853997

earch-article2019
EJD0010.1177/0959680119853997European Journal of Industrial RelationsIbsen

Article

European Journal of
Industrial Relations
Conciliation, mediation 2021, Vol. 27(1) 23­–39
© The Author(s) 2019
and arbitration in collective Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
bargaining in Western Europe: DOI: 10.1177/0959680119853997
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680119853997
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejd
In search of control

Christian Lyhne Ibsen

Michigan State University, USA

Abstract
Dispute resolution by third parties is a cornerstone of national industrial relations systems
across Europe. However, the formal powers of the institutions of conciliation, mediation and
arbitration vary considerably across countries. I aim to explain the existence of strong third-
party intervention across 17 Western European countries, using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative
analysis. I test two hypotheses: first, that strong institutions are established to control collective
bargaining when unions are powerful but fragmented; second, that strong institutions reflect
legal traditions that use civil courts rather than specialized labour courts. The analysis supports
the first hypothesis but not the second. Recent reforms since the Great Recession in Southern
European countries further corroborate this finding.

Keywords
Arbitration, collective bargaining, comparative study, conciliation, dispute resolution, Europe,
mediation, unions

Introduction
Across Europe, third-party intervention in collective bargaining has been a cornerstone
for resolving conflicts between capital and labour. Each country has in some way insti-
tutionalized voluntary or mandatory measures for conciliation, mediation or arbitration
(CMA) to help overcome stalemates and conflicts. Conciliation comprises activities
designed to bringing parties to the table, typically at a bargaining impasse; these include,
for example, information sharing, deliberation and persuasion. Mediation involves simi-
lar activities, but the third party can propose settlements. Arbitration includes the possi-
bility of making binding awards, giving the third party real decision-making power.

Corresponding author:
Christian Lyhne Ibsen, School of Human Resources and Labor Relations, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, MI 48824, USA.
Email: ibsenchr@msu.edu
24 European Journal of Industrial Relations 27(1)

There is potentially much to gain from strong CMA. First, costly labour conflict can
be averted without loss of bargaining autonomy, because collective bargaining is retained
as the regulatory process. Second, costly litigation can be avoided since CMA is typi-
cally not a legal process but an extension of negotiations. Third, by retaining bargaining
autonomy, both procedural and substantive legitimacy of settlements may be increased.
However, third-party intervention may be controversial if considered an intrusion into
free collective bargaining. In the end, the institutionalization of CMA is a matter of
political choices at specific times in specific contexts (Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003).
CMA constitutes a vital part of the collective bargaining machinery; despite some
erosion, it still regulates just less than 60 percent of the labour market in Europe
(European Commission, 2015). At the supranational level, both the EU and the ILO have
argued for CMA as a flexible alternative to costly labour conflicts (ILO, 2007). Yet few
studies have investigated CMA comparatively. They are often viewed as secondary insti-
tutions, overshadowed by phenomena such as social pacts (Avdagic et al., 2011), bar-
gaining centralization and levels (Traxler, 2004). There are many single-country studies,
usually by labour lawyers, but these are descriptive (Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003). As a corol-
lary, there is little theorization about different institutional designs of CMA across
Europe.
To fill this gap, I compare CMA institutions in 17 Western European countries and
explain the existence of strong third-party intervention before the Great Recession in
2008. I show that European countries have bestowed very different powers to CMA and
that this constitutes both an empirical and a theoretical puzzle. Some countries have
long-established institutions for CMA, like Denmark and the UK, while others such as
Greece have established CMA institutions much later. Yet others, like Sweden, have
recently reformed their institutions.
To explain differences, I use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA),
which allows for systematic comparison of cases in the search for necessary and/or suf-
ficient conditions for strong CMA. The next section presents the concept of CMA and
elaborates two hypotheses. Four conditions are included to explain strong CMA. I then
outline the research methods and data selection. After this, I present the empirical analy-
sis, using fsQCA to find necessary and/or sufficient conditions for strong CMA. I discuss
the empirical findings by zooming in on cases important to the hypotheses, and also refer
to some recent reforms after the Great Recession. Finally, I draw implications for future
research.

Literature on third-party intervention

The role of the third party is to facilitate linkages and information sharing, bringing
objectivity into conflict and potentially suggesting solutions or making settlements
(Walton and McKersie, 1965). The strength of CMA pertains to the force of the interven-
tion into bargaining and can be conceptualized on two dimensions (Stokke, 1998). The
first involves the powers of the third party; formal strength is lowest for conciliation
because the third party cannot propose a settlement; medium for mediation where it is
possible to present proposals, but these may be ignored; and highest for arbitration
because the third party can make a binding settlement. The second dimension is whether
Ibsen 25

Table 1. Dimensions of CMA.

