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A review of the research into the relations between hazards in multi-hazard

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Natural Hazards
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-020-04259-3

ORIGINAL PAPER

A review of the research into the relations between hazards

in multi‑hazard risk analysis

Jiajun Wang1,2 · Zhichao He1,2 · Wenguo Weng1,2

Received: 24 February 2020 / Accepted: 21 August 2020

© Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract
With the development of disaster-risk research, it has been found that many areas are prone
to the simultaneous occurrence of natural disasters and technological accidents. Such
events are known as “multi-hazard.” Increasing attention has been paid to multi-hazard
risk, and the theory and methods of multi-hazard risk analysis have been put forward and
applied in some areas. Compared with single-hazard risk analysis, multi-hazard risk analy-
sis is more complex and challenging. Researchers typically focus on the characteristics of
specific multi-hazard scenarios. However, when multiple hazards occur simultaneously,
the relationship between them may be complex. At present, there are still many confus-
ing descriptions of the relationship between hazards, and there are also differences in the
research methods for different multi-hazard scenarios. This paper clarifies the relationship
between hazards in multi-hazard scenarios by dividing them into three categories: mutually
amplified hazards, mutually exclusive hazards, and non-influential hazards. A series of risk
analysis methods have been reviewed for different hazard relationships (e.g., Natech events,
human-induced hazards, disaster chains, the domino effect, and concurrent hazards), and
possible challenges and solutions have been put forward.

Keywords Multi-hazard risk · Natural disaster · Technological accident · Relations of

hazards

* Wenguo Weng
wgweng@tsinghua.edu.cn
Jiajun Wang
wang‑jj19@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Zhichao He
hezc17@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
1
Institute of Public Safety Research, Department of Engineering Physics, Tsinghua University,
Beijing 10084, China
2
Beijing Key Laboratory of Comprehensive Emergency Response Science, Beijing, China

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Vol.:(0123456789)
 Natural Hazards

1 Introduction

As global problems such as climate change, population growth, and resource shortage have
emerged, the living environment of human beings is facing increasingly severe challenges.
In addition to the increased frequency of hazards, their impact on human society is growing
and has become one of main social problems. The key to reducing these threats is the com-
prehensive consideration and analysis of all relevant hazards. Many areas are prone to mul-
tiple hazards occurring simultaneously, which is a phenomenon that is widely described
as “multi-hazard” (Kappes 2011; Kappes et al. 2012). The concept of “multi-hazard” first
appeared in the United Nations’ Agenda 21 for sustainable development (UNEP 1992),
which argued that “complete multi-hazard research into risk and vulnerability of human
settlements and settlement infrastructure including water and sewerage was needed.” Since
then, the Johannesburg Plan (UN 2002) and the Hyogo Framework for Action (UN-ISDR
2005) have put forward relevant perspectives of the “multi-hazard” concept. Hazards are
classified into many categories, but the focus of this manuscript is natural and technologi-
cal hazards.
At present, the research into single hazards is mature, but when multiple hazards occur
simultaneously, the results of risk analysis for single hazards are often inaccurate and
incomplete, as multi-hazard risk analysis is not just the sum of single hazard risk exam-
inations and comparability of the single-hazard results is strongly needed (Kappes et al.
2012). Thus, it is necessary to carry out multi-hazard risk analysis. After many years of
research into disaster risk, the understanding of multi-hazard risk has greatly improved.
For example, in 2002 the Munich Reinsurance Company developed a comprehensive risk
assessment method for disaster indicators, which is mainly used to evaluate the disaster
losses suffered by the world’s 50 largest cities (Re 2002). The Joint Research Centre of the
European Commission proposed a multi-hazard assessment method and carried out com-
prehensive risk assessments and mapping of weather disasters in 10 European countries
(Lavalle et al. 2005). The Federal Emergency Management Agency has developed a multi-
hazard risk assessment software package, HAZUS-MH, for the comprehensive assessment
of earthquake, hurricane, and flood disaster risks in all levels of administrative regions of
the USA (Buriks et al. 2004). The European Spatial Planning Observation Network has
carried out a comprehensive risk assessment of natural and technological disasters in the
European Union (Schmidt-Thomé et al. 2003, 2005). Most of the studies mentioned above
share the aim of involving all relevant processes of a defined area, but not all multi-hazard
risk studies are the same. In many cases, the region is not defined before all the related
hazards in the space are studied; instead, multiple hazards are directly investigated in a
multi-hazard scenario.
Compared with single-risk analysis, the risk analysis of multi-hazard scenarios is more
complex and difficult (Kappes et al. 2012). This is because the characteristics of differ-
ent types of hazards are different, leading to differences between the analysis methods.
Researchers have also paid attention to different aspects. For example, if one hazard trig-
gers another hazard, or multiple threats are caused by one event, the triggering condi-
tions and probability may need to be considered (Tarvainen et al. 2006; Marzocchi et al.
2009). Moreover, analyzing natural disasters and technological accidents may need inter-
disciplinary integration (Daudon et al. 2014; Hayes et al. 2020). In addition, when mul-
tiple hazards co-occur, the relationship between them can be complex, resulting in cases
in which the analysis of different hazards cannot be simply superimposed (Kappes et al.
2012). For example, Tilloy et al. (2019) used literature database to identify trends for

