M - S. Prime Properties Vs M - S. Bhagyanagar Plot Owners ... On 29 June, 2020

12/8/23, 3:24 PM M/S. Prime Properties vs M/S. Bhagyanagar Plot Owners ...
on 29 June, 2020
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Telangana High Court

M/S. Prime Properties vs M/S. Bhagyanagar Plot Owners ... on 29 June, 2020
Bench: Raghvendra Singh Chauhan, A.Abhishek Reddy
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN

AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.ABHISHEK REDDY
I.A.No.1 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.493 of 2019,

I.A.Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.497 of 2019,
I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.498 of 2019,
I.A.Nos.2 of 2020 and 1 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.499 of 2019,
I.A.Nos.1 and 3 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.500 of 2019,
And
I.A.No.1/2020 in/and W.A.No.508 of 2019,
Date:29.06.2020
Between:
W.A.No.493 of 2019
ACE-HIBC PRIVATE LIMITEED
Rep.by its Authorized Signatory
Mr.Vellore Venkat Kamal Kumar ..Appellant
and
Smt.Sana Lakshmi Devi and others ..Respondents
W.A.No.497 of 2019 M/s.Prime Properties Rep.by its Managing Partner ... Appellant and
M/s.Bhagyanagar Plot Owners Welfare Association Rep.by its President And others ...Respondents
W.A.No.498/2019 M/s.Prime Properties Rep.by its Managing Partner Mr.NajeebAhmed ... Appellant
And M/s.Bhagyanagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited Rep.by its President E.Raja Uma Reddy
and others ..Respondents HCJ & AARJ W.A.No.499/2019 M/s.Prime Properties Rep.by its Partner -
Mr.Najeeb Ahmed ... Appellant And M/s.Swagruha Projects Pvt.Ltd.
Rep.by its Managing Director - B.Sudhakar]
And others .. Respondents
W.A.500 of 2019
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/39549890/?type=print 1/31
12/8/23, 3:24 PM M/S. Prime Properties vs M/S. Bhagyanagar Plot Owners ... on 29 June, 2020
M/s.Prime Properties
Rep.by its Partner - Mr.Najeeb Ahmed ... Appellant
And
Smt.Sana Lakshmi Devi and others ... Respondents
W.A.No.508 of 2019
ACE-HIBC PRIVATE LIMITEED
Rep.by its Authorized Signatory
Mr.Vellore Venkat Kamal Kumar ..Appellant
And
M/s.Bhagyanagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited Rep.by its President E.Raja Uma Reddy and
others ..Respondents Counsel for the appellants: Sri Satish Parasaran, Learned Senior Counsel Counsel
for the respondents : Sri P.Venugopal, Learned Senior Counsel, Sri M.V.Durga Prasad, Sri
V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, Sri Kakara Venkat Rao Sri Ali Farooq Sri M.Avinash Reddy HCJ & AARJ Sri
D.Gnageswara Naidu, Sri Srinivasa Murthy Sri Bhaskar Reddy, Government Pleader The Court made
the following:
HCJ & AARJ COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble Sri Justice A.Abhishek Reddy) The present
writ appeals are filed against the common order, dated 04.06.2019, passed by a learned Single Judge, in
W.P.Nos.22896, 25132, 26824 and 27963 of 2018, whereby the learned Single Judge had allowed the
writ petitions, and prohibited the Sub-Registrar, Kukatpally, from receiving the Joint Development
Agreement for registration presented by the respondents i.e., M/s. Prime Properties in favor of Sri
Sidharth Infratech and Services Ltd., and M/s.ACE HIBC Ltd.
2. Aggrieved by the above referred common order, the unofficial respondents Nos.5 to 7 in
W.P.No.25132 of 2018 i. e M/s. Prime Properties, and Sri Sidharth Infratech and Services Ltd., have
filed the following Writ Appeals, namely W. A. Nos. 493, 497, 498, 499, 500 & 508 of 2019 before this
Court.
3. All the writ petitions were filed questioning the action of the official respondents, more particularly,
the Sub-Registrar, Kukatpally, in receiving the Joint Development Agreement for registration presented
by the respondents i.e., M/s. Prime Properties in favor of Sri Sidharth Infratech and Services Ltd., and
M/s.ACE HIBC Ltd. The lands bearing Sy.No.1007, to an extent of Ac.119.00, was sought to be given
for Joint Development, and the same being contrary to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land
Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 ('Agricultural Ceiling Act') and Section 22-A of
the Registration Act, 1908 ('Registration Act'). The subject land in the present litigation is an area
admeasuring Ac. 119 .00 Gts in Sy.No 1007 of Kukatpally Village, Hyderabad.
4. The four Writ Petitions which are the subject matter of the present Writ Appeals are (1)
W.P.No.22896 of 2018 filed by seven HCJ & AARJ individual plot owners, (2)W.P.No.25132 of 2018
filed by Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited, (3) W.P.No.26824 of 2018 filed by
Bhagyanagar Plot Owners Welfare Association, and (4) W.P.No.27963 of 2018 filed by M/s.Swagruha
Projects Pvt.Ltd.
5. The parties are hereinafter referred to by their names as in W.P.No.25132 of 2018 filed by
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited. While respondents No 1 to 4 are the official
respondents, respondents No 5 to 7 are M/s. Prime Properties, Sri Sidharth Infratech and Services Ltd.,
and M/s.ACE HIBC Ltd. respectively.
6. The facts in W.P.No.25132 of 2018 filed by the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited
are being narrated herewith as the petitioners in other two writ petitions i.e., W.P.No.22896 and 26824
of 2018 are claiming under the sale deeds executed by the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society
Limited.
7. The case of the appellants i.e, M/s. Prime Properties, and Sri Sidharth Infratech and Services Ltd., is
as under:
a) Even before 1960, the land in Sy.No.1007 of Kukatpally village was an urban property. Thus, the
lands were not hit by Section 22-A of the Registration Act. While referring to various litigations
pending between the M/s. Prime Properties and the members of the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing
Society Limited, they have reiterated their stand stating that the land in Sy.No.1007 along with other
Sy.Nos.806, 1009 and 1043 to 1065 of Kukatpalli village were purchased in the name of one Hashim
Ali, S/o. Mohammed Ali under a registered sale deed No.707 of 1952, dated 02.05.1952. At the time of
execution of the sale deed, the said Hashim Ali was only a minor. Hence, he was represented by his
paternal grandfather, Nawab Rayees HCJ & AARJ Yar Jung. The said Nawab Rayees Yar Jung died in
the year 1960. Subsequently, Hashim Ali was brought up by his maternal relatives. Therefore, on
14.07.1972, by way of oral hiba (gift), Hashim Ali gifted his land in Sy.No.1007 to his maternal
relatives. Consequently, the eight donees i.e, Mohammed Arifuddin, Mohammed Rasheeduddin,
Begum Zainab Sharfuddin, Ameer Mohammed Khan, Begum Zehra Mohammed Ali, Begum Kulsum
Zainulabedeen, Shaik Ali and Rehmat Begum, became the owners and possessors of the said land
admeasuring Acs.340.00 in Sy.No.1007.
b) After the death of Nawab Rayees Yar Jung, the name of his second son, Mir Fazilath Hussain was
recorded in the revenue record. For, he was a guardian and acting for the benefit of his minor nephew,
Hashim Ali.
c) Further, when the lands were needed for Housing Scheme, A. P. Housing Board issued a notification
bearing No.17523/62/Yw-a, dated 15.01.1963 published in Gazette No.17, dated 25.04.1963 in Part 2
at pages 690-693 declaring that the lands mentioned therein are needed for a Housing Scheme, for
acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Housing Board acquired the lands vide
G.O.Ms.No.47, dated 21.11.1963, but the land in Sy.No.1007 was not acquired; it was left out from
acquisition.
d) Meanwhile, taking advantage of the fact that Hashim Ali was a minor, his uncle, Mir Fazilath
Hussain and others filed O.P.No.330 of 1968, before the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for
enhancement of the compensation, without impleading him as a party/respondent; the same was
allowed on 30.08.1972.
e) Subsequently, on coming to know about the pendency of O.P.No.330 of 1968, Hashim Ali, filed
I.A.No.597 of 1972 in HCJ & AARJ O.P.No.330 of 1968 for impleadment; Mir Fazilath Hussain filed
counter affidavit on 21.06.1972 in I.A.No.597 of 1972. He claimed that Hashim Ali had already filed a
civil suit, namely O.P.No.117 of 1972, for similar relief. Therefore, the said I.A. was dismissed on
24.06.1972.
f) As Hashim Ali had already filed O.P.No.117 of 1972, which was re-numbered as O.S.No.122 of
1973, before the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, he did not pursue the order
dated 24.06.1972 passed in I. A. No. 597 of 1972 dismissing the Implead Petition.
g) Further, at no point of time, during the pendency of the above proceedings, Mir Fazilath Hussain
disputed the relationship, the registered sale deed document No.707 of 1952, dated 02.05.1952, in
favour of Hashim Ali, or the fact that Hashim Ali was not the paternal grandson of late Nawab Rayees
Yar Jung. Subsequently, the suit in O.S.No.122 of 173 filed against Mir Fazilath Hussain and others
ended in compromise on 22.11.1973.
h) Furthermore, the land in Sy.No.1007 was not an agricultural lands even before 1960. Hence, Hashim
Ali did not file his declaration under the Agricultural Ceiling Act, as there was no legal necessity for
filing.
i) Moreover, after coming into force of ULC Act, enacted on 17.02.1976, Mir Fazilath Hussain and
others filed declarations under the Agricultural Ceiling Act claiming Ac.69.33 gts., each; on 09.12.1976
the Land Reforms Tribunal determined the holdings, subsequent to the enactment of the ULC Act,
1976.
j) M/s. Prime Properties filed suits, namely O.S.Nos.898 of 2001, 899 of 2001, 900 of 2001 and 901 of
2001 for cancellation of HCJ & AARJ sale deeds executed in favour of Bhagyanagar Cooperative
Housing Society Limited, and the same are pending adjudication before the V- Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Ranga Reddy District. Even though, Bhagyanagar Cooperaitve Housing Society Limited filed
O.S.No.730 of 2001 on the file of the I-Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, against
the District Collector and others, M/s. Prime Properties got themselves impleaded as Respondent No.
6. In fact, the interim injunction petition filed by the Society was dismissed on 31.12.2001 holding that
the sale deeds claimed by the Society and subsequent sales to its members are hit by ULC Act. Thus,
they are void. Moreover, the Society and its members were not in possession of the property.
k) The Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited by creating bogus ante dated agreements,
filed suit for specific performance against Mir Fazilath Hussain and obtained ex-parte decrees. On the
basis of the ex-parte decree, the sale deeds were executed by the Court.
l) Furthermore, Mir Fazilath Hussain himself had suffered decree in O.S.No.122 of 1973 and the ex-
parte decrees in favor of Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited are nothing but collusive
and obtained by fraud.
m) After the compromise decree was passed in O.S.No.122 of 1973 against Mir Fazilath Hussain and
others, the same remained unchallenged. In fact, subsequently, Hashim Ali, along with the donees,
formed a partnership firm viz. Sahara Real Estate Management Consultancy (later renamed as M/s.
Prime Properties); they contributed their portions of land into the firm as capital.
HCJ & AARJ
n) Moreover, the contention that the provisions of the A. P. Agricultural Lands (Prohibition of
Alienation) Ordinance and Act, 1972, and the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings)
Act, 1973, are applicable to the subject lands in question is not only false, but is also incorrect and
legally untenable. It is a well settled principle of law that once a registered sale deed is executed by a
vendor in favour of a vendee, the original vendor loses all his rights, title and interest in the said
property. Therefore, any person claiming under Mir Fazilath Hussain cannot have a better title than
him. Merely because the name of Mir Fazilath Hussain is entered in the revenue records, he will not
get any right, title and interest in the present subject matter lands. For, Mir Fazilath Hussain was not
the owner of the lands in Sy.No.1007, having suffered a decree in O.S.No.122 of 1973. Hence, the
declarations filed by Mir Fazeelath Hussain and others is not only erroneous, but is also nullity in the
eye of law.
o) Further, admittedly, as per the declaration filed by Mir Fazilath Hussain and others, the share of Mir
Fazilath Hussain is only Ac.69.33 gts. Thus, the agreements of sale executed in favour of the petitioner
society, for the extent of Ac.286.00 gts., is without any right or title; the same is a collusive; it has been
entered into only to defeat the rights of others.
p) Furthermore, after the lands in Sy.No.1007 were taken custody by the Receiver in 1988, M/s. Prime
Properties had filed a petition for release of the same. In fact, the possession of the property was
handed over by the Receiver; M/s. Prime Properties had taken possession of the property. And ever
since then, they are in physical possession and enjoyment of the same. Thus, the writ petition filed by
the petitioner is a mischievous. It has been filed for only defeating the rights of the M/s. Prime
Properties.
HCJ & AARJ
8. The learned Counsel for the appellants has also assailed the W.P.No.22896 and 26824 of 2018 filed
by the individual plot owners, and Bhagyanagar Plot Owners Welfare Association respectively, on
similar lines and denying that the writ petitioners are the owners, or that they are in possession of the
subject lands.
9. Insofar as W.P.No.27963 of 2018 filed by M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd is concerned, while
reiterating the submissions made in the other appeal, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has
raised the following contentions:
a) The alleged sale deed and agreement of sale executed in favour of M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd.
were brought into existence by projecting an imposter styling himself as Hashim Ali, S/o. Mohammed
Ali and without possession. M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd. do not have any locus to question the
