16.02.

2022
Racpan vs. Barroga-Haigh, G.R. No. 23449, June 06, 2018 – Real Actions vs. Personal Actions
Facts:
1. Petitioner, Ruby Racpan filed a Complaint “For Declaration For Nullity of Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase & Attorney’s Fees” before the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City.
2. In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that after his wife’s death he instructed their daughter
to arrange his wife’s important documents. - - - their daughter discovered a Deed of Sale
with right to purchase.
3. The Deed of Sale was signed by him and his late wife and appeared to convey to
respondent Sharon Barroga-Haigh a real property registered in his name.
4. Petitioner maintained that the Deed of Sale was falsified and fictitious as he never signed
any contract, not even any special power of attorney, for the sale or conveyance of the
property which is still in his possession. Thus, he prayed for the declaration of the Deed
of Sale’s nullity.
5. In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent contended by way of
affirmative defense, that the venue of the Complaint was improperly laid and that the
filling of the case lacks the mandatory requirement of Barangay Clearance.
6. The RTC dismissed the complaint. So. It was appealed in CA.
7. The CA explained that petitioner's Complaint is a real action as it wants the court to
abrogate and nullify -whatever right or claim the respondent might have on the property
subject of the Deed of Sale. Hence, for the appellate court, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court is applicable. Under this Rule, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved is
situated. As the property involved is located in Bo.Tuganay, Municipality of Carmen,
Province of Davao del Norte, the appellate court held that the Complaint should have
been lodged with the RTC of Davao del Norte and not the RTC-Davao.
8. Further, the CA found that the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is a mere ploy to avoid the requirement of a barangay conciliation, as a mere
annotation of a notice of lis pendens would achieve the same effect without having to
undergo trial or post a bond.
Issue:
Whether the complaint should be dismissed because it was laid in a wrong venue.
Held:
No, the complaint should not be dismissed because it was properly laid to the right venue
as it was a personal action not a real action.
 The nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In turn, the
nature of the action determines its proper venue. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides the rules
on the situs for bringing real and personal actions.
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTION
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of
the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. –
LOCAL ACTION
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hontanosas, Jr., The Rules of Court declares “all other
actions” as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal
property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.
In Chua v. Total Office Products and Services, lnc., the Court ruled that where the action is not
intended for the recovery of real property but solely for the annulment of a contract, it is a
personal action that may be filed in the court where the plaintiff or the respondent resides.
In the Complaint filed with the court, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase on the strength of this claim: he did not sign the same nor did he execute
any special power of attorney in favor of his late wife to do so in his behalf. But, as there was no
allegation that the possession and title to the property have been transferred to respondent,
nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege or pray for the recovery or reconveyance of the
real property.
Thus, the Complaint was not concerned with the title to or recovery of the real property, it was a
personal action. Thus, Davao City, where both the petitioner and the respondent reside is the
proper venue for the complaint.
Specified Contractors, etc. bs. Pobocan, G.R. No. 212472, January 11, 2018 – Real Actions
Facts:
1. The respondent was in the employ of Specified Contractors until his retirement sometime
in Mach 2011. His last position was president of Specified Contractors and its subsidiary,
Starland Properties Inc., as well as executive of its other subsidiaries and affiliates.
 2. Architect Olonan Allegedly agreed to give respondent one (1) unit for every building
Specified Contractors were able to construct as part of respondent’s compensation
package to entice him to stay with the company.
3. Two (2) of these projects that Specified Contractors and respondent were able to build
were the Xavierville Square Condominium in Quezon City and the Sunrise Holiday
Mansion Bldg. I in Alfonso, Cavite.
4. Pursuant to the alleged oral agreement, Specified Contractors supposedly ceded, assigned
and transferred Unit 708 of Xavierville Square Condominium and Unit 208 of Sunrise
Holiday Mansion Bldg. I (subject units) in favor of respondent.
5. In a March 14, 2011 letter addressed to petitioner Architect Enrique Olonan as chairman
of Specified Contractors, respondent requested the execution of Deeds of Assignment or
Deeds of Sale over the subject units in his favor, along with various other benefits, in
view of his impending retirement.
6. On January 17, 2012, petitioners, instead of filing an answer, interposed a Motion to
Dismiss[9] denying the existence of the alleged oral agreement. They argued that, even
assuming arguendo that there was such an oral agreement, the alleged contract is
unenforceable for being in violation of the statute of frauds, nor was there any written
document, note or memorandum showing that the subject units have in fact been ceded,
assigned or transferred to respondent. Moreover, assuming again that said agreement
existed, the cause of action had long prescribed because the alleged agreements were
supposedly entered into in 1994 and 1999 as indicated in respondent's March 14, 2011
demand letter.
7. The RTC, in granting the motion, dismissed the respondent's complaint in its June 4,
2012 Order. While the RTC disagreed with petitioners that the action had already
prescribed under Articles 1144[11] and 1145[12] of the New Civil Code, by reasoning
that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which prescribes after 30 years
conformably with Article 1141[13], it nonetheless agreed that the alleged agreement
should have been put into writing, and that such written note, memorandum or agreement
should have been attached as actionable documents to respondent's complaint.
8. On appeal, the CA reversed[14] the RTC's June 4, 2012 Order, reasoning that the
dismissal of respondent's complaint, anchored on the violation of the statute of frauds, is
unwarranted since the rule applies only to executory and not to completed or partially
consummated contracts.
Issue:
Whether Architect Olonan’s cause of action had already prescribed considering that, it is
a personal action and not a real action.
Held:
YES, Architect Olonan’s cause of action had already prescribed because it was a personal
action not a real action.
What determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In his complaint, respondent
claimed that petitioners promised to convey to him the subject units to entice him to stay with
their company. From this, respondent prayed that petitioners be compelled to perform their part
of the alleged oral agreement. The objective of the suit is to compel petitioners to perform an act
specifically, to execute written instruments pursuant to a previous oral contract. Notably, the
respondent does not claim ownership of, nor title to, the subject properties.

Not all actions involving real property are real actions. In Spouses Saraza, et al. v. Francisco, it
was clarified that:

x x x Although the end result of the respondent's claim was the transfer of the subject property to
his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it
sought Fernando's execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had
previously made.
As the Court has ascertained that the present suit is essentially for specific performance - a
personal action - over which the court a quo had jurisdiction, it was therefore erroneous for it to
have treated the complaint as a real action which prescribes after 30 years under Article 1141 of
the New Civil Code. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property,
the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are
those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. As a personal action
based upon an oral contract, Article 1145 providing a prescriptive period of six years applies in
this case instead. The shorter period provided by law to institute an action based on an oral
contract is due to the frailty of human memory. Nothing prevented the parties from reducing the
alleged oral agreement into writing, stipulating the same in a contract of employment or
partnership, or even mentioning the same in an office memorandum early on.
In this case, the respondent's complaint was ingeniously silent as to when the alleged oral
agreement came about, his March 14, 2011 demand letter annexed to his complaint categorically
cites the year 1994 as when he and Architect Olonan allegedly had an oral agreement to become
"industrial partners" for which he would be given a unit from every building they constructed.
The complaint for specific performance was instituted on November 21, 2011, or 17 years from
the oral agreement of 1994 and almost 12 years after the December 1, 1999 oral agreement.
Thus, the respondent's action upon an oral contract was filed beyond the six-year period within
which he should have instituted the same.
Therefore, the complaint should have been dismissed by the RTC on the ground of prescription.
Pajares vs. Remarkable Laundry, etc. G.R. No. 212690, February 20, 2017 – Pecuniary
Estimation
Facts:
 1. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning, the respondent, filed a Complaint denominated
as “Breach of Contract and Damages against spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares, the
petitioners, before the RTC of Cebu City.
2. Remarkable Laundry alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract
with Pajares whereby the latter, acting as a dealer outlet, shall accept and receive items or
materials for laundry which are then picked up and processed by former in its main plant
or laundry outlet.
3. Pajares violated the contract, which required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry
items each week, when, on April 30, 2012, they ceased dealer outlet operations on
account of lack of personnel;
4. Remarkable Laundry made written demands upon Pajares for the payment of penalties
imposed and provided for in the contract, but the latter failed to pay; and, that petitioners'
violation constitutes breach of contract.
5. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that
Remarkable Laundry’s is for recovery of damages for the alleged breach of contract for a
total amount of P280,000 of damages.
6. Under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
the amount of demand or claim in the complaint for the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction shall exceed P300,000.00; otherwise, the action
shall fall under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In this case, the total
amount of demand in the complaint is only P280,000.00, which is less than the
jurisdictional amount of the RTCs. Hence, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over the
instant case.
7. Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration for breach of contract, or one whose
subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation; jurisdiction thus falls with the RTC.
However, the RTC held its ground.
8. The CA rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the Order of the RTC and remanding
the case to the court. In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought
must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on
the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary
estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.
Issue:
Whether the RTC should take cognizance to the case on the basis that it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Held:
 NO, the RTC should not take cognizance to the case because it is capable of pecuniary
estimation, and the estimated amount is less than the amount for the RTC recognize it within its
jurisdiction.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal trial
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the Complaint shows that there is
nothing therein which would support a conclusion that respondent's Complaint is one for specific
performance or rescission of contract. It should be recalled that the principal obligation of
petitioners under the Remarkable Laundry Dealership Contract is to act as respondent's dealer
outlet. Respondent, however, neither asked the RTC to compel petitioners to perform such
obligation as contemplated in said contract nor sought the rescission thereof. In fact, neither
phrase appeared on or was used in the Complaint when, for purposes of clarity, respondent's
counsels, who are presumed to be learned in law, could and should have used any of those
phrases to indicate the proper designation of the Complaint. To the contrary, respondent's
counsels designated the Complaint as one for "Breach of Contract & Damages," which is a
misnomer and inaccurate. This erroneous notion was reiterated in respondent's Memorandum
wherein it was stated that "the main action of CEB 39025 is one for a breach of contract."
There is no such thing as an "action for breach of contract." Rather, "[b]reach of contract
is a cause of action, but not the action or relief itself" Breach of contract may be the cause of
action in a complaint for specific performance or rescission of contract, both of which are
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, cognizable by the RTC. However, as will be
discussed below, breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a complaint for damages.
A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory obligation contained in the penal
clause is actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary estimation.
Neither can the court sustain respondent's contention that its Complaint is incapable of
pecuniary estimation since it primarily seeks to enforce the penal clause of the contract.
To the mind of the court, petitioner’s responsibility under the penal clause of the contract
involves the payment of liquidated damages because under Article 2226[35] of the Civil Code
the amount the parties stipulated to pay in case of breach are liquidated damages. "It is attached
to an obligation in order to ensure performance and has a double function:(1) to provide for
liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the threat of
greater responsibility in the event of breach."
Concomitantly, what respondent primarily seeks in its Complaint is to recover aforesaid
liquidated damages (which it termed as "incidental and consequential damages") premised on the
alleged breach of contract committed by the petitioners when they unilaterally ceased business
operations. Breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a complaint for damages filed
pursuant to Article 1170 of the Civil Code. It provides:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof; are liable for
damages. (Emphasis supplied.
