1

A hierarchical framework for the measurement of well-being

David J. Disabato1

Fallon R. Goodman2

Todd B. Kashdan3

1
Kent State University
2
University of South Florida
3
George Mason University

Author Note

Correspondence should be addressed to:

David J. Disabato,

Kent State University, Department of Psychological Sciences

Address: PO Box 5190, Kent, OH 44242;

Email: ddisab01@gmail.com
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Abstract

Several decades of research on well-being has resulted in a plethora of measurement models

created by psychological scientists. In this review, we synthesize literature on the measurement

of well-being and present a hierarchical framework that organizes multiple existing models. We

detail the theoretical rationale and empirical evidence behind four hierarchical levels of our

framework: general well-being, well-being lenses (e.g., subjective well-being), well-being

contents (e.g., affects), and well-being characteristics (e.g., positive affect). We also propose a

bottom, fifth level of well-being nuances for future research at the most granular level. We

discuss various approaches to distinguishing between predictors of well-being and well-being

itself (i.e., preventing tautologies) and how they fit into our framework. Measurement properties

of the well-being framework are explored through comparisons to other major hierarchical

structures of intelligence and psychopathology in psychological science.

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A hierarchical framework for the measurement of well-being

Well-being is an increasingly popular area of study in psychological science. Well-being

research sharply increased at the turn of the century with the mobilization of scientists, grant

funding, and public interest under the umbrella term “positive psychology” (Seligman &

Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Well-being has been examined from different lenses within personality/

social, clinical, health, industrial/organization, cognitive, community, and developmental

psychology, as well as human factors and behavioral neuroscience. Allied disciplines, such as

economics, house researchers investigating the measurement, causes, and consequences of well-

being (Kahneman et al., 1999; Krueger & Schkade, 2008; Layard, 2010). Psychological

interventions have been developed with the goal of improving well-being for people with and

without medical illnesses (Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013; Sin & Lyubomirsky, 2009; Quoidbach

et al., 2015). If past behavior predicts future behavior, then the next several years will bring

about continued well-being research.

The foundation of any scientific field is measurement. The value of scientific evidence

rests on valid connections between theoretical constructs and their measures. For well-being,

countless constructs and associated measures have been developed; a 2016 review identified a

staggering 99 different measures capturing 196 different well-being constructs (Linton et al.,

2016), with more measures published since. Yet, there is little clarity and consensus on how to

organize these measurement components in a logical, empirical, and theoretically sound manner.

In a seemingly endless jingle-jangle of new strengths, secrets to happiness, and “positive”

qualifiers to establish constructs, there is a pressing need for a framework that organizes well-

being measures in a data-driven and coherent manner.

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To offer greater clarity and organization to well-being measurement, we propose a

measurement framework that subsumes measurement approaches together based on extant

psychometric evidence. In our framework, well-being is conceptualized hierarchically with a

single general construct at the top, similar to “g” in the intelligence literature or “p” in the

psychopathology literature. Underneath this general factor of well-being are three lower levels—

lenses, contents, and characteristics of well-being—with increasing specificity as one moves

down the hierarchy (Ree et al., 2015). Our framework aims to be agnostic to researcher

preferences or values about what well-being should or should not be, regardless of the public

popularity of any model. We review the history of well-being measurement and then outline our

hierarchical framework, summarizing the empirical support and delineating how to make

decisions about well-being measurement for studies.

History of Well-being Measurement

The measurement of well-being initially surfaced in psychological science half a century

ago. Before then, there were intermittent studies of happiness, but not a full body of literature

(e.g., Hartmann, 1934; Wilson, 1967). Happiness had been studied within medicine (e.g., quality

of life) largely as a predictor of physical health and mortality (Larson, 1978). The tides turned in

the 1970s when calls rang out to measure and study happiness as an outcome in and of itself

(Campbell, 1976). In part to gain credibility within psychological science, researchers began

using the term “well-being” rather than happiness because it sounded more scientific (E. Diener,

personal communication, Feb 7, 2019). The first widely adopted measurement model was called

subjective well-being and included three dimensions (Diener, 1984): 1) life satisfaction – how

satisfied a person is with their current life, 2) positive affect – how frequently a person

experiences pleasant emotions, and 3) lack of negative affect – how infrequently a person
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experiences unpleasant emotions. The traditional measurement method was self-report surveys,

where participants responded to multiple statements about themselves using a Likert response

scale. This model of well-being, arguably one of the most influential in psychological science,

integrated previous research on avowed happiness and affect balance (Bradburn, 1969; Shin &

Johnson, 1978).

Some researchers, however, believed that Diener’s (1984) subjective well-being model

omitted several important aspects of happiness written about by theorists (e.g., Jahoda, 1958),

and that happiness could not be reduced to fleeting affective experiences and generic life

satisfaction. To address this gap, subsequent measurement models sought to expand the construct

breadth of well-being. The second widely adopted measurement model was called psychological

well-being and included six dimensions (Ryff, 1989): 1) self-acceptance – possessing a positive

attitude about oneself, including an acknowledgment and acceptance of both good and bad

qualities, 2) positive relations with others – the presence of close, satisfying, trusting

relationships with other people, 3) personal growth – a feeling of continual development, where

one is changing in ways that reflect an expansion in knowledge and effectiveness, 4) purpose in

life – the presence of an overarching aim(s) that directs one’s life, 5) environmental mastery –

feeling able to effectively manage the situational demands presented in everyday affairs, and 6)

autonomy – the ability to act in ways that reflect self-reliance and independence from peer

influence.

Over the years, researchers proposed additional aspects of well-being believed to be

missing from scientific discourse. For example, a social well-being measurement model was

created that included five dimensions focused on people as members of a community rather than

isolated individuals (Keyes, 1998): 1) social integration – the sense that one is accepted by and
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has a sense of belonging in one’s community, 2) social acceptance – belief that other people are

kind and trustworthy, 3) social contribution – feeling that one’s contributions are valued and

impactful to society, 4) social coherence – belief that the world is sensible and predictable, and

5) social actualization – belief that society is improving for human beings. Other researchers

introduced singular dimensions of well-being, such as being engrossed or engaged during

activities, where a sense of “flow” is experienced in high frequency for enduring periods of time

(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Well-being researchers continued to identify and create new constructs

that were purported to be omitted from existing models. As the field strove for inclusivity in

well-being models, a growing number of constructs—some overlapping, some disparate, some

the same construct with different names—populated the literature.

