The Cambridge School and Leo Strauss: Texts and Context of American Political Science

Author(s): Rafael Major

Source: Political Research Quarterly , Sep., 2005, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 477-485
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3595616

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3595616?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

and Sage Publications, Inc. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to Political Research Quarterly

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Cambridge School and Leo Strauss:
Texts and Context of American Political Science

RAFAEL MAJOR, TRINITY COLLEGE

Over the past quarter century, the Cambridge School of Intellectual History has had a profound influence on
the study of political theory in the U.S. The scholarship of historians such as John Dunn, Quentin Skinner,
and John Pocock has almost single-handedly defined the terms with which political scientists understand early
modern thought, and consequently liberalism and its alternatives. In this essay I analyze Quentin Skinner's
"Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas" as the seminal argument for the Cambridge School's
interpretive strategy. In particular, I note the degree to which Skinner attacked the scholarship of Leo Strauss
in order to establish the Cambridge approach. Contrary to Skinner, I argue Strauss too has a concern for gen-
uine historical understanding. I conclude with a re-reading of Strauss' Persecution and the Art of Writing in order
to show that Strauss' interpretive strategy ultimately comes much closer to the "historicity" claimed by Skin-
ner and others.

T he publication of Quentin Skinner's Vision of Politics such

is dangers, however, that an interpretation of a text can
yield
the culmination of the so-called Cambridge School of an accurate historical account-seldom accomplished,
but
Intellectual History. "These volumes mark simultane- "doubtless" possible (Skinner 1969a: 31). In particular, I
wish
ously its triumph and, alas, its failure" (Wootton 2003: 10). to re-open the debate, apparently closed by Skinner,
between
I will leave the autopsy to others, but the occasion of the the Cambridge School and the "unhistorical way in
passing of an interpretive "paradigm" beckons us to remem-which the classical texts in the history of political theory had
traditionally
ber how it all began. In order properly to assess the mode of been read and interpreted" before 1966 (Woot-
textual interpretation that has dominated the field of theton 2003: 8).2 The dangers of unhistorical textual analysis
are
history of political thought for the past quarter century we many and complex, as Skinner goes to great lengths to
must return to its genesis-when both its impetus and its demonstrate, but surprisingly the central focus of "Meaning
aim were clear. and Understanding" is an attack on the writings and legacy
I analyze Quentin Skinner's "Meaning and Understandingof Leo Strauss.3 While it is true that unreflective interpreters
(circa 1969) cavalierly inserted their own words into the
in the History of Ideas" (1969a) in an effort to understand
the original success of the Cambridge School and perhaps mouths of the great books, found anachronistic concepts, or
used procrustean paradigms, it is not the case, I argue, that
more importantly, the intellectual "context" over and against
which it defined itself in the United States.' I recognize the accusations accurately describe the interpretive strategy
such
of Strauss-despite the fact he has been "tarred with the
provisional nature of such an analysis and the danger of the
"mythology of prolepsis" (Skinner 1969a: 22 ff.) an exami-same brush" (Gunnell 1986: 633).
nation of a single text can foster. It is by being mindful ofContrary to Skinner's stereotypes, not all "unhistorical"
interpreters think alike. The persuasiveness of "Meaning"
did a great service by challenging the status quo assumptions
There are differences between those associated with the Cambridge
of textual interpretation during the formative years of the
School, but this in-fighting did not begin until after the "devastating"
(Ashcraft 1975, see footnote 1-2 and context) and "iconoclastic" (Tully
1983: 489) success of the new "methodology" propounded in Skinner's
2 Wootton locates the beginning of Skinner's "international" (i.e., Ameri-
"Meaning and Understanding" (Zuckert 2002: 58-59). A thorough
can) reputation with the publication of "The Ideological Context of
analysis would require more space than allowable here, but I am mainly
Hobbes's Political Thought" (Skinner 1966a). Curiously, the coups d'etat
interested in phenomena of the Cambridge School before its "full force,"
of the Cambridge School in U.S. political science was carried out almost
"novelty," and "importance" were purposely obfuscated by Skinner
(Schochet 1974: 274 n.14 and context; Wootton 2003: 8) or redefinedexclusively in the pages of a single journal, Political Theory (e.g., Ashcraft
1975; Pocock 1973, 1975a, b, 1980, 1981, 1985; Skinner 1965, 1969a,
with anachronistic relevance for "times to come" (Pocock 1989: x). A
1973, 1974, 1976).
full-length study of the genesis of the Cambridge School in American
3 That the focus of "Meaning and Understanding" (hereafter cited as
Political Science departments would begin with Dunn (1968), Pocock
"Meaning") is an "attack" on Leo Strauss is not as apparent as it is in
(1971), and Skinner (1966a). For a useful summary of the Cambridge
Skinner's earlier work (Skinner 1966b). Michael Zuckert identifies a
historiens historisants, see Gunnell and Pocock (1984: 7 ff.).
"polemic" against Strauss but does not elaborate (Zuckert 2002: 59), I
NOTE: I would like to thank Dr. George Martin and the Liberty Fund forwill develop this point further below. For now, however, it should be
the leisure for research and writing. Even more gratitude is owednoted that several antagonists of the Cambridge School are attacked
to Richard Ruderman, Steve Forde, Dr. Eduardo deAlvarez, and Tyobliquely or with silence-especially Jurgen Habermas, but also Conrad
Tessitore. Several anonymous reviewers of this manuscript wereRussell (Wootton 2003: 9). Also see J.G.A. Pocock's silence on Leo
also decisively helpful and kind. Strauss' Thoughts on Machiavelli in his Machiavellian Moment, despite the
fact that Strauss taught Pocock "much" about the Florentine (Mansfield
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 3 (September 2005): pp. 477-485 1975a,b; Pocock 1975b).

