, Forrest, ‘Finance and Industry in Britain after 1945’, unpublished paper for
the fourth Anglo-Japanese Conference, London School of Economics, April, 1994.
Hawawini, Gabriel and Michael Schill, ‘The Japanese Presence in the European
Financial Service Sector: Historic Perspective and Future Prospects’, presented at
the Japanese Direct Investment in a Unifying Europe: Impacts on Japan and the
European Community Conference, INSEAD Euro-Asia Centre Fontainbleau, 26–
27 June, 1992.
Kiuchi, Takashi and The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., ‘Japanese Investment
Strategies in EC Banking Industry’, paper presented at the Japanese Direct

269
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Investment in a Unifying Europe: Impacts on Japan and the European Community

Conference, INSEAD Euro-Asia Centre Fontainbleau, 26–27 June, 1992.
Scott, John, ‘Patterns of Capitalist Development in the World System’, unpublished
paper.
Terrell, Henry S., Robert S.Dohner and Barbara R.Lowrey, ‘The U.S. and U.K.
Activities of Japanese Banks: 1980–1988’, International Finance Discussion Papers,
September, 1989.
Tickell, Adam, ‘Banking on Britain?: The Changing Role and Geography of Japanese
Banks in Britain’ , School of Geography, Leeds University, 1993.

270
 INDEX

Accepting House Committee 29 BIS (the Bank for International

Ackroyd, S. 4 Settlements) 36; BIS regulation 29,
age 12, 46, 185, 216–17, 220 40, 241
agents 2 blue-chip bank 47
American banks 29, 44, 47, 48, 49, blue-collar workers 108; factory
102, 182, 226, 235; Citibank 193 workers 3
American Occupation 72 Bratton, J. 4
Anderson, B. 12 Bretton Woods System 31
Anglo-American bankers 1, 2, 37, 44 British Bankers’ Association 62
Anglo-American banks 177, 240; British business culture 2
blue-chip bank 47 British Civil Service 99
Anglo-American business culture 5; British clerks 21, 80, 86–7, 91, 92, 95,
see also Japanese business culture; 107, 111, 115–16, 145, 157–8, 180,
deal oriented 47; financial skills 45; 196, 200–1, 204–5, 225, 246;
short-term interest 178; short-term clerical staff 91, 95, 115; clerical
profit 45, 240 workers 8–10, 137, 196; education
Anglo-American financiers 15, 42 79; employment 180–1; family 79
Anglo-Japanese Alliance 30 British employees 1; see British clerks,
Anthropology 14, 15 British female managers, British
Arab company 182 graduate trainees, British male
Asian economic success 179 managers, British managers, British
axes of gender, class and ethnicity 202 personnel managers, British senior
managers, British staff; see also
baby boom 71; baby boomers 168 Japanese employees
Bank of England 37, 68 British female managers 17, 21, 79,
Bank of Japan 67–8, 70 133, 137, 151–5, 182–4, 199–200;
Bank of Tokyo 30, 41, 42, 61; employment 183–4; qualification
see also Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank 71, 79, 182; specialist 79
banking licence 38 British graduate trainees 89, 106
Baring 187 British male managers 19, 21, 76–9,
Beijing 113 140 145–6, 151–2, 157, 204;
Benson 187 childhood 179–80; decision-making
Bermuda 186 77; education 77–9, 180; family
Bhabha, H. 247 background 77–8; family life 79,
Big Bang 28 145–6, 179; lack of promotion 77;
Big Four; see Japanese securities working life 79
company British managers 7, 97, 99, 100,
Birmingham 35 109–11; employment 181–4

