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Household acceptance of central Acceptance of

central bank
bank digital currency: the role of digital
currency
institutional trust
Klaus Solberg S€oilen
School of Business and Engineering, Halmstad University, Halmstad, Sweden, and
Received 29 April 2021
Lamiae Benhayoun Revised 30 June 2021
Institut Mines-Telecom Business School, Evry, France 4 September 2021
Accepted 20 September 2021

Abstract
Purpose – The authors investigate household acceptance of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) by
drawing on the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology and institutional trust theory.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors build a research model including six hypotheses and
quantitatively analyze it using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) and importance–
performance map analysis (IPMA) based on 282 answers to a survey questionnaire.
Findings – The continuous adoption of CBDCs by households is highly probable and is fostered by its
expected high performance, the social recommendations and the existence of facilitating conditions.
Nevertheless, institutions’ efforts to propose a flexible and understandable currency can benefit its adoption
only if these institutions also strive to build households’ trust in the currency’s system.
Originality/value – The authors provide a full review of the emerging literature on CBDCs and suggest that
digital currency offerings can be divided into centralized, semi-centralized and de-centralized control in a
meaningful taxonomy. The authors also complement extant studies on CBDCs that mostly apprehend its
operational challenges by focusing on the customer side and provide implications to the launching of CBDCs by
uncovering the customer-specific determinants of their adoption.
Keywords Digital currency, Institutional trust, Technology adoption, Household acceptance
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Technologies are rapidly changing the way we make financial transactions (Ashworth and
Goodhart, 2020). We are seeing increased competition between banks due to ever more
advanced forms of programmable money. Today cash and reserve balances are available
only to selected institutions, mainly banks, but this may be about to change. In a
programmable world, users are put in the center, searching to omit middlemen and
institutions like lawyers, brokers and bankers first of all to have faster and cheaper
transactions. These are some of the changes and underlying aspects which are pushing for
the introduction of digital currencies in our societies. On the route of digital currency
development (Nejad, 2016), the literature usually underlines two broad directions:
cryptocurrencies (decentralized control) and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) with
centralized control, which are the focus of this research. We examine how household
customers would behave if a CBDC was introduced and what this means for policymakers.
Cryptocurrencies, which rely on blockchain, are not governed by governments or banks.
Cryptocurrencies and other global programmable money in the form of anonymous systems
threaten nation–states as they take away control of both monetary and fiscal policy from
governments. If you forget the password the money is gone, with no possibility of retrieval.
Customers have already lost billions, mostly due to ignorance. In contrast, a CBDC is any
electronic, fiat liability of a central bank that can be used to settle payments or as a store of
value. It can be viewed as electronic narrow money and in some sense already exists in the International Journal of Bank
Marketing
form of central bank reserves (Meaning et al., 2018). Mancini-Griffoli et al. (2018) define CBDCs © Emerald Publishing Limited
0265-2323
narrower as a digital form of existing fiat money, issued by the central bank and intended as a DOI 10.1108/IJBM-04-2021-0156
IJBM legal tender. Most ongoing CBDC projects, such as the e-krona are fiat-based, but this is not a
required part of the definition. It can also be non-fiat-based, for example it can be based on
gold or other precious metal. An alternative and broader definition of CBDC is one where
reserves no longer exist separately but have been subsumed into the CBDC system (Kumhof
and Noone, 2018).
Centralized forms of digital currencies are still mainly in their testing phase to refine their
technical and operational functionalities and provide learnings to institutions worldwide.
Indeed, Bordo and Levin (2017) remind us that the financial sector consists of conservative
institutions and may want to learn from the experience of “early adopters” of CBDCs, even if
such a deferral involves foregone benefits. Boar et al. (2020) show that 10% of the central
banks surveyed are likely to issue a CBDC for the public in the short term, representing 20%
of the world’s population. Cross-border spillover effects are expected so that collaboration
through international vehicles such as the BIS (Bank for International Settlements)
Innovation Hub will be necessary. In this respect, the e-yuan is being tested in several Chinese
cities and is likely to be the first major CBDC on the market. A pilot test is underway for the e-
krona by Accenture initially scheduled to report on findings in early 2021 but now extended
to February 2022 with the test of an off-line version added.
One big issue with CBDCs is if the currency should be traceable or not. This would give
more control to the nation–state than what it has today. Then, from a technical perspective,
there is the question if CBDCs should be token-based or account-based and the degree of
anonymity allowed by users. Another key question is whether CBDCs should be interest-
bearing. de Lis and Gouveia (2018) lay out four scenarios depending on whether CBDCs
should be restricted or universal; identified or anonymous; yield-bearing or non-yield bearing.
The authors think that the less disruptive scenarios (anonymous and non-yield bearing) have
a greater chance of being rolled out first. The adoption of CBDCs is also thought to be a
function of cash use. Khiaonarong and Humphrey (2019) study the level and trend in cash
used for 11 countries using four different measures and estimate that it is falling by an
average of 1.3–2.2% a year. The average reduction in cash use out to 2026 is forecast to slow
to 1.4% a year. Gnan and Masciandaro (2018) point out that CBDCs can reduce costs
associated with physical cash handling, estimated to cost at least 1/2% of gross domestic
product (GDP) in European Union (EU) countries. Physical cash involves high storage costs,
estimated to 0.5–1% of the value stored, compared to negligible costs for CBDCs.
With CBDCs, we are rethinking the entire financial system, but major questions are still on
the drawing table. There are many non-technical problems to be solved. For one thing, there is
no research on household acceptance. Kiff et al. (2020) describe an implementation process for
CBDCs where the first step is to identify the needs and problems that a retail CBDC would
address. The marketing side–asking what people want–is missing in these papers, even when
it is expected, like in the three steps suggested by Mancini-Griffoli et al. (2018). The problem is
well illustrated in the CBDC pyramid of Auer and B€ohme (2020) which is divided into two
parts, “from consumer needs’’ on the left-hand side to “CBDC design choices” on the right-
hand side. So far practically all research has focused on right-hand side problems. This not
only illustrates a considerable research gap in the CBDC literature but shows that the process
has started in the wrong end; designing different models before it is known what households
and firms want. Accordingly, this paper aims at empirically covering this gap by
investigating how the factors characterizing households’ perception of CBDCs would affect
the adoption of such currencies. For this purpose, we rely on two theoretical frameworks: the
unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003) that is usually
applied to understand the adoption of different technologies, and the institutional trust theory
(Luhman, 1979) to take into account the multilevel setting in which a technology is used and
ascertain the perceived risks of the technology’s system (Sarker et al., 2020). Hence, this study
contributes to the existing literature by unveiling the key customer-related determinants of
CBDC adoption and the way they jointly influence user behavior regarding this currency. It Acceptance of
also highlights the central role of trust in the currency system within this specific adoption central bank
context and provides evidence for the complementarity of our two theoretical foundations to
fully understand the motivations of this adoption phenomenon. From a practical standpoint,
digital
we raise awareness of policymakers on the main determinants that they should be attentive to currency
while designing and implementing CBDCs and provide them with practical guidance to act on
these customer-specific factors.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a review on CBDCs, while
Section 3 details our two theoretical foundations and the hypotheses that we derive from
them. Section 4 introduces the research methodology whose results are presented in Section 5.
The study’s main academic implications are discussed in Section 6 and its practical
recommendations are provided in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 lists the research limitations,
and Section 9 proposes a general conclusion.

