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A Comparison of Attitudes and Emotions as Predictors of Behavior at Diverse

Levels of Behavioral Experience

Article in Journal of Consumer Research · March 1992

DOI: 10.1086/209276 · Source: RePEc

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A Comparison of Attitudes and Emotions
as Predictors of Behavior at Diverse Levels
of Behavioral Experience
CHRIS T. ALLEN
KAREN A. MACHLEIT
SUSAN SCHULTZ KLEINE*

This study examines individuals' reports about emotive experience vis-a-vis their
attitudinal judgments as predictors of subsequent behavior. Hypotheses are de-
veloped around the general premise that emotional reports tap information with
motivational implications that need not be integrated into attitude judgments and
thus should supplement attitude in prediction. The hypotheses are tested with a
unique data base that allows categorization of subjects on the basis of diverse
levels of prior experience and features naturally occurring behavior over a 12-month
period as the criterion variable. The data support the premise that emotional variables
can serve as incremental predictors in instances in which situational pressures may
inhibit formation of meaningful attitudes. Also, the data suggest that emotional reports
may furnish some unique information about what perpetuates a behavior. Implications
for further integration of emotional experience into consumer research are discussed.

I n two widely cited articles, Hirschman and Holbrook

(1982) and Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) chal-
lenged consumer researchers to break with convention
in search of a richer understanding of the experiential
aspects of consumption. Central to this challenge was
an explicit appeal to incorporate more emotional con-
siderations into research. As Holbrook (1986, p. 17)
observes, "We all recognize emotional phenomena as
pervasive components of human behavior in general
and consumer behavior in particular. Yet, like the way
in which weather reporters treat problematic news about
hurricanes and tornadoes, we dutifully note the key role
played by emotion in consumers' lives without doing
very much about it."
To date, consumer research explicitly featuring emo-
tion has maintained a narrow focus. As Cohen (1990,
p. 163) notes, "Most of the attention . . . has been to
'Chris T. Allen is professor of marketing and Karen A. Machleit
is assistant professor of marketing in the College of Business Admin-
istration, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221. Susan
Schultz Kleine is assistant professor of marketing, Department of
Marketing, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287. Data col-
lection in this project was funded by the Direct Marketing Policy
Center at the University of Cincinnati. The authors wish to express
their gratitude to the staff of the Hoxworth Blood Center at the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati for their cooperation and support in this project
and would like to thank Peter Dickson, Jim Ginter, Frank Kardes,
Paul Miniard, and Esther Thorson for their helpful comments on
prior drafts of the manuscript.
493
situationally induced (usually by advertising) moods
rather than more enduring motivational factors and
stronger emotional states." It is interesting that the
business press is filled with examples (see, e.g., Blu-
menthal1989; Miller 1990; Woodruffet al. 1990) that
suggest that it is marketing practitioners who have be-
come more intrigued with and informed about complex,
emotional motives for consumption.
Although Hirschman and Holbrook have offered
many suggestions for enriching the field, our research
was motivated by their specific concern about how af-
fective responses have been incorporated into consumer
research. As they note, to find affect represented in con-
sumer research, one can look to the substantial body
of work involving the attitude construct. Attitudes may
be shaped by hedonic responses involving simple pos-
itive or negative feeling states; however, by Holbrook
and Hirschman's estimate (1982, p. 136), this affect
"represents only a tiny subset of the emotions and feel-
ings of interest to the experiential view."
Given the common belief that emotions serve as pri-
mary motivators of behavior (see, e.g., Abelson et al.
1982; Ahtola 1985; Izard 1977; Tomkins 1970), Hol-
brook and Hirschman's (1982) concern over the absence
of emotion in attitude research raises a major question
about behavioral explanation and prediction. If the at-
titude construct reflects only a tiny subset of emotive
experience, then behavioral prediction should suffer.
Any construct or research stream that incompletely re-
© 1992 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc.• Vol. 18. March 1992
All rights reserved. 0093-5301/92/1804-0007$2.00
494
flects emotions may be overlooking a major component
of explainable variance.
Of course, for consumer researchers, attitude is not
just any construct: in terms of attracting and sustaining
research attention, attitude has had no rival. Cohen
(1990, p. 153, emphasis added) represents the motive
underlying this ongoing interest by noting that "the
major purpose in most of this activity was to locate an
intervening variable that would convincingly 'sum up'
all the personal and marketplace influences at work and
that would stand in a direct line causally to behavior."
But does the attitude construct-as it is conventionally
conceptualized and measured-capture or sum up the
influence of all complex emotional experience? More
than two decades of multiattribute modeling has estab-
lished that attitude does a good job of mediating the
influence of product-feature knowledge (Engel, Black-
well, and Miniard 1990) or so-called utilitarian beliefs
(Zanna and Rempel 1988) in the causal sequence to
behavior. Whether the same can be said for emotional
experience is simply not known (cf. Ahtola 1985; Hol-
brook and Hirschman 1982; Zanna and Rempel 1988);
however, current thinking in the practitioner literature
suggests that overlooking emotional response in favor
of cognitive beliefs and evaluations can impede man-
agers' insights about consumers' preferences (e.g.,
Mowen 1988; Woodruff et al. 1990).
In this article we investigate whether emotion's in-
fluence on behavior is accounted for by attitude or is
better represented as unique and unmediated. Specifi-
cally, we furnish data regarding three questions. First,
when individuals report emotions experienced in a par-
ticular domain, will these retrospections predict future
behavior? Second, will these retrospections add sub-
stantive explained variance to that which is accounted
for by conventional attitude variables? Finally, does at-
titude serve to mediate the effect of emotion, or is the
link between emotion and behavior direct? Before pre-
senting specific hypotheses, a general case will be made
for why and when emotions might be expected to sup-
plement attitudes as predictors.
WHY AND WHEN SHOULD
EMOTIONS ENHANCE
PREDICTION?
To avoid the potential confusion that has plagued
research on attitude and affect (cf. Cohen 1990; Mad-
den, Allen, and Twible 1988; Zanna and Rempel 1988),
explication of attitude and emotion terminology is re-
quired. We employ the traditional unidimensional view
of an attitude as the categorization of an object on an
evaluative continuum (Cohen 1990; Engel et al. 1990;
Fazio 1986; Zanna and Rempel 1988). This conception
of attitude as an enduring evaluation has dominated
work with the construct in psychological and consumer
research (cf. Batra 1986; Breckler and Wiggins 1989;
Fazio 1986).
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
Compared with the unidimensionalist's conception
of attitude, emotion represents a richer and more di-
verse domain of phenomenological experience (Hol-
brook 1986). Several typologies (e.g., Izard 1977; Plut-
chik 1980) have been proposed to categorize this
diversity in subjective experience into exhaustive sets
