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Well-Being Review Paper - PrePrint - 2021!03!22
Well-Being Review Paper - PrePrint - 2021!03!22
David J. Disabato1
Fallon R. Goodman2
Todd B. Kashdan3
1
Kent State University
2
University of South Florida
3
George Mason University
Author Note
David J. Disabato,
Email: ddisab01@gmail.com
2
Abstract
of well-being and present a hierarchical framework that organizes multiple existing models. We
detail the theoretical rationale and empirical evidence behind four hierarchical levels of our
contents (e.g., affects), and well-being characteristics (e.g., positive affect). We also propose a
bottom, fifth level of well-being nuances for future research at the most granular level. We
itself (i.e., preventing tautologies) and how they fit into our framework. Measurement properties
of the well-being framework are explored through comparisons to other major hierarchical
research sharply increased at the turn of the century with the mobilization of scientists, grant
funding, and public interest under the umbrella term “positive psychology” (Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Well-being has been examined from different lenses within personality/
psychology, as well as human factors and behavioral neuroscience. Allied disciplines, such as
economics, house researchers investigating the measurement, causes, and consequences of well-
being (Kahneman et al., 1999; Krueger & Schkade, 2008; Layard, 2010). Psychological
interventions have been developed with the goal of improving well-being for people with and
without medical illnesses (Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013; Sin & Lyubomirsky, 2009; Quoidbach
et al., 2015). If past behavior predicts future behavior, then the next several years will bring
The foundation of any scientific field is measurement. The value of scientific evidence
rests on valid connections between theoretical constructs and their measures. For well-being,
countless constructs and associated measures have been developed; a 2016 review identified a
staggering 99 different measures capturing 196 different well-being constructs (Linton et al.,
2016), with more measures published since. Yet, there is little clarity and consensus on how to
organize these measurement components in a logical, empirical, and theoretically sound manner.
qualifiers to establish constructs, there is a pressing need for a framework that organizes well-
single general construct at the top, similar to “g” in the intelligence literature or “p” in the
psychopathology literature. Underneath this general factor of well-being are three lower levels—
down the hierarchy (Ree et al., 2015). Our framework aims to be agnostic to researcher
preferences or values about what well-being should or should not be, regardless of the public
popularity of any model. We review the history of well-being measurement and then outline our
hierarchical framework, summarizing the empirical support and delineating how to make
ago. Before then, there were intermittent studies of happiness, but not a full body of literature
(e.g., Hartmann, 1934; Wilson, 1967). Happiness had been studied within medicine (e.g., quality
of life) largely as a predictor of physical health and mortality (Larson, 1978). The tides turned in
the 1970s when calls rang out to measure and study happiness as an outcome in and of itself
(Campbell, 1976). In part to gain credibility within psychological science, researchers began
using the term “well-being” rather than happiness because it sounded more scientific (E. Diener,
personal communication, Feb 7, 2019). The first widely adopted measurement model was called
subjective well-being and included three dimensions (Diener, 1984): 1) life satisfaction – how
satisfied a person is with their current life, 2) positive affect – how frequently a person
experiences pleasant emotions, and 3) lack of negative affect – how infrequently a person
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experiences unpleasant emotions. The traditional measurement method was self-report surveys,
where participants responded to multiple statements about themselves using a Likert response
scale. This model of well-being, arguably one of the most influential in psychological science,
integrated previous research on avowed happiness and affect balance (Bradburn, 1969; Shin &
Johnson, 1978).
Some researchers, however, believed that Diener’s (1984) subjective well-being model
omitted several important aspects of happiness written about by theorists (e.g., Jahoda, 1958),
and that happiness could not be reduced to fleeting affective experiences and generic life
satisfaction. To address this gap, subsequent measurement models sought to expand the construct
breadth of well-being. The second widely adopted measurement model was called psychological
well-being and included six dimensions (Ryff, 1989): 1) self-acceptance – possessing a positive
attitude about oneself, including an acknowledgment and acceptance of both good and bad
qualities, 2) positive relations with others – the presence of close, satisfying, trusting
relationships with other people, 3) personal growth – a feeling of continual development, where
one is changing in ways that reflect an expansion in knowledge and effectiveness, 4) purpose in
life – the presence of an overarching aim(s) that directs one’s life, 5) environmental mastery –
feeling able to effectively manage the situational demands presented in everyday affairs, and 6)
autonomy – the ability to act in ways that reflect self-reliance and independence from peer
influence.
missing from scientific discourse. For example, a social well-being measurement model was
created that included five dimensions focused on people as members of a community rather than
isolated individuals (Keyes, 1998): 1) social integration – the sense that one is accepted by and
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has a sense of belonging in one’s community, 2) social acceptance – belief that other people are
kind and trustworthy, 3) social contribution – feeling that one’s contributions are valued and
impactful to society, 4) social coherence – belief that the world is sensible and predictable, and
5) social actualization – belief that society is improving for human beings. Other researchers
activities, where a sense of “flow” is experienced in high frequency for enduring periods of time
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Well-being researchers continued to identify and create new constructs
that were purported to be omitted from existing models. As the field strove for inclusivity in
As time went on, some researchers sought to select a subset of existing well-being
dimensions and package them as a measurement model. For example, PERMA is an acronym for
five dimensions of well-being: P = positive emotions – feelings of joy, contentment, cheer, etc.;
socially integrated, cared about, and supported by others; M = meaning – believing that one’s life
progress toward goals and feeling capable of daily activities (Seligman, 2011). A different
and vitality (Huppert & So, 2013). Several other researchers have proposed their own
measurement models (Diener et al., 2009; Longo et al., 2017; Su et al., 2014). Existing models of
well-being often convey researchers’ personal preferences without an empirical basis for their
approach over the myriad of other potential options. Under the guise of empirical evidence,
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descriptions of these measurement models can come across as the definitive, objective
needs a framework that synthesizes them together—one that is not limited to a subset of well-
being dimensions and recognizes the many well-being measurement models with empirical
support. To accomplish this goal, we propose a hierarchical framework that allows for
intention in proposing this framework is to organize and explain published empirical data in a
well-being or choosing what fits our personal values or beliefs about well-being.