2. Literature review on digital currencies

In the Web of Science database, there are 966 articles on digital currency as a “topic” and 108
as “title.” Most of these contributions are on decentralized currencies like Tschorsch and
Scheuermann (2016) or on private currencies like Dwyer (2015). In comparison, there are only
80 articles on CBDC as “topic” and 16 as “title.” A reason for the low numbers is that most
relevant literature consists in working papers and papers published by central banks and the
BIS. Practically all papers on CBDC study currency value, technical and legal aspects, means
of implementation and application scenarios.
The overwhelming number of studies point to the positive effects CBDC can have on the
economy and as a way for governments to regain control of monetary policy. Barrdear and
Kumhof (2016) conclude that CBDCs could act as a highly effective form of money and
promote price stability, as the real value of CBDCs could easily be held stable over time. A
CBDC is seen as an effective form of person-to-person, person-to-business and business-to-
business transactions, assuming people will accept it. Williamson (2019) argues that a CBDC
has three beneficial effects: (1) mitigating crime associated with physical currency,
(2) enabling the payment of interest on a key central bank liability and (3) expanding the
reach of central bank liabilities through the issue of a CBDC potentially by introducing a
scarcity of safe collateral, if the central bank is limited to holding government debt. It can also
potentially increase welfare. Full transparency will reduce the amount of money in the
system. The shadow economy indeed represents on average around 15–20% of GDP in
advanced economies and around 30–35% of GDP in emerging economies according to
Kelmanson et al. (2019). In addition, according to Auer (2019), issuance of a CBDC is likely to
provide immediate clearing of transactions across individuals dramatically reducing the
costs of clearing in the long run. This can also reduce the funding of private banks
substantially through checking deposits and open the door for narrow banking.
However, the major problem may be that a CBDC will encounter political opposition from
the financial sector as they stand to lose the most, and because of this may take a long time to
materialize. The situation will depend on the country and who controls the central banks in
each country. For example, the Federal Reserve is owned directly by its member banks, even
though the chairman is appointed by Congress. This could make CBDC adoption slower in
the United States. Other authors are also more cautious, expressing the concern of the banks.
A widely accessible CBDC will be highly disruptive (Const^ancio, 2017). It may also open the
door to rapid bank runs (Callesen, 2017). Wadsworth (2018) asks more questions than we can
answer, calling for more research. Shirai (2019) states that central banks are afraid of what
CBDC will do to commercial banks, especially if deposits were to shift from commercial to
central banks. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2020) present similar warnings, believing that if
IJBM the competition from commercial banks is impaired (for example, through some fiscal
subsidization of central bank deposits), the central bank has to be careful in its choices to
avoid creating havoc with maturity transformation.
But the ball is already rolling. Digitalization is shrinking the role of cash (Griffol et al.,
2018) and stakeholders around the world are questioning their trust in the financial system
(Brychko et al., 2020) and especially the soundness of the USD (Grinin and Korotayev, 2020)
trapped in a cycle of money printing to uphold consumer spending (quantitative easing) with
no clear end in sight (tapering). Central banks around the world are evaluating how to
respond by issuing their digital currencies (Cukierman, 2019). A CBDC could promote
efficiency in exchange, crowd out bank deposits, raise banks’ funding costs and decrease
investment. But it could also raise welfare and make its distribution faster, cheaper and safer.
Keister and Sanches (2019) think that by appropriately choosing the interest rate it pays on
digital currency, the central bank can balance these competing concerns. Andolfatto (2018)
finds that a CBDC may, in some circumstances, serve to promote lending. Chiu et al. (2019)
think that a CBDC with a proper interest rate can raise bank lending by 3.55% and output by
0.50%. Kim and Kwon (2019) argue that to avoid bank-panic risk, CBDC accounts could be
made available via deposits at commercial banks instead of being held directly at the central
bank itself. Having deposits in the CBDC account decreases the supply of private credit by
commercial banks, which again raises the nominal interest rate and lowers a commercial
bank’s reserve–deposit ratio. Kumhof and Noone (2018) envision a CBDC system that pays an
adjustable interest rate, keeps CBDC and reserves distinct, and not convertible into
each other.
In sum, cash use is the key to driving the central banks’ plans regarding digital currencies
(Boar et al., 2020). In this vein, Wadsworth (2018) states that policymakers should investigate
the implications of CBDCs for monetary policy and the financial system by examining
whether a CBDC could be issued to the public while mitigating the cons that could arise.
Bindseil (2019) suggests that the overall business case for CBDCs will depend on the
preferences of households as users of money and as voters. Therefore, this research abounds
in this direction and aims at empirically assessing the impact of customer-related factors on
the adoption of CBDCs by households as developed in Section 3. But to bring more clarity into
the analysis of literature on digital currencies, we suggest that the market offerings can be
divided into digital currencies of (1) centralized, (2) semi-centralized and (3) de-centralized
control.

2.1 The Swedish e-krona (centralized control)

Sveriges Riksbank has published several reports on its “e-krona” project (Armelius et al.,
2018, 2020; Nessen et al., 2018; Juks, 2018; S€oderberg, 2018; Segendorf, 2018; Bergman, 2020).
The use of cash (cash-to-GDP ratio) in Sweden has been decreasing from 2.9% in 2010 to 1.3%
in 2019. This suggests low transaction costs upon transfer to a CBDC system as users have a
low cost of planning, deciding and changing plans compared to other electronic payment
systems (The Swedish Swish system, Paypal, cryptocurrencies, cards).
S€oderberg (2018) draws a parallel from today’s situation to that which led to the Riksbank
being given the sole right to issue banknotes in 1904. During both periods there has been a
growing banking sector and a central bank that was more clearly assuming the character of a
public authority. Nessen et al. (2018) point to the fact that Riksbank already issues digital
money to the institutions participating in the Riksbank’s RIX payment system. The e-krona
can be seen simply as broadening the circle of those who can hold digital central bank money.
Armelius et al. (2018) argue that if the e-krona is not interest-bearing, the consequences can be
a lower bound of zero percent for the policy rate, for other interest rates in the economy, which
could reduce the room for maneuvers for monetary policy. It can lead to greater volatility in
capital movements and the exchange rate. The long-term economic developments can benefit
if the e-krona improves the efficiency and resilience of the financial system. But the economy Acceptance of
can be affected negatively if an e-krona impinges on credit supply and financial stability. central bank
Segendorf (2018) argue that if there is a very large demand for the e-krona this could
significantly increase the size of the Riksbank’s balance sheet and have implications for
digital
monetary policy and financial stability. The author argues that it is reasonable to believe that currency
demand will be relatively small from a transaction perspective equivalent to 1–2% of the GDP.
Juks (2018) concludes that even if an e-krona leads to deposit outflows thereby affecting the
banks’ financing and liquidity, the banks will normally be able to steer these outflows using
their deposit rates. The banks can to a greater degree rely on long-term market funding to
continue to finance lending if needed. Juks thinks that in times of financial stress, an e-krona can
lead to greater disruptions compared to the current system, but that this depends on whether
the e-krona is more attractive than existing assets. The test pilot is based on distributed ledger
technologies and structured in two tiers: The first, Riksbank issues e-krona to participants of
the Riksbank’s settlement system the RIX, consisting of some 38 organizations, mostly Swedish
commercial banks. All transaction occurs in a separate system where only the Riksbank can
add new participants and control transactions (Riksbank, 2020).
This is close to what Davoodalhosseini (2018) understands by a debit card system, a
system that is owned and monitored by the central bank but where operations can be
outsourced to other institutions such as “FinTech” companies. Each individual has an
account with the central bank, and individuals can use these balances for purchases of goods
and services. The system provides access to the central bank balance sheet in electronic
format for all agents in the population and allows them to earn interest on their balances.
Today only some financial institutions have this privilege, as with RIX participants in
Sweden. The system allows monetary policy directly to influence the agents’ decisions to
carry balances, rather than through the financial system, making the implementation of
monetary policy more transparent. Auera and B€ohme (2020) point out that if the results of
these pilot tests are shared internationally then a clearer picture will emerge of which
technological choices are generally suited for CBDCs, and how the optima design might
depend on the specific circumstances of each jurisdiction.