477

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
478
478 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY

contemporary between
discipline of
behavioralism and normative political Pol
theory.7
it incorrectly Though
identified Straus
an uneasy truce exists today, remnants of this con-
the status quo.flictStrauss'
remain in many political scienceinterpr
departments in the
say the least, and
U.S., serving aswhatever
a reminder of a bygone era when politicalelse
it, it was anything but
science and political theory traditi
were supposedly indistinguish-
leading up to the appearance
able. As a story of
for the development of the study of political
inclusion, or rather
theory and philosophy inhis attack
the U.S., however, the retelling of o
tial authority" the (Skinner 1969a:
ascendancy of behavioralism is a myopic distortion-
textual analysis, has
told by the victor. had
The behavioral confu
revolution defined itself
not only in promoting misund
over and against the study of the "history of political
also in covering over
theory," but much
at the very same moment of
(circa 1945-1969) the
between Strauss'
study of theinterpretive
"history of political philosophy" was itself
This failure toundergoing a radical transformation (Gunnell 1986:
understand Str
misconceptions on
passim).8 the
By the time Dr. Skinner part
published "Meaning,"ofone b
selves as enemies of
individual theorist Strauss
in particular and
was gaining an increasing
"Straussian" banner. To
amount of notoriety-Leo Strauss.9 re-open
and Strauss, will serve
Leo Strauss' the
reputation among American political doub
theo-
original theoretical attractio
rists is best characterized by his attack on traditional polit-
while recovering a as more
ical philosophy accura
practiced in the U.S. According to
pher whose complex influence
Strauss, the study of the history of political thought was
fizzled efforts lumbering
of under his the assumptions
most of historicism
orig or
unquestioned ideologies (e.g., Strauss and Cropsey 1963:
LEO STRAUSS AND THE CONTEXT OF 1-6) and the typical traditionalist practitioner was in a
"MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING"
"slumber" (Strauss 1952: 31). The best example of such a
criticism is a review of a book on Plato where Strauss
The argument of Skinner's "Meaning and Understanding" unflinchingly excoriates those simple minds that turn to
moves in two distinct phases. The first portion is the "criti- ancient authors in the attempt to gather practical lessons to
cal and negative" attack against the "unselfconscious" tradi- solve modern political problems.10 In addition to this
tionalists in the field of political theory. Skinner anatomizes attack on the "traditionalist" study of political theory,
several mythologies, "perpetual" dangers, and inherent log- Strauss simultaneously gained notoriety as a leading oppo-
ical fallacies in the unreflective and anachronistic "precon- nent of the "new" behavioralist political science. Many of
ceptions" of conventional textual exegesis. The second his essays open with an obligatory criticism of modern
phase of the argument is Skinner's positive formulation or social science,1 but the most notable debate occurred after
proposal for a new way of understanding intellectual history the publication of Herbert Storing's Essays on the Scientific
that will eventually be born out by later studies.5 In the Study of Politics (1962) in which Strauss accused social science
argument to follow, however, I will focus almost exclusively
on the first part of "Meaning." It is only by understanding
the point of Skinner's attack (or revolution) against the 7 Notable combatants included Robert Dahl, David Easton, Heinz Eulau,

accepted practices in the study of political thought that
readers can appreciate the need for his new historical
approach.6 Understanding the first part of "Meaning," how-
ever, requires a look at its historical context.
A useful rubric for teaching the history of American
Political Science is the retelling of the "bitter quarrel"
4 The adolescent Cambridge School was referred to as the "new history"
(Gunnell 1982) and was already closely associated with the writings of a
single author-Quentin Skinner (Galston 1982: 257).
5 After Skinner's criticism of others, the reader is presented with a "type of
approach" that must "necessarily be adopted" (Skinner 1969a: 4).The
past and future "hero of the story" (41) or "case study" (Schochet 1974:
264) for Skinner's positive methodological and philosophic reflections
will be his eventual corpus on Thomas Hobbes.
6 The first phase of "Meaning" is necessary a priori for an appreciation of
the second phase of the argument. There are several critical appraisals
available for readers interested in Skinner's proposed method (Berki and
Parekh 1976; Parekh and Berki 1973; Schochet 1974; Tarcov 1982; Tarl-
ton 1973; Wiener 1974; Zuckert 2002).
Charles Hyneman, Harold Lasswell, Vernon Van Dyke, Russel Kirk,
Herbert Storing, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin (Ranney 1965: 283-84).
8 The justified "dissatisfaction" of traditional political theory (Riker 1962:
408) was so great and fractious, the very definition of political theory
was uncertain (McDonald and Rosenau 1968; Pocock 1971: 4).
9 (Kalleberg 1969: 28 n.14; Rothman 1962b: 341) Strauss was only one
of several emigre scholars who came to the U.S. in the 1930s and 1940s
who constituted part of the "resistance movement" against behavioral-
ism (Germino 1963). Others who became as famous as Strauss were
Hannah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, and Herbert Marcuse (Gunnell 1986:
632). These scholars, trained in Europe, were differentiated from Amer-
ican political theorists in their exegetical approach to texts and what
was seen as a fresh philosophic seriousness. But see Eric Voegelin
(1957) who comments, ". .. he does not rank as high as Leo Strauss
(Chicago)-but nobody else does. Strauss is hors concours."
10 Strauss (1946) also cautions those who all too easily dismiss modern
philosophy and blindly embrace antiquity (failing to see its problematic
character). In comparison to those who look to the antiquity as a theo-
retical golden age, Strauss is much more sympathetic to the fusion of
"history and philosophy of historicism" than many of his readers
assume (Tarcov 1991: 13).
"Obligatory" because publishable articles in the U.S. must follow a for-
mula (Exchange with Lowith).