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Natural Hazards

hazard interrelation and multi-hazard and from these group hazard interrelations into five
types: triggering, change condition, compound, independence and mutually exclusive. As
for the relationship between hazards, many concepts, terms, and definitions have been sug-
gested according to the characteristics of the hazards themselves and their interrelation-
ships. However, with the continuous emergence of new terms and the redefinition of old
ones, different definitions proposed by different researchers may overlap and contradict one
another. For the same term, different definitions may exist, and there may be multiple terms
for the same concept. The same terms (e.g., cascading (Cutter 2018; Carpignano et al.
2009), domino effect (Cozzani et al. 2005; Delmonaco et al. 2006), and compound disaster
(Saarinen 1973; Shi et al. 2014) may be used by different researchers to describe different
processes. There are also disputes about the scope of the terms, such as whether to describe
an event as a natural disaster or a technological accident (a detailed discussion is made in
Sect. 2). The research into and key technologies and challenges of different multi-hazard
scenarios may well be different.
The aim of this paper is threefold. The first objective is to help define and recognize
various multi-hazard scenarios from different terms and definitions and try to construct
a comprehensive framework to describe the relationship between hazards. After summa-
rizing, the relationship between hazards in multi-hazard scenarios is clarified by dividing
them into three categories: mutually amplified hazards, mutually exclusive hazards, and
non-influential hazards. The terms of the three categories are explained in detail. Secondly,
based on the specific situation of the definition of multiple hazards and the relationship
between different hazards, the current risk analysis methods of multiple hazards are sum-
marized. Considering the actual needs, risk analysis for multi-hazard scenarios with mutu-
ally amplified hazards is reviewed. Thirdly, this paper summarizes the more common diffi-
culties and challenges and proposes solutions to the challenges from the overall perspective
of multi-hazard risk analysis. The paper is divided into the following sections: Sect. 2
examines the relationship between hazards in multi-hazard scenarios; Sect. 3 discusses the
risk analysis methods for multi-hazard scenarios; and Sect. 4 reviews the challenges. There
are some review articles on multi-hazard topics. Khan et al. (2020) presented analysis of
the existing methods and technologies that are relevant to multi-hazard disaster scenarios.
Tilloy et al. (2019) identified modeling methods to quantify natural hazard interrelation-
ships. Cutter (2018) specifically clarified the terms related to the theme of multi-hazard
and Kappes et al. (2012) give an outline of the challenges each step of a multi-hazard risk
analysis poses and to present current studies and approaches that face these difficulties.
Shortcomings exist that the conventional multi-hazard risk analysis includes a step of the
hazard level, the vulnerability and the risk level, and the reviews are also done through
such a step which leads to a weak concern for the relationship between hazards. In addi-
tion, methods of risk analysis of different hazard relationships need to be compared. Rather
than a step-by-step overview of hazards, vulnerability, and risk, the risk analysis methods
of outlining each specific multi-hazard scenario are considered in this article. That is to
say, this paper examines the relationship between hazards and the research methods used
to investigate this relationship, rather than examining the multi-hazard risks in general. The
focus of the article is the analysis of the hazard, while exposure, vulnerability and risk are
not considered, and the authors do not claim completeness. Risk analysis of a certain kind
of the relationship between hazards is a subject in itself, so it cannot be fully covered in just
a section of this review.
For hazards themselves, risk is the focus of research, accompanied by the term “multi-
hazard” (Gallina et al. 2016), including multi-hazard risk identification, risk analysis and
risk management. The related terms and standards of “risk” have been formulated by

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 Natural Hazards

different organizations and countries (International Organization for Standardization Tech-

nical Committee (2018), Codex Alimentarius Commission, and Joint FAO/WHO 2007),
but what they describe are not precisely defined. In general, risk results from the combina-
tion of hazard and vulnerability of exposed elements at risk. And for ease of exposition,
the methods devised to better understand and reduce multi-hazard risks are collectively
referred to as “multi-hazard risk analysis” in this paper. And to avoid confusion, definitions
of some other terms used in this paper are clarified below:

• Hazard The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend

or physical impact that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as
damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, ecosystems,
and environmental resources (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
(Barros and Field 2014)).
• Disaster Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a society due
to hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to
widespread adverse human, material, economic or environmental effects that require
immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs and that may require
external support for recovery (IPCC) (Barros and Field 2014). “Natural disaster” is
used in this article to describe hazards caused by natural phenomena.
• Accident An unpleasant event, especially in a vehicle, that happens unexpectedly and
causes injury or damage (the Oxford English Dictionary). “Technological accident” is
used in this article to describe hazards caused by technological causes.
• Event A thing that happens, especially something important (the Oxford English Dic-
tionary). It is used in this article sometimes to describe something hazardous happen-
ing.
• Incident Something that happens, especially something unusual or unpleasant or a seri-
ous or violent event, such as a crime, an accident or an attack (the Oxford English Dic-
tionary). It is also used in this article to describe something hazardous happening.
• Technical and technological The term “technical” is connected with the practical use
of machinery, methods, etc., or the skills needed for a particular job, sport, art, etc. (the
Oxford English Dictionary), while the term “technological” is related to or associated
with technology (Collins English Dictionary). So “technical” is more about specific and
practical skills and methods. As industry and technology are closely related, “techno-
logical” but not “technical” is used to describe hazards associated with industry in this
article.

2 Relationship between hazards in multi‑hazard scenarios

Researchers have come to realize that there are complex relationships between hazards, but
there are few comprehensive classification frameworks that cover the relationships between
all hazards. Different terminology and definitions have been proposed to try to grasp the
essential characteristics of the relationships between hazards. However, precise definitions
are scarce, and the specific definitions used by different researchers are different. In terms
of results, however, it is known that the relationship between hazards will either strengthen
or weaken each hazard. Two situations of interaction can be distinguished. In the first situ-
ation, one hazard is triggered by another, which leads to a series of hazards in a chain or
network form. In the second situation, hazards have complex or vague relationships. In this

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Natural Hazards

case, there is no obvious relationship in which hazards are triggered by other hazards. One
hazard may affect the severity, process and outcome of other hazards.
Many terms are used to describe the triggering relationship between hazards, such as
disaster chain (Shi et al. 2014; Guo et al. 2006), which describes the evolution of disasters;
that is, the upper level of disasters leads to the next level of disasters. Similarly, Erlingsson
(2005) remark that “an earthquake may trigger a mass movement, which destroys a house,
which kills the people inside,” and they contend that this is a “chain reaction of cause and
effect in a disaster.” In addition, the term “cascading” is also widely used to describe this
chain relationship. For example, Cutter (2018) states that “cascading hazard” refers to “haz-
ards occurring as a direct or indirect result of an initial hazard.” Zuccaro and Leone (2011)
refer to “effects following the main one” as “cascading effects.” Carpignano et al. (2009)
think “a seism triggering landslides, or an industrial explosion triggering a fire” are typi-
cal cascading hazards. “Domino effect” is another widely used term. It is generally used
to describe the chain relationship in technological accidents. Cozzani et al. (2005) give a
detailed description, saying that the domino effect is “an accident in which a primary event
propagates to nearby equipment, triggering one or more secondary events resulting in over-
all sequences more severe than those of the primary event.” They divided the domino effect
into three stages: a primary accident scenario, a propagation effect following the primary
event and one or more secondary accident scenarios. Chen et al. (2018) focused on the
“escalation vector” (thermal radiation, overpressure, and fragment) and “escalation effect”
of the domino effect. Escalation here means that the final consequence is far more serious
than the initial accident. As well as technological accidents, the domino effect can also be
observed in other events. Luino (2005) believe that the domino effect exists in the sequence
of probability processes triggered by heavy rainfall. Delmonaco et al. (2006) describe land-
slides induced by earthquakes as a domino effect. The European Commission (Bizottság
2010) considers coinciding hazards as “follow-on events, knock-on effects, domino effects
or cascading events,” using a landslide triggered by a flood as an example. It can be seen
from above that disputes exist in the scope of the terms that whether “domino effect” is
only used for technological accidents. Generally speaking, the concepts mentioned above
describe different aspects of the triggering relationship between hazards. The concept of
a chain mainly refers to the triggering relationship between natural disasters; the concept
of a domino effect is mostly used to describe the transmission of technological accidents
between equipment; and the cascading effect focuses on the triggering and transmission
process of events. A more specific example is the occurrence of “natural hazard events
that trigger technological emergencies”, called Natech events, which was first proposed by
Showalter and Myers (1994).
In contrast, for relationships other than triggering, the meaning expressed by some
terms are not so clear. For example, Shi et al. (2014) describe a disaster compound as “two
or more (extreme) disaster events that have no genetic relationship but occur at the same
time or one after another. Even if a single event itself is not extreme, it will cause extreme
expansion due to a compound effect”. For Cutter (2018), compounding effects of natural
processes means the “follow-on sequences of other events that occur as a direct or indirect
result of the initial triggering event.” Marzocchi et al. (2009) divided events into “coupled”
and “individual,” which refers to the relationship between multiple events. Greiving (2006)
called the interrelations between hazards “cross-hazard effects,” including exacerbating
or ameliorating effects. In addition, the fuzzy relationships between hazards are described
variously as “interactions” (Marzocchi et al. 2009; Tarvainen et al. 2006; De Pippo et al.
2008), “interconnections” (Perles Roselló and Cantarero Prados 2010), “complex” (Cutter
2018), and so on. However, it is worth noting that although this fuzzy effect will generally

