Discuss in detail the law relating to anti defection under the Indian constitution law?

A law was sought to limit such defections in India. In 1985, the Tenth Schedule of the 52nd amendment
to the Constitution of India was passed by the Parliament of India to achieve this, which resulted in
introduction of the new word 'Political Party' in the Constitution of India.
Elections in a democratic country allow the people to assert their desire; some argue that political
defections occurring between elections undermine that assertive act and thus the expressed will of the
people. Defections were common in India even prior to the country's independence[citation needed].
Beginning around 1960, the rise of coalition politics increased the incidence of defections as elected
representatives sought to occupy a berth in the cabinet of ministers.[3] (It may be noted that in many
countries including the UK, a Government minister does not have to be a member of either House of
Parliament[4]) As an example, in 1967 a legislator Gaya Lal changed his allegiance three times in a
single day, and gave rise to the infamous expression Aaya Ram Gaya Ram ("Ram has come, Ram has
gone").[5]
Between 1957 and 1967, the Congress (I) party emerged as the sole beneficiary of defections. It lost
98 of its legislators but gained 419, whilst those who left other parties and who did not then join
Congress (I) formed separate new parties with the aim of exerting power on administration in the
future through coalition government, rather than supporting established administration. This situation
gave Congress (I) a strong hold of power on administration. In the 1967 elections, approximately 3,500
members were elected to legislative assemblies of various states and union territories; out of those
elected representatives, around 550 subsequently defected from their parent parties, and some
legislatives crossed the floor more than once.[6]
To tackle the scourge of political party defection, during the fourth Lok Sabha in 1967 a committee
was formed under the chairmanship of Y. B. Chavan. This committee submitted a report in 1968 which
led to a first attempt to submit an anti-defection bill in Parliament. Although the opposition was
supportive of the bill, the Government, then led by Indira Gandhi, referred it for consideration by a
Joint Select Committee; it did not emerge from committee before all other legislative proposals were
voided by subsequent elections.[7]
1977–79 was one of the crucial periods in Indian politics when the first-ever national non-Congress
administration, led by Morarji Desai, was driven out of power due to the defection of 76
parliamentarians. This caused political uncertainty until 1979, when Gandhi was elected by a clear
majority. There was a definite trend in the political landscape of India during the 1970-80s. Whenever
there was a Congress-led administration at the center, the regional administrations fell due to the
defection of non-Congress elected representatives. Then Chief Minister of Karnataka, Virendra Patil,
called this trend a "goldrush". Though corruption was a global phenomenon, the Gandhi period saw
the disruptive politics of defection become rampant in India.[7]
With rising public opinion[citation needed] for an anti-defection law, immediately after securing a clear
majority in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi proposed the new anti-defection bill in the Parliament. After marathon
debates, both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha unanimously approved the bill on 30 and 31 January
1985, respectively.[8] The bill received the President's approval on 15 February 1985 and the act came
into effect on 18 March 1985.[9] The law laid out the process for disqualifying an elected member for
the remaining term, who either resigned from, voted against the will of the belonging party or remained
absent during voting on a crucial bill. However, the law allowed mergers and splits of political parties,
allowing splits in the party by one-third of its members and merger (joining another party) by two-
thirds of other party members. Experts believed defections should not be viewed in terms of numbers
alone and should be seen in the context of how such political defections damage the people's mandate.
But Ashoke Kumar Sen justified the act of allowing mass defections by terming it as freeing the
legislators from "chains of obscurantism and orthodox politics".[7] Recently,[when?] Sachin Pilot and his
MLAs (from Congress' Rajasthan constituency) moved to the high court and challenged the anti-
defection law; stating that the provision should not jeopardize the fundamental freedom of speech and
expression of a member of the house. They have also demanded the clause 2(1)(a), to be declared ultra
vires (outside the scope) of the basic structure of the Constitution, and the freedom of speech and
expression under Article 19(1)(a).
Defection by legislators occurs in many democracies. It can be argued that they can undermine the
stability of the cabinet, which is dependent on the support of elected legislators. The argument follows
that such instability can amount to a betrayal of the people's mandate as voiced at the most recent prior
election.[how?]
Prior to the introduction of the anti-defection law, the election of both the Prime Minister and Chief
Ministers of some of its states and territories had experienced instances of perceived uncertainty
resulting from legislators changing their political allegiance. It may be noted that the 'Political Party'
was not a recognised word in the Constitution of India at that time. By one estimate, almost 50 per
cent of the 4,000 legislators elected to central and federal parliaments in the 1967 and 1971 general
elections subsequently defected, leading to political turmoil in the country.[1]
A law was sought to limit such defections in India. In 1985, the Tenth Schedule of the 52nd amendment
to the Constitution of India was passed by the Parliament of India to achieve this, which resulted in
introduction of the new word 'Political Party' in the Constitution of India. Thus, political parties got
recognition in the Constitution.