In Pacmac, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[37] this Court held that the party who
unilaterally terminated the exclusive distributorship contract without any legal justification can
be held liable for damages by reason of the breach committed pursuant to Article 1170.
In sum, after juxtaposing Article IV of the Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract vis-à-vis
the prayer sought in respondent's Complaint, this Court is convinced that said Complaint is one
for damages.
In an action for damages, the court which has jurisdiction is determined by the total
amount of damages claimed.
Under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
the amount of demand or claim in the complaint for the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction shall exceed P300,000.00; otherwise, the action shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In this case, the total amount of demand in the
complaint is only P280,000.00, which is less than the jurisdictional amount of the RTC.
Sarmiento Property Holdings vs. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 202836, June
19, 2018 – Pecuniary Estimation
Facts:
1. First Sarmiento obtained from Philippine Bank of Communications a P40,000,000 loan,
which was secured by a real-estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land, which the
amount of loan was gradually increased.
2. PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, it claimed
in its Petition that it sent First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still
failed to pay the principal amount and accrued interest on the loan. This prompted
PBCOM to resort to extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, a recourse
granted to it under the loan agreement.
3. The RTC of Malolos, Bulacan granted First Sarmiento’s Urgent Motion to Consider the
Value of Subject Matter of the Complaint as not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation, and
ruled that First Sarmiento’s action for annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
 4. The mortgage properties were auctioned and sold to PBCOM as the highest bidder.
5. First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and its
amendments with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. In his complaint that it never received the loan proceeds of P100,000,000
from PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extra extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Ex-Officio Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage or registering the certificate of sale in PBCOM's favor with the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
6. That same day, Judge Francisco issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order for 72
hours, enjoining the registration of the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan.
7. In its Opposition (Re: Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order),
PBCOM asserted that the Regional Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over First
Sarmiento's Complaint because the action for annulment of mortgage was a real action;
thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair market value of the
mortgaged properties.
PBCOM also pointed out that the Regional Trial Court's directive to maintain the status
quo order beyond 72 hours constituted an indefinite extension of the temporary
restraining order, a clear contravention of the rules.
8. Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan dismissed the Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction: Following the High Court's ruling in the case of Home Guaranty Corporation
v. R. II Builders, Inc. and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 192549, March 9, 2011,
cited by the bank in its Rejoinder, which appears to be the latest jurisprudence on the
matter to the effect that an action for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate
to efface the true objective and nature of the action which is to recover real property.
9. First Sarmiento sought direct recourse to this Court with its Petition for Review[29]
under Rule 45. It insists that its Complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage was
incapable of pecuniary estimation. It points out that the Executive Judge and Vice-
Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court likewise acknowledged that its action was
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento Corporation,
Inc.’s Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage.
Held:
YES, the RTC of City of Malolos has obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento
Corporation for annulment of real estate mortgage.
Lapitan v. Scandia instructed that to determine whether the subject matter of an action in
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first
be established. This finds support in this Court's repeated pronouncement that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is determined by examining the material allegations of the complaint and the
relief sought
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim.

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, the Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
In this case, petitioner's Complaint convinces this Court that petitioner never prayed for
the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its
ownership or possession over them. Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real
estate mortgage that it entered into with respondent because it supposedly never received the
proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan agreement.
Therefore, having the petitioners not praying for the recovery or reconveyance of the
mortgage of properties, instead it prayed for the annulment of the real estate mortgage it entered
into with respondent, so the case was incapable of pecuniary measure. Therefore, there was no
reason to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Bernabo, et al., vs. Heirs of Roman Tapulao, et al., G.R. No. 227482, July 1, 2019 – Assessed
Value
Facts:
1. Respondent Heirs of Roman Tapulo namely: Albert D. Tapulao, Danilo D. Tapulao,
Marieta Tapulao-Reyes, Linda Tapulao-Ramirez, and Josefina Tapulao-Dacanay filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioners Joaquin Berbano,
Trinidad Berbano, and Melchor Berbano.
2. In their Complaint, respondents averred that their father Roman Tapulao was the
registered owner of a lot located in Taguing, Baggao, Cagayan covered by Original
Certificate of Title. They paid the realty taxes thereon.
3. After the death of Roman Tapulao and his wife Catalina Casabar-Tapulao, respondents
caused the relocation survey of the lot. It revealed that petitioners occupied portions of
the lot. Despite several demands, however, petitioners refused to vacate and return the lot
to respondents.
 4. In their Answer, petitioners argued that the original owner of the lot was Felipe Peña.
Sometime in 1954, Felipe Peña ceded his possession over half hectare of the lot in favor
of Joaquin Berbano. From that time on, Joaquin had been in open and exclusive
possession of the lot.
5. Subsequently, Felipe Peña sold the adjacent lot to Roman Tapulao. When Roman
Tapulao caused its registration, the survey mistakenly included therein the adjacent lot
belonging to Joaquin. As a result, OCT No. P-9331 (in the name of Roman Tapulao) also
covered Joaquin's lot. Roman and Catalina Tapulao acknowledged this error through their
Affidavit dated April 2, 1976. They promised to respect Joaquin's ownership of that
specific portion.
6. The RTC erred declared that the plaintiffs where the rightful owner and ordered the
defendants to vacate the portion occupied by them and surrender possession.
7. In their motion for reconsideration, for the first time, petitioners raised the issue of
jurisdiction. They asserted that since the value of the lot (less than P20,000.00), the case
fell within the jurisdiction of the first level courts.
8. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC ruling that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the case because properties with assessed value of more than P20,000.00 fell within the
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Issue:
Whether the RTC obtained jurisdiction over the case considering the assessed value.
Held:
YES, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case considering the assessed value of the
property.