Settlement results from

Parties themselves Proposal by third party Third-party decision

Voluntary 1. Voluntary 3. Voluntary mediation 5. Voluntary
conciliation (UK) (DE) arbitration (LU)
Compulsory 2. Compulsory 4. Compulsory 6. Compulsory
conciliation (CH) mediation (DK) arbitration (PT)

third-party intervention is voluntary or compulsory. Obviously, CMA based on voluntary

arrangements is weaker than compulsory arrangements. Table 1 provides a simple 2 × 3
categorization of CMA institutions according to these two dimensions, giving a country
example of each.
In addition to these dimensions, the literature on third-party intervention stresses
additional capabilities given to conciliators, mediators and arbitrators (Ibsen, 2016;
Jacobs, 1993). The first is the capacity to extend the bargaining process, either through a
cooling-off period (as in Italy) or as an extension of the notices given for industrial action
(as in Scandinavian countries). The main purpose is to give the parties more time not
only to reach an agreement but also to short-circuit threats of industrial action that might
impede advances in the bargaining process (Kerr, 1954). Some third parties are allowed
to make new attempts at conciliation or mediation if the first attempts resulted in indus-
trial action. Finally, interventions may be formally biased towards certain objectives,
such as defending competitiveness, curbing wage increases or supporting the weak bar-
gaining party. Clearly, these formal capabilities are not conceptually exhaustive of CMA,
but other idiosyncrasies are beyond the scope of this study.

Explaining strong CMA

While we have good descriptive country analyses of CMA institutions (Jacobs, 1993;
Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003; Welz and Eisner, 2006), I know of no systematic attempt to explain
differences. How do we explain formal strength of CMA? The work of Elvander (1974)
and Valdés Dal-Ré (2003) provides two plausible hypotheses that guide my explanatory
analysis.
In a comparative study of Sweden and Denmark, Elvander (1974) found strong CMA
when unions are uncoordinated or otherwise lacking governance capacity in collective
bargaining: a corporatist logic (Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982). Coordination across
unions representing different industries and across different levels of bargaining accord-
ing to this logic is necessary for stable collective bargaining, because it produces uniform
bargaining demands and dampens the incidence of wildcat strikes. Elvander argued that
strong CMA would exist when unions were fragmented and thus unable to coordinate
effectively; it would curb the higher risk of industrial action by intervening in conflicts
of interest that might lead to strikes and lockouts. Stokke (1998) corroborated this find-
ing in a comparative study of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. However, can this expla-
nation be generalized outside Scandinavia?
26 European Journal of Industrial Relations 27(1)

Elvander focused on union structure and governance rather than actual levels of
industrial conflict to explain strong CMA. This might seem odd as the level of industrial
action is a more direct measure of the need for some kind of third-party intervention.
However, the relationship between CMA institutions and level of industrial action could
also be reversed, as strong CMA might have a calming effect on strike levels. Moreover,
the quality and comparability of strike data are questionable, building on the different
definitions, reporting and monitoring of strikes in different countries. Thus, I use
Elvander’s original hypothesis.
Valdés Dal-Ré proposes an alternative explanation based on national legal traditions,
an argument akin to the legal origin thesis on labour regulation (Botero et al., 2004):
strong CMA originates from a legal tradition of labour court systems. Valdés Dal-Ré
(2003) poses two interlinked hypotheses. We should expect strong CMA when no special
priority is given to industrial courts or labour courts over normal civil or common law
courts, and where social partners are not significantly involved in the labour court
system.
Underlying the two hypotheses is the familiar concept of voluntarism in industrial
relations (Crouch, 1993). If there is a tradition of specialized industrial/labour courts
with representation of social partners (hence a high degree of self-regulation), then the
legal tradition for strong intervention in collective bargaining should be weak. Thus,
there is a parallel with Elvander’s stress on governance, but the causal mechanism is
different.
I argue that additional conditions should be added to these hypotheses. First, develop-
ment of strong CMA should occur where collective bargaining in general and the threat
of work stoppages specifically have attained sufficient importance in a country, thus
where unions are powerful. We should accordingly expect strong CMA only when union
density and bargaining coverage are high. Unions primarily (but not exclusively) derive
their bargaining power from the capacity to withdraw labour. In order to do so, they need
members who can threaten to stop working. In addition, bargaining coverage tells us the
weight of collective bargaining in an economy and therefore the scope of industrial
action across industries and sectors.
Second, if the access of social partners to industrial action is severely limited, then
there is no need for strong CMA. Conversely, if there are few restrictions, strong third-
party intervention to prevent conflicts of interest from developing into work stoppages
should be expected. The statutory or bilateral regulation of industrial action both con-
strains and enables collective work stoppages, the strike and lockout being the best
known examples. Most notably, the peace obligation during the duration of a signed
collective agreement suspends the right to industrial action and typically refers conflict
resolution to labour courts as conflicts of rights (Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003). In addition, some
countries restrict industrial action by procedural requirements regarding strike ballots. In
the UK, for example, balloting procedures together with the use of injunctions have
severely restricted union access to strikes (Dickens and Hall, 2003). Moreover, some
countries require prior notification of industrial action. Legal industrial action can also
mean different things in different countries, as certain practices (political strikes, picket-
ing, boycotts, blockades) may be allowed or disallowed (Warneck, 2007). Thus, the
Ibsen 27

Table 2. Conditions and set-relationships to outcome.