10th Schedule of the Constitution

Why in News?
The Supreme Court has asked the Goa Assembly Speaker to respond to a plea filed by the opposition
Congress party to decide on the disqualification proceedings against 10 legislators who joined the
ruling BJP in July last year.
What’s the issue?
 In July last year 10 MLAs, purportedly claiming to form a two-third of Indian National Congress
(INC), decided to merge the said legislature party with the BJP and accordingly addressed a
communication to that effect to the Speaker.
 Based on the communication, the Speaker took note of the “alleged merger of INC’s legislative
party in the Goa Legislative Assembly, and allotted the 10 seats in the Assembly along with the
members of the BJP”.
However, petitioners contended that the legislators in question have incurred disqualification
under Article 191(2) of the Constitution, read with para 2 of the Tenth Schedule (defection), and
are liable to be disqualified as members of the Legislative Assembly.

What is the anti-defection law?

The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution in 1985 by the 52nd Amendment
Act.
 1. It lays down the process by which legislators may be disqualified on
grounds of defection by the Presiding Officer of a legislature based on a
petition by any other member of the House.
2. The decision on question as to disqualification on ground of defection is referred
to the Chairman or the Speaker of such House, and his decision is final.

The law applies to both Parliament and state assemblies.

Disqualification:
If a member of a house belonging to a political party:
1. Voluntarily gives up the membership of his political party, or
2. Votes, or does not vote in the legislature, contrary to the directions of
his political party. However, if the member has taken prior permission,
or is condoned by the party within 15 days from such voting or
abstention, the member shall not be disqualified.
3. If an independent candidate joins a political party after the election.
4. If a nominated member joins a party six months after he becomes a
member of the legislature.

Exceptions under the law:

Legislators may change their party without the risk of disqualification in
certain circumstances.
 The law allows a party to merge with or into another party provided that at least
two-thirds of its legislators are in favour of the merger.
 In such a scenario, neither the members who decide to merge, nor the ones who
stay with the original party will face disqualification.

Decision of the Presiding Officer is subject to judicial review:

The law initially stated that the decision of the Presiding Officer is not
subject to judicial review. This condition was struck down by the
Supreme Court in 1992, thereby allowing appeals against the
Presiding Officer’s decision in the High Court and Supreme Court.
However, it held that there may not be any judicial intervention until the
Presiding Officer gives his order.
Advantages of anti-defection law:
1. Provides stability to the government by preventing shifts of party allegiance.
 2. Ensures that candidates remain loyal to the party as well the citizens voting for
him.
3. Promotes party discipline.
4. Facilitates merger of political parties without attracting the provisions of Anti -
defection
5. Expected to reduce corruption at the political level.
6. Provides for punitive measures against a member who defects from one party to
another.

Various Recommendations to overcome the challenges posed by

the law:
1. Dinesh Goswami Committee on electoral reforms: Disqualification should be
limited to following cases:

A member voluntarily gives up the membership of his political party A

member abstains from voting, or votes contrary to the party whip in a
motion of vote of confidence or motion of no-confidence. Political
parties could issue whips only when the government was in danger.
2. Law Commission (170th Report):

Provisions which exempt splits and mergers from disqualification to be

deleted. Pre-poll electoral fronts should be treated as political parties
under anti-defection. Political parties should limit issuance of whips to
instances only when the government is in danger.
3. Election Commission:

Decisions under the Tenth Schedule should be made by the President/

Governor on the binding advice of the Election Commission.
Challenges of Anti-Defection Law
 The anti-defection bill aims to keep the government stable by preventing legislators from
switching sides
 This statute, however, prohibits legislators from voting by their conscience, judgment, and
the interests of their constituents
 The anti-defection statute obstructs the Legislature’s oversight duty over the government by
assuring that members vote based on party leadership decisions
 In other words, if parliamentarians are unable to vote on legislation independently, they will
be unable to serve as an effective check on the administration
 In effect, the Anti-Defection Law implemented the separation of powers between the
Executive and the Legislature, concentrating power in the hands of the executives
 According to the legislation, legislators can be disqualified for defection by the Presiding
Officer of a legislature based on a petition from any other member of the House
 However, there are other cases in which presiding officials serve the entrenched interests
of a ruling political party or government
 Furthermore, the statute makes no provision for the Presiding Officer to decide on a
disqualification plea within a specific time frame
 As a result, the ruling sometimes relies on the presiding officer’s whims and fancies
 The Anti-Defection Law implemented a democracy based on parties and numbers rather
than debate and discussion in India
 It makes no distinction between dissent and defection in this way, weakening Parliamentary
debates on any measure