constructs that use hierarchical frameworks to theoretically explain the diversity and overlap of
construct (e.g., g-factor; p-factor; general factor of personality), followed by multiple lower
levels in the hierarchy. The number of constructs and their specificity increases as one goes
down the hierarchy, as it does, for example, in models of personality: (Big 5) domains, aspects,
general well-being, a single overarching construct defined as the perceived enjoyment and
fulfillment with one’s life as a whole. The next level is 2. lenses, perspectives by which well-
being is conceptualized from, followed by 3. content(s) areas that make-up the various well-
being lenses and organize constructs at face value. The lowest level is 4. characteristics of well-
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being, defined as discrete, clearly defined components of well-being that offer practical value in
dissecting human experience. Table 1 illustrates this hierarchical framework populated with a set
of examples. Below, we walk through the examples at each level in the table. We emphasize that
these are examples and not reified categorizations. There are many ways to parse apart well-
being constructs within a hierarchy model, and it remains to be seen which structural model has
the strongest empirical support for the differential predictive value of one level in the hierarchy
A hierarchical framework does not give preference to one level over another but rather
offers different levels of analysis. Some research questions will pertain to general well-being,
while others will pertain to specific characteristics (e.g., positive affect, purpose in life). In this
way, research on general well-being predicting better physical health (e.g., Stranges et al., 2014)
and research exploring the differences between life satisfaction and meaning in life (e.g., Tov &
Lee, 2016) are both consistent within a hierarchical framework of well-being. This is analogous
to the scientific study of humans more broadly (e.g., Research Domain Criteria [RDoC]; Insel et
al., 2010). People can be studied at the level of atoms and molecules (i.e., chemical), cells and
bacteria (i.e., biological), electrical impulses and blood flow (e.g., neurological), behaviors and
facial expressions (e.g., behavioral), thoughts and feelings (e.g., psychological), or collective
groups and communities (e.g., sociological). No level of analysis is “correct” for studying
humans; instead, each level provides a different set of constructs and offers a unique perspective
for scientific knowledge. Researchers need to continually identify the level of the hierarchy at
which they want to measure well-being. One can always lump related constructs together or split
up constructs into finer components. The decision to lump or split does not have a correct answer
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and will often depend on the research question, study design, and measurement method (e.g.,
We now move to describing each level of the hierarchical framework in more detail,
outlining supportive empirical evidence and conceptual arguments for the examples in Table 1.
General Well-being
We acknowledge that general well-being is an open (or fuzzy) concept, per Meehl’s
(McDowell, 2010). For example, subjective, psychological, and social well-being are all defined
vocabulary), or psychopathology (e.g., panic attacks) is more manageable, but moving to define
general well-being, general intelligence, or general psychopathology becomes difficult. And yet,
there is a shared understanding among scientists of what is broadly meant by general well-being,
and general constructs tend to explain the most variance in important outcomes (e.g., Wiernik et
al., 2015). When working with general constructs, conceptual precision is sacrificed for
general well-being.
General well-being is defined as perceived enjoyment and fulfillment with one’s life as a
whole. Although the words in the definition are somewhat arbitrary, we argue that its structure is
key. First, at its core, general well-being is about one’s life. This includes not only the here and
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now, but also the story that a person tells about their life (an interpretive narrative; McAdams,
2001). It is indirectly about the self, given that the main character in your life story is none other
than you (i.e., self-concept). For example, meaning and purpose in well-being literature is
meaning and purpose in life, not some abstract, philosophical idea (the meaning of life). Second,
general well-being is about one’s overall life, or life “as a whole.” General well-being is a global
this way, it is distinct from enjoyment and fulfillment in one’s career, relationships, or
spirituality, which reflect specific contexts of one’s life. Third, general well-being has both an
affective and non-affective component. The word choice of “enjoyment” represents the affective
component, and “fulfillment” represents the non-affective component (e.g., cognitive, existential,
etc.). We did not choose words such as “pleasure” or “satiated” because they colloquially imply
more hollow psychological experiences, which would not fully capture well-being. Fourth, the
first word in the definition of general well-being is “perceived,” a synonym for subjective,
implying that well-being is a perception of one’s life and does not refer to any objective
characteristics of one’s life (e.g., income level; marital status) (van der Deijl, 2017). A person
living in third-world poverty is not excluded from having high general well-being, and a person
living as an affluent member of a first-world society is not assured of high general well-being.
