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Sekigahara: The Final Battle for Japan

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DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21856.84480

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SEKIGAHARA: THE FINAL BATTLE FOR JAPAN

Alan McAfee
HIST 482: History of Japan to 1800
University of Maryland University College
 1

Introduction

In most conflicts throughout world history, historians can often identify specific battles

which help to turn the tide of an overall conflict in favor of one side or another. In fewer cases,

there is a single pivotal battle which determines the outcome of an entire war. The battle that

took place in the vicinity of a small Japanese village called Sekigahara in 1600 did not only

determine the outcome of a war, it ​was​ the war. This single day’s military action would seal both

the fates of its two opposing commanders as well as that of the entire nation of Japan. This paper

will first explore Japan’s power dynamic in the years leading up to the final confrontation

between the forces of Ishida Mitsunari and Tokugawa Ieyasu in Sekigahara on October 21, 1600.

The focus will then shift to an analysis of the battle itself, and the individual troop movements

and actions which paved the way to total victory for Ieyasu. Finally, the battle’s aftermath and

Ieyasu’s subsequent consolidation of his newfound power will be discussed.

The Road to Sekigahara

The death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, second of the “three great unifiers” of Japan, left

control over the country in 1598 to two main councils comprised of his subordinates. One of

these was the Council of Commissioners, or ​bugyo​, a holdover from the previous government

organized by Oda Nobunaga and responsible for the day-to-day administration of the

now-unified country.​1​ This group of five seasoned bureaucrats included Ishida Mitsunari, a

________________________________

1. George Sansom, ​A History of Japan, 1334-1615​ (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

1961), 336.
 2

veteran general from Hideyoshi’s campaigns in Korea who had gained the favor of the late ​taiko

and rose to prominence through his skills in civil management rather than any particular military

proficiency.​2​ The other ruling group was the Council of Regents, or ​tairo​, the five strongest and

most loyal ​daimyo ​in Hideyoshi’s orbit, who were responsible for both the stewardship of the

empire in the name of his underage son Hideyori and the deciding of matters of great national

importance.​3​ The most powerful and influential member of the tairo was Tokugawa Ieyasu, a

lord of several provinces in eastern Japan who had initially stood against Hideyoshi after the

assassination of Nobunaga, but who through deft political maneuvering had thereafter assumed a

place of great prominence in Hideyoshi’s inner circle.​4

Ieyasu’s position as the most significant daimyo in Japan by the time of Hideyoshi’s

death was the result of a long history of successful military management and prudent

administrative decisions. Beginning his life as a hostage for first the Oda and then the Imagawa

clans,​5​ Ieyasu took charge of the middling Matsudaira family’s Mikawa domain upon gaining his

freedom in the obliteration of the Imagawa by his future liege lord, Nobunaga.​6​ First

consolidating the Matsudaira’s holdings inside Mikawa, Ieyasu then began to move on Imagawa

remnants in adjacent domains, while at the same time observing the role of subordinate ally to

________________________________

2. Anthony J. Bryant, ​Sekigahara 1600: The final struggle for power​ (Oxford: Osprey,
1995), 17.
3. Sansom, ​A History of Japan​, 336.
4. John Whitney Hall, “The bakuhan system,” in ​The Cambridge History of Japan,
Volume 4: Early Modern Japan,​ ed. John Whitney Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 136.
5. A. L. Sadler, ​Shogun: The Life of Tokugawa Ieyasu​ (Singapore: Tuttle, 1978), 6-8.
6. Ibid., 19.
 3

Nobunaga, his much stronger neighbor.​7​ In the following decades he fought many battles

alongside Nobunaga in the latter’s campaign of national conquest, gradually gaining both

experience and fame as a masterful commander of men.​8

When Nobunaga was assassinated in 1582 by his vassal Akechi Mitsuhide, Ieyasu did not

consider himself in a position to immediately mount a revenge offensive, and--showing his

predilection for attending to his own affairs first--made his way back to his home province of

Mikawa to regroup.​9​ Though this meant that Hideyoshi was able to seize the opportunity to

avenge Nobunaga and thus become the presumptive successor to the latter’s hegemony over

Japan,​10​ it also afforded Ieyasu time to further consolidate his own holdings and become even

more of a formidable force as the “lord of five provinces” in the Tokai region.​11​ In the years

between 1582 and 1586, Ieyasu actually fought against Hideyoshi under the cause of Nobunaga’s

oldest living son, Nobukatsu, though these limited skirmishes eventually ended with the

submission of Ieyasu’s coalition to the supremacy of Hideyoshi.​12

Because of Ieyasu’s now-unquestioned military prowess and his lucrative land holdings,

he was afforded great privilege in his relationship with his new lord. His position on the eastern

edge of Hideyoshi’s sphere of influence spared him from the burden of participation in