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 Natural Hazards

lead to the increase of the strength of the hazard itself or the increase of its impact, it does
not exclude the possibility that the hazard is prevented from occurring or that its impact is
weakened.
Following the consideration of the use of different terms by different researchers accord-
ing to the relationship between different hazards, multi-hazard scenarios can be divided
into three categories: mutually amplified hazards, mutually exclusive hazards, and non-
influential hazards, as shown in Fig. 1.
Mutual amplification of hazards is an important part of multi-hazard risk analysis. Due
to the interrelationship between hazards, risk analysis of multi-hazard scenarios cannot
be regarded as a simple sum of single-hazard risks. Especially when hazards are mutu-
ally amplified, if the specific process of amplification cannot be ascertained, the threat and
risk of hazards may be underestimated. Failure to provide accurate disaster prevention and
mitigation recommendations may have disastrous consequences. The scenarios in which
hazards amplify one another can be divided into the following categories:

• Natech event The term “Natech” was first proposed by Showalter and Myers in 1994 to
refer to “natural hazard events that trigger technological emergencies” (Showalter and
Myers 1994). In practice, earthquakes, storms, floods, and lightning are more likely to
cause Natech events.
• Human-induced hazards Human activities (including technological accidents) may
trigger natural disasters, which are called human-induced hazards. Both Natech events
and human-induced hazards are referred to as cross-category hazards because of the
mutual triggering of technological accidents and natural disasters.
• Disaster chain, cascading disaster “Disaster chain” describes the chain relationship
between natural disasters; that is, one or more disasters (parent disasters) lead to other
disasters (sub-disasters). According to the relationship between parent disasters and
sub-disasters, disaster chains can be divided into straight chains, divergent chains, cen-
tralized chains, and complex networks.
• Domino effect “Domino effect” refers to the phenomenon in which the spread of a
technological accident leads to one or more adjacent equipment accidents, resulting in
a total accident more serious than the initial one. Many studies have investigated the

Fig. 1  Three categories of multi-hazard scenarios according to the relationship between the hazards

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Natural Hazards

domino effect (Cozzani et al. 2005; Delmonaco et al. 2006). The domino effect is gen-
erally considered to be a special kind of “accident chain.”
• Concurrent hazards When hazards that are not related in origin occur at the same time,
their interaction can cause consequences more serious than if the hazards had occurred
individually. The interaction between concurrent hazards can be examined from two
perspectives: one is that the physical processes of different hazards interact with one
another, which may lead to an increase in their intensity or overall impact; the other
is that the vulnerability of victims may change due to a certain hazard, and another
kind of hazard may have more serious consequences for such victims. As some litera-
tures use “compound” to describe the triggering effect of hazards (Cutter 2018; Liu and
He 2017), and some literatures use it to describe multiple hazards affecting a country
(Kelly 2009), disaster chain and concurrent hazards are defined as “compound disas-
ters” in this paper.

Non-influence between hazards means that hazards are independent of one another, and
their relationship can be disregarded. If the time interval between hazards is long, they can
be treated as single hazards. Only when non-influential hazards occur in a similar space
and time can they be regarded as “non-influential hazards” in a multi-hazard scenario.

• Hazard set This term refers to the phenomenon in which the relationship between haz-
ards can be disregarded. They may be affected by the same environmental and geo-
graphical factors (for natural disasters), or they may be affected by the same hidden
dangers and omissions in management or production (for technological accidents).
Hazard sets can be divided into natural disaster sets and technological accident sets.
• Coinciding hazards Disasters and accidents that are independent of one another and
are not related to one another in cause of formation are referred to as coinciding haz-
ards. They occur in the same time and space only by chance. Occasionally when mul-
tiple hazards occur, there may be no obvious correlation or common cause; they occur
together only by coincidence.

Mutual exclusion of hazards refers to the fact that after one disaster or accident occurs,
another disaster or accident either cannot occur or its intensity decreases. Mutual exclusion
of hazards thus reduces risks. However, if multiple hazards are seen as always increasing
the risk, then their impact will tend to be overestimated. As more conservative estimations
satisfy the safety requirements, however, mutual exclusion of hazards is not an important
concern in multi-hazard risk analysis.

3 Risk analysis methods for multi‑hazard scenarios with mutually

amplification hazards

As mentioned above, for many single hazards, the risk analysis method is mature; however,
due to the potential relationships between hazards, multi-hazard analysis is more complex.
To analyze the risk of multiple hazards, researchers tend to take notice of all hazards in a
region and add together the risks in some way (Odeh 2002; Menoni 2006). This approach
is primarily spatially oriented. A thematically oriented approach is to analyze the risks of
a specific multi-hazard scenario and to study its characteristics and risk analysis methods.

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In Sect. 2, we divide the relationships between hazards into three main categories. Non-
influence between hazards means that hazards are independent of one another, and their
relationship can be disregarded. Risk analysis of hazards without mutual influence is close
to traditional multi-hazard analysis, namely to consider the risk of multiple hazards at the
same time. This is what many researchers, organizations and countries did as mentioned
in Sect. 1 (Re 2002; Lavalle et al. 2005; Buriks et al. 2004; Schmidt-Thomé et al. 2003,
2005). This kind of multi-hazard analysis can be regarded as a “superposition” of multiple
hazards and the relationship between them is less considered. So non-influence between
hazards is not our main concern. Mutual exclusion of hazards reduces risks (Gill and Mala-
mud 2014). However, if multiple hazards are seen as always increasing the risk, then the
impact of mutual exclusive hazards will tend to be overestimated. As more conservative
estimations satisfy the safety requirements, mutual exclusion of hazards is not an important
concern in multi-hazard risk analysis. Thus, among the relationships between hazards in
multi-hazard scenarios described above, the mutual amplification of hazards has been the
main focus of recent scientific research. This is because when hazards amplify one another,
the number and intensity of hazards increase, and the risk increases faster (compared with
linear growth) (Shi et al. 2014). This section summarizes the progress of the risk analysis
of mutually amplification hazards; namely, Natech events (Sect. 3.1), human-induced dis-
asters (Sect. 3.2), disaster chains (Sect. 3.3), the domino effect (Sect. 3.4), and concurrent
hazards (Sect. 3.5).