registration of the Development Agreement executed by M/s. Prime Properties. The execution of
registered document in favour of M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd., by an imposter named Hashim Ali,
S/o. Mohammed Ali itself establishes the fact that the land in Sy.No.1007 is not affected by Section 22-
A of the Registration Act. In fact, the case set up by M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt.Ltd., is a bogus one.
For, the original Hashim Ali never sold any part of the land to M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd., or
entered into any agreements of sale with them.
10. Per contra, the learned Counsels for the respondents have advanced the following contentions:
a) One Nawab Rayees Yar Jung was the real owner of the land over an extent of Acs.1500.00 gts., in
Sy.Nos.806, 1007, 1009 and 1043 to 1065 of Kukatpally village. After the death of Nawab Rayees Yar
Jung on 18.03.1960, his son Mir Fazellath Hussain had entered HCJ & AARJ into five agreements of
sale with the petitioner Society vide agreements, dated 13.06.1973, 18.10.1974, 15.09.1974,
18.01.1974 and 19.03.1974, for an extent of Ac.70.00, Ac.22.00, Ac.50.00, Ac.25.00 and Ac.119.00
respectively, total admeasuring Ac. 286.00 gts. in Sy.No.1007 of Kukatpally village. Mir Fazellath
Hussain, the vendor of the Society, received the entire sale consideration, and on 25.11.1980 delivered
physical possession of the land to the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited. However,
when the vendor failed to execute the sale deeds, the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society
Limited approached the Civil Court for the relief of specific performance of four of the agreements of
sale executed by Mr.Fazeelath Hussain. The said four suits were numbered as O.S.Nos.581/1992,
521/1984, 152/1984, and O.S.No.253 of 1985 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy
District. Subsequently, after due trial, the four suits were decreed by judgments and decrees, dated
27.02.1996, 21.06,1996, 25.04.1984 and 27.01.1986 respectively. The judgments and decrees passed in
O.S.Nos.581/1992, 521/1984, 152/1984, and O.S.No.253 of 1985 on the file of the Subordinate Judge,
Ranga Reddy District have become final, as they were not challenged either by Mir Fazeelath Hussain,
the vendor of the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited, or by anyone else. Further,
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited filed Execution Petitions, which were numbered as
E.P.Nos.12/1996, 93/1996, 43/1991 and 4/1986; the Civil Court registered the sale deeds vide
documents bearing registration No.2548/1996, 1621/2001, 8985/1992 and 8824/1994, dated
15.04.1996, 22.08.1998, 27.12.1991 and 27.06.1994 respectively in favor of the Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society Limited. Thus, the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited is
claiming the land in Sy. No 1007, Kukatpally village as per the table shown below:
HCJ & AARJ Sl. Date of Extent Suit filed by Date of E.P.No. Doc.No. Date of Agreement
Bhagyanagar Decree Execution No. of Sale Co-op Housing of Sale Society Limited Deed
1. 13.06.1973 Ac.70.00 O.S.No.581/1994 27.02.1996 12/1996 2548/1996 15.04.1996
2. 18.10.1974 Ac.22.00 O.S.No.521/1984 21.06.1996 93/1996 1621/2001 22.08.1998
3. 15.09.1974 Ac.50.00 O.S.No.152/1984 25.04.1984 43/1991 8985/1992 27.12.1991
4. 18.01.1974 Ac.25.00 O.S.No.253/1985 27.01.1986 4/1986 8824/1994 27.06.1994
5. 20.06.1974 Ac.119.00 Total Ac.286.00
b) After the four sale deeds were executed for a total extent of Acs.167.00 gts., the Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society Limited approached the Gram Panchayat for according permission to
divide the said land into house plots. Eventually, the layout was granted by the Gram Panchayat. The
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited further claims that it divided the subject land into
almost 2,000 plots, and allotted the same to its members. Between the years 1994 to 1996, the
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited registered sale deeds in favour of almost 1400
society members who were put into possession of their respective plots. In fact, some of the individual
plot owners, who purchased the plots from the society, applied to the government for getting the same
regularized under the Layout Regularization Scheme (LRS), some of them have constructed houses
and are residing in the said houses. The members of Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society
Limited have also applied to the government for regularization of their lands under G.O.Ms.No.455,
dated 29.07.2002 (Pertaining to Regularization of Surplus Ceiling Land) by paying substantial
amounts. But before the lands could be regularized by the government, in the year 2008, the ULC Act
was repealed. Resultantly, the government returned the HCJ & AARJ amounts paid by the individual
plot owners for getting their lands regularization under the provisions of ULC Act.
c) In addition to the above, the Counsel for Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and
others has also raised the following points:
i) The case set up by the M/s. Prime Properties is a bogus and concocted one. The petitioner-Society
has denied the plea of the M/s. Prime Properties that one Nawab Rayees Yar Jung, was the original
owner of the land bearing Sy.No.1007 along with other lands and during his lifetime he had orally
gifted the property to one Wali Mohammed, S/o. Fakheer Mohammed. Thereafter, the said Wali
Mohammed executed an alleged sale deed vide registered sale deed document No.707 of 1952, dated
02.05.1952, in favour of one Hashim Ali, S/o. Nawab Mohammed Ali (the grandson of Nawab Rayees
Yar Jung), aged about 2 years at that time, represented by his grandfather, Nawab Rayees Yar Jung, and
the said Nawab Rayees Yar Jung died on 18.03.1960 leaving behind his wife and eight others as his
legal heirs.
ii) The petitioner-Society has denied the fact that subsequently, in the inter se litigation between
Hashim Ali and Mir Fazeelath Hussain and others, a suit was filed which was numbered as O.S.No.122
of 1973 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, basing on the alleged
sale deed vide document No.707 of 1952, dated 09.05.1952. The said suit ended in a compromise
entered by the parties and an extent of Ac.340.00 in Sy.No.1007 was given to the alleged donees of the
said Hashim Ali, as per the Memorandum of Hibanama, dated 14.07.1972, namely Mohammed
Arifuddin, Mohammed Rasheeduddin, Begum Zainab Sharfuddin, HCJ & AARJ Ameer Mohammed
Khan, Begum Zehra Mohammed Ali, Begum Kulsum Zainulabedeen, Shaik Ali and Rehmat Begum.
Thereafter, the eight alleged donees of Hashim Ali along with Hashim Ali have constituted a
partnership firm by name M/s. Sahara Real Estates Management and Consultancy for the entire land of
an extent of Ac.340.00 in Sy.No.1007. Moreover, subsequently, Hashim Ali and other donees of the
Firm retired, and some new partners had entered into a supplement deed under the name of M/s. Prime
Properties i.e., 5th respondent in W.P.No.22896 of 2018. By virtue of the said partnership deed, M/s.
Prime Properties has become the owner of the subject land property is denied by the Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society Limited.
iii) The Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited had further stated that M/s. Prime
Properties had filed four suits, namely O.S.Nos.898/2001, 899/2001, 900/2001 and 901/2001 on the
file of the I-Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar, for cancellation of sale
deeds executed by the Civil Court in favour of Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited.
Even though the said suits were dismissed initially for non-prosecution on 05.11.2008, subsequently
the same were restored to file; presently, they are pending trial before the Civil Court.
iv) The petitioner-Society further claimed that another firm, namely M/s. Sridevi Colonizers, allegedly
obtained a GPA vide document No.147 of 1982 from Mir Fazilath Hussain in respect of the land for an
extent of Ac.349.00 in Sy.No.1007; one Mohd.Kazim Ali, who was a partner of M/s. Sridevi
Colonizers, filed a suit vide O.S.No.3306 of 1984 on the file of the VII-Junior Civil Judge, City Civil
Court, at Hyderabad, against the firm M/s. Sridevi Colonizers, and HCJ & AARJ other partners
claiming that he is having 50% share in the said firm and sought the following reliefs:
a) dissolution of the firm of partnership registered under Doc.No.2737/1980
b) for taking of account of the firm from May, 1980 onwards till date
c) for determination and payment of plaintiff share in the net profits of the firm
d) cost of the suit to be awarded
v) The petitioner-Society further stated that Mohd. Kazim Ali filed an interlocutory
application, namely being I.A.No.857 of 1985 and sought appointment of Receiver. The
said interim application was allowed. Thereafter, another interlocutory application, namely
I.A.No.1108 of 2001, was filed for passing of the final decree. During the pendency of the
I.A.No.1108 of 2001, M/s. Prime Properties filed an interlocutory application, namely
I.A.No.1339 of 2001, in I.A.No.1108 of 2001, in O.S.No.3306 of 1984 for impleading
itself as respondent No.20 in the said I.A. However, the said I. A. No. 1339 of 2001 filed
for impleading Prime Properties was dismissed on 08.07.2002. Aggrieved by the dismissal
order, dated 08.07.2002 passed in I.A.No.1339 of 2001, M/s. Prime Properties filed a
revision petition, namely C.R.P.No.3516 of 2001, before the High Court.
However, the said C.R.P. was dismissed on 22.07.2003 while directing M/s. Prime Properties to avail
appropriate independent remedy.
vi) Moreover, prior to the dismissal of the C. R. P., M/s. Prime Properties filed O.S.No.4401 of 2002
on the file of VII-Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, for cancellation of the preliminary
decree granted in O.S.No.3306 of 1984 and for delivery of possession. In the said suit, I.A.No.238 of
2004 was filed for HCJ & AARJ determination of Court fee, and the same was allowed on 15.04.2002
directing them to pay the deficit Court fee on market value of the suit schedule property. Assailing the
order passed in I. A. No 238 of 2004, M/s. Prime Properties filed a revision petition, namely
C.R.P.No.2461 of 2004, before this Hon'ble Court. However, the said C.R.P. was dismissed directing
them to pay the deficit Court fee. However, as M/s. Prime Properties chose not to pay the deficit Court
fee, the O.S.No.4401 of 2004 was dismissed.
vii) Furthermore, M/s. Prime Properties filed another interlocutory application, namely I.A.No.811 of
2004, in I.A.No.1108 of 2001, in O.S.No.3306 of 1984 under Order XXI Rule 52 proviso 1 read with
Rule 98 of Section 151 C.P.C. for adjudication of its title and possession vice versa i.e., receiver pro
interse sue and that M/s. Prime Properties should be put in possession of the property. But on
22.11.2004, the learned trial court dismissed the said I.A.No.811 of 2004 filed by M/s Prime
Properties. Aggrieved by the dismissal order, M/s. Prime Properties filed C.R.P.No.6697 of 2004
before the High Court. But by Order, dated 20.03.2009, the said C.R.P. was also disposed of by setting
aside the order in I.A.No.811 of 2004, and by directing the lower Court to release the property from the
custody of the receiver in favour of M/s. Prime Properties.
viii) Since the petitioner in W.P.No.26824 of 2018 i. e M/s. Bhagyanagar Plot Owners Welfare
Association were aggrieved by the order dated 20.03.2009, passed in C.R.P.No.6697 they filed an S. L.
P. before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely S.L.P. Civil No.3785 of 2012. However, vide order dated
02.03.2012, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, disposed of the said SLP by directing the M/s. Bhagyanagar
Plot Owners Welfare Association to approach the High Court by way of review.
HCJ & AARJ
ix) Meanwhile, Kazim Ali, the plaintiff in O.S.No.3306 of 1984, also filed a separate S.L.P, namely
S.L.P. Civil No.11595 of 2009 against the order, dated 20.03.2009 in C.R.P.No.6697 of 2004. In the
said S.L.P., the M/s.Bhagyanagar Plot Owners Welfare Association also filed a petition to implead
itself; the same was allowed. However, subsequently, the said S.L.P. was dismissed as withdrawn by
order, dated 10.01.2017, with an observation that "however, rights of any other parties and interveners
if they are affected in any manner are at liberty to take appropriate steps under the relevant provisions
of law before the appropriate forum".
x) The petitioner-Society further claimed that the M/s. Bhagyanagar Plot Owners Welfare Association
filed a review petition in C.R.P.No.6697 of 2004, namely Review CRPMP No.4638 of 2017. Vide
order dated 23.02.2018, this court allowed the review petition. Consequently, the original order, dated
20.03.2009 passed in C.R.P.No.6697 of 2004 was recalled; resultantly, the order in I.A.No.811 of 2004
in I.A.No.1108 of 2001 in O.S.No.3306 of 1984, dismissing the application of M/s Prime Properties
was upheld. Thus, by virtue of the order passed in review petition as well as S.L.P., all the parties were
directed to agitate their rights before the appropriate forum.
xi) According to the petitioner-Society in view of the pendency of the suit filed by Khazim Ali, namely
O.S.No.3306 of 1984, on the file of the VII-Additional Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad, and also the four suits filed by M/s. Prime Properties before the I-Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L. B. Nagar, M/s. Prime Properties does not have any right, title or
possession to deal with the subject property unless and until the suits filed by them are decreed in their
favour.
HCJ & AARJ
xii) The alleged sale deed, dated 02.05.1952 bearing document No.707/1952 did not see the light of the
day till date; the same is sham and bogus document, as it is hit by the provisions of A.P. (TA) Tenancy
& Agricultural Act, 1950 more specifically Section 47, which prohibits any transaction without taking
permission from the Thasildhar .
xiii) Even the Compromise decree between Hashim Ali and Mir Fazeelath Hussain & others, in