of primary emotions. Izard's (1977) differential-emo-
tions theory postulates 10 primary emotions: interest,
joy, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear,
shame, and guilt. His theorizing has been used as a
starting point for considering emotive experience in di-
verse contexts (e.g., Allen et al. 1988; Holbrook 1986;
Westbrook 1987). The demonstrated flexibility and
comprehensiveness ofIzard's framework made it a log-
ical choice for our research.
Should Attitudinal Judgments Always
Represent Emotional Experience?
Theorizing that attempts to integrate the disparate
literatures that deal with attitudes and emotions has
recently begun to appear (Ahtola 1985; Breckler and
Wiggins 1989; Cohen 1990; Zanna and Rempel 1988).
One approach has been to treat emotional experience
as simply another antecedent (along with utilitarian be-
liefs) of one's evaluation of the attitude object (Zanna
and Rempel 1988). Simple pleasant (or unpleasant)
feelings experienced through product use could yield a
more (or less) favorable attitude via instrumental learn-
ing. However, a central theme of the Holbrook and
Hirschman (1982) argument was their appeal to begin
considering behavioral domains typified by richer emo-
tive experience than pleasant or unpleasant affect. Al-
though Holbrook and Hirschman stopped short of ac-
tually saying it, it follows from their reasoning that, for
behaviors accompanied by complex and conflicting
emotions, it may be difficult for an individual to inte-
grate diverse feelings into a meaningful, global evalu-
ation of the behavior. In such instances, individuals'
retrospections about specific emotional episodes should
improve prediction.
The case against relying on attitude to sum up emo-
tion's influence is strengthened if one accepts Tulving's
(1983) distinction between semantic and episodic
memory. Episodic memory stores information in the
form of specific events as they were experienced. Se-
mantic memory stores knowledge and abstractions de-
rived from experience. Abstractions like attitudinal
judgments should thus be found in semantic memory,
whereas emotional experience would be stored initially
as part of autobiographical accounts in episodic mem-
ory (Friestad and Thorson 1986; Tulving 1983). Al-
though there is no contention that semantic and epi-
sodic memory exist in total isolation from one another,
there is also no requirement that episodic memory
traces containing information about emotion must be
integrated with the abstractions in semantic memory
(Breckler and Wiggins 1989; Cohen 1990; Friestad and
ATTITUDES AND EMOTIONS AS PREDICTORS
Thorson 1986). Lacking complete integration, individ-
uals' retrospections about emotions experienced during
a particular event should furnish unique information
vis-a-vis attitudes for predictive purposes (Abelson et
al. 1982; Breckler and Wiggins 1989).
The Moderating Role of Prior Experience
It would be overly simplistic to propose that emo-
tional reports will always supplement attitudinal judg-
ments. Obviously, no incremental prediction would be
expected for domains that are devoid of emotion.
Moreover, traditional moderators of the attitude-be-
havior relationship, such as direct experience, should
affect relative predictiveness. The generalization that
attitudes serve as more robust predictors when they are
formed via direct experience is widely accepted (e.g.,
Engel et al. 1990; Zanna and Rempel 1988). Two ex-
ceptions to this generalization motivate our reasoning
about when emotional reports might be expected to
supplement attitudes.
The first exception derives from Bern's (1972) self-
perception theory. As Fazio (1986, p. 221) notes, "Only
freely chosen, unmanded behavior can serve this pur-
pose. Behavior that is manded (i.e., obviously attrib-
utable to a situational cause) is not considered to reflect
internal dispositions." However, there is no reason to
contend that manded behaviors would be devoid of
emotion; furthermore, the nature of the emotions ac-
companying manded behavior may be an important
determinant offuture performance. Hence, in contexts
in which situational factors inhibit the development of
causal attitudes, recollection of emotion should be the
superior predictor.
A second exception to the generalization that atti-
tudes predict better when formed through experience
comes from recent theorizing about habits (Charng, Pi-
liavin, and Callero 1988; Ronis, Yates, and Kirscht
1989). These authors draw a distinction between be-
haviors that result from conscious decisions and be-
haviors that have become habits. They argue that once
behavior is habituated, it is no longer under volitional
control and may become relatively autonomous of at-
titudes. The question then becomes, Are recurrent be-
haviors also likely to be devoid of emotion? Although
the answer would certainly vary with the context,
there are domains in which emotional experiences are
important in perpetuating behavior (Cohen 1990;
O'Guinn and Faber 1989; Piliavin et al. 1982). In such
instances, emotional reports may again improve pre-
diction.
Summary
Arguments are presented above for why and when
attitude may not be expected to capture and mediate
emotion's influence on behavior. The "why" question
revolves around an integration issue. Complex or con-
495
flicting emotional states may be difficult to integrate
into overall evaluations of a behavior. Integration is
complicated further by the possibility that emotional
experience may be stored initially in episodic memory
and need not be transferred to abstractions stored in
semantic memory. The "when" question revolves
around the nature of one's prior experience. When past
behavior is manded, emotion's unique influence on fu-
ture behavior should be more pronounced. Also, when
prior experience has been extensive, emotional factors
may again emerge as a dominant influence on behavior.
These arguments are formalized as research hypotheses
below.
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND
HYPOTHESES
Our research context involves predicting voluntary
blood donation. This context has been used frequently
to study attitude-behavior consistency (e.g., Bagozzi
1981; Charng et al. 1988) and has several desirable fea-
tures. One reason for its popularity is that it can provide
an unobtrusive measure of actual behavior. Addition-
ally, although attitudes predict donation, they are weak
predictors: Bagozzi (1981, p. 625) concluded, "Attitude
does appear to influence (donation) behavior, but its
impact is a relatively small one." Finally, complex and
conflicting emotions (e.g., joy vs. fear vs. shame) often
accompany donation.
Manded Behavior and the Predictiveness
of Attitude versus Emotion
Two hypotheses dealing with experience as a mod-
erator of predictiveness are tested. The first is based on
the argument that attitudes will be useful predictors
when they are formed through direct experience but
only when behavior is unmanded. When prior behavior
is manded, it would be unlikely that diverse and con-
flicting emotive experiences would be integrated into a
coherent attitude. Conversely, the spontaneity and pre-
dictiveness of emotions should not be suppressed by a
behavior's manded status. Thus we posit:
H1: Where prior behavioral experience is heavily
manded, emotion will provide a substantive
contribution to attitude in predicting behav-
ior. As behavioral experience becomes less
manded, attitude will improve as a predictor.
It is common to find that an individual's first few
experiences as a donor are compelled by situational
factors (i.e., are manded). New donors are recruited ag-
gressively through systematic campaigns in which mo-
bile units are sent to cooperating organizations, and
donors are solicited by members of those organizations
(Condie, Warner, and Gillman 1976; Piliavin et al.
1984). Piliavin et al. (1984) conclude that at least three
496
donations are required before the behavior begins to
lose its manded status.