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),16
enumerates the cases falling within the jurisdiction of the RTCs, viz:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
On the other hand, Section 33 of BP 129 enumerates the cases falling within the jurisdiction of
the MTCs, Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs ), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs ),
viz:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (950,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
In this case, petitioners' claim that the property in dispute is only a specific portion of the
lot or only 6,804 square meters, which supposedly carries the proportional assessed value of
P8,111.72, is irrelevant. It does not alter what is actually alleged in the complaint. Besides, it is
not for petitioners to define the allegations in their adversaries' complaint. That is the
respondents' prerogative as plaintiffs below.
Therefore, the complaint allegation that the assessed value of the lot subject of the case is
P22,070.00. In accordance with BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, since the value of the subject
matter exceeds P20,000.00, the same falls within the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Hence, the RTC-
Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Frias vs. Alcayde, G.R. No. 174909, January 28, 2018 – Summons; substituted service
Facts:
1. Petitioner Bobie Rose D.V. Frias, as lessor and respondent Rolando Alcayde, as lessee,
entered into a Contract of Lease involving a residential house and lot (subject property)
located at Batangas East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City, for a period of one
year.
2. Respondent refused to perform any of his contractual obligations, which had accumulated
for 24 months in rental arrearages.
3. This prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, against the
respondent.
4. As per the Process Server’s Return the process server, Tobias N. Abellano (Mr.
Abellano) Tried to personally serve the summons but to no avail.
 5. Through substituted service, summons was served upon respondent’s caretaker, May Ann
Fortiles (Ms. Fortiles).
6. The MeTC rendered a Decision,9 in favor of the petitioner and ordered respondent to
vacate the subject premises and to pay the petitioner the accrued rentals at 12% legal
interest, plus ₱10,000 in attorney’s fees.
7. the MeTC issued an Order,11 granting petitioner’s Motion to execute the Decision
8. Petitioner, through her representative, Marie Regine F. Fujita (Ms. Fujita), filed a
Preliminary Submission to Dismiss Petition – Special Appearance Raising Jurisdictional
Issues (Preliminary Submission), on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person.24
She pointed out that the defect in the service of summons is immediately apparent on the
Officer’s Return, since it did not indicate the impossibility of a personal service within a
reasonable time; it did not specify the efforts exerted by Sheriff Tolentino to locate the
petitioner; and it did not certify that the person in the office who received the summons in
petitioner’s behalf was one with whom the petitioner had a relation of confidence
ensuring that the latter would receive or would be notified of the summons issued in her
name.
Issue:
Whether the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the basis of a defect in the
service of summons.
Held:
YES, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the basis of a defect in the
service of summons.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner once the complaint or petition is
filed. On the other hand, there are two ways through which jurisdiction over the defendant or
respondent is acquired through coercive process – either through the service of summons upon
them or through their voluntary appearance in court.
In the case of Guiguino Credit Cooperative, Inc vs. Torress, the court discussed the
function of summons in court action which stated that, the service of summons is intended to
give official notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it.
The service of summons upon the defendant becomes an important element in the operation of a
court’s jurisdiction upon a party to a suit, as service of summons upon the defendant is the means
by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Without service of summons, or when
summons are improperly made, both the trial and the judgment, being in violation of due
process, are null and void, unless the defendant waives the service of summons by voluntarily
appearing and answering the suit.
Furthermore, the court declared that jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or
respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a case against
him unless he was validly served with summons.
In this case, it was not possible to serve the defendant a personal summons, so the officer may
use a substituted service. However, he must follow the requisites of substituted service for it to
be valid.
The Court explained the nature and enumerated the requisites of substituted service in
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one (1) month
which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several
attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two (2) different dates. In
addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant,
the names of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other
acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the
Return to justify substituted service.
In this case, The Officer's Return revealed that no diligent effort was exerted and no
positive step was taken to locate and serve the summons personally on the petitioner. Upon
having been satisfied that the petitioner was not present at her given address, Sheriff Tolentino
immediately resorted to substituted service of summons by proceeding to the office of Atty.
Frias, petitioner's counsel. Evidently, Sheriff Tolentino failed to show that she made several
attempts to effect personal service for at least three times on at least two different dates. It is
likewise evident that Sheriff Tolentino simply left the "Notice of Raffle and Summons" with Ms.
Gonzales, the alleged secretary of Atty. Frias. She did not even bother to ask her where the
petitioner might be. There were no details in the Officer's Return that would suggest that Sheriff
Tolentino inquired as to the identity of Ms. Gonzales.
Indeed, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts
exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice
for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. Therefore,Sheriff
Tolentino fell short of these standards. For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply
with the requirements of substituted service, the same is rendered ineffective
Florete vs. Florete, G.R. No. 174909, January 20, 2016 – Indispensable Party
Facts:
1. People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. (People's Broadcasting) is a private corporation
authorized to operate, own, maintain, install, and construct radio and television stations in
the Philippines.
2. In its incorporation it had an authorized capital stock of P250,000.00 divided into 2,500
shares at PI00.00 par value per share.
3. Two of the stockholders were Marcelino Florete, Sr. owning 250 shares and Salome
Florete owning 100 shares.
4. Berlin and Sudario resigned from their positions as General Manager and Station
Supervisor, respectively.Berlin and Sudario each transferred 20 shares to Raul Muyco
and Estrella Mirasol.
5. Salome died and Marcelino, Sr. suffered a stroke which left him paralyzed and bedridden
until his death.
6. After Marcelino, Sr.'s stroke, their son, Rogelio, Sr. started managing the affairs of
People's Broadcasting.