Survey studies with various well-being dimensions offer empirical support that general
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were reasonably good in clinical (N = 472; χ2 = 281.20, df =
77, GFI = 0.860, CFI = 0.978, RMSEA = 0.075, SRMR = .056), student (N = 591; χ2 = 2938.41,
df = 846, TLI = 0.974, CFI = 0.975, RMSEA = 0.065, SRMR = .065), online (N = 517; χ2 =
111.97, df = 19, TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.10, SRMR = .03), United States
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community (N = 4,043; χ2 = 18,189.57, df = 888, TLI = 0.954, CFI = 0.957, RMSEA = 0.070,
SRMR = .064), European community (N = 1,438; χ2 = 855.82, df = 75, TLI = 0.85, CFI = 0.88,
RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = .06), and international community samples (N = 7617, χ2 = 970.85, df
= 27, TLI = 0.950, CFI = 0.963, RMSEA = 0.068, SRMR = .030) (Franken et al., 2018;
Gallagher et al., 2009; Petrillo et al., 2015; Disabato et al., 2016). In these studies, when multi-
factor models (e.g., subjective well-being, psychological well-being, social well-being, PERMA,
etc.) were tested, the CFA latent correlations ranged from .62 to .98, suggesting high overlap
among factors and providing support for lumping constructs together. Although splitting up
general well-being into multiple factors significantly improved model fit in each sample, it was
unclear whether the added complexity was always worthwhile relative to a more parsimonious
approach. For example, in the largest of these samples (N = 7,617), the correlations between the
different well-being factors and various outcome criteria were very similar (i.e., the average
Despite adequate model fit, there are aspects of these data not captured by a one-factor
model. Researchers using CFA have considered the impact of adding factors in addition to a
general well-being factor (i.e., bifactor models). The central question guiding these efforts is
whether the general well-being factor dominates the model or shrinks away in response to
including other factors. Several studies using bifactor models found a dominant general factor on
which almost all characteristics of well-being primarily load (Bohnke & Croudace, 2016; Chen,
et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2006; Jovanovic, 2015; Kokko et al., 2013; Longo et al., 2016; Longo et
al., 2017). These characteristics included subjective happiness, life satisfaction, positive affect,
(infrequent) negative affect, self-esteem, self-efficacy, meaning in life, purpose in life, value-
optimism, social belonging, and positive relations with others. Across the studies cited above,
and a study using a second-order factor model (Kallay & Rus, 2014), total scores from the set of
ranging from .71 to .86. The largest of these studies to date (N = 7,521) found that 14 different
standardized loadings greater than .40 (Longo et al., 2017). After accounting for a general factor,
the average residual correlation between well-being characteristics ranged from .04 to .08,
Other studies using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) found that only personal growth,
autonomy, and religiosity were distinct characteristics of well-being, while subjective happiness,
satisfaction with life, affect balance, quality of life, self-esteem, sense of coherence, and
optimism all combined together as one well-being factor (Compton et al., 1996). A follow-up
replication study found similar results, adding self-efficacy and purpose in life to the general
well-being combination (Compton, 2001). While not capturing all aspects of the data, modeling
well-being as a single, broad factor offers a parsimonious measurement option for researchers
and practitioners.
Lenses of Well-being
various perspectives by which well-being can be conceptualized. This has perhaps been the most
controversial level, with some people decisively declaring the importance of different well-being
lenses (Keyes & Annas, 2009; Waterman, 2008), while others question the validity and utility of
these distinctions (Biswas-Diener et al., 2009; Kashdan et al., 2008). Studies cited above found
correlations as high as .98 between “lenses” of well-being (Goodman et al., 2018), leading some
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researchers to comment that their well-being measurement model does not capture a different
lens of well-being but instead measures well-being at either the general or characteristic levels of
Still, not all studies have found such high correlations between lenses of well-being.
When exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM) is used, evidence for multiple lenses of
well-being has emerged. ESEM is an exploratory factor analytic model placed within a structural
equation modeling framework. The primary difference between an ESEM and a CFA is that in
the former, all cross-loadings are estimated rather than fixed to 0. With these factor analytic
specifications1, Joshanloo (2016b) found support for three lenses of well-being: subjective,
psychological, and social, that correlate between .30 and .60 with each other. Joshanloo and
colleagues have replicated this structure of well-being across five countries (Joshanloo, 2016a;
Joshanloo & Lamers, 2016; Joshanloo, Jose, et al., 2017; Joshanloo, Capone, et al., 2017;
Joshanloo & Jovanovic, 2016). However, these results do not generate factors that map directly
onto the original definitions of subjective, psychological, and social well-being (see Lamers et
al., 2011 for an exception). For example, in Joshanloo (2016b), self-acceptance and
environmental mastery load more on subjective well-being than psychological well-being, and
social integration and social contribution load more on psychological well-being than social
with ESEM when cross-loadings are non-negligible is whether the meaning of the factors are
important for scientists to be open to finding well-being lenses that do not map onto popular
measurement models or a priori hypotheses. For example, perhaps a major lens of well-being
1
Most of Joshanloo and colleagues’ ESEM models are actually mathematically identical to EFA models because
they include only one exploratory factor measurement model, no confirmatory factor measurement models, and no
structural model paths.