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE
THECAMBRIDGE SCHOOL AND LEO STRAUSS
CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL AND LEO STRAUSS 479 479

of being unknowingly
longer attack was necessary.l5 First, he delineates a taxon-
attack on social
omy scienc
of mythologies (historical nonsense) that result from
pages of the
the preconceived American
assumptions of interpreters. Simply put,
Wolin 1963; Storing
there is an extreme danger that interpreters, supposedly e
more interesting bec
engaged in understanding history, actually find only what
now in virtual isolation
they already know.6 Each mythology, we are lead to believe,
discipline. is conceptually From this
faulty in that contemporary biases or sets of p
entists and
categories arepolitical
built-in. The dangers inherent in traditional t
Strauss or exegesis
attack
are too great.'7 with
47).13 As behavioralism
Skinner does not predicate his call for a new method on
against normative
these dangers alone, however. The accusation thatpoli inter-
theorists preters import their own searchin
were concepts, paradigms, and ques-
tions into a text is as old as "interpretation" itself. A call for
SKINNER'S CRITICAL ATTACK AGAINST a "wholly different approach," based on potential dangers
"TRADITIONAL" INTERPRETATION would be "alarmist and unjustified" (Skinner 1969a: 30).
The majority of "Meaning" is a description of the "dangers"
Skinner's opening salvo in "Meaning" appears to be from of text-only studies, but again, because this method was
a position of strength-fortified by the entire modern acad- most generally accepted. It is a testament to Skinner's theo-
emy. Using an impressive array of the "knowledge" pro- retical clarity that in addition to spelling out "dangers," he is
duced by literary criticism, psychology, philosophy of sci- quite conscious of the fact that "dangers" alone are insuffi-
ence, sociology, art history, anthropology, and (when cient evidence to demonstrate that the traditional study of
convenient) strict logical rigor, Skinner takes on every cur- texts rests on fundamental philosophical error tout court.
rent mode (circa 1969) of historical scholarship. This criti- Pointing out a "danger," as proof of inadequacy, is the equiv-
cal and unflinching analysis was necessary in order to pave alent of calumny-rhetorically effective, but theoretically
the way for the historians of ideas to see the requirement of irrelevant.18 In order to show that the study of texts must be
"appropriate procedures" for an authentic or true under- supplemented by historical evidence, Skinner must show
standing of history (Skinner 1969a: 4). Unlike other fields that the traditionalist methods are "incapable in principle"
of inquiry, that consciously focus on methodological of achieving historical accuracy (Skinner 1969a: 31).19
assumptions and procedures, intellectual historians and The "most interesting and intractable" objection to reading
political theorists had avoided this self-reflection and as a a text as a "self-sufficient object of understanding," according
consequence the discipline was amuck with anachronistic to Skinner, is that writers deliberately engage in "oblique"
fallacies and "historical absurdities."'4 Limited by the domi- methods of writing. Unless we-as interpreters-understand
nant strains of "liberal and Marxist forms of [historical]
analysis," the field of the history of ideas was historically
insensitive at best, but more likely, polemics guided by 15 It would be a mistake to characterize Skinner's argument as an attack on
unquestioned ideology (Skinner 1969b: 489-90; Tully "text" in the name of "context," his final position is a nuanced balanc-
1983: 489). ing between the two (Schochet 1974). The attempt to understand
Skinner's assault is devastating. The majority of his criti- "social context" alone ultimately denies the very point of understanding
political ideas (Skinner 1969a: 4-5, 39-48).
cism is directed against those who interpret intellectual his-
16 Due to space, I will only outline Skinner's (1969a) anatomization of fatal
tory by reading "texts" (autonomously) as if they provide a
errors: Mythology of Doctrine (7-16), Mythology of Coherence (16-22),
"self sufficient object of inquiry" He eventually will criticize Mythology of Prolepsis (22-24), Mythology of Parochialism (24-30). It
the other orthodoxy of interpreting history in the context of is not an unthinking abstraction to say that all of these mythologies
extra-textual "religious, political, and economic factors," but involve interpreters importing what they already think they know into
the works of the past (whether they know it or not). A helpful summary
the orthodoxy of attempting textual exegesis, solo scriptura
of Skinner's "useful typology" is given by Tarcov (1982: 694-5; also see
as it were, was "more generally accepted" and hence the Zuckert 2002: 62 ff.).
17 No word in "Meaning" occurs as often as "danger." A complete study of
Skinner's rhetorical strategy in the article would require delineation of
12 ... one may say of it [the new quantitative political science] that it fid- how the various "dangers" of interpretation or "tendencies" of inter-
dles while Rome burns. It is excused by two facts: it does not know it preters are transformed from contingent dangers into "inescapable,"
fiddles, and it does not know that Rome burns" (Strauss 1968: 223). "inevitable," and unrecognized confusions.
13 Except for students of Strauss and their students, almost all references 18 For example, the observation that individuals potentially make arbitrary
to Strauss in political science scholarship are attacks on his "ideology" judgments points to the "danger" of using classical models of prudence
(McShea 1963, passim) and "sermonizing" (Riker 1965: 379). (Also see as a universal political principle, but such a danger does not require
Drury 1988; Drury 1997; Gunnell 1978; Rothman 1962a; Rothman abandoning practical wisdom all together. Or stated in reverse, the
and Roherty 1962.) observation that due process and the rule of law are potentially blind to
14 Until the appearance of "Meaning" historians of ideas had been "uncrit- individual or particular circumstances does not necessarily require
ical" and Skinner successfully elevated the methodological debate to the abandoning the rule of law.
philosophic frame of "the problem of knowledge" (Ashcraft 1975: 5-6; 9 Or as Strauss indicates, those who rely on explicit statements only are
also see Pocock 1971: 4-6). precluded from historical accuracy a priori (Strauss 1952: 27, 30).