3.1 Natech events

Natech events are technological accidents caused by natural disasters. For example, a snow
and ice disaster may cause transmission lines to freeze, resulting in widespread power out-
ages; an earthquake may damage a chemical plant, causing leakage of dangerous chemi-
cals, fires, and explosions; a flood may cause tank leakage, release of toxic substances,
and so on. Natech events usually involve a natural disaster causing failure and damage in
an industrial system (Cruz 2012). One of the important aspects of Natech events research,
therefore, is to study the vulnerability of equipment during natural disasters and calculate
the damage probability and outcomes. In addition, how to assess the risk of Natech events
is an important question, the answer to which is usually closely related to the risk of indus-
trial production.
For the damage caused by natural disasters to industrial systems, Antonioni et al. (2009)
developed a method for identifying different damage modes and possible triggering acci-
dents and for calculating the damage probability of equipment caused by natural events.
More specifically, the authors constructed a process for assessing the risks to chemical
plants from external events. Such a process has three main concerns. This is also a com-
mon step for researchers to study the mechanism of Natech events (Nascimento and Alen-
car 2016).

• Classification and characteristic analysis of external events (natural disasters such

as earthquakes and floods). For example, Necci et al. (2014) proposed a quantitative
method to evaluate lightning intensity by using the probability distribution function of
peak current intensity and lightning charge.
• Classified lists of equipment units in the target area. For example, Lanzano et al. (2015)
classified pipeline systems into five different categories to assess system vulnerability
associated with natural disasters.

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Natural Hazards

• Damage models to simulate the effect of different natural disasters on different equip-
ment. For example, Necci et al. (2014) used Monte Carlo simulation to determine the
expected frequency of lightning striking particular equipment and the probability of
equipment damage. Milazzo et al. (2015) analyzed the influence of ash deposition on
first-class sewage treatment equipment. They concluded that the critical ash thickness
depended on the specific surface area and the voidage of the discharge material. Their
research led to the critical threshold of ash deposition caused by equipment failure to be
updated.

The risk evaluation and management of Natech events focuses on industrial areas. In the
process of risk assessment, therefore, natural disasters are often considered as an external
event threatening industrial safety, which weakens the distinction between natural disasters
and other threats. Generally, the personal and social risks are mainly concerned (Antonioni
et al. 2009; Campedel et al. 2008; Han and Weng 2010). The fuzzy evaluation method is
the usual evaluation method. It can transform the evaluation from a qualitative assessment
to a quantitative index. It is a comprehensive evaluation method that can express the risk of
Natech events conveniently and intuitively. In this method, the risk is generally described
by constructing indicators. Cruz et al. (2011) developed the Natech Risk Index using expert
scoring combined with probability analysis. Han et al. (2019) established the assessment
framework of Natech environmental risk caused by typhoon disasters. With the analytic
hierarchy process and fuzzy evaluation model, the environmental risk assessment index
system of technological accidents caused by natural disasters was established. The sys-
tem includes five major indicators, such as production factors and emission factors, and 15
minor indicators, such as the quantities and hazard levels of chemicals and the hazards of
production processes. Han and Weng (2011) proposed a qualitative assessment method for
urban natural gas pipeline network, comprised of an index system, which includes a causa-
tion index, an inherent risk index, a consequence index and their corresponding weights.
Other approaches to risk management exist. Methods are introduced to reduce Natech
risk (Cruz et al. 2011) from the perspective of administrative means of the government and
key strategies, including emergency plans, education, and publicity activities (Busini et al.
2011).
At present, research into Natech events has mainly focused on the chemical industry, but
the key infrastructure such as the lifeline system of cities is also facing the threat of Natech
events. It is therefore necessary to establish a more comprehensive Natech-event database,
which covers more than the chemical industry such as other urban industrial systems to
better identify the risks of all possible Natech events. In addition, research into Natech
events is mostly based on case studies of actual accidents and the statistical analysis of his-
torical data. It is necessary to develop more general evolution rules and more general risk
analysis methods.

3.2 Human‑induced hazards

Human-induced hazards are caused by the imbalance of the ecological environment due
to human activities. This imbalance often appears on such a time scale that the trigger-
ing relationship between the human activities and the natural disasters cannot be seen
directly and clearly (Gill and Malamud 2016). To better understand human-induced haz-
ards, researchers have explored how human activities affect the natural environment and
have estimated the threshold of the imbalance in the natural environment. According to

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 Natural Hazards

the earth’s ecosphere (lithosphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere and biosphere) (Martin and
Johnson 2012), human-induced natural disasters can be divided into four categories: (1)
geological disasters, including earthquakes, landslides, surface subsidence, and volcanic
eruptions; (2) atmospheric disasters, including extreme high or low temperatures, drought,
haze, and dust storms; (3) hydrological disasters, including floods and coastal erosion; and
(4) biological (ecological) disasters, including forest fire and biological invasion.
Existing research is generally based on the examination of existing cases, such as the
investigation of designated areas and the deduction of the mechanism of human-induced
hazards from physics, geosciences, life sciences and other theories (Closson and Karaki
2009; Zhao 2008; Ellsworth 2013; Bernatchez et al. 2011). Human-induced hazards typi-
cally involve the destruction of geological structures by human activities, which leads to a
series of natural disasters. For example, Closson and Karaki (2009) summarized the over-
development of the Dead Sea tributaries which resulted in a reduction of the groundwa-
ter level and further led to subsidence, landslide and reactivation of salt karst. Ellsworth
(2013) reviewed the seismic activities related to industrial activities, focusing on the treat-
ment of deep well injection wastewater, and studied the mechanism of earthquakes induced
by hydraulic fracturing and other causes. Bernatchez et al. (2011) believed that rigid walls
built to resist coastal erosion amplify the effects of storm surges and waves, as these struc-
tures drive sand away from the coast, reduce the height of the beach and even cause the
beach to disappear completely from the area in front of the defense structure. As a result,
the natural ability of these coastal systems to absorb wave energy is weakened and the risk
of coastal flooding is increased.
A broad and comprehensive overview and classification of human-induced hazards
was given by Gill and Malamud (2017). Firstly, they identified 18 kinds of human activi-
ties, including underground material extraction, underground material addition, land-use
change, surface material extraction, surface material addition, hydrological change, com-
bustion, and so on. They also determined 64 possible interactions between two different
human processes, which may lead to simultaneous or continuous aggregation of different
types of human processes.
Most of the human activities that induce natural disasters are non-malicious normal pro-
duction and living activities. However, accidents may also induce natural disasters. Natural
disasters are often accompanied by the release of large amounts of energy or the change
of a wide range of natural conditions. Compared with such natural disasters, the energy
released by accidents is smaller and narrower in scope, and so an accident usually cannot
lead directly and quickly to a natural disaster. In the process of risk assessment, therefore,
researchers usually consider human activities as part of the disaster-pregnant environment,
which is not much different from the analysis of natural disasters alone. Future research
should regard normal human production and living activities as a kind of “hazard” and
integrate human activities into the framework of multi-hazard analysis, taking into account
the risks of human and natural processes.