Conditions Condition→Outcome
LGOVCAP Low governance capacity LGOVCAP→STRCMA
STRUN Strong unions STRUN→STRCMA
LREGIND Lax regulation of industrial action LREGIND→STRCMA
CIVCOURT Normal civil court system CIVCOURT→STRCMA

fewer the types of actions allowed, the more restrictive the regulation of engaging in
industrial action.
Table 2 summarizes the conditions and hypothesized relations to strong CMA. The
conditions can work in conjunction with each other or alone. On the one hand, we would
not expect low governance capability (LGOVCAP) to be related to strong CMA in the
absence of powerful unions (STRUN). This is because unions have to be a threat to
industrial peace before the governance capability becomes relevant to designers of CMA.
In other words, STRUN and LGOVCAP in conjunction should result in strong CMA.
Similarly, we might expect lack of governance capability to be related to strong CMA if
regulation of industrial action is very lax (LREGIND). Again, LGOVCAP and LREGIND
work in conjunction to produce the outcome. However, LREGIND alone might also be
sufficient to produce the outcome. On the other hand, normal civil court system
(CIVCOURT) is based on legal tradition, and strong unions and threats to industrial
peace might not be necessary for designers to opt for strong CMA – it might be designed
simply out of tradition. Thus, we would expect CIVCOURT to work alone to produce the
outcome.

Methods and data

I focus on CMA institutions for intervention in conflicts of interest in collective bargain-
ing, not conflicts of rights (Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003). The focus is on institutions in the pri-
vate sector, since regulation of public sector collective bargaining is often restricted in
various ways, adding to complexities for comparative analysis (Stokke, 1998). I examine
17 Western European countries (EU (15) plus Switzerland and Norway), because all
have had independent trade unions for at least three decades and most have strong tradi-
tions of collective bargaining. Other advanced Western democracies have been omitted,
since European countries share important historical and cultural backgrounds that war-
rant comparison of these countries exclusively (Crouch, 1993).
Also, I limit my analysis to the years before the Great Recession for two reasons.
First, I rely on secondary sources that cover CMA institutions in a consistent compara-
tive manner, and the latest such studies were conducted before the Recession. Second,
the Recession was in many ways an extraordinary event which unleashed major changes
in national collective bargaining institutions, especially in Southern Europe (Marginson,
2015). In the ‘Discussion of findings’ section, I return to how we might understand some
of these reforms given my empirical findings.
28 European Journal of Industrial Relations 27(1)

Data for time-varying conditions (low governance capacity and strong unions) were
calibrated using average scores for the decades before and after the most recent impor-
tant reform of CMA institutions. I used this method to ensure that conditions and out-
come coincide and that calibration was not skewed by outliers. The decades for each
country can be seen in Supplemental Table A6. Note that institution-building in
Luxembourg, Denmark and Norway date back to years for which we have no consistent
data for governance capacity and trade union power. Here, I have used data for the dec-
ade closest to that of institution-building and have corroborated with national sources,
see Supplemental Tables A2 and A3. Likewise, Switzerland and the Netherlands base
their CMA on bilateral agreements between unions and employers and therefore do not
have a particular decade for institution-building. Here, general averages for 1960s–2010s
have been used. Finally, some countries have experienced slow implementation of
reform, which is considered for calibration which uses data from 1980 to 2000.
Calibration of fuzzy-set scores for the outcome, strong CMA (STRCMA), is based on
the formal rules for third-party intervention in collective bargaining. Calibration is based
on most current and available national expert sources and comparative studies. I use the
European Commission project on CMA edited by Valdés Dal-Ré (2003), an earlier
Commission project by Jacobs (1993) and the EIRO comparative study (Welz and Eisner,
2006). Three dimensions are calibrated: first, whether a country has arbitration (the
strongest variant), mediation (intermediate) or conciliation (weakest); second, whether
the intervention is mandatory or voluntary and third, which competencies mediators and
conciliators have at their disposal. Some countries have a mix of arbitration, mediation
and conciliation, in which cases the strongest form prevails. To avoid naïve formalistic
calibration, the national expert accounts also contain information about ‘dead letter’ CMA
systems that are never used, in which case the fuzzy score is calibrated accordingly.
Low governance capacity (LGOVCAP) is based on two qualitative measures. First is
the concentration and centralization of trade unions at both confederate and federate
union levels, using the index developed by Iversen (1999) and the updated measures by
Visser (2016) of both the vertical and horizontal concentration and authority in the union
movement, ranging from 0 (least centralized) to 1 (most centralized). These are com-
bined in a weighted average with a special indicator of confederate and federal veto
power over decisions to go on strike, arguably an important measure for the Elvander
hypothesis. Second is the wage coordination index, ranging from 1 (least coordinated) to
5 (most coordinated) (Visser, 2016). The indicator ranges from economy-wide bargain-
ing to fragmented company bargaining or no bargaining at all. Indicators of wage coor-
dination are helpful in measuring the degree of union fragmentation. Moreover, since
fragmentation correlates strongly with employer fragmentation, I only need indicators
for organizational fragmentation of unions (Martin and Swank, 2008). A weighted aver-
age score is calculated between the two with qualitative fuzzy-set thresholds. The cali-
bration of this condition is based on data from two decades, that preceding and that
following the most recent important reform of CMA institutions (see Supplemental
Material for details). For Denmark and Norway, important reforms predate the Visser
database and other sources have been used to corroborate the calibration. For Switzerland
and the Netherlands, there is no single important reform, so averages of all available
years have been used.
Ibsen 29