Habituated Behavior and the Predictive ness
of Attitude versus Emotion
Recent theorizing (Ronis et al. 1989) about habits
also presents an exception to the generalization that
direct experience always produces more predictive at-
titudes. To extend Ronis et al.'s position, we have sug-
gested that emotional influences may serve to perpet-
uat: a habit after attitude loses its effect. However,
testmg such a proposition is problematic from the
standpoint that Ronis et al. (1989) supply no criteria
for determining when a behavior has actually become
a habit. Thus, this second hypothesis should be viewed
as exploratory and is stated in the null form.
H2: Increasingly high levels of experience with a
behavior will have no effect on the relative
contribution of attitude and emotion as pre-
dictors of future behavior.
Does Attitude Mediate the Influence of
Complex Emotions on Behavior?
The above hypotheses assert that emotional variables
will provide incremental prediction in certain situa-
tions. Our third hypothesis emphasizes the issue of me-
diation and is motivated by the theorizing of Zanna
and Rempel (1988). Zanna and Rempel (1988, p. 319)
define attitude "as the categorization of a stimulus ob-
ject along an evaluative dimension." Their novel thesis
is the proposition that these evaluations can have three
unique antecedents: cognitions or beliefs, past behavior,
and emotional experience. Hence, they posit that emo-
tion's influence on behavior will not be direct but in-
stead will be mediated by an overall evaluation or at-
titude.
Zanna and Rempel (1988) provide an excellent start-
ing point for research featuring both attitudinal and
emotional variables. However, their thesis is contra-
dicted by Ahtola (1985), who proposes that the influence
of hedonic experience on behavior will not be totally
mediated by an overall evaluation. Like Holbrook and
Hirschman (1982), we expect attitudinal judgments to
undervalue or misrepresent complex emotional expe-
rience:
H3: Retrospections about emotive experience will
serve as direct predictors of behavior; that is,
their effect will not be mediated by overall
evaluations or attitudes.
A brief comparison of this hypothesis with the agenda
in Holbrook and Batra's (1987) research on emotional
mediators highlights the uniqueness of our study. As
with our own, Holbrook and Batra's (1987) work was
motivated by concern over the restrictive conception
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
of affect that has dominated consumer research; they,
too, seek to incorporate a full gamut of emotional re-
sponses into their work. However, the studies diverge
in terms of focal mediators and dependent measures.
Holbrook and Batra assess emotion as a mediator of
advertising's influence on brand and ad evaluations. In
our study, attitude is examined as a potential mediator
of emotion's influence on naturally occurring behavior.
Holbrook and Batra (1987) furnish fundamental sup-
port for Zanna and Rempel's (1988) position that emo-
tion serves as a unique antecedent of attitude. Our study
investigates the possibility that emotive experience is
not mediated by attitude and thus influences behavior
directly.
METHOD
Sample
Data in this project consist of mailed questionnaire
responses and donation records of 361 donors from the
Hoxworth Blood Center. At the time of the study, Hox-
worth had nearly 120,000 names on file; however, a
majority of these were inexperienced donors who had
only donated at mobile units as part of institutional
blood drives. A stratified random sample was drawn to
yield subjects with diverse experience: 200 names were
drawn from the one-time donors, 500 names were
drawn from those who had accumulated between 2 and
10 donations, and 200 names were drawn from II-plus
donors. This sampling plan also assured adequate rep-
resentation of donors above and below the gallon-
donation level. The importance of the gallon demar-
cation is explained below.
A cover letter, questionnaire, and return envelope
were mailed to these 900 donors. Excluding 43 cases
that were not delivered because of bad addresses, the
response rate for this single mailing was 42.1 percent. 1
Prior information concerning the donors' gender, age,
and donation experience provides for a limited com-
parison of respondents and nonrespondents. The av-
erage age of respondents was 40.33 years versus 35.85
years for nonrespondents; 60.4 percent of respondents
versus 64.8 percent ofnonrespondents were males. The
age difference is related to the fact that more experienced
donors were more likely to respond. Mean prior do-
nations for respondents was 9.14 versus 4.66 for non-
respondents.
Measures
Attitude toward the Act. Subjects reported their
evaluations of the act of blood donation at the beginning
IOfthe 361 persons who responded, 58 were one-time donors, 173
had accumulated between 2 and 10 donations, and 130 had accu-
mulated more than 10 donations at the time of the survey. Response
rates by sample strata were thus 29 percent, 34.6 percent, and 65
percent, respectively.
ATTITUDES AND EMOTIONS AS PREDICTORS
and end of the questionnaire. Initially, they responded
to an II-item semantic differential scale built around
five items taken from Bagozzi (1981). Confirmatory
factor analysis revealed that this was not a unidimen-
sional scale; hence, conventional procedures were em-
ployed (cf. Madden et al. 1988) in identifying the prin-
cipal evaluative factor. This procedure led back to
Bagozzi's five items as the best unidimensional repre-
sentation of the evaluative factor.2 Attitude toward the
act (A act) is the sum of these five items. Following the
semantic differential, subjects reported confidence in
their evaluations on a single seven-point scale anchored
by "very confident" and "not confident at all."
The second attitude measure came at the end of the
questionnaire at which point subjects evaluated the act
of donation on a seven-point scale anchored by "very
favorable" and "very unfavorable." The label Aact2 refers
to this single-item measure.
Emotions. Blood donation is a domain in which
diverse and conflicting emotions are common. While a
variety of emotions can affect helping (see, e.g., Rosen-
han et al. 1981), it was not our goal to furnish a detailed
analysis of emotional motivators of donation. Our em-
phasis involves the relative predictive ness of attitude
versus emotion.
In operationalizing emotion it was deemed important
to draw on a conventional taxonomy that could accom-
modate the full gamut of feelings associated with do-
nation. Izard's (1977) differential-emotions theory fur-
nishes a comprehensive taxonomy that has influenced
research in diverse contexts (e.g., Kotsch, Gerbing, and
Schwartz 1982; Westbrook and Oliver 1991). Having
adopted this taxonomy, we applied the attendant mea-
sure following Izard's (1977) direction. The measure
asks respondents to report the frequency with which
various emotions were experienced in a specified time
period (cf. Westbrook 1987).lzard(1977,p.125)main-
tains that "the time period to be considered by the in-
dividual completing the scale can be varied to suit the
purpose." We directed subjects to retrospect about do-
nation and report how often they had felt each ofIzard's
10 emotions either before, during, or after giving blood.
To capture participants' recollections of specific
emotional experiences associated with donation, we
used the instrument referred to as the Differential Emo-
tions Scale III (cf. Allen et al. 1988; Kotsch et al. 1982).
In this scale, a set of three phrases describes each of the
10 primary emotions in Izard's (1977) taxonomy. For
example, for the emotion sadness, the three phrases are:
"feel unhappy, blue, downhearted"; "feel sad and
gloomy, almost like crying"; and "feel discouraged, like
you can't make it, nothing is going right." As Izard
2The five items in the A.ct scale are good/bad, foolish/wise, pleasant/
unpleasant, unsafe/safe, and punishing/rewarding. The scale's uni-