2.2 The Libra/Diem and the digital Yuan (semi-centralized and centralized control)
One American social media company, Facebook, and one Chinese e-commerce company,
Alibaba, are experimenting with forms of digital payment systems. Both projects have been
halted by their respective governments. Since December 2020, Facebook has started a new
project named Diem. Allen et al. (2020) point out that Facebook has the reach to make the
Libra instantly available to people in large parts of the world, including 1.7 bn households
unbanked today. This has catalyzed the global CBDC discussion. The Libra was a permission
blockchain-based system based on Stablecoin, backed by a basket of assets. The Diem will be
pegged only to the USD. This has appeased the Fed to a certain point as they see the Diem less
as a competitor but Facebook has still not shown how they will prevent money laundering.
The original idea was to make Libra similar to cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, but it was soon
realized that this would make it less stable and more speculative. Tischer (2020) is a skeptic of
the Libra project, arguing that it is not about democratizing money as the owners argue, but
on the contrary, making it exclusive. The Libra does not offer cutting-edge technology, but its
innovation is organizational overturning the decentralized character of blockchain and re-
centralizing it to the tech firm. This was also a reason why the Libra was halted. The Diem
project aims to make the currency independent of Facebook and tied to the USD, registering
with the US treasury as a money services business. The project is still on the drawing board
with several launching dates passed.
Alipay’s digital payment, which takes care of transactions on Alibaba’s commercial
platforms, is a digital currency based on the renminbi or yuan. Its use today is larger than that
IJBM of PayPal. Alipay’s attempt to launch its digital currency was halted by the central bank of
China, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). At the same time, PBOC has filed more than 80
patent applications related to digital currency (Allen et al., 2020) and launched their CBDC
called the digital currency electronic payment (DCEP). PBOC has built multiple payment
systems for various scenarios to increase the transparency of information, monitor the flow of
money more effectively, enhance regulation and strengthen the efficiency of payments in a
multi-tiered environment (Qian, 2019). DCEP is also being tested on WeChat Pay and Alipay
(Peters and Green, 2020). According to Shi and Zhou (2020), the DCEP is a general-purpose
digital token that adopts a complex multi-layer hybrid architecture design. Alipay may be
able to launch its digital currency later but will then need to fulfill the requirement as a
financial institution. The alleged house arrest of Jack Ma Alibaba’s founder may be related to
his resistance to sharing user data with the central government which is one of the
requirements for financial institutions (Wei, 2021). The halt of Ants’ initial public offering
(IPO) also slows down the process of privatization of money allowing the PBOC time to catch
up and launch the DCEP with equal emphasis on efficiency and security.

2.3 Bitcoin (de-centralized control) vs CBDC

All blockchain is a form of distributed ledger technology. Thus, there is no contradiction
between cryptocurrency and CBDC from a technological point of view. Grym et al. (2017)
argue that in its present form, blockchain technology would probably not be a suitable
solution, since it is unable to process a sufficiently large number of transactions. Fung and
Halaburda (2016) remark that due to high volatility, most users of Bitcoin will convert to
bitcoins only when they are about to make the payment and convert back to their local
currency as soon as they receive the bitcoins. A bitcoin is seen as the preferred currency of the
shadow economy as it does not comply with anti-money laundering and counterterrorist
funding requirements. While anonymous digital currencies facilitate crime, non-anonymous
CBDCs can go far in the aim to eliminate it. Many banks do not want this as it means less
business. The extent of dirty money and money laundering as relates to the great financial
centers of London and New York is explained in much detail in the popular book by Burgis
(2020). Accordingly, Engert and Fung (2017) identify anonymity as the most controversial
attribute of CBDC. They think that from a practical perspective, complete anonymity seems
to be undesirable for CBDCs.
An advantage with Bitcoin is cross-border transactions as it is a truly global currency.
Mancini-Griffoli et al. (2018) raise a series of questions about the introduction of CBDC related
to tourism and cross-border transactions. How would tourists be able to pay in a foreign
country? Would they need to register by a foreign central bank? Could they take the currency
with them? Would they be able to spend it from abroad? Could there be some cooperation
between central banks to convert back to local CBDC? It is not that these questions cannot be
answered, but CBDC is not there yet. Meaning et al. (2018) argue that under a universally
accessible, account-based CBDC, monetary policy could operate in much the same way as it
currently does, guiding the economy through varying the rate of interest paid on balances of
electronic central bank money and the aggregate quantity of that money. Thus, in the long
run, CBDC could have all the transnational benefits of existing currencies. The major
immediate question that is left to answer is related to household acceptance.