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
480
480 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY

that some writers voluntarily

need make no claims regarding Skinner's intention or motive
deliberate obliqueness, no
to claim that the effect of "Meaning"-how amoun
it was understood
and over) will in yield
its historical context-was understood by many to be an
historicall
writings of Hobbes
attack on Strauss.24 The forceand Bayle
of this attack is heightened,
an impressive however,
case because Skinner
that characterizes the writings
the of be
"systematic" or "sustained
Strauss as the "leading proponent" of a "demonological (but iron
appearance of the
highly influential)"orthodoxy
method of interpretation that dogged the of
"disguise" a historical study of ethical and politicalteaching.
heterodox ideas (Skinner 1969a:
"oblique" strategies is"ignored"
12-13). Contrary to the current often status of Strauss in mis
the case of political theory and intellectual
Hobbes and history (Wootton
Bayle, 1993),
recognize that whenreligious hetero
Skinner pens "Meaning," Strauss is still a "very influ-
commitment" ential (Skinner 1969a:
authority" (Skinner 1969a: 20). Given Strauss' reputa-
"Meaning" is tion as an innovative
more reader of classic texts, however, it is
devastating to
pretation than oddthis
that he would be included in Skinner's critical attack of
possibility o
"traditional" methods of interpretation. Again, in 1969, Leo
SKINNER'S ATTACK ON STRAUSS Strauss was anything but traditional.

More could be written on individual points above, but it STRAUSS' CHALLENGE TO

is important to see that Skinner has successfully constructed "TRADITIONAL" HISTORICAL STUDIES

a "straw man" of the traditional study of political theory22 It

is also important to realize that this straw man is not simply In order to understand better why Skinner deemed it
an abstraction, but rather, a very accurate historical depic- necessary to demonize the reputation of Strauss, it is neces-
tion of the condition and practice of the study of political sary to make some brief formulation of Strauss' rediscovery
thought when "Meaning" was published. It is true that many of esoteric writing and its context. This is a complicated task
practitioners in the discipline were engaged in an unreflec- to be sure, but I will confine myself in the main to the Per-
tive enterprise of exegesis-constructing historical absurdi- secution and the Art of Writing. It bears directly on the argu-
ties regardless of conscious intention or motivation. The ment at hand and by evidence of the citations in "Meaning,"
underlying force of "Meaning" was its awareness of difficul- it serves as the basis for the majority of Skinner's character-
ties that had not previously disturbed the slumber of the ization. In addition, I will ignore the writings of Strauss' stu-
typical traditionalist (Strauss 1952: 30). Like all straw men, dents. Any attempt to understand the coherence of a writer
however, there were exceptions to this status quo. I now of Strauss' caliber would be infinitely complicated by
turn directly to the writings of Leo Strauss in light of Skin- including subsequent followers.25 Skinner cites Joseph
ner's own arguments. Cropsey, Allan Bloom, and Richard Cox, but I will assume
As summarized above, Leo Strauss' influence in the field this was for the purpose of rhetorical effect rather than a
of political theory was a palpable reality. By 1969 the heart of substantive critique of Strauss.26
Strauss' most influential writings was complete and his grow- According to Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing is
ing influence as a thinker and teacher were undeniable.23 I meant to be useful material for some future "sociology of
philosophy." Contrary to the unreflective assumptions of
many intellectual historians (ca. 1952), such a study of
20 It is important to note that the dangers of mythology of doctrine, coher-
intellectual thought must not only attempt accurate histori-
ence, prolepsis, and parochialism are all exacerbated if an interpreter is cal interpretation, but also be cognizant and critical of "its
unaware of deliberate oblique strategies of writing. We can add, how- own basis" (Strauss 1952: 7).27
ever, that an awareness of such strategies as "systematic irony" greatly
reduces the dangers from the same mythologies-the more we know,
the more "self-sustaining" a text becomes. various interlocutors (e.g., Bloom 1960; Burckhardt 1960a; Burckhardt
21 The fact that key terms change meaning over time or that ideas mean 1960b; Cropsey 1962; Rothman 1962b). Strauss had published other
different things in different times are dangers (Skinner 1969a: 31, 35); works, but for our purposes, Skinner alludes to all of those cited above
however, the proof of these two dangers relies upon recovering much of (more individual works than any other author cited in "Meaning").
the terms' original meaning, i.e., "proving" a word has changed its 24 Or, the "illocutionary" effect of Skinner's logic concerning text-only
meaning over time obliterates the danger of not understanding a word analysis was an indictment of Strauss' reflections on interpretation.
has changed meaning. 25 In fact, nothing has been more damaging to Strauss' reputation than the
22 "To trace the history of a revolution is, almost of necessity, to start with assumption that all of his "disciples" or "epigones" (e.g., Rothman 1962a)
a straw man. The rhetoric of the exercise compels the construction of an are miner birds for their teacher. The attempt to understand Strauss in the
account of the way things stood before change began ..." (Pocock 1971: scattered writings of his students make the mythology of coherence and
4 and context). prolepsis a virtual certainty (e.g., Skinner 1969a: 16, 21-22).
23 For example, Strauss had already published On Tyranny (1963), Perse- 26 Using the "scattered remarks" of a single author to form a "coherent"
cution and the Art of Writing (1952), Natural Right and History (1953), argument is dangerous enough; using the "scattered remarks" of multi-
What Is Political Philosophy (1959), Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958), and ple students would make the mythology of coherence inescapable.
History of Political Philosophy (Strauss and Cropsey 1963). Major 27 I understand the danger of using what authors "say" as proof of an inter-
exchanges in the APSR had also occurred between Strauss' students and pretation of a text. I must make a tentative beginning, however, being

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE
THECAMBRIDGE SCHOOL AND LEO STRAUSS
CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL AND LEO STRAUSS 481
481

