c 2001)

Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2001 (°

Selective Attention and Anxiety: A Perspective on

Developmental Issues and the Causal Status

Merel Kindt1,2 and Marcel Van Den Hout1

A plethora of studies on selective information processing in anxiety have been carried out over the
past two decades. One of the most robust findings is that anxiety is associated with selective attention
(SA) for threatening information. The rationale of research into SA is that it is assumed to play a
vital role in the maintenance, and even in the etiology of anxiety disorders. It is the aim of this paper
to explicate on the validity of this assumption. There is ample evidence that anxiety enhances SA.
Although there is a lack of studies on the effect of SA on anxiety, there is now some evidence that
SA increases the level of anxiety. This leads us to conclude that SA is not a by-product of anxiety
only. Hence, the suggestion that SA plays a role in the maintenance of anxiety disorders seems to
be justified. Studies on SA in children suggest that if SA plays any role at all in the development of
anxiety disorders, it is not the SA in itself that is a vulnerability factor, but the continuation of this
SA. Individuals who develop an anxiety disorder could have difficulty learning to inhibit this SA.
Considering the finding that SA increases the level of anxiety, the authors suggest that anxiety in
childhood causes failure to inhibit SA, which in turn enhances the vulnerability to anxiety disorder
in adulthood.

KEY WORDS: selective attention; anxiety.

During the past 20 years, insights from cognitive psy-
chology have been applied to research on emotional disor-
ders. This has caused major changes in clinical research.
Firstly, cognitive theories have been formulated that can be
used to derive highly specific hypotheses on the nature and
origin of emotional disorders. At the same time, and pos-
sibly not less important, experimental procedures became
available as a welcome addition to introspective meth-
ods. In particular, the information-processing approach
to emotional disorders provided experimental paradigms
broadening the range of methodologies. It allowed to study
cognitive processes such as selective attention, encoding,
and retrieval, instead of only the content of cognitions.
Moreover, the information-processing approach provided
the possibility to study conscious as well as unconscious
1 Department of Medical, Clinical and Experimental Psychology,
Maastricht University, The Netherlands.
2 To whom correspondence should be addressed at Department of Med-
ical, Clinical and Experimental Psychology, Faculties of Medicine
and Health Sciences, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, The Netherlands; e-mail: merel.kindt@dep.unimaas.nl.
processes. The nature of research on anxiety disorders
has changed dramatically as a result of this paradigmatic
shift.
According to information processing models, anxi-
ety is presented in a cognitive anxiety network or schema
(Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1986; Bower,
1981, 1987; Bower & Forgas, 2000). These anxiety net-
works are assumed to lead to selective processing of threat-
ening information. Over the past two decades, there has
been a great deal of research on the selective attention (SA)
that anxious individuals are thought to have for threaten-
ing information. The idea is that SA could play a role in
the maintenance, and even in the etiology of anxiety disor-
ders. From the point of view of an anxious individual, SA
is functional, because the sooner a threat is perceived, the
sooner an adequate response can be given. If and insofar as
SA reinforces anxiety, and anxiety is irrational, SA is dys-
functional. In this way, SA may force anxious individuals
into a vicious circle of more attention to threat → more
anxiety → more attention to threat (see e.g., MacLeod,
1991). The result of SA in anxious persons would be
that threat stimuli easily activate the anxiety network and

193
0882-2689/01/0900-0193$19.50/0 °
C 2001 Plenum Publishing Corporation
194
hence increase its impact on information processing. Al-
though the operation of this alleged “vicious circle” has
been widely suggested in studies on SA and anxiety, the
question may be raised how much support there actually
is for this assumption. If true, this would imply that SA
plays indeed a role in the maintenance of anxiety disor-
ders. In pursuing the role of SA in the etiology of anxiety
disorders, it is assumed that individuals with an “anxious
personality” who also tend to selectively attend to threat,
would then be vulnerable to develop anxiety disorders. In
contrast, “nonanxious personalities” would tend to turn
attention away from threat in similar situations. Again the
question may be raised how much support there is for this
assumption.
To clarify the role of SA in the maintenance of anxiety
disorders, the authors will try to answer two main ques-
tions. The first question is whether anxiety promotes SA.
The second question is whether, reversibly, SA stimulates
anxiety. There are only a few researchers who addressed
this second—complex—question. Concerning the ques-
tion whether SA plays a role in the etiology of anxiety
disorders, no prospective studies are available that show
evidence for this theoretical account. Nevertheless, several
studies on SA in children are available that may shed some
light on the etiology issue. These studies and their impli-
cations will be discussed. Before these causality issues are
addressed, a brief outline of the underlying theories, the
most common research methods in the field and a number
of salient and frequently reported findings will be given.
SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND ANXIETY:
THEORIES, METHODS, AND
GENERAL FINDINGS
Cognitive anxiety networks (Lang, 1977, 1979;
McNally & Steketee, 1985) are held to consist of (a) infor-
mation about the feared stimulus situation (e.g. a spider);
(b) information about verbal responses (e.g. screaming),
physiological responses (e.g. palpitations), and behavioral
responses (e.g. running away); and (c) information about
the meaning of the stimulus (dirty spider) and the meaning
of response elements of the anxiety network (e.g. palpi-
tations mean panic). Anxiety networks would lead to a
prioritizing in the processing of threatening information.
According to Beck and Bower, all phases of information
processing are disturbed in anxious individuals: attention
is selectively focused on the origins of the threat, ambigu-
ous stimuli are more easily interpreted as threatening, and
threatening information is memorized better (Beck et al.,
1986; Bower, 1981, 1987; Bower & Forgas, 2000). Other
models, however, suggest that emotions may have differ-
Kindt and Van Den Hout
ential effects on different processes of information pro-
cessing (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). These models
indicate that anxiety primarily determines which infor-
mation enters the cognitive system (MacLeod & Mathews,
1991a). There is indeed a great deal of evidence available
to support the idea that anxious persons have an attentional
preference for threatening information. There is, however,
little evidence that suggests that anxious persons have a
memory preference for this information.
Studies of SA generally make use of the emotional
Stroop paradigm, a modification of the traditional color–
word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). In Stroop tasks, words
are presented in different colors. The subject is asked to
name the color of the word as quickly as possible (target
stimulus) and to ignore the content of the word (distractor
stimulus). Numerous Stroop studies have been published
(for an overview, see MacLeod, 1991; Williams, Mathews
& MacLeod, 1996). An important finding was that sub-
jects are unable to ignore the content of the word entirely.
The processing of the meaning of the word interferes with
the process of naming the color. It takes more time to name
the color of a word printed in red, than to name the color of
red meaningless symbols, such as “XXXXX.” The inter-
ference effects are greater when the meaning of the word is
more difficult to ignore. Warren (1972, 1974) found more
interference on words that had been presented auditively
immediately prior to the Stroop task. Geller and Shaver
(1976) found more interference on words relating to the
subjects themselves when the Stroop task was performed
in front of a mirror or a camera. Interference occurs be-
cause attention is given to the word, that is, processing
of the word cannot be completely inhibited. The attention
that is paid to the processing of the word affects the at-
tention that can be given to naming the color. The result
is a delayed response time. If anxious individuals have
an SA for information that is relevant for their anxiety,
they should be slower in naming the color of threatening
stimuli, compared to neutral stimuli.3
Another method of identifying SA is the “Visual Dot-
Probe Task” (VDT). In this response time task, two words
are simultaneously presented on a computer screen: one
word immediately above the centre of the screen, the other
immediately below the centre of the screen. Shortly after
3 There is currently a discussion on the question whether the emotional
Stroop task does in fact measure SA. This discussion derives from the
different definitions of attention. The Stroop task measures relatively
late selection processes, which are based on a semantic analysis of
the word (see e.g., Driver & Tipper, 1989). Some believe that only
relatively early selection processes should be regarded as part of the
attention processes. We regard relatively late selection processes also
as part of SA. This does not mean, however, that these only concern
conscious attention processes.
Selective Attention and Anxiety
the words have disappeared from the screen, a clearly visi-
ble dot (visual dot-probe) sometimes appears in one of the
word positions. The task of the subject is twofold: the up-
per word must be read aloud and a button must be pressed
as quickly as possible after the dot has appeared. This task
focuses on the speed of dot recognition. The only reason
why the upper word must be read aloud is to keep the
focus of attention constant. SA would lead to more rapid
responses if the dot appeared in the same position as the
threatening word. SA would lead to slower responses if
the dot did not appear in the position of the threatening
word. The VDT can be used to determine the direction of
attention, whereas the Stroop task enables us to measure
the degree of distraction. Both phenomena are reasonably
regarded as indications of SA.
The first study on the relationship between anxiety
and SA was done more than 20 years ago among students
preparing for an important examination (Ray, 1979). The
subjects responded more slowly to examination-related
colored words than to neutral words, and this effect was
greater in subjects who reported more state anxiety, as as-
sessed by the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Mathews and
MacLeod (1985) found a similar result in patients with
a generalized anxiety disorder. Patients responded more
slowly to words that referred to social threat (e.g. “fail-
ure” or “lonely”) or physical threat (e.g. “coffin” or “dis-
ease”). In addition, the degree of delay to the socially or
physically threatening words was related to the nature of
the anxiety in the subjects (social or physical). These two
findings were replicated by Mogg, Mathews and Weinman
(1989). This allowed for the conclusion that anxious in-
dividuals exhibit SA for threatening information and that
there is specificity: the selective attention concerns the in-
formation that is particularly frightening for this particular
person and not threatening information in general.