As time went on, some researchers sought to select a subset of existing well-being

dimensions and package them as a measurement model. For example, PERMA is an acronym for

five dimensions of well-being: P = positive emotions – feelings of joy, contentment, cheer, etc.;

E = engagement – feeling absorbed and interested in life; R = positive relationships – feeling

socially integrated, cared about, and supported by others; M = meaning – believing that one’s life

is valuable and connected to something greater than oneself; A = accomplishment – making

progress toward goals and feeling capable of daily activities (Seligman, 2011). A different

measurement model proposed ten dimensions of well-being: competence, emotional stability,

engagement, meaning, optimism, positive emotion, positive relationships, resilience, self-esteem,

and vitality (Huppert & So, 2013). Several other researchers have proposed their own

measurement models (Diener et al., 2009; Longo et al., 2017; Su et al., 2014). Existing models of

well-being often convey researchers’ personal preferences without an empirical basis for their

approach over the myriad of other potential options. Under the guise of empirical evidence,
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descriptions of these measurement models can come across as the definitive, objective

dimensions of well-being or as espousing new, unique types of well-being.

A Hierarchical Framework of Well-being

With a growing number of well-being measurement models, the science of well-being

needs a framework that synthesizes them together—one that is not limited to a subset of well-

being dimensions and recognizes the many well-being measurement models with empirical

support. To accomplish this goal, we propose a hierarchical framework that allows for

parsimonious lumping of well-being constructs and nuanced splitting of well-being. Our

intention in proposing this framework is to organize and explain published empirical data in a

comprehensive, balanced, and scientifically-informed way rather than arbitrarily categorizing

well-being or choosing what fits our personal values or beliefs about well-being.

Our hierarchical framework of well-being is similar to other broad psychological

constructs that use hierarchical frameworks to theoretically explain the diversity and overlap of

various dimensions (e.g., intelligence, psychopathology, personality). At the top is a general

construct (e.g., g-factor; p-factor; general factor of personality), followed by multiple lower

levels in the hierarchy. The number of constructs and their specificity increases as one goes

down the hierarchy, as it does, for example, in models of personality: (Big 5) domains, aspects,

facets, and nuances.

In our well-being framework, we propose four hierarchical levels. The top-level is 1.

general well-being, a single overarching construct defined as the perceived enjoyment and

fulfillment with one’s life as a whole. The next level is 2. lenses, perspectives by which well-

being is conceptualized from, followed by 3. content(s) areas that make-up the various well-

being lenses and organize constructs at face value. The lowest level is 4. characteristics of well-
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being, defined as discrete, clearly defined components of well-being that offer practical value in

dissecting human experience. Table 1 illustrates this hierarchical framework populated with a set

of examples. Below, we walk through the examples at each level in the table. We emphasize that

these are examples and not reified categorizations. There are many ways to parse apart well-

being constructs within a hierarchy model, and it remains to be seen which structural model has

the strongest empirical support for the differential predictive value of one level in the hierarchy

over another for useful life outcomes.

A hierarchical framework does not give preference to one level over another but rather

offers different levels of analysis. Some research questions will pertain to general well-being,

while others will pertain to specific characteristics (e.g., positive affect, purpose in life). In this

way, research on general well-being predicting better physical health (e.g., Stranges et al., 2014)

and research exploring the differences between life satisfaction and meaning in life (e.g., Tov &

Lee, 2016) are both consistent within a hierarchical framework of well-being. This is analogous

to the scientific study of humans more broadly (e.g., Research Domain Criteria [RDoC]; Insel et

al., 2010). People can be studied at the level of atoms and molecules (i.e., chemical), cells and

bacteria (i.e., biological), electrical impulses and blood flow (e.g., neurological), behaviors and

facial expressions (e.g., behavioral), thoughts and feelings (e.g., psychological), or collective

groups and communities (e.g., sociological). No level of analysis is “correct” for studying

humans; instead, each level provides a different set of constructs and offers a unique perspective

for scientific knowledge. Researchers need to continually identify the level of the hierarchy at

which they want to measure well-being. One can always lump related constructs together or split

up constructs into finer components. The decision to lump or split does not have a correct answer
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and will often depend on the research question, study design, and measurement method (e.g.,

Kashdan et al., 2015).

We now move to describing each level of the hierarchical framework in more detail,

outlining supportive empirical evidence and conceptual arguments for the examples in Table 1.

We start at the top with general well-being.

General Well-being

We acknowledge that general well-being is an open (or fuzzy) concept, per Meehl’s

(1986) criteria. Researchers often define well-being by a combination of selected characteristics

(McDowell, 2010). For example, subjective, psychological, and social well-being are all defined

by a list of specific characteristics more so than a single overarching conceptual definition.

Defining specific characteristics of well-being (e.g., life satisfaction), intelligence (e.g.,

vocabulary), or psychopathology (e.g., panic attacks) is more manageable, but moving to define

general well-being, general intelligence, or general psychopathology becomes difficult. And yet,

there is a shared understanding among scientists of what is broadly meant by general well-being,

and general constructs tend to explain the most variance in important outcomes (e.g., Wiernik et

al., 2015). When working with general constructs, conceptual precision is sacrificed for

empirical prediction. Nevertheless, we offer an initial conceptual definition of general well-being

as a starting point. Building off prior conceptualizations of well-being—particularly Diener’s

writings on subjective well-being (e.g., Diener, 1984)—we offer a conceptual definition of

general well-being.

General well-being is defined as perceived enjoyment and fulfillment with one’s life as a

whole. Although the words in the definition are somewhat arbitrary, we argue that its structure is

key. First, at its core, general well-being is about one’s life. This includes not only the here and
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now, but also the story that a person tells about their life (an interpretive narrative; McAdams,

2001). It is indirectly about the self, given that the main character in your life story is none other

than you (i.e., self-concept). For example, meaning and purpose in well-being literature is

meaning and purpose in life, not some abstract, philosophical idea (the meaning of life). Second,

general well-being is about one’s overall life, or life “as a whole.” General well-being is a global

psychological experience as opposed to something unique to a particular context of one’s life. In

this way, it is distinct from enjoyment and fulfillment in one’s career, relationships, or

spirituality, which reflect specific contexts of one’s life. Third, general well-being has both an

affective and non-affective component. The word choice of “enjoyment” represents the affective

component, and “fulfillment” represents the non-affective component (e.g., cognitive, existential,

etc.). We did not choose words such as “pleasure” or “satiated” because they colloquially imply

more hollow psychological experiences, which would not fully capture well-being. Fourth, the

first word in the definition of general well-being is “perceived,” a synonym for subjective,

implying that well-being is a perception of one’s life and does not refer to any objective

characteristics of one’s life (e.g., income level; marital status) (van der Deijl, 2017). A person

living in third-world poverty is not excluded from having high general well-being, and a person

living as an affluent member of a first-world society is not assured of high general well-being.