O.S.No.122/1973, dated 22.11.1973, is also a non-est and nullity in the eye of law as it was passed in
contravention of the provisions of the A. P. Agricultural Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Ordinance
and Act, 1973, and the Agricultural Ceiling Act.
xiv) Moreover, according to the petitioner-Society, the decree passed in O.S.No.122/1973, dated
22.11.1973 was never implemented in the revenue records and the Court fee which was directed to be
paid by the lower Court was never paid. Hence, M/s. Prime Properties cannot derive any right, title or
interest under the said decree.
xv) Furthermore, Mr.Fazeelath Hussain and his family members filed declarations under the
Agricultural Ceiling Act; the Land Reforms Tribunal, Ranga Reddy District, determined the holdings
of the respective declarants. After computation of the holdings, 08.02.1977, an area of Ac.49.00 was
declared as surplus by the Land Reforms Tribunal in C.C.Nos.W/158/75 and W/159/75; the
government took over the possession of the surplus land under a cover of Panchanamma.
xvi) Further, according to the petitioner-Society, the alleged appointment of Receiver in I.A.No.1108 of
2001 in O.S.No.3306 of HCJ & AARJ 1984, and that he took possession of the land to an extent of
Ac.286.00 and that it was in his custody from 1988 till 20.03.2009 are all concocted facts; they are not
binding on Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society or its members. The contention, that possession
was released in favour of M/s. Prime Properties, pursuant to the order passed in C.R.P.No.6697 of
2004, dated 20.03.2009, is collusive one. Thus, not binding on Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing
Society. Most importantly, the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society and its members and prior to
their purchase, their vendors were in continuous enjoyment and physical possession of the subject land.
xvii) According to the petitioner-Society, after the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
S.L.P.No.1195 of 2009, and also the order of the learned Single Judge in Review CRPMP No.4638 of
2017, dated 23.02.2018, relegating the parties to approach the appropriate forum for adjudicating their
rights, the said orders were never adhered to by M/s. Prime Properties. Therefore, the joint
development agreement which has been presented by M/s. Prime Properties in favour of M/s. Sri
Siddharth Infratech and Services (I) Limited and M/s.ACE HIBC Ltd is only a sham and a collusive
document. For, the M/s. Prime Properties does not have any right, title, interest or possession to deal
with the subject lands much less execute the Joint Development Agreement. Hence, if the Joint
Development Agreement is allowed to be registered, it will be contrary to the orders of "Status Quo"
granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.10128 of 2018, dated 01.10.2018.
xviii) Moreover, the alleged sale deed document No.707 of 1952, dated 02.05.1952, executed in favour
of Hashim Ali, and also the subsequent compromise decree, were never implemented in the revenue
records. For, right from khasra pahani (1954-55) and HCJ & AARJ subsequent pahanies, the name of
Mir Fazeelath Hussain is being continued.
xix) In fact, the name of Hashim Ali was never recorded as pattedar or possessor at any point of time.
Further, Hashim Ali has not filed any declarations as mandated under the Agricultural Ceiling Act.
xx) Moreover, as per provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act, more specifically Sections 7 and 17,
no document transferring the interest can be registered by the registering authority in the absence of
any declaration of the holding, and their determination by the authorities. In fact, on coming to know
about the attempt of the M/s. Prime Properties in trying to get the Joint Development Agreement
registered in favour of Sri Sidharth Infratech and Services Ltd., and M/s.ACE HIBC Ltd, the
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society, and some of its members have filed Objection Petition
before the Sub- Registrar. But, without adhering to the prohibition contained in Section 22-A of the
Registration Act and also Sections 7 and 17 of the Agricultural Ceiling Act and other statutory
provisions, the Sub- Registrar was not willing to consider the objections. Instead, the Sub- Registrar
has informed the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society and its members that unless and until a
competent Court prohibits the registration, the registration cannot be stopped. Thus, left with no other
alternative remedy, they have approached the Hon'ble High Court to stop the registration.
11. The Counsels in the other two writ petitions i. e. W.P.No.22896 of 2018 filed by the Seven
individual plot owners, and W.P.No.26824 of 2018 filed by Bhagyanagar Plot Owners Welfare
Association have also argued on similar lines, as that of the one filed by the HCJ & AARJ
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society i.e. W.P.No.25132 of 2018. Therefore, their contentions are
not being reproduced.
12. It is interesting to note that the petitioner in W.P.No.27963 of 2018, M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt.
Ltd. are claiming their title through Hashim Ali under document No.707 of 1952, dated 09.05.1952. In
their pleadings, they have made the following claims:
a) Even though Hashim Ali had filed O.S.No.122 of 1973, he had depended on one Sadiq Mohiuddin
to fight his case. However, Sadiq Mohiuddin played fraud on Hashim Ali in order to knock away the
property. Thus, without the knowledge of Hashim Ali, the so called compromise was entered between
Hashim Ali and Mir Fazeelath Hussain & others in O.S.No.122 of 1973. In the memorandum of
compromise, Sadiq Mohiuddin had got incorporated some clauses and as a result of which, Hashim Ali
was ultimately left with only Ac.43.00 in Sy.No.806.
b) Moreover, even without the knowledge of Hashim Ali, a fictitious firm in the name and style of M/s.
Sahara Real Estate and Investment Management Firm was brought into existence. A partnership deed,
dated 16.09.1974, stating that Hashim Ali and the other eight Hibadars (gift holders) i.e. Mohammed
Arifuddin, Mohammed Rasheeduddin, Begum Zainab Sharfuddin, Ameer Mohammed Khan, Begum
Zehra Mohammed Ali, Begum Kulsum Zainulabedeen, Shaik Ali and Rehmat Begum, had joined as
partners, was created. It was further shown that the land which had fallen to the share of Hashim Ali
i.e., Acs.43.00 in Sy.No.806 was invested as his share of capital in the said firm. Thereafter, the Deed
of Retirement, dated 10.11.1983, was brought into existence stating that all the eight Hibadars have
retired from the said firm by receiving Rs.37,500/- each HCJ & AARJ towards return of their capital
leaving Ac.48.00 each to the firm by relinquishing all their rights in the said land in favour of the said
Firm. However, on coming to know all these things, Hashim Ali had filed a private complaint in the
Court of the XIX Metropolitan Magistrate at Miyapur against Sadiq Mohiuddin and other partners of
the Firm; the said complaint was referred to KPHB Police Station, and a case in Crime No.306 of 2014
was registered; the charge sheet was filed against Sadiq Mohiuddin and others. But under a mistaken
impression, the charge sheet was returned by XIX Metropolitan Magistrate on the ground that a stay
granted by the High Court was in operation. The police have not re-submitted the same immediately
under the pressure from the unofficial respondents.
c) According to M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd, under the guise of the two joint Development
Agreements, which are presented before the Sub-Registrar for getting them registered, M/s. Prime
Properties is claiming ownership contrary to the review orders passed in C.R.P.No.6697 of 2004.
According to the petitioner, i.e. M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd, it is an agreement holder, vide
agreements of sale, dated 30.04.2013, 19.05.2014 and 22.08.2014 executed by Hashim Ali, for the
extent of Ac.12.00. Further, it had entered into two agreements of sale, dated 18.03.2015 for another
extent of Acs.6.00. Furthermore, the agreement dated 22.08.2014 culminated into a Registered Sale
deed, dated 16.03.2015 for an extent of Ac.1.00 gts., only.
d) Furthermore, once M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd, came to know about the Joint Development
Agreements being presented by M/s. Prime Properties, they filed their objections before the Sub-
Registrar. However, under the influence of the M/s. Prime Properties, the registration authorities,
without adhering to the provisions of HCJ & AARJ Section 22-A of the Registration Act, are going
ahead with the registration of the document. Therefore, the petitioners have approached this Court.
13. In the vacate stay petition filed by ACE HIBC in W.P.No.22896 of 2018, it was mainly contended
that, they are involved in the business of infrastructure development projects. In furtherance of the
same, they have entered into a Joint Development Agreement with M/s. Prime Properties to develop
the subject property i.e., an extent of Ac.119 in Sy.No.1007. They have invested huge amount and
entered into Joint Development Agreement on 26.08.2018 which was presented for registration. The
registration of the document was kept pending for want of certain clarifications. Meanwhile, the Writ
petitioners have approached this Court to stop the registration by making false, and frivolous
allegations, and by taking an untenable grounds, that the Joint Development Agreement is in violation
of Sections 7, 17 and 19 of the Agricultural Ceiling Act and also Section 22-A of the Registration Act.
Since the writ petitions were filed without making them as a party, they had to file an I.A. to implead
themselves as party respondents. They also filed an application for vacating the ex-parte stay granted
by this Court.
14. Heard Sri Satish Parasaran, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, and Sri P. Venugopal, the
learned Senior Counsel, Sri M. V. Durga Prasad, Sri V. S. R. Anjaneyulu, Sri Kakara Venkat Rao, Sri
D. Gnaneswara Naidu, Sri Y. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned Counsels for the respondents, Sri Ali
Farooq and Sri M.Avinash Reddy, the learned Counsels for the implead petitioners, and Sri
C.V.Bhaskar Reddy, the learned Government Pleader for Revenue.
HCJ & AARJ
15. While reiterating the averments made in the counter filed in W.P.No.25132 of 2018 and others, Sri
Satish Parasaran, the learned Senior Counsel, has assailed the correctness of the common order passed
by the learned Single Judge. He has vehemently argued as under:
i) The writ petitions filed by Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others were itself
not maintainable; the writ petitions were premature. For, none of the registration authorities had
exercised their powers, or passed any order, or issued any proceeding either in favour of the M/s. Prime
Properties or against the writ petitioners. In fact, there was no order in the eye of law which could have
been assailed in the writ petitions. The writ petitions were filed merely on the apprehension of the
parties that the registration authorities were going to register the Joint Development Agreement
presented by M/s. Prime Properties in favour of Sri Sidharth Infratech and Services Ltd., and M/s.ACE
HIBC Ltd. Medchal-Malkajgiri District, cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as giving
the respondents herein the cause of action for filing the writ petitions. The writ petitioners ought to
have approached the Civil Court, but not the High Court.
ii) There was no prohibition of law which prevented the registration of the documents submitted by
M/s. Prime Properties; the Writ Petitions are by persons who do not have any title or right and who are
not in possession. Hence, there was no cause of action for the petitioners to file the Writ Petitions, as
the registration authorities were never allowed to perform their duties as envisaged under the
Registration Act; even before they could perform their duty, the writ petitions were filed. Therefore, the
learned Single Judge ought to have dismissed the writ petitions in limini.
HCJ & AARJ
iii) The learned Single Judge should not have gone into the questions with regard to as who is in
possession of the land, the nature of land, and the applicability of the Agricultural Ceiling Act. Hence,
the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge were contrary to the pleading of the Writ
Petitioners.
iv) Once a registered sale deed is executed by the vendor, the vendor will lose all his interest, right,
title and possession over the said property and no person claiming under the said vendor can have a
better title, right, or interest. Subsequently, even if any sale deeds are executed by a person, who has
already sold the land, the subsequent sale deeds are void ab initio, and non est in the eye of law. For,
the vendee cannot have a better title than that of the vendor.
v) In this particular case also, a registered sale deed was executed in favour of Hashim Ali in the year
1952 vide document No.707/1952, dated 02.05.1952. And subsequently, after the death of Nawab
Rayees Yar Jung Bahadur, his legal heirs cannot claim any right under Nawab Rayees Yar Jung
Bahadur. For, after the sale deed was executed in favour of Hashim Ali, Nawab Rayees Yar Jung
Bahadur, had no subsisting right, title or interest in the subject land. Therefore, the legal heirs cannot
have a better claim, title or interest after his death.
vi) The revenue entries, if any, made in favour of Mir Fazilath Hussain, have to be construed as one
made for the benefit of Hashim Ali; Fazilath Hussain cannot take of advantage of the said entries as he
had no substantial right, title or interest. It is well established principal of law that mere entries in the
revenue records neither create any right, title and interest, nor can be construed as divesting the right,
title and interest of the original owner. The HCJ & AARJ evidentiary value of the entries in revenue