During the 80s and 90s, a similar Stroop effect was
replicated in various anxiety disorders, such as spider
phobia (e.g. Lavy, Van Den Hout, & Arntz, 1993), so-
cial phobia (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990),
generalized anxiety disorder (Mathews & MacLeod,
1985), panic disorder (McNally, Riemann, & Kim, 1990),
posttraumatic stress disorder (e.g. Thrasher, Dalgleish &
Yule, 1994), and obsessive–compulsive disorder (e.g. Foa,
Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer, & Murdock, 1993). SA has not
been found in anxious individuals only. Normal subjects
also appear to exhibit SA for stimuli that are related to their
individual concerns (e.g. Riemann & McNally, 1995).
However, the Stroop effect in anxiety disorders cannot
be explained exclusively by the degree to which threat-
ening stimuli are relevant for the patient’s concerns. A
study of obsessive–compulsive patients, in which negative
195
valence of the words and specific relatedness to the dis-
order were manipulated independently, showed that SA is
determined more by “negative valence” than by “related-
ness” (Lavy, van Oppen, & Van Den Hout, 1994).
Initially, the so-called “card version” of the Stroop
task was used to measure SA. In this version, words from
one category are printed on a card: one card for threaten-
ing words of type A, another card for threatening words
of type B, a third card for neutral words, etc. In 1990,
McNally et al. introduced the first computerized version
of the emotional Stroop task (McNally et al., 1990). This
increased the reliability of the task. In the card version,
the experimenter registered the total response time. But
in a clinical setting the experimenter often knows whether
subjects are patients or not. If the experimenter also knows
what the theory predicts with respect to the response time
of patients for the different cards, there is a danger that
the stopwatch is pressed slightly sooner/later for a certain
combination of subject and card. Also, the response time
was not corrected for errors made during color naming.
The computerized version had another important advan-
tage: the threatening and neutral stimuli could be presented
as a mix. This eliminated the possibility of the delay being
the result of a mood effect resulting from the cumulation
of threatening words: A Vietnam veteran who burst out
into tears after reading dozens of words like “Vietnam,”
“Charlie,” “Body bag,” “dead,” “torture,” undoubtedly ex-
hibits a delay, but this is an emotion effect rather than an
attention effect. Studies conducted with the computerized
version yielded the same convincing results as the card
version (Kindt, Bierman, & Brosschot, 1996; Williams
et al., 1996).
It is actually surprising that for years, SA has been
studied almost exclusively by means of threatening words.
Anxious individuals are, after all, not afraid of words, but
of stimuli that can be referred to with these words. This
issue prompted studies in which threatening images and
words were compared (Kindt & Brosschot, 1997; Lavy &
Van Den Hout, 1993). The studies were conducted among
spider phobics with the advantage that the stimuli were
unequivocally threatening. Phobic subjects rated the im-
ages of spiders as more aversive than words like “spider”
or “web.” This is not surprising; a picture of a spider looks
more like a real spider than the word “spider” (Kindt &
Brosschot, 1997). Contrary to the expectations, the SA for
words equalled that for images. That is, although phobics
rated the pictures as more threatening, slowing down on
color-naming spider pictures, relative to neutral pictures,
was as large as slowing down on spider words relative
to neutral words. Allocation of SA to threatening infor-
mation is possibly done on the basis of a fast and super-
ficial decision-making process, in which the individual
196
determines whether the stimulus is relevant or not. The
degree of relevance may not be important yet. To gain pro-
cessing priority, the stimulus must have a certain minimal
amount of relevance (threshold value; Cohen, Dunbar, &
McClelland, 1990). Above the threshold value, it does not
seem to matter how threatening the stimulus is. The only
condition for SA is that the stimulus is regarded as rele-
vant. LeDoux (1990, p. 39) illustrates this phenomenon in
the following passage:
An animal in the wild does not always have time to con-
template the full semantic ramifications of, for example,
the sound of rustling leaves nearby. Rapid organisation
of defensive responses on the basis of incomplete stim-
ulus identification may make the difference between life
and death. The cost of a false positive response in such a
situation is far less than the cost of a false negative. The
defensive flight or fight response can always be aborted if
more detailed processing indicates that the stimulus is not
really threatening or at least not predicting real danger.