Survey studies with various well-being dimensions offer empirical support that general

well-being is a parsimonious measurement model. Model fit indices from one-factor

confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were reasonably good in clinical (N = 472; χ2 = 281.20, df =

77, GFI = 0.860, CFI = 0.978, RMSEA = 0.075, SRMR = .056), student (N = 591; χ2 = 2938.41,

df = 846, TLI = 0.974, CFI = 0.975, RMSEA = 0.065, SRMR = .065), online (N = 517; χ2 =

111.97, df = 19, TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.10, SRMR = .03), United States
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community (N = 4,043; χ2 = 18,189.57, df = 888, TLI = 0.954, CFI = 0.957, RMSEA = 0.070,

SRMR = .064), European community (N = 1,438; χ2 = 855.82, df = 75, TLI = 0.85, CFI = 0.88,

RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = .06), and international community samples (N = 7617, χ2 = 970.85, df

= 27, TLI = 0.950, CFI = 0.963, RMSEA = 0.068, SRMR = .030) (Franken et al., 2018;

Gallagher et al., 2009; Petrillo et al., 2015; Disabato et al., 2016). In these studies, when multi-

factor models (e.g., subjective well-being, psychological well-being, social well-being, PERMA,

etc.) were tested, the CFA latent correlations ranged from .62 to .98, suggesting high overlap

among factors and providing support for lumping constructs together. Although splitting up

general well-being into multiple factors significantly improved model fit in each sample, it was

unclear whether the added complexity was always worthwhile relative to a more parsimonious

approach. For example, in the largest of these samples (N = 7,617), the correlations between the

different well-being factors and various outcome criteria were very similar (i.e., the average

correlation difference = .07; Disabato et al., 2016).

Despite adequate model fit, there are aspects of these data not captured by a one-factor

model. Researchers using CFA have considered the impact of adding factors in addition to a

general well-being factor (i.e., bifactor models). The central question guiding these efforts is

whether the general well-being factor dominates the model or shrinks away in response to

including other factors. Several studies using bifactor models found a dominant general factor on

which almost all characteristics of well-being primarily load (Bohnke & Croudace, 2016; Chen,

et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2006; Jovanovic, 2015; Kokko et al., 2013; Longo et al., 2016; Longo et

al., 2017). These characteristics included subjective happiness, life satisfaction, positive affect,

(infrequent) negative affect, self-esteem, self-efficacy, meaning in life, purpose in life, value-

congruence, vitality, flow, engagement, (low) depression, (low) psychological distress,

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optimism, social belonging, and positive relations with others. Across the studies cited above,

and a study using a second-order factor model (Kallay & Rus, 2014), total scores from the set of

characteristics modeled as indicators of general well-being showed reliability coefficients

ranging from .71 to .86. The largest of these studies to date (N = 7,521) found that 14 different

characteristics of well-being converged on a general well-being factor, with almost all

standardized loadings greater than .40 (Longo et al., 2017). After accounting for a general factor,

the average residual correlation between well-being characteristics ranged from .04 to .08,

suggesting a general factor of well-being captured most of the correlations.

Other studies using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) found that only personal growth,

autonomy, and religiosity were distinct characteristics of well-being, while subjective happiness,

satisfaction with life, affect balance, quality of life, self-esteem, sense of coherence, and

optimism all combined together as one well-being factor (Compton et al., 1996). A follow-up

replication study found similar results, adding self-efficacy and purpose in life to the general

well-being combination (Compton, 2001). While not capturing all aspects of the data, modeling

well-being as a single, broad factor offers a parsimonious measurement option for researchers

and practitioners.

Lenses of Well-being

The second-highest level of the hierarchy contains lenses of well-being, defined as

various perspectives by which well-being can be conceptualized. This has perhaps been the most

controversial level, with some people decisively declaring the importance of different well-being

lenses (Keyes & Annas, 2009; Waterman, 2008), while others question the validity and utility of

these distinctions (Biswas-Diener et al., 2009; Kashdan et al., 2008). Studies cited above found

correlations as high as .98 between “lenses” of well-being (Goodman et al., 2018), leading some
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researchers to comment that their well-being measurement model does not capture a different

lens of well-being but instead measures well-being at either the general or characteristic levels of

the hierarchy (e.g., PERMA; Seligman, 2018).

Still, not all studies have found such high correlations between lenses of well-being.

When exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM) is used, evidence for multiple lenses of

well-being has emerged. ESEM is an exploratory factor analytic model placed within a structural

equation modeling framework. The primary difference between an ESEM and a CFA is that in

the former, all cross-loadings are estimated rather than fixed to 0. With these factor analytic

specifications1, Joshanloo (2016b) found support for three lenses of well-being: subjective,

psychological, and social, that correlate between .30 and .60 with each other. Joshanloo and

colleagues have replicated this structure of well-being across five countries (Joshanloo, 2016a;

Joshanloo & Lamers, 2016; Joshanloo, Jose, et al., 2017; Joshanloo, Capone, et al., 2017;

Joshanloo & Jovanovic, 2016). However, these results do not generate factors that map directly

onto the original definitions of subjective, psychological, and social well-being (see Lamers et

al., 2011 for an exception). For example, in Joshanloo (2016b), self-acceptance and

environmental mastery load more on subjective well-being than psychological well-being, and

social integration and social contribution load more on psychological well-being than social

well-being—raising questions about the distinctions between factors. An important consideration

with ESEM when cross-loadings are non-negligible is whether the meaning of the factors are

different than CFA. As psychometric research on lenses of well-being continues, it will be

important for scientists to be open to finding well-being lenses that do not map onto popular

measurement models or a priori hypotheses. For example, perhaps a major lens of well-being

1
Most of Joshanloo and colleagues’ ESEM models are actually mathematically identical to EFA models because
they include only one exploratory factor measurement model, no confirmatory factor measurement models, and no
structural model paths.
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should include life satisfaction, positive affect, (infrequent) negative affect, self-acceptance, and

environmental mastery (Joshanloo, 2016b).

One lens of well-being that has not been supported is a eudaimonic well-being lens that

includes a combination of psychological and social well-being. Some researchers have argued

that the six dimensions of psychological well-being and the five dimensions of social well-being

combine to capture Aristotle’s philosophical concept of eudaimonia; this approach distinguishes

from hedonic pleasures (e.g., momentary positive emotions) and is inclusive of multiple

proposed components of well-being. Eudaimonia has been defined in numerous ways by

philosophers and psychologists, but the most common definitions often involve living in

accordance with one’s true self or up to one’s full potential (i.e., self-actualization; Ryan & Deci,

2001). Whether eudaimonia is a coherent and useful concept for distinguishing aspects of well-

being has been debated at length (e.g., Martela & Sheldon, 2019). Yet, if we assume the idea of

eudaimonia to be worthwhile, there are still questions about its measurement. Studies have

suggested that combining psychological and social well-being via factor analysis results in poor

model fit and that discriminant validity from subjective well-being—sometimes called hedonic

well-being in this context—is weak. For example, CFA of eudaimonic and hedonic well-being

operationalized in this way resulted in subpar model fit: (N = 84; χ2 = 189.40, df = 76, GFI =

0.78, CFI = 0.87, RMSEA = 0.135; Brown et al., 2014). The correlation between observed scores

was .79, leaving only 30% unique variance after accounting for reliability (α = .92). Instead,

EFAs suggested a general well-being factor and a societal beliefs factor. Direct comparisons of

eudaimonic and hedonic well-being factors versus subjective, psychological, and social well-

being factors suggest separating psychological and social well-being is more consistent with the

data (Franken et al., 2018; Gallagher et al., 2009). It is worthwhile to note that conceptualizing
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eudaimonia as a motive/activity, rather than a lens of well-being, has been found to predict well-

being and is arguably important for understanding the ingredients to the good life (Huta &

Waterman, 2014; Steger et al., 2008). In sum, independent of philosophical assumptions or

beliefs, psychometric evidence for eudaimonia as a lens of well-being is lacking.

