Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163

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Nuclear Engineering and Design

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Pool inlet LOCA safety analysis in support of the emergency core spray
system success criteria development of the PULSTAR research reactor
Asmaa S. Farag , Yahya A. Alzahrani , Mihai A. Diaconeasa *
North Carolina State University, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Raleigh, NC 27695, United States

A B S T R A C T

The PULSTAR pool-type research reactor has been operating at power levels up to 1 MWth since initial criticality in 1972 on the North Carolina State University
(NCSU) campus. At the current power level, there is no need for an emergency core cooling system to provide additional cooling during abnormal conditions since, at
this power level, the peak cladding temperature (PCT) cannot reach the maximum allowable temperature. The range of experiments possible could be extended if the
reactor is to be licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to run up to higher power levels. However, the maximum allowable PCT at higher power
levels could be exceeded during abnormal conditions. In this study, a best estimate transient simulation model is used to inform the design of an emergency core
spray system to the PULSTAR research reactor. We provide the analysis results of the most limiting scenario of a pool inlet large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
while operating at higher power levels. Currently, NCSU’s research reactor program is developing a plan to increase the operating power to 2 MWth, thus most of the
analysis performed in this paper is prepared at 2 MWth. In addition, a parametric study was carried out to obtain the maximum achievable operating power by having
the emergency core spray system installed with the current coolant system arrangement.

without the fuel reaching its melting point. Moreover, UO2 has low
thermal diffusivity, is chemically stable, and has an outstanding ability
1. Introduction
to retain fission products (Middleburgh et al., 2020; Behaviour, 2009).
These characteristics make UO2 an appealing fuel choice. Using the fuel
Many of the world’s nuclear reactors are research reactors used for
in pellet form rather than powder form also helps to prevent the rapid
training, materials testing, or the production of radioisotopes for med­
release of energy that could occur if the fuel were to disperse into the
icine and industry. Research reactors are much simpler and less
coolant due to loss of clad integrity. Furthermore, the nuclear industry
complicated in design than large commercial nuclear power plants. Most
has amassed a large amount of information about the properties of zir­
range up to 100 MWth, compared with 3000 MWth for a typical power
caloy and has extensive experience using zircaloy as cladding. As a
reactor. In addition, research reactors are owned by many countries in
result, zircaloy is considered a reliable material for use in nuclear re­
the world. About 220 research reactors are operating in 53 countries
actors (Olander and Jürgen Buschow, 2001; Karoutas, 2018). The use of
(Nuclear Research Reactors - World Nuclear Association, 2022). Many of
identical fuel to commercial light water reactors in the PULSTAR
them are operating on university campuses such as PULSTAR, which is a
research reactor supports and informs the development of light water
pool-type 1 MWth research reactor operated by North Carolina State
reactor fuel.
University (NCSU).
The reactor pool is lined with aluminum and enclosed by concrete
The NCSU PULSTAR reactor core is a heterogeneous system of light
shielding. The reactor consists of fuel and reflector assemblies, control
water, UO2 fuel, and Zircaloy cladding, identical to the commercial light
rods and guides, the grid plate support structure, and the lower cooling
water reactor fuel (Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power Upgrade
plenum chamber. The reactor core consists of up to 25 fuel assemblies of
for The NCSU PULSTAR Reactor, 2019; PULSTAR Reactor Updated
either 4 % or 6 % enrichment, reflected by up to 10 beryllium or graphite
Safety Analysis Report, 2017), which has several design features that
reflector assemblies, and operated by four control rods comprised of
make it very safe. One of these features is the use of low-enriched UO2
silver, indium, and cadmium (Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power
fuel in sintered pellet form. The UO2 fuel has a strong negative tem­
Upgrade for The NCSU PULSTAR Reactor, 2019). Fig. 1 shows a top view
perature feedback effect, known as the Doppler effect, which acts as an
of the NCSU PULSTAR research reactor.
inherent safety shutdown mechanism (van Dam, 2008; Pearce, 1961).
The PULSTAR research reactor coolant system (RCS) as shown in
Additionally, UO2 has a high heat capacity, which allows for the release
Fig. 2 relies on forced convection cooling, which was designed to remove
of a significant amount of energy in the core during transient conditions

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: madiacon@ncsu.edu (M.A. Diaconeasa).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2023.112163
Received 28 October 2022; Received in revised form 3 January 2023; Accepted 7 January 2023
Available online 12 January 2023
0029-5493/© 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
A.S. Farag et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163