dimensionality was confirmed through LISREL VI: all indicators
suggested an excellent fit (e.g., x2(5) = 2.53, p < .77, and adjusted
goodness-of-fit index = .991). Coefficient alpha for A.ct was. 72.
497
(1977) recommends, subjects respond to each of the 30
phrases on five-point scales anchored by "never" and
"very often." Coefficient alphas for 9 of the 10 subscales
are in the .80-.90 range for our sample. For the con-
tempt subscale, alpha is .56.
Perceived Self-Motivation. Although donation often
begins as a manded behavior, intrinsic motives may
evolve. A measure of subjects' perceptions of their mo-
tives was taken to check whether those with more ex-
perience did perceive their behavior as more self-mo-
tivated. Perceived self-motivation was measured on a
four-item scale: subjects responded to such statements
as "The last time I gave blood, someone had pressured
me into it," on a seven-point scale anchored by
"strongly agree" and "strongly disagree.,,3
Donation Behavior. Respondents' donation histo-
ries, including whether their last donation came on a
mobile unit or at a fixed-site location, and their dona-
tion activity for 12 months after the survey were drawn
from the computerized records of the collection center.
In the analyses that follow, 24 subjects were excluded
because of their responses to the final question in the
survey: it asked, "What would make you stop donating
blood?" Those excluded volunteered that they could
no longer donate because of medical reasons or because
they had left the area.
RESULTS
Does Experience Alter the Manded Status
of Donation?
To test the hypotheses, subjects were assigned to one
of four groups on the basis of number of donations ac-
cumulated prior to the survey. The cutoffs were: 1 or
2,3-7,8-15, and 16 or more accumulated donations.
Observed new donation activity is shown in Table 1.
The rationale for these cutoffs is presented below, fol-
lowed by empirical evidence that the manded nature
of donation erodes with experience.
Aggressive recruiting tactics used by collection cen-
ters produce new donors with weak intrinsic motives.
Although self-perception theory (Bem 1972) suggests
that repeated behaviors can foster internalization, it has
drawn criticism for not specifying the conditions under
which performance prompts self-reflection to yield in-
trinsic motives (e.g., Allen and Dillon 1983; Tybout
and Yalch 1980). Working with blood donors, Piliavin
et al. (1984) have tried to identify the number of do-
3This scale was derived from a larger set of items that gauged re-
spondents' perceptions about many different aspects of blood do-
nation. Exploratory factor analysis was used to identify the dimensions
of response; confirmatory factor analysis was used to establish uni-
dimensionality. All fit indicators from LISREL VI confirmed the
unidimensionality of the four-item scale (e.g., x2(2) = 3.23, p < .20,
and adjusted goodness-of-fit index = .975). Coefficient alpha for per-
ceived self-motivation was .75.
498
TABLE 1
OBSERVED DONATION FREQUENCIES AFTER 12
MONTHS, BY EXPERIENCE GROUP
Experience groupings based on accumulated
donations before the survey
Number of
donations One or two 3-7 8-15 16 or more
after donations donations donations donations
12 months (n = 87) (n = 99) (n = 87) (n = 64)
0 55 46 14 8 Frequency
1 19 28 21 6 Percentage
2 10 22 27 19
3 2 1 20 17
4 1 1 5 7 Frequency
5 3
6 2
7 1
8 1
nations required before intrinsic motives develop. Their
data suggest that a minimum of three donations is nec-
essary, which led us to select three as the first cutoff in
partitioning respondents for analysis.
It is certainly possible that simply performing this
behavior would not be enough to alter its manded status:
other cues or events may be needed to prompt the self-
reflection that fosters internalization. Such an event oc-
curs when one reaches the gallon level of donation.
When donors reach their first gallon-and for every
gallon thereafter-they are recognized with a lapel pin
and in a letter from the center's director that labels them
as continuing supporters of their community's blood
program. This recognition and labeling could be ex-
pected to prompt the self-reflection that is called for if
an intrinsic motive is to be inferred from one's behavior
(Allen and Dillon 1983; Tybout and Yalch 1980). Ac-
cordingly, 8 and 16, representing one and two gallons
of accumulated donations, respectively, were chosen as
the other cutoffs in partitioning respondents for anal-
ysis. 4
Direct evidence supporting the premise that the
manded status of donation declines with experience is
furnished by the perceived self-motivation measure.
Perceived self-motivation differs across the four groups
(F(3,336) = 6.29, p < .0004).5 The test for a linear trend
in these data is significant (p < .0001), suggesting that
self-motivation rises (and mandedness falls) as a func-
tion of experience. It is important to note, however,
4The goal underlying our sampling plan was to produce a sample
with a broad range of prior experience both above and below the 1-
gallon level: this was achieved. We did not envision the 2-gallon-plus
grouping at the time the sample was drawn; however, incorporating
this group into the data analysis allowed us to explore the issue em-
bodied in Hypothesis 2 concerning the moderating role of extraor-
dinary experience.
5Mean scores on perceived self-motivation across the four groups
were 23.84, 24.35, 25.29, and 25.85.
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
TABLE 2
CROSS CLASSIFICATION OF A SUBJECT'S EXPERIENCE
GROUPING, BY SITE OF LAST DONATION MADE
Experience groupings based on
accumulated donations before the survey
Site of last One or two 3-7 8-15 16 or more
donation donations donations donations donations
Fixed site:
22 52 50 45
of column 27.2 54.7 58.1 71.4
Mobile unit:
59 43 36 18
Percentage
of column 72.8 45.3 41.9 28.6
NOTE.-Data on site of last donation were missing for 12 cases; X2 = 31.134,
P < .00001. Kendall's TC = - .323, p < .00001.
that between-group contrasts establish the first gallon
of accumulated donation as pivotal in terms of statis-
tical significance. Cell means for perceived self-moti-
vation are higher in both the 8-15 and 16-plus categories
than in the other two groups (p < .05). Group com-
parisons above and below the gallon cutoff are not sig-
nificant.
Further evidence that motives internalize with ex-
perience is furnished by data concerning where donors
made their last donation. Donations on mobile units
stem from institutional blood drives, whereas fixed-site
donations may occur purely on the individual's initi-
ative (cf. Charng et al. 1988). In support of this con-
tention, those whose last donation was at a fixed site
expressed higher levels of perceived self-motivation than
those who last donated at a mobile site (X = 25.24 vs.
24.17, F(1,323) = 8.78,p < .003). Moreover, as shown
in Table 2, the percent of prior donations made at a
fixed site rises with experience, indicating a higher level
of individual initiative among experienced donors.
A final point concerning intrinsic motivation is made
in Table 1. Notice in Table 1 how Gallon Club members
were more likely to make multiple donations in the
year after the survey. Higher donation rates also indicate
individual initiative on the part of experienced donors,
because institutional blood drives typically occur on an
annual cycle. One can thus infer that those making
multiple donations within a 12-month time frame are
pursuing the behavior beyond the highly manded in-
stitutional context.
These data support a conclusion that the four group-
ings do reflect meaningful information about changes
in donors' motives. The perceived self-motivation, do-
nation-site, and donation-frequency results converge to
indicate that donation becomes less manded with ex-
perience. Achieving Gallon Club membership appears
to have special significance in the internalization pro-
ATTITUDES AND EMOTIONS AS PREDICTORS 499