7. In the meantime, Rogelio, Sr. transferred a portion of his shareholdings to the members
of his immediate family, namely: Imelda Florete, Rogelio Florete, Jr., and Margaret Ruth
Florete, as well as to Diamel Corporation, a corporation owned by Rogelio, Sr.'s family.
8. Marcelino, Jr., Ma. Elena, and Raul Muyco (Marcelino, Jr. Group) filed before the
Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Issuances, Transfers and
Sale of Shares in People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. and All Posterior Subscriptions and
Increases thereto with Damages against Diamel Corporation, Rogelio, Sr., Imelda
Florete, Margaret Florete, and Rogelio Florete, Jr. (Rogelio, Sr. Group).
9. The Regional Trial Court issued a Decision (which it called a "Placitum") dismissing the
Marcelino, Jr. Group's Complaint. It ruled that the Marcelino, Jr. Group did not have a
cause of action against the Rogelio, Sr. Group and that the former is estopped from
questioning the assailed movement of shares of People's Broadcasting. It also ruled that
indispensible parties were not joined in their Complaint.

According to the trial court, the indispensable parties would include: [Marcelino, Sr.]
and/or his estate and/or his heirs, [Salome] and/or her estate and/or her heirs,
[Divinagracia] and/or his estate and/or his successors-in-interest, [Teresita] and/or her
estate and/or her own successors-in-interest, the other [People's Broadcasting Service,
Inc.] stockholders who may be actually beneficial owners and not purely nominees, all
the so called nominal stockholders. . . [and] the various [People's Broadcasting Service,
Inc.] Corporate Secretaries[.]"
10. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Marcelino, Jr. Group did not have a cause of action
against those whom they have impleaded as defendants. It also noted that the principal
obligors in or perpetrators of the assailed transactions were persons other than those in
the Rogelio, Sr. Group who have not been impleaded as parties. Thus, the Court of
Appeals emphasized that the following parties were indispensable to the case: People's
Broadcasting; Marcelino, Sr.; Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.; Salome;
Divinagracia; Teresita; and "other stockholders of [People's Broadcasting] to whom the
shares were transferred or the nominees of the stockholders."
Issue:
Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction considering the absence of indispensable party
Held:
No, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction because of the absence of indispensable party.
An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest.
In the recent case of Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA-
KMU) v. Keihin Philippines Corporation, the Court had the occasion to state that:
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a
failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It
is "precisely 'when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be
dismissed.'
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present." The
purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues
not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected
by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of
indispensable parties.
In this case, the principal obligors in or perpetrators of the assailed transactions were
persons other than those in the Rogelio, Sr. Group who have not been impleaded as parties. Thus,
the following parties were indispensable to the case: People's Broadcasting; Marcelino, Sr.;
Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.; Salome; Divinagracia; Teresita; and "other stockholders
of [People's Broadcasting] to whom the shares were transferred or the nominees of the
stockholders."
Their absence as an indispensable party resulted of not obtaining jurisdiction by the RTC.
Since the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction, its decision is void.
Heirs of Josefina Gabriel vs. Cabrero, G.R. No. 222737, November 12, 2018 – Certification/
Forum Shopping
Facts:
1. Segundina Cebrero (Cebrero), through her attorney-in-fact Remedios Muyot, executed a
real estate mortgage over the subject property located in Sampaloc, Manila.
2. The property was registered under the name of Cebrero's late husband Virgilio Cebrero
(Virgilio) as security for the payment of the amount of Eight Million Pesos
 (P8,000,000.00), pursuant to an amicable settlement entered into by the parties in the case
of annulment of revocation of donation.
3. In the said settlement, Josefina Gabriel (Gabriel) recognized Cebrero's absolute
ownership of the subject property and relinquished all her claims over the property.
4. Upon Cebrero's failure to pay the amount within the period of extension Gabriel filed in
an action for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.
5. In a Decision the RTC of Manila, Branch 23 ruled in Gabriel's favor and ordered Cebrero
to pay the P8,000,000.00 and interest, or the subject property shall be sold at public
auction in default of payment.
6. The sheriff initiated the necessary proceedings for the public auction sale when no appeal
was filed and the decision became final.
7. Gabriel, being the sole bidder, purchased Cebrero's undivided share of one-half (1/2)
conjugal share, plus her inheritance consisting of one-ninth (1/9) of the subject property.
8. the sheriff issued the Final Deed of Sale when Cebrero failed to redeem the property.
9. However, Gabriel had not registered the Final Deed of Sale since she disputed the Bureau
of Internal Revenue's estate tax assessment on the subject property considering that she
claimed only a portion thereof.
It was also during this time that she discovered the registration of a peed of Absolute Sale
Cebrero's attorney-in-fact, purportedly conveying the entire property in favor of
Progressive Trade & Services Enterprises.
10. Eduardo Cañiza (Cañiza), allegedly in behalf of Gabriel, instituted a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of sale and of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the subject
property registered under Progressive
11. In their Answer, respondents alleged that Gabriel has no legal capacity to sue as she was
bedridden and confined at the Makati Medical Center. The complaint should be
dismissed because Cañiza signed the verification and certification of. the complaint
without proper authority.
12. Gabriel died during the pendency of the case, thus her heirs substituted her.
13. The RTC ruled in favor of Gabriel.
14. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. There was no Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) attached to the complaint to substantiate Cañiza's authority to sign the
complaint and its verification and certification of non-forum shopping. As the awardee of
the foreclosure proceedings, Gabriel is the real party-in-interest in the case. Since the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the complaint, all proceedings subsequent thereto
are considered null and void, and can never attain finality.
Issue:
Whether the action in the complaint should be dismissed on the basis that the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping was not supported with the SPA of Eduardo Caniza or
the defect was cured when one of the heirs of Gabriel substituted when she died during the
pendency of the case before the trial court.