record, as held by a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this High Court is very
clear that the entries in the revenue record are only for fiscal purpose; they will not confer any title,
right or interest.
vii) Furthermore, as per the ceiling declarations made by Mir Fazilath Hussain and other legal heirs of
Nawab Rayees Yar Jung Bahadur, the right, title or interest of Mir Fazilath Hussain is only to the
extent of Ac.69.33 gts., and not for the total extent of Acs.286.00. But without there being any valid
legal title in favour of Mir Fazilath Hussain for an extent of Ac.286.00 gts., the agreements of sale
entered by the Society with Mir Fazilath Hussain are only collusive and non est in the eye of law.
viii) Moreover, the suits filed by the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited for specific
performance of agreements of sale are collusive. Therefore, the decree of the Civil Court has to be
construed as one obtained by playing fraud: the same will not confer any right, title or interest to the
plaintiff in those suits.
ix) As against the five agreements of sale entered between Mir Fazeelath Hussain, and the
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited, the Society had filed only four suits for specific
performance of agreements of sale, dated 13.06.1973, 18.10.1974, 15.09.1974 and 18.01.1974, and
19.03.1974 for a total extent of Ac. 167.00 gts. As regard the fifth agreement of sale, dated 19.03.1974,
neither any suit was filed, nor any sale deed has been executed till date. The learned counsel has
stressed the fact that the said agreement of sale, dated 19.03.1974, is for an extent of Ac.119.00 gts.
Hence, the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited does not have any semblance of title to
the said extent of land.
HCJ & AARJ
x) Furthermore, the learned counsel has drawn the attention of this court to some of the documents
filed, more particularly, the memo, dated 18.03.2017, filed by the Receiver in I.A.No.857 of 1984 in
O.S.No.3306 of 1984, and the memo, dated 13.05.2009, filed by M/s. Prime Properties in O.S.No.3306
of 1984, which clearly reveal that M/s. Prime Properties is in possession and occupation of the land in
question. Hence, the members of the petitioner Society were never in occupation or possession of the
subject property.
xi) Emphasizing, on the pleadings of the Writ Petitioners, the learned Senior counsel has vehemently
argued that the lands are non- agricultural lands. Therefore, the provisions of Agricultural Ceiling Act
are not applicable to the subject lands. Even otherwise, the subject lands were non-agricultural lands
even prior to 1960. Once the lands are included in the urban agglomeration, the nature of the lands will
change, and they cannot be construed as agricultural lands anymore merely because the ULC Act is
repealed.
xii) According to the learned Senior Counsel, after the repeal of the ULC Act, the Agricultural Ceiling
Act will not come into force; the provisions of the said Agricultural Ceiling Act cannot be made
applicable to the lands in question. The learned Senior Counsel has relied on Thumati Venkaiah v. State
of A.P.1, and has distinguished the decision of State of Gujarat v. Manoharsinghji Pradyumansinhji
Jadeja2 to buttress his case, that, once the ULC Act is repealed, the lands which were included in the
urban agglomeration will not revert back to being agricultural lands and the provisions of the
Agricultural Ceiling Act will get revived. Thus, the prohibition contained in Section 22-A of the
Registration Act cannot be made applicable to the subject land.
(1980) 4 SCC 295 (2013) 2 SCC 300 HCJ & AARJ
xiii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court has not set aside the Order of the Full Bench in Vinjamuri Rajagopala
Chary v. Revenue Department3 and simply remanded the matter back to the High Court for dealing
afresh and there was no legal impediment or embargo for registering any document.
16. Per contra, Sri M. V. Durga Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, has raised the
following counter-arguments:
i) The provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act, more particularly, Sections 7, 17 and 19 of the Act are
applicable to the fact of the present case. And without there being any declaration by the owner of the
agricultural land, there is a clear prohibition of alienation by the owner. Therefore, without adhering to
the provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act, the registration authorities cannot entertain any
document for registration.
ii) As per the requirements of the Registration Act any person who presents a document for
registration, in respect of agricultural land has to file a declaration, as mandated by Section 19 of the
Agricultural Ceiling Act, declaring that the lands do not come under the purview of the Agricultural
Ceiling Act, and are not ceiling surplus lands. In the present case, the M/s. Prime Properties has failed
to file any such declaration as envisaged under Section 19 of the Agricultural Ceiling Act. Moreover,
the M/s. Prime Properties themselves have filed an application for mutation of the subject land in their
favour and for issuance of pattedar pass books and title deeds (PPB & TD). Therefore, they cannot now
contend that the lands are being used for non-agricultural purpose.
(2016) 1 ALT 550 (FB) HCJ & AARJ
iii) M/s. Prime Properties do not have any right, title or interest in the subject matter of the land; the
sale deed relied by them i.e., the sale deed in their favour by Hashim Ali, has never seen the light of the
day till date.
iv) Drawing the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 22-A of the Agricultural Ceiling
Act, the learned counsel pleads that as per Section 22-A (a) to (d), there is no necessity for the
government to issue any notification containing the list of lands which are prohibited for alienation.
Even de hors the said list, there is a clear cut prohibition for alienation in respect of the lands which are
governed by Agricultural Ceiling Act.
v) The provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act make it obligatory on the part of a land owner to file
declaration. However, Hashim Ali never did. On the other hand, in the declaration filed by Mir Fazilath
Hussain and his siblings they have declared an extent of Ac.349.33 gts. In fact, the Land Reforms
Tribunal after computing the holdings of the declarants, had held an area of Ac.49.00 gts., as surplus
land; the same was taken possession of by the government.
vi) The lands which are the subject matter of the Joint Development Agreement include flyovers, roads
and other common areas which vest with the municipality. Therefore, any document which includes
properties that belong to the Municipality cannot be registered.
vii) The alleged compromise entered between Hashim Ali and Mir Fazeelath Hussain and others in
O.S.No.122 of 1973, was never engrossed on a stamp paper. Thus, the said compromise decree is void
in the eye of law.
HCJ & AARJ
viii) The Learned Counsel has painstakingly taken this Court through the various provisions of the
Agricultural Ceiling Act and the ULC Act. According to him, the subject matter lands are agricultural
lands. Even if the lands are governed by the provisions of the ULC Act, after the repeal of the said
ULC Act, the provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act will automatically govern.
ix) The status quo order, granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is still in subsistence. Hence, and the
same cannot be violated. Thus, the learned Counsel has pleaded that the impugned order is legally
valid, for it is in consonance with the law laid down both by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and by this
High Court.
17. Sri M.V.Durga Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 7, has relied on the
decisions reported in Kanumuri Satya Suryanarayana Raji vs. Sribhashyam Jagannadhaswami4,
T.Bangaru Raju v. Authorised Officer-cum- R.D.O., Land Reforms Tribunal, 19975, and State of A.P.
v. Audikesava Reddy6.
18. On the other hand, Mr. V. S. R. Anjaneyulu, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, has
strenuously argued as under:
i) Right from the Khasra Pahani i.e Pahani for the year 1954-55, the name of Mir Fazilath Hussain is
reflected in the revenue records. According to the provisions of The Telangana Land Revenue Act,
1937, the name of the person who is entered in the Khasra Pahani as pattedar, has great evidentiary
value, for the Pahani is deemed to be record of right.
1976 SCC Online AP 191 1997(2) APLJ 84 (HC) (2002) 1 SCC 227 HCJ & AARJ
ii) The name of Hashim Ali was never mutated at any point of time in the Revenue record. Had the sale
deed executed in favour of Hashim Ali in the year 1952 been true, he could have had filed applications
before the revenue authorities for getting his name mutated in the revenue records, and would have
also filed declarations under the provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act.
iii) The contention of M/s. Prime Properties, that they are having possession of the property cannot be
believed, as the Receiver has filed a counter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. L. P. No.18163 of
2010 stating that the Receiver was in possession of the land, and has not yet been discharged.
iv) The Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and its members are, indeed, in possession
and occupation of the land in question; the layout was granted by the Gram Panchayat; most of the
members have got the plots regularized under the Layout Regularization Scheme ( LRS).
v) M/s. Prime Properties without waiting for the result of the suits filed by them, to cancel the sale
deeds executed in favour of the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited cannot seek
registration of the Joint Development Agreement. In Case, the Joint Development Agreement is
allowed to be registered, it will not only have far reaching consequences, but, will be in violation of the
orders of Status Quo granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. A. No.10128 of 2018, dated
01.10.2018.
vi) The orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be interpreted to get the Joint Development
Agreement executed by M/s. Prime Properties.
HCJ & AARJ
vii) A part of the land was acquired for construction of a road, and the Bhagyanagar Cooperative
Housing Society Limited was paid the compensation amount.
19. Sri VSR Anjaneyulu, the learned counsel for the respondents, has relied on the judgments reported
in Taher Hussain v. Mohd. Abdul Waheed7 , Union of India vs. Vasavi Co-operative housing Society
Limited8, Dubbasi Mallaiah v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh9, Dubbasi Mallaiah v. Government
of Andhra Pradesh10, Jakkana Lakshmaiah v. State of Telangana11, and Gamya Karanam Madhu v.
State of A.P.12.
20. Likewise, Sri P. Venugopal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, has
raised the following arguments:
i) The M/s. Prime Properties, having filed civil suit for cancellation of the sale deeds executed in
favour of the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited cannot get the Joint Development
Agreement registered without waiting for the outcome of the suit filed by it.
ii) M/s. Prime Properties was never in possession of the subject lands; the same is evident from the
counter filed by the Receiver in SLP No.18163 of 2010 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein he
has admitted that he has not given possession to M/s. Prime Properties.
iii) In order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the registration of the document should be avoided.
Hence, the learned Single Judge ILR 1976 AP 1095 202 (5) ALT 370 (DB) 1979 (2) APLJ 258 1986
(1) APLJ 25 2019 (5) ALT 346 (TS) 2019 (3) ALT 48 (AP) HCJ & AARJ has rightly allowed the writ
petitions filed by Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others to avoid any
multiplicity of the litigation.
iv) The status quo order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has to be honored; the same cannot be
interfered with and create litigation between the parties.
v) Further, unless and until a finality is reached between the parties, the so called Joint Development
Agreement cannot be registered.
21. Mr. Kakara Venkat Rao, the learned Counsel, while adopting the arguments made by the other
learned Counsels, has submitted as under:
i) The attempt of M/s. Prime Properties to get the Joint Development Agreement registered is meant
only to circumvent the order of Status Quo granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
ii) M/s. Prime Properties does not have any document to show any title to the property. Therefore, M/s.
Prime Properties has failed to make out any case for interference with the common order passed by the
learned Single Judge. He has, thus, prayed for dismissal of the Appeals.
22. The learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the official respondents has stated that the
Registration Authorities will have to follow Section 71 of the Registration Act. Further, he has stated
that the lands in survey No.1007 have already being converted into plots, roads laid and also there is a
fly-over in existence in the subject land. In the counter filed by the then Special Chief to Government
Revenue (Registration & Stamps), Government of HCJ & AARJ Telangana in the I.A. filed in one of
the writ petitions, it was clearly stated that the ceiling surplus land area of Acs.49-00 guntas, which
was taken possession of by the Government, does not form part and parcel of the subject lands. The
Special Chief Secretary had clearly stated in his counter that the M/s. Prime Properties had not filed
any declarations under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act,
1973, but the same cannot be construed as saying that after the repeal of the Urban Land Ceiling Act,
1973, the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, will apply to
the subject land. That as on date, the nature of the lands is not agricultural, and they cannot be put into
agricultural use as they have been converted into plots long back.