The primary coolant leaves the lower plenum through a 25.40 cm

Nomenclature (10-inch) stainless steel pipe which exits via the pool liner and a 25.40
cm manual isolation valve P-1 then it passes through a tunnel to another
NCSU North Carolina State University 25.40 cm manual isolation valve P-1A into the 16N delay tanks as shown
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System in Fig. 2. The 16N tanks are constructed of stainless steel with a nominal
PCT Peak Cladding Temperature capacity of 5110.31 L (1350 gallons). In addition, it is shielded with
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission concrete to shield the high-energy gamma rays produced by the decay of
16
NRP Nuclear Reactor Program N. The primary systems pipes are made of stainless steel and bitumi­
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency nous coated to prevent corrosion. After the coolant exits the 16N tanks,
PPV Primary Piping Vault which are located in the primary piping vault (PPV), it moves to the
INL Idaho National Laboratory mechanical equipment room and passes via a 25.40 cm manual isolation
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident valve P-2 connected to a reduced size 20.32 cm (8-inch) pipe and then
TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes and General Atomics into the primary pump. The primary pump is set up manually to achieve
a flow rate of 63.09 kg/s. The primary pump transfers coolant through a
20.32 cm throttling globe valve P-3 into the counter flow plate heat
exchanger. The heat exchanger comprises 126 plates, and all the wetted
1 MWth of heat during the steady-state operation mode. It has an parts are made of stainless steel (Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW
adequate natural convection cooling capacity, but it limits the operating Power Upgrade for The NCSU PULSTAR Reactor, 2019).
power to less than 100 kWth. However, natural circulation will not be The PULSTAR reactor has been operating at steady-state power
activated during a loss of coolant accident in the circulation loop since levels up to 1 MWth since initial criticality in 1972 to the present (Safety
there is no isolation of the pool. The primary coolant system contains Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power Upgrade for The NCSU PULSTAR
about 56781.18 L (15,000 galloons) in an open pool to maintain the Reactor, 2019). However, there is a possibility to operate at higher
reactor core inlet temperature at 313.71 K (105 ◦ F) within a mass flow power levels and expand the range of experiments and activities with the
rate of 63.09 kg (1000 Gal/min). During normal operation, pool water installation of an emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The ECCS will
flows downward through the core by forced convection, and core heat is be critical to provide an additional cooling source during abnormal
transferred through the heat exchanger and rejected to the atmosphere conditions to meet the NRC regulations and maintain the peak clad
through the cooling tower. Under accident conditions, the flapper valve temperature (PCT) below the maximum allowable temperature of
located at the side of the lower plenum opens by loss of differential 1477.59 K (2200 ◦ F) (Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power Up­
pressure to provide long-term stable cooling of the core by natural grade for The NCSU PULSTAR Reactor, 2019), which if exceeded will
convection (Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power Upgrade for The allow for zircaloy oxidation.
NCSU PULSTAR Reactor, 2019). In many research reactor designs, loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs)

Fig. 1. Top view of PULSTAR research reactor (“Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power Upgrade for The NCSU PULSTAR Reactor” (North Carolina State
University, 2019).