Held:
 YES, the action in the complaint should be dismissed on the basis that the the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping was not supported with the SPA of Eduardo Caniza and
it the defect was not cured when one of the heirs of Gabriel substituted when she died during the
pendency of the case before the trial court.
Every action must be presented in the name of the real party-ininterest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless,
otherwise, authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest.
In this case, Gabriel emerged as the highest bidder when a portion of the subject property
was sold on a public auction sale after she foreclosed the real estate mortgage over the· said
property. As the one claiming ownership of the said property, she is the real party-in-interest in
the instant case.
As to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the Court, in Altres, et al. v.
Empleo, et al., laid down the following guidelines:
Xxxx
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons".
Xxxx
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
In this case, the complaint filed before the RTC was filed in the name of Gabriel,
however, it was Cañiza who executed the verification and certification of forum shopping,
alleging that he was Gabriel's attorney-in-fact. However, there was no duly executed SPA
appended to the complaint to prove Cañiza's supposed authority to file and prosecute suits on
behalf of Gabriel. Thus, the complaint being filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is
unauthorized to do so is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal
effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction
over the complaint and the plaintiff.
In addition, the substitution of heirs in a case ensures that the deceased party would
continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of
his estate. From the foregoing, Cañiza's subsequent substitution as one of Gabriel's heirs did not
cure the defect in the complaint, i.e., when he signed the verification and certification against
forum shopping without apparent authority.

Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 216756, August 8, 2018 – Relaxing procedural rules; estoppel
Facts:
1. The respondent, through the Bureau of Customs, filed an Amended Complaint[4] for
collection of sum of money with damages and prayer for injunctive writ against
Mannequin International Corporation (Mannequin) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila.
2. The original complaint was amended to include other individuals - among them herein
Genoveva P. Tan (Genoveva) - as one of the defendants.
3. After the respondent rested its case, Geneveva filed a demurrer to evidence followed by
an urgent manifestation with leave of court to allow her to change the caption of her
demurrer to that of a motion to exclude and drop her from the case and/or dismiss the
same as against her. - - - The trial court excluded her.
4. Respondent thus filed an original Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA granted the
petition for certiorari, resulting for Genoveva filing for motion for reconsideration but it
was denied due to prescription.
5. Genoveva through Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, filed a Very Urgent and Vital Motion and
Manifestation with Prayer to Defer Proceedings with Leave of Court, praying that x x x
Genoveva be allowed to be represented by the aforesaid counsel in filing a Motion for
Reconsideration and for this Court to toll the running of period to file said Motion in the
meantime.
6. Atty. Simbillo filed a Formal Entry of Appearance, Genoveva, through said counsel, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of the decision of court.
7. Meanwhile, Atty. Carmelita Reyes-Eleazar, the counsel for x x x Genoveva as appearing
on the records, submitted her Motion to Withdraw.
8. As per said Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Simbillo claims to be the exclusive counsel
of record of x x x Genoveva in the proceedings below but he was supposedly left in the
dark as to the existence of the Petition before Us. Allegedly, he was neither notified of
the Petition nor was he sent any notice or pleading relative thereto. He was only allegedly
made aware of the proceedings before Us on 24 August 2013, when the househelper of x
x x Genoveva delivered to his office a copy of Decision.
9. Genoveva, through Atty. Simbillo, now asserts that the prescriptive period for her to file
a Motion for Reconsideration should only be reckoned from 28 August 2013 as it was the
time that her alleged exclusive counsel was actually notified of the Court's ruling. x x x
Genoveva likewise claimed that it would be the height of injustice and a violation of her
right to due process if her Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Simbillo were not
given due course, especially considering that she has a meritorious defense.
Issue:
 Whether the filling of the Motion for Reconsideration should be tolled on the basis that
the notification of the decision of Atty. Simbillo was delayed.
Held:
YES, the filling of the Motion for Reconsideration should be tolled not withstanding the
fact that the notification of the decision to Atty. Simbillo was delayed.
It bears to underscore in this vein that '[t]he presumption in favor of the counsel's
authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one. A lawyer is not even required to present a
written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of
appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client's name.'
In this case, Genoveva herself had impliedly admitted the authority of Atty. Reyes-
Eleazar to act as her counsel in this Petition. Second, - and this is worthy of emphasis - there is
unrefuted information from Atty. Reyes-Eleazar that Atty. Simbillo is, in fact, a collaborating
counsel and not an exclusive one, as claimed by him.
Considering that Atty. Simbillo was merely a collaborating counsel, there was absolutely
no need for the Court to likewise inform Atty. Simbillo of the developments of this case as
notices sent to Atty. Reyes-Eleazar indubitably sufficed to meet the due process requirement.
Indeed, the rule is that when a party is represented by two (2) or more lawyers, notice to one (1)
suffices as a notice to the party represented by him.
Therefore, Genoveva was properly represented by Atty. Reyes-Eleazar in this Petition, it
is certainly clear that the Very Urgent and Vital Motion and Manifestation with Prayer to Defer
Proceedings with Leave of Court filed by Atty. Simbillo has no leg to stand on and thus must be
denied. Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration subsequently filed by Atty. Simbillo ought
to be denied outright for being filed out of time.
Geneveva should already be considered estopped from questioning the decision to give
due course to the Petition. If she really thought that the ruling was erroneous, she should have
seasonably made the necessary move to contest the same, [e]specially that nothing prevented
her :from doing so. She kept quiet for so long, however, and did not do anything about the
matter. It is only now that she suddenly howls in protest just because the Decision on the merits
of the Petition turned out to be adverse to her.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs, Apo Cement – G.R. No. 193381, February 8, 2017 –
Verification/ unsigned pleading
Facts:
1. The Bureau of Internal Revenue sent Apo Cement Corporation (Apo Cement) a Final
Assessment Notice (FAN) for deficiency taxes for the taxable year 1999.