271
 INDEX
British Merchant Banks and Securities
Houses Association 29
British personnel managers 77–8, 89, 97,
137, 155–7, 180, 181, 182, 183, 196
British senior managers 16, 43, 90,
107, 184–5, 189–90, 191–5
British society 22, 179, 196, 199, 206,
242
British staff 16, 19, 40, 62, 64, 82, 94,
101, 106, 113, 114, 117, 144, 152,
157, 198–200, 201; local employees
6; local staff 88, 113, 123–6, 244
British Telecom 156
British work culture 7; see also
Japanese work culture, work culture;
assertiveness 105–7; contribution
107; efficiency 201, 223; experience
97; expertise 97, 98, 100, 101, 204;
individualism 102–5; job description
114–15; skills 97, 98, 101, 223–4,
248; socialisation 116–18
Britishness 10, 82, 85
Broadgate 29, 37
Brother 39
bubble 170, 188; bubble economy 40
Burberry’s 58
bureaucrats 143
business network 44, 50, 58
Cambridge University 180
capitalist systems 5; American style
capitalist system 176; Anglo-Saxon
pattern of 4; fair system 176;
free-market capitalist system 176,
227; Japanese pattern of 4; Japanese
system 4, 5, 22, 93, 175–8, 197,
203, 214, 243; late capitalism 4;
perfect capitalism 176
career 74, 135–7, 144, 171–2; see also
kokunaiha, kokusaiha, sōgōshoku,
ippanshoku; career abroad 144; élite
course 123; generalist 73, 82,
96–102, 135, 172, 248; lifetime core
workers 99, 206; lifetime employees
191; role model 220; specialist 73,
74, 75, 78, 93–4, 96–102, 158, 172,
182, 191, 223
centre of the world 169, 172–3, 208
Cheng, C. 132
China 189
City bankers 17, 28, 45, 51
City experts 21, 81, 197; merchant
bankers 44, 57
272
City of London 1, 2, 5, 11, 14, 21,
27–51, 57, 59, 99, 127, 179, 181,
182, 183, 187, 195, 240, 241, 248;
gender 29; geography 29; Lloyd’s
building 29; multiculturalisation 2, 7,
21, 27, 28–30, 48, 51; Square Mile
29, 195
City specialists 146, 202; British
bankers 48
Clark, R. 4
class 9, 66, 85, 161, 185, 197, 202,
204, 207, 244; class and
cross-culture 201
class society 157–8
classless Japan 157; dog racing 199;
middle class 73, 74, 201, 205; middle
class lifestyle 59; upper class 87, 201,
205; working class 157, 177, 199
clerical work 86, 115–16, 147; office
job 205
Cohen, A. 208, 216
Cohen, R. 6
communication 3, 11, 30, 50, 92, 118, 119,
120, 132, 161, 166, 206, 242, 244, 247;
miscommunication 5, 92, 127–8
company men 15; salary men 100, 168,
169
Conservative government 28
Continent 177, 234–5
Continental bank 48, 63, 182; European
bank 29, 49, 92, 102, 227, 240
convergence 11, 15
corporate culture 4, 167, 177, 193–4;
corporate philosophy 89; Japanese
corporate culture 2, 4
corporate group 142, 178, 241; see also
kigyōshūdan
corporate soldier 171
cosmopolitan 87, 208–9, 215, 222,
233; see also local
cross-shareholding 45
culture 7–11, 13, 19; see also Japanese
culture; British culture 9, 241;
cultural boundaries 22; cultural
differences 22; cultural hegemony
9–10, 244; cultural nationalism 9;
English culture 178; homogeneous
culture 96; hybrid culture 89, 195,
204, 247; national culture 5, 202,
233; village culture 105; Western
culture 8; women’s culture 7;
working-class culture 7
curriculum vitae 224
 INDEX
Cyprus 219
Czechoslovakia 235
Daiichi Bank 61
Daiwa 31, 32, 42
datsua-nyu¯o¯ 47, 171
dealer 231
debt crisis 34, 35
debts 1, 40, 188
decision-making 45, 103–5, 114, 127,
161, 189, 194, 204, 241, 244; see
also work culture; bottom-up
103–1, 244; consensus
decision-making 98, 105, 114;
exclusion 106; quick decision-
making 98; ringisho 103; top-down
103–4
Dedoussis, V. 99
Deutche Bank 121
diaspora 6, 7; Japanese diaspora 4, 7,
248
direct foreign investment 21, 27, 39
dock labourer 181
domestic business 174
Dore, R. 4, 71
double checker 214
Düser, T. 31, 44, 241
East End 80
economic miracle 1, 2; see also
high-growth economy; education 59,