Contents of Well-being

The third level of our hierarchical framework contains contents of well-being, which

include the topic areas that make up each well-being lens. The additional level of contents

introduces terms that cut across disciplines within psychological science. Each lens of well-being

contains two contents: subjective well-being includes affect and appraisal; psychological well-

being includes meaning-making and self-concept; social well-being includes community and

interpersonal relationships. Although factor analytic studies have not been conducted on the

well-being contents proposed, we outline below empirical and theoretical work that offers

preliminary support for the hierarchy placements.

Over the past four decades (see Diener, 1984 for the origin), SWB has included both

affect and appraisal. While the associations between positive affect, (infrequent2) negative affect

and life satisfaction are large enough to warrant the higher-order lens of subjective well-being,

they are also separable (Busseri et al., 2007) with inter-correlations ranging from .37 to .53

(Busseri, 2018). Research suggests the difference between affect and appraisal in SWB may be

in the sources of information used by raters: an individual uses specific events and activities to

calculate affect, while personal narratives are primarily used for calculating cognitive appraisals

(Luhmann et al., 2012). This distinction facilitated research on causal links that connect affect

and appraisal. For example, affect was found to mediate self-control and life satisfaction, helping

2
We use the term “infrequent” since research indicates the frequency, rather than intensity, of affect in daily life is
most relevant for well-being (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 2009).
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tease apart the well-being benefits of self-regulation (Hofmann et al., 2014). Subjective

happiness has also become a popular appraisal construct from the SWB tradition whereby

participants use their own personal definition of happiness, as opposed to being offered a

definition by researchers (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). There is preliminary evidence that life

satisfaction and subjective happiness hang together as appraisal components (Disabato et al.,

2016; Vela et al., 2017).

Psychological well-being is a heterogeneous type of well-being. It is perhaps for this

reason that we have yet to see a published conceptual definition of psychological well-being.

When psychological well-being is introduced in scientific articles, the definition tends to be a list

of the independent dimensions (that reside at the characteristic level of our hierarchy). As an

alternative, we propose the contents of meaning-making and self-concept that allow for more

descriptive and coherent groupings of constructs. Of Ryff’s psychological well-being

dimensions, purpose in life and personal growth are both part of conceptual models of meaning-

making (e.g., George & Park, 2016; King et al., 2016; Martela & Steger, 2016), whereas self-

acceptance and environmental mastery are part of conceptual models of the self. Existing

theories of meaning-making have broadened the number of concepts from purpose in life to

include coherence and significance/mattering (George & Park, 2016). Meaning-making includes

personal growth, which involves quotidian moments when an individual makes sense of rich

experiences (King et al., 2016) along with stressful and even traumatic experiences where felt

distress is reframed as growth and often influences a rewriting of mental schemas (Park, 2010).

Of Ryff’s psychological well-being dimensions, self-acceptance and environmental

mastery directly target an individual’s self-concept. Some researchers have noted that self-

acceptance and environmental mastery map onto the more commonly used terms “self-esteem”
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and “self-efficacy” (Burns & Machin, 2009), though Ryff and Singer (2008) argue that self-

acceptance is distinct from self-esteem. Using the sociometer definition of self-esteem, that very

well might be the case (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). In this model, self-esteem is a belief about

how much other people or society view one as valuable and includes perceived social status.

Researchers argue that self-esteem may not be the best indicator of health as one is vulnerable to

losing the roles/abilities/attributes that underly self-esteem (Neff, 2011). From this perspective,

Ryff’s (1989) conceptualization of self-acceptance may be more consistent with the

contemporary view of self-compassion, which emphasizes being kind to oneself independent of

social value (Bluth & Neff, 2018). Self-efficacy has long been central to an individual’s self-

concept, with generalized self-efficacy often converging strongly with other measures of self-

concept and well-being (Judge et al., 2002). Environmental mastery, by definition (Ryff, 1989),

is a variant of self-efficacy that involves aspects of locus of control, emphasizing one’s internal

agency to adapt to an environment (Haidt, & Rodin, 1999).

We exclude the dimension of autonomy from our example hierarchy because of its

cultural influences. Within the psychology well-being framework, autonomy does not mean

personal freedom to act how one wishes as it does in Self-Determination Theory (Sheldon &

Hilpert, 2012; e.g., “I was free to do things my way”), but rather reflects non-conformity to

societal beliefs with a lack of enculturation or convention (Ryff, 1989; e.g., “My decisions are

not usually influenced by what everyone else is doing). While arguably adaptive in Western

cultures, it is unclear how applicable this dimension would be in other cultures (Lehman et al.,

2004). Indeed, Ryff and Singer (2008) acknowledge “this aspect of well-being is undoubtedly

the most western of the above dimensions” (pp. 23). However, future research might explore

where the Self-Determination Theory perspective on autonomy might fit into a hierarchical
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framework of well-being given its association with subjective well-being is consistent across

cultures (Yu et al., 2018; Chirkov et al., 2003).

Keyes’ model of social well-being takes a more sociological perspective and captures

someone’s psychological relationship with their broader communities (Keyes, 1998).

Dimensions from his model make up the community content in our model. However, Keyes’

model of social well-being occupies only part of the broader space of social well-being, as it

leaves out one-on-one social connections that are central to individual’s daily lives (e.g., spouses,

parents, siblings, friends, co-workers). In our model, we include a separate well-being content for

interpersonal relationships.

Although there are five dimensions in Keyes’ model, we only include two of the

dimensions in our example constructs based on our conceptual definition of well-being as being

about a person’s life or self and not beliefs about society. The community content is about one’s

relationship with the communities in which they reside and does not include constructs capturing

communities as independent entities. Therefore, the two Keyes’ dimensions we include are social

integration (the perceived quality of relationships with the local community and broader society)

and social contribution (the perceived value one offers as a member of the local community and

broader society). The other three dimensions from Keyes’ model are excluded because they refer

to beliefs about community and society and are not tied to one’s life or self: 1) social acceptance

- believing other people in one’s community have good qualities such as kindness and

trustworthiness, 2) social coherence – understanding what is happening in one’s broader society,

including viewing it as sensible and predictable, 3) social actualization – believing one’s local

community and broader society are reaching their potential and will continue to prosper in the

future. Keyes draws analogies between social acceptance and self-acceptance, social coherence
19

and meaning in life, and social actualization and personal growth (Keyes, 1998); however, factor

analytic studies suggest the pairings do not map out empirically. A psychometric analysis of the

self-report survey data in Fredrickson et al. (2013) suggested that subjective and psychological

well-being loaded on the same factor together along with social integration and social

contribution, while the other three Keyes’ dimensions (social acceptance, social coherence, and

social actualization) loaded on their own factor (Brown et al., 2014). A psychometric analysis of

the Midlife in the United States – second wave (MIDUS-2) data suggests that only social

integration and social contribution loaded on well-being factors, while social acceptance, social

coherence, and social actualization had weaker associations with other well-being dimensions

(Disabato & Kashdan, in preparation).