Exceptions
On the other hand, the legislation does not bind politicians to their political parties
indefinitely. In various conditions, legislators can switch parties without fear of being
disqualified. This law allows a party to merge with another if two-thirds of its members
approve. In such an instance, none of the members face defection accusations. In other
situations, if a person was elected as chairman or Speaker and was forced to resign from
their party. As a result, they can rejoin the party after leaving that position.

The law originally stated that the Presiding Officer is immune from judicial review. The
Supreme Court, however, overturned this in 1992. It was further specified that no
interference would be made until the Presiding Officer issued his order.

In India, there have been numerous incidents of desertion. Several MLAs and MPs have
switched parties. After combining his party, Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik), with the
BJP in Jharkhand, ex-CM Babulal Marandi is also facing proceedings under the Tenth
Schedule. We trust that the preceding explanation clarifies the law for the readers.

91st Constitutional amendment act -2003

Its goals were to reduce the size of the Council of Ministers, prevent defectors from
entering public office, and improve the 10th Schedule of the Indian
ConstitutionPreviously, a merger was defined as a defection of one-third of a political
party’s elected members. It was amended to at least two-thirds after the amendment.The
court also affirmed the Speaker’s broad power in considering cases of MLA disqualification.

Conclusion
Though political instability caused by frequent and unholy changes of allegiance on the part
of our country’s legislators has been greatly reduced due to the 10th Schedule of the
Indian Constitution, there is still a need for a more rationalized version of the 10th
Schedule of the Indian Constitution to help establish a truly representative democracy.
Some sitting MLAs in the Manipur administration recently switched to the opposition,
causing political uncertainty in the state. This defection politics in Manipur is not unusual;
defections have also occurred recently in Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh,
and Uttarakhand. Political defections by members of the Legislature have influenced the
Indian political system for a long time.
The question of selection and appointment of judges in higher judiciary is critical to
the maintain the independent of judiciary

One reason for the diversity is that judicial appointment systems also implicate other values
that may be in some tension with the ideal of judicial independence. For example,
appointments must also ensure judicial accountability, the idea that the judiciary maintain
some level of responsiveness to society.

judicial independence ensures, in particular, that judges are free to conclude that actions
taken, or decisions made by the Government (or even by others) are in breach of the law,
and that they are in particular in breach of individual's rights, including of course their
fundamental, or human, rights - and to decide etc
The Framers of the Indian Constitution, while drafting it, understood the necessity to have an
independent judicial system. Dr Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly Debates stated that
“our judiciary must both be independent of the executive and must also be competent in itself.
And the question is how these two objects could be secured”. The recent debates on the
judicial appointments however state the contrary. The coming of the National Judicial
Appointment Committee, which was later struck down and stated unconstitutional has
brought to light a difficult question of the “need for independence of judiciary”. The tectonic
shift that took place from 1981, where a 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court declared that
the executive would hold primacy in judicial appointments[2], to the judiciary getting primacy
in appointment of Judges in 1998[3] has resulted in a need to structure a more viable, just
and acceptable process of judicial appointments.

Independence of the judiciary

1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined
in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and
other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.

2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and
in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences,
inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter
or for any reason.

3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have
exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its
competence as defined by law.
4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial
process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This
principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by
competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the
law.

5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using
established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established
procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction
belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals.

6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary
to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the
parties are respected.

7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the
judiciary to properly perform its functions.

Freedom of expression and association

8. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the
judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always
conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and
the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

9. Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other organizations
to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their
judicial independence.

Qualifications, selection and training

10. Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with
appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall
safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of
judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race,
colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a
national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.

Conditions of service and tenure

11. The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration,
conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately
secured by law.

12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a
mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.

13. Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective
factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.

14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an
internal matter of judicial administration.

Professional secrecy and immunity

15. The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their
deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of their duties
other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such
matters.

16. Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of appeal or to

compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, judges should enjoy
personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or
omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Discipline, suspension and removal

17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional
capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure.
The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its
initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.

18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or
behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.

19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in

accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.

