INTRODUCTION

“All murders are culpable homicide, but all culpable homicides are not
murder.”

Generally, the thin line of distinction between them is the reason why many
find it interesting. Even it poses difficulty for advocates and legal
practitioners who are unsure where to lay the case. Murder and culpable
homicide appear to be more similar than they are, but they are not
interchangeable terms. Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code defines culpable
homicide, whereas Section 300 deals with the concept of murder. The term
‘homicide’ refers to the killing of a human being, the term ‘culpable homicide’
refers to the unlawful killing of a person and the term ‘murder’ also refers to
the killing of a person.

HOMICIDE
Homicide is derived from the Latin phrases homi (man) and cido (cut).
Homicide literally means “the killing of a human being by another human
being.” The term ‘homicide’ refers to the act of causing or hastening the
death of a human being by another human being. However, not all homicides
are illegal or criminal. The death of an assailant caused by an innocent agent,
such as a child under the age of discretion (doli incapax) or a person of
unsound mind, or the death of the assailant caused in the exercise of the
right of private defence, is not illegal. In the first, the perpetrator is
‘excused,’ but in the second, the defendant’s actions are ‘justified.’

TYPES OF HOMICIDES
As a result, there are two sorts of homicides: (1) lawful homicides and (2)
unlawful homicides. Lawful homicides are ones that fall under the IPC’s
Chapter on General Exceptions and are hence not penalised. The homicides
that are penalised under the Code clearly fall within the category of unlawful
homicides.

Lawful homicides can be divided into two categories based on the nature of
the ‘general exceptions’ that surround the homicide: excusable homicides,
and justifiable homicides. As a result, the IPC recognises three types of
homicide. There are three types of murders:

• Excusable
• Justifiable, and
• Unlawful or criminal (i.e. killings that are neither excused nor
justified).
The ‘Offenses Affecting Life’ under Chapter XVI of the IPC deals with
homicide offences. It is made up of four homicide offenses, namely:

1. Culpable homicide that does not amount to murder,

2. Culpable homicide that does amount to murder,
3. Death by a rash or negligent act, and
4. Dowry death.

CULPABLE HOMICIDE
According to Section 299 of IPC, a person who commits culpable homicide
does an act with the intent of causing death, or with the knowledge that such
an act is likely to cause death.

Illustration:

A is aware that Z is hiding behind a bush. B is completely unaware of this. A

causes B to shoot at the bush with the intent of causing, or knowing that it is
likely to cause, Z’s death. Z is killed by B’s bullets. B may be innocent in this
case, but A has committed the crime of culpable homicide.

Culpable homicide is defined under Section 299 of the Criminal Code. Section
300 defines murder as a culpable homicide with certain distinguishing
features, which are listed in clauses 1-4 of Section 300, subject to the
exclusions set out in Section 300. Any culpable homicide that occurs within
one of the four clauses in Section 300 is considered murder. All other cases
of culpable homicide, including those that may fall under the exceptions to
Section 300, shall be considered culpable homicide rather than murder. While
Section 299 defines ‘culpable homicide,’ it is not exhaustive.

Essential ingredients of culpable homicide

The following are the essential elements of culpable homicide:

• a person must be dead;

• the death must have been caused by the act of another person; and
• the act causing death must have been done with:
(a) the intention of causing death; or

(b) the intention of causing bodily injury likely to cause death; or

(c) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death.
Explanations for Section 299 IPC
The definition itself specifies three scenarios in which the presence or
absence of particular criteria in the cause of death is recognised as culpable
homicide. Explanations 1-3 deal with these scenarios.

Explanation 1
It describes a circumstance in which the injured individual has a disorder,
sickness, or bodily infirmity that has hastened his death. The fact that his
death was expedited or hastened by the sickness or disease he was already
suffering from does not relieve the person who caused the damage of guilt.
In other words, the person who inflicted the harm cannot avoid criminal
liability for culpable homicide by claiming that the person wounded would not
have died if he had not suffered from the condition or ailment.