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should include life satisfaction, positive affect, (infrequent) negative affect, self-acceptance, and
One lens of well-being that has not been supported is a eudaimonic well-being lens that
includes a combination of psychological and social well-being. Some researchers have argued
that the six dimensions of psychological well-being and the five dimensions of social well-being
from hedonic pleasures (e.g., momentary positive emotions) and is inclusive of multiple
philosophers and psychologists, but the most common definitions often involve living in
accordance with one’s true self or up to one’s full potential (i.e., self-actualization; Ryan & Deci,
2001). Whether eudaimonia is a coherent and useful concept for distinguishing aspects of well-
being has been debated at length (e.g., Martela & Sheldon, 2019). Yet, if we assume the idea of
eudaimonia to be worthwhile, there are still questions about its measurement. Studies have
suggested that combining psychological and social well-being via factor analysis results in poor
model fit and that discriminant validity from subjective well-being—sometimes called hedonic
well-being in this context—is weak. For example, CFA of eudaimonic and hedonic well-being
operationalized in this way resulted in subpar model fit: (N = 84; χ2 = 189.40, df = 76, GFI =
0.78, CFI = 0.87, RMSEA = 0.135; Brown et al., 2014). The correlation between observed scores
was .79, leaving only 30% unique variance after accounting for reliability (α = .92). Instead,
EFAs suggested a general well-being factor and a societal beliefs factor. Direct comparisons of
eudaimonic and hedonic well-being factors versus subjective, psychological, and social well-
being factors suggest separating psychological and social well-being is more consistent with the
data (Franken et al., 2018; Gallagher et al., 2009). It is worthwhile to note that conceptualizing
15
eudaimonia as a motive/activity, rather than a lens of well-being, has been found to predict well-
being and is arguably important for understanding the ingredients to the good life (Huta &
Contents of Well-being
The third level of our hierarchical framework contains contents of well-being, which
include the topic areas that make up each well-being lens. The additional level of contents
introduces terms that cut across disciplines within psychological science. Each lens of well-being
contains two contents: subjective well-being includes affect and appraisal; psychological well-
being includes meaning-making and self-concept; social well-being includes community and
interpersonal relationships. Although factor analytic studies have not been conducted on the
well-being contents proposed, we outline below empirical and theoretical work that offers
Over the past four decades (see Diener, 1984 for the origin), SWB has included both
affect and appraisal. While the associations between positive affect, (infrequent2) negative affect
and life satisfaction are large enough to warrant the higher-order lens of subjective well-being,
they are also separable (Busseri et al., 2007) with inter-correlations ranging from .37 to .53
(Busseri, 2018). Research suggests the difference between affect and appraisal in SWB may be
in the sources of information used by raters: an individual uses specific events and activities to
calculate affect, while personal narratives are primarily used for calculating cognitive appraisals
(Luhmann et al., 2012). This distinction facilitated research on causal links that connect affect
and appraisal. For example, affect was found to mediate self-control and life satisfaction, helping
2
We use the term “infrequent” since research indicates the frequency, rather than intensity, of affect in daily life is
most relevant for well-being (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 2009).
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tease apart the well-being benefits of self-regulation (Hofmann et al., 2014). Subjective
happiness has also become a popular appraisal construct from the SWB tradition whereby
participants use their own personal definition of happiness, as opposed to being offered a
definition by researchers (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). There is preliminary evidence that life
satisfaction and subjective happiness hang together as appraisal components (Disabato et al.,
reason that we have yet to see a published conceptual definition of psychological well-being.
When psychological well-being is introduced in scientific articles, the definition tends to be a list
of the independent dimensions (that reside at the characteristic level of our hierarchy). As an
alternative, we propose the contents of meaning-making and self-concept that allow for more
dimensions, purpose in life and personal growth are both part of conceptual models of meaning-
making (e.g., George & Park, 2016; King et al., 2016; Martela & Steger, 2016), whereas self-
acceptance and environmental mastery are part of conceptual models of the self. Existing
theories of meaning-making have broadened the number of concepts from purpose in life to
include coherence and significance/mattering (George & Park, 2016). Meaning-making includes
personal growth, which involves quotidian moments when an individual makes sense of rich
experiences (King et al., 2016) along with stressful and even traumatic experiences where felt
distress is reframed as growth and often influences a rewriting of mental schemas (Park, 2010).
mastery directly target an individual’s self-concept. Some researchers have noted that self-
acceptance and environmental mastery map onto the more commonly used terms “self-esteem”
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and “self-efficacy” (Burns & Machin, 2009), though Ryff and Singer (2008) argue that self-
acceptance is distinct from self-esteem. Using the sociometer definition of self-esteem, that very
well might be the case (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). In this model, self-esteem is a belief about
how much other people or society view one as valuable and includes perceived social status.
Researchers argue that self-esteem may not be the best indicator of health as one is vulnerable to
losing the roles/abilities/attributes that underly self-esteem (Neff, 2011). From this perspective,
social value (Bluth & Neff, 2018). Self-efficacy has long been central to an individual’s self-
concept, with generalized self-efficacy often converging strongly with other measures of self-
concept and well-being (Judge et al., 2002). Environmental mastery, by definition (Ryff, 1989),
is a variant of self-efficacy that involves aspects of locus of control, emphasizing one’s internal
We exclude the dimension of autonomy from our example hierarchy because of its
cultural influences. Within the psychology well-being framework, autonomy does not mean
personal freedom to act how one wishes as it does in Self-Determination Theory (Sheldon &
Hilpert, 2012; e.g., “I was free to do things my way”), but rather reflects non-conformity to
societal beliefs with a lack of enculturation or convention (Ryff, 1989; e.g., “My decisions are
not usually influenced by what everyone else is doing). While arguably adaptive in Western
cultures, it is unclear how applicable this dimension would be in other cultures (Lehman et al.,
2004). Indeed, Ryff and Singer (2008) acknowledge “this aspect of well-being is undoubtedly
the most western of the above dimensions” (pp. 23). However, future research might explore
where the Self-Determination Theory perspective on autonomy might fit into a hierarchical
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framework of well-being given its association with subjective well-being is consistent across
Keyes’ model of social well-being takes a more sociological perspective and captures
Dimensions from his model make up the community content in our model. However, Keyes’
model of social well-being occupies only part of the broader space of social well-being, as it
leaves out one-on-one social connections that are central to individual’s daily lives (e.g., spouses,
parents, siblings, friends, co-workers). In our model, we include a separate well-being content for
interpersonal relationships.