2. Apo Cement protested the FAN.[6] The Bureau issued the Final Decision on Disputed
Assessment dated June 15, 2006 denying the Apo Cement's protest.
3. Apo Cement filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals.
 4. In its Answer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue admitted that Apo Cement had
already paid the deficiency assessments reflected in the Bureau's Final Decision on
Disputed Assessment, except for the documentary stamp taxes.
5. Apo Cement filed a Motion to Cancel Tax Assessment (with Motion to Admit Attached
Formal Offer of Evidence).[14] The Commissioner filed her Opposition.
6. The Court of Tax Appeals (Second Division) granted[16] Apo Cement's Motion to
Cancel Tax Assessment.
7. The Commissioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Tax Appeals
denied
8. Hence, the petitioner filed its Petition for Review with this Court.
9. One of the issue that was raise was the defect in verification of non-forum shopping.
In the Court's Resolution[31] dated December 8, 2010, the petitioner was directed to
submit a sufficient verification within five (5) days from notice. Petitioner did not
comply.
The verification was filed but still stated "belief," it was qualified by "based on authentic
records." Hence, "the statement implies that the contents of the petition were based not
only on the pleader's belief but ultimately they are recitals from authentic records.
Issue:
Whether there was a defect in the verification of Non-Forum Shopping.
Held:
The third paragraph of Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, expressly treats pleadings with a verification based on "information and belief' or
"knowledge, information and belief," as unsigned.
The amendment to Section 4, Rule 7 entirely removed any reference to "belief' as basis.
This is to ensure that the pleading is anchored on facts and not on imagination or speculation,
and is filed in good faith.
In Go v. Court of Appeals: Mere belief is insufficient basis and negates the verification which
should be on the basis of personal knowledge or authentic records. Verification is required to
secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true
and correct and not merely speculative.
In Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros
Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City,[37] the Court explained that the amendment in the rules
was made stricter so that a party cannot be allowed to base his statements on his belief.
Otherwise, the pleading is treated as unsigned which produces no legal effect.
However, unlike the requirement for a Certification against Forum Shopping in Section 5,
wherein failure to comply with the requirements is not curable by amendment of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading, Section 4 of Rule 7, as amended, states that the effect of the failure
to properly verify a pleading is that the pleading shall be treated as unsigned:
Therefore, a pleading wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's knowledge and
belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be
remedied.
In this case, petitioner did not submit a corrected verification despite the order of this Court. This
alone merits the denial of the Petition outright.
Cordillera Global Networks vs. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019 – Class
suit/Verification/forum shopping
Facts:
1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Administrative
Region, with clearancefrom then Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Secretary Ramon J.P. Paje (Secretary Paje), granted SM Investments Corporation's
request for a permit to cut and earth-ball the Benguet pine, Alnus trees, and saplings that
would be affected by the Expansion Project.
2. However, the permit's issuance was subject to several conditions, including the conduct
of public consultations with stakeholders and the procurement of an environmental
compliance certificate.
3. Cordillera Global Network filed a Complaint16 (first environmental case) against SM
Investments Corporation, Secretary Paje, Atty. Juan Miguel Cuna, the director of the
Environmental Management Bureau, and Secretary Rogelio L. Singson of the
Department of Public Works and Highways.
4. Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al. both alleged that the cutting or earth-balling
of the 182 trees on Luneta Hill would severely damage the environment and health of
Baguio City residents. They also assailed the regularity of the permits issued, further
claiming that the Expansion Project violated zoning and environmental laws.
5. Defendants asserted that the pertinent permits were issued only after strict compliance
with the relevant rules and regulations.
6. RTC dismiss the case filed. So as CA, it dismissed Cordillera Global Network and
Adajar, et al.'s claim that the case fell under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies since there was no patent illegality. It pointed out that despite not
being parties to the applications for the environmental compliance certificates, tree-
cutting and earth-balling permits, and building permits, they still should have come to the
appropriate administrative tribunals to resolve questions of fact.
7. The Petitioners filed a petition for review. In the answer of SM alleged that the Petition
was defective since out of the 202 claimed petitioners, only 30 signed the Verification
and Certification Against Forum Shopping.
Issue:
Whether the Petition should be dismissed on the basis of the defect in the verification
Against Forum Shopping.
Held:
 NO, the petition should not be dismissed on the basis of the in the verification Against
Forum Shopping.
In Altres v. Empleo, it provided guidelines, as culled from jurisprudence, on low to resolve
noncompliance with the requirement and defective submissions of verification and certification
against forum shopping:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct.
In this case, there were around 200 petitioners in the two (2) environmental cases on
appeal before this Court; yet, only 30 petitioners signed the Verification and Certification
Against Forum Shopping.
However, contrary to private respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and Shopping Center
Management Corporation's assertions, the failure of all petitioners to sign the document is not a
sufficient ground for the Petition's outright dismissal.
Jurisprudence confirms that petitioners substantially complied with the verification
requirement. The 30 signatories provided the guarantee that: (1) they had ample knowledge as to
the truth of the allegations in the Petition; and (2) the Petition was made in good faith.For the
certification against forum shopping, Altres stated the general rule that non-signing petitioners
will be dropped as parties to the case. Nonetheless, there is an exception: when all petitioners
share a common interest, the signature of one (1) petitioner in the certification against forum
shopping is enough to satisfy the substantial compliance rule.