Hideyoshi’s subjugation of Shikoku and Kyushu.​13​ When Hideyoshi finally moved east against

________________________________

7. “Tokugawa Ieyasu,” ​The Samurai Archives Japanese History Page,​ accessed October
10, 2017, http://www.samurai-archives.com/ieyasu.html.
8. Ibid.
9. Sansom, ​A History of Japan​, 386.
10. Ibid., 311.
11. Sadler, ​Shogun​, 76.
12. Hall, “The bakuhan system,” 136.
13. “Tokugawa Ieyasu,” ​The Samurai Archives.​
 4

the Hojo clan to complete his dominance over Japan, Ieyasu’s forces became the tip of the spear,

and Ieyasu was thereafter made lord over six of the eight provinces on the Kanto plain,

cementing his position as the richest single daimyo in Japan.​14​ It was this position of affluence

and power that Ieyasu would hold--and continue to foster--throughout Hideyoshi’s reign and into

the period of uncertainty afterward.

Ieyasu’s considerable influence made him a natural locus of power in the post-Hideyoshi

political landscape. As the strongest of the five tairo and thus the most powerful person in the

country, he was not subject to the desires of any living man but only to the final will of

Hideyoshi. However, Ieyasu’s movements to consolidate power after Hideyoshi’s death began to

draw the attention and sometimes the ire of his fellow government officials. In particular,

Ieyasu’s continued political strategizing through the marrying off of his children became a major

point of contention between Ieyasu and the other tairo, a conflict that was stoked by the

machinations of Ishida Mitsunari.​15​ Though this particular disagreement between the tairo was

eventually settled peacefully, Ieyasu had made an enemy in Mitsunari, who continued to sow

seeds of discord among Ieyasu’s peers.​16​ Eventually Mitsunari even took matters into his own

hands by attempting to have Ieyasu assassinated, but was unsuccessful.​17​ Upon learning of

Mitsunari’s plot, several generals loyal to Ieyasu moved on their own to eliminate the

treacherous bugyo, but Ieyasu himself intervened by protecting Mitsunari from danger and

________________________________

14. Hall, “The bakuhan system,” 137.

15. Sansom, ​A History of Japan​, 389.
16. Ibid., 390.
17. Sadler, ​Shogun​, 136.
 5

returning him to his own castle in Omi province.​18​ Theories abound on the exact reasons why

Ieyasu spared Mitsunari’s life, but the general consensus among historians seems to be that

Ieyasu sensed the inevitability of an eventual challenge to his growing power, and that

Mitsunari’s continued survival gave him a way to more easily predict the form such a challenge

would take.​19, 20, 21, 22

The challenge that Ieyasu anticipated did indeed begin to take shape in the early months

of 1600. It was at this time that Mitsunari’s ally Uesugi Kagekatsu, one of the five tairo

comprising the Council of Regents with Ieyasu, returned to his domain of Aizu in northern

Honshu and began swiftly to fortify his castle’s defenses in preparation for war.​23​ As Aizu was

situated in the rear of Tokugawa territory, Ieyasu considered the action to be a threat against

himself, and prepared to move his forces northward to attack Kagekatsu.​24​ Understanding that

vacating central Honshu to fight a conflict elsewhere would prompt the other allies of Mitsunari

to seize their own chance to move against him, Ieyasu called upon his friends in the Date and

Mogami clans to keep Kagekatsu busy while he took his time arriving.​25​ All things considered,

Ieyasu’s movement against the Uesugi was, in effect, a feint. Relying on the Date and Mogami to

protect his northern territories, Ieyasu was able to lead his army in a leisurely march while

________________________________

18. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 10-12.