TABLE 3 TABLE 4

ATTITUDE VERSUS EMOTION AT LOW EXPERIENCE LEVELS: ATTITUDE VERSUS EMOTION AT HIGH EXPERIENCE LEVELS:
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSES ON DONATION OCCURRENCE REGRESSION ANALYSES ON DONATION FREQUENCY
AFTER 12 MONTHS AFTER 12 MONTHS

One or two prior 3-7 prior donations 8-15 prior donations 16-plus prior donations
donations group group group group

2. Attitude 4. Attitude 2. Attitude 4. Attitude

1. Attitude plus 3. Attitude plus 1. Attitude plus 3. Attitude plus
Predictors only emotion only emotion Predictors only emotion only emotion

Aact .312 .404+ Aact .200+ .267* -.013

Aact2 .815 .718* .553 Aact2 .170 .218
Sadness .864** Disgust .190
Contempt -.724* Contempt -.185
Joy .505+ Shame .402**
Fear -.707* Fear -.230+
Chi-square .514 13.048** 4.737+ 8.447** F 4.772** 2.694* 1.432 4.964 **
Canonical MultipleR .321 .318 .212 .380
correlation .079 .391 .224 .303 Adjusted R2 .082 .063 .014 .115
Classification
rate .640 .702 .547 .596 NOTE.-Coefficients are beta weights. Predictors not entered in the stepwise
equation are designated with ellipses.
NOTE.-Coefficients are from the standardized canonical discriminant function. +p < .10.
Predictors not entered in the stepwise function are designated with ellipses. *p < .05.
+p<.10. **p < .01.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.