For instance, A is suffering from diabetes. B with the intention of hastening

the death of A gave him a lot of sweets. The intended victim ate the sweets,
as a result of which, his blood sugar level went high and eventually resulted
in his death. Thus, B is criminally liable.

Explanation 2
It describes a circumstance in which an injured person may have recovered
and avoided death if he had received early and appropriated medical
treatment. In such cases, the fact that the wounded person died as a result
of his inability to obtain adequate medical care cannot be used to absolve the
person who caused the harm in the first place of liability.

For instance, A is suffering from diabetes. B with the intention of hastening

the death of A gave him a lot of sweets. The intended victim ate the sweets,
as a result of which, his blood sugar level went high and eventually resulted
in his death owing to the lack of immediate medical care. Here, the fact of
the lack of immediate medical care cannot be considered to acquit B from
liability.

Explanation 3
It refers to a somewhat different circumstance. It takes into account a child’s
death while still in the mother’s womb. It is not culpable homicide if the child
dies while still in the mother’s womb, according to the law. However, if any
part of the child emerges from the mother’s womb, even if it is not
completely developed, and the kid dies, it is considered a culpable homicide.
For instance, A is a pregnant woman who’s yet to deliver a baby in the
hospital. Now, the head of baby B comes out of the womb. If the baby dies,
it amounts to culpable homicide.

In Jabbar And Ors. v. State (1965), Sarju, Jamna’s brother, was said to have
been hired as a labourer by Ishaq, the appellant, to transport limestone from
Saraiya hill. Ishaq was said to have slapped Sarju twice when he stated his
willingness to carry just five ‘dharas’ (seers) of lime instead of the seven that
Ishaq demanded. The three brothers, Jabbar, Ishaq, and Habib are said to
have gone to their residence after that and saw Sarju seated there while
Smt. Pangoli was applying turmeric to the back of his neck. Ishaq appellant
is accused of striking two lathi strikes at Sarju as soon as the appellants
arrived on the scene, causing him to flee to his own nearby Kotha. After that,
it is reported that Jabbar appellant inquired about Jamna. As Smt. Pangoli
was unable to inform him, the appellant Jabbar is accused of pushing her,
causing her to fall on her stomach, and then kicking her on the side of her
stomach. Smt. Pangoli, who was pregnant at the time, became unwell as a
result and gave birth prematurely to a seven-month-old baby who died. The
child’s hands, feet, and other body parts had developed, according to the
post mortem report. In other words, the baby had developed sufficiently to
be deemed an independent entity from the mother in the eyes of the law.
The court found Jabbar guilty of an offence under Section 304A of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced him to one year of rigorous imprisonment, a fine
of Rs. 500, and three months of further rigorous imprisonment if he did not
pay the fee.

SECTION 301 IPC : CULPABLE HOMICIDE BY

CAUSING THE DEATH OF A PERSON OTHER
THAN THE PERSON WHOSE DEATH WAS
INTENDED
By Section 301, if a person commits culpable homicide by causing the death
of someone whose death he neither intends nor knows to be likely to cause,
the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the same description
as if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or
knew to be likely to cause.

In Rajbir Singh v. State Of U.P (2006), the appellant alleged that his
brother’s home was attacked with bricks by a neighbour. As a result of this,
his father and the accused had a verbal spat, but the problem was eventually
resolved by the locals. The next day, the accused and two relatives arrived
with firearms. They approached the complainant’s business, where his father
was standing. The accused allegedly persuaded or urged his relatives to
murder him there. The accused began firing at the complainant’s father, who
was injured and fell to the ground. A girl went to that shop to buy some
items and was injured and fell down. On their route to the hospital, both of
the injured people died. In his defence, the accused claimed that the girl died
by mistake and that they had no intention of killing her. She was going
through that area when she was injured and died as a result. The Supreme
Court overturned the High Court’s decision and found the defendants guilty.
He was accused under Section 301 of the IPC.