Persecution and that philosophic

the Art questions
of wouldWriting
ever arise (Strauss 1952: is mo
ingly original 55-56; Strauss 1959: 56).
formulation of the prac
ing. Strauss makes Once thethe possibilityclaim
of oblique writing is accepted
that (even man
engage in the "metaphoric" practice
tentatively), the historian of ideas becomes faced with a sig- of
nificant amount of24).
lines" (Strauss 1952: evidence that several writers were aware
Understand
means by this is complicated,
of or engaged in it.32 Circa 1952, however, the academy of how
intellectual historians-across
approached with care. According disciplines-no longer was to St
ous and crudest" reason
attentive to the historicalfor a writer
evidence that persecution was a sig- de
an oblique style ofnificant
writing is
factor in interpretation. The persecutio
possibility of deliberate
of Skinner's Hobbes and voluntaryand
oblique writing Bayle
strategies was no longer (noted
taken
to the difficulty that authors
seriously For example, in cen-
"up to the end of the nineteenth differ
are often and literally tury, many philosophers in and theologians
"grave believed that dang
Authors like Farabi and Maimonides-embedded in the Hobbes was an atheist" (Strauss 1952: 28).33 But at the time
context of theologically governed regimes-could not pub-
of the publication of Persecution many historians were tacitly
lish their thoughts if these thoughts were heterodox. In Per-
or explicitly claiming that Hobbes was religious; even if "not
exactly" a follower of any one religion, at least a follower of
secution Strauss does not ever "simply" assert that these "writ-
ers were unable to say what they meant;" rather theneo-Kantian philosophy of religion.34 In this light, Strauss'
argument is grounded in the historical fact that these
entire argument for being sensitive to oblique writing consti-
thinkers lived in "a social order, if an all-comprehensive tutes an attack on the "slumber" of the modem study of his-
order, which regulates not merely actions but thoughts orand its failure to provide precise historical understand-
tory
ing.35 By pointing to the crude and obvious phenomena of
opinions as well."29 Stated cautiously, Strauss' primary exam-
ples in the opening pages of Persecution suggest that the persecution
his- and the possibility of esoteric writing, intellec-
torical context in which Farabi wrote is an important pre- tual historians of all stripes would be forced to consciously
reconsider unquestioned presuppositions of historical
liminary factor in interpreting a text of Farabi's on Plato.30
Strauss is sometimes charged with attempting un- or inquiry.
a- In light of this critique, the impetus and aim of
historical exegesis, but the entire introduction to Persecution
Strauss' "magnificent effrontery" in Persecution is identical to
makes an initial case for the possibility of oblique writing in
Skinner's attack of unreflective complacency in "Meaning."
terms of "persecution" assessed partly in terms of historical
context.3' Persecution is context because "the constraints of STRAUSS AND SKINNER AGREE ON THE

any given social situation" is a necessary consideration- "PHILOSOPHICAL POINT"

even if it does not provide sufficient ground for complete

certainty (Skinner 1969a: 40). Like it or not, philosophicStrauss and Skinner form a common front against those
intellectual historians who fail to grasp the philosophic
questions cannot be understood as being absolutely inde-
pendent from historical investigation. Without the experi-
importance of acquiring an accurate understanding of his-
ence and knowledge of history it is almost inconceivable
tory. It is not simply sufficient to form a bunker of internal
evidence based on the text alone.36 This observation in turn
does not give license to subsume any given author into the
open to the possibility that what Strauss says may not be what he means
bottomless milieu of social, political, or economic contexts
or that I may understand what the text "says" differently than he or the
within which a book is published (Skinner 1969a: 4-5,
original audience did. In beginning this way-conscious of possible
dangers-I follow Skinner, e.g., "his own explicit statements," "as he
put it," "by Bayle himself," or "according to Aubrey" (Skinner 1964,
1969a: 19.n. 84, and context: 34). 32 Strauss points to Lessing, Schleiermacher, Gibbon, Hobbes, Mon-
28 In noting "persecution" as the most "obvious and crudest," I suspect buttesquieu, and more (Strauss 1952: 27-28, 33).
cannot prove there may be another "reason" why esoteric writing 33 is
"It has been traditional to dismiss [Hobbes'] ... overt sentiments as the
practiced. work of an arch-skeptic slyly pressing a familiar vocabulary into the
29 It is important to note that Strauss (1952: 9-10) is mainly interested in most heterodox use" (Skinner 1969a: 33).
the political-theoretical difference between Christianity on the one hand 34 "The trend in much recent exegesis . . . has been to insist . . . that
and Judaism and Islam on the other, but this difference is reflected in Hobbes must after all have 'meant quite seriously what he so often says,
historical context of each as well. For the false accusation that Strauss that the Natural Law is the command of God, and to be obeyed because
"simply" says that esoteric writing "must be the case" see "Meaning" it is God's command' ... a thoroughly Kantian doctrine" (Skinner
(Skinner 1969a: 32). 1969a: 33).
30 This conclusion on Strauss' part is heightened by the fact that the his- 35 "Strauss is well aware that his own arguments will disturb and anger
torical context in which Plato wrote did not hold freedom of speech in some historians .. ." (Thompson 1954: 209). "At the very least, the
higher regard than did orthodoxy. "It is often said that the Greek city observations I have made will force historians sooner or later to aban-
was a totalitarian society It embraced and regulated morals, divine wor- don the complacency with which they claim to know ..., and to begin
ship, tragedy and comedy" (Strauss 1952: 21). to wonder whether the historical truth is not as difficult of access as the
31 Strauss is famous for his critique of "historicism" but this is not the same philosophic truth" (Strauss 1959: 232).
thing as "history," or, put differently, "There seems to be no more appro- 36 Assumed coherence of an author's intention has even led some critics to
priate way of combating this teaching [historicism] than the study of "discount whole works" of particular thinkers "without any external evi-
history" (Strauss 1963: 28). dence" (Skinner 1969: 18; Strauss 1952: 31).

