Predonzani - Miller - The Italian Wars - 4 - The Battle of Ceresole 1544

From Retinue to Regiment series
Warfare c.1453-1618
https:llwww.helion.co.uk!series/from-retinue-to-regiment-1453-1618.php
The period 1453 to 1618 connects the High Medieval Period to the Early
Modern Era. Commonly known as the Renaissance, it saw technological
advances and significant social and cultural change. Catholic dominance
was challenged by the rise of the new Protestant religions, and Western
Europe was itself challenged by the rise of the Ottoman Empire. The New
World was discovered and greater links with the East were created. This
period saw the fall of Constantinople to the Turks and the last major
battle of the Hundred Years War, both in 1453. The use of gunpowder and artillery played an
ever-increasing role in war, and this was coupled with the rise of the profeSSional soldier. The
condotierri, landsknecht and janissary were all to march across the battlefields of Europe and
beyond. Army organisation also changed. The mid to late 15th century still saw armies based
around the'lance !ournie' or 'retinue' of the High Medieval Era, formations based around a lord
and his immediate men-at-arms and other supporters. By the mid 16th century Italian officers
were fielding their troops in formations known as 'battagliones', and by the end of the century
the French term 'regiment' was in common usage.'From Retinue to Regiment 1453-1618'
examines this period in a broad sweep. It examines the wars and battles through narrative,
as well as looking at the equipment, clothing and logistics involved.
About the authors
Massimo Predonzani was born in Piran, Slovenia in 1959 and currently lives in Trieste, Italy. He is an illustrator
and researcher. He specializes in military heraldry during the Italian and European Renaissance. He is the author of
Anghiari 29 giugno 1440 (2010), and Ceresole 14 aprile 1544 (2012). Since 2006 he has been providing the magazine
Soldatini with texts and illustrations. He also has a website where he shares his research and his painted illustrations
(www.stemmieimprese.it.).
Simon Miller is a long time wargamer and author of the popular 'To the Strongest' series of wargames rules.
Submjssions
The publishers would be pleased to receive submissions for this series. Please contact series editor Charles Singleton via
email (charlessingleton@helion.co.uk), or in writing to Helion & Company Limited, Unit 8, Amherst Business Centre,
Budbrooke Road, Warwick, Warwickshire, CV34 5WE.
The Italian Wars
Volume 4: The Battle of Ceresole 1544 -
The Crushing Defeat of the Imperial Army
Massimo Predonzani and Simon Miller
Translated by Rachele Tiso
.HELION&
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Text © Massimo Predonzani and Simon Miller 2022.Translated by Rachele Tiso

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Contents
Introduction iv
Historical Background 5
2 The French Commanders 11
3 The Imperial Commanders 18
4 The Enfants Perdus and the Rise of the Arquebus in the Sixteenth
Century 26
5 The Italian infantry 29
6 Tactical Evolution of the Spanish Infantry 35
7 The French Infantry 40
8 The Landsknechts 46
9 The Swiss Infantry 52
10 The Light Cavalry 57
11 The Heavy Cavalry 61
12 The Heraldry of Alfonso d'Avalos 66
13 The War in Piedmont 70
14 The Approach Manoeuvres of the Two Armies and the First Clash on
Easter Sunday 77
15 Analysis of the Opposing Armies 80
16 Opening Shots 85
17 The Clash Between the Light Cavalry 90
18 The Combat on the French Left Flank 92
19 The Fighting in the Centre 95
20 The End of the Battle 101
21 The Death Toll 104
22 Reflections on the Battle 107
23 Epilogue 109
Colour Plate Captions 115

Bibliography 117
iii
Introduction
This is an updated edition of my book Ceresole 14 Aprile 1544 (Ceresole

14 April 1544) published in 2012 by the French publishing house Historic
One.
With the help of Helion & Company, we have revised the entire text
adding the footnotes absent in the previous edition. After new research I
felt this revision necessary to facilitate any future research by historians and
enthusiasts.
The chapters on heraldry have also been revised, with only a few
changes - this could be said to highlight the thoroughness of my previous
study. I have updated some of the colour plates, such as those depicting
commanders Del Vasto and Bourbon, as I was not satisfied with the quality
of the earlier ones, and corrected some mistakes and adjusted some colours.
For example, I have darkened the armour of the French infantry, as the
chronicler Monluc wrote that in the Battle of Ceresole the infantry wore
black (burnished) armour.
In my modest opinion, the best and most important revision is the one
that Simon Miller made to the chapters covering the battle. Simon says he
first read about the Battle of Ceresole in the compelling memories of Blaise
de Monluc but struggled to reconcile de Monluc's version with the other
existing battle reconstructions. He received valuable help from his French
friend Lolc Cloerec, who translated several useful sources into English for
him. Using these sources along with modern relief maps and aerial photos,
Simon created a new reconstruction of the battle and located the battlefield
in the countryside immediately west of Ceresole Alba.
In short, this book is a new, updated version for you to read and enjoy.
iv
1
Historical Background
When Francis I of France and his army lost the Battle of Pavia (25 February
1525), the French also lost the Duchy of Milan and their influence in
Northern Italy - albeit temporarily. In order to obtain his release from
captivity in Spain, Francis had to sign the Treaty of Madrid, imposed by
Emperor Charles V (14 January 1526), and accept the following conditions:
- waive his rights over the Duchy of Milan and the Kingdom of
Naples
- cede Burgundy to the Emperor
- marry Eleanor, the sister of Charles V
Once he returned home however, Francis broke his promise and announced
that he had signed the treaty under duress.
In May 1526, tensions rose among the Italian states after the Imperial
victory at Pavia, and a new league was created to oppose Charles V. The new
anti-Imperial coalition was known as the Cognac League, and consisted of
Pope Clement V II, the Republic of Florence, the Republic of Venice, the
Duchy of Milan (ruled by Francis 11 Sforza) and, last but not least, France.
Henry VIII of England did not join the coalition. Several factors, such as
differing goals, a lack of coordination among the allies, the failure of the
promised assistance from Francis I due to his dire financial situation and
the failure to find sufficient troops to support a campaign immediately put
the new league in difficulty.
Charles V reacted swiftly to this new threat and sent a large contingent of
12,000 Imperial soldiers to Italy. In May 1527, this army, consisting mostly
of the fearsome landsknechts of Georg von Frundsberg and led by Charles
de Bourbon, arrived in Rome and, after a short siege, conquered and sacked
the city. The Pope, barricaded in Castel Sane Angelo, had no choice but to
negotiate with the victors and leave the anti-Imperial coalition.
The arrival of the Germans marked some important events. On the 30
November 1526, Giovanni de' Medici, hit by a falconet during a skirmish
against some landsknechts near Governolo (Mantua), died of septicaemia
5
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
after his leg was amputated by the court doctor of the Duke of Mantua,
ironically the same Duke who had supplied this very same artillery to
the Imperials. In February 1527, after an uprising among his troops near
Bologna, Georg von Frundsberg gave up command of his landsknechts
and returned to Germany, where he died the following year. On the 6 May
1527, the commander of the Imperial army, Charles de Bourbon, was shot
to death with an arquebus in front of the walls of Rome. One of the worst
enemies of the King of France was thus eliminated and out of the picture.
Francis took advantage of these events and signed a new treaty with the
King Henry VIII of England, and also resolved to send a strong army to Italy
under the command of Odet de Foix, Count of Lautrec. After arriving in
Lombardy and occupying Pavia once again, de Foix took the road south to
Naples. He arrived in January 1528, and laid siege to the city. However, the
French had to abandon the campaign due to the desertion of the Genoese
fleet allied with France, and a sudden outbreak of plague that decimated the
army, including de Foix.
These events led to the Treaty of Cambrai in the summer of 1529. The
victorious Emperor Charles V decided to impose milder conditions on
the enemy both to avoid further conflict and because he was concerned
about the internal situation in Germany with emergence of the Lutheran
revolution. He renounced his claim on Burgundy and freed Francis I's
sons, who had been held hostage as a guarantee of the implementation of
the Treaty of Madrid. In turn, the French sovereign agreed to abandon all
claims to the Kingdom of Naples, renounce his plans to take the Duchy of
Milan and, in July 1530, he married Eleonora, Charles' sister. This peace
consolidated the formal and effective dominance of the Habsburgs in
Italy. In August 1530, after almost 10 months under siege, the Republic
of Florence capitulated, and the House of Medici could finally reaffirm its
power over the Tuscan capital.
In Europe, however, the situation for the Empire was not as favourable.
In the spring of 1529, after gathering a large army in Ottoman Bulgaria,
Suleiman the Magnificent began to threaten Vienna. From September until
the middle of October, he attacked the city but had to raise the siege due to
harsh weather conditions.
In 1531 the new Protestant faith had already spread widely to the borders
of the Empire, and the Protestant princes and cities joined the League of
Smalcalda. In 1532 France also resolved to support the League. To face this
new threat, Emperor Charles V had to consider the possibility of accepting
a religious compromise. However, the emperor's problems were not over.
In 1534 a new threat from the Mediterranean menaced Charles'
territories on the Italian peninsula. The Saracen pirate Khayr al-Din, known
as Barbarossa, attacked the Tyrrhenian coast of the Kingdom of Naples with
a fleet of eight galley s and sacked several towns including Procida, Capri,
Gaeta, Sperlonga and Fondi. Unsatisfied with the loot thus gained, he
decided to turn his attention toward the African coast and the cities under
Spanish rule, namely Bizerta and Tunis. Given this turn of events, Charles
V had to intervene to put a stop to these attacks by Barbarossa. In July 1535
7
THE ITALIAN WARS VOLUME 4
he moved to the coast of Africa to bring aid to the Spanish possessions and
managed to relieve Tunis, but Barbarossa managed to flee to Algiers.1
Meanwhile, Francis I, who had not put aside his rivalry with Charles V,
resumed his ruthless policy.
After signing an alliance with the League of Smalcalda in 1532, he then
sought an alliance with the sworn enemy of Western Christianity, Sultan
Suleiman the Magnificent, with whom he made a strategic agreement in
1535.
In November 1535, Francesco Sforza 11, the Duke of Milan since 1529,
died without heirs and the King of France claimed the Duchy for his second
Armour of a man at arms
(1540-1550).
son, the Duke of Orleans. He received a clear rebuttal in respect of this claim,
(Museo delle armi Luigi and in March 1536 he organised a military expedition under the command
Marzoli. Brescia. Photo by of Philippe de Chabot, Count of Charny and Buzan<;:ais to invade Piedmont.2
the author)
Charles 11, the weak and inept Duke of Savoy
and related to the Emperor - he had married
his sister-in-law, Beatrice of Portugal- hastily
fled. After conquering Turin, the French
reached the borders of Lombardy to negotiate
over the newly conquered lands.
Charles V was in Rome to meet the new
Pope Paul III (Alessandro Farnese, successor
to Clement V II, who had died in 1534), and
resolved to attack the French with a direct
assault on their homeland. He sent an army
to Provence where on the 13 August 1536, he
captured the city of Aix-en-Provence. But the
intervention of the French army in blocking
the roads towards Marseilles forced the
Imperials cease any further action. During
the campaign Antonio de Leyva died of gout.3
Concerned about the threatening
expansionist policy of Suleiman and the
spread of Lutheranism, Pope Paul III decided
to broker a peace treaty between the two
enemy sovereigns. On the 18 June 1538,
convinced by the Pope, Charles V and Francis
I signed a truce that was to last 10 years.
Charles V was granted possession of Milan
while Francis I gained Piedmont and Savoy,
except for Nice and some smaller cities that
A. UlIoa, Vita dell'invitissimo e sacratissimo imperator Carlo V, Venice 1575.

2 M. Mareo Guazzo,Historie, Venice 1549.
3 P. Giovio,II rimante della seconda parte dell'historie del suo tempo, Venice 1557,
p.16.
8
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
remained in the hands of Duke Charles 11 of Savoy under the protection of

the Emperor.4
However, the conquest of Milan remained an obsession for Francis I,
who decided to resume hostilities after having allied with the Turks and
Scotland to counter the English threat. The pretext for attacking the Empire
was the assassination of two French ambassadors sent by the King of France
to Sultan Suleiman 11 to negotiate an alliance. While the ambassadors were
travelling through Lombardy, in July 1541, they were intercepted and killed
by the soldiers of the Marquis of Vasto.
Francis I's aggressive policy, however, was not limited to the Italian
peninsula. To prevent the enemy from concentrating their resources, he
decided to engage the Imperials on several fronts. In July 1542, the French
attacked three European regions - the Py renees, the Netherlands and
Piedmont. In Flanders were the armies of the Duke of Vendome and his
ally, Duke William of Cleves, together with an army commanded by the
young Duke Charles of Orleans. The Duke of Cleves attacked and sacked
Brabant, while the Duke of Vendome invaded Flanders and the Duke of
Orleans invaded Luxembourg.
In the south, in Roussillon, the Dauphin Henry, with 40,000 men and
supported by Admiral of France Claude dJ\nnebault, laid siege to the city
of Perpignan. Given the good results obtained in the north of Flanders,
they were also joined by the brother of the Dauphin, Charles 11, Duke of
Orleans. But the numerical superiority of the French army was not enough
to capture the city. The delays and uncertainties in the French camp gave the
garrison enough time to gather reinforcements and provide the city with
new defences. Despite the continuous French bombardment, the garrison
did not give up. On 15 September 1542 the French lifted the siege.
Francis was extremely disappointed by the poor military results
achieved by his sons, especially because thanks to this setback the Spaniards
in Flanders had managed to raise another army.The situation also looked
dire for Francis' Scottish allies, who were beaten by the English at Solway
Moss in November 1542. The Scottish King, James V, was humiliated by the
defeat and died of sickness a few weeks later.
On the 11 February 1543, freed from the threat of an enemy on his
northern border, King Henry V III of England decided with Charles V to
attack France in a few months to honour their secret treaty. Despite the
poor outcome of these campaigns, Francis did not give up. After the winter,
he entered the region of Hainaut at the head of his army and captured
Landrecies. However, William of Cleves, his ally, was abandoned by the
French and defeated by Charles V on 24 August 1543, as a result of he had
to surrender to the Emperor. At this point, Charles V decided to face the
French directly. He travelled to Hainaut and set up camp on the banks of
the River Sambre. The French were camped on the opposite bank. The two
rivals did not, however, come into contact.
4 G. De Leva, Storia documentata di Carlo V, Padua 1875.
9
Meanwhile in July 1543 a fleet of 110 Ottoman galleys led by Barbarossa

arrived in Marseilles to help the French in the name of the 'unholy alliance',
as the Imperials called it. But Francis' expectations were not met because the
Turkish and French fleets failed to attack Nice. Even the war in Piedmont
did not yield the desired results, so Francis appointed a new and young
commander, the Count of Enghien, to try to turn the tide of the conflict.
10
2
The French Commanders
Fran<;:ois de Bourbon,
Fran-rois de Bourbon, Count of Enghien Count Enghien.
Franc;:ois de Bourbon was born on 23

September 1519 in the castle of La Fere in
Picardy, fifth of 13 children· of Charles de
Bourbon, Duke of Vendome, and Franc;:oise
d'Alenc;:on. In the Histoire de la Maison de
Bourbon, historian Auguste Savagner writes
that young Franc;:ois was raised by his uncle
Franc;:ois de Bourbon, Count of Saint-Po1, who
saw in him a predisposition for leadership. The
count described him as a noble and military
youth who combined strength, sagacity and
a feeling of glory. His qualities, together with
the influence of the Count of Saint - Pol on
King Francis I, ensured the young de Bourbon
a position as commander of the joint French
and Turkish fleets for the attack on Nice in
1543.1 At the time, the Count of Enghien was
23 and had only fought in one campaign, in
Luxembourg under the Duke of Orleans the
year before. Thus, the attack on Nice was his
first major military assignment.
Nice, together with Vercelli, was one of
the few towns in Piedmont still in the hands
of Duke Charles 11 of Savoy, since Francis I
had invaded the duchy in 1535 to provide
operating bases for an attack on the Duchy of
A. Savagner, Les Bourbons. Histoire de la maison de Bourbons, Paris 1845, p.335.
"
Milan. In 1541, during a truce between France and the Empire, the French
ambassador to Constantinople, Antoine de Rincon, was assassinated by
Imperial soldiers while he was passing through Lombardy. For this reason,
Francis asked Sultan Suleiman 11 to dispatch a fleet to Nice by appealing to
their secret agreement made in 1536, which was a military alliance against
the Empire. In 1543, after a long delay, Suleiman finally sent his admiral
Khayr aI-Din, better known as Barbarossa,to France with llO ships and
14,000 men. With him was Antoine Paulin Baron de la Garde, who had
replaced Rincon as ambassador. They met with the Count of Enghien,
Captain-General of the French army, in Marseille, who was in command
of 40 ships and 8,000 men, most of whom were Proven<j:als and Gascons.As
Savagner wrote: 'Y.t et ce neJut pas sans surprise que le monde chretien vit les
fleurs de lis, la croix et le croissant meies ensemble' that is 'Y.t and it was not
without surprise that the Christian world saw the lilies, the cross and the
crescent come together'. Thus, the alliance that had shocked Europe came
to be, poorly perceived even by the French.2 However, for Francis I, the
Emperor was a threat that he feared far more than the Turks.
On 5 August, the two fleets arrived off Nice. The city had relatively
strong walls and was defended by Andrea Odinet, Count of Montfort, with
six arquebusier companies and 300 other infantrymen. On 7 August the
Turks anchored in the bay of Villafranca and attacked the city, but were
repelled. Then, the besiegers set up camp, dug trenches and deployed their
artillery to bombard the city. Several times the Count of Enghien ordered
the citizens of Nice to surrender, but in vain. On 15 August there was a new
attack in the northern area of the city after a furious artillery bombardment
that opened a breach in the walls. The Turks and the French assaulted the
breach, but the defenders resisted tenaciously. The fighting was particularly
fierce at the Sinq -Quayre bastion, which was the most affected by artillery
fire, where the Janissaries of the pirate Dragut were locked in combat with
a company of Tuscans led by Leone Strozzi who fought fiercely. At some
point a Turkish standard bearer managed to plant the red flag (with the
crescent) at the top of the breach, but a washerwoman named Caterina
Segurana, who was on the ramparts among the defenders like the other
women of Nice, killed him with a paddle and stole the flag. Encouraged
by her action, the citizens of Nice counterattacked and repelled the enemy
from the breach. Paolo Giovio writes that the Turks lost 100 men in the
attack, the Tuscans 22, and that a Turkish flag was captured while one of
Strozzi's was torn down, although the wounded standard bearer managed
to save it.3 In total, the Turks and the French lost 300 men and left many
wounded on the battlefield.
2 A. Savagner, cit. p.336.

3 P. Giovio, Il rimante della seconda parte dell'historie del suo tempo, Venice 1557,
pp.326-330.
12
THE FRENCH COMMANDERS
The washerwoman Segurana, nicknamed La Maufaccia (the Ugly

Woman), is part of the popular culture of Nice but her existence as a
historical figure is not supported by contemporary documents.
The bombardment continued to destroy the walls in several places,
until Montfort agreed terms with the Count of Enghien and on 23 August
the French were finally able to enter Nice while Barbarossa was asked to
keep his men outand they were made to withdraw to Villafranca. The city
was captured, but the garrison still held out in the castle. The French had
exhausted their ammunition, and the Count of Enghien had to send Paulin
to ask the Turks for more. Barbarossa was disappointed at the lack of loot
and refused the help him. He also threatened to abandon the attack and
return to Turkey. Enghien and Paulin had to argue hard to convince the
admiral to stay.
On 6 September, the bombardment of the castle continued, when news
arrived that an Imperial army of 12,000 men led by the Marquis of Vasto
was two days march from Nice. In addition, during the night it began to
rain furiously and the besiegers were forced to leave their positions and
withdraw to their ships.The next day the soldiers disembarked again and
began to dismantle the artillery emplacements to bring everything back on
board. However, in the confusion, Giovio says that the Turks ran into the
city, pillaged it and set fire to the houses. The French could do nothing to
hold them back. Some historians report that the French also participated
in the looting. Once they had left Nice, the Count of Enghien withdrew
to Marseille and Barbarossa went to Toulon where he was dismissed by
Francis with an indemnity of 800,000 ecus.4
A few months later, towards the end of 1543, the war in Piedmont
had almost ground to a halt. Boutieres, an old soldier and commander
of the French troops, had made little progress and was besieging the city
of Ivrea, defended by the Imperial troops of del Vasto. Francis then sent
the Count of Enghien with reinforcements to take command and replace
Boutieres. Enghien arrived in Piedmont in mid-December, while the old
commander was on the point of capturing Ivrea. Angry at the king's choice,
he abandoned the siege, went to meet the new commander and handed
over his army. Enghien found himself at the head of an undisciplined army
inferior in number to his opponents, so he immediately started to restore
order, discipline and trust among the ranks. Then, he held a council with all
of his major captains and resolved to capture the stronghold of Carignano,
recently occupied by del Vasto.
January 1544 was a particularly harsh winter month in Lombardy. It is
said that the cold was such that the wine froze in the barrels and to drink it,
it was necessary to break the barrels with an axe. Despite the bad weather,
Enghien began the campaign and captured the cities of Crescentino, Desana
and Palazzolo. Then he interrupted communications between Carignano
and Chieri and Asti and the other strongholds beyond the Po. Finally, he
4 P. Giovio, cit. p.331.
13
besieged Carignano, which proved difficult to capture and was defended by

Pirro Colonna. The skilful manoeuvres of the French commander worried
del Vasto, who headed to Asti with his army.
At that point, Enghien was aware that a battle was imminent and sent
Blaise de Montluc to the king to ask for money and authorisation to engage
in battle. Despite strong opposition from his advisers, Francis gave his
consent to engage in battle and promised to give the requested amount.
After that, Montluc returned accompaniedby many young lords from the
main French noble families, excited to stand with the Prince in the coming
fight.
The great victory of Ceresole would bring much honour to Enghien
and his troops and he proved himself to be superior both in ingenuity and
courage to del Vasto who, at the time, was considered to be one of the best
generals in Europe. TheSpanish commander retreated to Milan while on 21
June 1544, Enghien forced the Imperial garrison of Carigliano to surrender.
However, this would be his last victory, for France was invaded in the
north and east by two Imperial armies and by the King of England who had
landed in Calais. Enghien had to send his elite soldiers to the rescue. On
his return to France after the Peace of Crepy, Francis awarded him with the
governorship of Languedoc.
A few years later, Enghien would die quite tragically. In February 1546
the French court was gathered in La Roche-sur-Yon, a delightful place
on the banks of the Seine. Enghien, who took pleasure in violent games
and especially simulated battles, organised a fight between two teams for
the conquest of a fort. Enghien was in charge of the fort, which was to be
attacked by the Dauphin Henry together with the Count of Aumale and
their companions. It was basically a snowball fight, but in the heat of the
simulation, the weapons used proved less than harmless. After the game
had ended, the weary fighters went their separate ways to rest. Enghien
was sitting on a bench, when a trunk thrown from a window hit him
on the head, wounding him mortally. He died after two or three days in
agony. Some said that he was killed intentionally, while others said that it
was a consequence of those violent games. The Italian nobleman Cornelio
Bentivoglio was accused of having thrown the trunk, instigated by the
Dauphin's companions and by the Count of Aumale, but the mystery was
never solved.
Fran<j:ois de Bourbon, Count of Enghien died on 23 February 1546 and
was buried in the church ofSaint-Georges de Vendome. The King of France
grieved his loss as if he were his own son.5
5 Other texts on the feats of the Count of Enghien: de Bourdeille Brantome, P,

Oeuvres completes, Paris 1867, volume Ill, pp.21S-220; Vatout, M. },La Chateau
d'Eu, Paris 1836, vol. Ill, pp.36-38.
14
Guigues Guiffrey Seigneur of Boutieres
Guigues or Gui Guiffrey de Boutieres was a gentleman of the Dauphine of

the House of Tour, born in Cheylas towards the end of the fifteenth century,
according to some in 1492.6
He began his military career as a page in the company of Pierre Terra,
Lord of Bayard. In 1509, he was part of the French army sent by King Louis
XII to besiege the city of Padua in support of Emperor Maximilian against
Venice. In Bayard's company, de Boutieres became a simple archer.At the
age of 16, in a clash with some Albanian Stratioti, he distinguished himself
by capturing the enemy standard bearer, much older than him, earning thus
his cornet. When the Albanian soldier was brought to the French camp, he
said that he had surrendered because he had been surrounded, not wanting
to admit that he had been taken prisoner by a boy. Knowing this, young
Guiffrey asked the Lord of Bayard for permission to challenge the Albanian
to a duel, claiming that he would defeat him again. The commander agreed,
but the Albanian refused. Later, Guiffrey became Bayard's lieutenant and in
1521 he fought in defence of Mezieres, where he was ordered to blow up the
bridges over the Meuse.
A few years later, King Francis gave him the command of a company of
100 men-at-arms. In March 1524, in Italy, he was taken prisoner together
with Jean de Fay, standard bearer of the company of Bayard, who would die
one month later at the battle of Romagnano.
On 2 April 1526 he married Gasparde Berlioz, daughter of the Lord of
Lumbinet. In September 1527 he travelled to London as part of a delegation
sent by Francis I to negotiate an alliance with King Henry V III against the
Emperor. In 1530, he became Lord of Touvet.
In 1536 he was appointed Governor of Turin by the king, but his
mediocre administrative talent led to his time in office being short. Still, he
thwarted two clever surprise attacks against the city led by Imperial Cesare
Masi from Naples. The first occurred in 1537. Masi knew that the sentries
on the walls of Turin were few and negligent, and one night, together with
a group of soldiers equipped with ladders, he occupied the bastion called
'di Nostra Dama' (of Our Lady). The operation was a success and no guards
noticed them. However, once they reached the door that led to the guard
post, they were careless and opened it loudly enough to be discovered.
De Boutieres rushed there with his guards and sealed the intruders in
the bastion. The infiltrators, unable to proceed, abandoned the walls and
returned to their camp.
The second attempt took place several years later, in 1542, and the
protagonists were once again Cesare Masi from Naples and de Boutieres.
This time, the Neapolitan captain used five carts full of hay and ordered six
6 For this captain see: P. de Bourdeille Brantome, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1867,
volume Ill, pp.220-223; M. Fakhoury, Jacques de Mailles et le chevalier de Boutieres,
deux compagnons de Bayard, Grenoble, Editions de Belledonne, 2001.
15
soldiers to hide in each cart, which were then transported to Turin during
the night. The next morning some peasants, in league with the Imperials,
brought the carts into the city with the excuse that they were there to sell the
hay. They left one cart on the bridge. At a given signal, the soldiers jumped
out of the carts and attacked the French guards, who promptly raised the
alarm. Once again, de Boutieres arrived immediately on the scene while
outside the walls, two bands of Imperial infantrymen rushed from some
nearby mills towards the bridge. However, a blacksmith from Turin who
was by pure chance near the door climbed onto the walls and lowered the
iron gate, closing the entrance. The Imperials who had managed to enter
were all killed or severely wounded by Guiffrey's Gascons. Those who were
outside, who had been joined by 300 horsemen led by Cesare Masi, had
to retreat promptly when they came under cannon fire from the French
artillery.
In 1543, he was given general command of the French forces in Piedmont
but after the fall of Carignano, he was replaced by the Count of Enghien. He
was deeply offended by that, but the new commander appreciated his skills
and gave him the command of the advance guard. At the battle of Ceresole,
the charge of his 80 men at arms was decisive. He died on the 21 December
1545 at the age of 53.
Paul de la Barthe Lord of Thermes
Paul de la Barthe was born in Couserans (Gascony) in 1482, son of Jean