MURDER
By Section 300, unless otherwise specified, culpable homicide is murder:

• If the act that causes the death is done with the intent of causing
death, or—
A fires a shot at Z, intending to kill him. As a result, Z dies. A
commits murder.

• If the act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as
the offender knows is likely to cause the death of the person to
whom the harm is caused, or—
Knowing that B is suffering from an illness that makes a blow likely
to kill him, A hits him with the intention of injuring him. As a result
of the strike, B dies. Although the strike may not have been
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a
person in good health, A is guilty of murder. However, if A, unaware
that B is suffering from a disease, strikes him with a blow that would
not, in the ordinary course of nature, kill a person in good health, A
is not guilty of murder if he did not intend to cause death or bodily
injury that would, in the ordinary course of nature, kill a person in
good health.

• If it is done with the aim of inflicting physical damage on another

person, and the bodily injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in
the regular course of nature, or—
In the regular course of nature, A purposefully causes Z a sword-cut
or club-wound sufficient to kill a man. As a result, Z dies. A is guilty
of murder in this case, despite the fact that he may not have
planned to kill Z.

• If the person conducting the act is aware that it is so risky that it

must, in all likelihood, result in death or physical harm that is likely
to result in death and conducts the act without any justification for
risking death or injury as stated.
Without justification, A shoots a loaded cannon into a gathering of
people, killing one of them. A is guilty of murder, even though he did
not have a planned plan to kill somebody in particular.
EXCEPTIONS

Exception I: grave and sudden provocation

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender causes the death of the
person who delivered the provocation or any other person by mistake or
accident while being deprived of the ability of self-control by grave and
immediate provocation.

Illustration

Under the impact of emotions aroused by Z’s provocation, A murders Y, Z’s

child, on purpose. In as much as the provocation was not offered by the
child, and the child’s death was not caused by accident or misfortune while
doing an act prompted by the provocation, this is murder.

The exception is subject to three exceptions of its own:

• The provocation should not have been sought voluntarily by the

culprit as a justification for killing or harming anybody.
• The provocation should not be caused by an act carried out in
accordance with the law or by a public official in the lawful exercise
of his powers.
• The provocation is unrelated to any actions taken in the exercise of
one’s right to self-defence.

KM Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra

The defendant in KM Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1961), was a naval
officer. He had three children and was married. His wife admitted to him one
day that she had an affair with Prem Ahuja, the deceased. Enraged, the
accused returned to his ship, got a semi-automatic pistol and six rounds from
the ship’s shop, proceeded to the deceased’s flat, entered his bedroom, and
shot him to death. Following that, the accused turned himself in to the police.
The Supreme Court had to decide whether the accused’s actions were
covered by Exception 1 of Section 300. The following postulates pertaining to
the grave and abrupt provocation were established by the Supreme Court:

• The test of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation is whether a reasonable

man from the same social group as the accused would be so
outraged as to lose his self-control in the position in which the
accused was put.
 • In India, words and gestures may give grave and sudden
provocation to an accused, so bringing his act within the first
exception to Section 300 of the IPC.
• In determining whether the succeeding action produced significant
and immediate provocation for committing the crime, the mental
context formed by the victim’s earlier act may be taken into
account.
• The fatal strike should be definitely connected to the effect of
passion emanating from that provocation, not after the passion had
cooled down due to the passage of time or otherwise allowing for
premeditation and calculation.
The accused may have temporarily lost control after his wife admitted to her
illegitimate relationship with the deceased, according to the Supreme Court.
After dropping his wife and children off at a movie theatre, he proceeded to
the ship, grabbed the handgun, conducted some official business, and then
drove his car to the deceased’s workplace and afterwards to his home. By
that time, three hours had passed, and he had had ample opportunity to
restore his temper. As a result, the Court decided that the requirements of
Exception 1 to Section 300 were not applicable. The defendant was found
guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison.