Hence, the finding that spider phobics showed a simi-
lar SA to spider pictures as to spider words, can be in-
terpreted in terms of an incomplete but rapid decision-
making process—both stimulus categories are threatening
enough. The degree to which the stimuli are considered to
be threatening, plays no role in this adaptive function of
SA. The latter requires refined semantic analysis, which
can be postponed till after SA did its job of alerting the
individual. The suggestion is therefore that, under the in-
fluence of anxiety, the allocation of processing capacity to
threatening stimuli is an automatic process. And automatic
processing does not generally require consciousness. Sev-
eral studies have been conducted on SA toward stimuli that
are supposed to be inaccessible to phenomenal awareness.
The first study on unconscious SA was done us-
ing a so-called dichotic listening task. This task involves
the simultaneous presentation of threatening and neutral
auditive information. The subject is asked to “shadow”
the neutral words presented to one ear (i.e. to repeat the
words loudly) and to ignore the threatening words in the
other ear. This task is based upon the principle of lim-
ited information-processing capacity, and is referred to as
a resource-limited paradigm (Norman & Bobrow, 1975).
Although both the threatening and the nonthreatening
words might be consciously perceived, the capacity over-
load on the shadowed message forces the nonshadowed
information below the perimeter of awareness (McNally,
1995). Thus, in the dichotic listening task, the stimuli (i.e.
threatening words) on which the attention is not focussed
are supposed to be registered unconsciously.
Mathews and MacLeod (1986) used such a dichotic
listening task to show that patients with a generalized anx-
iety disorder exhibit SA for threatening information. The
Kindt and Van Den Hout
fact that the patients were, afterwards, unable to report
which threatening words had been presented, made the
authors conclude that the object of SA was not consciously
perceived.
According to Holender (1986), however, the dichotic
listening paradigm is not suitable to measure unconscious
processes. It cannot be excluded that during shadow-
ing of the neutral words, the attention is repeatedly and
very briefly focussed on the threatening stimulus in the
other ear. The subject need not remember these rapid
shifts of attention. In reply to this criticism, the sublimi-
nal emotional Stroop task was introduced. In contrast to
a resource-limited paradigm, the Stroop task is a data-
limited paradigm, which require processing of physically
impoverished stimuli that cannot be consciously identi-
fied (Norman & Bobrow, 1975). In the subliminal Stroop
task, emotional words are presented so briefly (e.g. 20 ms)
that they cannot be perceived consciously. Each stimu-
lus is followed by a masking stimulus of the same color
as the emotional word. This is done to prevent afterim-
ages, and hence awareness of the emotional words. The
subject has to name the color of the masking stimulus as
quickly as possible. Various studies have revealed that both
nonclinically and clinically anxious individuals have SA
for threatening information presented subliminally (below
the perception threshold). As expected, clinically anxious
individuals suffering from a generalized anxiety disorder
also showed an attention preference for supraliminally
presented stimuli (Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & Mathews,
1993; Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995). Nonclini-
cally anxious individuals, on the other hand, showed only
SA for the subliminal stimuli, and not for the supraliminal
stimuli (Van Den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, Merckelbach,
& Kindt, 1995; MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; MacLeod &
Rutherford, 1992). Hence, it appears that all anxious in-
dividuals give priority to threatening information at the
unconscious level. SA may result from a rapid and auto-
matic analysis of the threat stimulus. As long as the feared
cues remain unconscious, all anxious people, regardless of
whether they suffer from a clinical disorder, seem to pref-
erentially process threat information. When the stimulus
information becomes conscious, however, nonclinically
anxious people may be able to inhibit selective process-
ing, whilst clinically anxious people may not be able to
do so. Thus, with regard to attention, it appears that both
clinically anxious people and anxious people who do not
suffer from straightforward clinical anxiety do not differ in
responding to subliminal threat information—regardless
of clinical status, threat information is preferentially pro-
cessed. Meanwhile, the two groups differ in the reaction to
supraliminally perceived threat cues. Although nonclini-
cally anxious people tend to strategically inhibit selective
Selective Attention and Anxiety
processing of threat, clinical patients seem unable to do so.
In conclusion, it is the response to consciously perceived
rather than unconsciously perceived threat that marks the
transition from nonclinical anxiety to clinical anxiety.
SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND ANXIETY:
THE CAUSAL DIRECTION
The relationship between selective attention for
threat and anxiety has become one of the best documented
phenomena in experimental psychopathology. But what is
the causal status of SA? Is it a result of anxiety? Or does
it cause anxiety. Or are both alternatives valid?