23. A perusal of the impugned common Order reveals that the learned Single Judge was mainly dealing
with the question with regard to the nature of the land, as to whether it is agricultural or non-
agricultural, whether the provisions of Agricultural Ceiling Act are applicable to the subject lands or
not, and if the Joint Development Agreement can be allowed to be registered or whether the same is hit
by Sections 7, 17 and 19 of the Agricultural Ceiling Act, and also Section 22-A of the Registration Act.
The learned Single Judge was also influenced by the fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil
Appeal No.10128 of 2018 has granted status quo order with respect to the subject land.
24. A reading of the common Order, impugned in all these Writ Appeals, further clearly reveals that
initially the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that "this Court is not required to go into
questions relating to the flow of title, disputed identity, ownership and rival claims in relation thereto,
etc., which have been argued at length by the learned Counsel, and also that it would be wholly
inappropriate HCJ & AARJ for this Court to go into issues which were relegated to resolution in the
pending proceedings, as per the Supreme Court's order". The learned Single Judge further concluded
that "the only question that requires to be decided presently is whether the documents executed by M/s.
Prime Properties, Hyderabad, in favour of Sri Siddharth Infratech and Services Limited, Hyderabad,
and ACE HIBC Private Limited, Hyderabad, should be registered at this stage even before adjudication
takes place in the pending proceedings, including the suits". Interestingly, while dealing with various
contentions, more specifically with regard to the Status Quo granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the
learned Single Judge concluded that "the status quo order would not apply per se to registration of
documents". However, after extracting the various clauses in the Joint Development Agreement, the
learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the same would fall foul of the order of Status Quo
granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
25. With regard to the possession of the parties, the learned Single Judge went on to discuss various
proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Contempt Petition (Civil) Nos.1583-1584 of 2017 in
SLP (C) No.18163 of 2010 and 11595 of 2009 initiated against the Receiver Sri Surender Singh
Choudhary, who was appointed as Advocate-Receiver in O.S.No.3306 of 1984, and that the said
Receiver made a Volte Face with regard to the question of giving any possession to the M/s. Prime
Properties, and went on to discuss the memo filed by M/s. Prime Properties, dated 13.04.2009, wherein
M/s. Prime Properties had stated to the effect that the High Court had declared that it was the real
owner of the land and was entitled to enjoyment of ownership rights without any hindrance from the
Receiver and further stated that for its beneficial enjoyment, it was HCJ & AARJ exercising all
ownership rights over the entire extent of land in Sy.No.1007 of Kukatpally village without any
hindrance from the Receiver as per the specific order of the High Court, but went on to hold that there
was no claim made by M/s. Prime Properties that they had actually and physically taken over
possession of the land from the Advocate-Receiver under proper documentation, after passing of the
order, dated 20.03.2009, in C.R.P.No.6697 of 2004. The learned Single Judge further went on to hold
that the Advocate-Receiver never delivered possession of the land either to M/s. Prime Properties or to
anyone else. Therefore, the self-serving claims of M/s. Prime Properties could be of no avail to
ascertain as to who is in actual possession as on date, if at all anyone is in possession.
26. Insofar as the question as to whether the land which is the subject matter of the litigation is an
agricultural or non-agricultural, the learned Single Judge observed that the lands are agricultural lands,
not only on the basis of the application filed for mutation by M/s. Prime Properties before the revenue
authorities, but also on the basis of the counter filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Telangana.
Thus, according to the learned Single Judge the registration of the document could be hit by the
provisions of Agricultural Ceiling Act, and also Section 22-A of the Registration Act. Thereafter, the
learned Single Judge shifted the burden of proof on M/s. Prime Properties, to establish the fact that the
lands are non- agricultural lands ostensibly on the ground that there was sufficient material to show
that the lands were agricultural lands. Thus, they were governed by the provisions of the Agricultural
Ceiling Act. The learned Single Judge has relied mainly on the judgment inManoharsinhji
Pradymansinhji Jadeja wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of the
Gujarat HCJ & AARJ Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, 1960, which are akin to the provisions of the
Agricultural Ceiling Act, has observed that the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act,
1960 would be applicable after repeal of the ULC Act w. e. f. 27.03.2008. The learned Single Judge has
held that the provisions of Agricultural Ceiling Act would apply and as such, without complying with
the said provisions, the registration of any document pertaining to the subject lands was prohibited.
Moreover, since M/s. Prime Properties or their vendors have not filed any declarations, as mandated
under Section 19(1) of the Agricultural Ceiling Act, the learned Single Judge held that the lands are
"agricultural lands" as there was no evidence to show that the nature of the land was changed from
agricultural to non-agricultural.
27. The learned Single Judge went on to discuss Section 3(j) and Section 3(i) of the Agricultural
Ceiling Act and other provisions including Sections 8, 9, 17 and 19 to hold that the lands are
agricultural lands. The learned Single Judge has mainly relied on the entries made in the Khasra pahani
(Pahani of 1954-55) which reflected that the nature of the land is agriculture and further held that
unless the contrary is proved, the presumption was that the lands are agricultural lands. The learned
Single Judge rejected the contention of M/s. Prime Properties that the lands are non-agricultural lands,
and provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act are not applicable as the Kukatpally village was brought
into the urban agglomeration and were governed by the provisions of the ULC Act. The learned Single
Judge further held that if the Joint Development Agreements were allowed to be registered, as per the
various clauses in the said Joint Development Agreements, they will create third party interest, and
would also involve delivery of possession. Hence, the same would be in violation of the orders of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.10128 of HCJ & AARJ 2018, dated 01.10.2018. Therefore,
innocent third party interests would be dragged into the picture without resolution of the disputes in the
pending litigations, including the suits.
28. Furthermore, the learned Single Judge went on to discuss Section 22-A(1)(d) of the Registration
Act which prohibited the registration of documents relating to agricultural or urban lands without filing
declarations as envisaged under the said Acts. Further, as per the strict interpretation of Section 22-A of
the Registration Act, unless and until the declarations by the owners of the agricultural lands are filed,
and the surplus determined, the act prohibits the registration of any documents. According to the
learned Single Judge, since the M/s. Prime Properties had not complied with the mandate of Section
19(1) of Agricultural Ceiling Act, which makes it mandatory for execution of a document to give a
declaration that the lands are not hit by the Land Ceiling Act. The learned Single Judge went on to hold
that the Joint Development Agreement per se will not create any title, if it is otherwise wanting, but the
same would authorize ACE HIBC Private Limited to execute further documents after developing the
subject land and these acts would be in violation of the status quo order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. All the four writ petitions filed by Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited were
allowed directing the registration authorities not to entertain any document for registration in relation
to the subject land in Sy.No.1007 of Kukatpally village till appropriate orders in that regard are passed
in the pending proceedings, including the suits.
29. Broadly, the main points that have to be considered by this Court can be summarized as follows:
HCJ & AARJ
1) Whether the writ petitioner had any cause of action to file the writ petition and whether
the writ petitions are maintainable in the absence of any cause of action?
2) Whether the writ petitioners have any title to the lands in Sy.No.1007, Kukatpally
village, for the entire extent of Acs.286.00 gts., as claimed, or not?
3) Whether learned Single Judge erred in holding that the nature of lands was agricultural,
contrary to the pleadings in the writ petitions and the record?
4) In the absence of any notification under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, notifying
the subject lands as having been entered in the Prohibitory List, whether the learned Single
Judge was right in holding that the registration of the documents was prohibited?
5) When once the lands are converted into non-agricultural purposes, whether the
provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act will revive again, after the Repeal of the ULC
Act?
6) Whether the order of status quo granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
C.A.No.10128/2018 dated 01.10.2018 creates an embargo for registration of the document?
30. In order to test the legality or otherwise of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, it is
essential to see whether the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge are supported by the
pleadings in the writ petitions or not.
31. Sri Satish Parasaran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has brought
to the notice of this Court the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thumati Venkaiah and HCJ &
AARJ distinguished the decision of Manoharsinghji Pradyumansinhji Jadeja to buttress his plea that
once the lands are included in the urban agglomeration, the provisions of the ULC Act will
automatically kick in. Moreover, even if the said ULC Act is repealed, the provisions of the
Agricultural Ceiling Act will not get revived.
32. Now coming to the maintainability of the writ petition, this Court has to see as to whether
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others, were justified in approaching the High
Court even before the Registration authorities have performed their duties or not. Mere presentation of
the document for registration does not, in any way, mean that the document will be registered by the
authorities. Merely because a communication has been issued to Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing
Society Limited, "that unless and until an order from the Court is obtained, the registration will not be
stopped", it cannot infered that the document is going to be registered. As per the provisions of the
Registration Act, whenever a document is presented before the authorities for registration, number of
formalities have to be fulfilled; unless and until the executants complete the formalities or legal
requirements cast upon them, the authorities will not register the document, but keep the document
pending. Only after the executants comply with the shortfalls pointed out, the document will be
registered. But, as seen from the pleadings, Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and
others have rushed to the Court even before the cause of action has arisen. A perusal of the prayer
made in the writ petition clearly shows that even before the authorities have exercised their power, the
petitioners have approached this Court.
33. The Registration Act, 1908, contemplates many formalities to be completed before the document is
registered, only if all the formalities and objections taken by the registration authorities are complied
with, HCJ & AARJ then the document is registered and given a Registration number. A duty is cast on
the officials to see that all the requirements of law and the provisions of the Registration Act are met.
In case a document lacks some information, or does not contain the necessary declarations as required
by law, then the competent authority will not register the document and the document will be given a
Pending number. If the authorities come to a conclusion that some more formalities have to be
submitted, then a communication will be issued to the executants to fulfill the same within the
stipulated period. In case the lacunae pointed out are not complied with, the registration of the
document will be refused.
34. It is pertinent to extract Section 71 of the Registration Act.
Reasons for refusal to register to be recorded - (1) Every Sub-Registrar refusing to register a document,
except on the ground that the property to which it relates is not situated within his sub-district shall
make an order of refusal and recorded his reasons for such order in his Book No.2, and endorse the
words "registration refused" on the document; and, on application made by any person executing or
claiming under the document, shall, without payment and unnecessary delay, give him a copy of the
reasons so recorded.
(2) No registering authority shall accept for registration a document so endorsed unless and until, under
the provisions hereinafter contained, the document is directed to be registered.
HCJ & AARJ
35. A Full Bench of this court in Yanala Malleshwari & others v. Ananthula Sayamma & others13 has
held as under:
It is misnomer to assume that all statutory authorities like registering authority, always
discharge public law functions.
Some of the functions like registration of documents/instruments may be in exercise of