Although there are five dimensions in Keyes’ model, we only include two of the
dimensions in our example constructs based on our conceptual definition of well-being as being
about a person’s life or self and not beliefs about society. The community content is about one’s
relationship with the communities in which they reside and does not include constructs capturing
communities as independent entities. Therefore, the two Keyes’ dimensions we include are social
integration (the perceived quality of relationships with the local community and broader society)
and social contribution (the perceived value one offers as a member of the local community and
broader society). The other three dimensions from Keyes’ model are excluded because they refer
to beliefs about community and society and are not tied to one’s life or self: 1) social acceptance
- believing other people in one’s community have good qualities such as kindness and
including viewing it as sensible and predictable, 3) social actualization – believing one’s local
community and broader society are reaching their potential and will continue to prosper in the
future. Keyes draws analogies between social acceptance and self-acceptance, social coherence
19
and meaning in life, and social actualization and personal growth (Keyes, 1998); however, factor
analytic studies suggest the pairings do not map out empirically. A psychometric analysis of the
self-report survey data in Fredrickson et al. (2013) suggested that subjective and psychological
well-being loaded on the same factor together along with social integration and social
contribution, while the other three Keyes’ dimensions (social acceptance, social coherence, and
social actualization) loaded on their own factor (Brown et al., 2014). A psychometric analysis of
the Midlife in the United States – second wave (MIDUS-2) data suggests that only social
integration and social contribution loaded on well-being factors, while social acceptance, social
coherence, and social actualization had weaker associations with other well-being dimensions
communities and broader society might be included. One example is a self-endorsed sense of
community, or the perception that one belongs and is welcomed in their community, with an
interdependence of giving and receiving among one another (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Stewart
& Townley, 2020). In addition to associates with other dimensions of well-being (Peterson et al.,
2008), the construct has been fruitful in understanding why certain first-year college students
leave or transfer from their universities (Berger, 1997). The community content of social well-
being is particularly relevant for minority or marginalized groups where there might be fewer
The interpersonal relationships content is distinct from Keyes’ model. Research suggests
the happiest people have the most intimate and successful interpersonal relationships
(Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Studies find that people who can name several people they are close
with and whom they share intimate concerns were more likely to report being happy (Myers,
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1992). We believe the psychological well-being dimension of positive relationships with others
makes the most sense as a characteristic under the interpersonal relationships content of social
with others they are close with. Although romantic relationship satisfaction is one important
example of relationship quality (Proulx et al., 2007), it is not the only one. Among adults, having
at least two high-quality best friend relationships was associated with greater well-being (Birditt
& Antonucci, 2007), while sibling relationship quality is central to youth health (Buist et al.,
2013). We include perceived social support (contrasted with receives social support) because it is
theorized to help maintain well-being during times of stress (Schwarzer & Leppin, 1989), was
integrated into previous frameworks of social well-being (Larson, 1992), and is consistently
literature, which are in between Big 5 domains and facets (DeYoung et al., 2007). While there is
strong factor analytic support for the Big 5 domains, there is still quite a bit of heterogeneity
within each domain. If someone did not want to go down to the level of 75 facets, another option
for capturing some of the personality heterogeneity is the level of 10 aspects. For example, the
trait of extraversion includes the aspects of enthusiasm and assertiveness and agreeableness
Characteristics of well-being
discrete, clearly defined features of well-being that offer practical value in dissecting human
experience. This is perhaps the level at which most individuals conceptualize well-being. Many
popular well-being measurement models focus on the characteristic level: subjective well-being,
21
psychological well-being, social well-being, PERMA, etc. Constructs at this level have clearer
definitions that lend themselves well to measurement. For example, two of the most popular
well-being characteristics are positive affect and meaning in life. Positive affect has been defined
as “one’s level of pleasurable engagement with the environment” (pg. 1020; Watson, 1988), and
meaning in life has been defined as “a significance beyond the trivial or momentary, to have a
purpose, or to have a coherence that transcends chaos” (pg. 180; King et al., 2006). Both
definitions are more tangible than those for general – or lenses of – well-being. An analogy can
be drawn between well-being characteristics and the Big 5 facets in the personality literature;
specifically personality traits within each broad domain (e.g., extraversion) are called facets (e.g.,
sociability).
The presence of general well-being and lenses of well-being levels at the top of the
hierarchy does not imply that specific well-being characteristics are identical to one another.
Positive affect and meaning in life are clearly different constructs, and there are well-supported
theories connecting them (King et al., 2006). People appear to experience more meaning in life
when feeling positive affect during laboratory tasks. Positive affect in daily life was a stronger
predictor of meaning in life than positive uplifts, negative affect, or negative hassles (Machell et
al., 2015). Indeed, correlations between positive affect and meaning in life often range from .38
to .54 (King et al., 2006). These correlations are about the same as those between different facets
of the same Big 5 domains. For example, conscientiousness facets correlated between .11 and .64
in one study (average r = .43; MacCann et al., 2009) and between .15 and .54 in another (Roberts
et al., 2004). Although the broad domain of conscientiousness is often used, the specific facets
are still conceptually and empirically distinct from each other and conscientiousness itself. The
same is true for general well-being and characteristics such as positive affect and meaning in life.
22
We want to reiterate that the characteristics outlined in the well-being content section and
those provided in Table 1 are examples. We include those characteristics as examples because
they have been studied the most in a psychometric context; however, other positively valanced
constructs may fit just as well within a hierarchical framework of well-being. For example, one
(Cooke et al., 2016). Another review was more inclusive and identified 99 well-being
assessments comprising about 196 well-being characteristics (Linton et al., 2016). Many of these
other constructs could fit nicely within a hierarchical framework of well-being. Although
characteristics for practical purposes - Seligman (2011) proposed five; Ryff (1989) argued for six
facets; Huppert & So (2013) suggested 10; Diener et al. (2009) identified 12; Longo et al.,
(2017) presented 14; and Su et al., (2014) offered 18 - they are arguably not the limit of available
Nuances of Well-being
We offer a speculative, potential fifth and bottom level of the hierarchy referred to as
the positive affect of excitement, the sense of duty feature of relationship quality). If
summarizing an individual’s general well-being is like using a paint roller, then well-being
nuances are like using a fine paintbrush. As the lowest level in the hierarchy, nuances provide the
most detail about a person. They allow researchers and practitioners to characterize an
individual’s well-being with greater specificity. This level may be particularly useful for
In the personality literature, constructs below the level of facets are sometimes referred to
as nuances (Mottus et al., 2017). The name arises from the narrowed level of specificity that
provides “nuanced” information. Personality nuances have traditionally been measured with
single items from a survey (e.g., “I make detailed plans when I go on a trip”); however, some
researchers have suggested multiple items could be combined together (e.g., NEO-PI-R; Mottus
et al., 2017). This would be our recommendation, as multi-item scores demonstrate stronger
variability and reliability. Initial work has already identified discrete positive emotions as
nuances of well-being with available multi-item scores (Weidman & Tracy, 2020).