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
482
482 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY

39-48). The historian

A must
knowledge engage of t
tentative to show the extent
enterprise of to which coming
those features of our own to
intention, yet remain
arrangements which we mayat sober
be disposed to accept as tra- d
might think
true.
ditional or even This is
'timeless' truths mayis
in factmade
be the merest d
ficult by the contingencies
very fact of our ownthat peculiar historyany
and social av
judgment of structure. (Skinner 1969a:
meaning and 53-54.) underst
be anachronistic. Rather than shri
meaning, however,The study historical inves
of history is "relevant" for us, because every
we are to be anything other
generation of men, including many writers ofthan
the "first c
age. To wit, the rank,"
very possibility
assume and even expound comprehensive doctrines th
writing exists provides tentative
that turn out to be the product of something locally and h
indeed authentic self-understandin
temporally confined. We must beware of the inclination "to
As a matter for the
identify the goal of ourconsideration
thinking with the point at which we
writing becomes have a
becomepowerful check
tired of thinking"- the point of finding in his-
already know tory what
(or wantwe already knowan (Strauss 1953: 21-2). Strauss
author t
must be understood on
would appeal to Plato its
and Skinner own
to Marx, but both agreeint
yet more is required.
that every society-even It must
our own-places limits uponalso
the
are not in the imagination such
same that human beings are literally blind to
circumstances a
inal audience. We must
the distinction never
between what is necessary and what mista
is the
for that of the past.
product merely ofIn effect,
our own contingent an
arrangements (Skin- i
thepossibility that
ner 1969a: 53; an author
Strauss 1952: 22). In this respect, theis
study en
must remain vigilant regarding
of history is almost invaluable in helping us pierce through ap
his own conclusions.
the unrecognized constraints The
on human thoughtperple
imposed
strategies-like irony-force readers
by society itself. Only historical knowledge can prevent one
proof. Questionsfrom about
mistaking the specificanfeatures author's
of the political life of
ological considerations to
one's time and one's country for the the fore,
"nature" of political
to a given author's intention
things (Strauss 1959: 56-57). (Skinn
ple (Pace Professors Strauss and Sk
argument concerning MISUNDERSTANDING MEANING AND CONCLUSION
Hobbes' irony
must amass some evidence conce
irony and ultimately
The emphasis of my what
analysis of Skinner's lies
"Meaning and ben
unmasking an Understanding in the History of
intention in Ideas" would indicate a
"disgui
sober consideration of agreement
great deal of theoretical alternative between Strauss and
of oblique strategies
Skinner contra the are
status quo in necessaril
the academy yet, in fact,
mological basis much of their
of Skinner's plea for a ownnew historical approach
claim is
assert the "text"defined
when it
in direct opposition suits
to Strauss. It is in the face or
of this th
better, will inescapably find
substantive agreement between what
Skinner and Strauss on the t
What is most significant about
difficulty and importance of precise historical understanding th
Skinner and Strauss,
that I must returnhowever, is
to the question of the ultimate disagree- no
precise historicalment understanding,
between Leo Strauss and the Cambridge School. b
tic Skinner's inclusion of Strauss in the
self-understanding. Theunhistorical tradition
mos
claim, or "philosophic
of interpreting texts would bepoint"
gratuitous enough, but theof
"Meaning" concerns the
characterization possibility
of Strauss as the leading proponent of a
yields a
"general truth"-not
demonological me
strain of traditional interpretation is almost
about ourselves beyond
as the well (Skinner
pale (Skinner 1969a: 12-13). This is especially 19
torical understanding yields
true given the state of the more
sub-field of political theory within
allows us the opportunity
the American political science in 1969. to Straussgain
was any- a
which to ponderthing philosophic
but traditional and further, much of his fame quest
was a
not merely a product of
direct result of exposing (even if our
more puckishlyown than Skin- h
ner) the naive assumptions of many of his contemporaries.
How could Skinner have made such an obvious mistake?
37 I do not deny thatI conclude
the by suggesting
invitationthat Skinner's attack to
on Strauss
unc
invite "perverse ingenuity" (Sabine
is a direct result of a misunderstanding 195:
that ultimately dis- 2
lights, but Skinner and Strauss do not se
torts an authentically historical grasp of Strauss' work. The cru-
enterprise (Strauss 1959: 223 ff.). A good
and non-Skinnerean
cialinterpreter
error is the assumption that Straussaware
is engaged in an enter-
of th
ent in the attempt prise
to intent on some practical goal secret
identify rather than a genuine
teach
1988; 1994a, b). pursuit of "self-knowledge" or theoretical understanding-

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE
THE CAMBRIDGE
CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL AND LEO STRAUSS 483
SCH
483

Skinner's "philosop
writing is
Strauss' primary
are wellstu
a
delusion not
that have
a fre
losophy would
Strauss' "s
r
(Strauss 1964: 11)
secution
study of scope.
political
Th
fructify existed
thought is
an
grasp of ancient
recognitio w
there is not
If even
an intea
points to esoteric
timeless
fundamental truth
during a
sally applied to
overall pol
ar
we interpret
teric the
writp
with a view to
ner's our
ultim
"a sophisticated
the fo
argum
It would seem plau
appreciat
purposely misrepre
according
approach on
against
"the th
u
political Science. In
subversive
taken conclusion
cases, he t
f
was and is
ofshared
persecu
standing of Strauss
secution w
a few of Strauss'
the o
practi
Skinner's
is "Meanin
not alw
"Straussian"
by school
thinke
what was perceiv
oblique m
around "secret
other w
tha
observed througho
between e
(Kendall 1967: 783
prevalent
standing becomes u
ultimately
geoning influenc
practiced
with much
fear so
smok
from
In fact, however,
importan
Strauss' writings
(Strauss 1r
Strauss' overriding
At the en
theoretical unders
consequen
ment every case,
"self-awarb
example immediat
ner, the st
of esoteric writing
ural tend
ment we are
with told
an
because of fear
1981). of
Ac
clear in "Meaning,
imagine t
opinions t
is in unde
38 Some examples: (1) th
own terms are given
(Strauss 1
opportunityof human
and incen
9,11); (2) a return to "c
of thought (Strauss 19
provisional
40position
So (i
self-ev
natural right"
where isSkinn
the
(Strauss 1953,
ing passim);
tactics
"pit beneath
41 a cave"
In fact,int
a
know practical
enced soluti
by Ho
(Strauss 1952: 155-57)
writing bec
39 For example
42 "The
ThoughSki
n
history takebe
cannot ofadeq
assu
tical purpose
To impose
which St
description take"
of how(Belav
easy
tical goals 43
is Also
given see C
by