statutory power but such functions may or may not strictly are concerned with public law.
For instance, a registration of gift deed executed by donor in favour of donee is only
pursuant to statutory power but the same does not involve any public law function. Similar
is the case in the event of registration of a sale deed, mortgage deed or licence deed,
compromise deed and/or cancellation of any of these deeds. Judicial review has its own
limitations and all decisions of public bodies are not amenable to this public law power.
36. It is imperative to reproduce the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of U.P. v.
Johri Mal , wherein the Apex court has reiterated the scope and limitations of judicial review in the
following terms:
The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article
226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the
relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by
the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi- judicial or
administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or
don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance
under the rule of law nor do the Courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the
suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have
adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review
Court. The limited scope of judicial review, succinctly put, is:
2006 SCC Online AP 909 2004 (4) SCC 714 HCJ & AARJ
(i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in Appeal over the
decisions of administrative bodies.
(ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds.
(iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it,

cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is
perverse or illegal.
(iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of
judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a Court is limited to seeking that
the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not
occasion miscarriage of justice.
(v) The Courts cannot be called upon to undertake the Government duties and functions.
The Court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and
economic belief of a Judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the
legislative bodies.
37. As seen from the pleadings and the record, there was no cause of action for the Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society Limited to file the writ petition and the same was premature.
38. Insofar as the 2nd point with regard to the title of the writ petitioners is concerned, as evident from
the pleadings of Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and all others claiming through it,
they have taken a specific stand that after they have entered into five agreements of sale with Fazilath
Hussain for an extent of Ac.286.00 gts., they were constrained to file four suits before the Civil Court
and the said suits were decreed for an extent of Ac. 167.00 gts., area only.
Sl. Date of Extent Suit filed by Date of E.P.No. Doc.No