One consideration when working with nuances is that broader constructs tend to have
greater predictive power. In the personality literature, the unique information from nuances that
do not overlap with facets was found to have poor predictive validity (Mottus et al., 2017). Well-
being nuances may be more relevant when predicting narrow, circumscribed outcomes. Although
nuances may not predict job performance above and beyond well-being characteristics, they may
predict artistic creativity when working. At the same time, researchers should consider whether a
specific well-being nuance or two are driving the effect of a characteristic on an outcome. For
example, the link between the Big 5 facet of impulsivity and diabetes appears to be primarily due
Throughout the presented hierarchy, context can appear and play an important role. The
example constructs presented in Table 1 and those reviewed in the text are all discussed without
any mention of context for simplicity. However, specific contexts, situations, and domains are
often relevant for conceptualizing and measuring well-being in practice. For example, an
executive coach might find the context of meaning in life at work, rather than the characteristic
24
of overall meaning in life, to be an important well-being outcome to track in their clients. Framed
in this way, well-being contexts have been studied across a variety of psychological disciplines.
Although not always referred to as “well-being,” well-being has been embedded and studied
within specific subdisciplines —emotion, romantic relationships, school, work, health, religion,
This is not to say that a new measure needs to be created for every context, and indeed
several already exist: Meaning-based Job-Related Well-being (Rothausen & Henderson, 2019),
Aging Working Group, 1999), etc. Regardless of the item count and content of a well-being
measures. A context measure may demonstrate high face validity but poor construct validity or
reliability.
An interesting dilemma that arises from broad hierarchical frameworks is identifying the
boundary of the construct space. In other words, which constructs “count” as well-being and
which are not well-being at all? Agreement among researchers about what constructs should be
view this as a strength of well-being science, not a weakness. Disagreement breeds creativity,
psychology where there is considerable disagreement on the individual facets that subsume the
Big 5 domains (Goldberg, 1999). However, the evidence and agreement on the five broad
Therefore, we do not view disagreements about the lower levels of a hierarchy as a reason to
An overly inclusive approach to defining and conceptualizing well-being runs the risk of
creating tautologies, where the same constructs are used to measure and predict well-being
(Kashdan et al., 2008). Tautologies are particularly problematic for studying causes of well-
being. A critique of the Oxford Happiness Scale noted that many of the survey items ask about
theoretical causes of happiness (e.g., kindness, sense of humor, aesthetic appreciation) rather
than happiness itself (Kashdan, 2004). If self-acceptance is used to measure well-being, then
well-being, then purpose in life cannot be tested as a cause of well-being. This same issue has
come up in clinical psychology, where constructs like self-criticism and hopelessness have been
Whiffen, 1995).
In any given study, care needs to be taken to ensure the same construct is not included as
both measures and predictors of well-being. Depending on which causes of well-being are tested,
various aspects of well-being may have to be excluded from a study’s well-being measurement
model. Of course, this is less of an issue for studies measuring non-psychological causes of well-
being. For example, a study testing the effectiveness of physical exercise on well-being might
include a wide array of well-being constructs, whereas a study testing what character strengths
predict well-being might have to include a narrower group of constructs to prevent tautologies.
In essence, in order for tautologies to be avoided, a universal set of well-being constructs used in
predictors, mediators, and outcomes of well-being. For example, the “Engine of Well-being”
structural model organizes personality traits (e.g., neuroticism) and strengths (e.g., curiosity) as
predictors of well-being, affects (e.g., positive mood) and evaluations (e.g., life satisfaction) as
mediators on the way to well-being, and behaviors towards meaningful goals (e.g.,
“The Eudaimonic Activity” structural model organizes eudaimonic motives (e.g., helping others)
(e.g., relatedness) as mediators, and subjective well-being (i.e., life satisfaction, frequent positive
affect, infrequent negative affect) as outcomes of well-being (Martela & Sheldon, 2019). The
engine of well-being and eudaimonic activity model each propose narrow definitions of well-
measures of well-being (Headey & Weary, 1992; Sheldon, 2016). “Content-free” means they do
not describe specific activities, life domains, or personality traits. If anything, one’s life or self is
the content, but nothing else. Constructs such as life satisfaction, subjective happiness, meaning
in life, self-esteem, self-efficacy, vitality, positive affect, and infrequent negative affect do not
refer to any particular domain of a person’s life and make for excellent candidates (e.g., Magee
& Biesanz, 2019). The “content-free” criterion significantly reduces the number of candidate
well-being constructs and prevents tautologies by having all the content come from the
psychological predictors of well-being (Hagerty et al., 2001; Layard, 2010). Constructs that
resemble mindsets (e.g., optimism), emotion regulation techniques (e.g., savoring), intervention
mechanisms of action (e.g., gratitude), life experiences (e.g., accomplishments), and established
27
personality traits (e.g., neuroticism) should be avoided because they are content-laden. Even
constructs such as satisfaction of psychological needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and the
predictors of well-being due to their content. Indeed, the psychological well-being model is a
great roadmap for how to get to well-being (i.e., causes) and has informed interventions such as
well-being therapy (e.g., Fava et al., 2017). An exemplar construct within positive psychology is
gratitude. No well-being researchers (that we are aware of) have claimed that gratitude is well-
being, but rather have argued it causes well-being; thus, efficacious gratitude interventions have
been developed and tested (Davis et al., 2016). Labeling “content-laden” constructs like gratitude
as well-being itself would prevent researchers from exploring gratitude is a mediating pathway
The point of distinguishing between the “what” and “how” of well-being is not to
being researchers only studied life satisfaction (Huppert & So, 2013)! Pioneering well-being
researchers did a wonderful job expanding well-being science to move beyond “either a focus on
happiness” (Keyes, 1998, pp. 133). Rather than being reductionistic or simplistic, we aim to
encourage critical discourse about separating the causes of well-being from well-being itself.
