Equal Protection Clause

11.Central Bank Employees Association vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No.
148208, 15 December 2014.
FACTS:
 The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for
Prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last
provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.
 July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished
the old Central Bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP.
 Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job
evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall
be instituted as an integral component of the Bank Sentrals human resource
development program. Provided that the Monetary Board shall make its own
system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided, however, that
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under
salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed
under RA No 6758.
 7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file
employees of Government Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA
No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA No 8282 (1997) – SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) –
SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No 8763 (2000) –
HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653,
runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal
protection of the laws”

RULING:
1. The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.

With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other
government financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last
provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination
on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation

of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found
reasonable because there were substantial distinction that made real differences
between the 2 classes.
 The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation
of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the
constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7
other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply
equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation,
so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without
differences.

The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each
exemption rests on the policy determination by the legislature. The policy
determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the
rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of
treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are
similarly situated.

The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results
of Congress inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP
and the 7 other GFIs. The challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of
RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy
adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.

In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that
allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if not identical
are analogous.

12.Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, 24 April 2018.

FACTS:
 Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro.
Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel
the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to
be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
 According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him
 or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law

ISSUES:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate
the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the
Philippines?

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation
of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the
latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the
wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be
a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file
the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even
if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce
proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow
such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of
the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court
ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind
adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal
protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on
a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal
protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino
spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a
divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings.
Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards
to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and
unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity
of the Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to
special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign
divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
 2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of
divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to
believe that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce
must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.

13.Abakada Guro Partylist vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, 14 August 2008.
FACTS:
 RA 9335 or theAttrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law
intends to encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation (Board).The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and
CSC were tasked to promulgate and issue the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9335, to be approved by the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose. Petitioners invoking their
right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335m a tax reform legislation Petitioners contend that:
1. By establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “
transforms the officials and employees into mercenaries and bounty
hunters’ as they will do their best only for such rewards. Thus, the system
of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve
the people with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
2. They also claim (Petitioners) that limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and BOC
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
3. Finally, petitioners assail the creation of the congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
compelled upon the enactment and approval of the laws, the creation of
it permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
 Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition
for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners
 have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this
Court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public
policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this
case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed
mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the
law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law
validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform
are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that
will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law
enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the
fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-
accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing
agencies.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the limitation of the scope of the system of such rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection?

RULING:
1. NO. Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the
same conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When
things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in
law differently.

A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary.

With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the
subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR
and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
 generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally
perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions -taxation. Indubitably, such a
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

Non-impairment of contracts
14.U.S. v. Conde, 42 Phil. 76
FACTS:
 On 30 December 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco borrowed
P300 from the defendants and by virtue of a contract, the former obligated
themselves with the interest rate of 5% per month, payable within the first
10 days of every month, and the first payment shall be made on 10 January
1916.
 Usury Law (Act. 2655) took effect on 01 May 1916, or four months
subsequent to the execution of said contract.
 On 21 May 1921, a complaint was filed against the defendants in violation of
the Usury Law. The Court of First Instance of Manila found the defendants
guilty and sentenced them to pay a fine of P120 and in case of insolvency, to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of law.
 The appellants contend that:
 The contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected was
executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted;
 At the time said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury
law in force in the Philippine Islands;
 Said Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or
four months and a half after the contract in question was executed;
 Said law could have no retroactive effect or operation;
 Said law impairs the obligation of a contract;
 All of said reasons the judgment imposed by the lower court should be
revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed, and that they should each
be discharged from the custody of the law.
 The lower court opined that even though the contract was established prior
to the passage of Act No. 2655, the defendants still collected a usurious
amount of interest after the adoption of said law and therefore, violated such
law and must be punished in accordance to Usury Law.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the defendants are guilty in violation of Usury Law (Act. No.
2655).
 RULING:

1. No. An ex post facto law is a law that makes an action, done before the passage of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
In the present case, the defendants executed an act which was legal before the
Usury Law. To make said law applicable to the defendants’ previous act would
render it an ex post facto operation. Moreover, if a contract is legal at its
inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. Also, no
law shall be passed impairing the obligation of contracts. If a law is passed
rendering the opposite effect, the law is null and void with respect to Jones Law.

Wherefore, all premises considered, the higher court hereby decide that the acts
complained of the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time they were
committed, and therefore the sentence of the lower court should be, and is
hereby, revoked; and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the complaint be
dismissed and that the defendants be discharged from the custody of the law,
with costs de oficio.

15.Ysmael vs. Deputy ES 190 SCRA 673

FACTS:
 In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquino’s administration, petitioner
sent letters to the Office of the President and to the Ministry of Natural
Resources (MNR) seeking the reinstatement of its timber license agreement
(TLA No. 87), which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine other
concessions, during the Marcos administration. It alleged that after the its TLA
was cancelled without being given the opportunity to be heard, its logging area
was re-awarded to other logging concessionaires without a formal award or
license, as these entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of
deposed President Marcos.
 The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due
process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn
whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not
discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires
whose licenses were revoked in 1983. It also emphasized the fact that there was
currently a total log ban being imposed on the subject areas.
 After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the
President, but the petition was denied on the ground that the appeal was
prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Hence,
petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders
issued by their predecessors in the past regime.
RULING:
1. The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory
administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine in
this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders
are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same
had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata
thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent
authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

Petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law for attacking the validity
of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent
its letter to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting for
reconsideration, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was
concerned.

More importantly, the assailed orders of the MNR disclose public policy
consideration, which effectively forestall judicial interference. Public
respondents, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy
to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an
ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into,
and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. A long line
of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under their special
technical knowledge and training.

Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal

instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

The Court expresses its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the

issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging
concessionaires. Should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear
grave abuse of discretion on the part of concerned officials with respect to
the implementation of this public policy, the Court will not hesitate to step in.
However, in this case, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and
to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought. Petition is dismissed.