Date of
Agreement Bhagyanagar Decre
Execution
Co-op Housin
of Sale
HC
& AARJ
No. of Sale Society Limite

Deed
1. 13.06.1973 Ac.70.00 O.S.No.581/1994 27.02.1996 12/1996 2548/199

15.04.1996
2. 18.10.1974 Ac.22.00 O.S.No.521/1984 21.06.1996 93/1996 1621/200

22.08.1998
3. 15.09.1974 Ac.50.00 O.S.No.152/1984 25.04.1984 43/1991 8985/199

27.12.1991
4. 18.01.1974 Ac.25.00 O.S.No.253/1985 27.01.1986 4/1986 8824/199

27.06.1994
Total Ac.286.00
39. As is evident from the pleading of Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society and the table
extracted above, there is absolutely no whisper with regard to the agreement of sale, dated 19.03.1974.
40. There is no pleading or explanation whatsoever as to what happened to the 5th agreement of sale,
dated 19.03.1974, between Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and Fazilath Hussain;
whether it culminated in a sale deed been executed in favour of Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing
Society Limited or not? In the absence of any sale deed, it has to be necessarily construed that
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited does not have title to the remaining Ac. 119.00 Gts
of land in Sy.No 1007, Kukatpally Village.
41. The Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited is also well aware that they do not have
any title to Ac.119.00 gts., of land, as is evident from the pleading in the plaint in O.S.No.730 of 2001
on the file of the I-Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, filed by Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society Limited against the government officials and in which M/s. Prime
Properties got themselves impleaded as defendant No.6. O.S.No.730 of 2001 was filed by
Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited seeking injunction in respect of only Ac.167.00
gts., in Sy.No.1007 of HCJ & AARJ Kukatpally village, and not for the entire extent of Ac.286 gts.,
claimed by them. It is pertinent to note that in the interlocutory application filed in the said suit,
numbered as I.A.No.1038 of 2001, and the said interlocutory application was dismissed on 24.08.2001.
The learned trial Judge while dismissing the said I.A.No.1038 of 2001 has held as under:
..... On such consideration, I am to said (sic) that there is no prima facie title in favour of
the petitioner's society in view of the earlier proceedings between the same parties before
Competent Court of Law. As far as the balance of convenience is concerned the petitioner's
society cannot be said, has any legal possession of the property considering the fact that
there was no lay-out approved by the Competent Authority so as to divide the land into
plots and to sell the same to its members. Further, the land is taken possession by the
government to protect the same. The contention made on behalf of the 6th respondent that
the so called agreements of sale were brought into existence collusively in order to defeat
the rights of other parties deserves consideration. Therefore, the petitioner having failed to
establish prima facie case and balance of convenience cannot be said that it will be put to
serious loss and irreparable injury if no injunction is granted.
42. Subsequently, the main suit being O.S.No.730 of 2001 was also dismissed on 05.07.2006 for
default. The above order seems to have become final. For, there is nothing on record to show that the
said suit was either restored, or any appeal was filed against it.
43. It is necessary to see the legal position on Agreement of Sale and whether they confer any title.
HCJ & AARJ
44. In Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt.Ltd v. State of Haryana and others15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
at paras 11 and 12 held as under:
11. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an
agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.
.......
It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed
of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and
registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be
transferred.
12. Any contract of sale (agreement of sale) which is not a registered deed of conveyance
(deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of Transfer of
Property Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable
property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53A of Transfer of Property
Act). According to Transfer of Property Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession
or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act enacts
that sale of immoveable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an
agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter.
45. In Narandas Karsondas v. S.A.Kamtam and Anr.16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This
expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prosad v.
Ram Mohid Hazra (1967(1) SCR 293). The fiduciary character of the personal obligation
created by a contract of sale is recognized in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and
in AIR 2012 SC 206 (1977) 3 SCC 2417 HCJ & AARJ Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The
personal obligation created by a contractor of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer
of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of
property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein.
In India, the word 'transfer' is defined with reference to the word 'convey'. The word
'conveys' in Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying
ownership..... that only an execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to
another...
46. The learned Single Judge failed to take into consideration that the vendors of Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society Limited have neither disputed the genuineness of the document executed
in favour of Hashim Ali executed in the year 1952, nor the relationship of Hashim Ali, nor challenged
the compromise decree. A certified copy of the sale deed is placed on record. But the parties have not
questioned the genuineness or otherwise of the said document. Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing
Society Limited has merely made a bald statement that the document has never seen light of the day.
Once a document is executed by the vendor, and the same is registered in favour of a vendee, the
vendor will lose all his rights, title, interest, possession over the same. Mir Fazilath Hussain and eight
others who are claiming title to the property in question through Nawab Rayees Yar Jung cannot get a
better title than that of their father, Nawab Rayees Yar Jung, as long as the document is registered one
and there is no dispute with regard to the genuineness of the said document, the legality or validity of
the said document cannot be questioned. Merely because the document did not see the light of the day
does not mean that it is a sham and a bogus document.
47. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that in the suit filed by Hashim Ali i.e., O.S.No.122/1973, all the
legal heirs of late Nawab Rayees Yar HCJ & AARJ Jung were arrayed as party defendants and they
have entered into a compromise in the said suit and the lands to the extent of Acs.340.00 in Sy.No.1007
of Kukatpally village had fallen to the share of Hashim Ali. Even in the said suit, the legal heirs of
Nawab Rayees Yar Jung Bahadur did not dispute the legality or the genuineness of the document.
Thus, the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others, who are claiming through
Mir Fazilath Hussain, cannot question the document which is executed in the year 1952 in favour of
Hashim Ali. All the sale deeds obtained by Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited are
subject matter of the four suits filed by M/s.Prime Properties to set aside the sale deeds themselves
48. Coming to the 3rd point with regard to the nature of the land, it is the specific case of Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society Limited that they have obtained a layout from the Gram Panchayat and
divided the land into almost 2,000 plots, the said stand is contrary to the stand taken in O.S.No.730 of
2001 filed by them. Moreover, they have stated that the subject land is covered by flyovers, roads,
common areas, parts etc., many of the individual plots owners, have applied to the concerned
Department for getting the plots regularized under the Layout Regularization Scheme, and applied to
the government under the provisions of the ULC Act for getting their individual plots regularized, and
paid substantial amount. When Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited themselves have
pleaded that the lands have been converted into plots and there are roads, flyovers, parks, common
areas etc., in the subject land, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge that the lands in
question are basically agricultural lands cannot be countenanced. It is well established principle of law
that any case has to stand or fall on HCJ & AARJ the basis of the pleadings made by the
plaintiff/petitioner who has approached the Court and not on the weakness of the defendant/respondent.
The Society on one hand cannot say that the subject land is converted into plots and covered by roads,
flyovers, drainage pipes etc., to suit their needs, and yet, on the other hand take a stand that the lands
are Agricultural lands, in order to defeat the claim of M/s. Prime Properties. Obviously, the nature of
the land will not change according to the whims and fancies of a party. Having taken a specific stand
that the land is converted into plots, that there are flyovers, roads, open areas, parks etc., in the subject
land, the Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited cannot turn around and take a contra
stand, that the lands are agricultural lands. For, a party cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold
simultaneously. In order to see if the provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act or ULC Act are
application or not, it is important to extract some of the provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act as
well as the relevant provisions of the ULC Act.
49. The object of the Agricultural Ceiling Act is as under:-
An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the fixation of ceiling on agricultural
holdings and taking over the surplus lands and to provide for the matters connected
therewith.
50. Section 3(j) of the Agricultural Ceiling Act defines the land as under:
'land' means land which is used or is capable of being used for purposes of agriculture, or
for purposes ancillary thereto, including horticulture, forest land, pasture land, plantation
and top; and includes land deemed to be agricultural land under this Act.
(Emphasis added) HCJ & AARJ
51. While Section 2(o) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 defines the 'urban land'
as "urban land" means, -
(i) any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master
plan; or
(ii) in a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban
land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the
local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called), a notified area committee, a town area
committee, a city and town committee, a small town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat,
But does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture.
Explanation - For the purpose of this clause and clause
(q), -
(A) "agriculture" includes horticulture, but does not include -
(i) raising of grass,
(ii) dairy farming,
(iii) poultry farming,
(iv) breeding of live-stock, and
(v) such cultivation, or the growing of such plant, as may be prescribed:
(B) land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land
is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of
agriculture:
Provided that where on any land which is entered in the revenue or land records before the
appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture, there is a building which is not in the
nature of a farmhouse, then, so much of the extent of such HCJ & AARJ land as is
occupied by the building shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of
agriculture:
Provided further that if any question arises whether any building is in the nature of a farm-
house, such question shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State
Government thereon shall be final;
(C) Notwithstanding, anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation, land shall not
be deemed tobe mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in
the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture;
52. Section 2(q) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 defines the 'vacant land' as:
"vacant land" means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an
urban agglomeration, but does not include -
(i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building
regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated;
(ii) in an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building
which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day with the
approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building; and
(iii) in an area where there are no building regulations, the land occupied by any building
which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the
land appurtenant to such building:
Provided that where any person ordinarily keeps his cattle, other than for the purpose of
dairy farming or for the purpose of breeding of live-stock, on any land situated in a village
within an urban agglomeration (described as a village in the revenue records), then, so
much extent of the land as has been ordinarily used for the keeping of such cattle
immediately HCJ & AARJ before the appointed day shall not be deemed tobe vacant land
for the purposes of this clause.
53. Section 6 of the ULC Act deals with persons holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file
statement, and the same is extracted hereunder:
(1) Every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of
this Act shall, within such period as may be prescribed, file a statement before the
competent authority having Jurisdiction specifying the location, extent, value and such
other particulars as may be prescribed of all vacant land and of any other land on which
there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held by him (including the
nature of his right, title or interest therein) and also specifying the vacant land within the
ceiling limit which he desires to retain:
Provided that in relation to any State to which this Act applie4s in the first instance, the
provisions of this sub-secton shall have effect as if for the words "Every person holding
vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit land the commencement of this Act", the words,
figures and letters "Every person who held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit on or
after the 17th day of February, 1975 and before the commencement of this Act and every
person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at such commencement" had been
substituted.
Explanation - In this section, "commencement of this Act" means -
(i) the date on which this Act comes into force in any State;
(ii) where any land, not being vacant land, situated in a State in which this Act is in force
has become vacant land by any reason whatsoever, the date on which such land becomes
vacant land;
HCJ & AARJ
(iii) where any notification has been issued under clause
(n) of Section 2 in respect of any area in a State in which this Act is in force, the date of
publication of such notification.
...........
54. Section 7 of the ULC Act deals with filing of statement in cases where vacant land held by a person
is situated within the jurisdiction of two or more competent authorities, and the same is extracted
hereunder:
(1) Where a person holds vacant land situated within the jurisdiction of two or more
competent authorities, whether in the same State or in two or more States to which this Act
applies, then, he shall file his statement under sub-section (1) of Section 6 before the
competent authority within the jurisdiction of which the major part thereof is situated and
thereafter all subsequent proceedings shall be taken before that competent authority to the
exclusion of the other competent authority or authorities concerned and the competent
authority, before which the statement is filed, shall send intimation thereof to the other
competent authority or authorities concerned.
(2) Where the extent of vacant land held by any person and situated within the jurisdiction
of two or more competent authorities within the same State to which this Act applied is
equal, he shall file his statement under sub-section (1) of Section 6 before any one of the
competent authorities and send intimation thereof in such form as may be prescribed to the
State Government and thereupon, the State Government shall, by order, determine the
competent authority before which all subsequent proceedings under this Act shall be taken
to the exclusion of the other competent authority or authorities and communicate that order
to such person and the competent authorities concerned.
(3) Where the extent of vacant land held by any person and situated within the jurisdiction
of two or more competent authorities in two or more States to which this Act applies is
equal, he shall file his statement under sub-section (1) of HCJ & AARJ Section 6 before
any one of the competent authorities and send intimation thereof in such form as may be
prescribed to the Central Government and thereupon the Central Government shall, by
order, determine the competent authority before which all subsequent proceedings shall be
taken to the exclusion of the other competent authority or authorities and communicate that
order to such person, the State Governments and the competent authorities concerned
55. Ultimately, what has to be seen is that whether the lands can be put to agricultural use or not. When
the land is incapable of being used for the purpose of agriculture, or for the purposes of ancillary to
agriculture, the nature of the land cannot be termed as "agricultural". Therefore, with the efflux of time,
the very character of the land has undergone a sea change, and admittedly, the same are converted into
plots, drainage line laid, roads are laid, flyovers and predominantly are used for the purpose of non-
agricultural use. Therefore, it cannot be said that the provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act will
apply.
56. The learned Single Judge has erred in holding the subject land as agricultural land, and on relying
upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinhju Jadeja which was
mainly dealing with the Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, of the State of Gujarat and more
particularly "bid lands". While dealing with the various contentions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after
duly considering the fact that even prior to the coming into force of the ULC Act, the 'bid lands' had
come under the definition of 'agriculture' as defined under Section 2 (17) and 2 (1) of the 1960 Act.
The bid lands are the lands mainly used for grazing by cattle or for cutting grass in the tenure lands
held by Girasdar or Barkhalidar. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that "Under the 1976 Act
while defining "vacant land", the said definition specifically excludes a "land" used for HCJ & AARJ
the purpose of "agriculture". The definition of "urban land" again makes the position clear that any
land situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan would exclude any
such land which is mainly used for the purpose of "agriculture". Under Explanation (A) to Section 2(o)
such of those lands which are used for "raising of grass" stood excluded from the use of "agriculture".
It is worthwhile to note that the "land used for grazing" has however not been specifically excluded
from the definition of "agriculture" in the said Explanation (A). The conspectus consideration of the
above provisions leads us to conclude that the apparent purport and intent, therefore, was to exclude
lands used for agriculture from the purview of the 1976 Act which would enable the holders of lands of
such character used for agriculture to be benefited by protecting their holdings even if such lands are
within the urban agglomeration limits and thereby depriving the competent authority from seeking to
acquire those lands as excess lands in the hands of the holder of such lands."
57. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to hold that once the ULC Act came to be repealed, whatever
constitutional embargo that was existing as against the 1960 Act as well as the 1974 Amendment Act
ceased to exist and the Gujarat Act would operate in full force.
58. But in the present case, the facts are completely different. As per the pleading of the Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others, the land was converted into plots, and covered by
roads, flyovers, parks etc. Therefore, the above decision is not applicable to the facts of this case.
59. It is also pertinent to note that in the four suits filed by M/s. Prime Properties, the Bhagyanagar
Cooperative Housing Society has HCJ & AARJ filed written statements wherein they have taken a
specific stand, which is extracted below:
15. The defendant submits that the land was laid out into plots and developmental activities
were taken up. The entire land now consists of the plots, metal roads, underground
drainage system, etc. The society had constructed two huge overhead tanks for the purpose
of storing of drinking water. Even electric poles are laid to a certain extent by the
Electricity Board. The defendant society had laid out 1800 plots and allotted to its members
and out of that 1100 plots were converted through registered sale deeds. The members of
the defendant society are in possession of the plots from the date of respective
allotment/conveyance.
60. Moreover, the individual plot owners who have purchased plots from Bhagya Nagar Coop.
Housing Society have filed applications for regularization of their plots under G.O.Ms.No.455, dated
29.07.2002, which was issued by the government for regularizing the surplus land under the ULC Act.
These applications make it abundantly clear that the lands in question are all individual plots, which by
no stretch of imagination can be used for "agricultural purposes". Hence, the finding of the learned
Single Judge that the lands are "agricultural in nature" is not correct and same is contrary to the record.
61. As a corollary, once it is held that the lands are no longer agricultural lands, the provisions of the
Agricultural Ceiling Act will not apply, and the 5th point is answered accordingly insofar as the subject
lands are concerned.
62. With regard to the 4th point, it is necessary to mention that the rigor of Section 22-A of the
Registration Act, makes it mandatory on the part of the registering authority to decline any document
which is HCJ & AARJ prohibited under Section 22-A of the Registration Act. As rightly pointed out by
the learned Senior Counsel, that unless and until the lands are published in the list of prohibition
maintained by the registration authorities, the registration of the said document cannot be stopped.
63. For the purpose of better adjudication, Section 22-A of the Registration Act is extracted hereunder:-
Prohibition of registration of certain documents:-
(1) The following classes of documents shall be prohibited from registration, namely:-
(a) documents relating to transfer of immovable property, the alienation or transfer of