Outside of Keyes’ model, other constructs involving one’s relationship to local

communities and broader society might be included. One example is a self-endorsed sense of

community, or the perception that one belongs and is welcomed in their community, with an

interdependence of giving and receiving among one another (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Stewart

& Townley, 2020). In addition to associates with other dimensions of well-being (Peterson et al.,

2008), the construct has been fruitful in understanding why certain first-year college students

leave or transfer from their universities (Berger, 1997). The community content of social well-

being is particularly relevant for minority or marginalized groups where there might be fewer

people similar to them in their community (Allen, 1992).

The interpersonal relationships content is distinct from Keyes’ model. Research suggests

the happiest people have the most intimate and successful interpersonal relationships

(Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Studies find that people who can name several people they are close

with and whom they share intimate concerns were more likely to report being happy (Myers,
20

1992). We believe the psychological well-being dimension of positive relationships with others

makes the most sense as a characteristic under the interpersonal relationships content of social

well-being. Another key component of interpersonal relationships would be relationship quality

with others they are close with. Although romantic relationship satisfaction is one important

example of relationship quality (Proulx et al., 2007), it is not the only one. Among adults, having

at least two high-quality best friend relationships was associated with greater well-being (Birditt

& Antonucci, 2007), while sibling relationship quality is central to youth health (Buist et al.,

2013). We include perceived social support (contrasted with receives social support) because it is

theorized to help maintain well-being during times of stress (Schwarzer & Leppin, 1989), was

integrated into previous frameworks of social well-being (Larson, 1992), and is consistently

associated with aspects of well-being (Chu et al., 2010).

The content level of the well-being hierarchy is analogous to “aspects” in personality

literature, which are in between Big 5 domains and facets (DeYoung et al., 2007). While there is

strong factor analytic support for the Big 5 domains, there is still quite a bit of heterogeneity

within each domain. If someone did not want to go down to the level of 75 facets, another option

for capturing some of the personality heterogeneity is the level of 10 aspects. For example, the

trait of extraversion includes the aspects of enthusiasm and assertiveness and agreeableness

includes the aspects of compassion and politeness.

Characteristics of well-being

The fourth level of our hierarchical framework contains characteristics of well-being:

discrete, clearly defined features of well-being that offer practical value in dissecting human

experience. This is perhaps the level at which most individuals conceptualize well-being. Many

popular well-being measurement models focus on the characteristic level: subjective well-being,
21

psychological well-being, social well-being, PERMA, etc. Constructs at this level have clearer

definitions that lend themselves well to measurement. For example, two of the most popular

well-being characteristics are positive affect and meaning in life. Positive affect has been defined

as “one’s level of pleasurable engagement with the environment” (pg. 1020; Watson, 1988), and

meaning in life has been defined as “a significance beyond the trivial or momentary, to have a

purpose, or to have a coherence that transcends chaos” (pg. 180; King et al., 2006). Both

definitions are more tangible than those for general – or lenses of – well-being. An analogy can

be drawn between well-being characteristics and the Big 5 facets in the personality literature;

specifically personality traits within each broad domain (e.g., extraversion) are called facets (e.g.,

sociability).

The presence of general well-being and lenses of well-being levels at the top of the

hierarchy does not imply that specific well-being characteristics are identical to one another.

Positive affect and meaning in life are clearly different constructs, and there are well-supported

theories connecting them (King et al., 2006). People appear to experience more meaning in life

when feeling positive affect during laboratory tasks. Positive affect in daily life was a stronger

predictor of meaning in life than positive uplifts, negative affect, or negative hassles (Machell et

al., 2015). Indeed, correlations between positive affect and meaning in life often range from .38

to .54 (King et al., 2006). These correlations are about the same as those between different facets

of the same Big 5 domains. For example, conscientiousness facets correlated between .11 and .64

in one study (average r = .43; MacCann et al., 2009) and between .15 and .54 in another (Roberts

et al., 2004). Although the broad domain of conscientiousness is often used, the specific facets

are still conceptually and empirically distinct from each other and conscientiousness itself. The

same is true for general well-being and characteristics such as positive affect and meaning in life.
22

We want to reiterate that the characteristics outlined in the well-being content section and

those provided in Table 1 are examples. We include those characteristics as examples because

they have been studied the most in a psychometric context; however, other positively valanced

constructs may fit just as well within a hierarchical framework of well-being. For example, one

review identified 42 different well-being assessments with about 56 well-being characteristics

(Cooke et al., 2016). Another review was more inclusive and identified 99 well-being

assessments comprising about 196 well-being characteristics (Linton et al., 2016). Many of these

other constructs could fit nicely within a hierarchical framework of well-being. Although

measurement models of well-being are often limited to a certain subset of well-being

characteristics for practical purposes - Seligman (2011) proposed five; Ryff (1989) argued for six

facets; Huppert & So (2013) suggested 10; Diener et al. (2009) identified 12; Longo et al.,

(2017) presented 14; and Su et al., (2014) offered 18 - they are arguably not the limit of available

well-being characteristics to be studied.

Nuances of Well-being

We offer a speculative, potential fifth and bottom level of the hierarchy referred to as

nuances of well-being. We define nuances as narrow aspects of a particular characteristic (e.g.,

the positive affect of excitement, the sense of duty feature of relationship quality). If

summarizing an individual’s general well-being is like using a paint roller, then well-being

nuances are like using a fine paintbrush. As the lowest level in the hierarchy, nuances provide the

most detail about a person. They allow researchers and practitioners to characterize an

individual’s well-being with greater specificity. This level may be particularly useful for

tailoring interventions to individual clients.

23

In the personality literature, constructs below the level of facets are sometimes referred to

as nuances (Mottus et al., 2017). The name arises from the narrowed level of specificity that

provides “nuanced” information. Personality nuances have traditionally been measured with

single items from a survey (e.g., “I make detailed plans when I go on a trip”); however, some

researchers have suggested multiple items could be combined together (e.g., NEO-PI-R; Mottus

et al., 2017). This would be our recommendation, as multi-item scores demonstrate stronger

variability and reliability. Initial work has already identified discrete positive emotions as

nuances of well-being with available multi-item scores (Weidman & Tracy, 2020).