3. Investigating household acceptance of CBDC

3.1 Theoretical foundations
Understanding the customer-related factors influencing the adoption of a technological asset
is crucial to adapt its design and increase its chances of success in the market (Davis, 1989).
Nevertheless, as explained in the previous section, most research on the CBDC investigates Acceptance of
the operational challenges and technical issues related to the architecture of this currency central bank
system without considering the customer side (Auer and B€ohme, 2020). Therefore, this study
aims at raising the awareness of designers on customer perceptions and needs concerning
digital
CBDCs that central banks should take into account while designing the currency to foster its currency
acceptance and subsequently its adoption. For this purpose, we rely on the UTAUT (unified
theory of acceptance and use of technology) model (Venkatesh et al., 2003) and the ITT
(institutional trust theory) (Luhmann, 1979, 1986) as a theoretical lens to examine the impacts
of customer-related factors on the adoption of CBDCs.
On the one hand, behavioral theories (Farah, 2017) and particularly UTAUT are widely
used to investigate technology adoption in banking (Tarhini et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2010) and
e-commerce sectors (Goswami and Dutta, 2016). UTAUT aims to explain an individual’s
intentions to use an information system and subsequent usage behavior (Venkatesh et al.,
2003). The authors developed UTAUT after the elimination of redundant constructs in eight
prior prevailing models that range from human behavior to computer science. UTAUT
proposes four main factors that influence the intention and usage of information technology.
First, effort expectancy refers to the degree of ease associated with the use of the system.
Second, performance expectancy is the level to which an individual believes that using the
system will help him or her to attain gains in performance. Third, social influence is the
degree to which an individual believes that others think he or she should use the new system.
Fourth, facilitating conditions represent individuals’ beliefs regarding the existence of
processes and infrastructure to support the use of the system. Venkatesh et al. (2012) then
extended the UTAUT model to propose UTAUT2 by incorporating three additional
variables: hedonic motivation defined as the fun or pleasure derived from using technology,
price value representing the cognitive tradeoff between the perceived benefits of the
technology and the monetary cost of its use, and habit referring to the extent to which an
individual believes the use behavior to be automatic. In this study, we rely on UTAUT instead
of UTAUT2 for two main reasons. UTAUT2 is proposed for consumer settings where
consumers bear the monetary cost of the technology’s use. This configuration is not suitable
to the context of the study as the cost of the system supporting the use of CBDC is carried by
central banking institutions. Also, as CBDC is a cutting-edge technology that has been
launched in very few countries lately, households do not possess any benchmarking basis to
assess the potential pleasure of using such technology nor the evolution of their
prolonged usage.
On the other hand, technology adoption models such as UTAUT focus on individual-
related factors, which can limit the understanding of the multilevel setting in which a
technology is used (Sarker et al., 2020). People’s use of certain systems is associated with
unwarranted consequences (Beldad and Hegner, 2018). This is particularly the case of
technologies that may compromise users’ information privacy such as e-commerce websites
(Gefen et al., 2003), cloud infrastructure (Alharbi, 2014) and mobile payment solutions (Patil
et al., 2020). In this respect, many scholars that examined the adoption of different
technologies included trust as an additional variable in their model to ascertain the risks and
uncertainties of the technologies’ systems. This is because when rules are not satisfactory,
consumers reduce the risk by relying on trust (Gefen and Straub, 2004). For example, Slade
et al. (2015) found a positive significant link between trust in providers and intention to use
mobile payment. Beldad and Hegner (2018) examined trust in fitness app and found a
significant positive result. Beyond technologies, core elements of trust should also be
embedded into banking values and norms (Kidron, 2021; Van Esterik-Plasmeijer and Van
Raaij, 2017). The existence of trust in banking institutions is even more critical for digital
currencies to compensate for the drawbacks of ongoing debates on digital and
cryptocurrencies (Zarifis et al., 2014, 2015). Therefore, we draw on ITT (Luhmann, 1979)
IJBM which argues that institutional trust is what allows strangers to engage in contracts due to
faith in the legal system and propose to incorporate in our model trust in the currency system
in addition to the customer-related factors underlined in UTAUT. We explain below the
hypotheses that we derive from the UTAUT and ITT theoretical foundations, which are
summarized in our research model (Figure 1).

3.2 Hypotheses’ development

Effort expectancy reflects the degree of ease associated with the use of the system (Venkatesh
et al., 2003). This construct represents the perceived ease of use of a technology (Martins et al.,
2014; Miltgen et al., 2013) and has a positive impact on the behavioral intention. This suggests
that when users feel that a banking technology is easy to use and does not require much
effort, they are likely to intentionally and willingly use this technology in the future (Zhou
et al., 2010). User interfaces, content design and functional ability of digital banking systems
can influence its adoption (Oliveira et al., 2014). Hence, we state that:
H1. Effort expectancy positively affects the behavioral intention to use a CBDC.
Performance expectancy conveys the perceived usefulness of a technology, that is the degree
to which an individual believes that using the system will help attain gains in performance
(Venkatesh et al., 2003). Luo et al. (2010) and Riffai et al. (2012) concluded that performance
expectancy is a key factor for a user to accept a banking technology. In such a case,
performance expectancy includes convenient payment, fast response, service effectiveness
(Zhou et al., 2010) and personal image (Rogers, 1995). Thus, we propose that:
H2. Performance expectancy positively affects the behavioral intention to use a CBDC.
Social influence is a direct positive antecedent of behavioral intentions that reflects subjective
norms (Venkatesh et al., 2003). It is the degree to which an individual perceives that it is
important for others to believe that he or she uses the new technology or complies with others’
expectations. These social influencers include the user’s friends, relatives and superiors
(Lopez-Nicolas et al., 2008). Their opinions will affect this user’s adoption and usage of a

Trust in the digital

currency system
Effort expectancy H1
+ H6 +

Performance H2
expectancy +
Behavioral H4
Use behavior
intentions +
H3
Social influence +

Facilitating H5
conditions + Direct effect
Indirect effect

Figure 1.
Research model Gender Age Experience
banking technology (Hong et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2010) since they might perceive him or her Acceptance of
as trendy and professional by using this technology (Oliveira et al., 2014). Therefore, we central bank
hypothesize that:
digital
H3. Social influence positively affects the behavioral intention to use a CBDC. currency
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) stated that behavioral intentions are determinant to use behavior.
The intention is the desire to perform the behavior and is not yet in the form of behavior.
Behavior is real action or activity that is carried out (Davis, 1989). Regarding banking
technologies, several studies underlined that a user’s intention to use the technologies will
determine his or her usage behavior (Gupta and Arora, 2019; Purwanto and Loisa, 2020;
Solekah and Hilmawan, 2021). Thus, we state that:
H4. Behavioral intention to use a CBDC positively affects the use behavior regarding this
currency system.
Facilitating conditions reflect the effect of a user’s knowledge, ability and resources and are
considered to have a positive direct effect on technology adoption (Venkatesh et al., 2003). The
digital currency as a new service requires users to have certain skills such as configuring and
operating devices to connect to the currency network. If users do not have the necessary
resources and operational skills, they will not adopt the banking technology (Shin et al., 2010).
When an individual believes that an institutional and technical infrastructure exists to
support the use of banking technology, then he or she is likely to accept and implement this
technology to perform different intended tasks (Oliveira et al., 2014). Hence, we propose that:
H5. Facilitating conditions positively influence the use behavior of a CBDC.
The ITT suggests that trust is a reduction of complexity and an internal force in human social
systems (Luhmann, 1979, 1986). The author separates between trust in systems and persons
and uses money as an example of the former and friendship as an example of the latter. In the
case of a technology, trust in its system is an important factor in the level of its adoption
particularly when this technology involves social uncertainty and financial risk (Gefen et al.,
2003). Trust is increased by means of effort expectancy that indicates the cognitive effort
needed to utilize the technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003), because the user assumes that the
technology provider is investing in the relationship by making the technology easily
accessible (Gefen et al., 2003). Heightened levels of trust would then reduce the social
complexity a user faces in digital currency as the latter can subjectively rule out undesirable
behaviors of the banking institutions, which encourages his or her acceptance and use of the
currency (Zarifis et al., 2014). Therefore, we propose that:
H6. Effort expectancy has an indirect impact on use behavior through trust.
Additional to these hypothesized structural impacts, we included in the model variables with
moderating influences as in UTAUT (Figure 1). We coded gender as a 0/1 dummy variable (1
male/0 female), and age and experience as dummy variables that took ordinal values of 1–7 to
capture the increasing user’s age and his/her level of familiarity with digital currencies. We
did not include voluntariness as a moderator because CBDC is expected to be a voluntary,
public option that supplements physical cash and private-sector payment options (Atako,
2021). This voluntary usage is even crucial to the success of CBDC (Choi et al., 2021).