3.3 Disaster chains

In a disaster chain, the number of disasters increases, and their impact may exceed
expectations. It is therefore important to identify and summarize different disaster
chains. Through the statistical analysis of different kinds of disaster chains, researchers
summarized the temporal and spatial characteristics of the distribution of disaster chains
and their formation rules. A review of the literature suggests that disaster chains can be

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Natural Hazards

studied by two methods: (1) qualitatively summarize and analyze the characteristics of
disaster chains and (2) establish relevant models to quantitatively or semiquantitatively
assess the risk of disaster chains. This section will include examples of both approaches.

(1) The qualitative method involves clarifying the patterns and characteristics of disaster
chains. Generally, statistical analyses are conducted on existing data. The sources of
data include historical records, chronicles compiled by local authorities, and official
public records, data records or existing statistical data. The data of Wang et al. (2016)
for example, were taken from the China Marine Disaster Bulletin, and Wang et al.
(2013) calculated the frequency of strong earthquakes from 2000 to 2011 from the
published data of the United States Geological Survey. Jia et al. (2016) obtained dis-
aster data from Chinese provincial newspapers and periodicals and summarized the
disaster chain of drought, earthquake, snow disaster and cold wave.
Researchers have also studied the patterns of different disaster chains. Mazzorana
et al. (2019) studied the cascade (chain) processes in river ecosystems in Chile. Wang
et al. (2016) proposed a classification system for global typhoon disaster chains
according to the characteristics of the region the typhoon passed through and the
classification of the disaster-pregnant environment. Within eight disaster-pregnant
environments, 18 categories were divided into 58 sub-categories. For the chain of
torrential rains and floods, Wan et al. (2017) collated and analyzed the flood informa-
tion of Baoji, China, from 1368 to 1911 and also produced a spatial distribution map
of drought and flood disasters in the area during the Ming and Qing Dynasties.
(2) In addition to qualitative methods, a variety of models and methods provide the pos-
sibility to quantitatively or semiquantitatively obtain the probability of disaster chain
occurrence, the intensity of disasters, and the vulnerability of victims. Such risk assess-
ment models and methods include probability analysis models, complex network mod-
els and system simulations.
(a) The probability analysis model usually calculates the probability of the sub-disaster
occurring after the parent disaster. The general approach is to list the possible sub-
disasters caused by the parent disasters, which are often presented in the form of
a disaster event tree and then calculate the relevant probability. Egli (1996) intro-
duced the method of building an event tree in four steps. These general methods
were applied to various processes. For example, Wang et al. (2013) summarized
23 common earthquake disaster event trees and divided their structures into series,
parallel and series–parallel types. In addition, particular approaches for specific
hazard-pair relations exist (Kappes et al. 2012), such as earthquake-induced land-
slides (Keefer 2002) and landslide-induced barrier lakes.
Of course, the core of probability analysis models are the probabilities assigned
to each step in the event tree and the probabilities of the potential final states of
the whole system. In practice, many theories and methods can be applied in such
analysis. For example, Bayesian networks contain nodes and connecting edges,
which is particularly suitable for deducing disaster chains in which the parent dis-
asters trigger child disasters (Wang et al. 2013; Rahman 2019). In addition, neural
networks, expert systems and other methods are also used to determine the con-
ditional probability of disaster-chain events (Gitis et al. 1994; Badal et al. 2005;
Chavoshi et al. 2008). The essential difference between probability analysis meth-
ods, therefore, is the calculation of the probability of sub-disasters. However,

13
 Natural Hazards

the current research lacks consideration of the vulnerability of victims and the
complexity of the disaster-pregnant environment, which means more elements
need to be considered when calculating the conditional probability with the prob-
ability analysis me H:\journals\Springer\Space\11069\4259\Stage300\Contents\
PAGN\s200\old11069_2020_4259_Article.LE.indd thod,
(b) Complex networks are networks in which it is likely that a series of chain reactions
are caused by small disturbances. Considering each disaster in the disaster chain
as a node, complex network theory can be used to study the evolution process of
the disaster chain. In general, after listing the possible sub-disasters by case or
logical judgment, the complex grid is constructed and the evolution process of the
network is then calculated (Peters et al. 2008; Zheng et al. 2017). In addition, there
are studies on the use of complex networks in disaster chain losses. Liu and Wu
(2015) expressed the risk under the action of parent nodes by the expected value
of risk loss of child nodes using complex networks. The obvious deficiency of the
current research is that the events and relationships in the disaster chain are highly
abstract in complex network, and the spatiotemporal characteristics of the disaster
chain cannot be fully expressed.
(c) System simulation refers to the design of models for disaster chains and the use of
artificial or computer simulation of the disaster evolution to establish the relevant
risks. This model can produce corresponding mathematical and physical equations
based on physical knowledge such as mechanics. For example, Liu and He (2017)
proposed a system simulation for the disaster chain of landslide, dammed lake and
sudden flood in a mountainous area. They applied the widely used hyperbolic conser-
vation law system derived from the depth-averaged mass and momentum equation.

Furthermore, cellular automata (Wolfram 1984) can be used to study the evolution of disas-
ters over time in designated areas and the transformation of natural disasters within and between
regions. In safety science, the current cellular automata models are used to study the spread of
a single disaster in space and time (Ohgai et al. 2004; Li et al. 2013) or the emergency response
when hazards occur (Ji et al. 2008). There is little mature and advanced research on the con-
struction of cellular automata models describing the chain-like spread of disasters.
The review of the literatures suggests that disaster-chain research has focused on earth-
quake debris flow, coastal typhoons and inland floods. Thus, the scope of disaster-chain
research needs to be expanded. In addition, many kinds of quantitative or semiquantitative
models are relatively abstract, and insufficient consideration is given to the vulnerability
and the distribution of the victims and the superposition of the effects of disaster chains
on the victims. It is necessary to further consider time, space and other complex factors,
to understand the disaster chain more comprehensively and to improve the precision of the
risk analysis of the disaster chain.