66, 77; A levels 80; boarding school
241; cramming school 72;
educational background 78, 160,
224; post-war education 248;
schooling 66, 138, 140, 141
EEO Law (Equal Employment
Opportunity Law) 75–6, 135–6, 214,
218; see also ippanshoku, sōgōshoku
ego 205
Elger, T. and C.Smith 4
élite 14, 16, 65, 71, 82, 99, 123, 136,
178, 201, 214, 244; élite company
men 82, 145
Emmott, B. 44, 241
Empire 2, 28, 30, 88
employees; see British employees,
Japanese employees
employment 158, 179–85; British
employment laws 153, 154;
employment market 100; individual
freedom 100; job descriptions 114;
273
labour market 227
job opportunity 62, 214; job security
4, 179, 181–2, 183, 184, 188, 198;
empowerment 14
England 221
English literature 170, 217
Englishness 58–9
equities business 227
Eriksen, T. 222
essentialism 242, 247; essential
differences 7, 242
essentialist 247 ethnicity 9, 16, 57, 64,
85, 161, 202, 227; ethnic culture 160;
ethnic group 8, 245; ethnic minority
222, 227, 230; Japanese ethnicity 8;
minority 203
Euro Disney 40
Euro-dollars 28
Euro-market 21, 27, 31, 32, 37, 40, 44,
46, 51, 240
Europe 60, 61, 179, 221, 240
European banks; see Continental banks
European currency 28
European financiers 42
Euro-tunnel 36, 40
exchange control 28
Falkland Islands 186
family 16–17, 65–6, 77, 138, 144–6,
149, 159, 219, 228–30; childhood
150; family background 140; family
business 167, 185–6; family life 79,
144–5, 149, 159, 207; fatherhood
138–41; ‘ideal’ family 229; ‘ideal’
mother 148, 149; kanai 145;
marriage 113, 147, 227–30; shujin
145, 220
fatalism 100, 199
femininity 132, 148, 160–1, 201; see
also gender, masculinity
feminist movement 159
Financial System Reform Act 42
First World War 28, 30
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law 32
France 235
friendship 16–17, 116–17, 141
Fuji Bank 61, 69
Fukuzawa, Y. 171
fund manager 122
gaiatsu 37, 173, 177; foreign pressure 42
 INDEX
gaijin 190
geisha girl 227
gender 9, 16, 85, 161, 185, 197, 199,
202, 207; see also masculinity,
femininity; and education 218;
anti-female 153–5; conformity 150,
151; discontent 150; gender and
class 207; gender and cross-cultural
identity 199; gender discrimination
161; gender relations 21, 132, 134,
157, 244, 246; male dominance 134;
male friendships 141; male networks
134, 142, 143; male power 138;
male world 144; mentor 142; otoko
shakai 150; sexual harassment 155,
161; subordination 148, 150, 156,
160
Giddens, A. 3
globalisation 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 21, 22,
95, 121, 166, 216, 242, 243, 245,
247, 248; economic globalisation 6
global bank 43, 48, 174
global business 45, 247
global community 11
global expansion of Japan 2, 248
global interpretation 243
global movement 6, 7, 215
global network 45
global promotion 204, 246
global village 248
going international 185–8
going Japanese 185
golf club 144, 241
government bonds 38
Hall, S. 20
Hamada, T. 65, 103, 143, 173
Hamada, Y. and T.Sawada 62
Hannertz, U. 215
Harrod’s 58
hegemony 10, 244
Heike 172
hierarchy 202
high-growth economy 168, 241; see
also economic miracle; period of
high-growth 173; rapid growth 47;
post-war economic growth 2
high-street bank 170, 180, 184
Hitotsubashi University 67, 68
holidays 114, 225
homogeneity 168
homogeneous group 148
274
Hong Kong 113
Housei University 68
ICI 99, 192
identity 8–11, 22, 166, 202, 208; being
international 185; belonging 8, 16,
57, 167–8, 171, 185, 199, 209, 225;
between cultures 215; British
identity 179; collective identity 166,
197, 202; core identity 166; crisis
172, 205, 208; cross-cultural
identity 198–9; cultural identity 7–9,
11, 21–2, 50, 57, 82, 161, 173–5,
203, 208, 209, 216, 236, 243, 244,
245, 248; ethnic identity 50, 57,
245; fixed identity 203, 233;
floating identity 166, 202–9, 230–3;
fragmentation of identity 202;