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
484
484 POLITICAL RESEARCH POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
QUARTERLY

assuming Berki, R. N., andcorrectnes

the Bhiku Parekh. 1976. "On Quentin Skinner's
sive truth. If 'Some Problems
thein the Analysis of Political
"genera Thought and
every Action."' Political Theory 4 (2): 235.
generation of man
Bloom, Allan. 1960. "Political Philosophy and Poetry." American
then Skinner fails to app
Political Science Review 54: 457-564.
own claims. If political l
Bruell, Christopher. 1993. "A Return to Political Philosophy
tingencies of our pecu
and the Understanding of the American Founding." In K. L.
(Skinner 1969a: 53), the
Deutsch and W. Nicgorski, eds., Leo Strauss: Political
other meansPhilosopherto and Jewishconvey
Thinker. Lanham, MD: Roman and a
than by the idiom
Littlefield. of th
By Skinner's own
.2002. "True Esotericism." In M. P.premis
Foley and D. Kries, eds.,
of the past-intent upo
Gladly to Learn and Gladly to Teach. Lanham, MD: Lexington.
forced Burckhardt, Sigurd. 1960a. "English Bards
to
convey and APSA Reviewers."
their i
make no claimAmerican Political Science Review 54: 158-66.
about the l
elitist . 1960b. "On Reading Ordinary Prose:
foundations A Reply to Allan-
to rec
Bloom." American Political Science Review 54: 471-73.
composed of opinion. R
Cropsey, Joseph. 1962. "The Revival of Classical Political Philoso-
Persecution, we can see t
phy: A Reply to Rothman." American Political Science Review
tion of authors of the pas
56 (2): 353-59.
the art of writing (of t
Drury, Shadia B. 1988. The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. New York:
more by pedagogical
St. Martin's Press. c
necessity of esoteric
.1997. wri
Leo Strauss and the American Right. New York: St.
cerns of educating
Martin's Press. or pe
validity of Dunn,
whatJohn. 1968. "The Identity ofthey alr
the History of Ideas. Philosophy
we are truly 43: 97-98. interested i
recoil at theGalston, William A. 1982. "Review of John Dunn's 'Political Oblig-
possibility t
ation in Its Historical Context: Essays
way-persecution orin Political Theory."'
no. Jour-
nal of Politics 44 (1): 256-58.
It is Strauss and not Ski
Germino, Dante. 1963. "The Revival of Political Theory." Journal of
the consequences of the
Politics 25 (3): 437-60.
sober auditor. For Stra
Gunnell, John G. 1978. "The Myth of the Tradition." American
knowledge Political
presents
Science Review 72 (1): 122-34. to
think we already know,
. 1982. "Interpretation and the History of Political Theory: c
seek a self-awareness
Apology and Epistemology." The American Political Scienceles
tingencies of our
Review 76 (2): 317-27. epoch.
truly relevant for us,
_ . 1986. " Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for not
Studying
ate problems,the History but
of Political Theory; the
to Status and eng
Appraisal of
the Classic Texts: An Essay
possibility of on Political Theory, Its Inheritance,
self-kn
philosophic and the
minds History of Ideas." American Political Science
of theReview
80 (2): 631-39.
cepts," but finally side
Gunnell, John, and J. G. A. Pocock. 1984. "Political Theory,
authors judge these co
Methodology, and Myth." Annals of Scholarship 1 (4): 3-62.
1983: 156 n. 98). By assu
Kalleberg, Arthur L. 1969. "Concept Formation in Normative and
insolubility of history's
Empirical Studies: Toward Reconciliation in Political Theory"
access for himself and
American Political Science Review 63 (1): 26-39. hi
ness" he claims to
Kendall, Wilmoore. 1967. "Review: Ancients hold-
and Moderns." Amer-
lacy, but something
ican Political Science Review 61 (3): 783-84. like
Maimonides, Moses. 1963. The Guide of the Perplexed, Vol. 1, trans-
REFERENCES lated and with an introduction and notes by Shlomo Pines,
Introductory Essay by Leo Strauss. Chicago: University of
Ashcraft, Richard. 1975. "On the Problem of Methodology and the Chicago Press.
Nature of Political Theory Political Theory 3 (1): 5-25. Mansfield, Harvey C. 1975a. "Reply to Pocock." Political Theory
Behnegar, Nasser. 2003. Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific 3 (4): 402-05.
Study of Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1975b. "Strauss's Machiavelli." Political Theory 3 (4): 372-84.
Belaval, M. Yvon. 1953. "Pour une sociologie de la philosophie," McDonald, Neil A., and James N. Rosenau. 1968. "Political Theory
"Review of Leo Strauss' Persecution and the Art of Writing." Cri- as Academic Field and Intellectual Activity." Journal of Politics
tique 77 (October): 852-66. 30 (2): 311-44.
McShea, Robert J. 1963. "Leo Strauss on Machiavelli." Western
Political Quarterly 16 (4): 782-97.
44 A fuller explication of these issues can be found in Wootton (1983: Parekh, B., and R. N. Berki. 1973. "The History of Political Ideas:
passim), also see Bruell (2002) and Maimonides, The Guide of the Per- a Critique of Q. Skinner's Methodology." Journal of the History of
plexed, lib. Ideas 34:163-84.