Effects of Anxiety on Selective Attention
Research on the effects of anxiety on SA initially
yielded contradictory results. The relative contribution of
state anxiety to SA and anxiety as a personality charac-
teristic are unclear. Mathews and MacLeod (1985), for
example, found that SA was best predicted by state anx-
iety, whereas Mogg et al. (1989) found that trait anxiety
was the best indicator. A follow-up study by the same
authors (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988) concentrated sys-
tematically on the relative contribution of both factors.
In individuals with low and with high trait anxiety, SA
was determined twice by means of the VDT: once a few
weeks before an important examination, so at a time of
low state anxiety, and once during the week of the exam-
ination, at a time of high state anxiety. During the first
session, neither of the groups exhibited SA. During the
second session, however, the high anxiety group exhib-
ited clear SA for examination-relevant threatening words,
whereas in the low anxiety group, attention was averted
from these stimuli. At the same time, state anxiety had
increased to a similar extent in both groups between the
first and the second session. This study therefore showed
that SA was best predicted by the two factors together, and
that neither state anxiety by itself, nor anxiety as a person-
ality characteristic by itself was sufficient to induce SA.
This result has been repeated by other researchers (e.g.
Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988). With respect to the ques-
tion of the causal relationship between anxiety and SA,
these findings suggest a shaded pattern. Neither state anx-
iety nor trait anxiety appears to be sufficient to be able to
observe SA. SA may only occur if the two conditions are
combined.
The question whether anxiety leads to SA can, in
principle, be studied in two ways. Firstly, the assumed re-
lationship suggests that an increase of anxiety—whether
197
experimentally induced or not—leads to the occurrence or
intensification of SA. This type of research was described
earlier. But reversely, a decrease of anxiety should also
lead to the disappearance or decrease of SA. Behavioral
therapists have become quite successful in treating anxiety
disorders. Some anxiety disorders require between 10 and
20 sessions. Single phobias like spider phobia may be sat-
isfactorily reduced after a single treatment session. Does
SA disappear after a successful treatment of anxiety?
In 1986, English researchers first established the ef-
fects of therapy on SA (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, &
Trezise, 1986). Spider phobics took part in a 6-week
group therapy treatment. The treatment consisted of the
method of “systematic desensitization” that was still ex-
tensively used at that time. This method consists of a
combination of relaxation and exposure to threatening
stimuli. Contrary to expectations, the treatment resulted
in a significant decrease of SA.4 Following Watts et al.,
the therapeutic effect of SA has been repeated for var-
ious anxiety disorders and different forms of treatment.
A reduction of SA was found, for example, in spider
phobics after a 2.5-hr exposure treatment (Lavy et al.,
1993), in patients with a generalized anxiety disorder af-
ter seven sessions in which relaxation, cognitive coping
strategies, and gradual exposure were used (Mathews,
Mogg, Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995), and in social phobics
who had taken 12 weeks of cognitive Behavioral ther-
apy (Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993). In the last study,
it was also shown that only patients who had benefited
from the treatment exhibited a decrease of SA. Therapy
also appears to have an effect on unconscious SA (Van
Den Hout et al., 1997; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White,
1995).
The above-mentioned results and the studies de-
scribed earlier support the option that anxiety leads to SA:
when anxiety increases, SA occurs (at least in individuals
who are trait anxious). In anxious persons who manage to
overcome their anxieties by means of behavioral therapy,
SA decreases; this applies to SA for threatening informa-
tion that can be perceived consciously, but also for threat-
ening stimuli that are so “degraded” that they cannot be
perceived. These findings are interesting and behavioral
4 This finding was not only of clinical importance, but also has theoretical
consequences. There has always beeen an alternative explanation for
SA: the “familiarity hypothesis.” Anxious individuals would simply be
more familiar with the threatening stimuli and hence processing such
stimuli would be more automatic. The degree of automatized process-
ing, after all, also has an effect on the regular Stroop effect. The more
familiar a word is, the slower the response (Klein, 1964). The study
by Watts et al. undermines this familiarity hypothesis. It shows that
the greater familiarity with spider stimuli (training in therapy) in fact
decreases SA.
198
therapists were pleased to observe that antianxiety ther-
apy at the same time decreases SA. Theoretically, how-
ever, this suggests a disappointing conclusion: SA seems
to be an epiphenomenon of anxiety.