Strong unions (STRUN) is a weighted average of two quantitative measures: first is

the private sector union density and second is the bargaining coverage in the private sec-
tor, both taken from Visser (2016). Where private sector figures were not available, the
general coverage has been used. Like the calibration for LGOVCAP, calibration of this
condition is based on data from two decades, before and after the most recent important
reform of CMA institutions (see Supplemental Tables A3 and A6 for details). Likewise,
for Denmark and Norway, important reforms predate the Visser database and other
sources have been used to corroborate the calibration. For Switzerland and the
Netherlands, there is no single important reform, so averages of all available years have
been used.
Lax regulation of industrial action (LREGIND) is based on leximetric analysis on the
presence or absence of various formal measures restricting industrial action. The most
important is the presence of peace obligations during the duration of collective agree-
ments. Moreover, I have calibrated the range of actions allowed during labour conflicts
pertaining to collective bargaining. Cross-national studies by Warneck (2007), Jacobs
(1993) and Welz and Eisner (2006) were used as well as a host of national sources to
corroborate the comparative studies. A weighted average of the various regulatory meas-
ures is then calculated for each country. For the countries that have implemented sub-
stantial reforms of regulation of industrial action, I have chosen the regulation that
temporally aligns with reforms of CMA.
Normal civil court system (CIVCOURT) is also based on leximetric analysis concern-
ing the two aspects presented by Valdés Dal-Ré: the role of specialized industrial or
labour courts as against normal courts and the involvement of social partner representa-
tives in labour courts. The latter logically follows the former as representation is of sec-
ondary concern if specialized courts do not play an important role. In order to pass the
0.5 threshold, normal courts must have a privileged role (which they normally do not
have in Western European labour market regulation). I have used data from the European
Association of Labour Court Judges (EALCJ, 2013) and national expert accounts from
EIRO/EMIRE (EIRO, 2013). As court systems have deep historical roots and do not
change over the period in question (Botero et al., 2004), I did not find it necessary to
align the data of this condition with times of reforms of CMA.
I view my theoretical framework in terms of set-relations, searching for sufficiency
and necessity for strong CMA (Ragin, 2008). For example, if low governance capability
is a sufficient condition for strong CMA, then all cases with low governance capacity
should also have strong CMA. Alternatively, if low governance capability is a necessary
condition for strong CMA, then all cases with strong CMA should also have low govern-
ance capability.
I choose fsQCA for three reasons (see also Benassi and Vlandas, 2016). First, my
theoretical arguments are based on conjunctural causation. For example, I do not expect
low governance capability to be sufficient for strong CMA in the absence of strong
unions. FsQCA allows for conjunctural causation in mid-sized N studies that would be
impossible with interaction terms in conventional regression analysis (Schneider and
Wagemann, 2012). Second, it is very possible that more than one condition or combina-
tion of conditions is sufficient for strong CMA. In other words, both hypotheses could be
right. FsQCA allows for equifinality, whereas conventional statistical analysis provides
30 European Journal of Industrial Relations 27(1)

Table 3. Fuzzy-set scores for 17 countries.

LGOVCAP STRUN LREGIND CIVCOURT STRCMA

DE 0.59 0.74 0.39 0.00 0.16
AT 0.01 0.97 0.37 0.80 0.32
CH 0.67 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.64
NL 0.30 0.68 0.37 1.00 0.20
BE 0.53 0.78 0.83 0.40 0.68
LU 0.87 0.61 0.59 0.20 0.68
FR 0.91 0.64 0.78 0.00 0.40
IT 0.72 0.75 0.70 0.60 0.68
EL 0.69 0.77 0.84 1.00 0.80
PT 0.74 0.72 0.67 0.80 0.80
ES 0.79 0.70 0.57 0.60 1.00
GB 0.74 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.20
IE 0.60 0.16 0.44 0.00 0.40
SE 0.25 0.96 0.56 0.00 0.76
DK 0.59 0.79 0.19 0.00 1.00
FI 0.57 0.90 0.41 0.00 0.72
NO 0.06 0.76 0.24 0.00 1.00