After all, using “content-free” dimensions is not a panacea to the tautology problem. For
example, if the Big 5 domains are tested as predictors of well-being, then having frequent
positive affect and infrequent negative affect as measures of well-being is problematic given that
they are central to extraversion and neuroticism, respectively (e.g., Hayes & Joseph, 2003;
Vittersø & Nilsen, 2002). Ultimately, the problem may need to be solved on a study-by-study
28
basis for the time being. We welcome future theoretical work exploring further solutions to
framework with general intelligence at the top level, followed by indices of intelligence, and then
intelligence subtests at the bottom level. General intelligence, known as “g,” is one of the most
replicated constructs in psychological science (Carroll, 1993). However, the indices and subtests
of intelligence are not agreed upon. The creators of the Wechler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-
IV; Wechler, 2008) propose four indices and ten primary subtests, while the creators of the
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (SB5; Roid, 2003) propose five alternative indices and ten
alternative subtests. Although researchers and practitioners have preferences, no set of indices
and subtests are considered objectively correct. Furthermore, the presence of general intelligence
does not render the indices of intelligence meaningless (Wee et al., 2016). On the contrary,
important differences are found from looking at intelligence indices separately (e.g., verbal vs.
quantitative; Schneider & Newman, 2015). Each point is analogous to our hierarchical
framework of well-being.
Other psychologists have proposed a broader set of intelligence indices (e.g., multiple
intelligences; Gardner, 1983). However, tests of such theories have suggested they are so
empirically distinct from other indices of intelligence that they are likely not intelligence itself
(e.g., athletic ability; Visser et al., 2006). The same is true for well-being. Some social well-
being characteristics, such as beliefs about society (e.g., “Society has stopped making progress”;
Keyes, 1998), are empirically distinct from other aspects of well-being and are arguably not
29
well-being itself (Brown et al., 2014). Researchers have suggested that some spiritual well-being
characteristics are not well-being itself but instead represent beliefs about spirituality, such as
paranormal spiritual experiences (e.g., “It is possible to communicate with the dead”;
MacDonald, 2018). These findings hint at where to draw the line between well-being and related
constructs. Of course, it is possible more diverse types of intelligence and well-being exist, and
they are simply not captured by current measurement methods. While psychological
philosophers can derive many different types of well-being (Alexandrova, 2012), if empirical
measures do not exist, the types will be of little use to psychological scientists.
The replicability of general well-being may be just as high as that of general intelligence.
Measures of intelligence tend to create a “positive manifold,” where correlations between them
are all meaningfully positive, resulting in high factor loadings. When reviewing correlation
matrices in the well-being studies cited above, correlations almost always exceed .30, and the
factor loadings are frequently above .50. General intelligence is also said to be “indifferent to the
indicator,” as long as a sufficient number of diverse intelligence dimensions are measured, the
same general construct will emerge (Johnson et al., 2008). One study might measure verbal
comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed, while another
processing, and working memory, and yet each study is believed to measure the same “g.” This
is exactly the kind of evidence well-being researchers are finding with life satisfaction,
happiness, and infrequent negative affect triangulating on the same general well-being construct
2018).
30
psychological constructs during adulthood (Davies et al., 2011). Scores on a 45-minute IQ test
were extremely consistent from age 11 to 79 (r = .63; Deary et al., 2000). Many psychologists
argue that general intelligence is not amenable to intervention in adults (Deary et al., 2010).
Well-being is different, with lower heritability estimates around 30-35% (Bartels, 2015), leaving
considerable room for well-being improvement from behaviors, activities, and interventions in
adulthood (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; and the critical rejoinder by Brown & Rohrer, 2019). A
(e.g., Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013). Therefore, theoretical causes of well-being have become a
prominent topic—which inevitably brings the issue of tautologies to the surface. Newer
intelligence researchers are grappling with this issue when arguing that training working
memory, currently an index of general intelligence, can cause increases in general intelligence
(Au et al., 2015). As a comparison, well-being researchers might ask whether fostering personal
growth increases general well-being over time. In both cases, researchers must ensure that their
Within the past decade, a group of clinical psychologists presented the hierarchical
taxonomy of psychopathology (HiTOP; Kotov et al., 2017), which involves five nested levels of
internalizing), 3) subfactors (e.g., distress), 4) maladaptive traits (e.g., worry), and 5) symptoms
(e.g., racing heartbeat). Others have advocated for conceptualizing the five-factor model of
nuances, disorders as facets, spectra as the five domains, and general psychopathology “p” as the
general personality factor (Kotov et al., 2010). These examples illustrate that while many
around deciding how to organize the lower levels as well as how many levels to establish within
a hierarchical framework (e.g., should the “Huge Two” be included?; DeYoung, 2006).