de la Barthe and Jeanne de Peguilhan, heiress of Thermes who was not the
biological mother of Paul or his brothers.
Paul started his military career in the Italian Wars and took part in
the siege of Naples in 1528. On the way back via sea, he was captured by
corsairs. He remained their prisoner until his family was able to pay his
ransom. After that experience, in 1536 he participated in the conquest of
Piedmont, in 1537 in the provision of supplies for Therouanne, and in 1541
in the siege of Perpignan. In 1542, he was appointed Governor of Savillan
by Francis I. In 1544, he was at Ceresole as commander of the French light
cavalry, who he led to victory over the opposing Florentine light horsemen.
However, during a charge against the infantry of the Prince of Salerno, his
horse was killed and he was captured.
Once freed, he was sent to Scotland as Lieutenant of the King of France,
Henry 11, where he fought bravely in the war of 1549. A year later, he was
sent as ambassador to Pope Paul III and in November of the same year,
as a lieutenant general to Parma, which was under siege. Here he fought
courageously in support of Duke Ottavio Farnese against the Imperial
troops.
In 1552, the Lord of Thermes was at the head of the relief army sent by
the King of France to Siena which in August of the same year had rebelled
against the Emperor. From there, he was sent to lead the attack on Corsica,
conquering the island in 1553. Then, in Piedmont, he commanded an army
in place of the Duke of Brissac and, in 1554, at the age of 72, he married
16
Italian heiress Margherita di Saluzzo Carde, who was only 20. They had no
children.
On 10 February 1555, after the capture of Calais and the entire county
of Oye, Henry 11 appointed him Earl of Comminges, Seneschal of Toulouse
and Governor of Calais. Then, in 1558, after the death of the Great Marshal
Strozzi, the king gave de la Barthe the baton of a Marshal of France as a
reward for his military merits. Shortly after, now Marshal de Thermes
arrived in Flanders with an army and between June and July 1558 he
captured Bergues, Thionville and Dunkirk. These conquests, however, were
his last moment of glory. On 13 July he suffered a severe defeat at Gravelines
that made him famous as the malheureux capitaine (unfortunate captain).
Nonetheless, he was always held in high regard at the French court. He died
in Paris on 6 May 1562 at the age of80. 7
7 P. de Bourdeille Brantome, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1868, volume IV, pp.I-5.
17
3
The Imperial Commanders
Alfonso d'Avalos, Marquis of Vasto
Alfonso d'Avalos was born in Ischia on 25 May 1502 into one of the most
illustrious houses of the Kingdom of Naples, the Avalos, a Castilian family
who had arrived in Southern Italy with Alfonso I of Aragon. The house
of Avalos had two branches: Pescara and del Vasto. Alfonso belonged to
the latter and was the son of Inigo d'Avalos, Marquis of Vasto, and Laura
Sanseverino, daughter of Robert Ill, Prince of Salerno.
Orphaned when young, Alfonso was raised by his aunt Costanza
d'Altavilla. However, when he was still a boy, he fled Naples to join his cousin
Fernando Francesco d'Avalos, the famous Marquis of Pescara, with whom
he shared a deep friendship and affection. Alfonso would become a brave
captain, but unlike his cousin, he distinguished himself for his violence and
atrocities in battle. He served in the army of Ferdinando Francesco and
fought with him in the Battle of Bicocca (1522), where he was wounded
in the arm. In the same campaign, he took part in the capture of Lodi and
Genoa.
In 1524 he distinguished himself in the battle of Romagnano Sesia,
where the famous French captain Pierre Terrail de Bayard died, saving the
life of his cousin Fernando, who, wounded in the head by a Swiss soldier
armed with a halberd, was about to be overwhelmed. Alfonso rushed to his
side and killed the Swiss. He received a reward for his actions and according
to historian Scipione Ammirato, he was also entrusted his first command of
an Italian infantry unit. He then led the Imperial infantryin the unfortunate
expedition to Provence, the siege of Marseilles and the subsequent retreat
to Lombardy.
On 24 February 1525, at the Battle ofPavia, he was to be found at the head
of the Imperial vanguard of 3,000 men, 1,500 of whom were arquebusiers.
Once having opened a breach in the wall of the park, he occupied
Mirabello with his troops and withstood the French counterattack led by
Montmorency, repelling it and thus contributing to the final victory. Later,
his cousin Fernando ordered him to occupy Saluzzo, which he did in July
18
THE IMPERIAL COMMANDERS
1525. In November of the same year, for his

merits, Emperor Charles V had appointed
him captain-general of all the infantry in
Italy. Shortly afterwards, in December,
Pescara died. Having no children, he left
d'Avalos his land and titles.In 1526, together
with Antonio de Leyva, he forced the Duke
of Milan, Francesco 11 Sforza, to flee the city
and in 1527, he fought in the war against the
Cognac League and was present in the sack
of Rome. In 1528, he led his infantry to the
relief of Naples, besieged by Odet de Foix,
Count of Lautrec, in a campaign that proved
to be difficult and partly unfortunate for
the Imperial forces. Dissension and rivalry
arose between the commanders, mainly
between Alfonso and the Viceroy of Naples,
Philibert of Chalons, Prince of Orange, and
with Ferrante Gonzaga, commander of the
cavalry.
The rivalry with his fellow military
commanders or other Imperial officials was a
constant factor in his career, mainly because
of his temperament and great ambition.
These issues often had repercussions on the
Alfonso d'Avalos, Marquis
outcome of his military campaigns, and he tried to remedy it by frequently
of Vasto. Portrait by Titian
complaining to the Emperor. Vecellio.
At the naval battle of Capo d'Orso, in the Gulf of Salerno, the Imperials
were defeated, and d'Avalos was captured. However, he managed to convince
Andrea Doria, commander of the French fleet, to change sides and fight
with the Imperials.
In August 1528, after the death of Lautrec, the war moved towards
Apulia, where d'Avalos assumed command of Charles V 's troops against
a coalition of French, Venetians and Florentines. However, militarily
speaking, the results of the campaign netted poor results and months were
wasted on a fruitless siege of the city of Monopoli.
In September 1529, in Tuscany, the Marquis was at the head of 5,000
Spaniards in a war during which the Imperials besieged Florence for 10
months to re-establish the power of the Medici family. D'Avalos conquered
the cities of Cortona, Prato and Empoli (which he looted), then besieged
Volterra which was defended by Francesco Ferrucci. He replaced Fabrizio
Maramaldo, who had initially begun the siege. The disagreements between
these two were one of the causes of the Spanish defeat and after two bloody
and unsuccessful assaults, d'Avalos had to lift the siege. Angry at the defeat
and ridiculed by the victorious defenders, he abandoned the campaign and
returned to Naples.
19
In 1535, he was chosen by Charles V to becommander-in-chief of

the Imperial army for the Tunis campaign, where he performed his task
excellently. Together with his troops, 25,000 infantry and 2,000 horsemen
consisting of Italians, Germans and Spaniards, he captured Goletta on 14
July and on 16 July he defeated an army of 80,000 soldiers under Barbarossa
near Tunis. On 20 July, he conquered and sacked the city, slaughtering
30,000 citizens and capturing 10,000 slaves. The capture of Tunis was one of
the worst atrocities committed by di\valos' men.
In the summer of 1536, he took part in the invasion of Provence as
infantry commander under General Antonio de Leyva. Alfonso disapproved
of this expedition, which proved to be an unfortunate enterprise. On the
death of de Leyva, he once again took command of the army and ordered
an immediate retreat back to Piedmont at the cost of many lives.
In June 1537, he faced indiscipline among his troops, as the soldiers
had not been paid for some time and they refused to fight, resorting to
looting and violence. They sacked Valenza and attacked Tortona and the
outskirts of Alessandria. This violence led to conflict between Alfonso and
Cardinal Marino Caracciolo, Governor of Milan, who did not want to apply
an extraordinary tax on the citizens to cover the debt. However, the matter
was pressing and the Cardinal had to give and resolve the problem, at least
for the time being.
Horse helmet, Italy In August 1537, reinforced by 10,000 landsknechts, the Marquis of Vasto
(1540-1550). Museo delle
began to reconquer the territories of Piedmont that had been captured by
armi Luigi Marzoli. Brescia.
(Author's photo)
the French. At first, he drove the French out of Casale Monferrato, sacking
the pro-French city. Then, he relieved the
siege of Asti by Humieres and captured
and sacked Chieri and Moncalieri. In
September, he captured Cherasco and Alba
without looting them and finally besieged
Turin. The siege was lifted with the truce of
November 1537.
In 1538, Governor Caracciolo died and
Emperor Charles V appointed del Vasto
Governor of the State of Milan, giving him
command of the Imperial army stationed
in Italy. At last, del Vasto's ambition was
satisfied even if his administrative powers
were limited by the emperor, who delegated
the judicial and financial matters to the
Milanese judiciary and took the most
important decisions himself. In reality,
war called for fast decisions and Alfonso
was often able to bypass the judiciary
and Charles V, especially when it came to
financial matters.
In June 1538, after the Truce of Nice, the
new governor of Milan had to again suffer
20
his soldiers who were dissatisfied with the lack of pay. Alfonso, penniless,
resolved to dismiss the troops on the spot and his men rampaged and
occupied Vigevano and Gallarate, asking for a ransom to free them. Then,
they also threatened the city of Milan. The Milanese were so afraid of what
they might do that they paid an extraordinary tax of 100,000 ecus issued
by Alfonso. Del Vasto managed to control the problem, but the citizens
were deeply disappointed in him and the protests spread and continued
throughout the time of his governorship. His administration of the city was
anything but good. He often had to take money from the duchy revenues
to offset a deficit of 800,000 ducats in 1546, an incredibly large sum for the
time.
Alfonso led a lavish life with his wife Maria of Aragon, daughter of Duke
Ferdinand of Aragon, surrounded by writers and artists such as Titian,
Pietro Aretino and Jacopo Nardi. He even tried to convince the famous
Michelangelo to paint his deeds, but the artist refused.
In 1539, after many complaints, Charles V sent his trusted diplomat
Lope de Soria to Milan to check on the Governor, and he also sent other
commissioners. Luckily for him, Alfonso avoided any trouble with the
Emperor thanks to the resumption of the war. More precisely, with the
failure of the Truce of Nice (July 1541) after the assassination of two of
Francis I's ambassadors (Cesare Fregoso and Antoine de Rincon) in the
Duchy of Milan. The ambassadors had been on the way toSultanSuleiman
11, sent by the French to negotiate an alliance. They were crossing Milanese
territory safely but when they reached the River Po, near the confluence
with the Ticino, they were attacked and killed by two boatloads of soldiers.
Their assassination was viewed as a scandal in all the courts of Europe and
all suspicion fell on del Vasto, who declared his innocence. However, his
role in the assassination was soon to be clarified.
Alfonso started the war in Piedmont, first by repelling the attack of
Claude dJ\nnbaut and freeing Mondovi from French control. He then
captured Nice from the Turks in 1543. After these victories however, he
was defeated inCeresole on 14 April 1544 by theCount of Enghien. He lost
about 10,000 men and approximately 3,000 of his troops were captured.
The French occupied Monferrato, but dJ\valos managed to keep hold of
Lombardy by frustrating the enemy attempts to reach Milan until hostilities
came to an end at the Peace ofCrepy (September 1544).
His reputation as a brave commander had fallen in the eyes of his
soldiers, the civilian population hated him, he was under administrative
investigation because of the duchy's budget deficit, and furthermore the
Emperor no longer trusted him. After this fall from grace he died on 31
March 1546 in Vigevano at the age of 44.1
P. de Bourdeille Brantome, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1864, volume I, pp.200-216;

G. De Carlo, Avalos, Alfonso d'Avalos marchese del Vasto in Dizionario Biografico
degli italiani, 1962 vol. 4.
21
Ferrante Sanseverino, Prince of Salerno
Ferrante was part of the Neapolitan house of Sanseverino, one of the most
powerful noble families of the Kingdom of Naples. This house was originally
from Normandy and settled in Neapolitan territory around the eleventh
century. In 1266, at the Battle of Benevento against the Swabians, the
Sanseverinos fought alongside the Anjou army and later married into their
house, thus acquiring yet more power inside the kingdom. They lost their
position of influence under King Ladislaus of Durres and regained it under
Aragonese rule. In the expeditions ofCharles VIII and Louis XII of France,
the house of Sanseverino sided with the French against the Aragonese and
Spanish, losing their possessions and rights as a result.
Roberto Sanseverino, the third Prince of Salerno, managed to regain
his office and principality by marrying Maria of Aragon, Duchess of
Villaformosa (inSpain) and niece of King Ferdinand theCatholic. Ferrante
was born in Naples on 18 January 1507 and the following year he lost his
father, Roberto Sanseverino. To honour King Ferdinand's will, his mother
Maria married Giacomo Appiano, Prince of Piombino. The child Ferrante
was entrusted to Bernardo Villamarina, Count of Capaccio and Great
Admiral of Naples, who raised him to be devoted to his Catholic king and
uncle. Bernardo Villamarina promised his only daughter Isabella to Ferrante
Sanseverino, raising both children and educating them in literature, music
and theatre; entrusting them for 12 years to the tutor Pomponio Gaurico,
the most famous Neapolitan humanist of the time. The two married on 17
October 1516 with the consent of King Ferdinand as theCount ofCapaccio
had died four years before when Ferrante was about 10 years old and Isabella
13. Over the years, the couple developed an exquisite cultural life and held
courts in their residence in Salerno frequented by artists, intellectuals and
philosophers, such as Agostino Nifo and Bernardo Tasso, the father of
Torquato Tasso. Ferrante himself was a good poet and excellent musician,
and Isabella, reported to be very beautiful, was also a good poetess.
Thanks to the Principality ofSanseverino,Salerno returned to being one
of the major cities in the south. The prince introduced the art of comedy
and had small theatres built at his expense to entertain the citizens of
Naples, who loved him not only for his generosity but also because during
the French siege led by Lautrec in 1528, Ferrante had helped the poor with
food and hospitality. The prince was also a brave soldier. He armed 1,000
infantry and 160 horsemen to fight Lautrec and participated in the naval
route at Capo d'Orso, where he was taken prisoner with the Marquis of
Vasto and Ascanio Colonna by Filippino Doria.
In 1530, Charles V came to Italy to be crowned emperor in Bologna
and Sanseverino met him to gift him 300,000 florins from the Kingdom
of Naples. The Prince of Salerno was expected to carry the sceptre of the
sovereign during the coronation ceremony, but a few days before the
Marquis of Astorga had arrived with 250,000 gold doubloons as a gift from
Spain for Charles V. The Imperial court, mainly Spanish, bestowed the
honour of carrying the sceptre to the Spanish marquis, while the task of
22
carrying the standard was entrusted to Sanseverino. The prince was deeply
offended by the choice and did not participate in the function.
He then followed the Emperor in his wars in Flanders and Germany
and in the conquest of Tunis, where he led the Italian infantry. On the road
back from Tunis, the Emperor decided to stop in Italy. In November 1535,
he arrived in Naples and was welcomed by Ferrante with a magnificent feast
in his honour that became famous in the chronicles of the time. A few days
after this triumphant entry into Naples, the prince was challenged to a duel
by Gaspare Toraldo, Marquis of Polignano. However, when Pedro Alvarez
da Toledo, the Viceroy of Naples, learnt of this, he forbade the duel and
had Toraldo arrested. Days later, while Toraldo was standing at the window
of his cell, he was shot and killed with an arquebus. Not surprisingly, the
main suspect was Ferrante, who refused to be summoned by the Viceroy to
defend himself and sent some friends to testify on his behalf. Meanwhile, he
went directly to see Charles V, who declared him innocent.
In 1541, he fought in the failed expedition of Algiers, after which the
Emperor abandoned his attempts to control the Mediterranean. After
returning to Naples, the Prince of Salerno was summoned to Lombardy by
his cousin, the Marquis of Vasto, where he was appointed captain-general
of the Italian infantry. In the fourth war between Charles V and Francyois I,
Ferrante fought in the defeat at Ceresole in April 1544, and managed to save
his infantry. About two months later, he fought in the Battle of Stradella (or
Serravalle), winning against the French troops ofPietro Strozzi. Among the
many prisoners taken by the Imperials, there were the Duke of Somma and
the Count of Caiazzo, relatives of the Sanseverino, considered rebels against
the Emperor and therefore liable to death in case of capture. The Prince
decided to let them escape, defying the wrath of Charles V.
In 1547, the Viceroy Alvarez da Toledo decided to introduce the Tribunal
of the Holy Inquisition in Naples, but the nobles and citizens were against
it, and the disputes soon turned into bloody riots. Don Pedro Alvarez da
Toledo, Marquis of Villafranca, had become Viceroy of the Kingdom in
1532 and his rule had been absolute in the typical Spanish fashion. He was a
despot, especially with the local nobility, and severely repressed the abuses
of the barons against their subjects and their other petty crimes. During
his period in office, he carried out about 18,000 death sentences. He also
dissolved the academies and drove its most important exponents, such as
Scipio Capece, from public life. In 1534, when the Emperor visited Naples,
many called for his dismissal, among them Alfonso d'Avalos and Ferrante.
In the uprising of 1547, the people and the aristocracy chose the Prince
of Salerno as an ambassador and asked him to persuade the Emperor to
remove the Viceroy from office and not institute the Inquisition. Charles
V did not consent to the dismissal of Toledo, but he accepted the second
request. Ferrante's return to Naples was a triumph. Celebrations were held
for three days and the Prince's fame increased among the Neapolitans as
much as did the Viceroy 's hatred for him. Years later, Garcia Alvares, the
Duke of Ferrandina and son of the Viceroy, ordered a nobleman of Salerno,
Tommaso de Ruggiero, to kill Sanseverino. The attack was unsuccessful and
23
the Prince was wounded in the leg by an arquebus bullet fired by Ruggiero,
who was immediately captured. However, legal proceedings against the
attacker were vetoed by the Viceroy.
Ferrante, worried about the Viceroy, decided to meet the Emperor and
left Naples, but when he arrived in Venice, he resolved to send in his place
Tommaso Pagano, a Neapolitan nobleman, to ask for insurance regarding
the safety of his person. Meanwhile, Charles V had been warned with a letter
by the Viceroy and did not want to come to terms with his vassal. Outraged,
Ferrante sought asylum from the Venetians, refused to pay homage to the
Emperor and renounced all his possessions in the Kingdom of Naples. He
was therefore declared a rebel and all his properties were confiscated.
Later, as his grandfather Antonello had done, he went to France to King
Henry 11 of Valois-Angouleme, where he was well-received and to whom
he proposed the conquest of the Kingdom of Naples. In 1552, thanks to
an agreement between the French and the Turks, Sanseverino set sail with
18 ships to Naples where he would meet a Turkish army conveyed in 200
ships. The conquest of the kingdom failed as the Viceroy bribed the Turkish
admiral with two million ducats to make him sail away from the Neapolitan
coast. Returning to France, Ferrante survived yet another assassination
attempt against him.
It is said that Ferrante died of old age after years of idleness and lascivious
living. However, on the death of King Henry 11, he joined the Huguenot
cause and in 1568 died in Avignon, alone and forgotten.
The senior branch of the House of Sanseverino died out with him
because his wife Isabella was barren and had no heirs. After the exile of her
husband, Isabella remained in Naples separated forever by her beloved. She
died in 1559 in Spain, where she had returned to meet her sister, a nun.
The infamous Viceroy Toledo died before Ferrante. Removed from office
by Charles V, who was aware of his thirst for power, he was ordered at the
age of over 70 years old to lead the Imperial troops against the Republic of
Siena. He had to abandon the campaign due to his old age and was brought
to Florence to stay with his daughter, Eleonora, who had married Duke
Cosimo I. It was there that he died on 22 February 1553.2
Aliprando Madruzzo
Aliprando was part of the noble Trentino- Tirolese house of Madruzzo,

which was originally from Nanno in Val di Non and, in the fifteenth century
had settled in Castel Madruzzo in the Sarca valley of the Trentino region.
Aliprando, of German heritage, was born in 1522 to Giovanni
Gaudenzio Madruzzo and Euphemia of the Lords of Sparrenberg and
Villanders. Cristoforo Madruzzo, his brother, was a famous bishop who
2 C. Carucci, Don Ferrante Sanseverino Principe di Salerno, Salerno, 1899; R.

Colapietra, I Sanseverino di Salerno. Mito e reait" del barone ribelle, Salerno, 1985.
24
became Cardinal of Trento in 1545. As a prestigious diplomat, Cristoforo

organised the Council of Trento held from 1545 to 1563.
Aliprando studied in Padua from 1538 to 1539 and then in Paris in
1540. His military career was rapid and promising thanks to his talent.
As an officer of the Imperial army of Charles V he also undertook civil
commitments by participating in diets, assemblies between the sovereign
and the most important princes of the empire, who mainly had legislative
duties. In 1541 he fought his first battle in Hungary against the Turks and
in 1542 he participated in the diet of Speyer, where he represented the
Bishopric of Trent. In 1543, he took part in Cleve's expedition to Flanders
against the French. The following year, at the young age of 22, he led half
of the landsknecht infantry in the Battle of Ceresole, where he was severely
wounded and captured.
Once recovered, in June 1545 in Worms and in the summer of 1546, he
participated in the Diet of Regensburg with his brother Christopher. He
fought in the war between the Empire and the Lutherans of the Schmalkaldik
League as part of the emperoes trusted council.
He fell ill and died on 18 February 1547 in VIm at the age of 25.3
Woodcut of the Battle of Ceresole by Heinrich Holzmuller, made shortly after the battle. (Courtesy of the
Bibliotheque Nationale de France)
3 L. Dal Pra, I Madruzzo e I'Europa (1539-1658). I principi vescovi di Trento tra

Papato e Impero, Catalogue of the exhibition (Trent 10 July-31 October 1993),
Charta 1993.
25
4
The Enfants Perdus and the Rise

of the Arquebus in the Sixteenth
Century
The Enfants Perdus or Compagnons Perdus (Lost Children) were soldiers

who volunteered for dangerous roles, such as an assault on a well-defended
position, where there was likely to bea strong chance of being killed or
injured. Usually, these volunteer soldiers wanted to stand out by virtue of
their deeds and have the opportunity to rise in the army, earn cash bounties,
or they simply did it for the glory.
The Enfants Perdus were commonly hired by almost all European
armies, deployed as scouts and to engage in skirmishes. Since their weapons
of choice were crossbowsand arquebuses, these soldiers are in a way
reminiscent of the Roman velites or the Ancient Greek psiloi and peltasts,
as in that they too were light infantrymen.
According to some historians' accounts, the Enfants Perdus were already
present as a troop type in the Middle Ages. At the time, these soldiers
called themselves Ribaldi (Scoundrels) and used to cover their heads with a
hood. They were armed with long war knives and clubs and used horns to
communicate with the main body of the army. Historian Aldo Settia, in his
book 'Rapine, assedi, battaglie. La guerra nel Medioevo' describes Ribaldi,
Saccomanni and Berrovieri as bands armed and equipped with what they
could lay their hands on, rather than specialised weapons. In times of peace
they often turned to banditry. Armies hired them for a variety of tasks,
including foraging, reconnaissance and the pillaging of enemy territory. 1
As early as 1214 at the Battle of Bouvines, a form of light cavalry was
even deployed in battle as Enfants Perdus. In 1494, the Swiss army deployed
troops similar to the Enfants Perdus, armed with a heavy arquebus fired
Aldo A. Settia, Rapine, assedi, battaglie. La guerra nel Medioevo, Editori Laterza,
2002, pp.20-23.
26
THE ENFANTS PERDUS
with the aid of a rest or by the simple expedient of placing the weapon
on a comrade's shoulder. At the Battle of Fornovo (l495),Giovio reports
that a unit of 300 young Swiss called Prodighi della Vita (Generous with
Life) or Perduti (Lost) came out from the two sides of their square pike
formation when the enemy infantry moved closer and proceeded to cut off
the heads of the enemy pikes of with long two-handed swords, resulting
in the Swiss victory.2 Also among the German landsknechts there were
sections of Dopplesoldner, literally 'paid twice: These soldiers were usually
armed with large two-handed swords to cut off the enemy pike heads and
create gaps in their formations. In the sixteenth century, according to
Brantome, the French army deployed some Enfants Perdus equipped with
long daggers and shields. Some did not wear armour and they were placed
in the vanguard.3 Even the famous Spanish Tercios, mainly consisting of
pikemen and arquebusiers, had within their ranks some soldados armed
with a sword, shield and dagger. After the arquebusiers had exchanged fire
with the enemy, these soldiers slipped under the legs of the opposition to
divide and disrupt their formation with a ferocious attack into their midst.
At the Battle of Bicocca (1522), Blaise de Montluc deployed the Enfants
Perdus and at Ceresole he commanded the vanguard of arquebusiers who
began the skirmish preceding the main battle.
The Arquebus
During the sixteenth century, firearms became pivotal in military strategy.

The arquebus in particular, the evolution of the fifteenth century handgun,
contributed to a change in how warfare was conducted and marked the
beginning of the decline of armour and the heavy cavalryman or man -at
arms. The name comes from the Italian word area bousa {literally 'arch with
a mouth' ) because it resembled the butt of a crossbow.
The most common model at the time was the matchlock or serpentine
arquebus, which took its name from the firing system placed at the
butt end of the barrel on the right side of the weapon. The matchlock
mechanism consisted of a funnel-shaped bowl or touch hole that linked
to of the barrel and a fuse or match holder, called a serpentine due to its
shape. The firer first loaded the weapon with powder contained in pre
packaged leather or single-use wooden containers - usually hung over the
shoulder on a bandolier. Then, he placed a piece of waddingof raw cotton,
fabric or silk on which he pressed the bullet taken from a supply contained
in a shoulder bag into the mouth of the arquebus. Finally he used a
wooden rod to ram the powder, wad and shot tightly at the bottom of the
arquebus barrel. This loading process ensured that gas leakage was kept
to a minimum, thus creating higher velocity and accuracy, and allowed
2 P. Giovio, La prima parte delle storie del suo tempo, Venice, 1560, p.94.
3 P. Brantome, Oeuvres Comletes, Paris 1864, vol. I, pp.339-340.
27
him to aim downwards without the

powder or bullet falling out.
Then, the shooter primed the
weapon by filling the touch hole
with fine priming powder, stored in
1
a large horn hanging on the soldier's
side. He then aimed and pulled the
trigger which caused the serpentine
with the lit match to move into the
bowl, igniting the priming powder
which in turn ignited the main
powder charge through the touch
hole and expelled the bullet. These
lead bullets weighed about one
ounce each (about 28g) and were
crafted by casting molten metal into
a bullet mould.
Around 1514-1518, the
wheellock arquebus was perfected
in Nuremberg and equipped with
a wheel and spring mechanism,
the rotation and friction of which
against the flint generated sparks
that ignited the priming powder
in the touch hole. Owing to the
expensive costs of its manufacture,
maintenance and the complicated
loading process, this type of weapon
The Enfants Perdus. was never used in significant
Drawing by the author numbers in war, the preference being for cheaper easier to use and 'soldier
proof' matchlock arquebuses. This situation remained unchanged until
1560-1580 when, thanks to new manufacturing methods, the wheel lock
arquebus became progressively safer and more reliable but still remained
almost exclusively the toys of the rich and were far from 'soldier proof: so
did not replace the matchlock arquebus.
28
5
The Italian infantry
In Historie by Paolo Giovio, the author states that at Ceresole 'the Italian
companies consisted of more than 6,000 veteran infantrymen, most of
whom were arquebusiers: 1 Like the French infantry, the Italian infantry
alway s had difficulty effectively countering the Swiss and Germans, that
were organised into square formations of 5,000 to 6,000 men with five
metre-long pikes. These soldiers became more important in Europe with
the Burgundian Wars of 1476-1477 and quickly proved themselves to be
a fundamental factor on the battlefield, breaking the dominant role of the
gendarmes and other heavy cavalry.
In Italy, the pike or long lance had been widely used since the time of the
municipalities, and was thus a common weapon in fifteenth century Italian
armies. The pike was used by mixed infantry formations which supported
the cavalry in battle. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, there
were three types of infantry, based on their weapon of choice: crossbow,
pavise and pike/longlance. These three groups were generally present
in equal numbers. The infantry also used other weapons such as spears,
pole weapons, bows and handguns. Towards the middle of the fifteenth
century, the types of infantry changed. There was a drastic reduction in the
number of soldiers armed with a pavise, and some armies increased the
number of soldiers with handguns rather than crossbowmen. For example,
around 1480, a fifth of the Milanese infantry used handguns. Subsequently,
formations consisting exclusively of pikemen were included in the army of
Ludovico the Moor, or the Romagna infantry who were considered to be
the most courageous native mercenary troops of the Italian peninsula.
At the Battle of Fornovo (February 1495), the Milanese infantry of the
Count of Caiazzo, armed with long pikes, was quickly routed by the more
experienced Swiss. In this regard, Giovio reports that the Italians deployed
in the first ranks soldiers armed with 'long pikes with their base resting on
the ground and wielded with the left arm, as was common practice at the
P. Giovio, Il rimante della seconda parte delle historie del suo tempo, Venice 1557,
pp.347r-347v.
29
time: In the following ranks, were infantrymen armed with partisans and
shields, and behind them were the crossbowmen. 'The Swiss awaited the
enemy without any fear, and with much laughter: they were nobly armed
and in neat order, and despised the Italians' awkward cluster of weapons
and their fighting style: 300 chosen infantrymen left the flanks of the Swiss
pike block formation and began to cut at the Italians' pikes with two
handed swords. At that point, the Italians fled to avoid having to fight with
the enemy pike block. 2
The chronicler goes on to say that the Italian formation held their pikes
in a defensive stance. Thus, the description that reads, 'on the ground and
wielded with the left arm' should not be taken as 'a pike held with the left
arm only' but as a pike with the butt end stuck in the ground, steadied by
the right foot and controlled with the left arm. This system allowed the
soldier to use the right hand to wield other weapons, such as swords or
maces. However, Giovio reports that the Swiss were still waiting for the
Italian advance, for if the Italians were to advance, the Swiss could not have
used the pikes defensively as described above. So either the chronicler made
a mistake and the Italian infantrymen were waiting to attack, or they were
inexperienced in battle.
In September of the same year, the infantry of King Ferrante of Aragon
was defeated at Eboli by the Swiss who at the time were still fighting for
the French. This time, the Italian infantry was composed of Neapolitans
and were numerically superior to the Swiss with 3,000 facing 1,000 of the
latter. The Neapolitan infantrymen, all armed with pole weapons such as
spears, bills and brawn bills and equipped with shields, throwing weapons
and swords, attacked the enemy pike block but could not break through the
wall of pikes in front of them that was still standing firm. Then, the Swiss
took control and destroyed the Neapolitan infantry.3
The Swiss pikemen were not the only soldiers who defeated the Italian
infantry. On 24 January 1497, at the Battle of Soriano between the Papal
States and the soldiers of the Roman barons, a formation of 800 landsknechts
hired by Pope Alexander VI clashed against 1,000 Italian infantrymen of
Vitellozzo Vitelli, hired by the barons. The Italians were Tuscans armed
with swords and pikes 'according to the custom of the German militia'
(Giovio), but the pike was one arm length longer (approximately 60cm)
than that of the landsknechts (about 70cm). The battle began with an
indecisive clash between the opposing cavalry, but Vitelli's pikemen resisted
the German attack and, against all odds, counterattacked and destroyed the
enemy formation.4 The introduction of a longer pike is also recorded at
the Battle of Rio Secco (March 1508) during the war between Venice and
Emperor Maximilian I of Habsburg. The emperor 's army included 2,500
2 P. Giovio, La prima parte delle historie del suo tempo, Venice, 1560, p.94.
3 F. Guicciardini, Storia d 'Italia, Naples 1874, vol. I, p.212; P. Giovio, La prima parte,
cit. pp.146-147.
4 F. Guicciardini, cit. pp.301-302.
30
THE ITALIAN INFANTRY
landsknechts, supported by pieces of artillery under the command of Sixt