One consideration when working with nuances is that broader constructs tend to have

greater predictive power. In the personality literature, the unique information from nuances that

do not overlap with facets was found to have poor predictive validity (Mottus et al., 2017). Well-

being nuances may be more relevant when predicting narrow, circumscribed outcomes. Although

nuances may not predict job performance above and beyond well-being characteristics, they may

predict artistic creativity when working. At the same time, researchers should consider whether a

specific well-being nuance or two are driving the effect of a characteristic on an outcome. For

example, the link between the Big 5 facet of impulsivity and diabetes appears to be primarily due

to the nuance of overeating (Vainik et al., 2015).

Well-being across contexts

Throughout the presented hierarchy, context can appear and play an important role. The

example constructs presented in Table 1 and those reviewed in the text are all discussed without

any mention of context for simplicity. However, specific contexts, situations, and domains are

often relevant for conceptualizing and measuring well-being in practice. For example, an

executive coach might find the context of meaning in life at work, rather than the characteristic
24

of overall meaning in life, to be an important well-being outcome to track in their clients. Framed

in this way, well-being contexts have been studied across a variety of psychological disciplines.

Although not always referred to as “well-being,” well-being has been embedded and studied

within specific subdisciplines —emotion, romantic relationships, school, work, health, religion,

etc.—beyond just mainstream positive psychology.

This is not to say that a new measure needs to be created for every context, and indeed

several already exist: Meaning-based Job-Related Well-being (Rothausen & Henderson, 2019),

Perceived Relationship Quality Components (Fletcher et al., 2000), Brief Multidimensional

Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality for Health Research (Fetzer Institute, National Institute on

Aging Working Group, 1999), etc. Regardless of the item count and content of a well-being

context measure, careful attention needs to be given to developing psychometrically sound

measures. A context measure may demonstrate high face validity but poor construct validity or

reliability.

The “what” and “how” of well-being—what counts?

An interesting dilemma that arises from broad hierarchical frameworks is identifying the

boundary of the construct space. In other words, which constructs “count” as well-being and

which are not well-being at all? Agreement among researchers about what constructs should be

included in a hierarchical framework of well-being is unlikely (e.g., Hernandez et al., 2018). We

view this as a strength of well-being science, not a weakness. Disagreement breeds creativity,

and critical discourse and diversity of thought should be encouraged—similar to personality

psychology where there is considerable disagreement on the individual facets that subsume the

Big 5 domains (Goldberg, 1999). However, the evidence and agreement on the five broad

domains of personality is one of the most monumental achievements of psychological scientists.

25

Therefore, we do not view disagreements about the lower levels of a hierarchy as a reason to

dismiss a hierarchical framework.

An overly inclusive approach to defining and conceptualizing well-being runs the risk of

creating tautologies, where the same constructs are used to measure and predict well-being

(Kashdan et al., 2008). Tautologies are particularly problematic for studying causes of well-

being. A critique of the Oxford Happiness Scale noted that many of the survey items ask about

theoretical causes of happiness (e.g., kindness, sense of humor, aesthetic appreciation) rather

than happiness itself (Kashdan, 2004). If self-acceptance is used to measure well-being, then

self-esteem cannot be tested as a predictor of well-being. If meaning in life is used to measure

well-being, then purpose in life cannot be tested as a cause of well-being. This same issue has

come up in clinical psychology, where constructs like self-criticism and hopelessness have been

conceptualized as both measures/symptoms and predictors of depression (e.g., Coyne &

Whiffen, 1995).

In any given study, care needs to be taken to ensure the same construct is not included as

both measures and predictors of well-being. Depending on which causes of well-being are tested,

various aspects of well-being may have to be excluded from a study’s well-being measurement

model. Of course, this is less of an issue for studies measuring non-psychological causes of well-

being. For example, a study testing the effectiveness of physical exercise on well-being might

include a wide array of well-being constructs, whereas a study testing what character strengths

predict well-being might have to include a narrower group of constructs to prevent tautologies.

In essence, in order for tautologies to be avoided, a universal set of well-being constructs used in

every study may not be possible.

26

One solution to avoid tautologies is to categorize positive psychology constructs as

predictors, mediators, and outcomes of well-being. For example, the “Engine of Well-being”

structural model organizes personality traits (e.g., neuroticism) and strengths (e.g., curiosity) as

predictors of well-being, affects (e.g., positive mood) and evaluations (e.g., life satisfaction) as

mediators on the way to well-being, and behaviors towards meaningful goals (e.g.,

achievements, relationships) as outcomes of well-being (Jayawickreme et al., 2012). Similarly,

“The Eudaimonic Activity” structural model organizes eudaimonic motives (e.g., helping others)

and activities (e.g., volunteering) as predictors of well-being, satisfaction of psychological needs

(e.g., relatedness) as mediators, and subjective well-being (i.e., life satisfaction, frequent positive

affect, infrequent negative affect) as outcomes of well-being (Martela & Sheldon, 2019). The

engine of well-being and eudaimonic activity model each propose narrow definitions of well-

being to prevent tautologies.

Another solution to avoiding tautologies is to choose “content-free” constructs as

measures of well-being (Headey & Weary, 1992; Sheldon, 2016). “Content-free” means they do

not describe specific activities, life domains, or personality traits. If anything, one’s life or self is

the content, but nothing else. Constructs such as life satisfaction, subjective happiness, meaning

in life, self-esteem, self-efficacy, vitality, positive affect, and infrequent negative affect do not

refer to any particular domain of a person’s life and make for excellent candidates (e.g., Magee

& Biesanz, 2019). The “content-free” criterion significantly reduces the number of candidate

well-being constructs and prevents tautologies by having all the content come from the

psychological predictors of well-being (Hagerty et al., 2001; Layard, 2010). Constructs that

resemble mindsets (e.g., optimism), emotion regulation techniques (e.g., savoring), intervention

mechanisms of action (e.g., gratitude), life experiences (e.g., accomplishments), and established
27

personality traits (e.g., neuroticism) should be avoided because they are content-laden. Even

constructs such as satisfaction of psychological needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and the

psychological well-being dimensions (Ryff, 1989) may be best conceptualized as psychological

predictors of well-being due to their content. Indeed, the psychological well-being model is a

great roadmap for how to get to well-being (i.e., causes) and has informed interventions such as

well-being therapy (e.g., Fava et al., 2017). An exemplar construct within positive psychology is

gratitude. No well-being researchers (that we are aware of) have claimed that gratitude is well-

being, but rather have argued it causes well-being; thus, efficacious gratitude interventions have

been developed and tested (Davis et al., 2016). Labeling “content-laden” constructs like gratitude

as well-being itself would prevent researchers from exploring gratitude is a mediating pathway

on the way to well-being.