19. Ibid.
20. Sansom, ​A History of Japan,​ 391.
21. Sadler, ​Shogun​, 137.
22. Paul K. Davis, ​100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present (​ Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 205.
23. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 34-36.
24. Sansom, ​A History of Japan,​ 391.
25. Sadler, ​Shogun​, 141.
 6

keeping close watch on any other allies of Mitsunari who might be planning to strike at him from

the west.​26​ Such was the foresight of Ieyasu that he specifically chose to make an overnight stop

in Fushimi castle, where his old ally Torii Mototada was stationed, to prepare for its crucial

defense once hostilities began.​27

As could be expected, Mitsunari chose to use Ieyasu’s march on Kagekatsu as an excuse

to begin his campaign against Ieyasu in earnest. He took up the cause of Hideyoshi’s heir

Hideyori and assembled a coalition of loyalist daimyo to march eastward against Ieyasu,​28​ whose

actions Mitsunari decried as an affront to the peace and stability of Japan.​29​ However, since

Ieyasu had not yet become entangled in any fighting against the Uesugi forces, he was free to

rearrange his army to face this new threat. The early attention that Ieyasu had given to Fushimi

castle would prove to be prescient, as it took Mitsunari ten days and 3000 men to finally occupy

the fortress.​30

By the time of Fushimi’s defeat, Ieyasu was back in his capital of Edo, where he was able

to begin preparing for the final battle against Mitsunari. Ieyasu decided to split his army into

three large forces of around 30,000 men each.​31​ One of these would be commanded by Ieyasu’s

son Hidetada and would take the Nakasendo road, moving north out of Edo.​32​ Another similarly

sized detachment would be commanded by Ieyasu’s allies, moving along the Tokaido road

________________________________

26. Sansom, ​A History of Japan,​ 392.

27. Ibid., 391.
28. Ibid., 392.
29. Hall, “The bakuhan system,” 143.
30. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 38.
31. Ibid., 41.
32. Sansom, ​A History of Japan,​ 392.
 7

westward toward Osaka.​33​ Ieyasu himself would command the third force and follow his allies

down the Tokaido.​34​ All three of these armies were to converge in late October of 1600 on the

province of Mino, the strategic importance of which had previously been established in the time

of Nobunaga.​35​ However, only two of the three detachments would actually arrive in Mino in

time for the pivotal battle of Sekigahara. Ieyasu’s son Hidetada disobeyed his father’s direct

orders to bypass the loyalist stronghold of Ueda castle, and instead decided to lay siege to it, an

action that would prove fruitless.​36​ Thus the Nakasendo branch of the Tokugawa army was

rendered completely ineffectual. The vanguard of Ieyasu’s Tokaido force did meet its goals,

however, and was able to capture the Mino fortress of Gifu castle by the beginning of October.​37

Ieyasu himself finally joined them on October 17th, and the combined force established a

headquarters to the southwest in the village of Akasaka.​38

Mitsunari during this time had been undertaking his own efforts to prepare to meet

Ieyasu’s forces. Moving east from Osaka with his army, Mitsunari worked to turn more daimyo

to the cause of Hideyori. He was able to extract promises of loyalty from many, including his

former enemy Kobayakawa Hideaki, to whom Mitsunari promised grand titles once Ieyasu had

been pacified.​39​ Hideaki had harbored great resentment toward Mitsunari after the latter had

criticized his competence during Hideyoshi’s invasions of the Korean peninsula, and it was

________________________________

33. Ibid.
34. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 41.
35. Sansom, ​A History of Japan,​ 392-393.
36. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 43-44.
37. Sansom, ​A History of Japan,​ 393.
38. Ibid.
39. “Kobayakawa Hideaki,” ​The Samurai Archives Japanese History Page,​ accessed
October 10, 2017, http://www.samurai-archives.com/hideaki.html.
 8

Mitsunari’s hope that this ill will could be smoothed over by giving Hideaki enough incentives.​40

Indeed, Hideaki at first appeared to acquiesce to Mitsunari’s plea, joining in the siege of Fushimi

castle and later moving to take a strategic position on the slopes of Mt. Matsuo above the village

of Sekigahara.​41​ However, Hideaki’s true loyalty was not totally assured, and he would

eventually turn against Mitsunari when the crucial time came.

The Battle

Mitsunari’s forces had made decent progress and were in a formidable position by the

time Ieyasu established his headquarters in Akasaka. Mitsunari had successfully captured Ogaki

castle--a major choke point between Ieyasu’s forces and Osaka--and his nominal ally Hideaki

was in a highly advantageous position should Ieyasu try to circumvent the fortress.​42​ Using

Hideaki’s mountain location in the southwest as a basis for his own strategy, on October 20th

Mitsunari moved the main body of his forces out of Ogaki castle to a complementary defensive

position in the hills surrounding the Sekigahara valley.​43​ From his command center in Akasaka,

Ieyasu received news of this deployment, and began to move his own forces to meet the loyalists

in an all-in confrontation.​44​ Even though the situation on its face appeared to heavily favor