3.4 Domino effect

In industrial systems, the domino effect is usually caused by fires, explosions and toxic
substances. Fire heat radiation, explosive fragments and explosion shockwaves are three
main factors leading to the spread of industrial accidents. Generally speaking, researchers
seldom consider the next accident caused by the leakage of toxic substances, and so the
leakage is usually the last accident of the domino effect.

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Natural Hazards

By analyzing the accident data, such as the area, hazardous chemicals, causes, con-
sequences, locations and expansion sequences, the characteristics of different scenarios
can be summarized (Kourniotis et al. 2000; Darbra et al. 2010; Abdolhamidzadeh et al.
2011). However, it is more important to calculate quantitatively the probability of esca-
lation caused by damage factors (usually caused by flame, blast and debris). Due to the
different scenarios and different computational methods and models used by researchers,
there are certain differences in the results of risk assessments. And there is still a poor
agreement on assessment procedures to address escalation hazard resulting in domino
scenarios (Necci et al. 2015). In this section, the methods of calculating the failure prob-
ability of the domino effect caused by fires and explosions are reviewed (Table 1).
For domino effects caused by fire, the thermal radiation may reduce the structural
strength of the vessel, the pressure in the pressurized vessel may increase, and the flame
may ignite the target equipment directly. For domino effects caused by explosions, the
blast wave and debris can further cause the target equipment to break down and generate
new shockwaves and debris. It is necessary to determine the circumstances under which
the target facilities are destroyed and analyze the probability of the escalation causing
the destruction of the target facilities. In addition, the trajectory equation and the prob-
ability of debris hitting or penetrating equipment need to be calculated.
Khan and Abbasi (1998) studied the probability of failure of the containers due to
high pressure caused by a fire and explosion accident in the 1990s (Table 1). Since the
model was proposed, it has been cited by many researchers. In addition, subsequent
researchers have proposed many of their own models and made improvements. The fol-
lowing is an overview of typical fire, explosive shock wave and damage model methods.

(1) There are two common models for calculating the risk of fire (thermal radiation). One
is the proportional model (Bagster 1991), in which the damage probability is related
to the ratio between the distance between the equipment and the initial accident equip-
ment and the maximum distance of the accident propagation. The proportional model
has been used by many researchers, but it is too simple to describe the damage prob-
ability of thermal radiation from fires. The other model is the probit model, in which
the probability analysis method is used to analyze the probability of propagation of the
incident according to the volume and pressure of the container. Cozzani et al. (2005)
summarized the escalation probability model of the domino effect used in various case
studies, which included the probability of loss propagation of thermal radiation (as
shown in Table 1). The failure probability can be calculated by calculating the time-
to-failure of peripheral equipment caused by fire radiation.
(2) The failure or damage probability of explosive shockwaves is mainly studied using
the probit model. The main consideration is the damage caused by shockwave over-
pressure. Eisenberg et al. (77) proposed the corresponding probability model as early
as 1975, which took the forms shown in Table 1. They fixed the values of A and B at
− 23.8 and 2.92, respectively. As mentioned above, Khan and Abbasi (1998) also pro-
posed a probability model for damage caused by explosion overpressure. Based on the
formula above, the peak overpressure was changed to the effective overpressure, taking
into account the drag coefficient of the shockwave, and the values of constants A and B
remained unchanged. On this basis, Cozzani et al. (2005) took different constants for
four kinds of containers: atmospheric, pressurized, elongated and auxiliary containers.
In general, for the quantitative assessment of the overpressure hazard caused by a
domino effect, the probit method is very attractive because its form is relatively sim-

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Table 1  Models for escalation probability of fire and explosion
Researchers Failure probability Definition of variables

P2 −Prelief Eymax Pr, Prb and Pf are, respectively, the damage probability of fire thermal radiation, explosive
Khan and Abbasi (1998) P =
r Prelief
∪ Ey shockwave and explosive debris
Prb = −23.8 + 2.92 ln[(1 + Cd )p0 ] P2 and Prelief represent the internal pressure and the opening pressure of the safety valve,
ps−h P2 −Prelief V
respectively; Eymax denotes the maximum stress on the shell wall; and Ey is the internal
Pf = ps
∪ Prelief
∪ Ve pressure stress
Cd is the drag coefficient of the shockwave and p0 is the peak overpressure of the shockwave
ps is the penetration strength of the debris, h stands for the thickness of the equipment wall, V
denotes the volume of equipment, Ve is half of the spherical volume with r as radius
rji 2
Bagster (1991) Pji = (1 − rth
) Pji denotes the probability that device i will initiate a domino effect due to the failure of the
device j; rji denotes the distance between device j and the device i; and rth denotes the maxi-
mum distance over which the initial accident can cause damage
Eisenberg et al. (1975) Y = a + b ln(Ps ) Ps is the peak overpressure
Cozzani et al. (2005) Y = 12.54 − 1.847 ln(ttf), ln(ttf) = −1.128 Y is probit value for escalation given the primary scenario; ttf is time to failure (s); I is radia-
ln(I) − 2.667 × 10−5 V + 9.877, Atmospheric verti- tion intensity on the target equipment (kW/m2); V is equipment volume (­ m3); Ps is peak
cal cylindrical vessel static overpressure on the target equipment (kPa)
Y = 12.54 − 1.847 ln(ttf), ln(ttf) = −0.947
ln(I) + 8.835 V0.032, pressurized horizontal cylin-
drical vessels
Y = −18.96 + 2.44 ln (Ps), atmospheric
Y = −42.44 + 4.33 ln (Ps), pressurized
Y = −28.07 + 3.16 ln (Ps), elongated
Y = −17.79 + 2.18 ln (Ps), auxiliary
Natural Hazards
Natural Hazards

ple. In addition, it does not depend heavily on the definition of damage threshold and
the correlation coefficient can be easily modified when sufficient data are available
(Cozzani et al. 2005). Based on the models of Eisenberg et al. (1975), Khan and
Abbasi (1998) and Cozzani et al. (2005), later researchers did improvements of the
probit model. For example, Mingguang and Juncheng (2008) redefined the severity
of target equipment failure and got a new probit model.
(3) Assessments of the risk of damage caused by explosive debris mainly consider the tra-
jectory of the debris and the impact and penetration relationship between the debris and
target equipment. Monte Carlo (MC) simulation can be used for the motion of explosive
debris. Sun et al. (2015) established the equation of motion of fragments of an explod-
ing vessel. MC simulation was used to study the ground distribution of fragments
of different source types and sizes, the probability of impact between fragments and
targets, the breakdown probability of impacting targets, and the risk of a domino effect
caused by fragments. To analyze the action of debris on target equipment, knowledge
of mathematical geometry, physical mechanics and kinematics should be synthesized.
For example, using a simplified mechanical model, Ahmed et al. (2012) described the
perforation and penetration, overturning, buckling, over bending and shear effects of
metal fragments when they hit surrounding tanks.