This was the last case decided by jury trial. This case was debated hugely
among the public. There was a major criticism about the case. Nanavati had
previously served as V. K. Krishna Menon’s Defence Associate while the latter
was High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, and had gotten close to the
Nehrus during that period. Jawaharlal Nehru was Prime Minister of India at
the time of Nanavati’s trial and punishment, and his sister, Vijayalakshmi
Pandit, was Governor of Bombay State. All of these benefits might not have
helped Nanavati under other circumstances, because a pardon could have
been perceived by the press and public at other times as a flagrant abuse of
authority to aid a crony of a powerful political family. Public opinion in the
generally conservative country, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly in
favour of Nanavati, who was viewed as an upright navy commander with
middle-class ideals and a strong sense of honour. Nanavati had served three
years in prison, and it was thought that granting him clemency would enrage
the Sindhi community, to whom the Ahuja family belonged. Around this time,
the government received a pardon plea from Bhai Pratap, a Sindhi
businessman who had been convicted of abusing an import licence and had
been a participant in the Indian independence struggle. The government was
inclined to pardon Bhai Pratap because of his history as a freedom warrior
and the minor nature of his transgression. Finally, even Mamie Ahuja, the
deceased’s sister, signed an application for Nanavati’s pardon. In writing, she
consented to his pardon. Bhai Pratap and Nanavati were finally pardoned by
Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the Governor of Maharashtra at the time. This case is
also an epitome of the influence of media trials.
In Shankar Diwal Wadu. v. State Of Maharastra (2008), according to the
prosecution, the accused Shankar Wadu is the brother of Mahu Wadu, who
was assaulted by him and died as a result of the assault. The event occurred
on October 22, 1996, in Kaimad Wadu Pada, Laluka Wada, Thane, where
both the accused and the victim, as well as other close relatives, lived. The
accused sought to maintain Kamlibai, the widow of his brother Vasant, as his
mistress, according to the prosecution evidence, but she refused. The
appellant was violently dragging Kamlibai to his residence on the day of the
occurrence. His brother Mahu (the deceased) told him at the time that he
couldn’t force and pull Kamlibai to his residence. The accused became
outraged by such unsolicited advice and lifted a wooden plank (Pat) and
whacked Mahur on the head with it, as well as kicking and punching him.
Mahu died instantly. Yeshubai, a close relative of both the offender and the
victim, filed a complaint alleging his attack. The investigation was launched
after receiving this complaint, and the accused was detained. The
prosecution called up to eight witnesses to establish its accusation of murder
against the accused, and the learned trial judge, after weighing the evidence,
found the accused guilty and sentenced him to life in prison under section
302 / 506 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as a fine of Rs.50,000.

Exception II : right of private defence

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith
of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power
given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is
exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any
intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such
defence.

Illustration

Z tries to horsewhip A, but not in a way that causes him serious injury. A
pulls a handgun from his pocket. The attack against Z continues. A, believing
in good faith that there is no other way to avoid being horsewhipped, shoots
Z to death. A has merely committed culpable homicide, not murder.

Under some circumstances, the right of private defence even extends to the
infliction of death. This Section applies when a person’s right to private
defence has been violated. It should be noted that the fact that a person has
exercised his right to private defence beyond its limits does not completely
exonerate him or her under this exemption. It is only used as a mitigating
element to lessen the crime from murder to culpable homicide that does not
constitute murder. Of course, before this exception may be invoked, it must
be established that the accused has the right to a private defence under
Sections 96-106 of the IPC. The question of whether the accused has
exceeded his right to private defence will arise only once the existence of the
right has been proved. If it seems that the accused does not have the right
to a private defence in the first instance, then this provision will not apply.