von Trautson. They faced 1,500 Cernide militia infantry and 500 cavalry of
Bartolomeo di\.lviano. Thanks to their longer pikes and their cavalry, the
Venetians surrounded the Germans and slaughtered two thirds of them,
while the Venetians suffered only a small number of casualties.5
This winning streak stopped. In that period, only Venice, among the
free Italian states, had developed its infantry based on the Swiss model
using Provvisionati (paid soldiers) from the Romagna and Cerne. While
the former were professional troops hired by the state (from commission,
provisions, pay), the Cernide were select militia. To avoid the economic
damage of a mass call to arms and the enrolment of people with poor combat
skills, in Italy it was customary to choose physically gifted men of the state,
whose family was sometimes paid a small amount as a recruitment bounty
and granted tax relief. On the other hand, the community and the state of
these enrolled individuals, contributed to the maintenance of the infantry
during their period of service and to their equipment.The well-trained
infantrymen from Romagna were usually deployed in the outer rows of the
square formations, while the Cernide stayed in the centre.
At Agnadello (1509), these Venetian infantrymen led by di\.lviano
managed to put the Gascon missile troops on the run and they then engaged
in battle with the Swiss. However, they suffered from a heavy counterattack
by fresh Swiss troops sent by the King of France Louis XII, who led the
French army in that fight, and were outnumbered and overwhelmed.6
Four years later, at La Motta, the Venetian infantrymen of Di\.lviano
suffered another defeat, but this time at the hands of the Imperials led by
Raman de Cardona. The Imperial infantry consisted of two squares, one of
3,000 landsknechts and the other of 4,000 Spanish pikemen, all veterans. The
Venetians could count on two square formations of 5,000 men each, with
Romagna Provvisionati in the front and behind them the Cernide consisting
of peasants and adventurers who were less experienced and enrolled only to
make up the numbers. Right from when the clash began, the Cernide broke
formation and fled instead of supporting the Provvisionati, contributing to
the devastating defeat of the entire army.
This defeat, coupled with that at Ravenna (1512), marked the beginning
of a crisis for the Italian, Papal and Venetian armies, the latter the only two
important Italian states that remained independent. From that moment on,
these states had to rely heavily on foreign troops during times of war, while
their troops only played a supporting role.
The Italian infantry adapted once again to include mainly arquebusiers
with a role of giving support to the pikemen who could be either Swiss,
German or Spanish. The best Italian infantrymen of the time, almost all
arquebusiers, were those led by Giovanni Medici. Hired by Francis I, they
5 M. Sanudo, I Diarii, Venice 1882, volume VII, pp.349-350.

6 M. Predonzani and V. Alberici, The Italian Wars, Agnadello 1509, Ravenna 1512,
Marignano 1515, Helion & Company 2021, vol. 11, pp.17-28.
31
fought in the defeat of Pavia (1525), while most of the arquebusiers led by
Del Vasto in the Imperial army were Neapolitan.
According to the account of Benedetto Varchi in Storia Fiorentina,
in 1528, the new Florentine guard that resisted the siege by the army of
Charles V consisted of 3,000 men, of whom 1,700 were arquebusiers, and
1,300 were soldiers armed with halberds, spears, partisans and swords. On
3 August 1539, at the Battle of Gavinana which marked the definitive defeat
of Florence, the troops of the Florentine Republic led by Francesco Ferrucci
were mostly arquebusiers who, at the beginning of the clash, forced back
the Spanish cavalry and killed the commander-in-chief of the Imperials,
the Prince of Orange.7
In the following years and until the battle of Ceresole, the Italian infantry
adopted a kind of warfare based mainly on arquebusiers. In Delle lettere di
Bernardo Tasso, Tasso reports an inspection of part of the Italian infantry of
the Prince of Salerno, in which it is reported that out of 4,000 infantrymen,
3,200 of them were arquebusiers and only 800 were pikemen.8 The Italian
infantry fought together with the Imperials or the French and were engaged
in conflicts outside of the Italian peninsula such as in Flanders, Germany,
The Italian infantry of

Sanseverino. Detail of
The Battle of Ceresole
by Heinrich Holzmuller.
Courtesy of the
Bibliotheque Nationale de
France.
7 P. Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana, Giulio Einaudi Editore 1952,

pp.588-593.
8 B. Tasso, Delle lettere di M. Bernardo Tasso, vol. I, Padova 1733, p.502.
32
THE ITALIAN INFANTRY
and in the expeditions of Tunis and Algiers. They often fought against other
Italians.
Livery, Heraldry and Garments of the Italian Infantry in Ceresole
The Imperial troops of the sixteenth century sported a red badge of

identification in the shape of a St. Andrew's or Burgundian cross, or wore
a band of red cloth across the chest. The Italian companies hired by the
Imperials sported the same identifying mark. In his Commentaires, Blaise
de Montluc reports the capture of Mondovi (1543) by the troops of the
Marquis of Vasto, who were Italian and Spanish infantrymen sporting the
red cross.9
The 6,000 Italian soldiers of Ferrante Sanseverino who fought at Ceresole
came from Southern Italy, namely from the Kingdom of Naples. In plate C,
these infantrymen wear the typical clothes of the time in the colours of
their commander (white and red), the livery of the Sanseverinos, Princes
of Salerno. Like the two arquebusiers who are about to shoot, they wore
a giuppone (Italian doublet) of wool or padded fustian for extra density to
partly protect the chest from blows. The giuppone had small flaps at the
waist and padded sleeves that were tighter at the wrist and showed the
underlying shirt in linen or cotton. The colletto, a form of doublet, was quite
common (see the two infantrymen in the plate). It was made of leather and
usually sleeveless.
The infantrymen also wore hose, often in the livery of their captain. In
the middle of the seventeenth century, the hose were split at the knee. The
upper part, called cosciale (cuisse), was padded and slashed in different
points and directions. The cosciale came with a braghetta (codpiece), which
was not used as protection but apparently as a manly symbol. 10 All soldiers
represented in the plate wear a beret, a fundamental and widespread piece
of clothing at the time. The exception is the arquebusier, who is depicted
with a burgonet without a visor.
The banners of the Italian infantry hired by the Emperor sported
the red cross that divided the bottom part of the banner into four fields
decorated with the colours of the commander. The main banner of the
Prince of Salerno sported the ' barry wavy or and argent: which comes from
the Sanseverinos' coat of arms, 'argent, a fesse gules: The family impresa
(emblem), the deer's antlers or deer's massacre (a heraldic term), is at the
centre of the bannerll with the Italian motto written around it: 'Porto le
corna ch'ogn'uomo le vede e qualche altro le porta che nol crede: that is 'I sport
the antlers so that every man can see them, and some others sport them too
unknowingly' (Plate H, Image 3).
9 B. De Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome I, Paris 1864, p.166.

10 For the clothing see: S. Piccolo Paci, Parliamo di Moda, Cappelli Editore 2002,
vo1.2, pp.45-49.
11 G. Ferro, Teatro d'imprese, hereafter Giacomo Sarzina 1623, p.248.
33
The reconstruction of this banner draws from Gli antichi libri di bandiere
della Bibiloteca Reale dell'Archivio di Stato di Torino by Aldo Ziggioto.12 This
study includes several French banners captured at the Battle of St. Quentin,
among which there is also an infantry banner with the Sanseverinos' coat of
arms and device. When this battle took place in 1557, the Prince of Sal er no
was already in exile at the court of Henry 11 of France. Even though no
historian mentions his presence at St. Quentin, he likely raised a regiment
of infantry for the French army of Marshal Montmorency. The banner
illustrated is similar to the one of the Royal Library apart from the presence
of the cross. At Ceresole it sported the Imperial one.
12 A. Ziggioto, Gliantichilibri di bandiere della BibliotecaReale e dell �rchivio di

Stato di Torino, in G. Bascade M. del Piazzo, Insegne e simboli: Araldicapubblica e
privatamedievale e moderna, 1999 Rome, pp.462-463.
34
6
Tactical Evolution of the Spanish

Infantry
At the end of the fifteenth century, the Spanish infantry was similar to the
Italian in weaponry and tactics. The Spanish infantrymen wielded short
spears called gianette, partisans with wide spearheads and shields.
During the expedition into Italy of the King of France, Charles VIII ,
King Ferdinand of Aragon sent a contingent of cavalry and infantry to help
his cousin Ferdinand 11 of Naples reconquer his recently lost kingdom. At
Seminara, on 28 June 1495, the allied forces led by the King of Naples and
Gonzalo Fermindez de Cordoba (El Gran Capitan) clashed with the French
army of Bernard Stewart, Seigneur Dl\ubigny. The Spanish and Neapolitan
troops were inferior in number in terms of cavalry but much superior in the
infantry, with 5,000 infantrymen (of whom 1,500 were Spaniards) against
just over 1,000 French soldiers. However, 800 of these soldiers were the
famous Swiss pikemen. The French men-at-arms quickly gained the upper
hand over the enemy cavalry. Meanwhile, the Swiss, armed with long pikes,
defeated the Spanish infantry who were armed mainly with swords, shields
and pole or throwing weapons. For many modern scholars of war, the Gran
Capitan took inspiration from the dynamic tactical end of this disastrous
battle to train his Spanish infantry in the Swiss method of using the pike. In
fact, at the Battle of Atella (June 1496), about half of his 2,000 infantrymen
were armed with pikes and they barely managed to sustain the impact of
1,000 charging Swiss. However, thanks to the help of the infantrymen armed
with swords and shields, who had earlier put 1,000 Gascon crossbowmen to
flight and the intervention of 400 light horsemen, the Spaniards managed
to surround the Swiss and defeat them. I
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, France and Spain started a
new conflict for the Kingdom of Naples, during which two more battles
P. Pieri, Consalvo di Cordova e le origini del moderno esercito spagnolo, in Fernando

el Catolico e ltalia, in Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragon, Estudios, vol.
Ill, Zaragoza 1954, pp.211-212.
35
took place at Seminara, one in December 1502 and the second in April
1503. The French army was led by D'Aubigny. In both battles the Spanish
infantry fought traditionally with spear and shield. On the first occasion
they lost against the Swiss, while the second they won thanks to the help of
the cavalry that, for once, had put their opponents to flight.
In the main sector to the north, Gonzalo de Cordoba managed to win
two decisive battles, one in Cerignola (28 April 1503) and the other on
the Garigliano river (December 1503), and these victories won him the
Kingdom of Naples. For these two battles he had changed the armament of
his infantry once more. He had obtained from Emperor Maximilian 2,000
landsknecht pikemen to counter the Swiss, while his infantry consisted
mainly of arquebusiers. The arquebusiers were decisive, especially in
Cerignola, where they broke the charge of the men-at-arms of the Viceroy,
the Duke of Nemours.2
In 1512 at Ravenna, the Spanish infantry of Pietro Navarro consisted
mainly of pikemen and rotellieri (infantrymen armed with swords and
rotella shields), while the arquebusiers only made up 10 per cent of the
force. According to scholars, this change was made because at that time,
Spain had hired neither German nor Swiss arquebusiers and consequently
had to adapt its own infantry to the use of the pike. At Ravenna the Spanish
pikemen and rotellieri distinguished themselves for the courage shown
against the fearsome landsknechts and for having been the only part of
the defeated Spanish-Papal army to withdraw from the battlefield in good
order, despite being continuously harassed by the French cavalry.3
Also at the Battle of La Motta (1513), when Spain defeated Venice, the
4,000 Spanish infantrymen were all pikemen. Nine years later, at the Battle
of Bicocca (1522), the Imperial commander Prospero Colonna was at the
head of 6,000 pikemen and 4,000 Spanish arquebusiers. Colonna used
the same tactics used at the Battle of Cerignola to stop the Franco-Swiss
advance with arquebus fire from behind a moat and then counterattack.
What had led to this victory was the use of the arquebus and the fire by
rank tactic. The Spanish arquebusiers formed four successive ranks of 1,000
men each. While the first rank was shooting, the other ranks loaded their
weapons and then started shooting in turn while the first and subsequent
ranks were reloading and so on.4 The two Swiss formations of 7,500 men
suffered severe losses in the attack, and in the end, the 12,000 arquebusiers
- half Spanish and half landsknechts - won the battle. When the army
of Charles V won the Battle of Pavia, 1,500 soldiers out of 2,500 Spanish
infantry were arquebusiers, and they had the merit of having broken the
elite and glittering French Gendarmes with their firepower.
2 P. Pieri, cit. pp.213-222.

3 P. Pieri, cit . p.224.
4 M. Predonzani V. Alberici, The Italian Wars, Francis 1 and the Battle of Pavia 1525,
Helion & Company 2022, vol. Ill, pp.17-25.
36
TACTICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SPANISH INFANTRY
According to historian Piero Pieri, throughout the sixteenth century

and beyond, the numerical difference between pikemen and arquebusiers
became a constant in the Spanish army. In his Tratado de Re Militari (1536),
Spanish historian Diego de Salazar reports that the basic unit of the Spanish
infantry consisted of 12 companies of 500 men each, 200 of whom were
armed with pikes, 200 with shields and swords and 100 with arquebuses.
In Jan Vermeyeds tapestries on the conquest of Tunis, woven 10 years later
than the actual conquest of Tunis (1535), the Spanish infantrymen are
depicted with the weapons and equipment described in the Tratado.
In any case, whether he was a pikeman, rotelliere or arquebusier, the
Spanish infantryman was considered as skilled and courageous as the Swiss
and Germans. Towards the end of the first quarter of the sixteenth century,
the Spanish infantryman managed to surpass them in fame. The Swiss were
especially at a disadvantage against the Spanish infantry because of the fewer
and less skilled arquebusiers in their ranks. In general, the superiority of the
Spanish infantry was down to a question of flexibility. These infantrymen
had a remarkable predisposition to siege warfare, a skill honed during
the long wars against the Moors of Granada and in quick actions such as
ambushes and surprise attacks. Furthermore the infantry was led by brave
commanders. Among the most famous are El Gran Capitan, Prospero
Colonna, and Fernando Di\valos, Marquis of Pescara.
In addition, their ranks consisted mostly of shepherds, adventurers
and wanderers as well as representatives of the Spanish nobility, as was
already the case in the Swiss and German infantry. The Spanish infantry
distinguished themselves not only in the wars in Italy but also in Flanders,
Germany, France, North Africa and the American continent. Over time,
the highly flexible Tercio formation took over, organised in arquebusiers
(later, musketeers) and soldados (mostly rotellieri). The Tercio consisted of
about 3,000 men. The pikemen (almost a third of the total) had a prominent
defensive role and opened their ranks to allow the passage of musketeers
and soldados when needed. In this way, the arquebusiers were protected and
could reload their weapons safely to then replace their comrades. Hand -to
hand combat was the speciality of the rotellieri.
From the middle of the sixteenth century and for almost a century
afterwards, the Tercios were renowned for their combat skills, and their
enemies feared them. The situation changed with the appearance of the
Dutch, Swedish, English and French practices during the Thirty Years' War
that, with the battles of Rocroi (1631) and the Dunes (1658), put an end to
the invincibility of the Tercio
The Spanish and Imperial Banners
The sixteenth century Spanish and Imperial banners displayed the St.
Andrew's or Burgundian red cross, which originates from the Burgundy
'raguly cross' formed by two wooden trunks with a sparking flint. This was
one of the badges of the Dukes of Burgundy, mainly used by Charles the
Bold on his banners. This badge symbolised the Duke's fiery and courageous
37
spirit in battle until he was defeated by the Swiss at Morat and Grandson
and then killed at Nancy. His lands were inherited by Emperor Maximilian
of Habsburg when he married Mary of Burgundy, Charles' only daughter,
and then by Emperor Charles V.
Thus, St. Andrew's cross became the distinguishing mark of the Imperial
army displayed on banners, standards, harnesses of horses, saioni (tunics)
and the chest and sometimes back of Spanish, German, Italian, and Flemish
soldiers, that is, all those belonging to the Imperial army. The cross sported
on banners could be simple (See plate G, image 2) or 'raguly' (See plate G,
Spanish and Germans of Ram6n de Cardona fighting against Gruyeres and Italians.
Detail of The Battle of Ceresole by Heinrich Holzmuller (Courtesy of Bibliotheque
Nationale de France)
38
TACTICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SPANISH INFANTRY
image 4) and usually in red, while the Burgundy cross with striker and flint
was used more by the armies of Maximilian. The bottom part of infantry
and cavalry banners had different colours. The field of the main insignias
was plain, argent (white), or (yellow), but also blue or black (See plate G,
image 2). Sometimes, although rarely, the cross could be white or yellow on
a red, blue or yellow field. In plate G, images 2 and 4, there are two examples
of banners of the infantry high command taken from the description by
Marco Guazzo of the funeral of the Marquis of Vasto.5 One banner had a
yellow field, the cross, the Imperial eagle and the coat of arms of Charles V.
The other was black with the cross and the coat of arms of Avalos.
The insignia of separate companies were in the bottom part of the
banner, depicted in bands of various numbers, thicknesses and colours
- usually light colours to make the red cross stand out, such as white/
red, yellow/white, white/blue, white/green, or yellow/red. Banners could
display a variety of lines of divisions other than bands, such as the 'rayonne:
the 'invected' or 'wavy: Each shape and colour linked a company to a
commander or captain and the tinctures of his coat of arms or insignia.
For example, in plate H, image 3, the banner of Ferrante Sanseverino and
the banner of Captain Raimondo di Cardona in plate G, image 5, sport the
impresa or coat of arms of the captain. Another famous insignia was the
black Imperial crowned eagle on a red, gold or blue field. Sometimes, the
eagle was depicted between the 'columns of Hercules' with the motto Plus
Ultra which was the impresa of Emperor Charles V.
In contemporary iconographies of the time, some insignia were entirely
decorated with the yellow and red 'barry: that comes from the red and
golden 'pale' of Aragon. Religious subjects, which were widely used, such as
those on the command standard of the Marquis of Vasto (plate G, image 1)
are discussed later in this book.
5 M. Guazzo, Historie, Venice 1549, pp.324-325.
39
7
The French Infantry
Since the end of the fifteenth century, the financially stable French monarchy
had hired foreign infantry for its army, especially those from Switzerland,
Germany and Italy. The French rulers rarely created infantry units by
enlisting their own subjects because of the poor skills these infantrymen
had shown on the battlefield and the fear that if trained and experienced,
they might one day rise against the King.
In 1445, almost at the end of the Hundred Years' War, Charles VII
tried to form a permanent national army with Compagnies d'Ordonnance
as cavalry and francs-archers as infantry. The latter, all recruited from the
civilian populace, were defeated at Guinegate in 1479, and King Louis XI
disbanded them due to their poor discipline. In their place, the French
began to hire Swiss mercenaries, who became famous for their crushing
victories over Duke Charles of Burgundy. These mercenaries constituted an
initial nucleus of regular infantry, alongside the bands of Picardie formed
mainly by adventurers from the border regions between Picardy and Artois.
During the reign of Charles VIII, the successor of Louis XI, these bands
defended the northern provinces valiantly against an attack by Emperor
Maximilian. They did not participate in Charles VIII's campaign in Italy,
and the king left for the campaign with the Swiss and a multitude of French,
Breton, Proven<ral, Gascon and Genoese adventurers. According to Louis
Susane, author of L'histoire de l'ancienne Infanterie Franfaise, the king left
France with 60,000 men, but at the Battle of Fornovo (1495), he deployed
only 8,000 of them due to sickness and desertion. I
Shortly after, Louis XII created the bands of Piedmont and Champagne
based on the model of those of Picardie so as not to be in a position of
relying solely on mercenaries, who were not always reliable. Swiss and
landsknechts, other than being expensive, often did not for example have
any desires to participate in sieges.
L. Susane, Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie franraise, Paris 1849, tome I, pp.64-67.
40
THE FRENCH INFANTRY
The French infantry, mostly Gascons, was considered one of the best.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, it fought in the unsuccessful
attempt to conquer the Kingdom of Naples and then, in 1507, it took part
in the capture of Genoa. The French cavalry, considered the best in Europe
and led by the brave Bayard, dismounted from their horses and led the
infantrymen in the attack on the fortifications. Unlike the Swiss, German
and Spanish infantry, where many nobles joined the foot soldiers as officers,
in the French army nobles in a similar position were few and often unruly
and ill disciplined.2
Brantome describes the clothes of the French infantrymen at the time
of Louis XII as follows, 'they wore long shirts with large sleeves, like the
Bohemians and the Moors, and kept them on for two or three months
without changing them. They showed their bare and hairy chest and wear
slashed shoes of singular fashion. They also wore colourful slashed hose
that showed their bare thigh and buttock. Other less scruffy infantrymen
used taffeta in large quantities and showed one or both bare legs and tied
their hose to their belt. The majority of them were however poor people or
criminals marked with a brand in the form of a lily on their shoulders. Their
ears were cropped, and they had long, thick hair and horrible beards.3
In 1509, at the Battle of Agnadello, the Gascons, who were mostly
arquebusiers, were initially defeated by the Venetian infantry, but with the
help of the Swiss, they managed to turn the tide of the battle. The same
happened at Ravenna (1511). Initially, the square formations of Gascons,
Picards and Italians were repelled off by the Spanish and Italians. However,
thanks to the support of the French cavalry, which had won its own its
battle with the enemy horsemen, the infantry managed to rally and reform
their ranks before charging at the enemy, which was a major contribution to
the victory.4 Two y ears later, at the combat of Ariotta, the French infantry,
again composed mainly of Gascons had to face the Swiss and was, perhaps
inevitably, defeated.
Up until that point, the French infantry had proven to be tactically
inferior to the strong experienced and ruthless infantry of the Swiss,
landsknechts, Spaniards and Italians. In France, the Swiss tactics with the
pike had not taken hold because the Swiss were part of the French army.
In their absence, the landsknecht pikemen were substituted for them. The
French national infantry had therefore taken on a support role with more
arquebusiers than pikemen. There was also the problem of infantry officers
who were not up to their roles.
In 1515 at Marignano, the French infantry had their revenge on the
fearsome Swiss. In this battle, there were 10,000 French infantrymen, 4,000
of whom were from the bands, and the majority of them were crossbowmen,
2 L. Susane, cit. pp.68-73.

4 M. Predonzani and V. Alberici, The Italian Wars, Agnadello 1509, Ravenna 1512,
Marignano 1515, Helion & Company 2021, vol. 11, pp.17-28 and pp.52-61.
41
archers, and arquebusiers. There were also 2,000 Genoese crossbowmen,

about 14,000 landsknechts, 2,500 horsemen, and 70 cannons. The
opponents, on the other hand, could count on about 20,000 Swiss divided
into three square formations supported by 200 Papal horsemen and eight
cannons. The battle lasted two days and was called the Battle of the Giants.
The French army led by King Francis I followed their orders perfectly.
The German pikemen contained the Swiss fury, and the cavalry attacks
combined with the artillery and French arquebus fire contributed to this
memorable victory. The intervention of the Venetians who supported the
French allies in the final phase of the clash was also a fundamental factor
in the victory.5
A few years later, France and the Swiss cantons agreed on a lasting
peace, and the Swiss infantrymen in the pay of Francis I returned to their
homeland. The King of France continued hiring foreign mercenaries for
his infantry, such as Germans, Italians and Corsicans, other than the Swiss.
When the conflict spread in 1521, he created four French armies or
military departments: Champagne, Picardy, Piedmont and Guyenne. These
departments protected the borders from ene�y attacks. To the north, there
were the bands of Picardie and Champagne, to the south, those of Piedmont
and Guyenne. Thus, the first four regiments of French infantry were born.
These bands consisted of 500 to 2,000 men each, led by a captain with two
lieutenants and an ensign under his command. If necessary, these bands
could also consist of as many as 4,000 to 10,000 men under the leadership
of a captain general.
Shortly afterwards, in addition to the fourbands already mentioned,
the king also created those of Brittany, Normandy, Burgundy, Dauphine,
Provence and Languedoc, on either a temporary basis or to use on
expeditions. These were contingents of the most important bands of
Picardie and Piedmont and they operated respectively in the north and
south of France. These different territorial positions led to differences in
customs and weapons between these two principal bands.6
According to Susane, the bands of Picardie were more versed in close
combat and sieges, and the majority of their captains were veterans. The
infantry came from the cities and countryside of the northern plain, their
clothing and weapons were simple but always in good condition. They were
known for their extreme brutality when looting.
The band of Piedmont, instead, had within its ranks young noblemen of
Gascony, Languedoc, Provence and Dauphine, all attracted by the thought
of campaigning in the beautiful and rich Italy. The Piedmont infantrymen
were more suited to assaults, surprise actions, clashes in the mountains and
aboard ship as marines. They owned expensive weapons and magnificent
doublets and wore feathers and ribbons as decoration.7
5 M. Predonzani and V. Alberici, cit. pp.79-94.