In general, the escalation of fires and explosions reflects the direct and simple chain
relationship between accidents in the multi-hazard scenario of domino effects. There are,
however, more complex scenarios, such as expansion effects and synergy effects. He and
Weng (2019) presented a method to assess the synergic effects in domino events, with MC
simulation and cumulative distribution function the basis of the method. Moreover, similar
to the analysis of complex disaster chains, the analysis of these effects can use methods
such as the event-tree method (Bernechea et al. 2013) and the Bayesian network method
(Khakzad et al. 2013) to determine the combination of various triggering relationships. In
addition, the industrial layout is optimized by constructing risk indexes such as Domino
Hazard Index (Tugnoli et al. 2008) and Integrated Inherent Safety Index (Khan and Amy-
otte 2004).
Current models of the probability of damage from fires and explosions form the basis of
risk analysis of domino effect, which is relatively preliminary, and the objectivity and accu-
racy of risk analysis are insufficient. This needs to be further improved such as equipment
vulnerability analysis. Moreover, it is necessary to adjust the model coefficients according
to the conditions in specific industrial parks. In addition, as a multi-hazard scenario closely
related to people and equipment, the risk analysis of domino effects needs to consider not
only the loss probability, but also the individual risk and social risk. How to express indi-
vidual risk accurately and calculate social risk are problems that require further consid-
eration. Currently, it is thought that the calculation of social risk depends on personal risk
calculations and personnel density distributions (Center for Chemical Process Safety 2000;
De Haag and Ale 2005). Cozzani et al. (2005) used the probit model to calculate personal
casualty probability. Kourniotis et al. (2000), Darbra et al. (2010) and Hemmatian et al.
(2014) produced social risk curves. However, in most cases, the escalation probability is
considered as being more related to the domino effect risk.

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3.5 Concurrent hazards

Concurrent hazards have a greater number of potential outcomes because physical interac-
tions between hazards often have unexpected catastrophic consequences. Differing from
the risk analysis of other multi-hazard scenarios, research on concurrent hazards often
focuses on the summary and analysis after the occurrence of the hazard; few studies have
used methods such as establishing models and calculating probability. This section intro-
duces two perspectives of the research into concurrent hazards; namely the physical inter-
action between the hazards and the effect of multiple hazards on the same victim.
Horsburgh and Horritt (2007) reconstructed and analyzed the Bristol Channel floods of
1607. On January 30, 1607, the lowlands surrounding the Bristol Channel suffered possibly
the worst coastal flooding on record. Horsburgh et al. showed that the tide and probable
weather at the time were capable of generating a surge that was consistent with contempo-
rary observations, without needing to invoke high river levels due to previous rainfall. The
floods represented the worst combination of high spring tide and locally generated surge in
the Bristol Channel. The physical interaction between the high spring tide and the surge led
to serious disasters.
In other cases, it is difficult to determine which hazard interactions will lead to more
extreme events, which are usually related to specific victims (special ecosystems, infra-
structure, urban lifeline systems, etc.). Kelly (2009) analyzed concurrent hazards in Tajik-
istan. In the winter of 2007–2008, unusually cold weather accompanied by heavy snowfall
destroyed food stores and seeds on the ground, resulting in the death of livestock and a
food crisis. At the same time, pipelines and heating systems were damaged, electricity sup-
plies were cut, and the food supply market suffered serious problems. After the beginning
of spring, Tajikistan suffered from severe drought, which led to a sharp reduction in irriga-
tion water, serious problems in food supply, and social unrest. The severe cold and snow-
storm in winter, coupled with the extreme drought in spring, continued to have serious con-
sequences for Tajikistan’s social system, especially its food production and supply system.
As the effect of concurrent hazards is difficult to predict, they often result in greater
impact and loss than expected. And since this uncertain interaction, it is difficult to use
qualitative or quantitative methods for risk analysis and case study is the main research
content (Cannon et al. 2008, 2010; Eckel 1970). Future research should focus on more
accurately summarizing and identifying the physical processes between concurrent haz-
ards, especially between natural disasters. Moreover, a deeper study should be made of the
vulnerability of victims, especially the key social infrastructure, so as to lay a foundation
for providing corresponding protective measures and preventing the collapse of victims
when multiple hazards occur.
Five different types of multi-hazard risk analysis have been reviewed: Natech events,
human-induced hazards, disaster chains, the domino effect and concurrent hazards. Multi-
hazard risk analysis has been summarized from different scenarios and only the mutual
reinforcement of hazards has been summarized. Each category of multi-hazard is synthe-
tized in Table 2. The multi-hazard risk analysis still faces many difficulties and challenges,
and these will be discussed in the next section.

13
 Table 2  Synthetization of each category of multi-hazard
Types of the investi- Main characteristics of the Used methods How it is studied and imple- Which are the gaps How can be improved
gated hazards and risks multi-hazard analysis mented till now
Natural Hazards

Natech events To study the vulnerability of Probability theory To assess the risks to indus- Research has mainly To establish a more compre-
equipment during natural Monte Carlo simulation try plants from external focused on the chemical hensive Natech-event data-
disasters and calculate the Fuzzy evaluation events: analysis of industry base covering more than the
damage probability and external events; classified Research is mostly based chemical industry
outcomes lists of equipment units; on case studies of actual To develop more general
damage models accidents evolution rules and more
Risk evaluation and man- general risk analysis
agement: personal and methods
social risks; to construct
risk indicators
administrative means to
reduce Natech risk
Human-induced hazards To explore how human Case study The investigation of Human activities are To integrate human activi-
activities affect the natural Physical modeling designated areas and the considered as part of the ties into the framework of
environment and estimate deduction of the mecha- disaster-pregnant environ- multi-hazard analysis
the threshold of the natu- nism of human-induced ment, which is not much
ral environment imbalance hazards from physics, different from the analysis
geosciences, life sciences of natural disasters alone
and other theories
Disaster chains To identify and summarize Statistical analysis Qualitative methods: exami- Research has focused on The scope of disaster-chain
different disaster chains Event tree nation of existing cases earthquake debris flow, research needs to be
To summarize characteris- Bayesian network Quantitative methods: prob- coastal typhoons and expanded
tics of the disaster chains Complex network ability analysis models inland floods To further consider time,
and their formation rules Cellular automata complex network model; Models are relatively space and other complex
Physical modeling simulation abstract factors