2
A.S. Farag et al.
Fig. 2. NCSU research reactor PULSTAR coolant system layout.
of any size and at any location is of no consequence because the decay
heat remaining from the fission process is so small and incapable of
causing fuel failure. However, at high operating power levels, fuel fail­
ure may occur, and an ECCS is necessary to remove the excess decay
heat. A LOCA resulting in the complete or partial uncovering of the
PULSTAR core is possible, although very unlikely, since the pool has
several penetrations, and reactor coolant pipes are located at elevations
that would permit a complete drain down.
In 2010, NCSU’s Nuclear Reactor Program (NRP) received a nuclear
university program NEUP grant to upgrade the PULSTAR reactor from 1
MWth to 2 MWth (Meehan, December 2019). As of 2013, and as part of
this grant, the primary and secondary cooling systems were upgraded to
support future operations at increased steady state power of 2 MWth
(PULSTAR Reactor Updated Safety Analysis Report, 2017; Hawari,
2013). The increase in power will enhance its educational and research
capabilities. As a source of intense radiation (including neutrons,
gamma rays, and positrons), doubling the power of the PULSTAR is
expected to result in a corresponding increase in the available radiation
fluxes that can be utilized in various applications, such as material
testing, characterization of nanomaterials, and neutron diffraction and
imaging applications (Meehan, 2019).
This study aims to assess the safety of the PULSTAR research reactor
while operating at 2 MWth by adding a spray safety system and during
the most limiting scenario of a pool inlet LOCA (25.40 cm diameter
break in the valve pit) using conservative assumptions for response time
and capabilities. The PULSTAR system model was developed and
simulated using RELAP5/Mod3.3 (Fletcher and Schultz, 1995).
Overall, this paper presents the following four analyses: (1) verifi­
cation of the pool inlet LOCA given in the 2019 safety analysis report
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Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163
(SAR) (Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power Upgrade for The NCSU
PULSTAR Reactor, 2019) with the water metal reaction not activated,
the water metal reaction can lead to the clad zircaloy oxidation that
could potentially lead to breaching the safety limits, (2) verification of
the pool inlet LOCA results obtained by the NRC with the water metal
reaction activated, (3) pool inlet LOCA results given the installation of a
spray system with the reactor operating at 2 MWth, and (4) parametric
analysis to obtain the maximum achievable operating power given the
installation of the spray system.
Since the spray system is to be designed based on this work, we have
performed a series of parametric studies of an emergency spray system
for a pool inlet LOCA to develop the appropriate performance success
criteria: (1) spray system initiating time, (2) spray system mass flow rate
with the spray system available indefinitely, (3) spray system failure
time, (4) spray system mass flow rate with the spray system failed at
3642 s, and (5) spray system location.
The paper contains the following sections. Section 2 presents a
literature review of research reactor power upgrade studies. Section 3
describes the RELAP5/Mod 3.3 input model with the pool inlet LOCA
scenario, section 4 presents the verification results with the 2019 safety
analysis report and the NRC latest results, section 5 describes the spray
system specifications and design parameters, section 6 shows the results
of the parametric studies on the spray system following a LOCA with the
reactor operating at 2 MWth, section 7 shows the results of the para­
metric analysis to obtain the maximum achievable operating power
given the installation of a spray system, and finally, section 8 summa­
rizes the results.
2. Literature review of research reactor power Upgrade studies
Research reactors are an essential source for various applications
including the production of isotopes for medical and industrial uses,
material testing, and neutron scattering experiments. However, many
research reactors are operating at lower power levels than their design
limits, often due to safety or economic considerations. On the other
hand, a power upgrade might be desirable to increase productivity and
meet new research goals. In this section, we present various approaches
and considerations involved in upgrading the power level of research
reactors.
El-Sawy Temraz et al. (2001) performed a power upgrading study for
the first Egyptian Research Reactor (ET-RR-1). The ET-RR-1 is a 2 MWth
Russian Water-Water Reactor (WWR) tank-type reactor with a designed
core that can accommodate 51 UO2 fuel assemblies. They performed the
study on the existing fuel basket with 4 × 4 fuel rods and a proposed fuel
basket with 5 × 5 fuel rods. They used the sub-channel code COBRA-IIIC
(Rowe, 1973) for the thermal–hydraulic analysis and used WIMS-D4
(Askew, et al., 1966) and DIXY (DIXY-2, 2022, 1981) codes for the
neutronic calculations. The study concluded that the reactor with its
current flow rate of 900 m3/hr can operate up to 4 MWth with its existing
4 × 4 fuel basket and up to 5 MWth with the 5 × 5 fuel basket
arrangement, without violating any safety criteria. With increasing the
coolant flow rate to 1350 m3/hr, the reactor can be safely upgraded up
to 6 MWth, using any of the two fuel arrangements. In addition, they
concluded that the 5 × 5 fuel basket increases the excess reactivity of the
reactor core than the present arrangement with equal U-235 mass and
would give a better fuel economy of fuel utilization.
Farhadi and Khakshournia (2008) performed a power upgrade
feasibility study on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). They investi­
gated the possibility of upgrading the TRR power from its current power
level of 5 MWth to a higher level without violating the safety criteria.
TRR is a pool-type light water reactor with MTR fuel of low-enriched
uranium. They performed the core neutronic calculations using the
cell calculation transport code WIMS-D4 (Askew et al.,1966) and CIT­
VAP (Villarino and Lecot, 1995) codes, and the thermal–hydraulic
analysis using TERMIC code (Abbate, 1995). They did a benchmark with
existing reactor data to check the reliability of the codes they used. They
A.S. Farag et al.
approached the investigation of upgrading the power by changing the
coolant flow rate from its nominal value of 500 m3/hr, the reactor
power, and achieving a power peaking factor of about 3. Their analysis
concluded that the TRR can be upgraded to 7.5 MWth with an 800 m3/h
coolant flow rate without violating the safety margins and without
changing or adding any safety component to the system.
Torres et al. (2014) and Bradley (2009) have performed an investi­
gation study of the power upgrading for the IEA-R1 research reactor.