Evidence has accumulated for a construct of general psychopathology at the top of the
hierarchy, denoted “p” (Lahey et al., 2012). Some clinical psychologists might argue that general
well-being is simply the opposite of general psychopathology. Evidence to date suggests this is
probably not the case (for a review, see Goodman et al., 2018). Rather, general psychopathology
may be the specific facet of negative affect within a hierarchical well-being framework.
Researchers have found high correlations between the frequency of negative affect and general
psychopathology (Tackett et al., 2013) with unipolar depression and generalized anxiety loading
the strongest on the general “p” factor (Lahey et al., 2011). The correlations between
psychological disorders that are less tied to emotional disturbances (e.g., psychosis and
alcoholism; although see McHugh & Goodman, 2019) and “p” are often smaller (Caspi et al.,
2014). These findings are consistent with older research finding global psychopathology
constructs of negative affectivity and psychological distress (e.g., Barlow et al., 2014; Coyne,
1994; Tyrer et al., 1992; Watson & Clark, 1984). While general well-being likely correlates
strongly with general psychopathology, the two constructs are expected to have discriminant
validity.
While well-being and overall psychiatric symptoms were correlated -.34 (Lamers et al., 2011),
well-being and depression were correlated -.79 (Franken et al., 2018). Researchers comparing
32
measures of depression and well-being have sometimes concluded that the underlying constructs
are the same (Bohnke & Croudace, 2016; Wood et al., 2010). From a personality psychology
perspective, depression may indeed be conceptualized as very low general well-being. The
tripartite model of depression and anxiety suggests that depression is driven by low positive
affect and high negative affect (Clark & Watson, 1991). The cognitive component of depression
seems to be captured by low life satisfaction, low self-esteem, and low meaning in life. Suddenly
we are seeing a construct that could parallel general well-being. Recent approaches to
conceptualizing anxiety suggest one bipolar dimension from severe anxiety to high calmness
(Siddaway et al., 2018). Instead of arguing that well-being is a construct that has been ignored by
traditional psychology, perhaps simply one end of the depression to well-being bipolar
dimension has been ignored. Of course, empirical investigations will have to test this hypothesis.
ontologically. It is important to emphasize that statistical support for a general factor does not
reify its existence in the world (Slaney & Garcia, 2015). Declaring the actual existence of a
causal entity underlying a general factor (or any factor) is not something mathematical formulas
and algorithms can determine (Cohen et al., 1990). Quantitative psychologists make an important
distinction between the evidence for a psychometric model vs. an ontological model (Bonifay et
al., 2017). Bifactor modeling, the most common form of scientific evidence for general factors,
(for a review, see Chen et al., 2012). Bifactor modeling cannot reify a theoretical entity such as
general psychopathology. The consensus on general intelligence is not its ontological existence
as much as its psychometric consistency (van der Maas et al., 2006). The same is true of general
33
Creating theories with general constructs can be useful for generating scientific
knowledge. When a strong general factor is evident among a set of variables, attempting to
delineate variable groupings can be problematic. The second version of the Minnesota
factor was found within nearly every MMPI-2 subscale (Tellegen et al., 2003). When individuals
were highly distressed, they would often show elevations on multiple forms of psychopathology
about this because having more than one disorder complicated treatment. Tellegen et al. (2003)
likely benefit from the same approach: first, establish strong measurement of general well-being,
and then explore what other constructs are relatively independent (e.g., MacDonald, 2018).
Certain constructs are going to be more proximal than others. Positive evaluations about one’s
life and the self will likely capture the essence of general well-being. In Keyes et al. (2002),
Disabato et al., (2016), and Longo et al., (2016), life satisfaction and/or self-acceptance/self-
esteem had one of the strongest factor loadings. Just as psychotic symptoms can be more easily
dissociated from general psychopathology, personal growth can be more easily dissociated from
general well-being (Compton, 2001; Compton et al., 1996). Without attention to a general factor,
we end up with 84% of people having the same classifications across “types” of well-being
Well-being researchers can learn from the wisdom of the replication crisis in
psychological science when evaluating the size, stability, and generalizability of effects from
future research. Meta-science studies suggest that most researchers use questionable research
practices—such as failing to report all dependent measures included in their study (78%),
selectively reporting studies that “worked” (67%) and excluding data after looking at the impact
of doing so (62%)—that weaken the quality of empirical evidence (John et al., 2012). Procedures
such as pre-registration (i.e., specifying conceptual hypotheses and their associated statistical
tests before collecting and/or analyzing the data) and registered reports (i.e., peer-review of
research methods and statistical plans prior to data collection) limit researchers from consciously
2019). Without safeguards in place, researchers can be incentivized to present only significant,
confirmatory, and/or novel results which exaggerate the value of particular constructs (e.g.,
researchers selectively reporting findings that favor their preferred constructs) and the efficacy of
interventions (e.g., only reporting results for well-being outcomes that showed significant
increases). Honest evaluation and full reporting of well-being findings will offer a truer
understanding for whom, under what conditions, and with what dosage particular levels of the
well-being hierarchy predict valued outcomes. As for applied work, researchers can uncover
which interventions have strong evidence for particular levels of the well-being hierarchy and are
worthy of larger scale dissemination (Eidelson & Soldz, 2012; Krueger & Schkade, 2008). By
programming for the well-being outcomes desired and not waste valuable resources.
35
well-being. At the top of the hierarchy is general well-being, which can be viewed similarly to
general intelligence “g” or general psychopathology “p” and maybe just as important as those
then allows psychological scientists to split well-being into more and more fine-grained
Lower levels of the hierarchy may be particularly useful for psychological practitioners doing
to pay particular attention to tautologies: constructs used to predict well-being cannot be used to
measure well-being itself. We look forward to future research on all levels of the well-being
hierarchy, spanning from developing construct definitions, organizing constructs into levels, and
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