gender identity 132–3, 160, 161,
202; homogeneous identity 202,
216; hybrid identity 10; in between-
ness 207; Japanese identity 173–5,
193; marudome 144; national
identity 7, 9, 11; new identity
10–11, 205, 208, 216, 233, 236,
247, 248, 249; old identity 216;
peripheral identity 11; problem 208;
self 19; self-identity 14; sense of
belonging 168, 209; unfixed identity
246
ideology 148; dominant ideology 245
imagined community 50; advanced
West 221; core of the West 167,
169, 172; dystopia 214, 233, 235;
ideal country 171; imaginary Japan
234; oppressive Japanese society
222, 233–4; unbearable Japan 221;
universal world 188; utopia 233
Immigration Act of 1971 80
India 186
individualism 103
Industrial Bank of Japan 42, 170
Institute of Personnel Managers 78, 180
International Banking Diploma 224
international business 173, 174
international businessmen 73
international financial business 1, 21, 27,
28, 47–8, 51, 63, 86, 178; aerospace
finance 35, 36; aviation banking 184;
currency exchange 35, 47; delivatives
35, 40, 89, 90; fund management 40,
41, 86; futures 38; inter-bank loans
31, 39; international banking 32, 240;
mergers and acquisitions 35, 38–40;
 INDEX
project finance 40, 89, 90; property
bonds 45; sovereign loans 35, 47;
swaps and options 1, 35, 36, 38;
syndicated loans 1, 27, 31, 32, 35, 36,
40, 47; UK domestic lending 28;
wholesale banking 100
internationalisation 2, 28, 31, 46, 126
interview 11, 13, 14
interviewer and interviewees 14–20
ippanshoku 75–6, 135–7, 146–9; see
also sōgōshoku, career, EEO Law
J.P.Morgan 121
Japan Development Bank 37
Japan Import and Export Bank 37
Japan Premium 31
Japanese bankers 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, 28,
42, 43, 44, 45, 46–51, 240, 243,
244, 246, 248
Japanese banking system 49, 177, 242;
see also Japanese financial system;
business methods 47; business
practice 240; convoy system 242;
core banks 35; cross-shareholding
45; gosōsendan houshiki 45, 240;
long-term credit 45; main bank 37,
45, 46, 142, 188, 193; main bank
system 46; relationship banking 35;
see also transaction banking
Japanese banks 1, 13, 27–43, 46, 47,
51n, 62, 85, 87, 88, 222, 227, 240,
241, 248; city bank 32, 35, 37, 45,
62; government banks 6–7, 37, 63;
regional bank 34, 40, 63, 143; trust
bank 45
Japanese business culture 182; see also
Anglo-American business culture;
business customs 27; business
methods 29, 204
Japanese Chamber of Commerce and
Industry 39
Japanese companies 2, 3–4, 5, 169,
179; construction company 37;
trading company 37, 39, 45, 67–8
Japanese culture 7, 9, 204, 232, 248; see
also culture; fushōfuzui 219; honne
19; ishindenshin 120; tatemae 19
Japanese Embassy 57
Japanese employees 3; see Japanese
female managers, Japanese male
managers, Japanese managers,
Japanese managing director; see also
British employees
275
Japanese employment system 176, 217;
core workers 103, 207;
core-periphery employment system
133, 138, 227; job for life 197;
lifetime commitment 97; lifetime
employees 94, 99, 191, 246; lifetime
employment 4, 40, 60, 90, 98–9, 176,
204, 217–18, 246; seniority payment
93, 98
Japanese expatriates 58, 62, 63, 65–76,
87, 208, 214, 215
Japanese female managers 16, 18, 19,
21, 43, 48, 49, 50, 57, 75–6, 113,
123, 132, 133, 135–7, 141, 146–51,
159–60, 201, 204; career paths 76,
147; children 76; clerical work 75;
education 75; family 75; marriage
113, 147–8; promotion 147, 148
Japanese financial community 7, 61,
57–82; business community 21, 22,
57–62; expatriate community 6,
215; Japan Club 60, 61; Japanese
community 59, 232; Japanese
delegates 233; Japanese expatriate
community 233; Japanese overseas
community 6, 248; Japanese
permanent residents 57, 58;
Japanese restaurants 59; Japanese
school 59; Japanese students 57, 58;