20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to

an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest
court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.
Discuss the question with the help of latest amendment to the constitution and
judicial decisions
A constitutional amendment is a modification of the constitution of a polity, organization or other type of entity.
Amendments are often interwoven into the relevant sections of an existing constitution, directly altering the text.
Conversely, they can be appended to the constitution as supplemental additions (codicils), thus changing the frame
of government without altering the existing text of the document.

Most constitutions require that amendments cannot be enacted unless they have passed a special procedure that is more
stringent than that required of ordinary legislation. Examples of such special procedures include supermajorities in
the legislature, or direct approval by the electorate in a referendum, or even a combination of two or more different
special procedures. A referendum to amend the constitution may also be triggered in some jurisdictions by popular
initiative.

The Indian constitution can be amended in 3 ways:

1. By Simple Majority of the Parliament

o This method is used to amend those parts of the constitution outside the purview of Article 368 of the
constitution.
o It is used in amending the following provisions:
 Formation of new states, alteration of boundaries of states, changing names of states and alteration of
areas of states
 Creation/Abolition of Legislative Councils in states
 Changing salaries and allowances of judges of Supreme Court and High Court
 Laws regarding citizenship
2. Through procedure mentioned in Article 368 of the Constitution
o This again is done in 2 ways -
 By Special Majority of the Parliament
 Special majority implies :
 A majority of the 'total membership' of the Parliament (ie., each houses separately) and
 A majority of 2/3rd of members present and voting
 By Special Majority of the Parliament and consent of states
 This requires
 Special majority in each house of the Parliament and
 Consent of half of the state legislatures
 This method is used for amending those provisions affecting states' interests. eg: Representation of
states in Parliament, distribution of legislative powers between the union and states etc.
Since its commencement in 1950, Indian constitution has been amended 105 times, as of August 2021.[14] Supreme
Court in Kesavananda Bharati Case held that parliament's power to amend is not unlimited, and it can't amend the basic
structure of the constitution.[15] The ‘basic structure’ includes the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law,
Independence of the judiciary, doctrine of separation of powers, federalism, secularism, sovereign democratic republic,
the parliamentary system of government, the principle of free and fair elections, welfare state, etc.[15]
Latest Amendment/s

Addition of articles
338B, 342A, and
Added Clause 11
102nd 26C. August Constitutional status to National Commission for Backward Classes
2018
Modification of
articles 338,
366.[113]

Amendment to A maximum of 10% Reservation for Economically Weaker

Article 15, added Sections (EWSs) of citizens of classes other than the classes
Clause [6], 12
mentioned in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 15, i.e. Classes other Ram
103rd January
than socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or the Nath
Amendment to 2019
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Inserted Clause [6] Kovind
Article 16, added
Clause [6].[114] under Article 15 as well as Inserted Clause [6] under Article 16.

To extend the reservation of seats for SCs and STs in the Lok
25
Amend article Sabha and states assemblies from Seventy years to Eighty years.
104th January
334.[115] Removed the reserved seats for the Anglo-Indian community in the
2020
Lok Sabha and state assemblies.[116]

To restore the power of the state governments to identify Other

Amended Article 10 Backward Classes (OBCs) that are socially and educationally
105th 338B, 342A and August backward. This amendment annulled the Supreme Court judgement
366[117] 2021 of 11 May 2021, which had empowered only the Central
government for such identification.[118]
Short Note
Council Of Ministers
The Union Council of Ministers [1] is the principal executive organ of the Government of India,
which functions as the senior decision making body of the executive branch. It is chaired
by the prime minister and consists of the heads of each of the executive government
ministries. Currently, the council is headed by prime minister Narendra Modi and consists
of 29 members, including the prime minister. The council is subject to the Parliament of
India.

A smaller executive body called the Union Cabinet is the supreme decision-making body in India;
it is a subset of the Union Council of Ministers who hold important portfolios and ministries
of the government[2]

Regulation
Pursuant to Article 75(3), the Council of Ministers is responsible collectively to the lower house
of the Indian parliament, called the Lok Sabha (House of the People).[3] When a bill
introduced by a minister in the Lok Sabha is not approved by it, the entire council of
ministers is responsible and not the minister. The council of ministers upon losing the
confidence of Lok Sabha shall resign to facilitate the formation of a new government.

A minister shall take any decision without being considered by the council of ministers per Article
78(c). All union cabinet members shall submit in writing to the President to propose a
proclamation of emergency by the president in accordance with Article 352.