Nathan v. State of Madras

The accused and his wife were in possession of some land that they had been
farming for some years in Nathan v. State of Madras (1972). They had fallen
behind on their lease payments to the landlady. The accused was forcibly
evicted, and the landlord attempted to harvest the crop. As a result, the
accused killed the dead in the exercise of his right to private property
defence. The Supreme Court agreed with the claim that the incident occurred
when the accused was exercising his legal right to private defence against
the property. The right to private property defence was restricted to the
degree of causing any harm other than death under Section 104, IPC
because the deceased person was not armed with any lethal weapons and
there could not have been any fear of death or severe harm on the part of
the accused and his party. As a result, the accused’s right to private defence
was violated, and the case was classified as culpable homicide not amounting
to murder under Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code
because the act was done in good faith and without the intent to cause
death. The accused’s death sentence was commuted to a term of life in
prison.

Exception III: lawful act of a public servant

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, while acting as a public
servant or assisting a public servant acting for the benefit of public justice,
exceeds the powers granted to him by law and causes death by doing an act
that he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the proper
discharge of his duty as such public servant and without malice toward the
person who is killed.

The following are the essential elements of this exception:

• The offence must have been committed by a public servant or a

person assisting a public servant;
• The alleged act must have been committed by the public servant in
the discharge of his official duties;
• He must have exceeded the powers granted to him by law;
• The act must have been done in good faith; and
• The public servant should have thought that his actions were legal
and required for the proper fulfilment of his duties, and
 • He should not have harboured any hatred toward the individual who
died as a result of his actions.
In Dakhi Singh v. State (1955), a suspected thief was apprehended by a
police officer and was being transported to a railway station. The robber was
able to flee the speeding train. He was chased by the constable. He fired at
him because he was unable to arrest him. However, he hit the fireman and
killed him in the process. The case was found to be covered by this
exception.

Exception IV: sudden conflict

Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed in the heat of emotion
during a sudden conflict and without the offenders taking undue advantage
or acting in a cruel or unusual manner.

The only requirements for this exception are that:

• the murder be committed without premeditation;

• it is committed in a sudden fight;
• it is committed in the heat of passion;
• it is committed upon a sudden quarrel; and
• It is committed without the offender taking undue advantage or
acting in a cruel or unusual manner.

In Manke Ram v. State of Haryana (2003), the Supreme Court granted the
benefit of exception 4 to a police inspector who killed his subordinate in a
bizarre combination of circumstances. In his chamber, he asked the
deceased to drink. While they were drinking, the deceased’s nephew entered
the room and summoned him for supper. As the deceased rose to leave the
room, the appellant became enraged and began insulting him in obscene
terms, which the deceased objected to. This enraged the appellant even
more. Between the two of them, a brawl erupted. The appellant took out his
service handgun and fired two bullets at the deceased, who was standing
close. These shots were lethal. The Supreme Court overturned the Punjab
High Court’s conviction under Section 302 of the Code, finding that the
incident occurred in the heat of passion and granting the petitioner the
benefit of exception 4. It was decided that, given the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellant did not take unfair advantage of the
fight or conduct in an unusual or harsh manner.
Exception V: death with consent
Culpable homicide is not murdered if the dead individual is beyond the age of
eighteen years and suffers or risks death with his consent.

Illustration

A intentionally causes Z, a minor under the age of eighteen, to commit

suicide by instigation. Because Z’s young, he was unable to consent to his
own death; as a result, A had aided and abetted murder.

The following things must be proven:

• The death was induced with the deceased’s permission;

• The deceased was over the age of 18 at the time; and
• The consent provided was free and voluntary, and not based on fear
or a misunderstanding of facts.
In the case of Narendra v. State of Rajasthan (2014), the deceased was a
married woman named Nathi who had left her house and was living with her
parents. There, she became close to the accused Narendra, and the two
expressed their desire to marry. Because they belonged to the same gotra,
the villagers were opposed to their desire to marry. Due to their
dissatisfaction with the villagers’ rejection of their love, both of them agreed
to commit suicide. Other villagers saw the accused inflicting harm on the
corpse one day, but the victim had already died before they could save her.
Although the accused had stab wounds in his abdomen, he was prevented
from killing himself. The High Court found no evidence on the record that the
deceased gave his free and voluntary consent. Later, the case reached the
Supreme Court, where justices emphasised facts such as the fact that the
deceased did not raise an alarm, that the accused was injured, and that he
did not have a weapon when he entered the residence. Taking into account
these facts, the Court found in favour of the deceased, awarding him benefits
under Exception 5.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CULPABLE