4. Methodology
4.1 Data collection
We elaborated a survey questionnaire based on existing literature. Given the nascent nature
of digital currencies, we could not find measurement scales of trust and UTAUT constructs
IJBM specifically formulated for this technology. Therefore, we adapted the UTAUT original scales
proposed by Venkatesh et al. (2003) and extant scales on trust in technologies (Gefen et al.,
2003) to the context of this study. In our formulations, we considered the propositions of Auer
and B€ohme (2020), which is the only study matching the consumer needs with the design
choices of CBDC. The authors identified six different user needs of digital currencies, namely
cross-border payments, accessibility, exchange privacy, operations’ robustness, convenience
for real-time payments and cash-like peer-to-peer functionalities. Appendix summarizes the
constructs, their associated items and the references used to formulate these items, including
the study of Auer and B€ohme (2020). The variables were assessed using a seven-point Likert
scale ranging from Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7). The survey pretesting was
realized by 10 scholars and professionals involved in the digital currencies’ stream.
To determine the sample size that is sufficient for the regression approach to be used in
this study, we performed an a priori power test following the recommendations of Cohen
(1988), with G*Power 3.1.9.7 software (Faul et al., 2009). By considering the parameters of
five predictors (Figure 1), an effect size of 0.15 (moderated value), a test power level of 90%
and a maximum allowed error of 5%, the software calculated 267 responses as the
minimum adequate sample size. To form a sample of respondents, we employed a
convenience sampling method (Deming, 1990) that is used when randomization across the
studied population is not possible. This non-probability technique is often applied in bank
marketing studies (e.g. Chauhan et al., 2019; Farah et al., 2018; Sharif et al., 2020) and is
particularly appropriate for the present research. Indeed, considering that CBDC is an
emerging technology in its early implementation stages, there are no databases nor
statistics on CBDC adoption that would have enabled the use of probabilistic sampling. A
convenience sample meets certain practical criteria, such as easy accessibility to
respondents, their availability at a given time or their willingness to participate (Etikan
et al., 2016). Hence, we adopted a voluntary, non-remunerated and anonymous participation
approach to form our sample. The questionnaire link was made available to potential
participants through the researchers’ professional social networks. This type of social
media service is solely focused on interactions and relationships of a business nature.
Participants were requested, in their turn, to share the questionnaire link with their
professional networks. Such snowball technique has proven its efficiency in research
recently published in the International Journal of Bank Marketing (e.g. Eren, 2021; Zainudin
et al., 2019). The study setting was, therefore, non-contrived and one-shot (cross-sectional),
with minimal interference from the researchers. Over one month from January to February
2021, a sample size of 282 complete questionnaires was obtained. Table 1 describes the
characteristics of this sample.

Criterion Response % Criterion Response %

Age 18–24 34 Region Europe 82

25–34 26 Asia 7
35–44 18 North America 5
45–54 13 Africa 4
55–64 8 Oceania 1
65–74 1 South America 1
Gender Man 63 Educational degree Master 42
Bachelor 27
Table 1. Woman 36 PhD 17
Description of the High school 13
sample Prefer not to say 1 Other 1
4.2 Data analysis Acceptance of
We employed PLS-SEM (partial least squares structural equation modeling) to analyze the central bank
proposed research model. PLS-SEM is gaining prominence in social science studies and is
suitable for large and small sample sizes, as well as for non-normal data (Hair et al., 2017).
digital
Additionally, PLS-SEM is fit for exploratory research (Peng and Lai, 2012) as is the case in the currency
present study. Our research aspires to examine the impacts of customer-related factors on the
adoption of CBDC, which has never been addressed in the extant body of literature. In this
study, our model causality goes from constructs to items, thus giving a reflective model (Hair
et al., 2013). Finally, our sample greatly exceeded the minimum size of ten times the largest
number of structural paths directed at an endogenous construct, as recommended by Hair
et al. (2013) for reflective models. We used SmartPLS3.0® software (Ringle et al., 2015) to
assess our constructs’ validity and reliability and to test the above-stated hypotheses.
To test the direct and indirect effects hypothesized in our model, we performed a 1,000
subsamples’ bootstrapping procedure with a 5% significance level. The analysis of our model
is done in two steps: Assessment of the constructs’ validity and reliability and evaluation of
the structural model (Hair et al., 2013). Additionally, we followed the recommendations of
Hayes (2009) to assess the indirect effect of Trust as a mediator (Hypothesis H6). If « a » is the
direct effect of the independent variable on the mediator and « b » is that of the mediator on
the dependent variable, an indirect effect exists when its magnitude « a 3 b » is statistically
significant.
Finally, we conducted an IPMA (importance–performance map analysis) to examine our
model’s analytic value. The IPMA “contrasts the structural model total effects (importance)
and the average values of the latent variable scores (performance) to highlight significant areas
for the improvement of management activities” (Hair et al., 2014, p. 206). It allows a deeper
interpretation of the SEM results and particularly aims to identify the variables which have a
large importance in explaining a specific endogenous variable (i.e. total effect) but a low
actual performance (i.e. average latent variable scores) to identify and suggest areas for
improvement (Hair et al., 2014). In this respect, to conduct our IPMA, we focused on the final
focal latent variable “Use-Behav” and utilized the total effects of the associations within the
structural model that describe the variation in the final construct. To exhibit performance,
before calculating the average, we rescaled unstandardized scores of both the latent
indicators and the variables between 0 and 100.

5. Results
5.1 Non-response bias and common method bias
We tested potential non-response bias using Levene’s test for equality of variances and a t-
test for equality of means between early and late respondents. These tests indicated no
difference in means and variation between the two groups and, consequently, no evidence of
significant difference within the population (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Regarding the
common method variance, as this study relies on data from self-reported measures in a one-
time survey, we used procedural and statistical methods to address common method bias as
recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003). For the procedural methods, participation in the
study was voluntary and the process guaranteed anonymity and data confidentiality. The
dependent and independent variables included in the questionnaire were introduced on
different pages of the electronic survey, preventing respondents from inferring cause–effect
relationships among the constructs. For the statistical procedures, we calculated Harman’s
single-factor based on an exploratory factor analysis with all independent and dependent
variables. This test resulted in a first factor that included only 32.14% of the observed
variance, therefore suggesting that common method bias is likely not a problem in the study.
In addition, we implemented a full collinearity test based on variance inflation factors (VIFs).
IJBM This test specifies that a VIF value greater than 5.0 suggests the existence of common method
bias (Ringle et al., 2015). Our estimations showed that VIF values ranged from 1.102 to 4.078
thereby providing evidence for the absence of common method bias in this research.

5.2 Measurement model results

We evaluated the reliability of the used items (Table 2) through a confirmatory factor analysis
that resulted in keeping all the items in our model. They were significantly associated with
their constructs and had loadings higher than 0.7 or between 0.4 and 0.7 (Facil-Cond2, Use-
Behav2, Trust3, Trust5) that did not alter the constructs’ reliability as recommended in
exploratory research (Hair et al., 2011).
Next, construct internal consistency was evaluated using composite reliability (CR) and
Cronbach’s alpha (Table 3) whose values exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.7
(Henseler et al., 2009). Also, construct convergent validity was verified (Table 3) using
average variance extracted (AVE), which was greater than the minimum value of 0.5 (Fornell
and Larcker, 1981).