1; these data involve inexperienced donors for whom

cess. These four experience groups are maintained
throughout testing of the three research hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Manded Behavior and
Relative Prediction
The hypotheses were tested via a series of discrimi-
nant and regression analyses. As shown in Table 1, over
half the subjects in the two lower experience groups did
not donate in the year after the survey. In these two
groups (i.e., 1 or 2, and 3-7 prior donations), discrim-
inant analysis was used to identify predictors of whether
a donation occurred during the year. Donation activity
was much more robust among Gallon Club members
(i.e., 8-15, and 16 or more prior donations). In these
groups, regression analysis was used to identify predic-
tors of donation frequency.6 Analyses were conducted
in pairs; the first function or equation included just the
two attitude measures, Aact and A act2 ' The second func-
tion or equation in a pair was derived through a stepwise
procedure in which the two attitude indicators were in-
troduced into the function or equation along with the
10 subscales from the emotion measure. Results are
summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
Prediction at Low Experience Levels. Functions 1
and 2 in Table 3 furnish clear support for Hypothesis
6S ubjects in all four experience categories expressed high degrees
of confidence in their attitudinal judgments. Mean scores on the con-
fidence scale item ranged from 1.37 to 1.70 across the four groups
(where 1 = very confident). The mean values are not different statis-
tically (F(3,330) = 1.88, p > .13).
donation is more likely to be manded. Function 1 shows
that, for these respondents, attitudes do not predict do-
nation occurrence. However, three emotions-con-
tempt, joy, and sadness-emerge as significant predic-
tors in function 2.
Function 3 in Table 3 demonstrates that attitude be-
gins to emerge as a significant predictor in the 3-7 prior-
donations group. However, findings from the stepwise
procedure again indicate improved prediction through
addition of the emotion variables. As illustrated in
function 4, when fear replaces A act , prediction improves.
A comparison of the classification rates of functions 1
versus 2, and 3 versus 4, upholds the primary assertion
from Hypothesis 1: when past behavior is manded,
emotion will provide a substantive contribution to at-
titude in predicting future behavior.
Prediction at Higher Experience Levels. It was ar-
gued above that the recognition and labeling that occurs
when one reaches the gallon-donation level should
stimulate self-reflection, prompting formation of in-
trinsic motives. As reported above, between-group con-
trasts involving perceived self-motivation indicated that
individuals who had attained Gallon Club status per-
ceived that they were more self-motivated than those
who had not. Table 4 displays findings for Gallon Club
members only: these data offer support for Hypothesis
1's secondary assertion.
Equations 1 and 2 in Table 4 represent tests of atti-
tude's improvement as a predictor when behavioral ex-
perience is less manded. In both these equations the
attitude variables provide a modest level of prediction;
500
thus, when behavioral experience is less manded, atti-
tude does improve as a predictor. Notably, Equation 2
also documents that no emotion variables emerged as
significant predictors among respondents with 8-15
prior donations.
Hypothesis 2: Habituated Behavior and
Relative Prediction
The case has been made that donation's mandedness
erodes with experience and that reaching the first gallon
demarcation has special significance in this process.
Unfortunately, no rationale exists to specify what
amount of experience is required for a behavior to be
declared habituated. The only guidance provided by
Ronis et al. (1989) on this issue is their assertion that
"the longer the behavior has been repeated, the less it
will be correlated with and predicted by attitude" (p.
221). We thus feature our most experienced donor cat-
egory-those with a minimum of two gallons of accu-
mulated donations-in exploring the issues raised in
Hypothesis 2. However, there is no basis for contending
that the 16-donation cutoff has any special significance
in terms of the habituated status of this behavior.
Data in Table 4 uphold Ronis et al.'s (1989) assertion
that attitude's predictive ness erodes at extreme expe-
rience levels. No association between attitude and be-
havior was found for the highest experience group. On
the other hand, Equation 4 shows a reemergence of
emotional predictors: two emotional variables, shame
and fear, were significant. Comparing R2 values for
Equations 3 and 4, the two emotions account for a 10
percent increment in explained variance. Hence, Hy-
pothesis 2 is not upheld: in this highest experience cat-
egory, attitude's contribution to prediction is clearly
transcended by that of emotion.
Hypothesis 3: Attitude as a Mediator
of Emotion's Influence
Our third hypothesis considers the issue of whether
emotion's association with behavior is direct or, as pos-
ited by Zanna and Rempel (1988), is mediated by at-
titude. It was tested with procedures recommended by
Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1177). The second condition
of Baron and Kenny's three-step procedure requires that
the independent variable (in our case, an emotion) be
associated with the dependent variable (in our case, be-
havior). Three instances supporting this condition (see
functions 2 and 4 in Table 3 and Equation 4 in Table
4) were used in testing Hypothesis 3: they involve sad-
ness in the 1 or 2 prior-donations group; fear in the
3-7 group; and shame in the 16 or more group. The
analysis involving shame was discontinued because the
mediator and independent variable were unrelated (t-
values less than one). Complete results for sadness and
fear are summarized in Exhibit 1.
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
EXHIBIT 1
REGRESSION TESTS OF ATTITUDE'S STATUS AS A MEDIATOR
OF EMOTION'S INFLUENCE
RegreSSion equations
1. Aact with sadness (-.123)
2. ABct2 with sadness (-.224*)
3. Donation with sadness (.186+)
4. Donation with ABet (.042) and sadness (.196+)
5. Donation with ABct2 (.057) and sadness (.199+)
6. Aact with fear (-.372 **)
7. Aact2 with fear (-.309**)
8. Donation with fear (-.244*)
9. Donation with ABet (.026) and fear (-.262*)
10. Donation with Aact2 (-.046) and fear (-.258*)
NOTE.-Beta weights for each predictor are shown in parentheses.
+p < .10.
'p < .05.
"p < .01.
As shown in Exhibit 1, Baron and Kenny's (1986)
preliminary conditions were met for sadness (see Equa-