net effects of the given independent variables. Third, I do not expect causal symmetry,
such that the conditions explaining strong CMA can be inversed to explain weak CMA.
Such an analysis might require a different set of conditions. Taken together with the lack
of temporal variation in institutions for CMA and the relatively small sample compared
to explanatory conditions, fsQCA was preferred to conventional statistical analysis.
FsQCA operates with fuzzy membership scores in the given conditions and outcome.
In traditional ‘crisp sets’, cases are either fully in a set (=1) or fully out (=0). With fuzzy
sets, membership scores can vary in degrees of membership between 1 and 0, with 0.5 as
a qualitative anchor (threshold) for cases that are neither in nor out (Ragin, 2008). For
this analysis, fuzzy-set membership scores for all 17 countries have been calibrated on
the four conditions and the outcome. Supplemental Table A7 summarizes the thresholds
used (raw data and calibrations can also be seen in the Supplemental data sheet).

Empirical analysis
In Table 3, the calibrated fuzzy-set membership scores are reported for the 17 countries.
Reading from left to right, the four conditions are reported in the first four columns and
the outcome in the last. With four conditions, there are 16 logically possible rows (24 = 16)
based on absence and presence of a condition. Ragin (2008) notes that there is a corre-
spondence between the rows of truth tables and the corners of the vector space defined
by fuzzy sets. This means that the four conditions create a four-dimensional ‘property
space’ in which cases are assigned positions according to their fuzzy scores and each
corner of this space constitutes 1 and 0, respectively, for each condition. Assigning set
Ibsen 31

membership scores, we find the corner to which a case most approximates (whether the
score is above 0.5 or not). The rows can therefore be understood as Weberian ‘ideal
types’ (Ragin, 2008). Logically, a case can have a membership score above 0.5 in only
one row or one ideal type.
Table 3 shows that 11 countries have strong CMAs (set membership scores in
STRCMA above 0.5). Looking at fuzzy-set scores in conditions, countries can be judged
using the ideal-typical typology of Nordic, Continental, Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean
employment relations models (Crouch, 1993). The Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden, have similar scores when it comes to strong unions and lack of
civil courts, and all have strong CMAs. However, both Denmark and Finland are mem-
bers, albeit barely, of the set of countries with low governance capacity. In addition,
Sweden has lax regulation of industrial action, unlike the other Nordic countries. The
Continental countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Benelux countries) are
more heterogeneous in both conditions and outcome. The Anglo-Saxon countries (UK
and Ireland) have relatively weak unions, low governance capacity, strong regulation of
industrial action and specialized labour courts together with weak CMA. Finally, the
Mediterranean countries share strong unions but low governance capacity, and weak
regulation of industrial action together with no specialized courts should yield strong
CMAs according to our hypotheses. Indeed, all Mediterranean countries except France
have strong CMAs.
The next step in the analysis is the search for necessary conditions for strong CMA.
Consistency of a necessary condition is given by the degree to which the membership of
each case in the condition is equal to or greater than its membership in the outcome, so
that the condition is always present when the outcome is present (Ragin, 2008). In
accordance with the conventions proposed by Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 143), I
set the threshold for consistency of necessity to 0.9. I also consider potential triviality of
necessary conditions and treat each condition (and its negation) independently. The
fsQCA 3.0 software tests for necessity shows that none of the conditions (or their nega-
tions) passes the 0.9 threshold for necessity. Strong unions come close with 0.85 consist-
ency and 0.75 coverage. However, on closer inspection, four countries with strong CMA
have lower memberships in the condition than in the outcome, thus violating the set-
theoretic requirement for necessity (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 139). Moreover, I
conducted an analysis of necessary conditions for the absence of strong CMA, and strong
unions also have high consistency for this outcome (0.88) which suggests that strong
unions alone are a trivial necessary condition, one that is present regardless of the out-
come (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). For example, Austria, Germany and the
Netherlands have high membership in the set of strong unions but all have weak CMA. I
therefore conclude that none of the conditions is necessary for the outcome and proceed
to test for sufficiency.
Table 4 shows the truth table in which each row represents each logical combination
of conditions, that is, 24 = 16 rows. The inclusion of rows for logical minimization is as
follows: there are nine logical remainders, as no cases ‘belong’ to these rows. Four of
these are ‘impossible remainders’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 154), about which
no assumptions should be made in our logical minimization. These are combinations of
high governance capacity (lgovcap) and weak unions (strun) which by definition cannot
32 European Journal of Industrial Relations 27(1)

Table 4. Truth table (standard analysis for sufficiency).