Here, petitioners all share a common interest, which is to declare the cutting or earth-
balling of the trees affected by the Expansion Project illegal. Hence, the signature of 30
petitioners to the certification against forum shopping amounts to substantial compliance with
the requirement under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Sarol vs. Diao, et al., G.R. No. 244129, December 9, 2020 – Mode of Service of summons
Facts:
1. Sarol purchased from a certain Claire Chiu a parcel of land located in Guinsuan,
Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental. Sarol claims to have purchased the property
for P2,000,000.00.
2. The Deed of Sale over the property was executed. Accordingly, the Original Certificate
of Title registered in the name of Claire Chiu was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued in the name of Sarol
3. Sarol had been in possession of the property since 2007 and began developing a beach
resort. She eventually left the Philippines to reside in Germany.
4. Her father, Emproso Sarol, was made to manage all her assets in the Philippines,
including the beach resort and Lot No. 7150. Sarol also left Marie Jeane Alanta-ol to
manage the beach resort.
5. Spouses Diao claim that their property is adjacent to Lot. They learned that their property
overlap to Solar’s property. So, They immediately demanded Claire Chiu and Sarol to
return their portion of the property, but to no avail.
6. Spouses Diao filed a complaint with the RTC Branch 44, Dumaguete City.
7. In the course of the proceedings for the abovementioned case, summons was issued for
service to Claire Chiu, her husband Ginghis Chiu, the Register of Deeds of Negros
Oriental, and Sarol. The address of Sarol indicated in the summons states "Guinsuan,
Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental," or the location of the property she purchased
from Claire Chiu.
8. Respondent Sheriff Tale issued a Sheriffs Return of Summons, which states that
summons was served on Claire Chiu but could not be served to Sarol "on the ground that
she is out of the country."
9. Spouses Diao then moved for the issuance of alias summons.In the Sheriffs Return dated,
Sheriff Tale stated his three failed attempts to personally serve the alias summons to
Sarol at Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental.
10. For this reason, Spouses Diao moved that summons be served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Dumaguete and in the Province of Negros
Oriental pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on extraterritorial service
of summons.16 In an Order dated February 5, 2016, the RTC directed service of
summons on Sarol by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Dumaguete and in the Province of Negros Oriental, for two consecutive weeks and to
send copies of the summons and of the order by registered mail to the last known address
of Sarol in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita Negros Oriental.
11. Claire Chiu filed her answer to the complaint, but failed to appear at the pre-trial
proceedings. Sarol, on the other hand, failed to file any pleadings with the RTC. Upon
motion of Spouses Diao, Claire Chiu and Sarol were declared in default in an Order.
12. RTC erred favorably to the spouses, so Sarol filed a petition for Annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules Court with the CA. She sought to invalidate the Decision of
the RTC because the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Sarol
argued that she was not served with any summons relating to the case instituted by
Spouses Diao.
 13. CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. The CA held that Sarol is a
Filipino resident, who was temporarily out of the country. Thus, the rules on service of
summons under Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is applicable. Under Section
16, service of summons, to a resident defendant, who is temporarily out of the country,
may be effected by modes provided for in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Following Section 15 on extraterritorial service of summons, one of the modes of service
may be "effected x x x by publication in a newspaper of general circulation, in which
case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant x x x".

The CA found that personal service of the summons and the alias summons could not be
effected at Sarol's address in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental
because Sarol was out of the country. Thus, Spouses Diao moved for the service of
summons by publication which the RTC granted in an Order dated February 5, 2016. The
CA held that summons was clearly served on the person of Sarol by publication. Having
failed to timely file an answer to the complaint, Sarol was declared in default.
14. Sarol filed the petition before the Court reiterating that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person. Sarol argued that there was a defective service of summons
by Sheriff Tale. While she is named a recipient of the summons, the address, Guinsuan,
Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, was incorrect. Sarol argued that she never
became a resident at said address. Her last known address in the Philippines was in
Barangay Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental. Hence, personal service of the summons
could not have validly been effected
Issue:
Whether the Summons of Solar were properly served.
Held:
NO, the Summons of Solar was not properly served because the address where the
summons were served was in correct and was not her known address in the Philippines before
she migrated in Germany.
Section 7, Rule 1443 of the Rules of Court allows the substituted service of summons if,
for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time. It shall be
effected by leaving copies of the summons:
(a) at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing
therein; or
(b) at the defendant's place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
"Dwelling house" or "residence" refers to the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time. Similarly, the terms "office" or "regular place
of business" refer to the office or place of business of defendant at the time of service
 However, in this case, the court found that the address in Guinsuan, Poblacion,
Zarnboanguita, Negros Oriental is not Sarol's place of residence. Therefore, service of summons
to Sarol, even by substituted service, should have been effected in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros
Oriental. Assuming that Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental is Sarol's regular
place of business, We find that there was no substituted service effected.
In addition. Spouses Diao moved for the extraterritorial service of summons by
publication under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Under this rule, one of the modes to
effect the extraterritorial service of summons is by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known correct address
of the defendant.
However, Following the provisions of Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the
aforementioned order of the court, publication must be duly observed and copies of the summons
and order of the court be served at Sarol's last known correct address by registered mail, as a
complement to the publication. The failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules
regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect
in the service of summons. Considering that Sarol's last known address is in Tamisu, Bais City,
Negros Oriental, copies of the summons and order of the court must be sent to this address. As
Spouses Diao furnished an address in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental,
service of summons by publication is defective in view of the failure to mail the requirements of
Section 15, Rule 14 to the correct address of Sarol.
The service of summons is vital and indispensable to defendant's right to due process.54
A violation of this due process is a jurisdictional defect which renders null and void all
subsequent proceedings and issuances in relation to the case.