The point of distinguishing between the “what” and “how” of well-being is not to

discourage research on a diversity of well-being constructs. What a shame it would be if well-

being researchers only studied life satisfaction (Huppert & So, 2013)! Pioneering well-being

researchers did a wonderful job expanding well-being science to move beyond “either a focus on

clinical symptomatology such as depression or on global measures of life satisfaction and

happiness” (Keyes, 1998, pp. 133). Rather than being reductionistic or simplistic, we aim to

encourage critical discourse about separating the causes of well-being from well-being itself.

After all, using “content-free” dimensions is not a panacea to the tautology problem. For

example, if the Big 5 domains are tested as predictors of well-being, then having frequent

positive affect and infrequent negative affect as measures of well-being is problematic given that

they are central to extraversion and neuroticism, respectively (e.g., Hayes & Joseph, 2003;

Vittersø & Nilsen, 2002). Ultimately, the problem may need to be solved on a study-by-study
28

basis for the time being. We welcome future theoretical work exploring further solutions to

differentiating the “what” from the “how” of well-being.

Comparisons to Other Hierarchical Models

Intelligence and “g”

The most popular measurement model of intelligence is a three-level hierarchical

framework with general intelligence at the top level, followed by indices of intelligence, and then

intelligence subtests at the bottom level. General intelligence, known as “g,” is one of the most

replicated constructs in psychological science (Carroll, 1993). However, the indices and subtests

of intelligence are not agreed upon. The creators of the Wechler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-

IV; Wechler, 2008) propose four indices and ten primary subtests, while the creators of the

Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (SB5; Roid, 2003) propose five alternative indices and ten

alternative subtests. Although researchers and practitioners have preferences, no set of indices

and subtests are considered objectively correct. Furthermore, the presence of general intelligence

does not render the indices of intelligence meaningless (Wee et al., 2016). On the contrary,

important differences are found from looking at intelligence indices separately (e.g., verbal vs.

quantitative; Schneider & Newman, 2015). Each point is analogous to our hierarchical

framework of well-being.

Other psychologists have proposed a broader set of intelligence indices (e.g., multiple

intelligences; Gardner, 1983). However, tests of such theories have suggested they are so

empirically distinct from other indices of intelligence that they are likely not intelligence itself

(e.g., athletic ability; Visser et al., 2006). The same is true for well-being. Some social well-

being characteristics, such as beliefs about society (e.g., “Society has stopped making progress”;

Keyes, 1998), are empirically distinct from other aspects of well-being and are arguably not
29

well-being itself (Brown et al., 2014). Researchers have suggested that some spiritual well-being

characteristics are not well-being itself but instead represent beliefs about spirituality, such as

paranormal spiritual experiences (e.g., “It is possible to communicate with the dead”;

MacDonald, 2018). These findings hint at where to draw the line between well-being and related

constructs. Of course, it is possible more diverse types of intelligence and well-being exist, and

they are simply not captured by current measurement methods. While psychological

philosophers can derive many different types of well-being (Alexandrova, 2012), if empirical

measures do not exist, the types will be of little use to psychological scientists.

The replicability of general well-being may be just as high as that of general intelligence.

Measures of intelligence tend to create a “positive manifold,” where correlations between them

are all meaningfully positive, resulting in high factor loadings. When reviewing correlation

matrices in the well-being studies cited above, correlations almost always exceed .30, and the

factor loadings are frequently above .50. General intelligence is also said to be “indifferent to the

indicator,” as long as a sufficient number of diverse intelligence dimensions are measured, the

same general construct will emerge (Johnson et al., 2008). One study might measure verbal

comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed, while another

study might measure fluid reasoning, knowledge, quantitative reasoning, visual-spatial

processing, and working memory, and yet each study is believed to measure the same “g.” This

is exactly the kind of evidence well-being researchers are finding with life satisfaction,

happiness, and infrequent negative affect triangulating on the same general well-being construct

as engagement, positive relationships, meaning in life, and accomplishments (Goodman et al.,

2018).
30

Tautologies seem to be less relevant in the intelligence literature because intelligence is

assumed to be mostly determined by genetics and childhood environment/experiences rather than

psychological constructs during adulthood (Davies et al., 2011). Scores on a 45-minute IQ test

were extremely consistent from age 11 to 79 (r = .63; Deary et al., 2000). Many psychologists

argue that general intelligence is not amenable to intervention in adults (Deary et al., 2010).

Well-being is different, with lower heritability estimates around 30-35% (Bartels, 2015), leaving

considerable room for well-being improvement from behaviors, activities, and interventions in

adulthood (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; and the critical rejoinder by Brown & Rohrer, 2019). A

major focus of well-being research is determining how to improve an individual’s well-being

(e.g., Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013). Therefore, theoretical causes of well-being have become a

prominent topic—which inevitably brings the issue of tautologies to the surface. Newer

intelligence researchers are grappling with this issue when arguing that training working

memory, currently an index of general intelligence, can cause increases in general intelligence

(Au et al., 2015). As a comparison, well-being researchers might ask whether fostering personal

growth increases general well-being over time. In both cases, researchers must ensure that their

measure of general intelligence/well-being does not include working memory/personal growth.

Psychopathology and “p”

Within the past decade, a group of clinical psychologists presented the hierarchical

taxonomy of psychopathology (HiTOP; Kotov et al., 2017), which involves five nested levels of

psychopathology: 1) super-spectra (e.g., general psychopathology “p”), 2) spectra (e.g.,

internalizing), 3) subfactors (e.g., distress), 4) maladaptive traits (e.g., worry), and 5) symptoms

(e.g., racing heartbeat). Others have advocated for conceptualizing the five-factor model of

personality as representing a hierarchical framework of personality pathology, with symptoms as

31

nuances, disorders as facets, spectra as the five domains, and general psychopathology “p” as the

general personality factor (Kotov et al., 2010). These examples illustrate that while many

researchers agree that “psychopathology” can be organized hierarchically, there is subjectivity

around deciding how to organize the lower levels as well as how many levels to establish within

a hierarchical framework (e.g., should the “Huge Two” be included?; DeYoung, 2006).

Evidence has accumulated for a construct of general psychopathology at the top of the

hierarchy, denoted “p” (Lahey et al., 2012). Some clinical psychologists might argue that general

well-being is simply the opposite of general psychopathology. Evidence to date suggests this is

probably not the case (for a review, see Goodman et al., 2018). Rather, general psychopathology

may be the specific facet of negative affect within a hierarchical well-being framework.

Researchers have found high correlations between the frequency of negative affect and general

psychopathology (Tackett et al., 2013) with unipolar depression and generalized anxiety loading

the strongest on the general “p” factor (Lahey et al., 2011). The correlations between

psychological disorders that are less tied to emotional disturbances (e.g., psychosis and

alcoholism; although see McHugh & Goodman, 2019) and “p” are often smaller (Caspi et al.,

2014). These findings are consistent with older research finding global psychopathology

constructs of negative affectivity and psychological distress (e.g., Barlow et al., 2014; Coyne,

1994; Tyrer et al., 1992; Watson & Clark, 1984). While general well-being likely correlates

strongly with general psychopathology, the two constructs are expected to have discriminant

validity.

