“RULE OF STRICT INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES” IN LIGHT OF THE CASE

RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

Equivalent citations: (2015) 6 SCC 477.

Author of Case: Justice R.F.Nariman

Bench: T.S. Thakur J, R.F.Nariman J, Prafulla C. Pant J.

1. INTRODUCTION

The interpretation of statutes entails construing the “true meaning” of the language used in the
provision. Because the Court is not expected to interpret randomly, certain principles have
emerged as a result of the Courts' ongoing work. These concepts are often known as "rules of
interpretation." The “rule of a strict interpretation of penal statutes” is a significant area of study
under the subject matter of interpretations of statutes, requiring our due consideration. In light of
this, it is crucial to consider the judgment authored by Justice R.F. Nariman in Rajinder Singh v.
State of Punjab,1 wherein the Apex court of India succinctly deliberated upon this issue while
pronouncing its judgment on the social evil of Dowry Death.

According to Maxwell, one of the significant general “rules of interpretation of penal statutes” is
that the language stipulating the elements of the offence is to be strictly interpreted. In case of any
ambiguity in the language, a reasonable interpretation is to be adopted in favour of the accused. In
case of multiple possibilities of reasonable constructions, the court is required to adopt the lenient
alternative. Therefore, a strict interpretation of the penal statutes is to be made without extending
the language beyond its ordinary meaning. Nevertheless, in certain cases such as the instant case,
the court may adopt a purposive interpretation of the penal statute which is consistent with the
object of the enactment, and which also does not go against the natural meaning of the words that
are unambiguously used in the penal statute. Here, the mischief rule of interpretation evolved in

1
Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477.
the landmark Heydon’s Case2 can be made applicable to interpret the penal statute, and
accordingly, the lacunae in the provision can be addressed to “sabotage the mischief.”

2. FACTS OF THE CASE

The relevant facts of the case that were presented before the Supreme Court, while hearing the
appeal against the impugned judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (“P&H High Court)
have been outlined below:

In 1990, Ms. Salwinder Kaur (“victim”) entered into matrimony with Mr. Rajinder Singh
(“appellant”). The victim was deceased within four years of marriage due to the consumption of a
highly poisonous pesticide namely Aluminium Phosphide. Subsequently, an FIR was lodged at
the concerned police station against the appellant, his older brother, and the brother’s wife.

The testimony of the father of the deceased victim (PW-2) – Mr. Karnail Singh revealed that
despite giving dowry to the appellant, they continued to quarrel with the victim for money. Further,
the victim was allegedly “ill-treated” by the accused. Significantly, fifteen days before her death,
the victim visited the parent's house after being allegedly “maltreated” by the accused. The
testimony of the father was accepted by the trial court, the High Court, and consequently by the
Apex Court during the appeal.

After reviewing the evidence given by the father, brother (PW-3), and the Sarpanch of the village
(PW-4), the appellant was convicted by the Trial Court under s. 304B of the IPC for ‘Dowry Death’
and sentenced to the minimum duration of punishment under the section, i.e. seven years of
rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were confirmed by the P&H High Court.

The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed against the impugned judgment of the High Court.

3. ISSUES FRAMED BY THE COURT

The Hon’ble Apex Court deliberated upon the following issues:

2
Heydon's Case (1584) 76 ER 637
Whether the instant case satisfies the ingredients under s. 304B Indian Penal Code 1860?

Whether the “rule of a strict interpretation of a penal statute” must be observed without any
exception?

4. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE COUNSELS

Based on the cross-examination of the father of the deceased victim (PW-2), the counsel for the
appellant argued that the link between the demand for dowry being connected with the marriage
was weak. Further, it was submitted that the ingredients of s. 304B were not satisfied as the
complaints were made at long intervals.

The counsel on behalf of the respondent State of Punjab vehemently opposed the appeal by
reiterating the findings of the Trial Court and the P&H High Court, in favour of confirming the
sentence and conviction of the appellant under s. 304B of the IPC.

5. JUDGMENT/ DECISION OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court, after hearing the contentions put forth by the counsels, made the following

observations in the judgment pronounced on February 26, 2015.

The court was concerned with construing the definition of “dowry” to determine whether the
instant case fulfilled the required ingredients to constitute an offence of “dowry death” under
section 304B of the IPC. Accordingly, it considered the definition of Dowry under s. 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Upon perusal of the section, the Court astutely identified the six
essential elements of the definition. The relevant point is that the giving or receiving of the
property/valuable security must be “in connection with” the marriage between the parties. The
Apex Court in the instant case held that, unless otherwise clear from the facts of the case, any
money/property/valuable security that is demanded by the persons mentioned under the section,
before/during/after the marriage which is “reasonably connected” with the instance of death of
the married women, would essentially be “in connection with” or “in relation to the marriage.”

Further, the Court cited a plethora of judgments3 and reiterated the four requisite ingredients for a
crime under section 304B: (a) death of the women was caused due to burns/other bodily injuries/
not under normal circumstances; (b) such death must be within seven years of marriage; (c) “soon
before her death” there must be an instance of cruelty/harassment by the husband or other relative
of the husband; (d) the cruelty/harassment must be “in connection with” the demand for dowry.

The court deliberated upon the interpretation of “soon before her death” and noted the observations
made in Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana,4 wherein it was held that the interpretation of the
phrase was to be made on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case, considering that
cruelty/harassment varies from “case to case” and also from “person to person.” Accordingly,
“soon before” was considered to be a relative term. Similarly, in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,5 it
was noted that a “straitjacket formula” could not be laid down to fix any time limit. In Sher Singh
v. State of Haryana,6 it was significantly held that “soon before” in s. 304B should not be
interpreted in terms of days/months/years, and rather it should indicate that the demand for dowry
was the “continuing cause for the death.” The Court in the instant case endorsed the view adopted
in the above-mentioned cases and held that "Soon before" was not analogous with "immediately
before.” Further, it was stated that considering the social evil that is sought to be fought with the
enactment of s. 304B it was only appropriate that “a fair and pragmatic construction” is to be
drawn, while interpreting the phrase “soon before”. Accordingly, it was held to be a relative
expression provided that the “demand for dowry” is found to be the “continuing cause for the
death” under s. 304B of the IPC.

3
See: Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350; Bachni Devi & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2011) 4 SCC
427; Pathan Hussain Basha v. State of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 594; Kulwant Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (2013) 4
SCC 177; Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129; Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC
582; Suresh Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353; Sher Singh v. State of Haryana, 2015 1 SCALE 250.
4
Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 4 SCC 129
5
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935]
6
Sher Singh v. State of Haryana, 2015 (1) SCALE 250,
On the facts of the case, especially the testimony of the victim’s father, the Apex Court upheld the
findings recorded by the Trial court and the P&H High Court and dismissed the appeal. Therefore,
the appellant was held liable under s. 304B of the IPC.

As noted earlier, the Apex Court was also concerned with the issue of strict interpretations of penal
statutes, which is also the subject matter of the current discussion. The court relied on two “path-
breaking judgments” to clarify the correct position on this issue. The Apex Court cited the decision
of the Constitution Bench in M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala7 and Standard Chartered
Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement,8 wherein it was concluded that while a strict interpretation
of penal statutes is the general rule, nevertheless, the legislative intent must also be considered.
Further, the court relied on the decision in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam,9 and noted that the penal
statute relating to Dowry was to be given “a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation to
fulfill the object sought to be achieved by Parliament.” Accordingly, it was held that the strict
interpretation of the definition of dowry made in Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra,10 does not
state the law correctly.

6. COMMENT (SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE IN LIGHT OF “RULE OF STRICT

INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES”

While the judgment of the Apex Court in this case prima facie deals with the social evil of dowry
death, nevertheless, in a broader view it also considers the significant issue of “strict interpretation
of penal statutes.” The rule of interpretation of penal statutes envisages a strict interpretation of
the provisions in a penal statute. Accordingly, Court is duty-bound to interpret the actual language
employed in the statute and accordingly determine the intent of the legislature, and in the absence
of ambiguity in the language of the statute, the court cannot take the aid of the objects and reasons
of the legislation to change the “natural grammatical meaning” of the statute enacted by the
legislature.

7
M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, 1963 Supp. (2) SCR 72.
8
Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530.
9
Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199.
10
Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721.
The instant case highlights that the “rule of a strict interpretation of penal statutes” does not warrant
a narrow interpretation of the penal provision to defeat the object of the statute. The noteworthy
aspect of the judgment is that the interpretations made with respect to the definition “dowry” and
the ingredients of s. 304B (dowry death) has been made fairly and pragmatically, with a common-
sense approach to fulfil the object envisgaed to be achieved with the enactment.

In Dyke v. Elliott, Lord Justice James observed that ordinarily all penal statutes must be strictly
interpreted. This means that while interpreting the provision of the penal statute the Court must
make certain that the alleged act constitutes an offence within the “plain meaning of the words
used”, without straining the word in the statute on the notion of ambiguity. Nevertheless, it can
also be argued that, although the act constitutes an offence with the “plain meaning of the words
used”, it is not within the “spirit of the enactment.” In case that the action is brought within the
words and the spirit of the enactment, the interpretation of the penal statute has to be made
according to the “fair commonsense meaning of the language used”, without the Court finding
ambiguity in the language of the penal statute which it would not have otherwise found in the same
language of any other instrument.

The above explanation of the rule has been accepted by the Indian Supreme Court. In the M.
Narayanan Nambiar case (supra) the Apex Court was concerned with the interpretation of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is a penal statute. While interpreting the Act, Justice
Subba Rao stated that, since the statute was a “socially useful measure” that was enacted in the
public interest, therefore it should be “liberally construed” to ensure that the object of the statute
is not defeated. Similarly, the provision under s. 304B is also a “socially useful measure” to fight
the social evil of dowry death.

The Apex Court in the Standard Chartered Bank Case (supra) again considered this issue. Justice
Balakrishnan held that, while all penal statutes are to be interpreted strictly, nevertheless, like all
other statutes the penal provisions must also be “fairly construed according to the legislative intent
as expressed in the enactment.” In this case, Justice Dharmadhikari also unequivocally added that
the “rule of a strict interpretation of penal statutes” does not call for a “narrow and pedantic
construction” of the statute, which effectively creates loopholes in the provision that can be abused
by the accused in his/her favour. Similarly, in Balram Kumawat v. Union of India,11 the Apex
Court reiterated that, during the interpretation of penal provisions, it is not appropriate to always
make a “narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction.” Criminal jurisprudence envisages
that the offender should not be able to abuse the provisions of the law merely due to the nonsensical
narrow interpretation of the statute. The “subject matter of the offence” and also the object of the
enactment are to be considered while interpreting the penal statute.

Therefore, an important aspect that is highlighted in the above cases and also the instant case is
that the “common-sense approach” to determine the applicability of a particular provision in the
penal statute cannot be precluded by narrow application of the “rule of strict construction.” For
instance, in a case regarding the interpretation of provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act r/w s.
498A of the IPC, the court expanded the definition of ‘husband’ under the section by a purposive
construction of the provision, to ensure that the object and aim of the provision are not defeated,
and the offender does not escape the clutches of law.12 Similarly, in the instant case, the Apex
Court has ensured that the “rule of a strict interpretation of penal statutes” does not prevent
purposive construction of the provision, or defeat the object of the enactment.

7. CONCLUSION

Over time, there have been conflicting developments that have influenced the “rule of a strict
interpretation of penal statutes.” The “general rule of interpretation of penal statutes” stipulates
that the unambiguous words and phrases used in the provision are to be strictly interpreted. The
instant case that has been comprehensively discussed above adds to the existing jurisprudence on
the interpretation of penal statutes by reiterating that the object of the penal statute must not be
defeated by employing this rule of strict interpretation narrowly.

11
Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 628.
12
Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199.