13
 Table 2  (continued)
Types of the investi- Main characteristics of the Used methods How it is studied and imple- Which are the gaps How can be improved
gated hazards and risks multi-hazard analysis mented till now

13
Domino effect To mainly study fire heat Statistical analysis Analyzing the accident Current calculation models Further improvement is
radiation, explosive Modeling data: to summarize the are relatively preliminary needed such as equipment
fragments and explosion Monte Carlo simulation characteristics of different The accuracy of risk expres- vulnerability analysis and
shockwaves leading to Event tree scenarios sion is not enough to adjust the model coef-
the spread of industrial Bayesian network Models for escalation prob- ficients
accidents Fuzzy evaluation ability of fire and explo- To express individual risk
sion: proportional model; accurately and calculate
probit model; equation of social risk
motion; mechanical model
Expansion effects and
synergy effects
To construct risk indexes
Concurrent hazards Research focuses on the Case study To study physical interac- Since the uncertain interac- To focus on more accurately
summary and analysis tion between hazards and tion, it is difficult to use summarizing and identify-
after the occurrence of the the effect of multiple haz- qualitative or quantitative ing the physical processes
hazard ards on the same victim methods for risk analysis between concurrent hazards
It is difficult to use qualita- and case study is the main A deeper study should be
tive or quantitative meth- research content made of the vulnerability
ods for risk analysis since of victims under concurrent
the uncertain interaction hazards, especially the key
social infrastructure
Natural Hazards
Natural Hazards

4 Challenges

The multi-hazard risk analysis described in this paper is based on the relationship
between hazards. This paper does not discuss the steps and tasks of multi-hazard risk
analysis as a whole. The review is based on previous research into the relations between
hazards and the different methods and concepts, and it presents many common difficul-
ties and challenges. Multi-hazard scenarios are complex, as the disaster mechanism is
complicated and changeable, leading to difficulties in prediction and prevention. Risk
analysis of multi-hazard scenarios is not a simple task. It includes many steps: multiple
hazards, vulnerability, multiple risks, and so on. In recent years, much research has been
conducted on multi-hazard risk analysis, but mature methods and accurate theoretical
systems have not yet been developed. The methods and ideas put forward by researchers
have their own merits and demerits. It is hoped that in the future the following aspects
can be considered.

(1) Up to now, researchers have adopted concepts from conventional descriptions for use in
specific multi-hazard scenarios. Their grasp of the relationship between hazards does
not have a unified standard. In general, the triggering relationship between natural dis-
asters and technological accidents (disaster chain, domino effect) is easily recognized;
however, the more complex and ambiguous relationships between hazards require
greater understanding and more research. It is important to build an overall framework
to describe the relationship between hazards. In this study, some attempts have been
made, but more discussion and consideration are still needed, including the accuracy
and completeness of classification.
(2) As the occurrence of hazards is often a complex process, the level of abstraction is often
high and the refinement of the models is insufficient. In particular, vulnerability-related
considerations need to be included more in hazard modeling; for example, the distribu-
tion of victims when natural disasters occur, the superposition of affection of hazards,
and the vulnerability of equipment to the domino effect. Such considerations should be
more integrated into more refined models than at present. In addition, crowd movement
and personal protection should also be included in the risk analysis of hazards.
(3) In the case of simultaneous occurrence of hazard events, the risk of multiple risk factors
is different from that of a single risk. Not only can the single risk not simply be super-
posed, but the complex relationships of social systems brought by multiple hazards
should also be considered. However, this often leads to multi-disciplinary problems,
from natural (biology, meteorology, geology, etc.) to technological (chemistry, explo-
sion, fire, structure, mechanics, etc.) and social (economics, management, psychology,
etc.) subjects. In the further development of methods, however, an interdisciplinary
approach is very important, although it brings more challenges to multi-hazard risk
analysis.
(4) One of the purposes of multi-hazard risk analysis is the communication of risk analysis
results so that the decision-makers of stakeholders can have more accurate information
upon which to base their decisions. However, it should be considered that, although
stakeholders are concerned about all types of hazards in the region, what is more
important to them is the potential loss of victims. The typical method to describe this
potential loss is the vulnerability curve (surface) or matrix. However, in the case of the
simultaneous occurrence of hazards, as mentioned above, vulnerability may exhibit
nonlinear changes, and so a dimension needs to be added to describe the changes on the

13
 Natural Hazards

basis of the original vulnerability. In addition, the interaction between hazards (such
as mutual enhancement or triggering) also needs to be demonstrated. Therefore, the
presentation of risk analysis results to non-professionals also needs to be considered
(5) There is a basic classification of hazards: natural disasters and technological accidents.
Furthermore, scenarios involving multiple hazards occurring at the same time are
divided into disaster chains, domino effects, Natech events, and so on. However, this
classification is too simple because it does not capture the fact that forest fires and
floods (both natural disasters) are not of the same nature; similarly, it does not capture
the fact that forest fires and accidental fires (different types) are of the same nature. In
addition, the impact of hazards, such as the collapse of infrastructure or environmen-
tal pollution, may be the key link to further expand the subsequent impact or gener-
ate other hazards, but this “intermediate link” is not accounted for in a multi-hazard
scenario. Given these criticisms, a generalized methodology for a specific category of
multi-hazard could be useful to be implemented as it could be applied to different case
studies that could be compared in the results. One possibility is to divide hazards into
material, energy and information according to the elements of the disaster so that the
results of risk analysis are more overlapping and comparable.

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis of multi-hazard risk is multifaceted and challenging. Regardless

of the kind of multi-hazard scenarios and regardless of the kind of relationship between
the hazards, scenarios can be considered from the perspectives of multiple hazards, vul-
nerability and risk, among others. For different multi-hazard scenarios, there are qualita-
tive, semiquantitative and quantitative methods that can be used, and the choice of methods
depends on the characteristics of the multi-hazard analysis and the purpose of the research.
However, practical problems such as the accuracy of the quantitative model complicate the
selection. Moreover, to make decisions related to risk management, it is necessary to have
more general risk analysis methods and a clearer understanding of the process of hazards.
This paper reviews a series of risk analysis methods for different hazard relationships, as
well as possible challenges and solutions. In dealing with relations between hazard types
and analyzing how risk emerges or escalates due to the relations, the main focus of this
work is the multiple hazards aspect rather than on the vulnerability and risk issues. The
hope is that this work will help risk analysts accurately grasp the essence of multi-hazard
risks and provide some ideas for the development of multi-hazard risk analysis.

Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to The National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Schol-
ars (71725006) and National Key R&D Program of China (2016YFC0802801) for funding this research.
The authors also want to thank several persons who contributed to discussions, critics and explanations.

Funding The National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars (71725006) and National Key R&D
Program of China (2016YFC0802801).

Availability of data and materials Available.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest The authors declare no competing financial interests.

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Natural Hazards

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