which is prohibited under any statute of the State or Central Government;
(b) documents relating to transfer of property by way of sale, agreement of sale, gift,
exchange or lease in respect of immovable property owned by the State or Central
Government, executed by persons other than those statutorily empowered to do so;
(c) documents relating to transfer of property by way of sale, agreement of sale, gift,
exchange or lease exceeding (ten) 10 years in respect of immovable property, owned by
Religious and Charitable Endowments falling under the purview of the Andhra Pradesh
Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 or by Wakfs
falling under the Wakfs Act, 1995 executed by persons other than those statutorily
empowered to do so;
(d) Agricultural or urban lands declared as surplus under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms
(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 or the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation)Act, 1976;
(e) any documents or class of documents pertaining to the properties the State Government
may, by notification prohibit the registration in which avowed or accured interest HCJ &
AARJ of Central and State Governments, local bodies, educational, cultural, Religious and
Charitable Institutions, those attached by Civil, Criminal, Revenue Courts and Direct and
Indirect Tax Laws and other which are likely to adversely affect these interests.
(2) For the purpose of clause (e) of sub-section (1), the State Government shall publish a
notification after obtaining reasons for and full description of properties furnished by the
District Collectors concerned in the manner as may be prescribed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the registering officer shall refuse to
register any document to which a notification issued under clause (e) of sub-section (1);
(4) The State Government either suo moto or on an application by any person or for giving
effect to the final orders of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh or Supreme Court of India
may proceed to de-notify, either in full or in part, the notification issued un sub-section (2).
64. The contention of Sri M. V. Durga Prasad and other Counsels appearing on behalf of the
respondents that even without there being any publication of the prohibited properties, Section 22-A (a)
to (d) make it mandatory that the person presenting the document should comply with those provisions,
and unless and until they complied with the said provisions, the document is bound to be rejected has
to be brushed aside. Once it is held that the lands are not agricultural lands, the provisions of the
Agricultural Ceiling Act will no longer apply and the above provision cannot be relied. Moreover, as
seen from the record, the registration authorities are allowing the registration of documents in respect
of the very Sy.No.1007.
65. Coming to the last point i.e., whether the order of status quo is a bar for registration of document, it
is seen that the learned Single HCJ & AARJ Judge mainly relied on the counter filed by the Receiver in
Contempt Petition (C) No.1583-84 of 2017 in SLP(C) Nos.18163 of 2010 and 11595 of 2009 filed by
Bhagya Nagar Plot Owner Welfare Association. The learned Single Judge concluded that the Receiver
did not hand over the possession of the land to M/s. Prime Properties. But the learned Single Judge
failed to take into consideration that under the heading 'Reply on Merits', the Receiver had stated as
under:
.... It is respectfully submitted that it is not the Answering Respondent who has released the
property but it is Respondent No.4 i.e. M/s Prime Properties who has themselves resumed
possession of the suit land on the strength of the judgment dated 20.03.2009 passed by the
Hon'ble High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.6697 of 2004 without intervention of Ld.
Trial Court and Receiver.
66. The Hon'ble Supreme Court basing on the reply filed by the said Receiver, has closed the Contempt
Petition. Moreover, the learned Single Judge has failed to take into consideration that in the suit filed
by Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing Society, in the year 2001, the learned trial Judge in I.A.No.1038
of 2001 in O.S.No.730 of 2001 gave a categorical finding that Bhagyanagar Cooperative Housing
Society was not in possession and declined to grant interim injunction and dismissed the I.A.
67. It is also pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.10128 of 2018
(arising out of SLP (C) No.20052/2018) filed by M/s. Prime Properties, has held as under:
7) .... We are of the view that at least one thing is clear and that is that the partnership firm
was not the owner of the aforesaid property. Therefore, the High Court was not correct in
thereafter going into the merits as to ownership, which is pending in several proceedings
between the parties. We, therefore, set HCJ & AARJ aside the orders dated 23.02.2018,
20.03.2009 as well as the order dated 22.11.2004.
8) We have been informed of the various proceedings between the parties, as mentioned
hereinabove, including suits, pending between the parties. This being the case, we direct
that status quo with regard to possession, as of today, shall continue until further orders are
made in these proceedings at the behest of any of the parties.
(emphasis supplied)
68. The above order was passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 01.10.2018. A reading of the above
makes it abundantly clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while setting aside the orders, dated
23.02.2018, 20.03.2009 and 22.11.2004, was conscious of the fact that M/s. Prime Properties was in
possession of the land in question and as such, in the above order it was held as under "status quo with
regard to possession as on today shall continue until further orders". M/s. Prime Properties asserted
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that subsequent to the order of the Hon'ble High Court in CRP
No.6697 of 2004, dated 20.03.2009, M/s. Prime Properties had taken possession of the subject land. If
the same was not the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court could have definitely passed the order of status
quo "as on the date of dismissal of I.A.No.811 of 2004 in I.A.No.1108 of 2001 in O.S.No.3308 of
1984, dated 22.11.2004" ante but not "as on today" (i.e. 01.10.2018). The learned Single Judge having
held that mere registration of the document will not be in violation of the orders of the status quo of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, ought not to have gone further into the surmises and conjectures and to
conclude that "as per the terms and conditions of the Joint Development Agreement (JDA), the future
acts and obligations of the parties to the JDA would result in violation of the status quo". If after the
registration of the document, the parties do anything more in furtherance of the JDA, which amounts to
violating the order of the HCJ & AARJ status quo, it is for them to face the consequences, and not for
the Courts to speculate as to what will happen in the future. The aggrieved parties have a remedy under
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and if so they are advised they are bound to take some steps to get
the contemnors punished.
69. The contention of M/s. Prime Properties that the claim set up by M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd.,
is a bogus one as the person by name Hashim Ali is an imposter, and he is not the real grandson of
Nawab Rayees Yar Jung, this fact is evident from the letter, dated 09.09.2014, addressed by the
Assistant Commissioner of Police to the Public Prosecutor of this High Court, counter of the Police
filed in W.P.No.14696 of 2014, the affidavit of Hashim Ali filed in Criminal Petition No.6007 of 2014
before this Court admitting that he is not the real son of Nawab Rayees Yar Jung.
70. It is pertinent to note that Hashim Ali filed an affidavit in Crl.P.No.6607 of 2014, and, at para 3 and
8, he stated as under:-
I submit that through me got filed a false private complaint filed which is registered as FIR
No.305 of 2014 of KPHB Police Station against Syed Sadiq Mohiuddin and others
(petitioners herein and one Yaseen Shakir, Petitioner in Crl.P.No.9501 of 2014), styling
myself as Hashim Ali son of Mohammed Ali, born in 1950 and falsely as owner of land
insyno.1007 and 1009 of Kukatpally village, purchased under sale deed Doc.707 of 1952,
dated 2.5.1952 and under decree in O.S.No.122 of 1973 and 189 of 1974 whereas I am not
the said Hashim Ali and I am not the purchaser under Sale Deed Doc.No.707 of 1952
which is evidence as I was born (on 14.05.1952) subsequent to the sale deed itself and I
have nothing to do anything with the properties mentioned in the said sale deed and decree
in O.S.No.122 of 1973 as I am not the plaintiff mentioned therein. As such I have no
concern HCJ & AARJ with lands in Sy.Nos.1007 and 1009 of Kukatpally village or with
Prime Properties.
I submit that since, a false complaint was made in my name registered as FIR No.305 of
2014 of KPHB Colony Police Station, Kukatpally and the above petition is filed to quash
the same, I respectfully submit that the petition may be allowed and the FIR may be
quashed. I admit my identity documents filed by the petitioners in the above case as true
and correct. I submit that I am innocent and I have been used by several others as
submitted above and I have been made party to several suits without my knowledge. I also
filed Written Statement in O.S.No.756 of 2018 admitting my true identity.
71. Basing on the said affidavit filed by the complainant, this Court vide Order, dated 28.01.2019, in
Crl.P.Nos.6007 and 9501 of 2014, has passed the following common order:-
From several contentions raised by the Counsel for the petitioners, coming to the counter of
the 2nd respondent-de facto complainant, it is stated ultimately at paras 8 and 9 to allow the
petition by quashing the FIR so far as against the petitioners in Cr.No.305 of 2014 of
KPHB Colony Police Station, Kukatpally, which is virtually settlement between the
accused and the de facto complainant to compound the non- compoundable offence though
no such petition is filed.
By considering to that extent, the Criminal Petitions are allowed by quashing the
proceedings in Cr.No.305 of 2014 of KPHB Colony Police Station, Kukatpally against the
respective petitioners/A.1 to A.3 and A.4 and they are acquitted. Their bail bonds shall
stand cancelled.
72. Moreover, only an area of Ac.1.00 gts., is registered in favour of M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd.,
and the rest of the land is through agreements of sale executed by an impostor. Thus, these agreements
of sale do not pass on any title to the parties. Moreover, the very registration of the document in favour
of M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt.
HCJ & AARJ Ltd., belie their claim that there is a prohibition under Section 22-A of the Registration
Act.
73. All the Counsels have repeatedly pointed to the fact that the document which is sought to be
registered includes roads, flyover, parks etc., and the same cannot be permitted as they belong to the
Municipality. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has fairly submitted that they
will make necessary changes in the Joint Development Agreement and delete all areas which are
covered by roads, flyovers, parks etc.
74. In view of the above discussion, the Writ Appeals are allowed and the impugned common order
passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The Registering Authority shall receive and process the
subject document, subject to the appellants complying with the provisions of the Indian Registration
Act, 1908, and Indian Stamps Act, 1899. It will be open to the Registering Authority to refuse/receive
the document presented before him, if the authority have any other objection, by duly assigning the
reasons in support of such decision and communicate the said decision to the appellant. It is made clear
that mere registration of document does not confer title to the property, and does not prevent any party
to assert its title in any pending suits or otherwise.
75. In all these appeals, a third party impleadment petitions have been filed by the persons claiming
through Hashim Ali--the very same Hashim Ali who executed the sale deed and agreements of sale in
favour of M/s. Swagruha Projects Pvt. Ltd. In view of the discussion held at para 69, when the very
identity of the Hashim Ali is doubtful, and he himself has filed an affidavit in the High Court that he is
not the owner of the land in survey No.1007 and is not the grandson of HCJ & AARJ Nawab Rayees
Yar Jung, therefore any person claiming under him cannot get any right, title or interest in the subject
lands. The impleadment petitioners are claiming under an oral Hiba ("gift") and GPA, which does not
create any title, right or interest over the subject lands. If they are so advised, they are free to file civil
cases before the appropriate forum. But they do not have any locus to get themselves impleaded in the
present writ appeals. Hence, the impleadment petitions are dismissed.
76. Insofar as implead petitions filed by Munirunnisa Begum @ Muneer Hyder and another, who are
represented by GPA Holder - Mir Ahmed Ali Khan are concerned, they have not filed any document to
show that they are the legal heirs of Late Rais Yar Jung and Late Mir Fazilath Hussan, and they have a
share in the Estates of Late Nawab Salar Jung and Late Nawab Fakhrulmulk including the subject land.
They are free to work out their remedies in the pending suits. Hence, these implead petitions are also
dismissed.
77. It is also clarified by way of abundant caution that the observations made are for the purpose of this
case; they shall not be construed as making any comments or giving any finding on the merits or
demerits of the case. The authorities/Courts shall deal with the cases on its own merits uninfluenced by
any observation/finding recorded herein.
78. It is further clarified that the rights of the respective parties shall be subject to the orders made in
the pending proceedings between the parties, as ordered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal
No.10128 of 2018 by its order dated 1.10.2018.
HCJ & AARJ The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order
as to costs.
______________________________ RAGHVENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN, HCJ

__________________ A.ABHISHEK REDDY, J 29th June, 2020 smr/sur

M - S. Prime Properties Vs M - S. Bhagyanagar Plot Owners ... On 29 June, 2020

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12/8/23, 3:24 PM M/S. Prime Properties vs M/S. Bhagyanagar Plot Owners ...

Telangana High Court

HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN

I.A.No.1 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.493 of 2019,

I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.498 of 2019,

I.A.Nos.2 of 2020 and 1 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.499 of 2019,

I.A.Nos.1 and 3 of 2020 in/and W.A.No.500 of 2019,

I.A.No.1/2020 in/and W.A.No.508 of 2019,

ACE-HIBC PRIVATE LIMITEED

Rep.by its Authorized Signatory

Mr.Vellore Venkat Kamal Kumar ..Appellant

Smt.Sana Lakshmi Devi and others ..Respondents

Rep.by its Managing Director - B.Sudhakar]

And others .. Respondents

Smt.Sana Lakshmi Devi and others ... Respondents

ACE-HIBC PRIVATE LIMITEED

Rep.by its Authorized Signatory

Mr.Vellore Venkat Kamal Kumar ..Appellant

HCJ & AARJ

HCJ & AARJ

1. 13.06.1973 Ac.70.00 O.S.No.581/1994 27.02.1996 12/1996 2548/1996 15.04.1996

2. 18.10.1974 Ac.22.00 O.S.No.521/1984 21.06.1996 93/1996 1621/2001 22.08.1998

3. 15.09.1974 Ac.50.00 O.S.No.152/1984 25.04.1984 43/1991 8985/1992 27.12.1991

4. 18.01.1974 Ac.25.00 O.S.No.253/1985 27.01.1986 4/1986 8824/1994 27.06.1994

5. 20.06.1974 Ac.119.00 Total Ac.286.00

a) dissolution of the firm of partnership registered under Doc.No.2737/1980

d) cost of the suit to be awarded

HCJ & AARJ

HCJ & AARJ

HCJ & AARJ

HCJ & AARJ

HCJ & AARJ

(1980) 4 SCC 295 (2013) 2 SCC 300 HCJ & AARJ

(2016) 1 ALT 550 (FB) HCJ & AARJ

HCJ & AARJ

HCJ & AARJ

HCJ & AARJ

34. It is pertinent to extract Section 71 of the Registration Act.

HCJ & AARJ

Some of the functions like registration of documents/instruments may be in exercise of

(iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it,

Sl. Date of Extent Suit filed by Date of E.P.No. Doc.No

No. of Sale Society Limite

1. 13.06.1973 Ac.70.00 O.S.No.581/1994 27.02.1996 12/1996 2548/199

2. 18.10.1974 Ac.22.00 O.S.No.521/1984 21.06.1996 93/1996 1621/200

3. 15.09.1974 Ac.50.00 O.S.No.152/1984 25.04.1984 43/1991 8985/199

4. 18.01.1974 Ac.25.00 O.S.No.253/1985 27.01.1986 4/1986 8824/199

HCJ & AARJ

49. The object of the Agricultural Ceiling Act is as under:-

(Emphasis added) HCJ & AARJ

Explanation - For the purpose of this clause and clause

(A) "agriculture" includes horticulture, but does not include -

(i) raising of grass,

(ii) dairy farming,

(iii) poultry farming,

(iv) breeding of live-stock, and

(v) such cultivation, or the growing of such plant, as may be prescribed:

Explanation - In this section, "commencement of this Act" means -

HCJ & AARJ

(iii) where any notification has been issued under clause

Prohibition of registration of certain documents:-

(a) documents relating to transfer of immovable property, the alienation or transfer of