locally settled Japanese 59, 215;
relationship with British society 60
Japanese financial firms; see Japanese
financial institutions
Japanese financial institutions 28, 30,
34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 43, 46, 63, 240,
241; causality insurance companies
4; insurance companies 27, 38–40,
63, 73, 86; lease companies 63; life
insurance companies 38–9, 41, 45,
63; non-life insurance companies
39–40, 42, 63, 70, 86
Japanese financial sector 104
Japanese financial system 31, 43, 45;
see also Japanese banking system
Japanese financiers 28, 50, 240
Japanese government 46, 50
Japanese male managers 8, 16, 17, 19,
21, 22, 65–74, 82, 113, 116–17,
119–22, 127, 134, 138–46, 158,
168–78, 201, 203–4, 207; childhood
65; class 66; education 66, 138,
140, 141, 170; family 66, 113, 138–
 INDEX
41, 144–5; friendships 116, 141–2;
network 142; promotion 65, 67;
recruitment 71, 73; university 66–73
Japanese management 4, 5, 7, 97–8
Japanese management system 8, 192,
242, 243–4
Japanese managers 43, 46, 48, 49, 50,
57, 94, 112, 114, 167, 244;
Japanese staff 157
Japanese managing director 18, 63
Japanese manufacturing companies 5,
27, 31, 35, 39, 45, 57, 62, 65, 199;
manufacturing practice 21
Japanese manufacturing industry 2, 5, 28,
37, 43, 44, 47, 49, 73, 103, 178, 242
Japanese securities business 37, 176
Japanese securities companies 27, 37,
40, 44, 46, 187, 188; Big Four 31,
32, 37–8; securities firms 42, 70;
securities houses 37, 38, 40, 49, 63,
67, 69–70, 73, 87, 183, 198, 224
Japanese securities houses; see Japanese
securities companies
Japanese society 169, 176, 178, 201, 248
Japanese tourists 58, 215; tourism 233;
tourist gaze 222; travellers 215
Japanese transnational companies 3, 5,
6, 7, 20, 21, 133, 242; board of
directors 62, 90; management
structure 85, 92–3
Japanese work culture 102–18, 137,
177, 187, 243; see also British work
culture, work culture; control of
clerical work 115–16; drinking 116,
142; for the company 105–7; golf
110, 116, 142, 144; groupism
102–5; hard-working 201, 222, 223;
job description 114–15, 223;
karaoke 152; long working hours
107–10, 223, 224, 225, 244; loyalty
107, 222, 244; messhibōkō 177;
socialisation within companies
116–18; work-oriented lifestyle
111–13
Japaneseness 10, 82, 85, 203, 204, 236
Japanisation 4–5
JCB International 39
JETRO (Japan External Trade
Organisation) 57
Jewish house 187
jogakkō 150
just-in-time 4
276
Kabuto-cho 168
kanban 167
Kangyo Bank 61
karo¯shi 108
kaseki 177
Keio University 67, 69
kibbutz 215, 219
kigyo¯shu¯dan 45; see also corporate
group
kikokushijo 123
kokunaiha 74, 96, 119, 121, 122, 126,
144, 146, 172, 175, 214, 243; see
also kokusaiha, career
kokusaiha 74, 102, 121, 126, 144, 172,
175, 176, 214, 243; see also
kokunaiha, career
Komatsu 39
Korea 189
Kyoto University 70
Labour Party 88
Lam, A. 133, 135
language 8–10, 85, 118–28, 202, 243,
244, 247; English classes 155;
English language 14, 15, 19, 44, 57,
118–25, 147, 156, 169, 189, 206,
214, 217, 221, 222, 225, 226, 244;
English language school 59, 74;
English-speaking audience 20;
English teacher 186; Japalish 120;
Japanese language 14, 118–19,
123–4, 126, 222, 244; universal
language 126–7; vernacular
language 126–7
liberalisation of Tokyo market 37
life insurance companies 38, 39, 41
life story 3, 11–14, 22, 65, 113, 209,
216, 217
life story interview 6, 11–14
Lloyd’s 39
local 209, 215, 233, 235, 245, 247; see
also cosmopolitan
local culture 2, 215, 242, 247
local phenomena 2
locality 244; vernacular value 233; see
also universalism
local council 35
localisation 44, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95
locally-hired Japanese women 17, 18, 21,
22, 80–1, 91–2, 93, 106–7, 123,
201–2, 207, 214–33, 246 (education
80, 81; family 80, 219; friendship
 INDEX