Mitsunari--his forces held all of the high ground around Sekigahara and Ieyasu would be forced

into taking the offensive--Ieyasu had knowledge that Mitsunari did not. A message had reached

________________________________

40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 49-51.
43. Davis, ​100 Decisive Battles,​ 206.
44. Sansom, ​A History of Japan,​ 393.
 9

Ieyasu from Hideaki on October 14th, indicating that the latter would be willing to pledge his

assistance in support of the Eastern coalition.​45​ Ieyasu therefore was not concerned about the

apparently overwhelming array of enemies that faced him from on high as he marched into

Sekigahara, as he knew that when the time came to fight, Mitsunari’s crucial flank would be

completely exposed.

In the early morning of October 21st, 1600, the battlefield of Sekigahara was a

rain-soaked expanse of mud, and visibility was extremely poor due to a thick fog.​46​ As Ieyasu’s

vanguard (led by Fukushima Masanori) advanced toward Mitsunari’s forces, it suddenly

encountered a detachment of the enemy, and both sides were so startled by this that each

retreated rather than engaging.​47​ By sunrise, visibility on the battlefield had improved, and Ieyasu

decided that the time to commence the battle had come.​48​ He thus ordered the forward part of his

central force to advance and engage the enemy. Masanori began this push, but encountered

competition from his allies in Ii Naomasa’s “red devil” corps, a group of crimson-clad shock

troops who were also stationed at the center of the line.​49​ Together the two units made headway

into Mitsunari’s line, attacking the central position of Ukita Hideie.​50​ However, this advance

stalled, and with the muddy conditions from the previous day’s heavy rain soon devolved into a

________________________________

45. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 47.

46. Ibid., 55.
47. Davis, ​100 Decisive Battles,​ 206.
48. Ibid., 207.
49. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 56-57.
50. Ibid., 58.
 10

“slugging match” between the Fukushima and the Ukita ranks.​51​ Next to Ukita Hideie’s forces in

the loyalist center was a smaller unit under the command of the veteran general Shimazu

Yoshihiro. Despite repeated pleas from Mitsunari for his forces to engage and assist Hideie,

Yoshihiro did not order his troops to move.​52​ But Mitsunari had his own problems in his position

on the slopes of Mt. Sasao. Ieyasu’s right flank, a combination of units led by Kuroda Nagamasa,

Hosokawa Tadaoki, and others was pressing on fiercely toward Mitsunari’s command post.​53

Though their spirited advance was successfully stalled, Mitsunari found his forces in an overall

stalemate with those of Ieyasu.​54​ It was at this point that Mitsunari needed his ally Kobayakawa

Hideaki’s help the most.

Hideaki’s forces on Mt. Matsuo had watched the morning’s hostilities without showing

any intention to move from their positions. By this point, both Mitsunari and Ieyasu were

becoming anxious about Hideaki’s intent.​55​ Mitsunari decided it was time to light the signal fires

that were to be Hideaki’s cue to sweep down the mountain into Ieyasu’s right flank, but Hideaki

saw the fires and did not stir.​56​ Ieyasu, wishing to force Hideaki to make up his mind, ordered his

matchlock gunners to fire on the latter’s position.​57​ This tactic produced the desired effect in

Hideaki, and he moved his forces down the mountain and into the right flank of a loyalist unit

from the Otani clan.​58​ Suspecting Hideaki’s possible treachery because of his failure to move

________________________________

51. Davis, ​100 Decisive Battles,​ 207.

52. Sadler, ​Shogun​, 155.
53. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 60.
54. Ibid., 65-66.
55. Sadler, ​Shogun​, 155.
56. Ibid.
57. Davis, ​100 Decisive Battles,​ 207.
58. Ibid.
 11

when signaled, the general Otani Yoshitsugu was already decently prepared for this move, and

quickly turned half of his men to meet Hideaki’s charge.​59​ Unfortunately for Mitsunari, the

addition of Hideaki’s forces to the Eastern army became too much to contain, and the right flank

of the loyalists began to fall to the combined might of Hideaki and the stalwart Fukushima

Masanori.​60​ Victory was no longer within Mitsunari’s grasp, and he was forced to retreat.