The IEA-R1 is a pool-type research reactor that uses MTR fuel type and
has been operating at 2 MWth, although its nominal power is 5 MWth.
This type of reactor can operate up to 3 MWth without an ECCS
(McCurdy, 1967), so in order to increase its power to 5 MWth, they had
to install an ECCS, and isolation devices. They performed experiments
using electrically heated plates to simulate the response of the reactor
while operating at 5 MWth with an ECCS and they supported the
experimental results with a 2-D heat conduction model using finite
difference techniques.
Jaime et al. (1989) have mentioned that the IAN-R1 research reactor
started in Colombia, in 1965, with a rated power of 10 kWth, and was
modified a year later to operate at 20 kWth. Given its importance to the
application of nuclear technology in Colombia, they decided to increase
the power to 1 MWth by adding several modifications that include
conversion of the core to low-enriched fuel, modification of the shield­
ing system, renovation of instrumentation, and installation of a radio­
isotope processing plant.
Hron (1990) has mentioned in an International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) report that the LWR-15 research reactor has resulted
from the reconstruction of the WWR-S research reactor that was in
operation in Czechoslovakia since 1957. The WWR-S started operating
at 2 MWth with highly enriched U-235 IRT-M− type fuel and then a few
years later by modifying its fuel assemblies, it was upgraded to 4 MWth.
The reconstruction to LWR-15 to operate at 10 MWth, included the
replacement of the aluminum vessel with a stainless-steel vessel,
reconstruction of the primary and purification circuits, and the safety
and control systems to assure all safety criteria are achieved. In addition,
they adopted probabilistic safety assessment methods to support their
modifications.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published a
TECDOC-1625 in 2009 (Bradley, 2009) that contains many papers
representing each country’s plans and updates on their research re­
actors’ modernization and refurbishment including power upgrades in
Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Romania. The RA-6 research
reactor in Argentina has been upgraded from 500 kWth to 3 MWth by
modifying its fuel and core configuration and accordingly the primary
and the secondary system parameters were to be modified to accom­
modate the increase in power. The BRR research reactor in Hungary has
first been upgraded from 2 MWth to 5 MWth by modifying the fuel and
beryllium reflector then was upgraded to 10 MWth by a full-scale reactor
reconstruction. The Bandung TRIGA (Training, Research, Isotopes,
General Atomics) reactor in Indonesia was upgraded from 1 MWth to 2
MWth by modifying the core, safety and cooling systems, and emergency
ventilation systems. The PARR-1 research reactor in Pakistan was
upgraded from 5 MWth to 10 MWth by several modifications in the fuel,
and reactor safety and cooling systems. Finally, the TRIGA research
reactor in Romania was upgraded from 14 MWth to 21 MWth by major
changes in the reactivity control, secondary cooling systems, and
modernization of other reactor systems.
Several research reactors have been successfully upgraded to higher
power levels through various modifications and adjustments. Entities
have selected different approaches based on their exciting design, such
as the addition or changing of new fuel assemblies, control rods,
instrumentation, increased coolant flow rates, modified fuel basket
arrangement, installation of emergency core cooling systems, and
adoption of probabilistic safety assessment methods. Overall, upgrading
the power of research reactors is achievable through careful analysis and
modifications to ensure compliance with safety criteria.
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Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163
3. PULSTAR best estimate transient simulation model
description
RELAP5/Mod3.3 is a light water reactor best estimate transient
analysis code developed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the U.S.
NRC. It is one of the most widely used system codes for simulating
reactor accidents and transients. The thermal–hydraulic model in
RELAP5/Mod3.3 is a one-dimensional, transient, two-fluid model for
the flow of a two-phase steam-water mixture. The non-equilibrium
transient two-fluid model is represented by the conservation equations
of mass, momentum, and energy for each phase.
The RELAP5/Mod3.3 input model of the PULSTAR research reactor
simulates the transport of heat and coolant in the primary system. The
pool and the primary coolant loop are represented by a series of hy­
drodynamic volumes. Fuel assemblies in the core region are represented
by heat structures. Fission and decay power are calculated using the
point kinetics model in RELAP5/Mod3.3. In this version of the input
deck, the reflood model is activated in the heat structures covering the
reactor core region, however, the counter current flow limitation (CCFL)
model is not activated, given this phenomenon is not expected to occur
(Tsukamoto, 2019).
The core consists of 25 fuel assemblies which contained 5 × 5 fuel
rods and were modeled with four lumped fuel channels. The total
number of fuel channels is lumped into three averaged fuel channels
each representing 5, 9, and 10 fuel assemblies respectively, in addition
to the hot channel which represents the highest power channel in the
core. Every channel consists of 14 volumes, 10 volumes are in the active
core region, and an additional four volumes are for the bottom and top of
the fuel assemblies. The hot channel characterizations are decided upon
by the NCSU PULSTAR neutronics analysis (Hawari et al., 2015). The
active fuel length is divided into 10 axial nodes, and it is assumed that
the hottest pin in the hot channel has a peaking factor of 3.0. The fuel
material properties are obtained from the IAEA TECDOC 1496 (Ther­
mophysical Properties Database of Materials for Light Water Reactors
and Heavy Water Reactors: Final Report of a Coordinated Research
Project, 2006).
A schematic diagram of the RELAP5/Mod3.3 model showing the
main components of the PULSTAR primary system is shown in Fig. 3,
representing the reactor pool and core configuration and the coolant
loop configuration. Table 1 shows the nominal conditions for the PUL­
STAR research reactor and the simulated limited conditions used in the
PULSTAR RELAP5/Mod3.3 input. The LOCA location at the pool inlet is
indicated in Table 2.
Table 2 shows the progress of the LOCA scenario with having the
break happen at time 0.0 sec followed by a scram and primary pump trip.
In the case of the proposed design with having the ECCS that allows for
operating at higher power without exceeding the safety limits, the ECCS
Fig. 3. Nodalization of the PULSTAR model used in RELAP5/Mod3.3.
A.S. Farag et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163