7 L. Susane, cit. pp.99-1O1.
42
THE FRENCH INFANTRY
In the war against Charles V, Francis I suffered crushing defeats such as

that ofPavia in 1525, which frustrated his ambitions towards the Kingdom
of Naples and Milan. These military defeats also undermined his confidence
in the Swiss and landsknechts, pushing him to create a national troop in the
fashion of the old francs-archers, who had been enrolled in the parishes
of French villages. Thus, around 1534, there were seven legions of 6,000
men each, deployed in Normandy, Brittany,Picardy, Languedoc, Guyenne,
the provinces of Champagne, Burgundy and Nivernais, and in Dauphine,
Provence, Lyonnais and Auvergne. Each legion was divided into six bands of
1,000 men with two banners each, 40 officers, six sergeants, four drummers
and two fifers. The infantry was armed partly with pikes and partly with
arquebuses, so that out of a total of 42,000 men, 12,000 were arquebusiers.
Even captains and other officers and had to be originally from the home
counties of thelegion.8 Each captain had under him two lieutenants, who
led 500 men each. A colonel led each legion.
However, as Susane points out, this military institution was too rigid,
since it did not consider the customs of the time nor the capricious
character of the nobles and the indiscipline of the common soldiers. In
1536, the legion of Dauphine was dissolved because of the disturbances and
violence it had caused. In the same year, some of the legions of Champagne
and Guienne were dissolved with dishonour because of rioting amongst the
men. In 1543, after the capture of Luxembourg, Martin du Bellay reports
that out of 10,000 soldiers of the legions of Champagne and Normandy left
as part of the garrison, only 300 men remained due to desertions. In 1545,
in Boulogne, 1,000 men ofPicardy, led by the Lord ofVervins, surrendered
the stronghold to the English despite the population being willing to defend
it and despite the fact that relief was on its way. The Lord of Vervins was
executed by beheading as punishment.
Because of these and other disservices, these legions were deployed less
and less. In 1547, after the death of Francis I, and according to Susane, they
fell into disuse, although without being formally abolished. Around 1535,
the bands began to be called 'Old Bands: probably to distinguish themselves
from the legions, and with the progressive increase of the failures of the
legions, many soldiers and members of the legions preferred to be enlisted
in thesebands. The increase in enlistments led to the creation of new
military units that took the name of 'New Bands:
After being held captive in Spain, King Francis I ordered that one unit
had to consist of 400 men. In 1543, this number was increased to 500 for
each new band, led by a captain with a lieutenant and a banner and consisted
also of sergeants, musicians and paymasters. The men were divided into
pikemen and arquebusiers, with drummers and fifers. In battle, they stood
in a square formation with the pikemen in the centre and the arquebusiers
at the sides. The captain stood in front, while the lieutenants were in the
rear to close ranks. The banner was in the middle of the first ranks.
43
All the officers and pikemen were armed with pikes and swords and
wore on their heads a burgonet or other solid helmet that covered the ears.
They wore corslets or armour with knee-length tassets. The arquebusiers
wore lighter pieces of clothing, such as leather jackets with chainmail
sleeves and wore a morion or another style of lighter helmet, and carried
swords or daggers.9
At that time, the overall commander of the Bands was called captain
general and, later, colonel general. The first two officers to hold this title
were Charles de Cosse-Brissac (1542), commander of the Old Bands of
Piedmont, and Jean de Taix (1543), who fought at the Battle of Ceresole.
The victory of the French infantry at Ceresole over the feared landsknechts
was proof that these changes in infantry tactics was for the better.
Identifying Marks and Banners of the French Infantry
In the sixteenth century, the French and foreign troops under the King
of France used the white cross as an identifying mark, in contrast to the
Imperial red cross. The infantrymen sported this cross, usually in cloth,
on the chest, sewn on jackets, tunics or surcoats, but sometimes also
painted on the breastplate of armour. The French had used the white cross
since the Hundred Years War, and is a recurring symbol in chronicles
and iconographies up to the Battle of Pavia, although from that time on,
it appears more rarely. Another identifying mark of the French troops in
battle was a white band of cloth that crossed the chest from the shoulder.
The use of this band is documented also in the iconographies of the Battle of
Pavia, the war with Siena and the Wars of Religion against the Huguenots.
The cross had certainly been in use for a longer time than the use of
bands, which appear only around the first quarter of the sixteenth century.
These two identifying marks coexisted for a while, then the band started to
replace the cross. In the History of Emperor Carlos V, Spanish chronicler
Sandoval mentions that in 1544, the year of the Battle of Ceresole, a
contingent of 3,000 foreign cavalrymen changed sides from the French to
the Imperials, exchanging the white band for a red one. 10
In De Fatti di Cesare Maggi da Napoli, Luca Contile repeatedly mentions
the white cross as a French identifying mark both in Lautrec's attempt to
conquer Naples in 1527 and the war in Piedmont in 1537.11 The white
cross was probably also sported, albeit in a limited way, after the Battle of
Ceresole.
Plate E shows the French infantrymen of the Old Bands (the
Vieilles Bandes)at Ceresole. The officers sport the white band, while the
infantrymen use the cross. At the time the banners of the French infantry
9 L. Susane, cit. pp. 100-105.

10 P. De Sandoval, Historia del Emperador Carlos V; Rey de Espana, vol. VII, Madrid
1847, p.370.
11 L. Contile, De Jatti di Cesare Maggi da Napoli, Milan 1565, pp.34v and 108r.
44
THE FRENCH INFANTRY
were rectangular, displaying the white cross on a field painted in the colours
of each captain's coats of arms. Jean de Taix, an infantry commander, must
have had the insignia on a banner in his colours, namely blue and white (see
plate H, image 6). Jean de Taix was also colonel general of the French bands,
meaning that he bore the white triangular flame in battle which was sign of
the supreme commander of the infantry (see plate H, image 7).
The French infantry. Detail of The Battle of Ceresole by Heinrich Holzmulier. (Courtesy
of Bibliotheque Nationale de France)
45
8
The Landsknechts
The Swiss infantry made a name for themselves in the Burgundian Wars
thanks to their winning tactics in pitched battles. Thus, the European
rulers, who mainly had feudal-type armies began to hire Swiss mercenaries
or other troops who adopted similar military tactics. I
Charles the Bold, defeated at Grandson and Morat by the Swiss, tried
to hire and train troops in the Swiss fashion. Around 1480, Emperor
Maximilian I of Habsburg did the same by enlisting pikemen from Flanders,
Brabant, Switzerland and southern Germany. The Germans distinguished
themselves in many military actions, and some contemporary Burgundian
chroniclers began to call them Landsknecht or Lansquenets, that translates
literally as 'land knight:
At first, the landsknechts were deployed alongside the Swiss and learned
from them. Then, after a number of years, they became more autonomous
and developed a deep-seated rivalry against the Swiss who were considered
their betters and had better pay and privileges.
Under Maximilian I of Habsburg, the landsknechts distinguished
themselves in the war against Hungary and in the battles of Guinegate in
1479 against the French, Calliano in 1487 against Venice and also in the
Battle of Stoke Field in 1487 during the Wars of the Roses, as mercenaries
of the Yorkist pretender.
These mercenaries came not only from Southern Germany but also from
the Tyrol and the Trent area. Some were recruited in Rhineland Germany
and in Flanders. From these latter areas came the famous German Black
Bands in the pay of France, who fought at the battles of Ariotta, Marignano
and Pavia.
All these infantrymen belonged to lower social classes, such as peasants
or labourers from rural areas, but there were also men from Imperial cities,
such as common criminals, domestic servants, and workers in general such
For this chapter the authors consulted: R. Baumann, I lanzichenecchi. La loro storia
e cultura dal tardo Medioevo alia guerra dei Trentanni, Giulio Einaudi Editore
1996.
46
THE LANDSKNECHTS
as artisans. Even some bourgeois were attracted to enlist. Similarly, the

nobles and sons of wealthy citizens were equally drawn by the prospects
of a glorious career in the landsknechts. In the book I Lanzichenecchi,
historian Reinhard Baumann remarks that it was the noble commanders
who shaped this German infantry, such as Count Romont, Philip of Cleve,
the Counts Eitelfritz and Emperor Maximilian. These commanders led
their men, not on horseback but on foot wielding a pike and fought in the
front ranks; for example the Emperor fought on foot in the front rank at
the capture of Oudenaarde, or Georg von Frundsberg, the most famous of
the landsknecht commanders, who at the Battle of Bicocca fought in the
front rank alongside his officers. Commanders, captains and nobles fought
on foot alongside their infantrymen as a sign of equality, and this was the
same among the Swiss. These units were operated as cooperatives and took
collective decisions. As Baumann relates, before battle, a colonel might ask
the opinion of his men regarding his proposed strategy and tactics.
In 1499, the landsknechts finally faced the Swiss in the Swabian War,
but they suffered several defeats. They were slaughtered mercilessly in every
battle and lost about 3,000 men at Bregenz-Hard, and the same at Dornak.
These high losses were because the Swiss had vowed to take no prisoners,
marking the beginning of the deadly hatred between the two great rivals on
the battlefield.
With the onset of the Italian wars, the Swiss and Germans fought once
more at Cerignola (1503), lost by the Swiss, and Ariotta (1513), lost by the
landsknechts. However, they also fought under the same flag. Swiss and
landsknechts were in the pay of Charles VIII, King of France, during his
campaign to conquer the Kingdom of Naples. They also fought alongside
Ludovico the Moor, Duke of Milan, until they betrayed and abandoned the
Duke into the hands of Louis XII at Novara.
In Italy, the Germans in the pay of the Empire could fight and compete
with the Italian and Spanish infantry. They were defeated by the Italians
in Rio Secco (1508) and at the siege of Padua (1509) but they won at La
Motta (1513). As for the Spanish, the landsknecht Black Bands in the pay
of France were unable to resist their assault at the Battle of Ravenna (1512).
At the Battle of Marignano (1515), the landsknechts had to face the Swiss
again, and the Black Bands inthe pay of France once more barely withstood
the fury of the Swiss.
Their revenge on the Swiss came in two bloody and pivotal battles. The
first was in 1522 at Bicocca, where the Imperial artillery and arquebusiers
killed 3,000 Swiss, and the landsknecht infantry despatched the survivors.
The second was in 1525, at Pavia, where the Germans massacred most of the
fleeing Swiss. The chronicles report more than 10,000 or 20,000 dead in the
French army. However, many of them were part of the famous landsknecht
Black band in the pay of the King of France. Considered traitors by their
brothers who served with the Imperials, they were massacred in the park of
Mirabello as a punishment and example to others.
In the sixteenth century, Emperor Maximilian first, and Charles V later,
issued several prohibitions against mercenary military service, trying to
47
make Germans desist from fighting against the Empire. However, at the
time, the concept of 'nation' did not yet exist. There was the concept of a
'homeland' as a city or territory in which the person was born. Precisely for
this reason, the relationship between vassal and feudal lord was privileged,
allowing people the freedom to choose the country or the flag under which
to fight. Moreover, fighting only under the Empire did not always guarantee
enough work for everyone.
In 1527, after the Battle of Pavia, the Imperial troops perpetrated the
infamous 'sack of Rome' by the Germans, Spaniards and Italians, but this
behaviour is largely attributed solely to the landsknechts. The brutal looting
lasted a few months, causing about 20,000 deaths among the population
and 5,000 deaths among the attackers due to the plague which broke out
during the looting.
According to some historians, most of the landsknechts were Lutherans
with a burning hatred toward the Catholic church. However, other factors
contributed to their brutality. The soldiers had not been paid for a long
time, and their best commanders had died. Frundsberg had returned to
Germany because of ill health and Duke Charles of Bourbon had died
during the assault on the city walls.
In any case, discipline among the landsknecht ranks was a long-lasting
issue. Conflicts often arose between officers and men, who often rebelled
due to lack of pay or scarce rations or because of their habit of drinking
excessively when not in battle.
Until the middle of the sixteenth century, these soldiers participated in
and distinguished themselves in all the wars fought by the Empire; the siege
of Vienna in 1529, the expeditions to Flanders and France, the campaign
of Tunis (1535), the defeat at Algiers in 1541 and the Schmalkaldic war
in 1546. Around 1530, some landsknecht units also travelled to the New
World alongSide the Spanish expeditions, contributing to the conquest of
South America.
Landsknechts: Clothes and Weapons
Landsknecht costume was peculiar and extravagant with a wide variety of

shapes, colours and great use of slashing. Their clothes influenced military
and even civil fashion until the middle of the sixteenth century.2 They wore
hats with wide brims adorned with feathers or round berets with slashing
and sometimes decorated with coloured feathers. Their face was covered by
a thick and often long beard. They wore a baggy linen shirt with overcoats
or doublets with slashes on the sleeves and chest from which flaps of the
shirt showing through. At first, they wore tight hose of various colours,
2 To write this chapter, the authors have consulted, in addition to Baumann's book,
also: S. Piccolo Pad, Parliamo di Moda, Cappelli Editore 2002, vol.2, pp.50-52; M.
Troso, L'ultima battaglia del Medioevo, La battaglia dell 'Ariotta Novara 6 giugno
1513, Edizioni della Laguna 2002, p.72.
48
THE LANDSKNECHTS
decorated with more slashing that showed their bare skin. Later, they added
slashed trouser legs of raw cloth or leather that showed the stockings below.
With time, they wore wider trousers with two layers, namely the inner
lining and the outside layer. These trousers were short, to the knee with
hose to cover the calves. Finally, there was the codpiece in fabric or leather,
exaggeratedly padded sometimes, to cover the genitals.
These infantrymen are depicted in the numerous woodcuts, engravings
and paintings of artists of the time, such as Albrecht Durer, Daniel Hopfer,
Virgil Solis, Erhard Schoen, Leonhard Beck, and Albrecht Altdorfer. These
images show that their clothes were often puffed on the chest, shoulders,
arms and thighs. These were not only for aesthetic or fashion reasons but
more simply they acted as a padding, of rags, cloth and anything else that
these infantrymen could put under their clothes to cushion the opponent's
blows. Baumann reports that most of them went into battle 'naked: without
adequate defensive equipment until about the middle of the sixteenth century.
The vast majority of the landsknechts were peasants or members of the
lower classes who, other than their clothes, had a pike that at the time cost
about a florin, often purchased on credit and then repaid after receiving
their first payment. Only a few of them could afford a burgonet, costing
three florins, and even fewer were those who were able to procure an iron
breastplate and back plate.
At the time, only commanders, officers or Doppelsoldner (literally
'double-pay men') owned any armour, that is, essentially those who had the
financial wherewithal to buy it. In the middle of the sixteenth century, a set
of infantry armour cost 16 florins, but the usual pay for a soldier was four
florins per month, a level that remained constant throughout the century.
Continuous devaluation of the currency due to wars or famines did little to
improve their spending power.
At the Museo delle Armi Luigi Marzoli in Brescia there are four sets of
armour, in the German fashion or landsknecht corselets. They are of good
craftsmanship and date to 1540-1560, and therefore are contemporaneous
to the Battle of Ceresole or shortly thereafter. The Corselets depicted in
photographs on pages 50 and 106 are typical of the period. The photo on
page 106 shows a corselet with decorative engravings on the sides of the
chest plate, and on the blades of the tassets and is similar to a set of half
armour dated 1540-1550, preserved at the Musee d'Armee in Paris. These
two sets of armour are alike in shape, the number of plates on the tassets,
pauldrons and the burgonet complete with a combed crest. They differ only
in the engraving and other decorations and could easily have been crafted
in the same armourers' workshop.
The corselet shown on page 50 from the museum of Brescia displays
another infantry corslet without vambraces, but complete with a peculiar
burgonet, fitted with vertical plates to protect the face. It is also equipped
with a gorget, has eight holes level with the height of the ears and a rotating
brim and was pointed to the top of the skull. In Erhard Schoen's woodcuts
dated about 1540 and entitled 'Procession of lanterns: the artist depicts
similar corselets.
49
The picture depicted below is inspired by these woodcuts

and shows five pikemen, and the two at the sides are wearing
landsknecht half armour. This consisted of an iron gorget and
tassets attached to the seven or eight-plate breastplate. They
wear vambraces and a burgonet on the head that protects the
face. The first on the left has his face fully covered by an iron
visor with holes for vision and ventilation. Regarding the
full-face helmet, Baumann points out that it was not much
used by infantrymen or by their leaders, who preferred open
helmets in order to see and breathe better and also to be
more easily recognised. The last figure on the right has the
burgonet equipped with vertical plates to protect the face.
This protection is similar to that on the armour preserved in
the museum of Brescia.
The armour was, however, usually reserved for those
fighting in the first ranks of the pike block formations of each
army. They were the bravest, and those ranking higher, or
the richest, although these last two groups did not necessary
also demonstrate the requirements of the first. In the book
Lultima battaglia del Medioevo. The Battle of Ariotta. Novara
6 June 1513, Mario Troso highlights a detail regarding
the use of armour by mercenary infantry of the time. It
publishes a photograph of the breast and back plate of the
armour belonging to Swiss captain Feer Peterman, preserved
at the Historisches Museum in Lucerne. The armour was
manufactured in Milan around 1470, and Peterman wore
it in the battles of Dornach in 1499 and Ariotta in 1513.
This demonstrates not only that the armours of that period
were used for a long time, Peterman used his for more than
German corslet. Museo

delle armi Luigi Marzoli.
Brescia. See comments
on page 49. (Photo by the
author)
Landsknechts of the mid

sixteenth century. Woodcut
by Heinrich Holzmuller
50
THE LANDSKNECHTS
40 years, but also commanders' unwillingness to buy new weapons and

armour for their men.
The book cover illustration is a reconstruction of the landsknecht square
formation at Ceresole with the captains in the front-rank wearing German
style infantry corselets. The identifying marks are those of the Empire,
namely red sashes, handkerchiefs, plumes and crosses.
The Flags of the Landsknechts
The flags of the landsknecht infantry in the pay of Charles V were similar
to those used by the Imperial army in general. The iconography of the
Battle of Pavia, one of the most praised representations together with the
works by Rupert HelIer, Jorg Breu, and Barnaert van Orley, shows accurate
representations of these flags.
The works of the aforementioned artists show that most of the insignias
displayed a St. Andrew's Cross with or without saw tooth, usually in red
but sometimes even yellow. The field could be a single colour but often
had horizontal bands in various colours that probably represented the
livery of the city, the country from which the infantrymen came or their
captain's livery. In some iconography of the Battle of Pavia, the landsknecht
banners are decorated with bands or squares. These were not depicted at
the bottom of the flag but placed above or below the frame with the cross.
The banners without a cross were completely decorated with bands of two
colours: yellow and blue (livery of Burgundy), red and white (livery of the
Habsburgs but also of Tyrol), yellow and red (the colours of Aragon), or
red and black or yellow and black (probably the livery of a city or captain).
Last but not least, there was the flag displaying the black Imperial eagle on
a golden or red field.
In respect of the Battle of Ceresole, the only iconography that depicts
relevant flags for this volume is a woodcut by Swiss artist Heinrich
Holzmiiller, who made it shortly after the battle and unfortunately in
black and white. In the engraving, the German square formation bears 18
identical flags displaying St Andrew's Cross without any visible decoration.
The tapestries by Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen on the capture of Tunis in
1535 proved to be another precious source for this volume. This Dutch artist
followed the army of Charles V in its African campaign, during which he
made many drawings that were later used in the tapestry cartoons, which
were materially executed by Willem de Pannemaker in about 1546-1547,
im mediately after the Battle of Ceresole. The flags of the landsknecht troops
depicted display the red St. Andrew's cross on a white, yellow, or striped
field but also the yellow cross on a white field (see the example in plate
H, image 4). Other flags without a cross display horizontal bands in white
and red, black and brown or brown and white (see plate H, image 5). One
of them in particular is decorated with golden flames (called 'rayonne'
in heraldry) that start from the four sides of the flag and converge in the
centre, while the bottom of the flag is half white and half blue.
51
9
The Swiss Infantry
In the sixteenth century, the Swiss were considered to be the best

infantrymen in Europe. I
Their fame began with the struggles for independence against the
Austrian Habsburg princes. In 1291, the Swiss communities implemented
The clash between

landsknechts and Swiss.
Detail of The Battle of
Ceresole by Heinrich
Holzmuller. (Courtesy of the
Bibliotheque Nationale de
France)
For this chapter the authors consulted the texts: J. McCormack, One Million
Mercenaries. Swiss Soldier in the Armies of the World, Leo Cooper London 1993;
M. Troso, L'ultima battaglia del Medioevo, La battaglia dell'Ariotta Novara 6 giugno
1513, Edizioni della Laguna 2002.
52
THE SWISS INFANTRY
the first confederate pact between Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, laying
thus the foundations of what the Swiss Confederation would be as we know it
today. This league defeated theAustrians at Morgarten (1315) and Sempach
(1386), where the square formation of the Confederate infantrymen armed
with spears, vouges and halberds defeated the cavalrymen and infantrymen
of the Habsburgs.
Later, the Confederation used their military strength against the
Burgundy army of Charles the Bold in the battles of Grandson, Murten
and Nancy (1476-1477), which ended in bloody victories that affirmed
the effectiveness of the Swiss tactic in the eyes Europe. In the book The
Battle ofAriotta, Mario Troso describes their tactics well. The infantrymen
were divided into a sequence of compact square formations of 1,500 to
1,600 men each, then arranged obliquely to protect each square, and the
infantrymen were armed with pole weapons and pikes. The pikes were
about three meters long and, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the
pikes increased in length to about five meters or more.
In the Swabian war of 1499, the Swiss cantons, allied with the
Graubiinden League, withstood the attacks of Emperor Maximilian I
and his army, which included large numbers of landsknechts, mercenary
soldiers originally from Swabia who fought in the same style as the Swiss.
During this conflict, the Confederation and League infantry always
sealed their victories by slaughtering the Germans even after they had
surrendered. The Swiss commanders had decided to not take prisoners to
enhance their troops' discipline. Until then, the Swiss used to take prisoners
for ransom, pursuing their enemies even when they left the battlefield,
which sometimes could have endangered their victory. Thus, under oath,
all infantrymen were forced to obey this brutal but tactically sound order,
causing heavy losses to the Swabians. This led to a deadly hatred among
Swiss infantrymen and landsknechts, and the two groups of mercenaries
implemented the so-called mala guerra (bad war) policy equally, according
to which they no longer took prisoners.
With the Italian wars, the Swiss mercenary troops fought alternately
for France, various Italian states and also for the Empire. Their enlistment
was controlled by the cantonal authorities of the Confederation and by
the Leagues. This was the case both for recruitment by the Confederation
against enemy state and for the recruitments of mercenaries employed by
other states. The main reason why this phenomenon of mercenary activity
developed in Switzerland during this period was the great poverty of the
mountain cantons. The cultivation of land for crops was increasingly
reduced and this forced farmers to become shepherds or herdsmen. This
also led to temporary male emigration: women and children milked and
grazed the cattle, while men went abroad, even for long periods, to earn
money as mercenaries.
A peculiarity of these mercenaries, in addition to the weapons and
combat tactics they adopted, was the 'democratic' organisation of the army.
The Federal authorities chose the commanders, but not the foot soldiers.
These practices led to common decisions, typical of mountain communities
53
and cities, that often influenced the military hierarchy. The supreme
commander was considered a primus inter pares (first among equals), while
the council of commanders had the decision - making powers.
In the Italian peninsula, the Swiss mercenaries initially fought under
the French, then for the Duchy of Milan and later for the Pope, capturing
Milan from the French (1512). W ith the important victory of Ariotta (1513)
against the French of King Louis XII, the Confederation's idea of expanding
into Lombardy seemed plausible. However, the bloody yet honourable
defeat at Marignano in 1515 by Francis I and his Venetian allies ended these
territorial ambitions.
In 1516, France and the Confederation made peace, and in 1521 they
signed a 'perpetual' alliance that lasted for 250 years.
The Battle of Marignano marked a military turning point for the
Swiss army. The tactical invincibility of its ordonnances clashed with and
succumbed to the combined action of artillery, French cavalry, and the
massive use of firearms and crossbows, that weakened and disordered
the Swiss squares. In addition, for the first time, the landsknechts hired
by Francis I managed to withstand the impact of the hated Swiss pikemen
until the arrival of the Venetian reinforcements led by Bartolomeo
di\.lviano. Then came the harsh defeats of Bicocca (1522) and Pavia (1525),
where the landsknechts and the Spanish arquebusiers massacred the Swiss
infantrymen to avenge the massacres during the Swabian War. However, at
the Battle of Ceresole di\.lba, their roles were reversed with the landsknechts
as victims and the Swiss as executioners.
The Banners of the Swiss in the Pay of France
The iconography of wars or battles fought by Swiss armies from the birth
of the confederation until the sixteenth century is extensive thanks to the
numerous illustrated Swiss chronicles of the and fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries written in German-speaking Swiss cities. In these illustrations,
the signs traditionally sported in combat are those of the individual cantons
and the flag of the Swiss Confederation, the white cross on a red field which
dated back to 1300.
The flags of the Swiss infantry in the pay of France were different.
The catalogue book Schweitzer Fahnenbuch of 1942 contains descriptions
of all the military flags preserved in Swiss museums, and the chapter
'Franzosische dienste' (in the service of France) lists about 15 Swiss banners
of the sixteenth century used when they were in the pay of France. These
flags date from the beginning of the century to about the second half of
the sixteenth century, providing a good overview of the evolution of the
Swiss flags.2 They all display the white cross - the emblem of the French and
2 A. Bruckner, Schweizer Fahnenbuch, Verlag: Saint-Gall, Zolllikofer & co, 1942, in

the chapter: Franzosische dienste, p.148 et seq.
54
THE SWISS INFANTRY
Swiss armies, with the arms extended to the edges of the flag. Thus, the flag
was split into four fields, decorated in various colours or coloured bands
depending on the unit. Chronologically, the first flags (from the beginning
of the sixteenth century) were square, about 250cm per side, with fields in
only one or two colours. Then, towards the first quarter of the sixteenth
century, the flags became larger, rectangular (about 370cm x 280cm), and
were decorated with horizontal bands or stripes of various colours.
In the tapestries of Barnaert van OrIey on the Battle of Pavia in 1525,
which are preserved at the Capodimonte Museum, it is possible to see the
flags of the Swiss infantry that fought in the battle. These banners display a
white cross with the four fields bottom crossed each by three bands of two
colours: yellow and blue, yellow and red and yellow and white. The colour
combinations represented the various formations or bands.3
Most banners in the Schweitzer Fahnenbuch date back to the second half
of the sixteenth century, and some pieces were identified as being sported
at the battle of Moncontour (1569). In all these banners, the horizontal
stripes increase in number, to even six or seven per field, and some have the
two upper fields decorated with stripes and the two lower ones with single
colour fields. The colours of the stripes are white-red, white-orange, yellow
green, green-black, and blue-yellow.
What about Ceresole? What were the Swiss infantry banners like? The
engraving preserved at the Bibliotheque Nationale de France in Paris of
the Battle of Ceresole by the Swiss Heinrich Holzmiiller can answer these Flag of Wihelm Fr6lich,
questions. It was completed a few years after the battle and is a detailed Swiss commander.
woodcut of the opposing forces (Drawing by the author)
in the field that accurately depicts
weapons, clothes and flags.
Unfortunately, the author did not
finish colouring it, and 90 percent
of the troops, except the Spanish
cavalry, were left in black and
white. The Swiss square formation
is depicted with bearing 13 flags
displaying the cross. Barely half of
them have three or four bands per
field, while the others have a single
coloured field. Plate G shows the
reconstructions of the banners of
Ceresole, the result of this research.
The picture on the right shows
the war trophy attributed to Swiss
commander Wihelm Frolich,
also described in the Schweitzer
3 N. Spinosa, Gli arazzi della battaglia di Pavia, Bompiani editore, 1999, pp.63, 67
and 71.
55
Fahnenbuch and preserved at the Altes Zeughaus in Solothurn.4 The banner

is a square, 110cm per side, and made of silk damask and it displays a black
double-headed eagle with golden claws, beak and crown on a red field. The
Frolich coat of arms on a blue field with a white anchor was later placed
in the centre, but it belonged to the family that originated from the main
House of Solothurn and not to Wihelm who, born in the House of Frolich
of Zurich, and had the following coat of arms: 'chequy sable and argent,
chief vert a two roses argent: According to the explanation in the catalogue,
Frolich had captured this Imperial banner at Ceresole and placed the coat
of arms of the Frolichs of Solothurn in the centre in the absence of one of
his own.
Plate F shows the Swiss infantrymen in Ceresole who fought in the first
ranks of pikemen, with partially complete corselets. They are all officers and
some of them sport the identification mark of the white cross. The officer
in the centre, the only one with a burnished corselet, is Wihelm Frolich, in
a reconstruction taken from a full-figure portrait of him painted in 1549 by
the Swiss painter Hans Asper.
4 Schweizer Fahnenbuch, cit. p.149.
56
10
The Light Cavalry
In the sixteenth century, the role of heavy cavalry began to decline, due
to the increasing role played by pikemen-armed infantry coupled with the
effectiveness of the arquebus. The heavy cavalry provided the main force of
most European armies, but it had maintained a feudal structure more akin
to that found in the Middle Ages, and was mainly comprised of nobles. With
the rapid technical evolution in firearms, the expensive and heavy armour
of these cavalrymen became less and less effective and, in the same way, the
heavy cavalry charge against a well-ordered block of infantry armed with
long pikes became ineffective.
For these reasons, the military commanders of the time sought to
enhance the role and effectiveness of light cavalry. 'Lighter' cavalry had
already been introduced in fourteenth and fifteenth-century armies, albeit
sporadically, and was formed of crossbowmen on horseback operating
within the formations of French, Italian, and Burgundian heavy cavalry, to
provide support to the men-at-arms.
Towards the end of the fourteenth century, the Stratiote hired by the
Republic of Venice contributed to the increased the employment of
mercenary autonomous light cavalry. Recruited in the Venetian colonies,
the Stradioti came from Dalmatia, Albania and Greece and were armed
with a short spear, javelin, bow and shield. They did not wear armour,
wore clothes in Turkish fashion and were mounted on small agile horses.
They proved their worth against the Turks in Dalmatia and the Morea and,
around 1470 the Venetians began to recruit them for their wars in Italy.
They were brave and reckless fighters who attacked with rapid attacks on
the flanks and rear of the enemy formations. In the War of Ferrara, they
distinguished themselves in the Venetian victory at the Battle of Argenta
(1482).
They were also famous for their lack of discipline. After their initial
victory at the Battle of Fornovo, they immediately plundered the French
baggage train, which allowed for the reorganisation of the French troops.
They also cut off the heads of enemies killed in battle to collect a prize, a
57
habit that Venice disapproved of but never truly discouraged.) However,

thanks to their skill, the Stratioti were hired throughout the sixteenth
century also by other European states, including the Empire and France.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, during the wars fought for the
Kingdom of Naples, another type of light horseman appeared from Spain,
the famous /inete. These light cavalrymen used fighting techniques similar
to that of the Stratioti, inherited from the wars against the Moors in Spain.
Their equipment consisted of light armour such as the brigandine, and were
sometimes equipped with vambraces and genouilleres (armour to protect
Light horseman with
the banner of Cosimo I the knees), an open helmet and a spear, sword and round shield. They were
de' Medici. See further mounted small horses. The/inetes were grouped in autonomous units suited
discussion on page 59. for reconnaissance and were feared for their audacity, ferocity and fast raids.
(Drawing by the author) They rose to further fame
in Southern Italy, where they
distinguished themselves in the
army of Gonzalo Fernandez
de Cordoba against the French
commanded by the Duke of
Nemours. To better protect his
army from the numerous enemy
in Barletta, Cordoba deployed
these cavalrymen extensively
and effectively for skirmishes,
ambushes and sudden attacks
against the enemy. They then
fought in the victory at Cerignola
( 1503) and contributed to the
defeat of the French army at the
Battle of Garigliano, in December
of the same year. The /inetesalso
distinguished themselves at the
Battle of Ravenna where it was
among their ranks that Fernando
di\valos, Marquis of Pescara,
made his debut as captain, and
at the Battle of Pavia, where they
pursued the fleeing Swiss and
French.2
Over time, given the
usefulness and effectiveness of
light cavalry as a striking and
manoeuvring force, European
1 M. Mallet,L 'organizzazione militare di Venezia nel '400, Jouvence 1989, pp.98-99.