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE
THECAMBRIDGE SCHOOL AND LEO STRAUSS SCHOOL
CAMBRIDGE AND LEO STRAUSS 485 485

Pocock, J. Storing,
G. Herbert J. 1962.
A. Essays on the
1971.
Scientific Study of Politics. P
ical Thought New York: Holt,and
Rinehart. Histo
_ . 1973. Storing,
"Verbalizin
Herbert J., Leo Strauss, Walter Berns, Leo Weinstein, and
Speech." Robert Horwitz. 1963. "Replies to Schaar and
Political Wolin: I-VI."
Theo
. 1975a. "On Richard Ashcraft's 'On the Problem of Method- American Political Science Review 57 (1): 151-60.
ology."' Political Theory 3 (3): 317-18. Strauss, Leo. 1946. "On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political
. 1975b. "Prophet and Inquisitor: Or, a Church Built upon Philosophy" Social Research 13 (3): 326-67.
Bayonets Cannot Stand: A Comment on Mansfield's 'Strauss's .1952. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe, Illinois:
Machiavelli."' Political Theory 3 (4): 385-401. Free Press.

_ . 1980. "Review: Gunnell, John G., Political Theory: Tradi-
tion and Interpretation." Political Theory 8 (4): 563-67.
. 1981. "Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Histori-
ans of Political Thought." Political Theory 9 (3): 353-68.
. 1985. "Machiavelli in the Liberal Cosmos." Political Theory
13 (4): 559-74.
1989 (see 1971). Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on
. 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
_ . 1958. Thoughts on Machiavelli. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
. 1963. On Tyranny. New York: Free Press.
. 1964. The City and Man. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

Political Thought and History. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Ranney, Austin. 1965. "Political Science: The State of the Profes-
sion-A Review Article." Political Science Quarterly 80 (2): 277-87.
Riker, William H. 1962. "Review: Tullock's Calculus of Consent."
Midwest Journal of Political Science 6 (4): 408-11.
_ . 1965. "Theory and Science in the Study of Politics." Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution 9 (3): 375-79.
Rothman, Stanley. 1962a. "The Revival of Classical Political Phi-
losophy." American Political Science Review 56 (2): 341-52.
_ . 1962b. "The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy: A
Critique." American Political Science Review 56 (2): 341-52.
Rothman, Stanley, and James M. Roherty 1962. "Communica-
tions: Rejoinder to Cropsey." American Political Science Review
56 (3): 682-85.
Sabine, George H. 1953. "Review of Persecution and the Art of
Writing." Ethics 63 (3): 220-22.
Schaar, John H., and Sheldon S. Wolin. 1963. "Essays on the Sci-
. 1968. Liberalism Ancient and Modern. New York: Basic
Books.
Strauss, Leo, and Joseph Cropsey 1963. The History of Political Phi-
losophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tarcov, Nathan. 1982. "Quentin Skinner's Method and Machi-
avelli's Prince." Ethics 92 (4): 692-709.
. 1991. "On a Certain Critique of "Straussianism." Review of
Politics 53 (1): 3-18.
Tarlton, C. D. 1973. "Historicity, Meaning, and Revisionism in the
Study of Political Thought. History and Theory 12: 307-28.
Thompson, Lawrance. 1954. "Review of Persecution and the Art of
Writing." Modern Philology 51 (3): 208-10.
Tully, James H. 1983. "The Pen Is a Mighty Sword: Quentin
Skinner's Analysis of Politics." British Journal of Political Science
13 (4): 489-509.
Voegelin, Eric. March 20, 1957. Letter to Fesler Concerning
Review of Willmoore Kendall. New Haven: Box 20.39., Hoover
Institution Archives.

entific Study of Politics: A Critique." American Political Science Wiener, Jonathan M. 1974. "Quentin Skinner's Hobbes." Political
Review 57 (1): 125-50. Theory 2 (3): 251-60.
Schochet, Gordon J. 1974. "Quentin Skinner's Method." Political Wootton, David. 1983. Paolo Sarpi: Between Renaissance and
Theory 2 (3): 261-76. Enlightenment. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, Quentin. 1964. Hobbes's Leviathan. Historical Journal 7: . 1988. "Lucien Febvre and the Problem of Unbelief in
321-33. the Early Modern Period." Journal of Modern History
. 1965. "History and Ideology in the English Revolution."60 (4): 695-730.
Historical Journal 8 (2): 151-78. . 1993. Political Writings: John Locke. New York: Mentor.
_ . 1966a. "The Ideological Context of Hobbes's Political . 1994a. "Narrative, Irony, and Faith in Gibbon's Decline and
Thought." Historical Journal 9 (3): 286-317. Fall." History and Theory 33 (4): 77-105.
_ . 1994b. "Ulysses Bound? Venice and the Idea of Liberty
_ . 1966b. "The Limits of Historical Explanations." Philosophy
4: 199-215. from Howell to Hume." In D. Wootton, ed., Republicanism, Lib-
_ . 1969a. "Meaning and Understanding in the History of
erty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776. Stanford, CA: Stanford
Ideas." History and Theory 8 (1): 3-53. University Press.
__ . 2003. "Quentin Skinner on Himself: The Hard Look Back."
_ . 1969b. "Review of Dunn: The Political Thought of John
Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Trea- Times Literary Supplement, March 14: 8-10.
tises of Government."' American Historical Review 75 (2): 489-90.
Zuckert, Michael P 2002. "Appropriation and Understanding in
. 1973. "The Empirical Theorists of Democracy and Theirthe History of Political Philosophy" In Launching Liberalism, a
Critics: A Plague on Both Their Houses." Political Theorycollection by Michael P Zuckert. Lawrence: University Press of
1 (3): 287-306. Kansas.

. 1974. "Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought

and Action". Political Theory 2 (3): 277-303.
_ . 1976. "Review: Handbook of Political Science," vol. 1. Polit-
Received: March 23, 2004
ical Science. Scope and Theory. Political Theory 4 (3):385-88.
Accepted for Publication: January 18, 2005
_ . 1981. "Reply to Robert Sullivan." New York Review of Books.
November 5. rafael. maj or@trincoll. edu

This content downloaded from

114.84.62.210 on Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:45:44 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms