Journal of Contemporary European Studies,

Vol. 13, No. 1, 5–20, April 2005

The ESDP: Between Estrangement

and a New Partnership in Transatlantic
Security Relations
LISA WATANABE*
Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto, Canada

Ever since Europeans committed themselves to endowing the Union with a capacity for
autonomous action in the area of crisis management at the European Council summit in
December 1999, EU member states have embarked on a rigorous quest towards this
objective. Much has changed in the European security sphere since this fateful decision
was made, not least the EU’s relationship with NATO. Whilst the prospect of improved
European military capabilities should please US policymakers, who have long been
calling on Europeans to shoulder more of the burden within the transatlantic alliance,
many remain deeply suspicious of the long-term implications of strengthening Europe’s
military capacity. They fear that NATO will eventually be undermined and the US
monopoly on decision making within the Euro-Atlantic security arena eroded. Much
depends on the degree of autonomy that Europeans really seek. Yet, Europeans occupy a
no less ambiguous position with regard to the ESDP. In characteristic European fashion, a
‘constructive ambiguity’ has been built into its construction in order to accommodate
continued divergences between member states about the desired relationship between the
EU and NATO. Some EU member states are eager to see the EU develop the capabilities
necessary to act, at least some of the time, independently of NATO; others see no reason to
duplicate NATO assets and risk upsetting transatlantic relations.
This article examines how changes in the international political and economic
environment have altered the politics of European security during the 1990s. It argues that
shifts in European states’ security practices and corresponding redeployment of military
apparatuses in the post-Cold War era have combined with defence industrial issues in at
least two major EU member states, namely France and Germany, to produce a strong
interpretation of what is meant by ‘capacity for autonomous action’. Given that Britain and
the US have a fairly weak interpretation of what this means, the ESDP can be expected to
remain a sensitive issue amongst the ‘big three’, as well as point of contention in
European – American security relations.

*
Correspondence Address: Lisa Watanabe, Wagnerstrasse 5, 3007 Bern, Switzerland. Email: watanl@freesurf.ch
1478-2804 Print/1478-2790 Online/05/0105-16 q 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/14782800500060999
6 L. Watanabe

The Creation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy

During the wars in the former-Yugoslavia, European politicians and officials were
painfully reminded of their dependence on American military assets provided via NATO,
as well as the need to develop the tools with which to respond effectively to crises. The
wars effectively acted as a catalyst for the development of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). At the 1992 Maastricht European Council meeting, it was decided
the CFSP would replace the European Political Cooperation (EPC) as the second pillar of
the European Union.1 The 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed at Maastricht,
was, thus, the first treaty to contain provisions anchoring the Union’s responsibilities in the
field of security. Since the EU lacked military capabilities of its own, the Treaty
envisioned that the EU would request the Western European Union (WEU)—Europe’s
defence arm at the time—to plan and implement military measures on its behalf (The
German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). The Maastricht Treaty represented a
first step on the road toward constructing a European caucus within the Euro-Atlantic
security sphere. Defence, however, was postponed, owing to divergences between major
members of the EU with regards to any transfer of competence in military security matters
to the EU (Haine, 2004: 37 –38).
The European desire for greater autonomy was initially accommodated within a NATO
framework. At the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, member states approved the
development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)—an instrument aimed
at facilitating European efforts to develop ‘separable but not separate’ capabilities through
the WEU (Davis, 2003: 213). WEU-led crisis management operations were to be enabled
by the US-inspired concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The idea behind the
CJTFs was to provide a framework within which NATO could continue to provide the
command and organisational means necessary for multi-national, wide-ranging missions
that would not always include the entire NATO membership. They, thus, implicitly
provided the US with a way of maintaining control over decision making within the Euro-
Atlantic security arena and enshrined the EU’s dependence on NATO/US capabilities,
without guaranteeing that those capabilities would be available in the event of a crisis
situation (Howorth, 2002). The ESDI, therefore, provided a means of strengthening a
‘European pillar of defence’ within the framework of NATO.
Yet, improving European capabilities within a NATO framework failed to provide
sufficient incentive and, as far as some in Europe were concerned, did not go far enough
towards allowing greater European autonomy. Difficulties of coordination within NATO
and the degree of control exerted by the US during the intervention in Kosovo, galvanised
European governments into taking further steps toward developing greater autonomy in
terms of political decision making and military capacity—this time, within the framework
of the EU. Two significant events took place in December of 1998. At Potsdam, on
1 December, France and Germany issued a joint statement, in which President Chirac and
Chancellor Schröder announced that they were in the process of defining CFSP and a
common defence policy, and that they continued to be committed to integrating the WEU
into the EU. They also emphasised the importance of equipping the EU with its own
military and operational capacities. These capacities were to be created either from within
the WEU framework, from multinational forces, such as the Eurocorps,2 or via
capabilities made available by NATO, as agreed at the North Atlantic Council in Berlin
in June 1996. The Franco-German meeting was followed by a Franco-British meeting on
 Transatlantic Security Relations 7

3 –4 December. The outcome of this meeting, the much heralded St. Mâlo Declaration,
affirmed that the EU required ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by a credible
military force, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to
respond to international crises’ so that the EU could ‘take decisions and approve military
action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged’ (cited in Bono, 2003: 28).
As such, it represented a shift in London’s approach to Europe, as well as a French
concession to Atlantic legitimacy (Haine, 2004: 43). It was clearly aimed at the European
objective of gaining greater political and military autonomy within a restructured Atlantic
Alliance (Howorth, 2002: 2). Doing so by engaging the EU in common external action in
the area of crisis management logically led to the construction of a ESDP, as a distinctive
part of the CFSP. The ESDP, however, lacked a treaty basis, since the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam still provided for the WEU to be called upon to plan and implement military
action on the EU’s behalf. At the European Council summit in Cologne in June 1999,
member states made it known that they were determined to see the Union play a greater
role on the international stage and that they intended to give the EU the ‘necessary means
and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on
security and defence’ (European Council, 1999).
To achieve this objective, it was decided at European Council summit in Helsinki in
December 1999 that permanent political and military bodies would be established within the
Council structures: a Political Security Committee (PSC)—the EU’s equivalent of NATO’s
North Atlantic Council (NAC)3—the EU Military Committee (EUMC)—an EU military
authority—and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)—a military staff tasked with
implementing the decisions of the EUMC, performing early warning, situation assessments
and strategic planning for crisis management, including identification of relevant forces.
These institutions were established under the 2000 Nice Treaty. The Treaty also transferred
a number of institutions that were previously part of the WEU acquis to the EU, namely the
WEU’s Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, and its Institute of Security Studies. These
institutions were added to two other bodies that were established within the Council under
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty: the post of Secretary-General of the Council, currently held by
Javier Solana, who also acts as high representative for the CFSP, and a Policy Planning and
Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) (Balis, 2003: 28).
However, the core of the St. Mâlo Declaration had addressed the development of
capabilities. In accordance with this, member states set themselves a so-called Headline
Goal for capabilities development at the Helsinki summit. The aim was to put at the
Union’s disposal a military force, specified as the creation of a rapid reaction force of
60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days, with additional air and naval capabilities as
needed, and sustainable in the field for up to one year (Davis, 2003: 215). The missions
assigned to this Rapid Reaction Force were those defined at Petersberg by the WEU in
1992 and inscribed in the TEU—the so-called Petersberg tasks—namely ‘humanitarian
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking’ (cited in Haine, 2004: 44). In order to be able to carry out these
operations, particular attention was given to the means necessary to fulfil these tasks, such
as deployability, sustainability, interoperability, mobility, survivability and command and
control. At Laeken in December 2002, the ESDP was declared operational, though the
capabilities development process had not come to an end (Balis, 2003: 27).
Whereas the first headline goal was inspired by the wars in the former Yugoslavia, a
second headline goal—the 2010 Headline Goal—which was put together following the
8 L. Watanabe

divisions over the war in Iraq, as well as in view of impending enlargement of the Union,
has been guided by the EU’s security strategy. The Union’s strategic document identifies
international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and
organised crime as major threats to European security (Solana, 2003). In military planning
terms, this suggests a need for highly mobile, specialised forces, rapidly deployable and
able to carry out operations in difficult terrain, which the Union still lacks. In order to
address this deficit, France, Germany and Britain presented a so-called battle group
concept in February 2004. This has now become an important element of the 2010
Headline Goal. The battle group concept envisages the creation of tactical groups,
comprising approximately 1500 troops, including support, to be ready for deployment
within 15 days. These forces will be designed specifically, though not exclusively, in
response to UN requests. The aim is to establish two to three high-readiness battle groups
by 2005, and seven to nine groups by 2007. As regards the composition of these groups, a
member state may form a group alone, in cooperation with other member states as the
‘lead nation’ or in cooperation with several states. If successfully implemented, the battle
group concept will fill an important capability gap (Schmitt, 2004: 98 – 99).
Member states also committed themselves to strengthening, as part of the ESDP, the
Union’s civil component of crisis management capabilities. With the experience of
Bosnia, particularly the civil administration of Mostar by the WEU, the European
Multinational Protection Force (EMPF) in Albania and the Multinational Advisory Police
Element (MAPE) in Operation Alba, in Albania, the Union has acquired considerable
expertise in civilian crisis management, making it an obvious area to be built upon within
the ESDP. At the Santa Maria da Feira European Council summit in June 2000, member
states agreed on an Action Plan aimed at improving capabilities in the areas of police
cooperation, the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. The Action Plan
declared member states’ intention to create, by 2003, a pool of 5000 police officers, 200
judges, prosecutors and other experts, assessment teams to be dispatched within 3– 7
hours, as well as intervention teams consisting of up to 2000 people for deployment at
short notice, able to assist in humanitarian actions through emergency operations (Haine,
2004: 45; Schmitt, 2004: 91).
To sum up, Europeans have consistently sought to augment their role within the Euro-
Atlantic security arena since the end of the Cold War. The framework within which they
have pursued this objective has, nevertheless, shifted since they began this endeavour in
the early 1990s. What initially started off as a NATO, American-inspired project is now a
distinctly European project, albeit to some extent dependent on access to NATO
capabilities and infrastructure for more ‘robust’ missions. Over the course of the last five
years, a series of capabilities and infrastructure with which to carry out a wide array of
missions has been established and capabilities are now being developed in response to the
EU’s recently outlined security strategy, suggesting that a common perception of security
threats to the Union as a whole are beginning to inform capabilities development
(Eriksson, 2004: 10).

The Shift to an EU Framework

While cooperation in this area has become more formalised and EU-level institutions have
gained a greater room for manoeuvre as the number of issues dealt with under the banner
of the ESDP has increased, the intergovernmental nature of the ESDP has meant much of
 Transatlantic Security Relations 9

the ESDP’s earlier development was bottom up. With the disappearance of the bipolar
order and the decline of violent geopolitical conflict between advanced industrialised
nations, European states were redefining their security policies in ways that required a
redeployment of their external military apparatus (Price, 2001: 31). In France and
Germany, both of which enjoyed a less intimate military and defence industrial
relationship with the US than Britain, these new exigencies combined with defence
industrial issues in such a way as to favour a reorientation towards ‘Europe’.

Reformulation of Security Policies and Defence Planning Implications

In France, changes in the global order necessitated a redefinition of the Gaullist synthesis
that had previously informed French security policy. Attaining grandeur and rank through
the pursuit of national autonomy, a belief in French exceptionalism and the universalism
of French values, as well as the value of military force as a tool of state power and prestige
in pursuit of European and global security was rendered anachronistic with the end of the
Cold War. The demise of the East – West stand-off eliminated the context in which France
could play the role of a third diplomatic force and called into question the value of
deterrence. Europe came to be seen as the most appropriate forum in which France could
best exercise its influence and adjust to the altered environment. Fostering greater Franco-
German cooperation within the context of European integration appeared to provide a way
of containing German influence and, moreover, promised to make it easier for French
policymakers to achieve stated national objectives within a European framework.
During the Cold War, France’s independent nuclear capability—force de frappe—was
viewed as an essential tool in the pursuit of national autonomy and influence. With the end
of the East – West arms race, the possession of nuclear weapons no longer served France in
the pursuit of these ideals. Moreover, the paramount importance that had been placed on
French nuclear independence was further challenged by increased focus on civil and
ethnic wars, terrorism and weapons proliferation—security threats that appeared to require
a different set of military capabilities. The wars in the former Yugoslavia and the first Gulf
War made French policymakers particularly aware of France’s need to restructure its force
base in order to be able to engage in crisis management and, moreover, to make this a
cornerstone of a common European security policy under French leadership.
The wars also made it apparent that Europe needed, at least in the short term, to keep the
US engaged in light of Europe’s lack of military capabilities with which to respond to
crises. This change in thinking set the stage for the new flexibility in the Franco-US/NATO
relationship that emerged in the early- and mid-1990s, and played a key role in the
acceptance of the CJTFs framework within NATO. Yet, frustrated with their attempts to
restructure NATO from within, French policymakers soon shifted their focus away from
the WEU and CJTFs as the appropriate means to strengthen the ‘European pillar of
defence’ and towards the EU. In 1998, when the WEU Brussels treaty was due to expire,
the French took the opportunity to initiate a debate on the future of the organisation. In the
summer of that year, Chirac publicly suggested that the WEU’s functions be absorbed by
the EU (Latawski & Smith, 2003: 136).
Within the changed global environment, Germany was also redefining its security
policy. Germany’s Cold War situation had seen its security policy heavily bound to the
US/NATO’s strategic priorities and the constitutionalisation of the notion of selbstbindung
(self-restraint). For almost half a century, Germany’s security policy was heavily
10 L. Watanabe

circumscribed by East– West antagonism, ‘rehabilitation’ through the pooling of its

sovereignty and a preference for non-military solutions to security problems. The demise
of East –West confrontation, the re-unification of Germany and the new understanding of
the use of military force in a globalising world helped to initiate the reshaping of the
contours of German security policy. The perception of Germany as a fully sovereign
partner of the US and a heavyweight in Europe set off a domestic debate about the
country’s role as a security actor.
Enhancing Germany’s role in the context of the redefinition of threats to security and
NATO’s reinvention inevitably led to debates over the need to change Germany’s
constitution to enable participation in NATO operations. For the best part of four decades,
the role of the German Federal Army was shaped by the strategic calculations of the Cold
War and the concerns of Germany’s European Allies: The Federal Army was itself created
in 1955 when the US became convinced that a German land force contribution to NATO
was necessary in order to deter Soviet conventional forces; it was subsequently
commanded by NATO’s CINCENT (Hürsoy, 2002: 224); and the circumstances under
which it could be employed abroad were confined to the self-defence within the Alliance
context. As NATO broadened its mission in the early 1990s to enable it to undertake
multiple and wide-ranging operations, including peacekeeping (Davis, 2003: 213),
Germany’s membership in the Alliance impelled policymakers to reconsider the
circumstances under which military force should be projected. After a fractious internal
debate following US criticism of Germany’s refusal to participate in direct military action
during the 1991 Gulf War, the German Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 that Germany
could participate in military operations within the framework of a collective security
system—for example, as a member of NATO, the WEU or the EU (Takle, 2002). Despite
the lack of firm consensus about the country’s role, there is an overriding desire to be an
active partner in NATO and to assume what many in Germany consider to be the country’s
responsibilities. This implied a readiness to get involved in international military
operations.
While some degree of continuity in the close German-US/NATO relationship remained,
German policymakers were equally convinced that Europe needed to work towards a
genuine European security and defence capability due to their commitment to advancing
the political union of EU member states. To this end, they played a key role during the
negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, advocating a Political Union and a common ESDP.
They also played an important role in negotiating the link between the EU/CFSP and the
WEU. From the German perspective, the WEU was the pivot upon which to strengthen the
CFSP through a European security and defence policy, as well as to Europeanise NATO.
When the time came to negotiate the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, Germany pushed hard for
more concrete provisions for the development of a European security and defence policy.
At the intergovernmental conference in June 1997, which led to the Amsterdam Treaty,
Germany proposed, inter alia, to incorporate the Petersberg tasks into the EU and inserting
a timetable in the Treaty for the integration of the WEU into the EU. Alongside these
proposals, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced its vision of a three-phased
model in which cooperation between the EU and the WEU would first be enhanced,
then the WEU’s activities and structures would be transferred to the EU and, finally,
the Article 5 commitments of the WEU would be included in the revised TEU.
The German rationale behind these proposals was, on the one hand, the inclusion of
common defence in the EU, the development of crisis management capabilities and
 Transatlantic Security Relations 11

the creation of a second, European Pillar of Defence within the framework of NATO
(Hürsoy, 2002: 273 –275).
In the British case, the St. Mâlo Declaration was a turning point in the British position
vis-à-vis the development of a European pillar of defence in that it posited the need for the
EU to develop the capacity for autonomous action within a EU framework and to develop
the appropriate structures in support of this objective, though Britain has always been in
favour of strengthening the European pillar of the transatlantic alliance (Howorth, 2002).
Prior to the Anglo-French declaration, Britain had staunchly supported the American-
inspired ESDI within NATO. Rather than representing a fundamental re-assessment of the
centrality of the transatlantic alliance in foreign and security policy thinking, ‘Europe’
came to be viewed as an appropriate context in which to improve European capabilities to
safeguard the long-term health of the Alliance.
As it became clear that the WEU had failed to develop significant political will to
develop Europe’s operational capabilities, key policy figures within the Ministry of
Defence (MoD) called for a change in the status quo (Latawski & Smith, 2003: 126). This
movement for change intersected with concerns within the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO). The majority view within the FCO was that in order to keep the US engaged
in Europe, Britain had to play a bridging role between its European allies and the US
(Brussels diplomat 2003, interview, October). This implied, on the one hand, persuading
European allies to build up their own military capabilities in order to achieve a more equal
partnership within the Alliance and, on the other hand, communicating to Americans that
greater European capabilities need not imply a threat to NATO.
Developing the capabilities for ‘autonomous action’ was, however, in no way equated
with duplicating NATO assets as a way of acting in EU-only operations. Britain’s intimate
relationship with the US has enabled it to retain some degree of its rank as a major power
with global interests. Britain enjoys privileged access to American space-based
capabilities, which are essential in creating ‘strategic effects’4 and for projecting force
far-a-field—both of which are regarded as crucial to responding to security threats at their
point of origin. This means that policymakers in the MoD, as well as those in the Treasury,
are generally opposed to duplicating these capabilities through joint programmes with
other European states. Their reluctance is matched by the FCO’s concerns about the
political ramifications of such duplication, since the US is not eager to see Europe develop
space-based technology for commercial (as well as geopolitical) reasons.
Taking a lead role in the area of ‘defence’ also served the perceived need of boosting
Britain’s role in the EU in light of the negative impact that Britain’s non-accession to the
Euro had had on its influence (Grant, 1998: 7– 8; Latawski & Smith, 2003: 130). As one of
the few EU member states capable of projecting military power beyond Europe’s borders,
demonstrating leadership in the field of security and defence provided the Blair
government with an opportunity to play a greater role in European affairs. Other than
Britain, only France was considered a ‘serious’ military power, used to acting globally and
with a high threshold for casualties. However, French reforms to force structure were less
complete than those of Britain and, perhaps more significantly, France’s non-membership
of NATO’s integrated military structure and its awkward relationship with the US, gave
Britain an advantage in terms of reassuring the US that NATO would not be undermined
by an EU framework for increased military capabilities (Freedman, 2001: 295).
Of course, redefining security policies implied developing the appropriate capabilities
with which to engage in new kinds of interventions abroad. After the end of the Cold War,
12 L. Watanabe

West European governments had engaged in uncoordinated defence cuts in the hope of a
‘peace dividend’. Yet, new weapons systems are technologically intensive and, therefore,
costly. European governments could only conceive of procuring and developing these
systems by combining their resources and developing joint defence programmes.
At present, European producers operate in numerous regulatory environments and
procurement markets. They, therefore, incur higher costs and reap none of the economies
of scale that American producers do. There is, therefore, a clear incentive for joint
programmes and procurement among European countries if Europe is to improve its
military capabilities (Keohane, 2002b).
At the same time, the European defence industry as a whole was undergoing
consolidation. The end of the Cold War had led to the end of the concept of a defence
company’s exemption from internationalisation. In Europe, adaptation to the global
market forces has led to large scale concentration and rationalisation as European firms
sought to compete with their rivals in the US. In the latter, restructuring of the defence
industry has been facilitated by US administrations and is closely related to the
deregulation of telecommunications, which the US worked hard to bring about. European
defence firms have, thus, become increasing integrated with one another in order to gain a
certain ‘critical mass’ with which to compete with American companies, such as Boeing,
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which are eager to penetrate European markets.
Transnational integration is particularly advanced in aerospace and defence electronics
(Schmitt, 2000: 10, 16– 17).
In aerospace, there are now two major firms: EADS (European Aeronautic, Defence and
Space Company) and BAe Systems (the former BAe)—the former being horizontally
integrated with strong points in civilian aerospace and the later being vertically integrated
and highly specialised in the area of defence, where it has a wide range of activities. EADS
is a Franco – German entity, which originates from the merger of the German champion,
Dasa, and its French counterpart, Aerospatiale-Matra, which took place in 1999, and the
Spanish, formerly state-owned CASA’s integration into it. BAe Systems is the result of the
British firm, BAe’s, acquisition of Marconi, the British group has gone from being a
military aerospace platform builder to a real systems manufacturer that has important
capabilities in defence electronics. At the same time, the integration of Marconi North
America has made BAe Systems a major actor in the American market. Indeed, BAe
Systems North America is one of the Pentagon’s main suppliers and the group’s turnover
in the US is higher than that in Britain. Moreover, it has further strengthened its presence
in the US by purchasing Lockheed Martin’s control systems business. The Pentagon also
claims to treat BAe Systems North America like an American firm, which is a clear
advantage when tendering for contracts, due to the ‘Buy American’ Act (Schmitt, 2000:
23– 24, 32).
Since France and Germany saw a major proportion of their defence industry
transformed in to EADS, they have a greater incentive to promote common procurement
and to reduce the amount of regulatory frameworks within which European defence firms
must operate—in other words, to create a European defence industrial base—than Britain.
Britain’s defence industrial linkages with the US and its special relationship with the US,
which involves collaboration on weapons programmes—both nuclear and conventional
weapons—create obstacles to further cooperation with other EU member states, largely
due to the secrecy surrounding shared technology and market interests. Nevertheless,
Britain does have an interest in capabilities improvements in Europe. This is perhaps why
 Transatlantic Security Relations 13

they have been engaging in efforts to improve the regulatory environment and joint
programmes with other European states (Keohane, 2003, interview, 17 December;
Whitehall Official 2003, interview, December).

Diverging Interpretations of the Requirements for Autonomous Action

Given the specificities of Britain, France and Germany, a number of contentious issues
have yet to be worked out regarding the degree of autonomy the EU should have in the
Euro-Atlantic security sphere. This section explores the way in which the competing
agendas of each of the three major EU member states play out around the issues related to
the perceived requirements of the ESDP and the EU’s relationship to NATO.

Responsibility for Missions

Responsibility for missions involving NATO and the EU are currently governed by the so-
called Berlin-Plus arrangement, which allows for three possible scenarios: missions
conducted by NATO only; military operations conducted by the EU with recourse to
NATO assets and capabilities; and military operations that are conducted by the EU only.
Essentially, NATO and the EU have decided under the Berlin-Plus arrangement that
NATO will have the ‘right of first refusal’ with regard to missions. This means that NATO
has the right to decline involvement in a mission before the EU can decide to get involved.
This arrangement is the result of a considerable degree of compromise among both EU and
NATO member states. The starting positions of the US, Britain, France and Germany,
respectively, reflect the different perspectives that each country has regarding the role of
the EU and the corresponding degree of autonomy it should have.
The US position, which was first established by the Clinton administration and later
continued by the Bush administration, is that NATO should have the right to decline
intervention in a conflict before the EU can decide to act. According to Daniel Keohane,
the US originally envisioned only two possibilities for operational responsibility: Either
NATO or the EU with NATO assets. This would give Washington a de facto veto over EU
involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security arena, since the EU’s use of NATO assets
requires the collective approval of all NATO member states. Furthermore, many within
the US have emphasised that if any serious crisis arose in Europe, the US would want to be
involved. As Jennifer Medcalf points out, the US would only act within the NATO
context, which would mean that NATO would automatically be engaged in any serious
crisis in Europe (Medcalf, 2003: 103). Britain tends to share the US view of operational
responsibility. From the viewpoint of many British policymakers, the political and
monetary cost of duplicating expensive assets and capabilities—something that EU only
missions could ultimately imply—is simply unwarranted. The French, by contrast, take a
rather different view.
Whilst the positive experience of operational involvement with NATO on the ground
has brought the French military around to further rapprochement with NATO, most within
the French establishment share a general preference for the ESDP (Brussels diplomat
2003, interview, October) because of the limitations of gaining greater autonomy within
the NATO framework. This is particularly the case in the French Foreign Ministry, where
the Gaullist tradition is particularly strong, as well as in the Elysée Palace. Indeed,
both Chirac and French foreign ministry officials are the most active in promoting
14 L. Watanabe

the development of the ESDP. In line with their desire to see a European Pillar of Defence
equal that of a ‘North American Pillar of Defence’, the French were initially dissatisfied
with the Berlin-Plus arrangement (Medcalf, 2003: 104). They feared that the EU would be
regarded by the US as a ‘sub-contractor’ to NATO. While the French conceded to pressure
from other EU Member states to accept the arrangement, the French persist in their efforts
to undermine the US monopoly on political decision making within the Euro-Atlantic
security arena by emphasising that the EU will mostly act on its own—the effective veto
wielded by non-EU NATO member states as a result of the EU’s dependence on NATO
assets would clearly be avoided if the EU were carrying out operations using their own
capabilities and infrastructure (Medcalf, 2003: 109). Nevertheless, the French also accept
that Europeans may have to call on NATO assets and infrastructure for ‘high-end’
missions.
The differences in emphasis that exist between Britain and France with regards to ESDP
operations reflects their different approaches to the purpose of the project and the weight
the EU should carry relative to NATO within the Euro-Atlantic order. As Medcalf notes,
the French view the ESDP above all as a European project which involves, under some
circumstances, making use of NATO. The British, by contrast, see it as the best means of
safeguarding the Alliance, which will increasingly involve making use of a European
instrument for tasks the US would rather not undertake as it focuses its efforts on the
Middle East and Asia. Germany, for its part, tends to give equal weight to both the ESDI
and the ESDP and regards them as entirely complementary projects (Medcalf, 2003: 105).
Accordingly, it has always stressed that the ESDP is not intended to undermine NATO, but
to complement it. The Berlin-Plus agreement is viewed as buttressing the EU-NATO
relationship. If importance is attached to European-only missions, it is not done so with a
view to undermining the US as a ‘European’ power.

Capabilities Required for ‘Autonomous’ Action

From the French perspective eroding the US monopoly on political decision making is
dependent on the EU’s ability to reduce its reliance on NATO capacities. Accordingly,
French initiatives and diplomatic manoeuvres have been conceived with this in mind. One
year after issuing the St. Mâlo Declaration, Chirac presented France’s EU partners with an
Action Plan that envisioned an EU, able to act autonomously, even in the absence of US
consent, and the development of a fully-fledged European chain of command, full
multilateralisation of existing French and British Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQs),
autonomous intelligence, power projection and C3 capabilities and the establishment of a
technological and industrial base (Hürsoy, 2002: 397). France has been able to find some
common ground with Germany on a number of these issues, while Britain, predictably, has
been lukewarm about what its policymakers view as unnecessary duplication.
Command and planning. In the aftermath of the Anglo-American-led war against Iraq,
the French, along with the Germans, actively pursued the idea of an independent EU
command and planning cell. Together, they proposed the creation of an independent
military headquarters in Turveren, near Brussels, Belgium. Not unsurprisingly, this
proposal caused intense concern in Washington, because of the greater autonomy it
implied for the EU. Unease in the Pentagon was further intensified, because of the timing
of the initiative: the idea surfaced when Blair was trying to repair relations with France and
Germany following their fall-out over the war in Iraq and shortly after a tripartite summit
 Transatlantic Security Relations 15

in Berlin in September 2003 between Blair, Schröder and Chirac (Financial Times, 2003b:
A1). Washington feared that some kind of deal on greater ‘defence’ cooperation had been
made by the three statesmen. The US reacted fairly strongly—the US ambassador to
NATO, Nicholas Burns, is on record as claiming that the Franco-German proposal
represented ‘one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship’—calling an
extraordinary meeting in NATO the following month to challenge the initiative (Financial
Times, 2003c: A1).
While the idea of an independent headquarters at Turveren has been buried, due to lack
of Anglo-American support, a compromise deal appears to have been reached. At a
meeting in Naples in November 2003, EU foreign ministers agreed upon the creation of a
small independent military planning cell in the EUMS for EU missions independent of
NATO and a EU planning cell in SHAPE to be employed for missions undertaken with
NATO or with recourse to NATO assets (Financial Times, 2003a: A2) Britain, which was
in favour of the idea of an EU presence at SHAPE, was clearly key in negotiating the
compromise. Indeed, according to one Whitehall official, Britain worked closely with the
US on its negotiating position and, as Charles Grant notes, the change in the British
position vis-à-vis a planning cell at the EUMS would most likely not have gone ahead
without the blessing of the Bush administration. The compromise solution was also likely
to have been facilitated by Germany’s flexibility on the issue. Germany, apparently, was in
favour of an EU presence at SHAPE (Brussels diplomat 2003, interview, October) and
most likely supported the French position out of gratitude for France’s solidarity in
opposition to the war in Iraq (Keohane, 2003, interview, 17 December).
The rift created by divergent positions on the war in Iraq between European countries,
as well as that within the transatlantic alliance, in effect, created an impetus for greater
European cooperation in the area of security and defence as European sought to recover
from deep divisions and Washington’s effort to exploit them. The Turveren plan was but
one element of proposed measures for deeper cooperation in the security and defence
fields. At the Brussels summit, France, Germany and Belgium also called for greater
cooperation among those EU member states ready to form a ‘core’ Europe in the area of
security and defence. In light of Britain’s bid for leadership in this area, Blair had little
choice but to cross some of its previous ‘red lines’. The feeling in Whitehall and the
Cabinet was that Britain had to make a greater effort to play a constructive role in Europe.
Washington no doubt recognised this and the need to tone down its rhetoric. Its
policymakers were, consequently, willing to accept the resulting compromise on the
headquarters issue.

Intelligence and related capabilities. Political momentum for the development of further
cooperation in the area of intelligence has also been gaining ground in recent years. At St.
Mâlo in 1998, Britain’s acceptance of the need for the EU to develop ‘a capacity for
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic
planning’ was widely seen as an important milestone in the movement towards a European
intelligence policy (Joint Declaration on European Defence, 1998, emphasis added). In
June 1999, at the EU summit in Cologne, EU leaders furthered their stated aims by adding
that responding to international crises, even without prejudice to NATO, required ‘the
maintenance of a sustained defence effort, the implementation of the necessary adaptations
and notably the reinforcement of our capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic
transport, [and] command and control’ (Presidency Conclusions, 1999, emphasis added).
16 L. Watanabe

The Cologne declaration also called for the transfer of the WEU’s Satellite Centre in
Torrejon in Spain to the EU, which has since taken place under the 2000 Nice Treaty.
Despite this apparent drive toward the development of the EU’s intelligence capabilities,
significant differences between EU Member states continue to exist.
While EU Member states are a long way away from developing a pan-European
intelligence policy and the supporting structures, a good deal of embryonic bilateral and
multilateral cooperation has been underway since the early nineties. A low level of
integration between France and the US in the field of intelligence, compounded by the
Gaullist tradition in France, has placed France in the vanguard of efforts to boost
autonomous EU intelligence and C4I capabilities. Dependence on the US during the 1991
Gulf War and Bosnia peace implementation force (IFOR) from 1995 to 1996 convinced
France that Europe needed to improve its autonomous collection capabilities, particularly
with regard to space-based assets (Villadsen, 2000: 2). While the US shared most of its
intelligence with its European partners during the IFOR operation, occasionally it did not,
frustrating Europeans in their efforts to independently assess the situation. The French also
claim that in 1996, when the Clinton administration launched cruise missile strikes against
Iraq, in retaliation for alleged movements of Republican Guards into Iraq’s Kurdish area,
Hélios 1 satellites (belonging to France, Italy and Spain) showed the troop movement to be
insubstantial. Such incidents, as well as France’s distant intelligence relationship with the
US, have led to a great deal of suspicion on the part of the French as to the quality of and
potential access to US strategic data. French officials argue that Europeans cannot rely on
the US as if it were a neutral country that would always supply Europeans with accurate—
i.e., not low-grade or misleading—data (Hürsoy, 2002: 397). Germany tends to share
French concerns. The German Defence Ministry, in particular, has complained that on
three occasions during the Kosovo conflict, the US provided inadequate or misleading
material that had implications for German forces on the ground (Grant, 2000: 11).
Consequently, Germany has also been involved in efforts to enhance Europe’s intelligence
capacities.
In response to European shortfalls during the Second Gulf War, France spear-headed
the Hélios project, which represented a significant leap forward in Europe’s imagery
intelligence capabilities. Hélios 1 comprises two satellites, which were developed by the
former Matra Marconi Space for the French armaments agency and co-funded by Italy and
Spain—each holding 14 and 7 percent shares, respectively. Hélios 1 was launched in 1995
and has since contributed satellite imagery to the three funding states, as well as to the
WEU. Despite Hélios 1’s contribution to European imagery capabilities, it cannot cut
through cloud cover and lacks radar and infrared capabilities. This has led to the
development of Hélios 2—a French-led follow-up to Hélios 1—which includes infrared as
well as electro-optical imaging capabilities. France attempted to get Germany involved in
this project in return for French investment in Germany’s cloud-piercing Horus radar
observation satellite programme. According to Grant, the Clinton administration tried to
thwart these plans by trying to persuade Germany to buy an off-the-shelf Lockheed spy
satellite rather than invest in Hélios 2. Kohl decided to support the French programme,
because the French promised unlimited access to satellite imagery; whereas the US would
pre-select the photos. However, German budgetary constraints, as well as political
differences over the implications of these programmes for relations with US/NATO,
caused Germany to pull out of the Hélios 2 programme a few years later and to abandon
Horus altogether (Gregory, 2000: 139; Gueldry, 2001: 169; Villadsen, 2000: 6).
 Transatlantic Security Relations 17

In addition to being in the vanguard of developing Europe’s imagery intelligence

capabilities, France has also worked hard to strengthen the European capacity to interpret
the resulting intelligence data. A major part of this effort was the creation of the WEU
Satellite Centre at Torrejon in Spain, which became operational in March 1993. The
Centre is funded by France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain, Belgium and Holland. It
initially purchased French SPOT satellite images, later obtaining images from India’s IRS-
1C, Hélios 1 and Russian satellites. It also orders images from ERS-1 and 2 (European
Space Agency), Landsat 4 and 5 (USA), and Radarsat (Canada) (Gregory, 2000: 140;
Villadsen, 2000: 17 –18). In line with the Cologne declaration, as mentioned, the Torrejon
Satellite Centre has since been transferred to the EU.
France has also been eager to develop space-based C4I in order to reduce Europe’s
dependence on NATO and US C4I capabilities and infrastructure. Given that France places
great importance on EU only missions, it has been keen to develop C4I capabilities. In 1998, it
showcased a C4I capability during a multinational exercise involving France, Spain, Italy and
Portugal by using command and information systems with intelligence assets such as Hélios
(Valladsen, 2000: 8). Work is also underway on a Franco-German successor to the Sycaruse II
network, which presently provides French forces with virtually global connectivity (Gregory,
2003: 140). While European C4I capabilities could be used in EU-led missions, they would
likely fall short of those of NATO/US (Villadsen, 2000: 8) Europe’s exploitation of space-
based technology is simply not as advanced as that of the US. This is perhaps one reason why
the French argue that Europe needs a coherent space policy (Keohane, 2003: 2) and favour the
development of a European equivalent to the US’ Global Positioning System (GPS)—a
network of satellites whose signals can be picked up by small devices that reveal the ‘users’
exact location (Keohane, 2003: 1)—which has direct relevance to the so-called digitalisation
of the battlefield.
In contrast to France, and to a lesser extent Germany, Britain is reluctant to develop national
or European capabilities for imagery intelligence. This is not surprising, considering Britain’s
privileged access to US satellite data and its deeper integration into the US’ C4I capabilities.
Duplicating NATO/US assets and capabilities that are available to Europeans under the
Berlin-Plus arrangement is viewed as an unnecessary expense, particularly since Britain tends
to favour missions involving NATO-only or EU missions with recourse to NATO assets. In
addition to intimate relations in the area of space-based intelligence capabilities, Britain also
enjoys extensive institutionalised relations with the US in the areas of signals and human
intelligence. Given the extent of Anglo-American intelligence relations, a higher degree of
trust exists between Britain and the US. Britain also has more to lose by going up against the
US, which does not wish to encourage Europeans to develop their intelligence capacities for
both political and commercial reasons: reduced European dependence on US assets and
capabilities implies less control over Europeans, and American defence companies,
reportedly, hope to sell satellites to Europeans (Keohane, 2002a).
The positions of Britain, France and Germany regarding the development of
autonomous European intelligence capabilities are, thus, on the one hand, heavily
informed by the degree to which each state is integrated into the Atlantic intelligence
network. With no privileged access to US satellite data, France and Germany have a
greater motivation to boost European imagery intelligence than Britain. On the other hand,
diverging priorities are also the result of the specific kind of international ties
the companies associated with their defence industrial base have developed since exposure
to a globalising political economy.
18 L. Watanabe