2 G. Gush, Renaissance Armies 1480-1650, Pat rick Stephens, Cambridge 1982,
pp.53-55.
58
THE LIGHT CAVALRY
armies tried to increase their numbers, sometimes to the detriment of the

heavy cavalry. These are some figures to illustrate the changes:
In 1495, at Fornovo, the Italian army consisted of 2,500 men-at-arms
and 1,800 light horsemen . In 1512, at Ravenna, the Spanish and Papal
armies had 1,900 heavy cavalrymen and 1,700 light cavalrymen, while the
French had 1,900 men-at-arms and 3,000 light horsemen. At Pavia, both
opposing armies had a greater proportion of light horsemen; the Imperials
having 800 heavy horsemen and 1,500 light horsemen, while the French
had 1,200 men-at-arms and 2,000 light horsemen.3
In addition to units of cavalrymen armed with spears, bows or
crossbows, there were also mounted formations armed with arquebuses.
Many scholars refer to these arquebusiers on horses as the forerunners of
dragoons. Famous in the first quarter of the sixteenth century were the
arquebusiers riding in the company of Giovanni Medici and later those
of Piero Strozzi, a Florentine captain who spent his life in the service of
France. In 1535, an ordinance of King Francis I established the weapons
of a mounted arquebusier as a small one-metre-Iong arquebus carried in a
leather holster attached to the saddle on the right, while on the left was a
mace and a sword.
At that time, light horsemen wore light armour called a corselet. This
covered the chest and back and had vambraces without gauntlets for the
arms and long tassets covering the thighs to the knee. The corslet did not
protect the lower part of the leg, and there were no greaves to lighten the
armour so soldiers wore knee-high boots instead. The horsemen wore light
helmets, such as sallets with ventail or burgonets. In appearance, the cavalry
corslet was similar to the one used by the infantry in the same period, which
usually differed in the tassets, insofar that the cavalry wore them strapped
around the thighs, and for the lance-rest, which was absent in the infantry.
In Vita del serenissimo Signor Cosimo de Medici, Giovanbattista Cini
writes that the Duke sent a contingent of light horsemen and mounted
arquebusiers to Piedmont to help the Marquis of Vasto. According to Cini,
these cavalrymen, who later fought in Ceresole, were part of Cosimo's guard,
and the Duke parted with them reluctantly.4 At that time, the Duke of Tuscany
only employed light horsemen, and in 1569, he introduced some heavy
cavalry companies. The illustration on the previous page depicts a standard
bearer of the Florentine light cavalry. He wears a corslet and burgonet, boots
and bears the Imperial signs, namely the red band and a handkerchief.
The red fork-tailed standard displays in the centre the Medici coat
of arms, which is 'or, five roundels gules surmounted by a roundel azure
charged with three fleurs-de-lys or'. The roundel with the lilies of France
was a concession made to the House of Medici by King Louis XI in 1465.
3 These figures, not entirely precise, are taken from: P. P ieri, 11 Rinascimento
e la crisi
militare italiana, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1952.
4 G. Cini, Vita del serenissimo Signor Cosimo de Medici, primo Gran Duca di Toscana,
Florence 1611, pp.130-131.
59
The coat of arms was surmounted by the golden ducal crown. This was
the most commonly used insignia in Cosimo's army, as described by many
biographers of the Duke and represented by the painters Giorgio Vasari
and Giovanni Stradano, who were employed by him for a long time. The
infantry also displayed the Medici coat of arms on their flags, which were
square like all infantry flags of the time.
Contemporary iconography shows that the insignia of Cosimo's various
cavalry companies and infantry bands could be identified with different
colours on the bottom part of the flag, always with the ducal coat of arms
in the centre. Sometimes, in paintings of battles, the coat of arms of the city
of Florence also appears; 'argent, fleur-de-lys gules' in the middle with the
ducal crown on top.
In the description of the funeral of Cosimo I in 1574, chronicler
Giuliano de Ricci reports that the panoply of the Grand Duke (Cosimo I
was crowned Grand Duke in 1569), carried by his pages, consisted of his
armour, helmet, pike, estoc, rich surcoat and lance with a vane displaying
the tortoise with sail impresa.5 Cosimo had several personal impresas, still
visible today in his palaces on statues and his pictorial representations. The
tortoise is the only impresa displayed on army flags. The banner depicting
ared field with the ducal coat of arms in the middle had the sail and the
two intertwined anchors impresa. Surprisingly, the Duke is often depicted
in armour in paintings and statues but he never actually fought in a battle
nor even saw one from afar. He was an excellent politician but he lacked his
father's military skills, the famous leader Giovanni de' Medici, erroneously
called 'of the Black Bands:6
The French light cavalry had the same type of armour and weapons as
the cavalry of Medici and the Imperials, and sported white bands worn
across the chest, an identifying mark of the French army.
Each company of the French cavalry, whether it consisted of cavalrymen
or mounted arquebusiers, carried an identifying mark a two-pronged
cornet (symbol of command) with a large white cross that divided the
field into four parts and was decorated with the commander's livery. The
cornet sported by the light horsemen of Paul de la Barthe, Lord ofThermes,
for example, had the bottom crossed by gold and red pales, or horizontal
bands, as in the figure shown in plate H, image 1, since the coat of arms of
Thermes was 'or, four pales gules:
5 G. de' Ricci, Cronaca (1532-1606), Milan 1972, pp.94-lOS.

6 See: M. Predonzani V. Alberici, The Italian wars, Francis I and the Battle of Pavia
1525, Helion & Company 2022, vol. Ill, pp. 109-1 14.
60
Plate A: Alfonso d'Avalos. Marquis of Vasto. with his guard
Illustration by Massimo Predonzani © Helion & Company.
See Colour Plate Captions for further information.
Plate B: Franc;ois de Bourbon, Count of Enghien, with his men
11
Plate C: Italian infantrymen
III
Plate 0: Spanish infantrymen
IV
Plate E: French infantrymen
v
Plate F: Swiss pikemen
VI
Plate G: Standards and flags
VII
3
Plate H: Other standards and flags

VIII
11
The Heavy Cavalry Light horseman armour,

Nuremberg (1550-1560).
Museo delle armi Luigi
Marzoli. Brescia. (Photo by
the author)
In the sixteenth century, the heavy cavalry

was still largely organised on a feudal basis
and was formed almost entirely by nobles.
Especially in France, these heavily armoured
cavalrymen constituted the main force of the
army. Protected by a full suit of armour, whose
quality denoted their social status, these
soldiers were armed with heavy lance, used in
the first impact and sword and mace for close
combat. The French cavalrymen despised the
growing importance of infantry and the use of
firearms. They were brave men-at-arms and
considered themselves the best heavy cavalry
in Europe.
In 1445, King Charles VII of France created
the Compagnies d'Ordonnance, permanent
national cavalry troops. They consisted of
companies of 100 lances of six men each.
One was the man-at-arms or gendarme called
maitre, two were archers on horseback, a
coustillier, that is a lightly armoured soldier on
horseback, a valet and a page. Each gendarme
had four horses, one for his valet, one for his
baggage, a war horse and a spare. The two
archers and the coustillier had two horses
each.l Charles VII created 15 Compagnies
d'Ordonnance, each of them led by a captain
and a lieutenant with their own insignia and a
guidone (pennon).
L. Susane, Histoire de la cavalerie fran�aise, tome I, Paris 1874, pp.12-14.
61
The composition of the lance changed over time. Under Louis XI there
were five. At the beginning of Louis XII's reign there were seven and this
rose to eight in 1513. With Francis I, the numbers fell to six again, while
with Henri 11 they changed from six to eight and sometimes 10 or more.2
Emulating France, other neighbouring countries created Compagnies
d'Ordonnance, such as Burgundy, where around 1470 Duke Charles the
Bold created bands of ordonnance of 100 lances each. The Burgundian
lance consisted of nine men: the man-at-arms called condotier, a squire,
a coustillier, three archers and three gens de traite or infantrymen - a
crossbowman, a hand gunner and a pikeman.3
The Italian lance had yet another different organisation. Since the
beginning of the fourteenth century, the lance had formed the basic unit
of the cavalry. They consisted of three cavalrymen, one man -at-arms, one
piatto or second cavalryman and one page. At that time all the armies of the
Italian lords were formed by mercenary companies of which almost two
or three of those men were mounted. After 1450, with the steady increase
in the numbers of infantrymen in the Italian armies, the number of lance
members also increased, sometimes reaching five or six thanks to the
addition of two or three crossbowmen or arquebusiers on horseback, or
light cavalrymen.4
The Spanish heavy cavalry, which in the Imperial armies of the sixteenth
century usually constituted the majority of men-at-arms, was also organised
in lances, although smaller than the French ones because they lacked a
coustillier and a page. Even the armament of these cavalrymen was lighter
than that of the French. They used a lighter lance and had less armour for
their horses.5
The German heavy cavalry was also organised in lances. At the
beginning of the sixteenth century, Emperor Maximilian created companies
of 50 men-at-arms each, with 50 archers on horseback and 50 on foot.
Every company was led by a captain. The armament of these cavalrymen
was refined. Since the first half of the century, they used Maximilian-style
armour manufactured in Germany, strong and decorated with fluting in
contrast to the more famous Milanese armour. Even the protection for the
horse was often iron and highly decorated.
Around 1520, Charles V established eight units for these companies.
Then around 1545, the units increased to 19 and in 1547 they were
reduced to 15.6 Between 1530 and 1540 the men-at-arms stopped using the
Maximilian-style armour, preferring instead the white or Italian armour.
2 L. Susane, cit. pp.31-3S.

3 Liliane et Fred Funcken, Le costume, l'armure et les armes au temps de la chevalerie,
tome IJ, le siecle de la Renaissance, Casterman 1978, pp.36-38.
4 M. Predonzani, V. Alberici, The Italian Wars, the Expedition of Charles VIII into
Italy and Battle of Fornovo, 1495, Helion & Company, 2019, pp.28-29.
S S. Conde de Clonard, Album de la cabalLeria espanola sus primitivos tiempos hasta
el dia, Madrid 1861, pp.11-1S.
6 Liliane et Fred Funcken, cit., pp.38-40.
62
THE HEAVY CAVALRY
In the same period, around 1520, soldiers started to use burnished armour,
which they could maintain better. Captain Giovanni Medici was one of
the first to burnish his armour. The nobles on the other hand, commonly
garnished their armour with steel, decorated with embossed or engraved
markings, often golden but also blackened. The steel could also have
lightblue or burnished shading with engraved and gilded strips.
Southern Germany and Northern Italy were the main manufacturing
centres of this armour, competing also against the workshops in Tyrol,
France and England, where many Italian and German craftsmen worked.
Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, the growing effectiveness of
firearms marked the decline in the use of heavy armour. At first, armourers
increased its weight which reduced mobility, and then began to eliminate
parts of it, such as those pieces that protected the leg below the knee. This
type of armour, also called corselet, was used by the cavalry until the middle
of the seventeenth century.
There was also armour for horses, called barding, made of boiled leather
or iron. Barding was formed by the peytral, that defended the horses breast
up to the shoulder and could be made from a single piece or several plates
joined together. The rear of the horse was covered by the croupiere which
generally consisted of a single piece. The last piece of the barding was the
chanfon that protected the animal's head and was equipped with holes
for eyes and ears. Often also provided with a protruding iron point at the
forehead, called spuntone or brocco (spike). However, this full barding was
for captains' or nobles' horses, since all the other cavalrymen used only
harnesses or leather straps that crossed on the rump. Sometimes they
protected the animal with a chanfon or peytral.
The cavalrymen often had their harnesses richly decorated with their
livery, impresa or identifying marks. Among the Imperial cavalry, it was
common to a paint a St. Andrew's Cross on leather or engrave it onto the
iron barding. The same cross was often sported by cavalrymen on their
armour or surcoat and consisted of two red bands that descended from the
shoulders and crossed on the chest joining behind the back. The use of a
single red band that crossed the chest was more common.
The French gendarmes instead, used a white cross or a white band and
as can be seen from contemporary iconography or documents, decorations
from the livery of their captain. Sometimes, bardings and saioni (tunics)
were entirely made of crimson velvet or other colours, embroidered with
gold.
Insignia of the Heavy Cavalry and its Cadre
In respect of the cavalry banners, all armies had in common the fork
tailed banner, usually of large size (350-400cm). The Imperial banners
of the time are accurately described by chronicler Marco Guazzo in the
account of Alfonso del Vasto's funeral in 1546, two years after the Battle of
63
Ceresole.7 Among the many flags used in the funeral ceremony, there was
a red zendado (silk) banner with the Avalos' coat of arms, namely that of
Alfonso's family. According to Marco del Guazzo, this banner belonged to
the men-at-arms of the kingdom led by the Marquis (see plate G, image 3).
Another banner, always of red zendado, displayed the Madonna with child,
which was used as identification by generals of the Imperial army (see plate
G, image 1).
These two important banners were certainly used at the Battle of
Ceresole. The account of the funeral of the Marquis of Vasto also describes
two if the Emperor's banners, one of white zendado with the Imperial eagle
and Charles V 's coat of arms, the other of yellow or gold zendado with the
Imperial coat of arms and the columns impresa. Both banners recur in the
iconography of the period and were perhaps also used in battle.
The following are the standards used by the French heavy cavalry,
Compagnies d'Ordonnance and the insignias of command.
Every company of men-at-arms was equipped with a standard and a
guidone (pennon). The standard was forktailed and about four metres long,
while the gUidone was a little shorter with a straight or curved fly-end. The
field was in the colours of the captain's livery, with rich decorations based
on religious subjects or symbolic depictions with mottos. Plate H, image 2
shows the reconstruction of the pennon of Fran<;ois Ricard de Genouillac
Seigneur dJ\.cier,8 commander of a Compagnie d'Ordonnance at Ceresole.
The field is azure scattered with five-spoke gold stars, taken from the
Genouillac coat of arms, and the allegorical figure represents luck with the
family motto j'ayme fortune around it.9
The main flags were the insignia of the royal house and a white cornet.
The first, called Pennon Royal, is the well-known French coat of arms of
'azure, three fleurs-de-lys or: This coat of arms was officially adopted by
King Charles V in February 1376 in place of the version with golden lilies on
a blue field that had first appeared on the French banner of Philip Augustus
at the Battle of Bouvines in 1214 and was used for over a century. In 1376,
Charles V declared that he wanted to use the three lilies as a symbol of the
Holy Trinity, while modern heraldry scholars have highlighted the technical
difficulty of reproducing these on the king's possessions with engravings or
embroidery and the elevated cost in depicting such a multitude of golden
lilies. The army always sported the Pennon Royal, even in the absence of the
king (see plate B, image 4).
The royal white cornet was the sign of the supreme commander, whether
or not the king was present. The banner was square and made of white silk
7 M. Guazzo, Historie, Venice 1549, pp.324-325.

8 This captain was the son of the best-known Jacques Ricard de Genouillac, lord of
Acier. See: P. Anselme, Histoire genealogique et chronologique de la maison royale
de France, tome V III, Paris 1733, p.167.
9 The motto and impresa were found on a bas-relief in the Genouillac chapel of the
castle of Acier.
64
THE HEAVY CAVALRY
with no decorations.lO Its use dates back to the reign of Charles VI when,
with a newfound devotion to theVirgin Mary -whose colour was white as
a symbol of purity -he had the white cornet replace the Oriflamme insignia
which was red and had been used until then as the flag par excellence. The
flag ofJeanne d'Arc was also white, as it was the national cross. These factors
contributed to make white become the national colour from that moment
on. The word cornet seems to date back to the reign of Charles VIII and
derives from the word cornua or corona, that is crown or head of an army,
therefore commander of the army. I I
Plate B, image 3 shows Fran<;ois de Bourbon, Count of Enghien and
commander of the French army at Ceresole. He wears a suit of fine armour
decorated with engravings and his horse is protected by a complete steel
barding that bears on the peytral and the croupiere the word Esperance, the
motto (mot) of the Bourbons. He sports his family colours on his plume and
lance - blue, red and white - and the Bourbon coat of arms, always carried
on his lance of 'azure, three fleurs-de-lys or, baton gules: Information on
any personal impresas (device) of the Count of Enghien is unavailable.
Immediately behind the Count of Enghien, a standard bearer bears the
Pennon Royal (see plate B, image 4), while to his left there is the white
cornet brought to Ceresole by Andre de Bourbon Seigneur de Rubempre,
who belonged to an illegitimate branch of the Dukes ofVendome (see plate
B, images 1 and 2).
10 It is possible that the cornet was decorated. The cornet brought at the Battle of San
Quentin (1557) had a white field and also displayed the commanders' devices . A.
Ziggioto, Gli antichi libri di bandiere della Biblioteca Reale e delli\rchivio di Stato di
Torino, in G. Bascade M. del Piazzo, Insegne e simboli: Araldica pubblica e privata
medievale e moderna, 1999 Rome, pp.465-466.
11 For more information on the Pennon Royal and the white cornet see: P. Charrie,
Drapeaux et etendars du roi, Paris 1989, pp.9-13; M. Rey, Histoire du drapeau, des
couleurs et des insignes de la monarchie franfaise, Paris 1837, vol. 11, pp.561-564; G.
Dejardin, Recherches sur les drapeaux franfais, Paris 1874, pp.14-20 and 44-51.
65
12
The Heraldry of Alfonso d'Avalos
Plate A, image 3 shows Alfonso d'Avalos, Marquis of Vasto, Governor of

Milan and Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial army.
In Historie del suo tempo, Giovio reports that at the Battle of Ceresole
the Marquis wore a black cloak as a disguise instead of his captain
general's surcoat. 1 Actually, the colour black was still part of the livery of
the Marquis. In Historie, Marco Guazzo describes the entry into Milan of
Emperor Charles V in 1541.2 On that occasion, the landsknechts of the
guard of Avalos, who, as Governor of Milan, had to welcome the sovereign
appropriately, were dressed in black giupponi (Italian doublets) and hose
displaying the Marquis' device (see plate A, image O. Also his cavalrymen
wore white and black silk (see plate A, image 2), while his trumpeters were
all dressed in black like the Governor, who wore a cape of the same colour.
However, it is essential to underline the point that white and black were
the colours of the Marquis and only the colour white (argent) was part
of the coat of arms of the Avalos family; 'azure, a tower or, with bordure
compony gules and argent:
The light cavalry of Avalos was dressed in the same fashion, with black
velvet tunics with black and white sleeves (see plate A, image 5). In this
image, behind the Marquis, there is one of his light horsemen with the
standard of the unit (see plate A, image 4). At the funeral of the Marquis
in 1546, this same standard is described as made of white ormesino (silk
fabric), displaying the world and its separated elements painted in the
centre, the Madonna with her son in her arms on one side and the archangel
Raphael and Tobiolo on the other.3
The Madonna with child symbolises purity, the meaning of which is
enhanced by the white field of the standard. The white colour and the
Virgin Mary are the same symbols, and for the French the white cornet had
P. Giovio, Il Rimanente della seconda parte delle Historie del suo tempo, Venice,
1557, p.355r.
2 M. Guazzo, Historie, Ferrara, 1549, p. 284v.
3 M. Guazzo, cit., pp.324r-325r.
66
THE HERALDRY OF ALFONSO D'AVALOS
the same meaning and the same importance in the army. The Madonna is
the mother who accompanies her children in battle, and the commander
becomes the soldiers' 'mother' by keeping the standard close to him. In
two depictions of the Battle of Pavia, one preserved in Stockholm and the
other in Leeds, it is possible to see the white banner with the Madonna with
child, and both banners are carried close to the Imperial commanders. This
divine image was also used by other armies, such as that of the Republic of
Siena when, on 26 July 1526, it victoriously raised against Pope Clement
VII and the Florentines, who had tried to conquer the city. In the Franco
Florentine siege of Pisa of June to July 1500, the chronicler Jean d'Auton
reports in Chroniques de Louis XII that the besieged displayed on the walls,
as a sign of protection, two white banners depicting respectively Jesus on
the cross and Our Lady. A Madonna with Child also appears on a French
French cavalry. Detail from The Battle of Ceresole by Heinrich Holzmuller. (Courtesy of
the Bibliotheque Nationale de France)
67
royal cavalry guidone (pennon) at the Battle of Saint Quentin, documented

in The Ancient Flag Books of the Royal Library of the Turin State Archives by
Aldo Ziggioto.4
Combining a symbol of love with war might seem contradictory, but for
a long time in history the Mother of all Mothers and Queen of the Universe
was also the Queen of all Victories.
Another symbol on the Marquis of Vasto's banner is the propitiatory
image of the archangel Raphael and Tobiolo. This divine symbol recurs in
sacred art since the fifteenth century and represents the ultimate guide and
defender.
In the Bible, God sends Raphael to help young Tobiah (or Tobiolus) on a
dangerous journey to collect credit for his blind father. During this journey,
Raphael protected the young man from many dangers, helped him to
celebrate a happy marriage and then cured his father of his blindness. These
two characters appear in the deuterocanonical books, namely those books
of the Bible recognised by the Latin Church and rejected by the Anglican
and Protestant Churches. That is why it is a Catholic symboL
The third element of the standard, the one at the centre, is the world
separated from its elements or the spheres of four separate elements,
the personal impresa of the GeneraL Alfonso d'Avalos was a brave and
ambitious captain. He saw all his captain colleagues as rivals and often felt
disappointed because his military exploits were attributed to others, such as
his cousin Ferrante di\valos Marquis of Pescara or Antonio de Leyva. When
these two captains died, Charles V gave the Marquis the position of general
commander. At that point, as Giovio reports in Dialogo delle imprese, the
Marquis, finally without rivals, commissioned the Milanese writer and
senator Gualtieri Corbetta, to produce an impresa to celebrate his military
prowess. The beautiful impresa displayed the four elements as separated
spheres -earth, water, fire, air - with a mot (motto) that said, Discretissua
virtus adest, that is, 'Virtue resides in the distinguished things: meaning
that each element alone shows its virtue, like the fire that in its sphere which
burns only when it joins the other elements. The same thing applied to
Alfonso who, finally general commander without other competitors, could
finally show his true worth.5
The Marquis of Vasto, like many powerful men of the time, had several
impresas. An insignia that he sported prior to the one with the four
elements was the two sheaves of ripe wheat, created by Giovio. The motto
read Finiuntpariter renovantque lavores,meaning that as soon as the wheat is
harvested one must sow for another harvest, renewing the farmer's efforts.
In the same way, the Marquis, just appointed captain-general, had given up
4 A. Ziggioto, Gli antichi libri di bandiere della Biblioteca Reale e delli\rchivio di

Stato di Torino, in G. Bascade M. del Piazzo, lnsegne e simboli: Araldica pubblica e
privata medievale e moderna, 1999 Rome, pp.465.
5 P. Giovio, Dialogo delle imprese militari e amorose, Bulzoni 1978, p.llS; G. Ferro,
Teatro d 'impresa, Venice 1623, p.376.
68
THE HERALDRY OF ALFONSO D'AVALOS
his role of infantry captain to start his duty as general. According to Giovio,
the Marquis sported this impresa on his surcoat and on his standard with the
motto running along the edges of both.6 These two impresas were created
almost simultaneously after the death of de Leyva and the consequent
coveted appointment of the Marquis as general in October 1536. They were
both beautiful, and the Marquis displayed them both on his flags but chose
the second impresa for the standard of the household.
The Marquis had another impresa with a love theme, created by Antonio
Epicuro, a writer of the Neapolitan Academy. It depicted the temple
of Tuno Lacinia supported by columns with an altar at the centre where
an eternal fire burned while the wind blew from the spaces between the
columns7• The Marquis commissioned this impresa to prove to a long-loved
lady that he had once abandoned that the fire of his love was eternal and
inextinguishable, like that of the temple ofJuno Lacinia. The identity of this
lady is unknown, neither Giovio nor other scholars mention her. Perhaps it
was his wife Maria of Aragon, daughter of the Duke of Montalto, Fernando
of Aragon, whom he had married in 1523 before then dedicating himself
to his military career. At first, their marriage was unhappy but with time it
turned into a strong union, and they had six children.
6 P. Giovio, cit. p. 114; G. Ferro, cit. p.333.

7 P. Giovio, cit. p. 116; I. Ruscelli, Le imprese illustri, Venice 1584, pp. 44-54; G. Ferro,
cit. p.687.
69
13
The War in Piedmont
At the end of 1543, the French army was challenged by the war in Piedmont.
In the summer of 1543, the King of France, Francis I, with the Turkish
corsair Barbarossa, resolved to take Nice, his former possession, currently
ruled by Charles, Duke of Savoy who was loyal to Emperor Charles V.
At the beginning of August, the king gathered a fleet of 22 galleys and
18 large ships at Marseille with 8,000 infantrymen on board, about half of
whom were Gascons. The French sailed along the coast until they reached
the port ofVillefranche-sur-Mer. Two days later, Barbarossa's fleet of about
150 galleys followed them.]
Soon after, the siege of the city began. A series of furious bombardments
and assaults by the fearsome Janissaries led the Turks and French to victory.
The garrison of the castle led by Paolo Simeoni was the last part of the
city standing in defence of the honour of the Duke of Savoy.2 Emboldened
by some letters from the Marquis del Vasto ensuring the arrival of
reinforcements, the garrison was able to resist for a long time.
The Imperial army led by the Marquis delVasto and the Duke of Savoy
arrived in the port of Villefranche-sur-Mer at the beginning of September,
thanks to the fleet of Prince Doria. The Turks and French, weakened by
numerous desertions and the losses from the siege, decided to lift the siege
of the city without fighting the Imperials, who reoccupied it in the following
days. DelVasto took possession of the city once again and praised castellan
Simeoni for his conduct during the siege. Then, he decided to move his
army to Mondovi in Piedmont.J
Mondovi was ruled by Charles Vagnone, Lord du Dros, who served
the Frenchman Charles du Dros. He was a brave captain who had rebelled
P. Giovio, 11 Rimanente della second a parte delle Historie del suo tempo, Venice,
1557, p.326.
3 According to Marco Guazzo, the Marquis was at the head of 12,000 men (3,000
Germans, 7,000 Italians and 2,000 Spaniards) and 18 pieces of artillery. See M.
Marco Guazzo, Historie, Venice 1549, p.313.
70
THE WAR IN PIEDMONT
against the Duke of Savoy and had chosen to serve France. According to
chronicler Montluc, who participated in the campaign in Piedmont, du
Dros had under his command four companies of Italians, two companies
of Swiss and 200 Gascons.4 On the 15 September 1543, the Imperials had
already occupied the villages surrounding Mondovi, so deployed 18 pieces
of artillery and began bombarding the city walls. The city garrison fought
so valiantly that the city did not fall despite the numerous skirmishes and
three assaults in which many of del Vasto's men died.
But the siege was not lifted and the confidence of the Franco-Swiss
began to falter. After almost a month the situation had become critical.
The Gascons had lost their captain, Brian<;on, a casualty of the continued
bombardment. The same happened to the Swiss, who lost all their captains
and lieutenants. Having lost their leaders, the Swiss began to mutiny and
demanded that the Lord du Dros negotiated with the enemy. Moreover, the
French army stationed in Piedmont, led by Guigues Guiffrey Soigneur de
Boutieres, had not yet marched to their relief.
At that point, where force failed, deception succeeded. Boutieres' letters
in response to Charles du Dros' requests for help were intercepted by
the Imperials, who counterfeited them using Boutieres' seal and rewrote
them in French. As it can be easily imagined, the answer to the request
for help that the Imperials sent back was negative. The motivation was the
lack of men to intervene. The counterfeited letters also advised du Dros
to surrender with honourable conditions should he no longer be able to
defend the city.5
The deception succeeded and on 3 November, the garrison left the city in
the hands of the Imperials with del Vasto's promise of sparing their lives and
possessions.6 Once the Imperials entered however, they faced an unexpected
inconvenience. In the surrender agreement, du Dros had also committed
to surrender a castle that was within the city, but the castellan refused to
let the victors in. Angry, del Vasto ordered a squadron of horsemen to
arrest du Dros because he had not kept his word. Once the squadron had
departed, several bands of Imperial infantry promptly joined them to loot
the French. Having reached the departing column of the former garrison,
they attacked the unsuspecting Swiss who were the rearguard. Before the
Marquis del Vasto came to forcefully stop his men, many Swiss had been
already slaughtered or wounded. The chroniclers of the time report that
the Spanish infantrymen were the greediest and most vicious planners of
this assault. The Swiss, stubbornly proud, did not forget the wrong suffered
and retaliated in a much bloodier way in the Battle of Ceresole. In the
general confusion caused by the sudden assault, the Marquis du Dros took
advantage of the turmoil and managed to escape on horseback.
4 B. de Monluc, Commentarires et lettres, Paris 1864, tome I, pp.166-167.

6 B. de Monluc, p.168.
71
THE WAR IN PIEDMONT
Having taken Mondovi, the Marquis del Vasto left a garrison there under
the orders of Giovan Matteo Longo and departed for Savigliano with the
Duke of Savoy. The city was ruled by the Lord de Termes together with some
brave captains, including Monluc. According to Monluc's Commentaires,
the Imperials did not attack Savigliano but detoured to the surrounding
country side. Then Monluc, with some other captains and leading 150
men, emerged from the city to attack the Imperial rearguard. During the
clash, Duke Charles 11 of Savoy was almost captured. He wanted to attend
mass in a chapel near Savigliano and went there with an escort of only 25
horsemen. He had left just before the arrival of the French who, alerted by
some peasants, chased after him.7
Near Marene, a small village east of Savigliano, Monluc and his men,
instead of the Duke, ran into some Imperial wagons led by Louis Costa,
Count of Trinity. The French defeated the escort and obtained a rich haul
of 400 workhorses and 80 carts of provisions.8 The count managed to
save himself by escaping with five other horsemen. Then, the Marquis del
Vasto went to Carignano to join Pierre d'Ossun and Francesco Bernardino
Vimercato, who were there with their light cavalry companies and some
infantry men.9
After crossing the Po by a ford near Lombriasco, the Imperial Captains
Vistarino and Federico da Dovara attacked the French led by d'Ossun. Too
much haste in wanting to beat Dovara cost d'Ossun his freedom. During
the fight, he was caught off guard by the arrival of del Vasto's men, causing
his men to flee him to fall into the hands of the enemy.
The Marquis entered Carignano and seeing that the place was
strategically important, decided to fortify it. He entrusted its defence to
the brave Captain Pirro Baglioni (known as Colonna) and three Spanish
companies commanded by Camp-Master San Miguel and three companies
of Germans led by Count Felice d'Arco. According to Monluc, these
infantrymen numbered 2,000 Spaniards and 2,000 landsknechts.
Captain Cesare from Naples guarded Carmagnola with several
companies of Italians and Germans, and in Racconigi there were four
Spanish companies. Lastly, d'Avalos sent his cavalry to Vigone, Piobesi
and Vigono, and then withdrew to Milan, while Duke Charles 11 of Savoy
withdrew to Vercelli.
Returning from Flanders, Francis I was informed of the loss of Mondovi
and Carignano, and decided to send reinforcements to Piedmont. IQ
7 B. de Monluc, cit. pp.173-174.

8 According to Monluc, the escort consisted of 50 Spanish infantrymen, 50 Germans
and a company of horsemen as well as baggage handlers, for a total of about 400
men. See B. de Monluc, p.178.
10 According to Marco Guazzo, there were 25,000 men - a number that seems quite
an overestimate. See M. Guazzo, cit. p.313.
73
In the meantime, Count Pietro

Porto, an ally of the Imperials
and Governor of Fossano, had
been ambushed. To reinforce the
Piedmontese town deprived of its
Governor, Caesar of Naples, Porto
decided to send three infantry
companies to foil any French
incursions. These companies were
led by the Neapolitan Captain
Biaggio from Somma, Captain
Giacomo Bernezzo from Piedmont
and Captain Giovanni Battista from
Milan and were escorted by two horse
companies; one under the command
of the Lieutenant of Sigismondo
d'Este, Count of San Martino and a
relative of the Duke of Ferrara, and
the other led by the Spaniard Rosales.
There were four other companies of
Spanish infantrymen under Juan de
Guevara stationed in Racconigi.
De Termes, who was in Savigliano
with six infantry companies and 100
men-at-arms, was warned by some
spies of the imminent passage of
these Imperial troops and decided
to attack them. He therefore formed
Horseman's armour. contingent of 400 infantrymen,
a
Augsburg about 1540. half arquebusiers, under the command of Captains Baron and Gavarret,
Museo delle armi Luigi
supported by 80 horsemen led by Captains Mons and Monluc, and an
Marzoli. Brescia. (Photo by
the author) additional 15 cavalrymen and 20 mounted arquebusiers of the Lord of
Santal. Near Marene, while on patrol, Monluc sighted the Italian infantry
and cavalry from afar on the road to Fossano and farther away, 400 to
500 Spanish infantrymen, marching slower because of the weight of their
armour.
The French waited for the Italians to disappear from sight and attacked
the Spanish infantry, defeating it. The two Imperial cavalry companies,
alerted by the clamour of battle, went back to help the infantry but met the
same fate. Only Rosales, four horsemen and a wounded Guevara managed
to escape. The Imperial losses amounted to at least 100 dead. The Lieutenant
of Sigismondo d'Este was captured together with many Spanish captains,
officers, infantrymen and horsemen, who were all taken to Savigliano.
Shortly after these events, the Commander, the Seigneur of Boutieres,
given the defeat of the Imperial troops, summoned the garrisons to
Pinerolo and moved towards Vigono with his men. Warned of the arrival of
the French, the Imperial cavalry of Vigono, Piobesi and Vinovo withdrew
74
THE WAR IN PIEDMONT
to Carmagnola, chased by Boutieres. Cesare from Naples considered

Carmagnola's defences insufficient and abandoned it to go to Chieri with
all of his men.
The French commander then destroyed the bridge over the Po at
Carignano to block any help to the city coming from Chieri or Asti. Then,
he fortified Vigono, Piobesi and Vinovo with 12 infantry companies of
Italians and French and the body of cavalry led by d'Ossun, who had had his
reputation redeemed, to stop any help coming from that direction. Finally,
he headed north towards the Dora Balteariver, already forded by Ludovico
Birago, and with the rest of the army conqueredSantia and San Germano in
the name of France.
Boutieres decided to besiege Ivrea with Captains de Termes, Saint
Jullien, Birago and Maure. After long and furious bombardments and
several assaults, they were on the verge of prevailing over the garrison of
the city. At that point Boutieres learnt that the king had replaced him with
Fran<;:ois de Bourbon, Count of Enghien, who arrived in Turin at the end of
December 1543.11 According to Monluc, Bourbon brought with him seven
companies of Swiss commanded by the Baron of Hohenfax and seven or
eight companies of Proven<;:als and Italians led by Monsieur de Cros. When
Bourbon wrote to Boutieres to send him an escort, the old captain, angry
that he had been replaced by a young noble just as Ivrea was about to fall,
lifted the siege and went to meet Enghien to give him the command of the
army.
As soon as the new commander arrived, he wasted no time and advised
by his captains, he conquered Crescentino, Palazzolo, Desana and other
small places along the banks of the Po during the harsh winter in January
1544, leaving garrisons there to guard them.12 He then left for Carignano and
made Moncalieri his headquarters from where he ordered the continuation
of the siege of Carignano, which was strongly defended by Colonna.
After a few days, he heard that the enemy wanted to send food from
Chieri to the besieged. Thus, he left part of his troops in Vinovo, Piobesi
and the nearby places and passed the Po south of Moncalieri on a bridge
of boats he had ordered to be built in Sabbioni. There, he left four infantry
companies of Italians and went to Villastellone. It was the beginning of
February 1544.
Meanwhile, Colonna's men often made sorties out of the walls that
ended in skirmishes, some victories, and some defeats.
In March, Bourbon learned that the Marquis del Vasto was preparing an
army to support Carignano. From there, del Vasto would go to Carmagnola
and Lombriasco to build a bridge over the Po. If the Imperial plan had
worked, they would have controlled a vast area, since Asti, Chieri, Mondovi,
Fossano, Cuneo and Brusca were already in their hands. With the conquest

75
of Carmagnola, they would undoubtedly have prevented the French from

receiving provisions from the Marquisate of Saluzzo.
Bourbon evaluated the situation with his captains and decided to
anticipate the enemy moves. He went to Carmagnola and built a bridge
over the Po to get the supplies from Saluzzo. The French succeeded, thus
worsening the already difficult situation of the Imperial troops inside
Carignano.13
Weary and tired, Colonna sent word to the Marquis del Vasto that
surrendering would be inevitable if no help arrived by the middle of ApriL
76
14
The Approach Manoeuvres of the

Two Armies and the First Clash on
Easter Sunday
The Marquis of Vasto was aware of the perilous situation of the besieged
garrison in Carignano, so gathered an army to march to their rescue. He left
Vercelli, where he had visited the Duke of Savoy, and upon reaching Asti
with this army, he gathered draft animals and carts full of provisions for the
relief of the besieged garrison.
He was sent two regiments of Germans by the Emperor. The first one
was led by the Barons of Brennor and Hans Christoph von der Leiter.
Known as the Scaliger brothers, they were descendants of the noble Italian
House of Scala, Lords of Verona from the mid thirteenth century until
1387, when they were driven out of the city by the Visconti.1 In the fifteenth
century, after some roaming from place to place, the Scala family settled in
Bavaria, where it played an important role in the court. The landsknecht
infantrymen also came from Bavaria, from the area of Augusta, and Austria.
The second regiment was led by the young and brave Aliprando Madruzzo,
brother of the famous Cristoforo, Bishop ofTrento. His infantry came from
the Principality of Trento and from Tyrol. According to Giovio, all these
landsknechts were given corselets and sallets (burgonets) in Milan.2
His army also included a formation of Spanish infantrymen and German
landsknechts, all veterans of the emperor's campaign inTunis, commanded
by Raimondo di Cardona and the Baron of Seisneck. The Prince of Salerno,
assisted by Cesare Maggi of Naples, contributed 6,000 Italian infantrymen,
most of whom were arquebusiers.
P. Giovio, 11 Rimanente della seconda parte delle Historie del suo tempo, Venice,
1557, p.347.
77
Del Vasto was satisfied with his infantry, particularly with the quality of
his arquebusiers, but not with his cavalry. Numbering only 600 horsemen,
his cavalry was not only inferior in numbers, but also in armament, as the
French army included many fully armoured men-at-arms. Moreover, the
French army had been reinforced by a contingent of young gentlemen and
noble volunteers from the French court, many of whom would fight on
horseback.
Conscious of the inferiority of his cavalry, the Marquis of Vasto asked
Duke Cosimo I de Medici to send him horsemen from Tuscany. Cosimo,
although worried about possible coastal raids by the Turks, had to agree
due to his obligations towards the Emperor, who had helped him to take
power in Florence. Therefore, he despatched the Perugian condottiero
Rodolfo Baglioni with a band of veteran light lancers.
Once these additional reinforcements had arrived, del Vasto's force
departed from Asti and headed towards Sommariva. To deceive the enemy,
he sent the Prince of Salerno with the Italians to Montechiaro, only to
recall him shortly afterwards. The Marquis had planned to set up camp
in Monta on the first night of the march, then reach Sommariva on the
next and Casalgrasso on the following day. He would then cross the River
Po and head towards Carignano. He hoped that after crossing the Po, the
French would decide to ford it as well, to prevent him from reaching the
besieged city. If not, the French would have found themselves in a poor
tactical position, caught between the Imperial army and the besieged city.
The Count d'Enghien was warned of this plan by Captain Blanfosse, a
Frenchman who had escaped from the Imperial camp. After consulting his
captains, d'Enghien decided to confront the enemy and foil their plan. He
ordered Captain de Thermes, commander of the light cavalry, to send 20
horsemen each to Villastellone, Sommariva and Racconigi, as pickets to
keep a watch for the approaching enemy.
However, before the French could act, the Imperial plans went up
in smoke. During their march it rained so heavily that dry fields were
flooded and roads turned into torrents filled with water and mud. The rain
bogged down the carts, horses and the soldiers, and del Vasto's army was
able to advance only with great difficulty.3 Giovio writes that it poured to
such an extent that it took four days for the army to reach Monta. French
chroniclers on the other hand do not mention this difficulty encountered by
the Imperials; Monluc reports that del Vasto left Asti on Good Friday to go
to Monta, from whence he left for Ceresole on Easter Day.4
On Easter Sunday, when the bad weather ended, del Vasto left Monta
and advanced down from Ceresole into the valley below, in the direction
of Sommariva. On the way, his vanguard brought him two captured French
stragglers, who reported that the Count d'Enghien was preparing for battle
in Carmagnola. He ordered that Ceresole be held by Gutierre Quijada,

4 B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome I, Paris, 1864, p.257.
78
THE APPROACH MANOEUVRES OF THE TWO ARMIES
captain of his guard, with 200 arquebusiers. Then, he marched from Ceresole
with the remainder of the army, intending to arrive in Sommariva before
nightfall and camp there.5 However, the Imperial army became spread out
on the road, as the artillery proved particularly difficult to move along the
roads made so muddy by the recent rains. Moreover, the Spanish infantry
who were with them and the Italians of the vanguard, led by Salerno, were
tired. As the front of the column reached Sommariva, they were spotted by
the French garrison who fired on them from the castle.
Meanwhile, a company of French horsemen led by Captain Taurines,
and including Blaise de Monluc in their number, caught sight of the
Imperial vanguard. D'Enghien left with 400 or 500 horsemen, 400 (Monluc)
or 1,000-1,200 arquebusiers6 (du Bellay) and three medium guns with
additional limber horses so that they could keep up with the cavalry. These
moved to the top of a sparsely-wooded hill just outside Ceresole, most
likely the one at the road junction now named Tre Vie. From here, they
could look down into the valley below and see the Imperial army marching
in column down the road towards Sommariva.
The French deployed skirmishers and their artillery and opened fire
upon the Imperials, who must have been shocked by the sudden appearance
of an enemy army above them and behind their flank. Du Bellay writes that
the crest of hill concealed the relatively small French numbers from del
Vasto in the valley below.7 A skirmish ensued between the opposing light
cavalrymen, supported by their respective arquebusiers, which lasted for
three hours (Monluc). The chronicler Du Bellay praises the performance of
the Lord of Ossun and his horsemen in this fight. Giovio, instead, praises
the Neapolitan cavalrymen, while Santa Cruz cites Philippe de Lannoy,
Prince of Sulmona, in Cronica del Emperador Carlo V.8 However, as the
day went on, the French forces became tired and hungry, and d'Enghien
decided to retire to his camp for the night. Having confounded the enemy
advance towards Sommariva at the cost of only a few casualties, he must
have felt a certain degree of satisfaction. Del Vasto, unable to achieve his
objective, uncertain of the French numbers and with his army exhausted by
marching and counter marching along the muddy roads, returned to make
camp near Ceresole. The battle was therefore postponed to the following
day, 14 April 1544.

6 B. de Monluc, cit. p 260; M. du Bellay, Memoires, P aris, 1569, p.321v
7 M. du Bellay, cit. p.322r.
8 M. du Bellay, cit.p.321v; P. Giovio, cit. p.350; A. de Santa Cruz, Crimica del
Emperador Carlos V, Madrid, 1928, p.347.
79
15
Analysis of the Opposing Armies
On Easter Monday 1544, the Count d'Enghien had his troops woken at 3:00
a.m. They then formed up and marched along the Old Carignano Road,
onto the plain to the west of Ceresole. By 6:00 a.m. the French army was in
battle order, ready to face the enemy. D'Enghien had intended to occupy
the same ground from which he had fought on the previous day, but as he
approached Ceresole he discovered the Imperials already deployed on the
high ground just outside the town, so that the Imperial left was anchored
on the very same lightly wooded hill near the Tre Vie road junction that
the French had held on the previous day. Here, del Vasto had deployed the
leftmost of his three divisions. According to the most reliable accounts,
there were around 6,000 to 7,000 Italian infantry led by Ferrante di
Sanseverino, Prince of Salerno, assisted by Cesare Maggi from Naples. They
were supported by 300 Tuscan light horsemen led by Rodolfo Baglioni.
In the centre, del Vasto had deployed his landsknechts in two deep
formations, one commanded by Madruzzo and the other by the Barons
der Leiter. These two formations consisted of 7,000 pikemen in total. To
their right were 200 horsemen led by Carlo Gonzaga di Gazzuolo and the
Marquis of Vasto himself with his guard.
On the right flank, del Vasto had deployed the 5,000 veteran Spanish and
German infantry commanded by Cardona and by the Baron of Seisneck.
On the extreme right of the line were 300 or 400 horsemen led by Philippe
de Lannoy, Prince of Sulmona, the son of Charles de Lannoy, the former
Viceroy of Naples.
In front of the Imperial lines were two batteries of artillery, each based
in a farm complex and sited such that each could enfilade an attack upon
the other. There was also a body of four companies of Spanish arquebusiers,
perhaps 1,000 men strong, that had been detached for use as skirmishers. I
The French army was also divided into three divisions. On the right
facing the Italians, was the vanguard led by the Lord of Boutieres, consisting
B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome I, Paris, 1864, p.266.
80
of his own Ordonnance company of 80 men-at-arms and that of Lord

Honorat of Savoy, Count of Tende. According to Memoires de Vieilleville,
these two companies were 150 men strong. To their right were the French
infantrymen of Colonel Jean de Taix - 4,000 Gascons of the Vieilles Bandes
- and eight pieces of artillery.
On the extreme right, drawn up between the infantry and the wooded
edge of the escarpment, were the light cavalry companies of Paul de La
Barthe, Seigneur de Thermes, Francesco Bernardino, and the Lord of
Maure de Nouate, with 200 horsemen each - Bernardino's cavalrymen were
arquebusiers, while the others were probably light lancers.
The main body of the French army, opposite the Imperial landsknechts,
was led by d'Enghien in person, and included the Ordonnance companies of
Francyois Ricard de Genouillac, Seigneur dl\cier, Charles de Cursol d'Uzes
de Monreuil, and Pierre d'Ossun. These had been reinforced by roughly
100 volunteers from the French Court.2 These amounted to 200 men-at
arms, supplemented by 200 light horsemen led by Lord Lodovico Birago
and Antoine de Boullier, Lord of Cental. To their right were 3,000-4,000
Swiss commanded by Captain James of Saint-Julien, Baron of Hohenfax
and Wilhelm Frolich, and eight more artillery pieces.
On the French left, facing the Imperial Spanish, stood the French
rearguard led by Claude de Clermont, Baron of Dampierre and Charles
de Dros. This consisted of 400 horsemen and 6,000-7,000 Gruyere Swiss
and Italians (mostly Milanese, Piedmontese and Savoyard exiles) and
four cannon.3 This rearguard was deployed across the line of the Old
Carmagnola Road, and the battery of cannon was deployed near a farm
which is depicted in the engraving of the battle by Heinrich Holzmiiller (see
2 The following are the names of the gentlemen listed in the French chronicles:
Claude de Clermont Baron of Dampierre, who commanded the French left wing
in Ceresole; Jacques d'Albon Lord of Saint-Andre, favourite of the Dauphin
and Marshal of France in 1547; Franc;:ois Ricard de Genouillac Lord of Acier,
son of Jacques Galliot Grand Squire of France, who died at Ceresole where he
commanded 50 men-at-arms; Guy Chabot Lord of Jamac in Poitu; Gaspard de
Coligny of Chastillon, who became Admiral in 1552, and his brother Andelot,
who became an infantry Colonel; Jamac of the House of Chabot; Franc;:ois de
Vend6me Prince of Chabannois; the two brothers Franc;:ois de Gouffier, sons of the
Admiral of France Bonnivet; Franc;:ois de Hangest Lord of Genlis and his brother
Jean de Hangest, sons of Antoine of Genlis Grand Cup-bearer of France; Gaspard
de Saulx-Tavannes, who became Marshal of France in 1570; Jean d1\nnebaut, son
of Marshal Claude d1\nnebaut; the Lord of Bourdillon, the Lord of Escart; the
Lord of Lusarches; the Lord of Warty (or Wartis), and many others.G. de Saulx
Tavannes, Memoires, in Choix Chroniques et Memoires par J.A.C. Buchon, Paris,
1836, p.l 07; B. de Monluc, cit, pp.255-256; F. de Scepeaux de Vieilleville, Memoires,
in Collection complete des Memoires for M. Petitot, volume XXVI, Paris 1822,
p.126; M. du Bellay, Memoires, Paris, 1569, pp.321r-321v.
3 For the French army see: F. de Scepeaux de Vieilleville, cit. pp.129-130; M. du
Bellay, cit.p.321r; M. Guazzo, Historie, Ferrara, 1549, p.314r; G. de Saulx-Tavannes,
cit.p.107; P. Giovio, Il Rimanente della seconda parte delle Historie del suo tempo,
1557, p.351r.
82
ANALYSIS OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES
illustration on page 38). Behind the rearguard was a wood and some of the
army's baggage train.
Stretching across the front of the French army from the extreme right to
the centre was a body of 700-800 skirmishing arquebusiers, commanded by
Captain Blaise de Monluc, detached from the French infantry for this task.
The French army was nominally commanded by the Count d'Enghien.
Perhaps in view of his youth (he was 25), or because he was personally
leading the French men-at-arms, Captain Martin du Bellay, Sieur de Langey
and Governor of Turin, was charged with co-ordinating the activities of the
three divisions of the army.4 Overall, the French army was superior in terms
of the weight and numbers of its cavalry but was numerically inferior in
infantry.
Both sides seem to have believed the Imperial infantry to have a
qualitative advantage over their opponents. Del Vasto had greater numbers
of arquebusiers, and troops similarly armed had proven decisive against
French men-at-arms at Pavia in 1525, the last major combat in Northern
Italy between the French and the Imperials. Whilst many of the landsknechts
were new recruits, the perception of German infantrymen was such that
they were understood to be fit for a stand-up fight with the Swiss pikemen.
Events would prove this confidence to be somewhat misplaced and the
performance of de Taix's French infantry formation, in particular, would
exceed expectations.
The numbers reported above are the result of cross-referencing between
the various surviving sources, supported by the studies and insights of
several modern scholars, such as Charles Oman's The Art of War in the
Sixteenth Century.5 Determining the number of soldiers employed in
historical battles is always difficult due to the chroniclers' conflicting reports.
After the battle, most French chroniclers exaggerated the number of actual
enemies in order to glorify a victory that redeemed the reputation of French
chivalry after Pavia, but otherwise failed to achieve any larger strategic aim.
Du Bellay, de SauIx and Vieilleville all report that the landsknecht and Italian
infantry each numbered some 10,000 men, and the Spanish 6,000, twice the
number of the French infantry. These same chroniclers exaggerate, albeit to
a lesser extent, the number of Imperial cavalrymen.6 Conversely, Spanish
chroniclers such as Sandoval and Santa Cruz exaggerate the number of the
French cavalry, reporting a total of 3,000 horsemen. Furthermore, Santa
Cruz reports the enemy infantry to comprise 4,000 Italians, 7,000 Swiss and
12,000 French, an enemy army that would have outnumbered the Imperials
by 9,000 infantrymen, in order to excuse the costly defeat. Monluc, on the
other hand, records numbers similar to those recorded by Giovio, Guazzo
4 M. du Sellay, cit.p.323v
5 C. Oman, A History of the art of war in the sixteenth century, London 1937, pp.229-
243.
6 M. du Sellay, cit.p.323; G. de Saulx-Tavannes, cit. p.107; F. de Scepeaux de
Vieilleville, cit. p.129.
83
and Santa Cruz (who only recorded detailed figures for the Imperials) and
the anonymous writer of the Battle of Ceresole published in the Archives
Curieuses by Cimber and Danjou.7 Italian chroniclers, such as Giovio,
Guazzo, Bernardo Tasso and Luca Contile, also report more realistic figures,
though not hiding their sympathies for the Emperor.8
It is possible, however, that Santa Cruz's estimate of 3,000 French cavalry
on the battlefield is only a slight exaggeration and it may be closer to reality
than the modest 1,325 estimated by Charles Oman. It is feasible that when
Blaise de Monluc states, for example, that 80 men-at-arms are present in
a formation, he means 80 gendarmes plus 80 to 160 supporting archer
cavalry in the second and third ranks, for a total of 160 to 240 men. Oman,
perhaps noting that some archer cavalry was detached to the flanks of the
French army, used the lower numbers as the total strength of the formation.
Thus, if some archers indeed remained with the gendarmes, he may have
underestimated the total number of the French horsemen. If these archers
are included, there may have been as many as 2,000 or more French cavalry
present at the battle. This is supported by the rOrdonnance account9 which
was supposedly written in the French camp on the night after the battle and
which states that there were 2,500 French horsemen present.
7 B. de Monluc, cit.pp.265-267; Cimber et Danjou, La journee de Cerizolles, in