Table 1
Nominal conditions of the PULSTAR research reactor and the simulated condi­
tions used in RELAP5/Mod3.3 input.
Parameter Nominal Simulated

Reactor Power (MWth) 1.80 2.00

Primary flow (kg/s) 63.09 56.78
Core Inlet Temp (K) 313.71 320.37
Core Temp Rise (K) 262.26 263.87
Pool water level (meters) 6.10 6.10
Secondary Flow (kg/s) 63.09 63.09
Secondary Inlet Temp (K) 306.48 310.73
Secondary Pressure (Pa) 1.28 × 105 1.28 × 105

Table 2
Sequence of events in response to a LOCA.
Event Time (sec)
Fig. 5. Verification results with the PULSTAR SAR 2019: pool water level.
Break initiation 0.00
Reactor scram signal and primary pump trip 0.00
Scram rods start to drop 2.05
Full insertion of scram rods 3.05
Water level reaches 5 m 40.00

is designed to start working after about 500–600 sec (8–10 mins) once
reaching the pool water level to 5 m after the 40 sec from the initiation of
the simulation. The initiation time is a conservative assumption for
when the local city water will be used and the arrival of the fire
department.

4. Pool inlet LOCA verification study

The first step we had to take was to verify that the latest RELAP5/
Mod3.3 input deck produces the same results that were given in the
PULSTAR SAR 2019 (“Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power Up­
grade for The NCSU PULSTAR Reactor” (North Carolina State Univer­
Fig. 6. Verification of the results obtained by NRC with the water metal re­
sity, 2019). The SAR was submitted to the NRC in 2019 having the water action activated.
metal reaction not activated in the input model causing non-realistic
results of the actual clad surface temperature. The cladding surface
temperature at 1 MWth and 2 MWth during a pool inlet LOCA with the
temperature and pool water level as a function of time are shown in
water metal reactions activated in the input model. The result shows
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively. The figures show that the RELAP5/
that the cladding surface temperature exceeds the PCT limit of 1477.5 K
Mod3.3 verification results for pool water level and the cladding surface
(2200◦ F) when operating at 2 MWth with the water metal reaction op­
temperature do not exceed the PCT limit during pool inlet LOCA while
tion activated in the input model, however it does not in the case of
operating at 2 MWth. That is because the water metal reaction that
operating at 1 MWth as expected since the temperatures are not high
would cause the zircaloy oxidation was not activated in that input
enough to initiate the water metal reaction. Thus, these results show the
model.
need for an emergency core cooling system, such as a spray system, if the
Fig. 6 shows the verification with the NRC results for the clad surface
reactor is to operate safely at 2 MWth.

5. Spray system specifications

The ECCS that is under investigation to be designed and installed in

the PULSTAR research reactor is a spray safety system. The spray safety
system will be used to remove all the decay power after the shutdown of
the reactor during LOCA. The spray system water inventory will be
provided through the city water and the fire departments. The city water
can be immediately aligned with a flow rate of about 2.52–3.15 kg/s.
The fire departments should arrive after the emergency notification in a
maximum of 10 mins to provide flow rates of about 3.15 kg/s and up to
25.24 kg/s.
In RELAP5/Mod3.3 input deck, the spray system is modeled as a tank
full of water that will push water at a specified mass flow rate into the
reactor pool when the pool water level goes below 5 m. The simulation is
performed for 10,000 s (2.78 h), which gives sufficient simulation time
to characterize the response of the reactor during the accident and
decide the specifications of the spray system to be installed. The tank
Fig. 4. Verification results with the PULSTAR SAR 2019: clad surface volume is adjusted based on the chosen flow rate, so we can assure that
temperature. there will be enough water in the tank until the end of the simulation

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A.S. Farag et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163

time. Fig. 3 shows the spray system connected to pipe 120, which rep­
resents the upper middle part of the pool. Table 3 shows the spray sys­
tem fixed parameters that include the tank pressure, water temperature,
tank length, boron concentration, water level condition, and the decided
initiating time.

6. Results of the parametric study on spray system for a pool

inlet LOCA while operating at 2 MWth

We first investigated the initiating time of the spray system after

initiating LOCA at the pool inlet at a time 0.0 sec and reaching the pool
water level to 5 m while operating at 2 MWth. Fig. 7 shows the pool
water level and spray system flow rate being initiated after 1000.0 sec
with a flow rate of 2.52 kg/s from reaching the 5 m water level, thus
validating the function of the modeled spray system. Fig. 8 shows that
the water level goes below 5 m at 40 sec then the spray system is initiated Fig. 7. Water level and spray system flow rate initiated after 1000 s.
to inject the water at 1040 sec.
Fig. 9 shows the results for initiating the spray system after 60, 200,
and 800 sec from reaching the 5 m water level at a flow rate of 2.52 kg/s
while operating at 2 MWth. The results show that the spray system can
successfully cool down the reactor in all cases. However, we decided that
we are going to initiate the spray system at 500 sec where the clad
surface temperature reaches ~ 811 K. Based on Fig. 9 the maximum
available time for an operator to take action after the initiation of the
pool inlet LOCA is at most 1800 sec before the clad temperature reaches
to 1477.59 K taking into the consideration that activating the core spray
system takes few seconds. According to the SPAR-H human reliability
analysis method in NUREG/CR-6883 (Gertman, 2005), the nominal
human error probability (HEP) in the nominal case is 0.001, and in the
case of time available is ≥ 5 times the time required, the HEP 0.0001,
and in our case the time available is ≥ 3.6 times the time required, which
lies the HEP between 0.001 and 0.0001. Therefore, in this study, the 500
sec selected will give enough time for the operators to successfully
initiate the spray system with low failure probability.
After determining the time at which to initiate the spray system, a Fig. 8. Zoom in for the water level and spray system flow rate initiated after
1000 s.
parametric study has been done at different flow rates with the appro­
priate spray tank volume. Table 4 shows the chosen flow rate and tank
volume that is sufficient to provide water into the pool for 10,000 sec.
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the results for the clad surface temperature
and fuel centerline temperature at the hottest pin, respectively. The
results show that the PCT cannot be exceeded at all the different flow
rates and cooling down to the ambient temperature is achieved, and as
can be expected cooling down is faster with increasing the flow rate.
Setting a small flow rate of 1.26 kg/s and initiating the spray system
after 500 s was too late to maintain the cladding surface temperature
low enough to establish a quenching front and rewet the full length of
the fuel rods, possibly due to insufficient mass flow rate to make up for
the evaporation on the fuel rods. On the other hand, increasing the flow
rate limited the increase in temperature driven by the occurrence of the
water film on the fuel rods much quicker, which was sufficient to
maintain the cooling rate to reach the ambient temperature. In addition,
the difference between the clad surface and fuel centerline temperatures
is very small during the shutdown and cool-down period reaching to an
average of ~ 8 K. Fig. 9. Clad surface temperature results for initiating the spray system at 60,
After verifying the function of the spray system for cooling down the 200, 800 s at 2.52 kg/s.

Table 3 Table 4
Spray system parameters. Different flow rates and tank volumes for the spray system.

Spray system parameters Value Flow rate (kg/s) Tank volume (m3)

Tank pressure 6.89 × 105 1.26 12.62

Tank temperature 288.71 K 1.89 18.93
Length of the volume 1.5 m 2.52 25.24
Boron concentration 0.00 3.15 31.55
Water level condition 5m
Initiation time after reaching the water level condition 500.00 – 600.00 s

6
A.S. Farag et al.
Fig. 10. Clad surface temperature at all flow rates.
Fig. 11. Fuel centerline temperature at all flow rates.
reactor during LOCA at the pool inlet, a conservative scenario is
considered of failing the spray system at different times. Fig. 12 shows
the flow rates for the spray system failing completely at 842, 1740, and
3642 sec while running at a 2.52 kg/s flow rate. Fig. 13 shows the cor­
responding clad surface temperature. The results show that the clad
surface temperature peaks are lower than the PCT limit of 1477.594 K
(2200 ◦ F) for all three cases. In the case of the 842 sec, the maximum
temperature reached is 1446.48 K (2144 ◦ F).
An additional parametric study has been performed is fixing the time
Fig. 12. Spray system flow rate failing at all the different times with initiating
flow rate of 2.52 kg/s.
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Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163
Fig. 13. Clad surface temperature for all different cases of the spray system
failing and with initiating flow rate of 2.52 kg/s.
of the spray system failing at 3642 s after the pool inlet break and
looking at different flow rates including 1.89, 2.52, and 3.15 kg/s.
Fig. 14 shows the spray system flow rate behavior after failing at 3642
sec after the pool inlet break and different flow rates. Also, Fig. 15 shows
the clad surface temperature at the different flow rates not exceeding the
PCT limit of 1477.59 K which shows high reliability of the spray system
even if it failed after 3142 sec (~52 min) sec from its initiation.
Another parametric study is being considered for changing the
location where the spray system is attached. In this case, a comparison
has been made between the spray system attached to component 120–03
at 4.65 m and component 130–03 at 5.93 m with a mass flow rate of
2.52 kg/s, as shown in the nodalization in Fig. 16.
The results show that connecting the spray system at different lo­
cations produces the same flow rate and temperature profile as can be
seen in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18, respectively.
7. Parametric study on the operating power with the spray
system installed
We further investigated the consequences of LOCA on the clad sur­
face temperature by initially running the RELAP5/Mod3.3 input without
the ECCS at different power starting from 1 MWth to 5 MWth. Fig. 19
shows the decay power for the different power scenarios. Fig. 20 shows
the clad surface temperature for the different power scenarios indicating
that the PCT limit will be exceeded for power scenarios greater than 1
MWth and the need for an ECCS is essential to remove all the decay heat.
We started our parametric study by fixing the ECCS flow rate at 3.15
kg/s and initiating it at 600 sec (10 mins) after reaching the pool water
Fig. 14. Spray system flow rate after failing at 3642 s.
A.S. Farag et al.
Fig. 15. Clad surface temperature at the different flow rates and the spray system failing at 3642 s.
level to 5 m. The results indicated that only the 2 MWth power scenario
did not exceed the PCT limit with initiating the ECCS after 600 sec as can
be seen in Fig. 20 and Fig. 21, and in all the other power scenarios, the
ECCS failed to remove all the decay heat.
After that, we fixed the ECCS flow rate to be 3.15 kg/s, and we
changed the initiation time of the ECCS starting from 100 sec to 400 sec
for each power scenario. Fig. 22, Fig. 23, and Fig. 24 show the clad
surface temperature results for 3 MWth, 4 MWth, and 5 MWth power
scenarios, respectively. For operating at 3 MWth and 4 MWth, in order to
not exceed the PCT limit, the ECCS has to be initiated no later than
approximately 300 sec, since the simulation failed to converge for the
400 sec case. However, for the 5 MWth power scenario, the PCT limit was
exceeded starting from the initiating time of 200 sec. As can be seen in
the figures below, in some extreme cases, the temperature did not
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Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163
stabilize and the simulation crashed, possibly due to not being able to
establish quenching of the fuel rods.
An additional parametric study was implemented by fixing the ECCS
flow rate to 6.31 kg/s and changing the initiation time of the ECCS
starting from 100 sec to 400 sec for each power scenario. Fig. 25, Fig. 26,
and Fig. 27 show the clad surface temperature results for 3 MWth, 4
MWth, and 5 MWth power scenarios, respectively. Similar results with
the 3.15 kg/s case were obtained for 3 MWth and 4 MWth as the PCT limit
will not be exceeded if the ECCS was initiated at approximately 300 sec
However, the peak temperature in the case of 6.31 kg/s is lower than for
3.15 kg/s for both power scenarios. In addition, for operating at 5 MWth,
the PCT limit will not be exceeded if the ECCS is initiated around 200 sec
and the run failed with the initiating time at 300 sec.
A.S. Farag et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163

Fig. 19. Decay power at all operating power scenario without using an ECCS.
Fig. 16. RELAP5 model nodalization of the PULSTAR reactor pool and core
(“Safety Analysis for Assessing 2 MW Power Upgrade for The NCSU PULSTAR
Reactor” (North Carolina State University, 2019).