According to the Constitution of India, the total number of ministers in the council of ministers
must not exceed 15% of the total number of members of the Lok Sabha. Ministers must be
members of parliament. Any minister who is not a member of either of the houses of the
parliament for six consecutive months is automatically stripped off his or her ministerial
post.[3]
Doctrine Of Colorable Legislation
Doctrine of Colorable Legislation means that if a legislature lacks the jurisdiction to enact
laws on a specific subject directly, it cannot make laws on it indirectly. In simple
words, the doctrine checks if a law has been enacted on a subject indirectly when it is
barred to legislate on that topic directly.

EVOLUTION

India, a federal country, had a greater influence on the colonial ruling system during the English
rule. It also influenced the Constitution to create three pillars of democracy i.e. executive,
legislative and judiciary. In Indian Constitution, the separation of powers prevails which should
be balanced and maintained between the different organs of the government where the
lawmaking power vests on the legislature, i.e. one organ should not override or interfere over
other organs to avoid inconsistency and have cooperation among the organs. In India, this
doctrine is enacted to impose a limitation on the law-making power of the legislation.

MEANING

The doctrine of colorable legislation is based upon the maxim that “you cannot do indirectly
what you cannot do directly”. As there is a necessity to have a balance between different organs,
this doctrine can be invoked when the legislature done an act inconsistently or what it does not
authorize to deal with certain matters directly but done indirectly. In other words, this doctrine
is applicable when the legislature does not have a right to make law on a particular subject but
indirectly done in such matters. Legislative powers are dealt with under Art.248 and in Seventh
Schedule distributed by List I, II and III of the Constitution of India. Parliament has exclusive
control to make laws in the list enumerated in List II. The Parliament and State Legislative have
the right to make laws in mentioned in List III which is known as a concurrent list. Hence, this
doctrine is enacted to limit the legislative to exercise their rights between the Centre and the
State to have a harmonious relationship with the legitimacy of the rule. When the legislature
has indirectly, veiled and concealed the act which it is not exercised to do, the doctrine of
colorable legislation comes into play.

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENT TO TEST TO DETERMINE THE TRUE NATURE OF THE

LEGISLATION

1. The court must not look into the nature of the law but to its form for which it has enacted.

2. The court must look into the object and effect of the law.

3. The court must read the entire statute and determine the combined effect.
LIMITATIONS

1. The doctrine does not extend to subordinate legislation.

2. If the legislature has the power to make legislation on a particular subject, the legislature
can do so.
3. The doctrine does not limit the legislature when the constitution does not restrain the
power of the legislature.

CASE LAWS

Case 1

K.C.G Narayan Dev V. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375, Held - The substance of the
Act that is material and not merely the form or outward appearance, and if the subject-
matter in substance is something which is beyond the powers of the Legislature to
legislate upon the form in which the law is clothed cannot save if from condemnation.
The Legislature cannot violate the constitutional prohibitions by employing indirect
method.

Case 2

State of Bihar V. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252. Held - In this case the Bihar Land
Reforms Act, 1950, was held void on the ground that though apparently it purported to
lay down principle for determining compensation yet in reality it did not lay down any
such principle and thus indirectly sought to deprive the petitioner of any compensation.
It is the case, Where a law has been declared invalid on the ground of colorable
legislation.

Case 3

Deep Chand V. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 648. Held - On 1956 the Parliament with a
view to introduce a uniform law amended the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 and added a new
provision enabling the State Government to frame rules of nationalisation of Motor
Transport. Since both the Union Law and State Law occupied the same field, the State
Law was void to the extent of repugnancy to the Union Law. Case 4 Smt. Ujjam Bai V.
State of Uttar Pradesh, 1962 AIR 1621 That is colorable legislation which cannot claim
the benefit of Art. 265 and it must be held to contravene Art. 19(1) (g) unless saved by
Art. 19(6). But where the law in within the competence of the legislature and is otherwise
valid and is not colorable can it be said that it is liable to be attacked as infringing Art.
19(1).

Case 4

S. Bagavathy v. State Of T.N., 2007 SCC ONLINE MAD 218. The contra theory is of
colorable legislation which means though apparently the legislature enacted the statute
purported to act within the limits of its power had in substance and reality transgressed
 the limits of constitutional powers, the transgression being a camouflage by what appears
on the appropriate examination to be a merepretence and disguise.

Case 5

M.Karunanidhi V. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 988. The repugnancy would arise
between the two statutes in the following situation,

1. It must be shown that there is clear or direct inconsistency between the two enactments
which is irreconcilable. So they cannot stand together or operate in the same field.

2. There can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of
two statutes.

3. When there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying a particular field, but there is
no room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into
collusion with each other, no repugnancy results.

4. Where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create
distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes
continue operate in the same field.