What followed was a gradual dismantling of the remaining loyalist forces. Shimazu

Yoshihiro, having waited until the retreat of Mitsunari to engage his troops in combat, was

quickly outmatched and had to effect his own perilous retreat.​61​ Moving away from the

battlefield around Mt. Nangu, the Shimazu encountered the Chosokabe, who had yet to arrive at

the battle. The word was passed that the loyalist forces had already been defeated, and so the last

remaining reinforcements were prompted to retreat.​62​ Once the last fighting had ended and the

loyalists who had not fled had been eliminated, Ieyasu made camp and began to call his generals

before him to commend them for his victory.​63​ Two days after the battle of Sekigahara, Ieyasu’s

forces moved on the Ishida stronghold of Sawayama, crushing it and causing the deaths of

Mitsunari’s remaining family members.​64​ Mitsunari himself was captured and handed over to

Ieyasu shortly thereafter, and without much delay was brought to Kyoto and executed.​65

________________________________

59. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 72.

60. Davis, ​100 Decisive Battles,​ 207.
61. Bryant, ​Sekigahara,​ 76.
62. Ibid., 76-77.
63. Sadler, ​Shogun​, 158.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid. 159-161.
 12

After Sekigahara

Ieyasu spent the years following Sekigahara on a quest to consolidate his position as the

undisputed ruler of Japan. He used his newfound dominance to rearrange fiefs in order to punish

his enemies and reward those who fought for him.​66​ In 1603, Ieyasu’s assumed authority became

such that the emperor finally declared him ​shogun,​ thereby allowing him to formally usurp the

authority of Hideyoshi’s heir Hideyori.​67​ However, Ieyasu was careful not to press his advantage

too far against the Toyotomi house. There were still many daimyo throughout Japan who

remained loyal to the memory of Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu was forced to treat Hideyori with

deference, allowing the latter to remain safely in Osaka castle while Ieyasu asserted his authority

elsewhere.​68​ By 1614 though, he was ready to strike the ​coup de grace.​ Accusing Hideyori of

insulting him through some manufactured pretense, Ieyasu laid siege to Osaka castle.​69​ Within

the span of a few months, the castle had fallen and Hideyori was dead along with his infant son,

finally destroying the house of Toyotomi.​70

Conclusion

The Sekigahara campaign of Tokugawa Ieyasu had extremely comprehensive effects for

Japanese society. It established a ruling house and an overall way of life that was not to be

dismantled for over two centuries, and it ensured an equally long period of peace and prosperity

________________________________

66. Gary R. Saxonhouse, “The stability of megaorganizations: The Tokugawa state,”

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics​ 151, no. 4 (1995): 741-742.
67. “Tokugawa Ieyasu,” ​The Samurai Archives​.
68. Sansom, ​A History of Japan,​ 397.
69. Ibid., 398.
70. “Tokugawa Ieyasu,” ​The Samurai Archives​.
 13

for the Japanese people. That these results were due mostly to the outcome of a single battle was

extraordinary, and a testament to the strategic plans of both Ieyasu and his enemy Ishida

Mitsunari. Though skirmishes and sieges did take place in other areas of Japan before the battle

of Sekigahara, none of these would turn out to lend much of an advantage to either side. Before

the forces of the Western and Eastern coalitions met on the battlefield on October 21st, 1600,

nothing was decided. Ieyasu and Mitsunari both had every confidence in their abilities, and their

armies were more or less evenly matched. It was only the vagaries of chance and the decisions of

men on the ground that finally gave Ieyasu his victory. And because each side had committed all

of its hopes on the outcome of this battle, a single day of fighting was enough to make Ieyasu the

unquestioned master of Japan.

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Bibliography

Bryant, Anthony J. ​Sekigahara 1600: The final struggle for power.​ Oxford: Osprey, 1995.

Davis, Paul K. ​100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present​. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1999.

Hall, John Whitney. “The bakuhan system.” In ​The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 4:

Early Modern Japan,​ 128-161. Edited by John Whitney Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1991.

“Kobayakawa Hideaki.” ​The Samurai Archives Japanese History Page.​ Accessed October 10,

2017. http://www.samurai-archives.com/hideaki.html.

Sadler, A. L. ​Shogun: The Life of Tokugawa Ieyasu.​ Singapore: Tuttle, 1978.

Sansom, George. ​A History of Japan, 1334-1615.​ Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.

Saxonhouse, Gary R. “The stability of megaorganizations: The Tokugawa state.” ​Journal of

Institutional and Theoretical Economics ​151, no. 4 (1995): 741-747.

“Tokugawa Ieyasu.” ​The Samurai Archives Japanese History Page.​ Accessed October 10, 2017.

http://www.samurai-archives.com/ieyasu.html.