Archives Curieuses de l'histoire de France, Volume Ill, 1843, pp.67-70.
8 B. Tasso, Delle lettere di Bernardo Tasso, Padua, 1733, p.303; L. Contile, De Jatti by
Cesare da Napoli, Milan, 1565, pp.142-147.
9 rOrdonnance de la bataille faicte a Syrizoles en Piedmont, avec la deffaicte des
Espaignols in gallica.bnf.fr I Bibliotheque Nationale de France, p.8.
84
16
Opening Shots
As the sun rose on the morning of 14 April, the French sent forth enfants
perdus ('lost children' or skirmishers) to secure favourable terrain and
Imperial cavalry. Detail
screen the enemy army. These 800 Frenchmen and Italians were led by
of The Battle of Ceresole
Captain Blaise de Monluc, who d'Enghien had placed in overall command
by Heinrich Holzmuller.
of the French army's arquebusiers. In his Commentaires, Monluc writes (Courtesy of the
that he was assisted by four Lieutenants: Captain Bruil, Captain Guasquet, Bibliotheque Nationale de
France)
85
OPENING SHOTS
Captain Lyenard and Captain Favas. Favas and Lyenard were assigned to
command the right flank of the enfants perdus, whilst Monluc and the other
two captains took the left flank. I In front of the Gascons commanded by
de Taix was a low ridge on top of which stood the Cascina Alfieri farm
complex, referred to in some of the texts as the maisonette or the stables.
This was a key position as the slight rise offered the infantry of the French
right and centre protection from the Imperial artillery. Moreover, the farm
included a tall dovecot tower which must have offered invaluable views
across the battlefield.
Monluc led his French arquebusiers forward to secure this key position.
Once in possession, they observed that three or four companies of Spanish
arquebusiers (perhaps 500 men) were approaching. Thus began the skirmish
between the two formations. At some point two or three French cannon
were pushed forward to the farmhouse and the enemy artillery returned
fire. MuBatt, the Ceresole battle museum, reports that cannon balls were
recently recovered from the walls of the farm's dovecote.2
In addition to the frontal attack, Italian arquebusiers detached from
Salerno's command advanced along the valley of the Ricchiardo, attempting
to outflank the French position. The French arquebusiers on the right flank,
led by Captains Favas and Lyenard, began a prolonged skirmish with them.
Monluc reports that they 'sometimes beat back the enemy as far as their
main battle, and sometimes the enemy repelled them back to ours: 3
During this opening phase of the battle, the Imperials (according to
Spanish chronicler Santa Cruz) had 150 Italian arquebusiers led by a certain
Captain Pradian, 200 arquebusiers of del Vasto's guard led by Gutierre
Quijada and 30 arquebusiers mounted on horseback. According to Santa
Cruz, the Imperials eventually forced the French skirmishers to retreat for
a mile and captured three pieces of artillery. Giovio also reports this but
writes that it was the Italian infantry men who captured the cannon and
that there were two pieces rather than three.4 In the biography De Fatti of
Cesare da Napoli, historian Luca Contile describes this skirmish in great
detail but from a different perspective. He writes that Cesare Maggi's Italian
arquebusiers approached the farmhouse, which he describes as located in
the valley that led to the town of Sommariva. This farmhouse had been
captured shortly before by the French arquebusiers. The Italians attacked it
fiercely, driving out the French and seizing the nearby cannons. According
to Contile, Cesare Maggi was accompanied by Captains Giovan Giorgio
M. du Bellay, Memoires, Paris, 1569, pp.323r-323v; B. de Monluc, Commentaires et

lettres, tome I, Paris, 1864, pp.266-267.
2 Municipality of Ceresole di\lba, MuBatt - see '10. The Territorial Context' <https:11
www.comune.ceresoledalba.cn.it/en-us/vivere-il-comune/rubriche/mubatt -1881-
1-8a9132785f2eI94f69b40c56834c6c78>
3 B. de Monluc, The Valois-Habsburg Wars and the French Wars of Religion, Great
Britainl971, pp.106
4 A. de Santa Cruz, Crimica del Emperador Carlos V, Madrid, 1928, p.376; P. Giovio,
Il Rimanente della seconda parte delle Historie del suo tempo, Venice, 1557, p.352r.
87
Lampognano, Andreotto da Soliero, Morgante da Viadana and Giovan

Francesco Macedonio.s
After being forced to retire from the farmhouse, Monluc writes that he
became aware that the Italians were also winning the skirmish in the valley
and outflanking de Thermes' light horse on the French right. He stripped
most of the remaining arquebusiers from de Taix's Gascons and led them off
to the extreme right to restore the situation. After reinforcing the skirmish
and returning from the wing, Monluc writes that d' Enghien ordered him to
retake the farm complex.6 This had become a pressing requirement because
the Gascon infantry had begun to suffer heavy losses from the fire of six
Imperial guns that had been moved up next to the farm. D'Enghien sent
60 horsemen under the command of the Lord of Cabry and another 25
led by Lord de Monenx to Monluc as reinforcements. With their assistance
and with the support of the French artillery under Monsieur de Mailly,
Monluc reports that he managed to drive off the Imperial horsemen and
arquebusiers and recapture the farm complex.7 However, once back inside
Cascina Alfieri, perhaps from the excellent vantage point afforded by the
dovecote, he was able to observe that the mass of Imperial landsknechts had
begun their advance and were now close to his position. He and his hard
working skirmishers abandoned the farmhouse for the second time and fell
back to warn the commanders of the French right of the coming storm. The
battle proper had begun.
This skirmish phase had lasted between three to four hours, during
which the tide of the battle had turned several times. During the fighting,
which had started in the southern sector of the battlefield, more and
more arquebusiers from both sides had been stripped from their parent
formations and drawn into the fray until, according to du Bellay, as many
as four to five thousand arquebusiers were manoeuvring between the two
armies.8
So why had the skirmish phase been so prolonged and what caused
it to come to an end? Neither side had wanted to advance, because each
was in a relatively advantageous position. The French, so long as they
remained on a reverse slope, were shielded from the worst effects of the
Imperial artillery. The Imperials were in a strong defensive position on the
hill outside Ceresole, which they were reluctant to abandon. Unfortunately
though, the Spanish/German formation on their right was exposed to the
fire of the French artillery. In a speech attributed to del Vasto in the Tratado,
he instructed the formation to attack the enemy artillery that had been
bothering them.9 He then ordered a general advance of all the Imperial
forces, with the exception of Salerno's Italians on the left.
5 L. Contile,De Jatti by Cesare da Napoli, Milan, 1565, pp.144-145.

6 B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome I, Paris, 1864, pp.267-268.
7 B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, cit,p.268.
8 M. du Bellay, cit.pp.323r-323v.
9 M. G. Cerezeda, Tratado de las campaflas y otros acontecimientos de los ejercitos del
88
OPENING SHOTS
Monluc offers a slightly different theory regarding the reason for the
Imperial attack. He writes that the six Imperial cannon that had advanced
across the ponds, were well ahead of the rest of their army. Once the
Imperial skirmishers were driven back from the farmhouse, there was a
danger of these cannon being captured and the landsknechts were ordered
forward to secure them. \0
emperador Carlos V,tome 3,p.184.

10 B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, cit.p.269.
89
17
The Clash Between the Light

Cavalry
The Italians on the extreme left of the Imperial line did not join in with the
advance of the rest of their army. According to Giovio and other Italian
chroniclers, del Vasto had ordered the Prince of Salerno not to advance
unless in receipt of his express order to do so. This was perhaps because
the Italians were poorly suited to melee - since they included relatively few
pikemen - or because their pikemen were regarded as less effective than
those of other nationalities, or because they were guarding the Imperial
baggage in Ceresole. Before the battle, Cesare Maggi had proposed
exchanging 1,000 Italian arquebusiers for landsknecht pikemen, in order to
make both formations more balanced, but this proposal had been rejected. I
Rodolfo Baglioni's Florentine light cavalrymen were situated towards
the left of the Imperial line, either between Salerno's Italians and the
landsknechts or, most likely, on the extreme left. The intended function
of the cavalrymen was probably to protect the left flank of the Italians
or, should they need to advance, that of the landsknechts, from attack by
enemy cavalry.
Accordingly, once the landsknechts began to move forwards, Baglioni's
light cavalry took station on their left, probably crossing the front of the
Italians to do so. Du Bellay writes that de Thermes, who was commanding
the light cavalry on the extreme right of the French line, observed this and,
fearing that they would charge de Taix's Gascons in the flank, decided to
charge them first.
The two opposing formations collided with such impetus that many
on both sides fell to the ground. Once the horsemen had broken their
spears, they fought on with swords and maces. At a certain point however,
Baglioni's outnumbered cavalry could no longer withstand the French
assault and broke. In the fighting and ensuing pursuit, Giovio reports that
L. Contile, De Jatti d; Cesare Magg; da Napoli, Milano 1565, p.143r.
90
THE CLASH BETWEEN THE LIGHT CAVALRY
many Florentine horsemen died, including Giulio Attio, son of the Lord of
Todi. Rodolfo Baglioni himself was wounded and his horse was killed. The
Perugian commander narrowly managed to escape death by taking refuge
amongst Salerno's Italian infantry.
De Thermes' victorious cavalry appear to have pursued the Florentines
right into the Italian infantry, who were some distance behind them. The
French cavalry suffered heavy losses during their charge however, because
they were fired upon from the flank by Captain Don Juan de Guevara,
whose 300 Spanish arquebusiers were lining the edge of the strip of trees
that bordered the plain.2 Bernardo Tasso (father of the famous Torquato
Tasso) writes that Sanseverino's Italian infantrymen, who were mostly
arquebusiers and who had fought in the initial skirmish, were still scattered
across the hills when de Thermes attacked and so only around 800 soldiers
were available to valiantly resist the charge of the enemy cavalry,3 and
somehow they managed to repel them. De Thermes himself was unhorsed,
badly injured and captured by a young Neapolitan infantryman named
Napoliello.
According to du Bellay,4 the charge of the French cavalry was decisive
since it prevented Salerno's Italian infantry from advancing to support the
Imperial attack and it meant that the Gascons could face the landsknechts
without fear of their intervention.
2 M. G. Cerezeda, Tratado de las campanas y otros acontecimientos de los ejercitos del

emperador Carlos V, tome 3,p.184.
3 P. Giovio, cit. p.352v; M. du Bellay, Memoires, Paris, 1569, p.324; B. Tasso, On the
letters of Bernardo Tasso, Padua, 1733, pp.304-305.
4 M. du Bellay, cit. p.324r
91
18
The Combat on the French Left

Flank
On the Imperial right were a large formation of veteran pikemen and

arquebusiers of around 2,000 Spanish and 3,000 Germans led by Raman de
Cardona and Baron Christopher of Seisneck, screened by a forlorn hope of
300 arquebusiers. They were supported on their right by the Imperial light
cavalry, led by the Prince of Sulmona. When del Vasto ordered the general
advance, he directed them to march against the guns on the French left
wing. He mistakenly believed that the bodies of foot standing in support of
these were du Taix's Gascons, who were the intended target for the Spanish/
German veterans. I
These troops were not in fact the Gascons, but rather Gruyeres and
Italians. The former were Swiss soldiers enlisted in the county that gave
them their name, led by the Lord of Cugy de Vaud, lieutenant of Count
Michel de Gruyeres. According to the chroniclers, the Gruyeres numbered
3,000 to 4,000 men. To their right, there were several companies of
Italians. According to Monluc, there were seven or eight bands of Italians
and Proven�als. Giovio instead reports that they were a mix of Milanese,
Savoyards and Piedmontese. These 3,000 infantrymen were led by two
Piedmontese nobles, Giovan Battista dei Grimaldi di Broglio, Lord of
Escros, and Carlo Vagnone Lord of Dros, who had rebelled against the
Duke of Savoy and had changed sides to serve the French. In front of them,
drawn up next to a farm, was a small battery of four cannon under the
command of the son of Captain de la Mole.
From his position in front of the gendarmes, at the centre of the French
line, d'Enghien observed the advance of the Spanish/German formation. It
seems that these soldiers, galled by the fire from the battery on the French
left, advanced rather more rapidly than their landsknecht comrades in
the centre. The speed of this advance caused the left flank of the Spanish/
B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome I, Paris, 1864, p.274
92
German infantry to become exposed. D'Enghien spotted an opportunity;

once they became frontally engaged with the Gruyeres and Italians, he
would lead his gendarmes in a crushing charge into their flank.
The Spanish/Germans first overran the small battery of cannon in
front of the French left. The Gruyeres behind were so intimidated by the
aggression of the Imperial advance that they fled immediately 'without so
much as standing one push of pike:2 Du Bellay and Monluc both describe
them as 'lubberly: big, clumsy men. Monluc writes bitterly in his account
that the Gruyeres 'are indeed neighbours to the Swiss, but there is no more
comparison betwixt them than betwixt a Spanish horse and an ass: 3 The
Italians on the right of the Gruyeres also fled, except for the captains in the
front rank, who preferred to die fighting. These included Dros, Escros and
Colonel Cugy of the Gruyeres. This event is depicted in the Holzmiiller
engraving on p. 38.
Meanwhile, the Count d'Ehghien's cavalry charge struck the Spanish/
Germans in the flank and smashed right through it, exiting on the far
side, temporarily knocking down all of its standards.4 However, without
the support of the fleeing Gruyeres infantry the casualties amongst the
gendarmes and gentlemen volunteers were terrible. Moreover, despite
having been ridden through, the veteran Spanish/German battalia was
quickly able to recover its formation. The Count rallied his gendarmes and
charged again, but this time the Imperials could devote their undivided
attention to the French horse and their losses were heavier still, such that
after the second charge, d'Enghien had only 100 horsemen remaining with
him, and many of their mounts were wounded.5
Whilst all this was taking place, on the wing the Baron of Dampierre led
his cavalry in a charge against Sulmona's Imperial cavalry, routing them.6
The fleeing Gruyeres had, at least, been given a modest head start by
d'Ehghien's charge. After repelling the gendarmes, the Imperial infantry men
pursued these fugitives, killed some and took others prisoner. Their pursuit
took them along the line of the Old Carmagnola Road, through woods and
French baggage elements and towards the French camp.
Britain 1971, p.109
3 B. de Monluc, The Valois-Habsburg Wars and the French Wars ofReligion, cit. p.110
4 M. du Bellay, Memoires, Paris, 1569, pp.324r-3245v.
5 B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, cit. p.275.
6 M. du Bellay, cit. p.324r.
94
19
The Fighting in the Centre
The landsknechts began the battle on the higher ground near Ceresole,
where they must have spent an uncomfortable time, exposed to the
long-range fire of the enemy artillery. They may have knelt or lain prone
to minimise casualties. When the Marquis del Vasto ordered the attack,
they got up and picked up a fistful of dirt, throwing it behind over their
shoulders. This was an ancient custom (or, as Giovio says, a superstition)
of some infantrymen, who hoped to gain the favour of the god of victory.'
Giovio writes that del Vasto, riding in the midst of his army to observe
its movements, noticed that the landsknechts were proceeding slowly. He
approached them to exhort their colonels, who were marching in the front
ranks, to move faster. As he did so, he noticed that the der Leiter (or della
Scala) brothers at the head of the German battalions were pale with fear. Del
Vasto supposedly turned to his assistants, the Lord of Scalengo Piemontese,
Count Francesco di Landriano, and Sayavedra, who were employed as
aides-de-camp, and said: 'May this sinister omen that I have seen never
come true, since these Germans, in whom we strongly trust to win, go into
battle daunted, which is unusual for these troops: 2
The slowness of their advance may have been, in part, due to the
unfavourable terrain . To the right of the Imperial landsknechts there was a
very large fishpond (smoked tench being a local delicacy), shaded by trees
(this still exists, although possibly somewhat reduced in size). The recent
heavy rain had made the ground and particularly the tracks around the
pond extremely muddy. Consequently, the landsknechts must have had to
open their ranks as they moved around the southern edge of the pond onto
the plain, where they reformed and readied for the battle.3
Madruzzo's 3,000 landsknechts formed up on the left, and the Scaliger
brothers' 4,000 men on the right. The two formations were so close together
P. Giovio, 11 Rimanente della seconda parte delle Historie del suo tempo, Venice,
1557, p.353r.
2 P. Giovio, cit. p.353v.
3 P. Giovio, cit. p.353r.
95
that they appeared to form a single unit that was thirty or more ranks deep
and two to three hundred metres wide. Gonzaga's cavalry moved up behind
their right flank. Lannoy's cavalry advanced with the intention of guarding
their left flank, but were intercepted en route and routed as described earlier.
The front ranks of the advancing landsknechts must have been able to
see the pikes and standards of de Taix's Gascons, who had knelt behind a
low rise to reduce their casualties inflicted by the Imperial artillery. Formed
up on the left of the French infantry were de Boutiere's gendarmes, and
somewhere to their right were de la Maille's artillery and the remnants of
the French arquebusiers, who had fallen back from the farm. Invisible (at
least initially) to the Imperials, were the Swiss, who were some distance
behind the Gascon left flank, and who were lying prone.
Captain Villefranche, who commanded the right flank of the Gascons,
realised that the enemy front line was wider than his own and would overlap
them. He hastily withdrew two ranks of armoured pikemen from the rear of
his formation and used these to widen his frontage so that it matched that
of the landsknechts.4
Monluc, who had run across to join the Gascon infantry, describes signs
of disorder amongst the approaching landsknechts. (The Germans came up
to us at a very round rate, insomuch as their battle being very great, that
they could not possibly follow, so that we saw great windows in their body,
and several ensigns a good way behind: 5 It is likely that the landsknechts
had never entirely managed to fully reform after passing the fishpond, and
a rapid advance, spurred on by the cannon fire from the French batteries
caused them to lose their order, such that the gaps between their ranks
increased and parts of the formation fell behind.
Monluc describes the different manner in which French and landsknechts
held their pikes. The Germans held the pike at the end to take the full
advantage of its length, fencing with it. 6 Monluc writes that he exhorted his
fellow Gascons to grasp their pikes by the middle, in the Swiss manner, and
to run headlong into the enemy formation. This way they would be inside
the reach of the enemy pikes, which would thus be rendered useless. The
disorder of the enemy formation must have facilitated this.
According to Monluc, the Swiss lay prone until the last possible
moment, and then stood up and (like savage boars they ran into their
(the landsknechts') flank: 7 In du Bellay 's slightly different account, the
landsknechts observed the Swiss from a distance and divided their
4 M. du Bellay, Memoires, Paris, 1569, p.324r.

Britain 1971, p.IOB.
6 B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome I, Paris, IB64, p.271.
Britain 1971, p.l OB.
96
formation into two, with Madruzzo facing the Swiss and the Scaliger
brothers the French.8
Giovio and Brantome recount an interesting anecdote. They write
that Eriprando Madruzzo, the landsknecht commander, had spotted the
Proven<;al Captain Joseph de Boniface de la Mole among the approaching
French front rank and challenged him to a duel. The two fought each other
with pikes so skilfully that each hit the other in the face and fell to the
ground. De la Mole suffered a fatal blow over the eye, near the edge of his
burgonet helmet, whilst Madruzzo was severely injured by a deep cut from
the cheek to the ear.9
The clash between the landsknechts and de Taix's infantry was to be
unusually bloody. At Montluc's suggestion, the French had replaced their
second rank of pikemen with arquebusiers, with the specific purpose of
firing at the moment of collision with the landsknechts, the intention being
to kill the captains who formed the enemy front rank. Unfortunately for
the French however, both du Bellay and Monluc affirm that the Germans
had hit upon a similar stratagem. They had armed their second rank of pike
with pistols.IO Consequently, as the formations collided, there was a terrible
loss of life as most of the men in the front rank of each formation were
shot at point-blank range. Many French and German captains and those
gentlemen volunteers from the French court who, lacking warhorses, had
elected to fight on foot, were killed outright. The clash between the Swiss
and the landsknechts is depicted in the Holzmiiller engraving on page 52.
At around the same time as the infantry clashed, Gonzaga's Imperial
cavalry approached the French gendarmes led by de Boutieres and the
Count of Tendes. But before they reached the enemy, Gonzaga's cavalrymen
suddenly changed direction and made a sharp turn to the left. The man
responsible for this manoeuvre was the Mantuan knight Goito, the captain
of horsemen riding at the head of the Imperial squadron. Shouting 'Turn!
Turn!' his intention was perhaps, to draw the French cavalry away from
the infantry fight, or perhaps to attack the enemy flank, but in fact the
effect of the turn was to make Gonzagas cavalrymen collide with the right
flank of the nearest landsknecht formation, the one facing the Swiss, I I
throwing it into disorder as they rode through it. 12 After an initial moment
of surprise, the French gendarmes lowered their lances and pursued the
Imperials, riding into the gaps created in the landsknecht formation by
the fleeing horsemen. Giovio reports that the cavalrymen 'with some large
and broad swords carried attached to the saddle, which were similar to
8 M. du Bellay, cit. p.324r

9 P. Giovio, cit. pp. 353r-353v; P. de Brantome, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1867, vol.
p. 347.
10 M. du Bellay, cit. p.324r; B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome 1, P aris, 1864,
p.277.
11 A. de Santa Cruz, Cronica del Emperador Carlos V, Ma drid, 1928, p.378.
12 P. Giovio, cit. pp.353v-354r; P. d e Sandoval,Historia del Emperador Carlos V,
volume VII, Madrid , pp.350-351.
98
THE FIGHTING IN THE CENTRE
the knives of hunters, easily cut off the limbs of their unarmed enemies'.13
(The landsknechts in the centre of the formation would have been
unarmoured). According to Vieilleville, the French paid a heavy toll for this
incisive action. In the clash, they lost 60 gendarmes, 200 Albanians from
the light cavalry and 120 mounted arquebusiers. Another 40 gendarmes,
including Boutieres himself, had their horses killed and they continued to
fight valiantly on foot with maces and swords. 14 Despite these heavy losses,
the cavalry charge was decisive. After half an hour of bloody fighting, the
landsknechts broke and ran.
The aftermath of the rout of the Imperial centre was terrible. The Swiss,
remembering how their comrades were robbed and killed after their
surrender at Mondovi, were furious. Shouting 'Mondovi! Mondovi!' they
threw themselves against the fleeing Germans, killing everyone they caught.
Due to their mutual hatred, the mala guerra, 'bad war', that is the massacre
of the defeated enemies, is a recurring theme in the fighting between the
Swiss and the Germans. The exact scale of the massacre after the fight is not
known, but it was probably enormous. All chroniclers agree in attributing
most of the dead in that battle to the Germans.
Paolo Giovio does not hide his aversion to the Protestants by reporting
that, according to rumours he heard, they had not attended mass on Easter
Sunday. Instead, they had played dice, looking for the consecrated stones
of the altars of the surrounding churches for that purpose. Thus, they
deserved their defeat because they were Lutherans and had been impious,
and they had also desecrated a wooden crucifix by soiling it with mud.ls
The Milanese historian Gaspare Bugatti also reports this fact, adding that
the German infantrymen were doubly punished, as their dead left on the
battlefield were stripped of their belongings by the neighbouring peasants
the night following the battle. They were helped by women who focused
on collecting the landsknechts' breeches, where they were rumoured to
hide their money. Bugatti writes that one of these women, working alone,
managed to collect 200 pairs of breeches. 16
The slain landsknecht officers included the two brothers der Leiter,
Wolfgang de Fiirstenberg (Giovio writes that he was the son of Count
Wilhelm von Fiirstenberg of Tyrol), Michael Preussinger, the Tyrolean
lieutenant of Brennor der Leiter, Hildebrando Thurn, Baldessar Charles,
Jacopo Figer, Antio Orso, Martino Borsa, Adam Bralio and Baron Gunstein.
Aliprando Madruzzo was found seriously wounded among the corpses and
captured. 17
13 P. Giovio, cit. p.54r.

14 F. de Scepeaux de Vieilleville, Memoires, in Collection complete des Memoires for
M. P etitot, volume XXVI, P ar is 1822, p.132.
15 P. Giovio, cit. pp.354v-355r.
16 G. Bugatti, Historia Universale, Venice, 1571, p.934.
17 P. Giovio, cit. p.54v.
99
Many of the French infantry captains in the front rank had also been
killed. Du Bellay remembers the names of five of them: Captain de la
Mole (who had been killed in his duel with Madruzzo), Captain Passin
of Dauphine, the Gascon captains Barberan and Moncault, and Captain
Sainct -Genevieve. Captain la Mote Daute was found alive and rescued
buthad been blinded. Conversely, no Swiss captain was injured except for
Baron de Saxe, who was wounded in the neck by a pike.18 The relatively low
casualties suffered by the Swiss supports Monluc's claim that they engaged
in a flank attack, rather than du Bellay's account which says they engaged
frontally.
18 M. du Bellay, cit. p.325v.
lOO
20
The End of the Battle
The Marquis del Vasto had witnessed at close hand the flight of his cavalry
and the massacre of his landsknechts. Moreover, whilst he was defending
himself with his sword in the turmoil of the battle, he had been struck in
the knee by an arquebus bullet and his burgonet helmet had been broken
by mace blows. Wounded, he retreated towards Asti accompanied only by
his personal escort. I
Salerno's Italian infantrymen who stood on the hill on the left did not
advance to support the Germans. According to some chroniclers, the
Marquis del Vasto had ordered them not to move without receiving his
express order, and he did not send any such order, perhaps because he
became caught up in the fighting. Perhaps too, they simply did not wish
to enter a fight that, from their vantage point on the hill near Tre Vie,
they could see was already clearly lost. W hen the Italian infantry saw the
Imperial cavalry in flight and the landsknechts' flags waver and fall, they
began to retreat in an orderly manner towards Asti.
Pro-Imperial chroniclers, such as Giovio, Santa Cruz, and Sand oval (as
well as the French Gaspard de Saulx),2 describe the fate of the Spanish and
German veteran infantrymen who had earlier defeated the Italians and the
Gruyeres. They pursued the broken infantry from the battlefield and for
some distance further along the Old Carmagnola Road. Unaware of the
outcome of the battle, they then turned about to rejoin the main army, at
which point they were attacked once again by d'Enghien's French cavalry,
which had originally consisted of 200 men -at -arms and the 200 light
horsemen of Dampierre. The Imperial infantry, surrounded and attacked
P. Giovio, Il Rimanente della seconda parte delle Historie del suo tempo, Venice,
1557, p.355r
2 P. Giovio, cit., p.355v; A. de Santa Cruz, Crimica del Emperador Carlos V, Madrid,
1928, pp.378-379; P. de Sandoval, Historia del Emperador Carlos V, volume VII ,
Madrid, 1847, pp.352-353; G. de Saulx-Tavannes, Memoires, in Choix Chroniques
et Memoires par J.A.C. Buchon, P aris, 1836, p.108.
101
by the gendarmes and then by the French and Swiss infantrymen, was
defeated and had to surrender.
However, French chroniclers such as du Bellay, Vieilleville and Monluc
report a different and more dramatic course of events. According to them,
the Count d'Enghien ordered a charge at the Imperial square formation
when it had just clashed with the Gruyeres and the Italians under Dros.
The French cavalry managed to break into the rear ranks of the pikemeds
formation, but at the cost of many lives, including that of the Lord of Acier.
Later, the Count d'Enghien followed the advance of the Imperial infantry
towards Carmagnola attacking them again, but again failing to break
their square formation.3 According to Monluc, these charges were bloody
and fruitless. Du Bellay writes that the Spanish arquebusiers hampered
d'Enghien's charges by constantly surrounding him.4
French sources report that d'Enghien's cavalry suffered heavy losses in
their repeated charges against Spanish and German infantrymen, including
the aforementioned Lord of Acier, the Baron Douyn, Lieutenant of the
Count of Montravel or Montreueil, Monsallais, standard-bearer of the
Baron of Cursol, the standard-bearer of the Lord of Ossun and his nephew,
the Lord of Glayve, Governor of Cahors, the Lord of Courville, and two of
d'Enghien's squires. The Lord of Lassigny had his horse killed and escaped
on foot. The Lord of Saint Amand, known as de Rocheuart, and the Lord of
Fervaques were wounded. Another fifty men-at-arms died.5
Now some distance from the rest of his army, the young Count d'Enghien
was isolated and disheartened. He was left to face the 4,000-5,000 enemy
pikemen with just a hundred or so horsemen. Moreover, a low rise obscured
his view of much of the battlefield. Unaware of the success achieved by the
rest of his army, he assumed it had been defeated in much the same manner
as the Gruyeres and the Italian infantry. Monluc writes that Monsieur de
Pignan of Montpelier was told by the Count that the commander was so
desperate and certain of being defeated, that he brought twice the tip of
his sword to his throat.6 Du Bellay portrays d'Enghien more stoically, but
admits he was ready to mount a final suicidal charge against the Imperial
pikemen.
According to Monluc, St Julien, the Swiss field commander and colonel,
spotted d'Enghien in the distance, close to the edge of the wood that led
off to Carmagnola. He rode over to him shouting 'Sir, sir, face about, for
the battle is won, the Marquis del Vasto is routed, and all his Italians and
Germans are cut to pieces:7
3 M. du Bellay, Memoires, Paris, 1569, p.325; F. de Scepeaux de Vieilleville, Memoires,

in Collection complete des Memoires for M. Petitot, volume XXVI, Paris 1822,
pp.130-131; B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome I, Paris, 1864, p.275.
6 B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, cit. p.268.
7 B. de Monluc, The Valois- Habsburg Wars and the French Wars of Religion, Great
Britain 1971, p.1IO.
102
THE END OF THE BATTLE
At this point d'Enghien had the good fortune to be joined by a

detachment of three companies of Italian arquebusiers that had mounted
themselves on horses and marched to the sound of the guns.8 Once these
arquebusiers had deployed to support his gendarmes, the Count d'Enghien,
fortified by St. Julien's good news, was able to resume the struggle. He sent
a horseman summoning the victorious Swiss and Gascons from the gate
of Cerisole, where they were slaughtering the last of the landsknechts.
The Swiss and French infantry swiftly reformed and marched to join him.
Observing their arrival and realising that the battle was lost, the Spanish
and German veterans desperately sought to surrender to d'Enghien's more
amenable gendarmes before the arrival of the vengeful and bloody enemy
infantrymen. They clustered in groups of fifteen or twenty around individual
gendarmes, seeking protection from the Gascon and Swiss infantry. But as
Monluc cheerfully writes, 'Here the game began, some killing and others
endeavouring to save ...above half of them were slain, for as many of them
as we could lay our hands on were dispatched:9 Giovio lists the Spanish
captains who were taken prisoner as Don Raman de Cardona, maestro del
campo, and the Captains Juan Beamonte, Gonzalo Hernandez, Chesada,
and Chevedio. Baron Seisneck, the commander of the Germans, found a
horse and managed to escape.lO
The redoubtable Monluc then retrieved his horse and joined a group
of twenty or more similarly minded adventurers who, like him, hoped to
secure a high value prisoner for ransom. Riding off at a gallop they managed
to catch up with del Vasto's retreating bodyguard. However, when they saw
that the Imperial horsemen were 'rallied and close up to the crupper, still
marching on in very good order at a good round trot and their lances ready
in the rest: 11 they considered discretion to be the better part of valour and
returned to their camp.
8 B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, cit. pp.277-278.