228–9, 231); health and pension 231 multicultural society 245

(identity 233–6; ideology of family multicultural workplace 13, 132, 160,
229); locally-hired Japanese man 161, 166
80–1, 205–7, 246 (marriage 219–20, multinational companies 3, 118, 166,
227–30 nationality 232 promotion 186, 216
231 work 217–19, 222–7) myth 4, 40, 188
London Bridge 180 multiculturalism 7
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 42,
241 narrative 11, 12, 14, 21, 50, 241, 243, 244
long-term relationships 31, 35–6, 41, national boundary 1, 209
46, 240 national business system 242
Los Angeles 170 National Health Insurance System 231
nationality 232
Navy 172
main bank system; see Japanese networking 16–17, 142
banking system New York 34, 38, 46, 169, 173, 176, 192
Manchester 35 New Yorkers 171
manufacturing industry 3, 5, 16, 45, NHS 231
46, 47, 49, 73, 178, 181, 189, 198; Nihon Keizai Shinbun 62
decline of British industry 8; Nihon University 68
de-industrialisation 5, 168, 242, nihonjinron 9–10
248; industrial North 189–199 Nikko 31, 32, 42
Marie Claire 235 Nippon Credit Bank 241
masculinity 132–3, 138, 160–1, 245; Nixon Shock 31, 61, 169
see also femininity, gender Nomura 31, 32, 38, 41, 42
maternity leave 151 non-fixed repayment bonds 45
Meiji Restoration 47 No¯rinchu¯kin Bank 42
melting pot 222
merchant banking 35; merchant banks
48, 63 oil crisis 31; oil shock 32
mergers and acquisitions 35 Oliver, N. and B.Wilkinson 4
messhibōkō; see Japanese work culture Open University 80
metropolis 6 Oral historians 13
Middle East 181, 186 Oral history method 12
migration 60, 214–15; citizenship 228; Osaka 192
economic migration 214; spiritual Osaka University 67
migration 214 otherness 21, 160–1, 167; Other 2, 85,
miner 179–80 167, 179, 246; Others 6, 8, 10, 12,
Ministry of Finance 31, 32, 34, 37, 45, 14, 15, 46, 50, 51, 90, 95, 96, 127,
143, 144, 176, 177, 240, 242; 159, 160, 208, 242
Banking Bureau 32; Insurance outsiders 179
Bureau 32; Securities Bureau 32 Oxbridge 59, 78, 81, 97, 157, 199
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 172 Oxford 99, 183, 206
Ministry of International Trade and
Industry 175, 176, 242 Paris 31, 192
Mitsubishi 30, 41, 61, 69, 70, 71; see pension 231
also Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank pension funds 42
Mitsubishi Trust Bank 42 Perlmutter 3
Mitsui 30, 70 personnel management 74, 78, 91, 98
modern girl 229 Piccadilly Circus 58, 59, 61
modernisation of Japan 8, 30 Plaza Agreement 34, 240
modernity 167 postal savings 42
motherhood 149 prisoners of the War 61