Effects of Selective Attention on Anxiety
The first major study to investigate whether SA is
in fact a vulnerability factor, was conducted by MacLeod
and Hagan (1992). They investigated whether SA would
predict stronger negative responses to a stressful medical
event. Thirty-one women awaiting colposcopy investiga-
tion, were screened on both self-report measures of emo-
tional vulnerability, and on an emotional Stroop. In 15 of
these patients, cervical pathology was diagnosed subse-
quently. Eight weeks after SA was assessed, the affective
responses of these 15 patients to the life-threatening di-
agnosis were determined. SA for subliminal threat stim-
uli appeared to be the best predictor for the dysphoric
responses elicited by the subsequent diagnosis of cervi-
cal pathology. Contrary to the self-reporting methods that
were administered in the first assessment session (BDI;
Beck, 1967; STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970), SA predicted
not only anxiety symptoms, but also depression symptoms
as reactions to the subsequent diagnosis. These emotional
reactions were assessed by a Postdiagnostic Mood Assess-
ment Questionnaire developed by the authors. Although
this concerns a correlational study that does not bypass the
third variable problem, the study was at least prospective:
it is impossible that the subsequent anxiety and depression
caused the SA observed earlier. It may imply that the pres-
ence of SA is a vulnerability factor in stressful situations.
On the basis of the finding that SA was a better predic-
tor than the self-reporting measures, it may be advisable
to determine cognitive styles also by means of objective
Behavioral measurements instead of only using subjective
measurements.
The fact that the response to unconsciously perceived
words is a good predictor of the response to stress, was
not only observed in Australian gynaecology patients. A
highly similar effect was observed in the Netherlands (Van
Den Hout et al., 1995). In the latter case, emotional re-
sponses were not measured in a stressful situation, but
subjects were asked to imagine themselves in 15 differ-
ent stressful situations and to indicate how they would
respond. This study also showed that unconscious SA was
the best predictor of the degree of negative emotional re-
sponses to stressful situations.
A similar correlational link was recently found in
students from Singapore (MacLeod & Ng, submitted). SA
proved to be a successful predictor of negative emotional
Kindt and Van Den Hout
responses to migration to Australia for further education
(MacLeod, 1999, p. 469).
Although all three studies seem to provide some sup-
port for the hypothesis that SA is a vulnerability factor,
strictly speaking, the data do not allow for conclusions on
causation. All three studies were correlational and do not
exclude the operation of third variables: prediction does
not imply causation. Highly interesting, however, are re-
cent studies, in which for the first time the causal relation-
ship between SA and anxiety responses were experimen-
tally investigated. In the first study, SA was manipulated
by training normal subjects through the use of a modi-
fied dot-probe task (MacLeod, Ebsworthy, & Rutherford,
submitted). Each trial briefly presented a word pair, con-
taining a threat word and a nonthreat word. Following
this word pair presentation, a linear probe stimulus al-
ways appeared in one of the two screen locations, and this
line could slant either left or right. Subjects were required
to rapidly discriminate the slope of each probe. For one
group, virtually all the probes appeared in the same screen
location as the preceding threat word. These subjects were
trained to focus attention to the threatening stimuli. For
the other group, in contrast, virtually all these probes ap-
peared in the opposing screen location to that previously
occupied by the threat word, and it was intended that this
would induce attentional avoidance of the threat stimuli.
Following this attentional training procedure, all subjects
were exposed to a stress manipulation that involved their
being videotaped while completing a difficult anagram
task, under timed conditions and while receiving failure
feedback. This manipulation served to elevate dysphoric
mood state across both training groups. The crucial finding
was, however, that the magnitude of this dysphoric mood
response was attenuated for those subjects who had ex-
perienced the training procedure that induced attentional
avoidance of threat. Recently, this finding has been repli-
cated (MacLeod, 1999). Note that the emotional effect
of attention training was not visible during and immedi-
ately after the attention training, but was only observed
in a subsequent stressful situation. These studies convinc-
ingly demonstrate that SA is causally related to emotional
vulnerability.
DEVELOPMENT OF ANXIETY AND SELECTIVE
ATTENTION DURING CHILDHOOD
The question whether SA plays a role in the etiology
of anxiety disorders can also be approached from a devel-
opmental perspective. Studying the development of SA
and anxiety during childhood can provide useful informa-
tion. If SA for threatening information is already present in
Selective Attention and Anxiety
anxious children, it shouldn’t of course prove the hypoth-
esis that SA plays a pathogenic role. It would, however, at
least justify a prospective study that investigates the role
of SA in the development of anxiety disorders in adult-
hood. And if SA is not yet present in anxious children,
this would be a reason for modifying the theory.
Research among nonclinically low and high anxi-
ety children (8–9 years) in a stressful situation (prior to
vaccination) showed that the anxious children exhibited
SA for words relating to the medical situation (e.g. in-
jection, fainting; Kindt, Brosschot, & Everaerd, 1997). A
surprising finding, however, was that low anxiety children
also exhibited this SA. This result was replicated in a sec-
ond experiment, in which similar groups were selected.
This time, the SA in a neutral situation was measured.