LGOVCAP STRUN LREGIND CIVCOURT Cases Raw PRI

consistency consistency
1 1 1 1 IT; EL: PT; ES 0.972528 0.949749
1 1 0 0 GE; DK; FI 0.892377 0.75
1 1 1 0 BE; LU; FR 0.888186 0.718085
1 0 0 0 CH; GB; IE 0.814634 0.54491
0 1 0 1 AT; NL 0.722846 0.267327
0 1 0 0 NO 0.932127 0.852217
0 1 1 0 SE 0.930521 0.81579
0 0 0 0 Impossible remainder
0 0 1 0 Impossible remainder
0 0 1 1 Impossible remainder
0 0 0 1 Impossible remainder
1 0 0 1 Logical remainder
1 1 0 1 Logical remainder
1 0 1 0 Logical remainder
1 0 1 1 Logical remainder
0 1 1 1 Logical remainder

exist since governance capacity is built around high bargaining coverage (Traxler, 2004).
It is, however, perfectly possible to have low governance capacity (LGOVCAP) and
strong/weak unions (STRUN/strun). Thus, the other five rows with no cases are all logi-
cal remainders for which we only use easy counterfactuals. Five rows were included for
logical minimization:

1. LGOVCAP*STRUN*LREGIND*CIVCOURT
2. LGOVCAP*STRUN*lregind*civcourt
3. LGOVCAP*STRUN*LREGIND*civcourt
4. lgovcap*STRUN*lregind*civcourt
5. lgovcap*STRUN*LREGIND*civcourt

Two of these rows contained logical contradictions – cases that share the combination
of conditions but not the outcome, but were nevertheless included as combinations lead-
ing to strong CMA. First, Germany, Denmark and Finland belong to the same row, but
Germany does not have strong CMA. Second, Belgium, Luxembourg and France belong
to the same row, but France does not have strong CMA. I opted to include the rows,
nonetheless, following the advice of Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 243) on how to
treat simultaneous subset relations. Using the Proportional Reduction in Error (PRI)
(Ragin, 2017: 39) consistency scores of the two rows for both strong CMA and weak
CMA, I find that both rows should be considered as sufficient only for strong CMA
because the PRI scores are larger for presence of the outcome than absence of the out-
come (0.75 vs 0.25 and 0.72 vs 0.26, respectively). I discuss Germany and France below
as deviant cases for consistency.
Ibsen 33

Table 5. Solutions.

Complex/Intermediate

Raw Unique Consistency Cases covered (set

coverage coverage membership in solution
term/outcome)
STRUN*civcourt 0.636973 0.233716 0.840708 SE (0.96, 0.76), FI (0.9,
0.72), DK (0.79, 1), NO
(0.76, 1), LU (0.62, 0.68),
BE (0.6, 0.68), GE (0.74,
0.16), FR (0.65, 0.4)
LGOVCAP*STRUN*LREGIND 0.576628 0.173372 0.902549 IT (0.7, 0.68), EL (0.69,
0.8), PT (0.67, 0.8), FR
(0.65, 0.4), LU (0.59,
0.68), ES (0.57, 1), BE
(0.53, 0.68)
Solution coverage: 0.810345.
Solution consistency: 0.859756.
Uncovered cases with strong CMA: CH.

Conversely, I excluded the row containing Switzerland, UK and Ireland, and the row
containing Austria and the Netherlands. While both rows had rather high raw consisten-
cies, above the conventional level of 0.8, none except Switzerland has strong CMA and
the rows were therefore not suitable to explain the outcome (although they could poten-
tially explain the absence of strong CMA).
In Table 5, I show two solutions produced by logical minimization in the fsQCA 3.0
software: the complex solution (no counterfactuals used) and the intermediate solution
(using only easy counterfactuals). In accordance with standard fsQCA practice, only
easy counterfactuals are used in the intermediate solution, when there are directional
expectations about a condition and its set-relation to an outcome (Schneider and
Wagemann, 2012). The logical minimization using easy counterfactuals in line with
directional expectations produces two causal paths to strong CMA, as seen in Table 5.
The complex and intermediate solutions are identical.
The solution consistency, 0.86, is highly satisfactory while the coverage is also satis-
factory at above 0.8. The results seem to disconfirm the Valdés Dal-Ré hypothesis. Only
the first causal path includes court systems, but contrary to expectations, strong CMA
exists in the absence of normal court systems, when specialized courts prevail. And it is
only in combination with strong unions that absence of normal courts is a condition for
strong CMA. On the contrary, the second causal path, low governance capacity, strong
unions and weak regulation of industrial action, fits well with the extended Elvander
hypothesis. Hence, low governance capacity is a sufficient condition for strong CMA but
only in combination with strong unions and weak strike rules, thus nuancing the original
Elvander argument. Strong unions are present in both paths, but as noted above, I do not
consider this a truly necessary condition.
34 European Journal of Industrial Relations 27(1)