Joint defence programmes and procurement. Changes in European defence industries

and the related financial cost constraints of European governments have created an
incentive—albeit unevenly spread—among European governments to deepen cooperation
in the area of procurement and to create a more uniform regulatory environment for
European defence firms. To this end, Britain, France and Germany, along with Italy, Spain
and Sweden signed a Framework Agreement in July 2000, covering six areas: (1) security
of supply; (2) transfer and export procedures; (3) security of classified information;
(4) research and technology; (5) treatment of technical information; and (6) harmonisation
of military requirements. In these six domains, signatories agreed to create a more
homogeneous regulatory framework, with the aim of improving market conditions for
greater transnational cooperation (Schmitt, 2002: 36). In addition to attempting to
establish a common set of rules for cooperation, a Franco-German inspired joint
programme management agency—the Joint Armaments Co-operation Organisation
(otherwise known by the French Acronym (OCCAR)—has been established. OCCAR is
aimed at improving the efficiency of joint European procurement by establishing one set of
guidelines for joint programmes, giving participating firms a central reference point
instead of several national teams. While many of OCCAR-managed programmes have
been Franco-German, Britain is involved, along with France and Germany, in a cobra
programme to produce a long-range battlefield radar, and has also joined forces with
Germany and The Netherlands on a multi-role armoured vehicle programme (MRAV)
(Keohane, 2002b: 24, 26).
In Thessaloniki in June 2003, the European Council tasked the relevant bodies of the
Council with taking the necessary steps towards the creation of an intergovernmental
agency dealing with capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments during
2004. Following the summit, the Council established an ad hoc Preparation Group to
develop a blueprint for the Agency’s organisation and mission. In February 2004, an
Agency Establishment Team (AET) was set up in order to prepare for the creation of the
Agency. Based on its findings, the agency will initially act as a coordinating point for
existing armaments bodies and will assist the Council in the capabilities development
process. When fully operational, it will be responsible for coordinating operational needs
and capability acquisition and development, and will incorporate relevant elements of pre-
existing arrangements, notably those of OCARR, LoI, Framework Agreement, and
WEAG/WEAO (Eriksson, 2004: 100 – 101).
A link between military planning and defence research and procurement has, thus, been
brought within the Union framework, as well as strengthened. This is perceived as
particularly important for harmonising capability requirements, fostering standardisation
of equipment and translating common capability needs into procurement projects
(Schmitt, 2004: 101) even by Britain, which has supported the establishment of the
agency, but remains eager to prevent its politicisation.

Conclusion
The end of the East – West confrontation and global economic restructuring have,
thus, altered the politics of European security and, by extension, those of American –
European security relations. The disappearance of the bipolar order and reduced threat of
state-to-state military confrontation, have altered security policies, which require a new set
of capabilities with which to engage in new forms and styles of intervention abroad. Those
 Transatlantic Security Relations 19

major EU member states with less intense military and defence industrial linkages with the
US, namely France and Germany, tend to take a maximal view of what is meant by a
‘capacity for autonomous action’ than Britain, which is more intensely integrated with US
military and intelligence capabilities, and has significant defence industrial linkages with
the US. Given the cost of acquiring and developing technologically-intensive weapons
systems with which to reduce the Union’s dependency on NATO assets, and the positive
economic spin-offs from doings so on a regional basis, France and Germany are also
strong supporters of the development of a European defence industrial base more so than
Britain. With such differences in appreciation amongst the ‘big three’, the ESDP is likely
to remain, at least for the foreseeable future, a contentious issue in transatlantic relations.

Notes
1
The Second Pillar of the European Union is intergovernmental as opposed to supranational in nature.
2
Established in 1992, Eurocorps comprises military contributions from its five framework nations:
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain. Available at http://www.eurocorps.org.
3
The PSC comprises representatives at senior ambassadorial level and one representative from the
Commission. It prepares policy options in anticipation of events and is charged with the strategic
direction and political control of EU activities in crisis situations. Its definition within the Treaty
effectively replaces previous references to the WEU’s Political Committee.
4
This refers to network-enabled capabilities designed to perform a wide-range of military tasks.

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Lisa Watanabe is a doctoral student at Department of Political Science, York University,

Toronto, Canada. Her publications include: Unraveling the European Security and
Defence Policy Conundrum (2003) and ‘European Security in an American Era: Between
Estrangement and a New Partnership’, Global Governance and Global (Dis)orders:
Trends, Transformations and Impasses (2004).