277
 INDEX

private sector 188; see also public sector socialisation 116–17, 144
production of goods 178 socialising 204
promotion 9, 77, 93–5, 99, 100, 101, Sogo¯ 59, 67
126, 148, 174–5, 179, 189, 205, so¯go¯shoku 75–6, 79, 135–7, 146–9, 156;
223, 227, 231 see also ippanshoku, career, EEO Law
public sector 180, 188; see also private Southern US 171
sector stereotype 11, 15, 111, 112, 157, 159,
161, 205; ideas of femininity 148;
Quaker 185, 186 images 4, 153–154
qualification 182, 224; Banking story 4, 11–14, 15, 17, 20–1, 22, 102,
Diploma 224; Cambridge First 122, 158, 160, 167, 241, 248
Certificate Examination 224; Stratford-on-Avon 58
Cambridge Proficiency Examination subjectivity 13
224; International Banking Diploma subsidiary banks 63
224; MBA 73, 100, 137 Sumitomo 30, 61, 69
qualitative research methods 13
Takushoku Bank 241
racial discrimination 95; racism 196 Thatcher, M. 4, 28, 242; Thatcher
recession 1, 27, 28, 63, 191 Government 57–8, 242
recruitment 73 third space 247
redundancy 176 Third World 14
Regent Street 59 Thompson, P. 12
representative office 63 Tokio Marine and Fire Company 67, 71
retail banking 101 Tokyo 41, 46, 192
Rohlen, T.P. 65 Tokyo head offices 41, 42, 45, 49, 73,
Rothchild 187 74, 80, 90, 167
Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) 30 Tokyo market 37, 40, 42, 49, 50, 173, 240
Tokyo University 67, 68, 69, 70, 71,
Said, E. 8–10 82, 139, 143, 169
Sako, M. 71 Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank 30; see also
salary 93–5, 174–5, 224, 225 Bank of Tokyo, Mitsubishi
salary men; see company men Tonkin, E. 12
Samuel R. 12 trade union 89
sankyoku goui 32, 38–9 transaction banking 35; see also
sayonara 189 relationship banking
Scotch House 58 travellers’ gaze 233
Scottish 192 Trevor, M. 99
Second World War 1, 2, 8, 27, 30–1, Turkey 235
61, 123, 138, 167, 214 turnover 94–5
Securities and Exchange Law (article
65) 32 UK domestic corporate finance 35
securitised bonds 227 underwriting 37
segregation 8–9, 16, 17, 29, 85, 90–5, universalism 10; see also locality
166, 167, 175, 244; gender universal values 2, 246
segregation 133–4 universal world 188
seken 218, 222 universality 66–74, 244
self 19, 22, 168 Urashima Tarou 172, 176
sense of ranking 73 us and them 10, 85, 118, 198
shinjinrui 177 us from them 202
skills; see British work culture US treasury bonds 34, 38, 43, 49
snowball technique 16 USA 173, 181
social skills 231

278
 INDEX

value system 202; vernacular value work culture; decision-making;

system 233 changing 4; leisure 114;
VJ Day 61 task-oriented work discipline
108–9; time-oriented work
discipline 108
Walby, S. 79
work ethics 244
Wall Street 43
Warburg 187 work practice 244
Waseda University 67, 70 working hours 107–11, 204, 225
Wedgwood 59 World Bank 31
Western feminism 160
White, M. 65 Yamaichi 31, 32, 42, 241
White Paper (Ministry of Labour) 108 Yemen 186
white-collar workers 108, 179 Yen; high values of 1; strength of 60
wholesale banking 101 Yokohama Specie Bank 30
wives 21, 81, 149; marriage 81, 82, Yoshino, K. 65
149; tennis club 82; flower yuppies 79, 183, 199
arranging 60
work culture 85, 88, 95–118, 204; see zaibatsu 30, 45, 49, 68–9, 70, 87, 225
also Japanese work culture; British zen 227

279