Item Loading T-statistics p-values BCa CI 2.5% BCa CI 97.5%

Behav-Int1 0.887 62.243 0.000 0.856 0.914

Behav-Int2 0.909 54.394 0.000 0.874 0.939
Behav-Int3 0.863 39.617 0.000 0.806 0.900
Eff-Exp1 0.812 25.452 0.000 0.737 0.862
Eff-Exp2 0.867 33.192 0.000 0.806 0.906
Eff-Exp3 0.865 39.443 0.000 0.815 0.901
Eff-Exp4 0.846 33.170 0.000 0.786 0.891
Eff-Exp5 0.854 41.847 0.000 0.817 0.889
Eff-Exp6 0.815 25.632 0.000 0.740 0.866
Facil-Cond1 0.799 15.338 0.000 0.690 0.883
Facil-Cond2 0.652 6.379 0.000 0.377 0.781
Facil-Cond3 0.720 9.862 0.000 0.548 0.813
Facil-Cond4 0.782 13.537 0.000 0.643 0.864
Perf-Exp1 0.820 26.053 0.000 0.750 0.870
Perf-Exp2 0.883 42.951 0.000 0.841 0.917
Perf-Exp3 0.901 54.044 0.000 0.864 0.929
Perf-Exp4 0.898 58.177 0.000 0.861 0.924
Perf-Exp5 0.907 59.193 0.000 0.871 0.929
Perf-Exp6 0.885 56.065 0.000 0.850 0.912
Soc-Inf1 0.913 53.371 0.000 0.877 0.941
Soc-Inf2 0.934 67.413 0.000 0.907 0.959
Soc-Inf3 0.886 30.913 0.000 0.813 0.927
Trust1 0.843 20.834 0.000 0.740 0.903
Trust2 0.863 24.886 0.000 0.782 0.914
Trust3 0.604 7.546 0.000 0.432 0.731
Trust4 0.715 11.580 0.000 0.553 0.805
Trust5 0.613 7.806 0.000 0.421 0.749
Use-Behav1 0.777 26.613 0.000 0.706 0.830
Use-Behav2 0.690 14.214 0.000 0.583 0.765
Use-Behav3 0.788 23.174 0.000 0.711 0.840
Use-Behav4 0.847 49.727 0.000 0.808 0.878
Use-Behav5 0.813 35.676 0.000 0.768 0.860
Use-Behav6 0.819 29.249 0.000 0.765 0.866
Table 2. Use-Behav7 0.816 35.397 0.000 0.763 0.861
Item reliability Use-Behav8 0.762 21.579 0.000 0.684 0.822
Finally, we assessed the discriminant validity of our constructs through Fornell–Larcker and Acceptance of
Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio (HTMT) criteria (Table 4). The correlation coefficients of each central bank
construct with the other latent variables were lower than the square root of its AVE as the
diagonal elements represented in Table 4, thus meeting the first criterion (Fornell and
digital
Larcker, 1981). Also, the HTMT ratios of all constructs were below the 0.9 thresholds required currency
for the second criterion (Henseler et al., 2015).

5.3 Structural model results

After ensuring the reliability and validity of the constructs in the measurement model, we
proceeded to the analysis of the structural model. To assess the model fit, we first evaluated
its explanatory power by calculating the coefficient of determination (R2) of the endogenous
construct (i.e. Use-Behav). Results indicate an R2 value of 0.619, hence suggesting that the
model is significant (Falk and Miller, 1992) and has high explanatory power (Cohen, 1988).
Second, we analyzed the models’ predictive relevance by a blindfolding procedure to calculate
Stone-Geyser’s Q2 of the endogenous construct, which was above zero (0.38) thereby
providing evidence of predictive relevance (Hair et al., 2011). Then, we assessed the
significance of the structural paths associated with our hypotheses based on a 5%
significance level (i.e. the 95% BCa confidence interval does not include 0). The results
gathered in Table 5 show that, except for hypothesis H1, all the remaining hypotheses of
direct and indirect impacts in our model were supported.

5.4 IPMA results

Table 6 gathers the results of IPMA with a focus on the focal endogenous variable “Use-
Behav.” We first note that Performance Expectancy has both high performance and
relatively high importance. This suggests that households are aware of the performance
implications of an efficient CBDC and confer significant attention to this criterion to adopt the

Cronbach’s alpha Composite reliability (CR) Average variance extracted (AVE)

Behav-Int 0.864 0.917 0.786

Eff-Exp 0.919 0.937 0.712
Facil-Cond 0.741 0.828 0.548
Perf-Exp 0.943 0.955 0.779
Soc-Inf 0.898 0.936 0.830 Table 3.
Trust 0.788 0.852 0.542 Constructs’ validity
Use-Behav 0.913 0.930 0.624 and reliability

Behav-Int Eff-Exp Facil-Cond Perf-Exp Soc-Inf Trust Use-Behav

Behav-Int 0.887 0.324 0.237 0.406 0.298 0.348 0.866

Eff-Exp 0.296 0.844 0.479 0.618 0.254 0.276 0.354
Facil-Cond 0.217 0.405 0.740 0.313 0.225 0.302 0.316
Perf-Exp 0.370 0.578 0.274 0.883 0.312 0.350 0.462
Soc-Inf 0.265 0.231 0.190 0.290 0.911 0.377 0.412
Trust 0.310 0.257 0.241 0.331 0.327 0.736 0.383
Use-Behav 0.771 0.327 0.294 0.428 0.376 0.350 0.790
Note(s): Fornell and Larcker criterion Table 4.
HTMT criterion Discriminant validity
IJBM Path T- p- BCa CI BCa CI
coefficient statistics values 2.5% 97.5%

Moderators Age → Perf-Exp on Behav-Int 0.040 0.427 0.670 0.237 0.133

Age → Eff-Exp on Behav-Int 0.026 0.257 0.797 0.248 0.147
Age → soc-Inf on Behav-Int 0.019 0.309 0.758 0.139 0.106
Age → Facil-Cond on Use- 0.057 0.768 0.443 0.206 0.084
Behav
Experience → Eff-Exp on 0.099 1.605 0.109 0.021 0.227
Behav-Int
Experience → soc-Inf on 0.034 0.627 0.531 0.141 0.067
Behav-Int
Experience → Facil-Cond on 0.024 0.559 0.576 0.100 0.061
Use-Behav
Gender-Man → Perf-Exp on 0.017 0.196 0.844 0.174 0.164
Behav-Int
Gender-Man → Eff-Exp on 0.163 1.851 0.065 0.006 0.328
Behav-Int
Gender-Man → soc-Inf on 0.084 1.332 0.184 0.051 0.191
Behav-Int
H1 Eff-Exp → Behav-Int 0.067 0.955 0.340 0.087 0.193
H2 Perf-Exp → Behav-Int 0.266*** 3.578 0.000 0.119 0.415
H3 Soc-Inf → Behav-Int 0.174** 3.080 0.002 0.072 0.282
H4 Behav-Int → Use-Behav 0.700*** 17.802 0.000 0.621 0.768
H5 Facil-Cond → Use-Behav 0.115** 2.788 0.006 0.043 0.199
H6 Eff-Exp → Trust (a) 0.257** 3.392 0.001 0.123 0.402
Trust → Use-Behav (b) 0.097* 2.426 0.016 0.023 0.174
Eff-Exp → Trust → Use- 0.025* 2.008 0.045 0.005 0.051
Behav (axb)
R square 0.619
Table 5. SRMR 0.088
Results of the Chi-square 1845.212
structural model NFI 0.760
assessment Note(s): ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Importance Performance