The observation that low anxiety children also gave prior-
ity to threatening information, contradicts earlier findings
among adults and suggests a cognitive development hy-
pothesis (Kindt, Brosschot, & Everaerd, 1997). During
the development, the information-processing capacity in-
creases and cognitive skills are acquired in order to regu-
late emotional responses. A modified Stroop task may tap
the functioning of this regulating mechanism. The sub-
jects are explicitly asked to ignore the content of words.
Children, whether anxious or not, may lack the skills to
inhibit the SA for emotionally relevant information. This
lack may be due to their restricted processing capacity, or
the lack of experience with threatening stimuli.
Although the observations by Kindt et al. seem to
indicate that there is no relation between anxiety and SA
in children of 8–9 years old, Martin, Horder and Jones
(1992) observed SA in spider phobic children of 6–13
years old. Martin and Jones (1995) replicated this effect
in children aged 4–9, using a variation of the card format of
the modified Stroop task (i.e. pictorial stimuli). There are,
however, two important differences between our studies
and the ones by Martin et al. that could explain the diverg-
ing findings. First, the type of anxiety that was studied
differed between the two studies. SA appears to be a ro-
bust finding particularly in specific fears, such as phobias
(for an overview, see Williams et al., 1996). On the other
hand, SA is not always found in high anxiety persons who
do not fear specific situations (Fox, 1994; MacLeod &
Rutherford, 1992; Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991). In the
case of specific fears, the fear-inducing stimuli are unam-
biguous and hence it is easier for the researcher to present
stimuli that selectively activate the cognitive fear network.
It is therefore possible that matching the Stroop stimuli to
the fear of the subjects was more successful in the study by
Martin et al. than in the Kindt et al. study. The other differ-
ence between the two studies was that Martin et al. used
a card format, whereas Kindt et al. used a computerised
199
version, in which the stimuli were presented one by one.
In the card version, the stimuli were presented within a
context of the same emotional valence, which could rein-
force the emotional impact of the stimuli (McNally, Amir,
& Lipke, 1996). The differences between the samples and
Stroop versions only explain that, contrary to Martin et al.,
no differential effect between high and low anxiety chil-
dren was observed in the Kindt et al. study. However, they
do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the finding
that even low anxiety children show SA for threat.
Other research on SA in children also illustrated dif-
ferences between high and low anxious children. In chil-
dren and adolescents (aged 9–17) suffering from PTSD,
an anxiety-related bias was observed (Moradi, Taghavi,
Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999). In this study,
children and adolescents showed increased Stroop inter-
ference on trauma-related words. In contrast to the previ-
ous Stroop studies in children, these subjects suffered from
an anxiety disorder. Also in the laboratory of the authors, a
moderate association between spider phobia and selective
attention in children (aged 8–12) was observed, using a
Stroop task in which words were presented on colored cir-
cles (Kindt & Brosschot, 1999). Moreover, several other
studies also showed SA in anxious children (Bijttebier,
1998; Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish,
1999; Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & Brown, 1995; Vasey,
Elhag, & Daleiden, 1996). These studies did not make use
of the emotional Stroop task, but used the VDT described
earlier. Two studies found that SA was only present in the
clinically anxious children (Taghavi et al., 1999; Vasey
et al., 1995). In other studies, nonclinically test-anxious
children also exhibited SA (Vasey et al., 1996), as well
as children with a high “trait anxiety” (Bijttebier, 1998).
It should be noted that the children in these studies were
generally older than in the Kindt et al. studies, varying
from 9 to 18 years old. It must also be said that Bijttebier
only found indications for SA when the anxious children
were in stressful situations, when they were in hospital
prior to medical examination. In a neutral situation, the
low anxiety children also exhibited SA. This finding thus
partly matches the Kindt et al. findings. Hence, research on
anxiety-related bias in children do not produce unequivo-
cal observations. One explanation for the conflicting pat-
terns of results is that the children in the studies in which
an anxiety-related SA was revealed were older than in the
studies in which this relation was absent.
