Shared Virtue-Based Ethical Monism

between Confucian and Bhraminst

Texts:
Both Metaphysical and ethical concepts from Confucian and Bhraminist texts share apparent

similarities. For ethics in the case of Confucianism li (禮) is the interpretation of a duty to uphold

certain practices and attitudes according to social role to maintain natural order. This notion is

difficult to match to Western ethics because it is virtue centric rather than rule centric

(deontology). Interestingly li does intuitively appear quite similar to dharma in Brahmanist

traditions which also can refer to a virtue-based social duty also supporting a natural universal

order. In this term paper an argument will be made that this commonality is not

superficial but relates to a degree of shared virtue-based ethical monism (ethics

centering around a singular notion of virtue) between the cultures. Monism will first be

established with textual evidence and from there a sense of general consistency will

follow.

Before examining any textual evidence it should be mentioned that at one point

in Chinese scholarship there was an ambiguity between technical Chinese and Sanskrit

terms that was merely an artifact of translation. From the late Han to early Wei period

when Chinese Bhuddsim was merely an influence on existing traditions and not yet

independent. During this period rather than reproducing abstractions in Chinese some

scholars artificially equivocated concepts in what is known as Geyi. From the 5th

century onwards, Chinese Buddhism produced substantial scholarship of its own and

Bhuddist principles were described in Chinese more organically. This approach was
known as deyi or grasping substance. In this essay it is the substance of underlying

concepts that will be associated with monism and such instances of ambiguity will be

avoided.

Between classical Chinese texts discussing ethical standards the term li is used in varying

contexts including both general principle and concrete manifestations. In the Analects limited

specifics as to what li consists of are given, but references make it clear that li has no intrinsic

values apart from allowing one to achieve human virtue ren (仁). This is made quite clear by

passage 8.2 (Eno translation) it is stated that “If one is reverent but without li one is burdened; if

one is vigilant but without li one is fearful; if one is valorous but without li one causes chaos; if

one is straightforward but without li one causes affronts.” In passage 2.23 Confucius also

emphasizes that the li is not static but rather is accumulated through generations (“The Yin

Dynasty adhered to the li of the Xia Dynasty; what they added and discarded can be known. The

Zhou Dynasty adhered to the li of the Yin Dynasty; what they added and discarded can be

known. As for those who may follow after the Zhou, though a hundred generations, we can

foretell.”). To relate these two positions, it appears that Confucius holds that while what

constitutes ren may be independent of era or culture the means of achieving virtue is dynamic

and evolves over time as circumstances change. This is clearly monisitc because li is just the

optimal path to achieving the objective state of ren.

There are three ritual classics based on the Western Zhou dynasty which provide a

concrete foundation for what Confucius advocated. Of the books that comprise the Record of

Rites (Liji) which regard ethics at too narrow a scope to indicate monism or pluralism. The

Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong) which is is attributed to Confucius’s grandson Zisi explains

the Confucian conception of Dao or way stating that it is human dao to replicate the perfection of
heaven (tian 天). In the section V part e of the Eno translation this is made clear by “Perfect

genuineness is the Dao of Tian. Making things perfectly genuine is the Dao of humankind”. The

notion that actions should be centered around actualizing a single condition which is intrinsically

virtuous is consistent with virtue-based monistic ethics.

Further insight into monism in wider Confucian ethics requires consideration of texts

beyond the core Confican cannon. Xunzi depending on interpretation may be deemed as tending

to pluralist ethics. In Xunzi Hutton translation chapter 8 lines 99-110 it is stated that the ren

associated with past aristocracy does not relate to a heavenly way but what is deemed proper to

him. At the same time in chapter 21 lines 5 to 9 Xunzi states that “there are not two Ways for

the world, and the sage is not of two minds. Nowadays the feudal lords have different

governments, and the hundred schools have different teachings, so that necessarily

some are right and some are wrong, and some lead to order and some

lead to chaos.” It seems likely that Xunzi supported monistc ethics but was dissatisfied with

human virtue relating to heaven. With Xunzi’s counterpart Menscius there does not appear to be

a similar controversy as he maintained that among humans ren is spontaneous and that virtue is

inspired by heaven.

At this point it is appropriate to move on to ethical monism in the Brahmanist tradition.

The term Dharma was introduced in the earliest Vedic text the Rigveda and even there was used

in a variety of contexts. As other texts were introduced like the Upaniṣads and especially as

Indian religions diverged, the range of implications of the term only expanded further. In general

it involves harmonizing with a natural social order. Unlike with li neither virtue ethics nor ethical

monism are not traditionally attributed to Brahmanist dharma. In the caste system moral

obligations varied with Brahmins (priestly caste) being held to the highest standard. There was
no universal ren as existed in Confucianism. Nevertheless an argument has been advanced for

Brahmanist virtue ethics.

In an article by University of Idaho professor Nichloas Gier

(https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/ethics-and-epics-philosophy-culture-and-religion/) analyzes the

famous modern Indian philosopher Bimal Krishna Matilal interpretation of deity Krishna’s in the

ethical instruction in the Bhagavad Gita. For context the Bhagavad Gita (part of the greater

classic Sanskrit epic Mahabharata) is a Hindu text about ethical and metaphysical discourse

between Krishna and Arjuna who belong to a group of brothers known as Pandava in a war with

cousins known as Kauravas (depicted as malicious) vying for the throne of the kingdom. Krishna

poses as the charioteer of Arjuna and they rise into battle together. Matilal emphasized that while

Krishna was opposed to Arjuna killing his brother Yudhisthira for insulting his bow denouncing

the impulse as rash he also enticed Arjuna to violate rules of engagement established to have an

advantage. Thus Krishna's understanding of Dharma is between Utilitarianism and deontology

leaving room for virtue ethics.

The article goes on to give more clear evidence of virtue ethics. In the Varnaparvan

section of the Mahābhārata a king Nahusha who held Yudhisthira’s brother captive is asked

several questions on Bhramanist principles including on the definition of Dharma. In opposition

to the caste system Yudhisthira recipes that if a shudra (laborer caste) demonstrates nobility

associated with virtues like truthfulness, generosity, forgiveness, goodness, kindness, self-

control, and compassion he would be equivalent to a brahman,and if a bhaman lacks such

qualities he is equivalent to a shudra. This statement is suggestive of a universal conception of

virtue which is consistent with ethical monism.

 Now to summarize the indications of virtue ethics and monism in Brahmanist and

Confucian texts. In Confucian texts both canon and non-canon while there is minor controversy

as to whether virtue is heavenly inspired in the case of Xunzi there is consistent agreement that

virtue is singular and what constitutes li is related to the pursuit of human virtue or ren. In

Brahmanist texts dharma does not consistently adhere to deontology or consequentialism like

utilitarianism but offers possibilities for virtue ethics such as the dialogue between Nahusha and

Yudhisthira. The terms of Li and Dharma can be interpreted as such where the substance of the

concepts they represent in their own traditions interrelate.