On closer inspection, the cases seem to cluster geographically around the causal
paths. The first is the Nordic that includes Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway,
which all have membership scores in this combination of conditions above 0.5.
Luxembourg and Belgium are also members of the path and have strong CMAs. Finally,
France and Germany are members of this path, but neither have a strong CMA: they are
false negatives. The second path is the Mediterranean that includes Italy, Spain, Greece
and Portugal. Again, France is also a member but it is a false positive. Belgium and
Luxembourg are also members of the second path. Surprisingly, the extended Elvander
hypothesis fits better to Mediterranean countries than to the Nordic countries on which
the hypothesis was originally formulated. The two causal paths explain 10 out of the 11
cases with strong CMA (all but Switzerland, which is a deviant case for coverage, or a
false positive according to our theoretical expectations) (Schneider and Wagemann,
2012: 308–309).
I also ran several robustness checks of the solutions to check if recalibration of cases,
or if changing the frequency and consistency thresholds for inclusion in logical minimi-
zation, would affect solution terms. The robustness checks did not substantially change
the solutions from the present analysis.

Discussion of findings
The following discussion examines more closely the cases and the mechanisms behind
causal paths. I first discuss deviant cases and then proceed to within-case analysis of
mechanisms behind relationships between conditions and outcome.
Figure 1 provides a scatter plot of the set-relations between solutions (X) and outcome
(Y). Sufficiency is established when membership in the condition(s) is equal to or smaller
than membership in the outcome: cases should stay above or on the diagonal in the scat-
ter plot. In accordance with Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 308–310), I identify devi-
ant cases for consistency (the southeast quadrant) and deviant cases for coverage (the
northwest quadrant). Most cases stay above and close to the diagonal, although there are
a few near misses and two truly deviant cases (false negatives): France and Germany.
These two countries should be compared with similar cases to establish which omitted
conditions might explain why France has high memberships in both causal paths, and
Germany has high membership in STRUN*civcourt, while neither country has high
membership in the outcome. Switzerland, on the contrary, is a deviant case for coverage,
and false positive, and should be compared to irrelevant cases, the Netherlands, to see
which omitted conditions might explain its strong CMA.
Rojot et al. (2005) give a threefold explanation of weak CMA in France. First, the
prud’hommes system already includes conciliation procedures, making strong CMA
redundant. Second, French law prohibits any contractual clauses specifying use of CMA
that impede the individual right to strike. Third, state labour inspectors can advise and
conciliate in order to prevent collective disputes from arising in the first place. In con-
trast, other Mediterranean countries set up CMA during the 1980s and 1990s to ‘democ-
ratize’ collective bargaining and interest politics from its past (Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003).
Moreover, reforms of CMA in Portugal and Greece were clearly aimed at curbing indus-
trial unrest and possible wage inflation in relation to EMU accession, bringing about
Ibsen 35

Figure 1. XY scatter plot of solutions (X) and outcome (Y).

what commentators have called ‘competitive corporatism’ (Rhodes, 1997). I discuss

recent reforms connected to the Great Recession in these countries below.
Germany’s weak CMA can be contrasted with the strong CMA of Scandinavian coun-
tries, all building on voluntarist self-regulation and a coordinated market economy
(Zachert, 2003). Germany had a compulsory system of state arbitration during the
Weimar Republic, but this was replaced by the current weak CMA (Jacobi et al., 1998:
216). The traumas of Weimar most likely deterred German policymakers from strong
intervention into collective bargaining despite situations of industrial unrest, economic
crisis and low governance capacity (Zachert, 2003: 178). Conversely, strong CMA in
Scandinavia can be traced to economic crises with large-scale industrial unrest and low
governance capacity (Stokke, 1998).
Switzerland can be compared to the Netherlands. In 1937, the Swiss tradition for
consensual industrial relations was institutionalized with an agreement for the engineer-
ing industry, which included a multi-stage mediation system and possibility of compul-
sory arbitration. As Oesch (2011) remarks, unions and collective bargaining, although
relatively weak, were tolerated as long as they contributed to peaceful relations and as
implementers of social and labour market policies. By contrast, the Netherlands since
36 European Journal of Industrial Relations 27(1)