9 B. de Monluc, The Valois-Habsburg Wars and the French Wars of Religion, cit.
p.1l2.
lO P. Giovio, cit. p.355v.
11 B. de Monluc, The Valois-Habsburg Wars and the French Wars of Religion, cit.
p.114.
103
21
The Death Toll
Chroniclers and historians estimate the total number of casualties to be

12,000, about 28 percent of the 34,000 to 36,000 soldiers engaged in the
battle. Du Bellay and Monluc report 12,000 to 15,000 deaths. I However,
whilst French chroniclers attribute this number of casualties only to the
Imperials, Spanish and Italian chroniclers tend to consider the total
casualties on both sides that were engaged in the battle.2 Still, some like
Giovio and Marco Guazzo report the higher losses to be among the
Germans and the Imperials.3
The landsknecht formations in the Imperial centre suffered the greatest
losses, perhaps 5,000 men. Including the casualties from Seisneck's
formation this raises the total to around 7,000. When the casualties among
the Spanish and Italian infantrymen and the cavalry are also considered,
the total Imperial losses might amount to 9,000 to 10,000 or more men. A
similar number of casualties is mentioned in the anonymous report on the
Battle of Ceresole published by Cimber and Danj ou.
With regard to the French casualties, the estimates are much lower
and range from 200, including du Bellay's men-at-arms, to the 500 to 600
reported by the anonymous report mentioned above. Most of the casualties
in the Count d'Enghien's army were incurred by the Gruyeres and the
Italians on the left flank. There were a few hundred casualties in the Vieilles
Bandes who defeated the landsknechts of Madruzzo and a few hundred
more among the men-at-arms of the Compagnies d'ordonnance and light
cavalry, plus, according to the accounts of Swiss historians, about 40 Swiss
from Frolich. In his book The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, Charles
M. du Bellay, Memoires, Paris, 1569, p.325v; B. de Monluc, Commentaires et lettres,

tome I, Paris, 1864, p.286.
2 12,000 total deaths for: G. Cambiano, Historico discourse, 1839, book Ill, col. 1088
and for Santa Cruz, cit. p.380; for Sandoval 8,000 Imperial and 4,000 French: P. de
Sandoval, cit. p.353.
3 P. Giovio, 11 Rimanente della seconda parte delle Historie del suo tempo, Venice,
1557, p.355v; M. Guazzo, Historie, Ferrara, 1549, p.315v.
104
THE DEATH TOLL
Oman, an English historian of the twentieth century, estimates the total

French losses to be about 1,000 or 1,500. If this number was added to the
fallen enemy, it would reach the initially reported total of 12,000 deaths.
French casualties fell particularly heavily upon the nobility because the
gendarmes and gentlemen volunteers from court fought in the front ranks
of their formations.
What of the prisoners? The accounts record about 3,000 Imperial
prisoners, of whom 2,000 were Germans and more than 600 Spanish
infantry. The captive landsknechts were sent back through Savoy to their
home countries, but a large number died from their wounds during the
journey. The Spaniards on the other hand, were brought to France, treated
well and then sent to on Spain. Few Italian prisoners were taken by the
French, since their contingent had been able to retreat to Asti almost
intact, despite being harried by the attacks of a few thousand peasants from
Cisterna dJ\sti sent by Captain Alessandro Torto, who governed that place
on behalf of the Count d'Enghien. It seems that these villagers managed to
take 60 prisoners.
Many of the Imperial cavalry escaped to Asti, although Carlo Gonzaga,
their commander, was taken prisoner. According to Giovio, shamed by
their defeat, he threw himself in the midst of the French seeking death.
The French soldiers, however, killed his horse and captured him. The noble
Brescian brothers Ercole and Attilio Martinengo met a different fate. They
too, had thrown themselves into the enemy lines to clear their names but
Swiss halberds (about
were cut down and killed. 1490-1525). Museo delle
In the end, only between 6,000 and 6,500 Imperials survived. The armi Luigi Marzoli, Brescia.
Marquis del Vasto also arrived in Asti, (Photo by the author)
wounded and accompanied by only
six or seven arquebusiers of his guard.
Four other landsknechts from his
guard, dressed in black, were captured
by d'Enghien who, according to the
anonymous report mentioned earlier,
chivalrously sent them back to del Vasto
holding a white stick.
The French captured about 40 pieces
of artillery (including many pieces of
small calibre), 40 to 45 flags, 70,000 scudi
(coins), 4,000 to 5,000 corselets and other
types of armour, and all of the portable
bridges which the Marquis had intended
to use to cross the River Po. They also
captured 600 wagons, full of provisions
(intended for the reprovisioning of
Carmagnola), 2,000 pairs of oxen and,
according to the anonymous report
published by Cimber and Danjou, four
trunks full of iron handcuffs. These were
105
intended to be used to shackle those Italians

deemed guilty of having betrayed the Duke
of Savoy and the Emperor. The Marquis was
convinced he would take them prisoners
after the victory and bring them in chains to
Milan.4
Corslet. Museo delle armi

Luigi Marzoli, Brescia. See
comments on page 49.
(Photo by the author)
4 Cimber et Danjou, La journee de Cerizolles. in Archives Curieuses de L'histoire de

France, Volume Ill, 1843, pp.72-76;C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the
Sixteenth Century, London 1937, p.241; Giovio, cit. pp.355v-356r.
106
22
Reflections on the Battle
The Marquis del Vasto had deployed his forces in a strong defensive position,
Francis I. King of France,
taking advantage of the higher ground and with ponds and muddy ground
circa 1538, after Joos van
between him and the French, expecting that the French would attack him
Cleve, Netherlandish
through the crossfire of his two artillery batteries. Unfortunately for the (Saint Louis Art Museum
Imperials, the French did not Public Domain)
oblige, and when it became

necessary for the Imperials
to attack, so that they could
resume their march to relieve
Carignano, the very strengths
of the defensive position then
turned into weaknesses as the
fishponds divided their forces
and the marshy ground slowed
and disordered the advance of
his landsknechts.
The French, on the other
hand, made better use of the
terrain. Their French and Swiss
infantry, on a reverse slope,
were able to shelter from the
worst of the fire of the Imperial
artillery. The French artillery,
particularly the guns in the
small battery on their left
flank, inflicted serious losses
on Cardona's Spanish/German
formation, eventually goading
them into an attack.
The French were swift to
realise the importance of the
farm complex on their right,
and Monluc seized it early in
107
the battle. As well as providing protection from artillery, control of the

low ridge upon which the farm stood concealed the exact position of their
forces from the enemy.
When eventually it came, the Imperial attack was poorly co-ordinated.
Cardona's Spanish/German formation launched a swift and effective attack
against the French left, driving the Gruyeres and Italians from the field,
but after that they played little part in the battle, other than to absorb the
attention of the remnants of d'Enghien's gendarmes. The landsknechts,
who might reasonably have been expected to defeat the less numerous
Swiss opposite them, were disordered by the marshy ground across their
approach. The Italians did not advance to support them, either because they
were not ordered to do so, or because they had been charged by de Thermes'
horsemen, or because del Vasto had forgotten to order it. The two Imperial
cavalry units that should have guarded their flanks were each defeated by
the French cavalry opposite them.
During the battle, the French command proved more adept than the
Imperials at responding to events. D'Enghien's gendarmes were able to
manoeuvre and deliver a charge into the flank of Cardona's Spanish/
Germans, which might well have proved decisive against troops of a lesser
quality. Junior officers such as Monluc and du Bellay displayed considerable
initiative, for example persuading de Taix not to attack the passive Imperial
Italian contingent, but rather to await the more serious threat posed by the
landsknechts. The French were able to concentrate multiple units against
these Germans, pinning them frontally with de Taix's Gascons whilst the
Swiss struck a corner of their formation and de Boutiere's gendarmes
charged their flank. Later, the French were able to concentrate their forces
against Cardona's Spanish/German formation.
In terms of the performance of the various formations in the battle, the
French Gruyeres infantry performed very poorly, fleeing without hardly
striking a blow. If they had stood, even for a time, then the outcome on the
French left might have been quite different. The French Gascon infantry,
on the other hand, were able to resist the might of the landsknecht charge
sufficiently long enough for the Swiss and gendarmes to break them.
The most effective troops in the Imperial army were undoubtedly
Cardona's Spanish/German veterans, whose highly professional attack
swept all before it. The least effective Imperial formation was Gonzaga's
Spanish cavalry. Either because they feared the French gendarmes, or were
attempting a sophisticated manoeuvre that failed, they led the enemy
cavalry right into the flank of the landsknechts, sealing the latter's fate.
108
23
Epilogue
The chronicler Giovio was of the opinion that Marquis del Vasto was
saddened by the defeat which he blamed on bad luck. He could however
still count on the Italian infantry and most of his cavalry. With them, he
was confident of defending the garrisons in Piedmont from likely French
assaults. Having organised their defence, he went to Pavia to have his
wounded knee treated. He wanted to remain close to Milan, fearful that the
news of his defeat would lead to an uprising within the city.
D'Enghien had retreated to Carmagnola but he, too, had difficulties
facing him. Many of his officers had been killed and King Francis had
sent insufficient money to pay the soldiers. Furthermore, his Swiss
mercenaries were reluctant to attack Lombardy because their contract had
been issued purely for defensive purposes. Therefore, d'Enghien had to
temporarily abandon the idea of advancing towards Milan. He decided to
stay in Piedmont and focus instead on bringing the siege of Carignano to a
successful conclusion.
He sent de Taix with the Vieilles Bandes, 200 men -at -arms and six cannon
to Monferrato, where they captured Moncalvo, Vignale, Ponte di Stura and
other places. I He sent the prisoners away, the Spanish infantry men first to
France and then to Spain, and the Germans to Germany via Savoy. He also
released the captains, including Raimondo di Cardona, Carlo Gonzaga and
Aliprando Madruzzo, in exchange for the Lord of Thermes.2
In the meantime, Francis had heard that the Emperor and the King of
England were preparing an attack on Northern France. Nevertheless, he
sent the Florentine condottierri Piero Strozzi to Milan, to await French
reinforcements. He was certain they would arrive and hopefully incite
an uprising by the discontented Milanese. Strozzi was part of a wealthy
republican family, opposed to the power of the Medici and was allied
to France. He personally hired 7,000 infantrymen, most of whom were
P. Giovio, 11 Rimanente de/la seconda parte delle Historie del suo tempo, Venice,
1557, p.358.
109
Florentine exiles and marched to Mirandola (Emilia), where he intended

to raise further troops. He was joined by Count Giorgio Martinengo from
Brescia with a band of horsemen, Count Pier Maria Rosso with more
infantry and Galeotto Pico, Count of Mirandola.3
In Rome, militia were being raised simultaneously, both for Piero
Strozzi and for the Imperials. Given the then neutral status of the Papacy,
the Roman barons and the cardinals of the Church were free to subsidise
one party or the other. Thus Francesco Orsini, the Duke of Somma and
the Count of Capaccio all recruited infantry companies for Strozzi, whilst
Marzio Colonna and Giuliano Cesarini were headed to Lombardy with
soldiers hired by the Emperor.
In Tuscany, Duke Cosimo - worried by the Imperial defeat at Ceresole
- gathered 2,000 infantry under the command of the Oddo brothers and
Federico da Montaguto (or Monteacuto). They reached Genoa by sea
and from there marched to Lombardy, where Captain Rodolfo Baglioni
gratefully welcomed them.
Strozzi was growing impatient waiting for the arrival of further
reinforcements from Rome, so decided to get ahead of the Marquis del
Vasto. After fording the Po at Casalmaggiore, he crossed the territory of
Cremona and arrived in Castiglione. After repelling an attack by Imperial
horsemen under Girolamo Silva, he then crossed the Adda river, heading
towards Lodi. Del Vasto, fearing that he would lose this city, sent the
Spaniard, Captain Calder6n, accompanied by a band of horsemen, to
reinforce its defences.
According to historian Paolo Giovio, Strozzi was accompanied by
Pallavicino Visconte, known as Monsignor of San Celso, a descendant of
the ancient Visconti family that had ruled Milan until the middle of the
fifteenth century.4 He had a great following among the Milanese people,
who were oppressed by the crippling taxes imposed upon them and were
believed to be tired of Spanish rule and ready to rebel. But with the arrival
in the city of Baglioni's 2,000 Tuscan infantrymen, the hope of a popular
uprising vanished and Milan remained at peace.
Meanwhile, the Marquis had left Pavia heading towards Milan with
his vanguard, which consisted of the horsemen of the Prince of Sulmona
and the infantrymen of the Prince of Salerno. Piero Strozzisaw that the
Milanese and the French would not be able to help him anytime soon and
that the Marquis had received reinforcements from Tuscany and Rome with
Colonna and Cesarini, so decided to retreat. He had a bridge built over the
River Lambro near Orio, crossed it with his army and then destroyed the
bridge behind him. He headed to Piacenza where Duke Pier Luigi Farnese
helped him cross the Po to safety. Pier had recently been appointed Duke of
Parma and Piacenza by Pope Paul III (his father), but the title had not been
3 P. Giovio, cit. pp.359-359v.

4 P. Giovio, cit. p.361 v.
110
EPILOGUE
confirmed by Emperor Charles V. Disappointed, Duke Pier Luigi secretly

began to side with France.
Protected by the Farnese, Piero Strozzi reorganised his men in Castel
San Giovanni, because many of his soldiers had deserted during the retreat.
Here he was joined by Pitigliano's reinforcements from Rome. The Florentine
captain decided to march to Piedmont along the Tortona road, knowing
that in Monferrato he would find de Taix's men; he was counting on the
latter's cavalry since he had none of his own. Having gathered provisions in
the Piacenza area, Strozzi and his men passed along the Apennines towards
Tortona, marching along mountain paths to avoid the Imperials.
The Marquis del Vasto heard of this manoeuvre and sent some companies
of horsemen after the enemy to hinder them. The bulk of the army, led by
the Princes of Salerno and Sulmona, followed the main road that connected
Voghera and Tortona. They undertook an exhausting journey of three days,
which involved passing Tortona and descending from the Apennines along
the Scrivia River. Upon reaching the plains near Serravalle on 4 June 1544,
Strozzi's men found the Prince of Salerno waiting for them.
Although tired, Strozzi's soldiers prevailed at the beginning of the fight.
Fear of the enemy cavalry dictated that they deployed among some vineyards
by the river. When two companies of Imperial infantry, with two cannon,
occupied a hillock near the vineyards, Strozzi's soldiers stormed the hillock,
defeating both companies and capturing their flags and artillery. Spurred
on by their success, some of the infantrymen ran forward shouting 'Victory,
victory!' and the rest of Strozzi's army followed them out of the vineyards.
The Prince of Salerno seized the opportunity and urged Sulmona to bring
in the light cavalry led by Rodolfo Baglioni, Sforza Pallavicino and Sforza di
Santa Fiore. The cavalry broke Strozzi's disorganised infantry, and with the
support of his own infantry, put Strozzi's whole force to flight. 5
The Imperials suffered few losses, perhaps 100 including Ulysses Orsini
and Captain Cazzalocca. However, most of Strozzi's men were taken
prisoner. The chroniclers say that since the two armies consisted only
of Italians, the ancient victors' custom of settling for the victory without
further harming the defeated was renewed. This custom was frequent in
Italy among the mercenary armies of the fifteenth century, which at that
time consisted largely of Italians, fighting on contract but often unpaid. To
increase their income, they tended to take as many prisoners as possible so
that they could demand ransoms. This led the famous 'bloodless wars' that
Machiavelli so strongly despised. The custom died out in Italy with the start
of foreign expeditions at the end of the fifteenth century. It should be noted
however, that the Italian mercenaries' regard for their prisoners applied
only to those who had sufficient money to pay a ransom. Historians often
report that poor people such as infantrymen, auxiliaries, servants, peasants
or women, who in the chronicles of the time were defined as 'useless people'
were killed.
111
The army of the Prince of Saler no took 64 colours, which they sold to the
Marquis del Vasto. Strozzi, Pitigliano, Flaminio dell' Anguillara and other
captains saved themselves by fleeing to Monferrato. Count Martinengo and
the two Sanseverino Princes were captured. The two princes were freed
by their relative, the Prince of Salerno, since by having turned against the
Emperor they risked paying the ultimate price for their betrayal. Many of
Strozzi's Florentine exiles were freed upon payment of a ransom. After the
battle, Strozzi complained to Captain de Taix, who was in Monferrato, that
he had not supported him as promised with his infantry and cavalry. The
French captain apologised, saying that he had not wanted to leave his bases
ungarrisoned.
Meanwhile, d'Enghien continued to besiege Carignano, which was in
dire straits due to lack of supplies. Commander of the city, Pirro Colonna,
was forced to send maestro del campo San Miguel and Count Felice dl\rco
to the French commander to negotiate the city's surrender. The latter,
having heard of movements of Imperial troops towards Carignano, offered
relatively generous conditions to the besieged. Accordingly, on 21 June 1544,
the city surrendered and the Imperials withdrew, keeping their weapons but
without their drums or banners. They had to swear to cross the river Adda
and not to fight against France for six months.6 Pirro Colonna was paroled,
having to go to France and surrender himself to King Francis who would
keep him at his court for a year. Pirro complied and so did his subordinates,
except for the Spaniard San Miguel, who marched down river along the
banks of the Po, arriving in Brescello which belonged to the pro-French
state of Ferrara, which he captured and sacked.
In the meantime, Piero Strozzi had returned to Piacenza after having
passed safely through enemy territory with many of his men; he had a
red cross sewn on the soldiers' robes as a ruse. Then, after enlisting new
soldiers, he returned through the neutral territory of Genoa and arrived in
Piedmont, where he conquered Alba.
Whilst these manoeuvres took place, Don Juan de Vega, the Spanish
ambassador to the Pope had arrived in Milan. He was outraged by the Pope's
pro-French sympathies and had left to offer his services to the Marquis del
Vasto. The Marquis sent the Spanish nobleman with horsemen and infantry
to hinder Strozzi's march through the Apennines, but without success. Don
Juan then attacked Asigliano near Vercelli, a place that had changed their
allegiance from the Duke of Savoy to France. The garrison defended itself
valiantly but was eventually forced to surrender. The Spanish commander
allowed his Spanish and German soldiers to sack the place, indiscriminately
killing civilians and the defenders alike. The Milanese officers and infantry
were all hanged from the gutters. The Italian soldiers in the ranks of de Vega
were shocked by the brutality of their new commander, who apologised to
6 P. Giovio, cit. p.368; M. Guazzo, Historie, Venice 1549, p.317.
112
EPILOGUE
them, but said that he had rightly punished those who had rebelled against
their duke and Emperor, of whom they were vassals.7
Don Juan also took the nearby Desana without losses, because the
garrison - fearful of suffering the same fate as the defenders of Asigliano -
surrendered. Thus Vercelli, the residence of the Duke of Savoy, was relieved
from the depredations of French raiders, who had used those places as a
base. After this, by order of the Emperor, de Vega was obliged to return to
his ambassadorial duties.
After the capture of Carignano, King Francis ordered the Count
d'Enghien to send 6,000 French of the Vieilles Bandes from his army in
Piedmont and as many Italians to strengthen his defences against the
Emperor and the English, who had both invaded France with their armies.
In May of 1544 about 50,000 Imperials, divided into two armies,
crossed the French borders. One force was under the command of Ferrante
Gonzaga, which occupied Luxembourg, whilst the other was personally
led by Emperor Charles V and advanced into the Palatinate. Henry V III
had arrived at Calais by sea with about 40,000 men and had also divided
his army in two groups. One was led by the Duke of Norfolk, which had
arrived from the south to besiege Montreuil, and the other was under the
command of the Duke of Suffolk with orders to besiege Boulogne-Sur-Mer.
In July, the Imperial armies gathered at Saint Dizier to besiege it. This
city resisted for over 40 days, slowing down the advance of Charles V's
troops. Finally, the Imperials advanced into the heart of France, invading
Champagne and occupying several places including Epernay, Chatillon
sur-Marne, Chateau-Thierry and Soissons. They halted near Jalons due
to the presence of French forces. King Francis intervened with an army of
40,000 infantry, 2,000 men-at-arms and 2,000 light horse, deploying them
on the other side of the Marne.
By that point, the Emperor lacked sufficient funds to continue the war
and faced domestic problems caused by the growing Protestant threat in
Germany. King Francis also had money issues, so an agreement was reached
between the two, signed on 18 September 1544 in Cn!py. According to
the terms of peace, the two parties renounced their territorial claims, re
establishing what had been agreed with the Truce of Nice in 1538. In Italy,
Mondovi was returned to the French, while France gave back to Duke Carlo
di Savoia the cities of Cherasco, Crescentino, Verrua, San Germano and
other lands captured after the Truce of Nice.
The King of England, who hoped to conquer Boulogne-Sur-Mer, did
not want to be included in the peace agreement. He succeeded in capturing
Boulogne in 1544.8 However, he had to abandon the siege of Montreuil due
to the intervention of a French relief army led by the Dauphin Henry. The
war between France and England ended in June 1546 with the Treaty of

8 M. Guazzo, cit. p.321.
113
Andres, which granted Henry VIII the city of Boulogne until 1554, when
he would be obligated to return it to France.
The French victory at Ceresole might have been expected to lead to
gains in the war as a whole and in all likelihood the capture of Milan.
However, the defeat of Strozzi's army and the King of France's inability to
pay his soldiers in Italy, together with the need to withdraw some of the
best of these to fight in Picardy, meant that the situation in Northern Italy
soon reverted to the status quo found previously. The battle, deprived of
its strategic significance, was soon relegated to the list of forgotten French
victories.
114
Colour Plate Captions
Cover: Landsknecht pikemen
Plate A: Alfonso d'Avalos, Marquis of Vasto, with his guard
Fig 1 Landsknecht of the guard

Fig 2 Bavarian man at arms
Fig 3 Alfonso del Vasto
Fig 4 Alfonso's standard
Fig 5 Light horseman
Plate B: Fran�ois de Bourbon, Count of Enghien, with his men
Fig 1 White Cornet

Fig 2 Standard bearer
Fig 3 Fran<;:ois de Bourbon
Fig 4 Standard bearer with the royal standard
Plate C: Italian infantrymen
Plate D: Spanish infantrymen
Plate E: French infantrymen
Plate F: Swiss pikemen
Plate G: Standards and flags
Fig 1 Standard of the General of the Imperial Army

Fig 2 Infantry banner with Avalos' coat of arms
Fig 3 Banner of the Imperial men-at-arms
Fig 4 Flag of the Imperial infantry with the coat of arms of Charles V
Fig 5 Flag of Captain Raimondo di Cardona
Fig 6 Swiss Infantry banner
Fig 7 Swiss infantry banner
115
Plate H: Other standards and flags
Fig 1 Cornet of the light horsemen of Paul de la Barthe, Lord of Thermes

Fig 2 Guidone (pennon) of Fran<;:ois Ricard de Genouillac, Seigneur of Acier
Fig 3 Infantry banner of Ferrante Sanseverino
Fig 4 Landsknechts' flag
Fig 5 Landsknechts' flag
Fig 6 Banner of Jean de Taix, commander of the French infantry
Fig 7 Insignia of the supreme command of the French infantry
116
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des Espaignols in <gallica.bnf.fr> Bibliotheque Nationale de France
118
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Volume 4: The Battle of Ceresole 1544 -

The Crushing Defeat of the Imperial Army

Massimo Predonzani and Simon Miller

Translated by Rachele Tiso

Published by Helion & Company 2022

Text © Massimo Predonzani and Simon Miller 2022.Translated by Rachele Tiso

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

We always welcome receiving book proposals from prospective authors.

Colour Plate Captions 115

This is an updated edition of my book Ceresole 14 Aprile 1544 (Ceresole

A. UlIoa, Vita dell'invitissimo e sacratissimo imperator Carlo V, Venice 1575.

remained in the hands of Duke Charles 11 of Savoy under the protection of

4 G. De Leva, Storia documentata di Carlo V, Padua 1875.

Meanwhile in July 1543 a fleet of 110 Ottoman galleys led by Barbarossa

The French Commanders

Franc;:ois de Bourbon was born on 23

A. Savagner, Les Bourbons. Histoire de la maison de Bourbons, Paris 1845, p.335.

2 A. Savagner, cit. p.336.

The washerwoman Segurana, nicknamed La Maufaccia (the Ugly

4 P. Giovio, cit. p.331.

besieged Carignano, which proved difficult to capture and was defended by

5 Other texts on the feats of the Count of Enghien: de Bourdeille Brantome, P,

Guigues Guiffrey Seigneur of Boutieres

Guigues or Gui Guiffrey de Boutieres was a gentleman of the Dauphine of

Paul de la Barthe Lord of Thermes

Paul de la Barthe was born in Couserans (Gascony) in 1482, son of Jean

7 P. de Bourdeille Brantome, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1868, volume IV, pp.I-5.

The Imperial Commanders

Alfonso d'Avalos, Marquis of Vasto

1525. In November of the same year, for his

In 1535, he was chosen by Charles V to becommander-in-chief of

P. de Bourdeille Brantome, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1864, volume I, pp.200-216;

Ferrante Sanseverino, Prince of Salerno

Aliprando was part of the noble Trentino- Tirolese house of Madruzzo,

2 C. Carucci, Don Ferrante Sanseverino Principe di Salerno, Salerno, 1899; R.

became Cardinal of Trento in 1545. As a prestigious diplomat, Cristoforo

3 L. Dal Pra, I Madruzzo e I'Europa (1539-1658). I principi vescovi di Trento tra

The Enfants Perdus and the Rise

The Enfants Perdus or Compagnons Perdus (Lost Children) were soldiers

During the sixteenth century, firearms became pivotal in military strategy.

him to aim downwards without the

The Italian infantry

landsknechts, supported by pieces of artillery under the command of Sixt

5 M. Sanudo, I Diarii, Venice 1882, volume VII, pp.349-350.

The Italian infantry of

7 P. Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana, Giulio Einaudi Editore 1952,

Livery, Heraldry and Garments of the Italian Infantry in Ceresole

The Imperial troops of the sixteenth century sported a red badge of

9 B. De Monluc, Commentaires et lettres, tome I, Paris 1864, p.166.

12 A. Ziggioto, Gliantichilibri di bandiere della BibliotecaReale e dell �rchivio di

Tactical Evolution of the Spanish

P. Pieri, Consalvo di Cordova e le origini del moderno esercito spagnolo, in Fernando

2 P. Pieri, cit. pp.213-222.

According to historian Piero Pieri, throughout the sixteenth century

The Spanish and Imperial Banners

5 M. Guazzo, Historie, Venice 1549, pp.324-325.

The French Infantry

L. Susane, Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie franraise, Paris 1849, tome I, pp.64-67.

2 L. Susane, cit. pp.68-73.

archers, and arquebusiers. There were also 2,000 Genoese crossbowmen,