Fig. 20. Clad surface temperature at all operating power scenarios without
using an ECCS.
Fig. 17. Spray system flow rate at 2.52 kg/s and connected to
different components.

Fig. 21. Clad surface temperature at 2 MWth operating power, 3.15 kg/s ECCS
flow rate initiated after 600 s.

Fig. 18. Clad surface temperature for the spray system connected to
different components.
8. Conclusions
This study presents an overview of the PULSTAR design, a historical
review of research rectors power upgrade, and a feasibility study of
installing an ECCS into the PULSTAR research reactor that is significant
to upgrade the operating power of the PULSTAR to expand the range of
experiments and activities, taking into considerations achieving safety
criteria. Moreover, this study investigates the characterization of
installing a core spray system to the existing coolant system. Based on
our conducted research, the following conclusions are obtained: 1)
operating the PULSTAR at 2 MWth without the ECCS during pool inlet
LOCA with the water metal reactions activated, the cladding surface
temperature surpasses the PCT, which requires the need of an ECCS,

9
A.S. Farag et al.
Fig. 22. Clad surface temperature at 3 MWth operating power, 3.15 kg/s ECCS
flow rate initiated at different times.
Fig. 23. Clad surface temperature at 4 MWth operating power, 3.15 kg/s ECCS
flow rate initiated at different times.
Fig. 24. Clad surface temperature at 5 MWth operating power, 3.15 kg/s ECCS
flow rate initiated at different times.
however, it doesn’t exceed the limit while operating at 1 MWth, 2) when
operating at 2 MWth, the core spray system effectively maintained the
clad surface temperature lower than the PCT limit when initiated after
60, 200, 500 and 800 sec with a flow rate of 2.52 kg/s from the time pool
inlet LOCA is initiated, 3) the spray system tested at initiating time of
500 s from the time the pool inlet LOCA is initiated, with different range
10
Nuclear Engineering and Design 403 (2023) 112163
Fig. 25. Clad surface temperature at 3 MWth operating power, 6.31 kg/s ECCS
flow rate initiated at different times.
Fig. 26. Clad surface temperature at 4 MWth operating power, 6.31 kg/s ECCS
flow rate initiated at different times.
Fig. 27. Clad surface temperature at 5 MWth operating power, 6.31 kg/s ECCS
flow rate initiated at different times.
of flow rate 1.26–3.15 kg/s with 0.63 kg/s increment, the analysis
showed that it is capable of not exceeding the PCT limit of 1477.59 K
(2200◦ F) at all rates, 4) Operating at 2 MWth, the results show that a
spray system delivering water with a mass flow rate of at least 2.52 kg/s
for 1240 sec assuming its initiation at 500 s after the pool inlet LOCA
initiation is capable of meeting the PCT limit of 1477.59 K (2200◦ F), and
with higher flow rate, less time is needed to meet the safety criteria if the
A.S. Farag et al.
safety system failed at later time, and 5) In addition, for operating at 3
MWth and higher, faster response time is needed with much higher flow
rate and the current arrangement with the fire department and using the
city water will not be enough to not exceed the PCT safety limit. The
results of this work will be used to support the design of the spray system
and the PULSTAR license amendment application to the U.S. NRC.
Furthermore, for future work and after the selection of the final
design of the spray system, sensitivity and uncertainty analysis will be
performed on the selected design parameters. Moreover, detailed fuel
pin mechanics will be included in the transient cases including fuel clad
ballooning at high temperatures and the effects of flow area reduction
will be investigated for safety margin considerations.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Asmaa S. Farag: Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation,
Writing – original draft, Visualization. Yahya A. Alzahrani: Investiga­
tion, Writing – original draft. Mihai A. Diaconeasa: Conceptualization,
Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing – original draft,
Supervision, Funding acquisition.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Data availability
The authors do not have permission to share data.
Acknowledgments
We would like to acknowledge NCSU’s Nuclear Reactor Program
staff for sharing the baseline version of the PULSTAR RELAP5/Mod3.3
input deck and discussing with us with the high level requirements
needed to design the spray system.
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