Behav-Int 0.689 61.019

Eff-Exp 0.114 78.700
Facil-Cond 0.126 72.971
Perf-Exp 0.191 76.669
Table 6. Soc-Inf 0.106 58.006
Results of the IPMA Trust 0.102 67.433

currency. Second, our results show that the Behavioral Intentions of households regarding
the use of CBDC has very high importance but relatively low performance. Accordingly,
central banks should increase the performance aspects captured by households, regarding
the continuous, frequent and daily use of CBDC. Third, while Facilitating Conditions and
Effort Expectancy were found to have very high performances, their importance was
relatively low. Thus, central banks must make sure that customers are aware of the necessity
of having access to resources and knowledge to make good use of CBDC, without providing
substantial efforts in getting used to the currency system. This would help them appreciate
the banks’ efforts in providing an ergonomic currency with adequate infrastructure and Acceptance of
continuously available support services for the customers. central bank
Fourth, we observe that Social Influence and Trust in the currency system both have
relatively low performances and importance. Regarding the Social Influence construct,
digital
central banks must, on the one hand, struggle to diffuse CBDC across the population and currency
clearly communicate on this generalized adoption. They should, on the other hand, make sure
that households grasp the importance of a wide adoption of CBDC across the customers’
acquaintances for example in terms of transactions’ interoperability. Regarding the Trust
construct, the IPMA result is particularly critical given that our PLS-SEM findings unveil a
mediating role of this variable on the link between Effort Expectancy and Use Behavior with
no significant impact of Effort Expectancy on households’ intention to systematically use a
CBDC. Accordingly, by increasing trust in the currency system and inciting customers to
give great importance to this criterion to adopt the CBDC, central banks would make it easier
for households to appreciate the importance of dealing with a currency system that is easy to
use and to appraise the banks’ efforts to propose such a system.

6. Discussion and implications

Consistent with extant research on CBDC, our findings suggest that households are
knowledgeable of these currencies and are ready to adopt them to improve the efficiency of
their financial transactions. This result supports the growing interest of central banks around
the globe to issue their own digital currencies and motivates the relevance of ongoing tests of
such currencies in many countries. However, while scholars and policymakers have put much
emphasis on the operational issues of CBDCs, our goal was to complement this body of
knowledge by bringing understanding of households’ perception of these currencies to guide
their design and foster their large-scale adoption. For this purpose, we analyzed primary data
in light of the UTAUT and ITT theoretical backgrounds to propose a complete picture of the
customer-related determinants of CBDC adoption as discussed hereafter.
The results of our PLS-SEM analysis suggest that households are likely to continuously
use these currencies the way they are being designed by institutions (H4). This adoption is
fostered when the CBDC performs as expected (H2), the social sphere is recommending it (H3)
and the user has access to resources facilitating CBDC use (H5). We could not find support to
hypothesis H1, suggesting that CBDC’s ease of use does not per se enhance the adoption
potential of this currency. These findings propose that, in the case of CBDC, UTAUT cannot
accurately explain the user behavior, but requires the inclusion of the trust component to
provide a fuller picture. In fact, we provide evidence of a significant indirect effect between the
effort to use CBDC and its expected usage through trust (H6). It seems that institutions’ efforts
to propose a flexible and understandable currency can benefit its adoption only if these
institutions also strive to build households’ trust in the currency’s system. In line with other
technologies’ systems (Gefen and Straub, 2004; Slade et al., 2015), we show that trust
supplants problems of product complexity of CBDCs among consumers. As such, we find
support for the theory of institutional trust as expressed by Luhmann (1979) and demonstrate
its complementarity with UTAUT in the case of CBDC adoption.
Accordingly, this research particularly unveils the role of the trust component in the
adoption of CBDCs. Trust in the existing system of major interrelated fiat currencies led by
the US dollar which is associated with Nixon’s break with the Bretton Woods system in 1971
and the Feds policy of Deficit spending under Alan Greenspan and which continues to this
day, has been seriously eroded over the past two decades, worsened by the crisis of 1995–
2000 (dot.com bubble), 2007–2008 (subprime mortgage crisis) and now 2020 (corona
pandemic). This has led to massive printing of US dollars by the US Treasury with no clear
end in sight. Cryptocurrencies have risen as an alternative form of currency, but their value is
IJBM primarily that of storage and in speculation not in use. This suggests that, in their current
forms, they are not a good replacement for money (Gnan and Masciandaro, 2018). In this
respect, we show that CBDCs are likely to remain suitable alternatives for stored value if trust
is installed in this currency system. Therefore, we provide support to studies that emphasize
the security perceived by users regarding government vs non-government issued currencies
(Mancini-Griffoli et al., 2018; Wadsworth, 2018).

7. Practical recommendations
Our study shows that CBDCs are not only accepted by a younger generation, something which
may have been expected, but by a majority of potential users. Hence, governments should strive
to issue CBDCs as this currency can be a tool by which the state would create a more efficient
and safer welfare system through direct, immediate and more flexible payments.
In particular, the IPMA conducted in this research provides interpretations of the
managerial actions to be undertaken by policymakers regarding the UTAUT factors to
promote the adoption of CBDCs. We propose that central banks should increase the perceived
benefits of CBDCs stemming from the continuous, frequent and daily use of this currency by
households and by their acquaintances. They should also make sure that households
appraise the importance of having access to knowledge and support from the central banks to
facilitate the appropriation of CBDCs.
Our results additionally suggest that CBDCs can be issued by governments as a way to
regain better control of monetary policy if the users have trust in the currency’s system. In fact,
we show that trust represents the vehicle through which the ease of use of the currency system
fosters its adoption. A fiat-based CBDC is no alternative for a currency with little trust.
Governments must first make sure the public trusts the currency, fiat-based or non-fiat-based,
before they launch a digital version. Our IPMA findings even propose that central banks should
struggle to make a “commercial” use of this trust to get households to adopt CBDCs.