1950 had an established tradition of corporatist control of wage settlements, which made
strong CMA redundant (Visser, 1998).
In the UK, ACAS is built around the historical tradition of voluntarism and ‘gentle-
men’s agreements’ between union and employers, inhibiting third-party intervention
based on mandatory procedures. After industrial disputes were at a highpoint in the
1970s, the Thatcher government pursued stricter regulation of industrial action instead of
strengthening CMA (Dickens and Hall, 2003; Kilpatrick, 2003; Mumford, 1996). Thus,
restrictions on industrial action and debilitation of unions made strong CMA redundant.
The within-case analysis seems to suggest that the underlying mechanism in our two paths
to strong CMA is about a search for control over industrial relations, and especially strong
unions (Ibsen, 2015). Elvander argued that strong unions with low governance capacity in
Denmark led to strong CMA; looking at the 1934 reform, this was certainly the case, as control
over decentralized, strong unions was the main aim and high governance capacity came later
(Due et al., 1994). Similar patterns occurred in Norway in 1935 (Stokke, 1998). The same is
true for the 1997 and 2000 reforms of Swedish CMA against the backdrop of industrial unrest
and wage inflation. Elvander (2002) thus suggested that Sweden’s reform of its mediation
institutions could largely be explained by the apparent governance problems of Swedish social
partners and the will of governments to steer bargaining without undermining it.
The extended Elvander hypothesis about control over collective bargaining and wage
increases in particular is supported by recent reforms of CMA since the Great Recession
in Greece and Spain (Molina, 2014: 28–29). In Greece, legislation in 2010 made it pos-
sible for employers to resort unilaterally to arbitration in case of disagreement with a
mediation proposal. In 2012, a new law made consent by both parties necessary for
arbitration. Moreover, after a recommendation by the Troika, in 2011, the government
announced that it would use all available measures to achieve the goal of wage modera-
tion which included intervening directly in the resolution of some arbitration cases by
OMED. In Spain, a 2011 reform made recourse to mediation compulsory in disputes
regarding either collective agreement renewal or implementation of internal flexibility.
If no agreement is reached with mediation, arbitration within the SIMA is compulsory. A
2012 reform also made compulsory arbitration by the CCCC possible in conflicts regard-
ing opt-outs from sectoral agreements. Clearly, these recent reforms were about control
of collective bargaining and of trade unions.
Conversely, other countries have resisted strong CMA either because it was not neces-
sary since unions were under control or weak, as in the Netherlands, Switzerland and the
UK, or because the preference for non-intervention was stronger than the threat of adver-
sarial industrial relations, as in Germany and France. This puts strong unions and low
governance capacity at the heart of explanations for strong CMA, in line with the
Elvander thesis based on Scandinavian countries, all with strong unions but differences
in governance capacity.

Conclusion
I have aimed to explain the existence of strong CMA in 17 Western European countries
using fsQCA. In all these countries, CMA plays some role in collective bargaining, a
Ibsen 37

regulatory process still vital to European labour markets. In 11 of these, I find rather
strong CMA systems that are potentially pivotal in structuring bargaining processes
and outcomes. What explains this difference? I identified four explanatory conditions
related to strong CMA: strong unions, low governance capacity (Elvander), weak reg-
ulation of industrial action, and absence of specialized labour courts (Valdés Dal-Ré).
My analysis shows two causal paths to strong CMA: the first combines strong unions
with absence of civil labour courts; the second, low governance capacity, strong unions
and weak regulation of industrial action.
None of the conditions was consistently necessary for strong CMA, although
strong unions are present in both causal paths. Strong unions could be considered an
insufficient but non-redundant part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but suf-
ficient for the occurrence of the effect, because they are necessary for strong CMA to
be established but only in combination with other conditions. The solution terms had
satisfactory consistency and coverage levels and withstood robustness tests. On the
basis of these results, the Elvander hypothesis was partly supported while that of
Valdés Dal-Ré was not. Within-case analysis furthermore suggests that the underlying
mechanism in our two paths to strong CMA is a search for control over industrial rela-
tions, and especially strong unions. For example, reforms to strengthen CMA in
Nordic countries were consistently linked to abnormal periods or situations of low
governance capacity. Similarly, the Mediterranean countries have set up stronger
CMA in a post-fascist attempt to ‘democratize’ collective bargaining and interest poli-
tics from its past, and recent reforms of CMA in Portugal and Greece were clearly
aimed at curbing industrial unrest and possible wage inflation in relation to EMU
accession. The same can be said of reforms during the Great Recession. I conclude
that the mechanism leading to strong CMA is control over collective bargaining, and
the impetus for institutionalizing control has been strong unions and low governance
capacity, just as Elvander proposed. Traditions of court systems, however, are not
causally relevant.
Future research into CMA and collective bargaining should accordingly focus on the
mechanism of control by primarily government. My study has highlighted the structural
impetus – so-called remote factors (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006) – for control over
collective bargaining: strong unions and low governance capacity. The actual translation
of this impetus into institution-building and design, however, is political. In other words,
political interests and coalitions leading to strong CMA should be investigated. This
could be done cross-nationally, as in this study, or longitudinally in process-tracing of
reforms (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). There is also a need to investigate the impact
of CMA on practice (Ibsen, 2016). Do formal CMA institutions actually affect collective
bargaining processes and outcomes, and how? Are the formal differences visible in CMA
practice? Such analysis has been done in national case studies but, as noted, less so in
cross-national comparative work.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
38 European Journal of Industrial Relations 27(1)

Supplemental material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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Author biography
Christian Lyhne Ibsen is Assistant Professor at the School of Human Resources and Labour
Relations, Michigan State University, and Associate Professor at FAOS, University of Copenhagen.