A related hypothesis is that general well-being is simply the opposite of depression.

While well-being and overall psychiatric symptoms were correlated -.34 (Lamers et al., 2011),

well-being and depression were correlated -.79 (Franken et al., 2018). Researchers comparing
32

measures of depression and well-being have sometimes concluded that the underlying constructs

are the same (Bohnke & Croudace, 2016; Wood et al., 2010). From a personality psychology

perspective, depression may indeed be conceptualized as very low general well-being. The

tripartite model of depression and anxiety suggests that depression is driven by low positive

affect and high negative affect (Clark & Watson, 1991). The cognitive component of depression

seems to be captured by low life satisfaction, low self-esteem, and low meaning in life. Suddenly

we are seeing a construct that could parallel general well-being. Recent approaches to

conceptualizing anxiety suggest one bipolar dimension from severe anxiety to high calmness

(Siddaway et al., 2018). Instead of arguing that well-being is a construct that has been ignored by

traditional psychology, perhaps simply one end of the depression to well-being bipolar

dimension has been ignored. Of course, empirical investigations will have to test this hypothesis.

Other psychologists have questioned whether general psychopathology actually exists

ontologically. It is important to emphasize that statistical support for a general factor does not

reify its existence in the world (Slaney & Garcia, 2015). Declaring the actual existence of a

causal entity underlying a general factor (or any factor) is not something mathematical formulas

and algorithms can determine (Cohen et al., 1990). Quantitative psychologists make an important

distinction between the evidence for a psychometric model vs. an ontological model (Bonifay et

al., 2017). Bifactor modeling, the most common form of scientific evidence for general factors,

was initially a psychometric tool to determine the unidimensionality of a quantitative measure

(for a review, see Chen et al., 2012). Bifactor modeling cannot reify a theoretical entity such as

general psychopathology. The consensus on general intelligence is not its ontological existence

as much as its psychometric consistency (van der Maas et al., 2006). The same is true of general
33

well-being. General constructs in psychological science are parsimonious ways of organizing

empirical observations rather than truly reflecting reality.

Creating theories with general constructs can be useful for generating scientific

knowledge. When a strong general factor is evident among a set of variables, attempting to

delineate variable groupings can be problematic. The second version of the Minnesota

Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) showcases the issue. A general psychopathology

factor was found within nearly every MMPI-2 subscale (Tellegen et al., 2003). When individuals

were highly distressed, they would often show elevations on multiple forms of psychopathology

(e.g., depression, paranoia, hysteria, hypochondriasis). Clinical psychologists were concerned

about this because having more than one disorder complicated treatment. Tellegen et al. (2003)

found it more helpful to establish subscales corresponding to factors relatively independent of

general psychopathology (i.e., Restructured Clinical Scales). Well-being researchers would

likely benefit from the same approach: first, establish strong measurement of general well-being,

and then explore what other constructs are relatively independent (e.g., MacDonald, 2018).

Certain constructs are going to be more proximal than others. Positive evaluations about one’s

life and the self will likely capture the essence of general well-being. In Keyes et al. (2002),

Disabato et al., (2016), and Longo et al., (2016), life satisfaction and/or self-acceptance/self-

esteem had one of the strongest factor loadings. Just as psychotic symptoms can be more easily

dissociated from general psychopathology, personal growth can be more easily dissociated from

general well-being (Compton, 2001; Compton et al., 1996). Without attention to a general factor,

we end up with 84% of people having the same classifications across “types” of well-being

(Table 6, Keyes et al., 2002).

Future Directions and Conclusions

34

Well-being researchers can learn from the wisdom of the replication crisis in

psychological science when evaluating the size, stability, and generalizability of effects from

future research. Meta-science studies suggest that most researchers use questionable research

practices—such as failing to report all dependent measures included in their study (78%),

selectively reporting studies that “worked” (67%) and excluding data after looking at the impact

of doing so (62%)—that weaken the quality of empirical evidence (John et al., 2012). Procedures

such as pre-registration (i.e., specifying conceptual hypotheses and their associated statistical

tests before collecting and/or analyzing the data) and registered reports (i.e., peer-review of

research methods and statistical plans prior to data collection) limit researchers from consciously

or unconsciously suppressing nonsignificant, inconsistent, or unoriginal results (Janke et al.,

2019). Without safeguards in place, researchers can be incentivized to present only significant,

confirmatory, and/or novel results which exaggerate the value of particular constructs (e.g.,

researchers selectively reporting findings that favor their preferred constructs) and the efficacy of

interventions (e.g., only reporting results for well-being outcomes that showed significant

increases). Honest evaluation and full reporting of well-being findings will offer a truer

understanding for whom, under what conditions, and with what dosage particular levels of the

well-being hierarchy predict valued outcomes. As for applied work, researchers can uncover

which interventions have strong evidence for particular levels of the well-being hierarchy and are

worthy of larger scale dissemination (Eidelson & Soldz, 2012; Krueger & Schkade, 2008). By

doing so, organizations that spend thousands of dollars on interventions—government agencies,

schools, private companies—are more likely to receive high-quality, well-vetted, effective

programming for the well-being outcomes desired and not waste valuable resources.
35

Sufficient scientific evidence has accumulated to warrant a hierarchical framework of

well-being. At the top of the hierarchy is general well-being, which can be viewed similarly to

general intelligence “g” or general psychopathology “p” and maybe just as important as those

two constructs for understanding a person’s lifespan development. A hierarchical framework

then allows psychological scientists to split well-being into more and more fine-grained

components from lenses to contents to characteristics, depending on their research question.

Lower levels of the hierarchy may be particularly useful for psychological practitioners doing

case conceptualization. Researchers studying psychological causes or effects of well-being need

to pay particular attention to tautologies: constructs used to predict well-being cannot be used to

measure well-being itself. We look forward to future research on all levels of the well-being

hierarchy, spanning from developing construct definitions, organizing constructs into levels, and

developing new measures.

36

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Table 1. Example Constructs Organized Into a Hierarchical Framework of Well-being

Level Definition Construct
perceived
enjoyment and
1. General fulfillment with
one’s life as a
WELL-BEING
whole
lenses or
perspectives by
2. Lenses which well- Subjective Well-being Psychological Well-being Social Well-being
being is
conceptualized
content areas Interpersona
that make up the Meaning-
3. Contents
various well- Affect Appraisal Self-concept Community l
making
being lenses relationships
discrete, clearly Positive relations
defined Positive Affect Life Satisfaction Meaning in life Self-esteem Social integration
w/others
characteristics (Infrequent) Subjective Relationship
of well-being Purpose in life Self-compassion Social contribution
Negative Affect Happiness quality
4. Characteristics that offer
Perceived Social
practical value Personal Growth Self-efficacy Sense of community
support
in dissecting
human Locus of control
experience
Notes: The constructs presented are examples and are not meant to be exhaustive.