tions 1-3) and fear (see Equations 6-8). The crucial test
of mediation then entails how the proposed mediator
influences the relationship between the emotion and
donation when it is added to the regression equation.
To infer mediational status for attitude, the regression
coefficients for the emotion variables should decrease
significantly when Aact and/or Aact2 are entered. As Ex-
hibit 1 shows, there were no such decreases. Comparing
Equation 3 with 4 and 5 shows a slight increase in the
beta weights for sadness. Notice also that the association
between sadness and attitude is negative, whereas the
relationship between sadness and donation is positive.
Thus, greater sadness implies a higher propensity to
donate and a less favorable attitude. Clearly, such a
pattern defies the simple mediational argument that ex-
periencing negative affect produces less favorable atti-
tudes, which, in turn, deter behavior.
For fear, comparing Equation 8 with 9 and 10 again
shows a slight increase in the magnitude of the beta
weights for fear when the attitude variables are entered.
Thus, the case for inferring mediational status for at-
titude again breaks down at this crucial step. Overall,
these results uphold Hypothesis 3: emotion can have a
direct influence on behavior that is not captured or
summed up by attitude judgments.
DISCUSSION
In general terms, these results demonstrate that in-
dividuals' reports about emotive experiences can be
valuable for predicting behavior. Moreover, such rec-
ollections need not merely duplicate information de-
rived via traditional attitude measures. We report sev-
eral instances in which emotion variables contribute
increments of explained variance that are substantive
by the standards of consumer research (cf. Peterson,
ATTITUDES AND EMOTIONS AS PREDICTORS
Albaum, and Beltramini 1985). A dependent measure
involving naturally occurring behavior that transpired
over 12 months adds to the results' noteworthiness.
Findings derived in testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 sug-
gest more specific conclusions. First, it was shown that
attitude is an ineffective predictor when prior behavior
is likely to be manded, upholding Fazio's (1986) con-
tention that only freely chosen, unmanded behaviors
lead to predictive attitudes. In addition, tests of Hy-
pothesis 1 indicate that, in those contexts in which past
behavior is manded, one may expect emotional vari-
ables to supplement prediction.
The data also demonstrate that emotions can serve
as supplementary predictors at very high levels of ex-
perience. Given the exploratory nature of our second
hypothesis, the results can only serve as a basis for en-
couraging future research; however, findings concerning
Hypothesis 2 suggest that, after extensive prior expe-
rience, attitude's value as a predictor may be limited.
This finding is consistent with recent theorizing about
habits (Charng et al. 1988; Ronis et al. 1989). Unex-
pectedly, emotive reports predicted best for those re-
spondents with extensive experience. Additional theo-
rizing and research about emotion's role in perpetuating
behavior seem justified by these data.
Diagnosing Motives from Emotional
Reports
Furnishing specific diagnoses of the emotional mo-
tivators of donation was not a primary goal of this re-
search. Although the results summarized in Tables 3
and 4 can be interpreted as reflecting different types of
motives, any such interpretation is obviously post hoc.
We offer some speculative interpretation at this juncture
simply to illustrate the potential of reports of emotions
for supplementing attitude judgments in diagnosing
motives.
Among the least experienced donors (see Table 3),
the positive relationship between sadness and donation
indicates that donation may be used for relieving neg-
ative moods (cf. Rosenhan et al. 1981). Alternatively,
the negative relationship between contempt and do-
nation suggests the influence of empathy, another fun-
damental motivator of pro social behavior (Piliavin et
al. 1982). Those seeking relief from negative moods or
those who are compelled by empathetic responses may
also be sensitive to the gratification accompanying do-
nation, which would account for the joy and donation
linkage.
Piliavin et al. (1984) note that a unique motivational
aspect of donation involves fear about negative con-
sequences: fear and anxiety must be mastered if one is
to become a repeat donor. Fear is so pervasive among
inexperienced donors that it may not differentiate those
who will or will not donate again; however, as donors
gain experience many, but not all, master their anxieties.
Consistent with this reasoning, function 4 of Table 3
501
shows that fear predicts donation at intermediate ex-
perience levels.
A final example of the supplementary diagnostic po-
tential of reports on emotions comes from those with
extensive experience. While shame is commonly por-
trayed as a motivator of helping (Izard 1977; Rosenhan
et al. 1981), its emergence among veteran donors (see
Table 4) is of special interest. This finding on shame
may reflect a motivational mechanism that is common
to many compulsive behaviors. Alleviating negative
feelings is a primary motive that drives compulsion,
and these negative feelings are spawned in part by low
self-esteem (O'Guinn and Faber 1989). The likelihood
that low self-esteem will beget specific negative feelings
like shame (Izard 1977) suggests that donation may as-
sume a compulsive character for some veteran donors.
Limitations and Future Research
Hypotheses were tested in this research with a unique
data base that facilitated partitioning of respondents
into diverse prior-experience categories and featured a
year's worth of actual behavior as the criterion variable.
In this section we wish to acknowledge the unique set
of limitations that attend these data. Although nonre-
sponse biases are always a matter of concern in survey
research, it is noteworthy that response rates to our sur-
vey varied dramatically as a function of prior experi-
ence. For instance, among Gallon Club members, the
response rate was 62.5 percent; for nonmembers, it was
31.1 percent. Although we acknowledge that these dif-
ferential response rates represent a potential confound
when comparing findings between prior-experience
categories, it should be emphasized that the primary
focus of our analyses entailed within-category compar-
isons. We can see no basis for concern that attitude or
emotion would gain a within-category advantage in
prediction as a result of higher or lower response rates.
This project's findings also emphasize how much we
have yet to learn about the factors that perpetuate be-