HOMICIDE AND MURDER
The sole distinction between culpable homicide and murder is the degree of
purpose and knowledge involved. The case would be classified as murder if
there was a high level of purpose and knowledge. The case would be
classified as responsible homicide if there was a lesser degree of purpose or
knowledge. As a result, establishing categorical demarcations between
culpable homicide and murder is challenging.
State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya
In the landmark judgment of State of AP. v. Rayavarappu Punnaya (1977),
the Apex Court created a comparison table to grasp the key differences
between them.

Section 299 IPC Section 300 IPC

A person commits culpable homicide if the Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is
act by which the death is caused is done – murder if the act by which the death is caused is
done –

Intention
With the intent to cause death; or with the
intention to cause physical damage that is
likely to result in death; or
Intention
With the intention of causing death; or with the
intention of inflicting physical injury that the
offender knows will result in the death of the person
to whom the harm is inflicted; or with the intention
to inflict bodily damage on any person and the
physical injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature, or

Knowledge Knowledge
Knowing that the conduct is likely to result in With the knowledge that the conduct is so
death. immediately harmful that it must almost certainly
result in death or bodily injury that is likely to result
in death and without any justification or risk of
causing death or injury as described above.

CASE LAWS RELEVANT TO CULPABLE

HOMICIDE AND MURDER

Vasanth v. State of Maharashtra

There existed prior animosity between the accused and the deceased
in Vasanth v. State of Maharashtra (1983). The accused and the dead were
observed fighting. The two were separated by a few people who were
present. The accused then rushed to his vehicle, drove it on the wrong side
of the road and straight into the deceased, knocking him down and driving
over him, killing him. The route on which the accident occurred was broad
and lonely. The accused had no cause or requirement to drive the jeep in the
incorrect way. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused intentionally
slammed his jeep into the deceased and ran him over with the purpose to kill
him. It’s worth noting that the first clause of Section 300, ‘act done with the
purpose to cause death,’ is the same as the first clause of Section 299, which
is likewise ‘performing an act with the intent to cause death.’ As a result, an
act that falls under clause (1) of Section 300 will also fall under Section 299,
and it will constitute culpable homicide amounting to murder in both cases.

State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh

In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh (2003), the Supreme Court
found the accused guilty of murder for inflicting an incised cut with a sword
on the deceased’s neck, resulting in excessive bleeding and organ failure, on
the grounds that he knew the bodily injury he caused would likely result in
death.

Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh

(2006)
In Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2006), the Court outlined
the facets that courts should consider when deciding whether an act is
punishable as murder, culpable homicide, or culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, and stated that the Court should proceed with caution
when deciding whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304
Part II. As a result, it is the responsibility of the courts to ensure that
instances of murder punished under Section 302 are not changed into
offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or that cases of culpable
homicide that do not amount to murder are considered as murder punishable
under Section 302. A combination of a few or many of the following, among
other things, can be used to determine the intent to cause death:

• The weapon’s properties;

• Whether the accused carried the weapon or it was picked up on the
spot;
• Whether the strike is directed at a critical bodily part;
• The amount of force used to injure someone;
• Whether the action occurred during a sudden dispute, a sudden
fight, or a free-for-all brawl;
• If the incident happened by coincidence or was it planned in
advance;
 • Whether there had been any previous animosity or if the deceased
was a stranger;
• Whether there was any grave and immediate provocation, and if so,
what caused it;
• Whether it was committed in the heat of emotion;
• Whether the person who inflicted the harm acted in a cruel and
unusual manner;
• Whether the accused gave a single blow or multiple strokes. Of
course, the preceding list of conditions is not complete, and there
may be other particular circumstances in individual situations that
provide light on the question of purpose.