8. Limitations and future research perspectives

Our research is Kuhnian in approach as it builds knowledge by solving problems
corresponding to specific research gaps within a paradigm as requested by peers and
illustrated in the CBDC pyramid of Auer and B€ohme (2020). Although this approach enabled
filling an important research gap related to household consumer needs and provided
implications for CBDC design choices, it has several limitations. First, our results represent
households’ perceptions for a future adoption phenomenon. If it turns out households
underestimate the requirements or overestimate their knowledge of CBDC then central banks
have a bigger task ahead in fulfilling their responsibilities. Future studies can conduct a
similar analysis once CBDCs are largely adopted to ascertain the differences between the a
priori perception of these currencies and their real-life usage. Second, we were constrained to
use a convenience sample as there are no statistics on CBDC adoption due to its emerging
nature and its nascent implementation in very few countries. Hence, future research may re-
analyze CBDC adoption once this currency is generalized to a large scale among households,
and accordingly rely on a probabilistic sampling possible at that adoption stage, which is
more guaranteed to be representative of the population studied. Finally, the subjects for this
study have higher education and live mostly in the Western world which might limit the
generalizability of our findings. It would be recommendable to extend this empirical research
to other segments of the population and to other continents and cultures. This, however, does
not mean that we expect there to be different findings on other continents, especially where
mobile banking is common, which includes most major industrial nations but also a large part
of Africa and Asia. Future studies may want to investigate to which extent users from
different countries have trust in their existing currency systems and whether a future CBDC Acceptance of
should be fiat or gold-based according to the cultural and individual characteristics of central bank
the users.
digital
currency
9. Conclusion
The present research shows that households are rather knowledgeable of CBDCs and are
ready to adopt them to improve the efficiency of financial transactions. In addition, we unveil
the importance of trust in this currency system and its complementary role with UTAUT to
provide a full understanding of the technology adoption phenomenon in the case of CBDCs.
We demonstrate that policymakers cannot capitalize on their efforts to propose a flexible and
understandable currency unless households’ trust regarding the CBDC system is deployed.
Accordingly, we provide practitioners with recommendations to act on trust and on key
technology acceptance factors in order to foster the adoption of CBDCs. Central banks should
practically raise users’ awareness of CBDC’s performance to improve the flexibility and
quality of their different financial transactions. They should also increase the benefits
perceived from the continuous, frequent and daily use of CBDCs by households and by their
acquaintances. Finally, central banks should make a commercial use of households’ trust in
the CBDC system. Trust in the existing system of interrelated fiat currencies has eroded over
the last decades and worsened with the coronavirus disease (COVID) crisis. While
cryptocurrencies appear to be a potential alternative, our research provides evidence that
digital currencies issued by central banks are perceived as more trustworthy by households.
Hence, by increasing trust in the currency system and inciting customers to value this
criterion, policymakers would make it easier for households to appreciate the efficiency and
ergonomy of CBDC’s system granted by central banks.

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Appendix Acceptance of
central bank
digital
Construct Items References currency
Performance This digital currency system should . . . Venkatesh et al. (2012), Davis
expectancy (Perf- Perf- . . . be useful for operating my (1989), Gefen et al. (2003), Auer
Exp) Exp1 financial transactions and B€ohme (2020)
Perf- . . . improve my performance (real-
Exp2 time, cost, etc.) in operating my
financial transactions
Perf- . . . enable me to operate my financial
Exp3 transactions more quickly
Perf- . . . enhance my effectiveness in
Exp4 operating my financial transactions
Perf- . . . make it easier to operate my
Exp5 financial transactions
Perf- . . . increase my productivity in
Exp6 operating my financial transactions
Effort expectancy It is necessary for me . . . Venkatesh et al. (2012), Davis
(Eff-Exp) Eff- . . . to be able to easily use this digital (1989), Gefen et al. (2003), Auer
Exp1 currency system and B€ohme (2020)
Eff- . . . to easily learn how to use this
Exp2 digital currency system
Eff- . . . to easily become skillful at using
Exp3 this digital currency system
Eff- . . . to easily use this digital currency
Exp4 system the way I want to use it
Eff- . . . to flexibly interact with this digital
Exp5 currency system
Eff- . . . to have a clear and understandable
Exp6 interaction with this digital currency
system
Facilitating Using this digital currency system will Venkatesh et al. (2003), Venkatesh
conditions (Facil- require . . . et al. (2012)
Cond) Facil- . . . that I have access to
Cond1 complementary resources (new
devices, internet)
Facil- . . . that I acquire new knowledge
Cond2
Facil- . . . high compatibility with other
Cond3 technologies I use
Facil- . . . that I easily get help from others
Cond4 (professional support, competent
acquaintances) in case of difficulties to
use this system
Social influence People who . . . Venkatesh et al. (2003), Venkatesh
(Soc-Inf) Soc-Inf1 . . . are important to me should suggest et al. (2012)
that I use this digital currency system
Soc-Inf2 . . . influence my behavior should
suggest that I use this digital currency
system
Soc-Inf3 . . . I value the opinions should suggest
that I use this digital currency system Table A1.
Constructs and their
(continued ) associated items
IJBM Construct Items References

Trust in the I trust . . . Construct adapted to the context

currency system Trust1 . . . the central bank more than a of the study (Auer and B€ohme,
(Trust) commercial bank to receive my salary 2020; Gefen et al., 2003; Zarifis
in digital currency et al., 2015)
Trust2 . . . the central bank more than a
commercial bank to manage my
digital wallet
Trust3 . . . a digital currency system only if it
ensures that the transactions are
private
Trust4 . . . a government-controlled digital
currency system more than a non-
government-controlled system (e.g.
Bitcoin)
Trust5 . . . a national currency system (with a
scope similar to the current currency
system in my country) more than a
worldwide managed system
Behavioral When the digital currency system will be Venkatesh et al. (2003), Venkatesh
intention (Behav- available, I intend to . . . et al. (2012), Davis (1989), Gefen
Int) Behav- . . . always use it et al. (2003)
Int1
Behav- . . . use it frequently
Int2
Behav- . . . try to use it in my daily life
Int3
Intended behavior I plan to use this digital currency system A monolithic concept based on
of use (Use-Behav) ... several activities defined
Use- . . . to carry out wiring transactions according to the context of the
Behav1 study (Auer and B€ohme, 2020;
Use- . . . for cross-border payments Gefen et al., 2003)
Behav2
Use- . . . for online shopping
Behav3
Use- . . . for physical shopping
Behav4
Use- . . . to transform most of my bank
Behav5 deposits into the digital currency
Use- . . . to perform peer-to-peer cash-like
Behav6 transactions
Use- . . . to receive my salary
Behav7
Use- . . . to be paid for tasks other than my
Table A1. Behav8 day job

About the authors

Klaus Solberg S€oilen is Professor of Management at Halmstad University, Sweden. He has taught
management for more than two decades and is the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Intelligence Studies in
Business (JISIB). Before entering academia, he worked for six years in industry, in the US, France and
Norway, the last three as an auditor by KPMG, Oslo. Dr. Solberg S€oilen writes on Management and
Political Economy, more precisely Intelligence Studies, Digital Marketing and Geopolitics. He has
written more than 70 articles, book chapters and case studies and is the author of half a dozen books on
intelligence-related topics.
 Lamiae Benhayoun is associate professor at Institut Mines Telecom Business School, France. She Acceptance of
holds an engineering degree in telecommunications and a PhD with a double qualification in
management sciences and automation engineering. Prior to joining the academic field, Dr. Benhayoun central bank
worked as an IT engineer at Alcatel Lucent and as a customer business developer at Procter and digital
Gamble. Her research interests include collaborative innovation and digital transformation, with a focus currency
on information systems and maturity assessment. Dr. Benhayoun also strives to transfer
academic knowledge to socio-economic actors through case studies, university-industry partnerships
and the design of audit tools. Lamiae Benhayoun is the corresponding author and can be contacted at:
lamiae.benhayoun@imt-bs.eu

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