havior. As others have suggested (cf. Charng et al. 1988;
Cohen 1990; Ronis et al. 1989), the attitude construct
can only furnish an incomplete account for what main-
tains, accelerates, or undermines behavioral perfor-
mance over time. Our data suggest that reports on emo-
tions offer a meaningful supplement to attitude
judgments for predicting performance; this incremental
prediction varied as a function of prior experience.
These findings would have been more compelling had
there been a theoretical basis for hypothesizing which
specific emotions would be predictive in particular ex-
perience categories. Unfortunately, theories that inte-
grate affective, cognitive, evaluative, and behavioral
domains are rare (cf. Cohen 1990). Yet without such
theorizing to provide legitimization, we must acknowl-
edge that the pattern of results may be due to some
idiosyncratic feature of the research design.
Our presentation and discussion of the results also
contains an assumption that, as one gains more expe-
502
rience with donation, one's motives for the behavior
may change and become more internalized (cf. Piliavin
et al. 1982, 1984). We thus treat the four experience
groups as representing stages in a developmental pro-
cess; alternatively, the four groups may simply capture
individual differences in motives that yield different
donation rates. For example, those who associate shame
with donation (see Table 4) may be driven to donate
more frequently than those associating sadness with
donation (see Table 3). The correlational nature of the
data cannot distinguish between these competing in-
terpretations concerning the meaning of the experience
categories; however, our conclusion that emotion sup-
plements attitude for predicting behavior seems war-
ranted in either case.
Another alternative interpretation for the results
stems from the fact that attitude and emotion are mea-
sured via different scale formats. That is, the emotion
measure encouraged retrospection and prompted the
respondent to report how often various feelings were
experienced in the donation context. The attitude mea-
sure, however, asked for the subject's evaluation ofthe
act of donating with the traditional, semantic-differ-
ential format. Differences in predictive ness for the
measures could be due to format per se.
In defense of these measures, we would argue that
they are conventional and logically consistent with the
phenomena of interest. It is common in measuring
emotion to ask individuals to retrospect about how they
felt in a specified context (e.g., Madden et al. 1988;
Westbrook 1987; Westbrook and Oliver 1991). More-
over, while traditional attitude measures reflect an im-
plicit assumption that evaluations are stored in and ac-
cessible from semantic memory (Fazio 1986), emotional
reports commonly encourage retrieval from episodic
memory. Hence, although our measures are conven-
tional, they are also consistent with Tulving's (1983)
proposal that it is logical and efficient to use different
scale formats when assessing attitude judgments versus
emotive experience because of differences in how each
is stored in memory.
While defending our selection of measures, we do
not mean to suggest that "conventional" measures of
emotion cannot be improved on for consumer research.
As Westbrook (1987) notes, measures such as Izard's
are essentially aided-recall tasks in which individuals
are asked to recollect past episodes and report frequency
of occurrence. Little is known about how best to direct
individuals to recollect emotive experience. For ex-
ample, would detailed descriptions of a particular con-
sumption context yield more predictive and diagnostic
emotional reports than just a general reference to the
context would? Might the actual presence of artifacts
from the context enrich the nature ofthe reports? Could
mood-induction techniques be adapted to encourage
respondents to re-create their feelings prior to mea-
surement? If we are to do a better job of integrating
emotive experience into consumer research, there are
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
important improvements needed in the measurement
area (cf. Havlena and Holbrook 1986).
Finally, data in this project indicate that attitude does
not mediate the effect of emotive experience on behav-
ior. Hypothesis 3 was formulated and tested to provide
direct assessment of this mediational question. It should
be emphasized, however, that this test was conducted
in a single behavioral domain. Blood donation can be
accompanied by diverse and intense emotions; fur-
thermore, the nature and intensity of this emotive ex-
perience may change over time. Caution is advisable
in generalizing our findings to consumption contexts
that may have very different emotional dynamics.
Whether attitude judgments will prove uniformly inef-
fectual in mediating emotion's influence across behav-
ioral domains is a question for future research.
CONCLUSION
This research demonstrates that emotive reports can
supplement attitudinal judgments for behavioral pre-
diction and may also prove valuable for diagnosing
motives. The findings encourage integration of emotive
constructs into research about consumption phenom-
ena that share one or both of the focal features of blood
donation: when behavior is likely to be manded or when
it is accompanied by complex or conflicting emotive
experience, explicit consideration of emotion may en-
rich prediction and understanding.
There are many consumption domains that meet one
or both of the above conditions. For instance, blood
donation is just one potential exemplar of a much larger
class of gift-giving behaviors (cf. Sherry 1983). The rit-
ualistic nature of gift giving combined with the donor's
desire to please the recipient can yield behavior that is
heavily manded as well as emotionally charged (Sherry
1983; Sherry, McGrath, and Levy 1991). Sherry et al.
(1991) emphasize that explicit consideration of diverse
negative emotions will be particularly valuable in re-
search on gift giving. Another broad consumption cat-
egory that will benefit from considering emotions en-
compasses all products or ads that provoke nostalgic
experience (e.g., Havlena and Holak 1991; Miller 1990).
Nostalgic consumption is of interest not because of its
mandedness but because it is thought to be accompa-
nied by a complex and conflicting, or "bittersweet,"
emotional condition (Havlena and Holak 1991). This
is just the sort of emotional experience that may be
undervalued or misrepresented by the traditional atti-
tude construct.
[Received August 1990. Revised July 1991.]
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