PUNISHMENTS FOR CULPABLE

HOMICIDE AND MURDER

Section 304 IPC: penalty for culpable homicide

that does not amount to murder
If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing
death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,
and also be liable to fine; or with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and also be liable to fine; or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,
and also be liable to fine.

Though the Section itself does not split the Parts in this fashion, the sentence
under this Section is separated into two parts, often referred to as Section
304, Pt I and Section 304, Pt II. If the conduct is done with the purpose to
cause death or physical damage that is likely to cause death, Section 304, Pt
I, specifies a penalty of life imprisonment or imprisonment of any kind for a
term up to ten years and a fine. This sentence refers to Section 299, clauses
(a) and (b).

Section 304, Pt II applies to crimes committed with the knowledge that they
are likely to result in death, but not with the purpose to cause death or
bodily damage that is likely to result in death. This phrase corresponds to
Section 299, clause (c). However, if an offence is committed with the
knowledge that it is so dangerous that it must almost certainly result in
death or bodily injury that is likely to result in death, and the act is
committed without justification, the offence is removed from the scope of
Section 304, Pt II and brought under Section 302, as the offence would
amount to murder under Section 300(4).

In the case of Vishwanath v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1959), the accused

stabbed the dead with a knife that penetrated his heart as the deceased was
attempting to carry away the accused’s wife and sister by force. The
Supreme Court ruled that the suit fell under Section 304, paragraph II.

Section 302: murder

Murder is punishable under Section 302. It specifies a penalty of death or life
imprisonment, as well as a monetary fine. If a court finds an offender guilty
of murder under Section 300, the court must sentence the criminal to death
or life imprisonment. No other lesser punishment can be imposed by the
court.

In 1973, the Code of Criminal Procedure was updated again, making life
imprisonment the rule. The judge’s ability to impose a death sentence has
been limited by Section 354(3) of the new Code, which requires the court to
establish particular reasons for imposing a death sentence. When it comes to
assigning a penalty for murder, it has now made life imprisonment the rule
and death sentence the exception.

Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State

In Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State (2005), the Apex Court permitted the
accused, a doctor, who was engaged in many murders of his in-laws, to be
sentenced to life in jail. The court, however, barred him from collecting any
remissions on auspicious occasions in order to serve as a deterrent.
Similarly, in Lehna case (2002), the Supreme Court declared the death
penalty imposed by the trial court and upheld by the high court on the
accused of murdering his mother, brother, and sister-in-law to be
unconstitutional and commuted it to life imprisonment, reasoning that the
multiple murders, while brutal, were not the result of diabolic and sinister
planning.
 Difference between Culpable Homicide and Murder
Basis of Difference Culpable Homicide
1. Meaning Someone who causes the death
of another by doing an act likely
to cause that person’s death.
2. Ingredients 1. Causing death
Murder
Someone who does any act
resulting death of another with
the sufficient intention to cause
that person’s death.
1. Causing Death

2. Doing an act 2. Doing an act

3. Intention and knowledge must 3. Presence of knowledge

exist
3. Section 299 and 304 300 and 302

4. Purpose Likely to cause death To cause death

5. Types Lawful and unlawful First- degree Murder, Second-

degree Murder, third-degree
Murder, Voluntary
manslaughter, and Involuntary
manslaughter.
6. Degree of Less Sufficient
Intention

7. Knowledge The knowledge that the act will Compulsory

likely cause death.
8. Explanation/ Explanation:
Exception
a. Causing injury to a disabled
person
b. Causing injury when
remedies could be adopted
c. Causing the death of a child
inside a mother’s womb
Exception:
a. Grave and sudden
provocation
b. Private defence
c. Performing Legal duty
d. Sudden tussle
e. Death with consent

9. Punishment Imprisonment for life or ten years Death or Life imprisonment

with or without a fine.