In order to obtain greater insight in the development
of SA in children, a follow-up study was carried out among
spider phobic children (8–12 years; Kindt, Bierman, &
Brosschot, 1997). In this study, the number of subjects was
large enough to allow for examination of age-effects. SA
was established by means of both versions of the Stroop
200
task. In line with our earlier results, SA was found both
in spider phobic and in control children, regardless of the
Stroop version. More interesting is the observation that
SA appeared to decrease in normal children as they were
older, whereas in the anxious group SA maintained with
age. This result need not be inconsistent with the obser-
vations by, for instance, Vasey et al. (1996) in nonclin-
ically anxious individuals in the age group between 11
and 14. Kindt et al. found that SA in the spider phobic
group maintained with age (8–12 years), whereas it de-
creased in the control group. This result has recently been
replicated in children of 8–11 years old (Kindt, Van Den
Hout, de Jong, & Hoekstra, 2000). In the light of these
results, it must be doubted whether SA is properly re-
lated to the development of anxiety disorders. SA in itself
may not be a risk factor, but that inadequate inhibiting of
SA puts one at risk. In other words inhibiting SA must
be learnt. Anxious adults could be characterized by in-
adequate cognitive control when confronted with threat-
ening information. They may be unable to suppress the
tendency to give priority to threatening information, even
though they are required to do so. A study by MacLeod
and Mathews (1991b) did indeed find that anxiety only
leads to SA when the subject is confronted with two si-
multaneous stimuli and priority had to be given to one
stimulus while the other stimulus had to be ignored. When
the subjects received single stimuli, no effect of anxiety
was observed. According to these authors, the cognitive
effect of anxiety may best be described as a priority for
the processing of certain stimuli. Because of the limited
processing capacity, this has a negative effect on the pro-
cessing of other information. According to development
psychologists, (Flavell, 1985) the processing capacity in
children is smaller than in adults. Hence our findings that
SA is equal in low anxiety children and in high anxiety
children, could be the result of an age-related lack of cog-
nitive capacity. This explanation of the results is also in line
with the general emotion theories, which state that emo-
tions primarily affect the control over cognitive processes
(Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; MacLeod & Mathews,
1991b).
It is not possible yet to draw an unequivocal picture
of the findings in the field of SA in children. However, the
fact that the results are not unequivocal at least justifies
the conclusion that, if there is any relationship between
anxiety and SA in children, this relationship is a weak
one, in particular among nonclinically anxious children of
8–10 years old. It is therefore contrary to the hypothesis
that SA plays a causal role in the etiology of anxiety dis-
orders. Our results suggest that if SA plays any role at all
in the development of anxiety disorders, it is not the SA
in itself that is a vulnerability factor, but the continuation
Kindt and Van Den Hout
of this SA. Individuals who develop an anxiety disorder
could have difficulty learning to inhibit this SA.
CONCLUSION
In the past two decades, dozens of studies have been
carried out on the relationship between SA and anxiety.
The presence of such an association is a robust finding.
The rationale of these studies was that SA plays a role in
the maintenance and etiology of anxiety disorders. The
question addressed in this paper was to what extent this
supposition is justified. Research shows that when individ-
uals are anxious, they show more attention toward threat.
However, this does not apply to everyone. Only people
with a general tendency toward anxiety exhibit this so-
called attention priority. SA in turn a reinforcing effect on
the anxiety level. There is some evidence that suggests a
reciprocal relationship between anxiety and SA: anxiety
reinforces SA and SA reinforces anxiety. Hence the as-
sertion that SA plays a role in the maintenance of anxiety
disorder seems to be justified.
Studies among children, however, casts doubt upon
the assumption that SA in itself (i.e. as separate from in-
hibition) is responsible for the development of anxiety
disorders. The fact that all young children give priority
to threatening information illustrates that SA is first and
foremost a normal phenomenon. As age increases, SA de-
creases among nonanxious children, whereas it maintains
among anxious ones. The authors suggest that normal chil-
dren learn to inhibit SA. Anxious children, on the other
hand, would not learn to inhibit SA. The observation that
SA decreases with age in normal children and increases
in anxious children is compatible with two explanations:
(1) that SA is an epiphenomenon of anxiety and (2) that
not learning to inhibit SA is a vulnerability factor. Con-
sidering the finding that SA has a reinforcing effect on
the anxiety level, the authors suggest that anxiety in child-
hood → not learning to inhibit SA → anxiety disorder in
adulthood. This may imply that SA indirectly plays a role
in the etiology of anxiety disorders.
Cognitive research on anxiety has provided useful
knowledge on a variety of dysfunctional aspects of SA.
The insights would not have been gained if researchers
had solely relied on introspective measuring methods. In
several aspects, there appears to be a clear differentia-
tion between results obtained with information-processing
procedures and the results obtained with subjective anxi-
ety measurements. Self-report measures of anxiety do not
always concur with observations of SA. That is, absence
of self-reported fear may concur with observed SA in chil-
dren. And the presence of self-reported fear may concur
Selective Attention and Anxiety
with the absence of SA in nonclinically anxious individu-
als. Furthermore, SA may under certain circumstances be a
better predictor of emotional responses than the self-report
measurements. Thus, the use of information-processing
paradigms seems to be a fruitful addition to the self-report
measurements in order to gain insights in the pathologic
mechanisms of anxiety disorders. Hardly any research has
been done on the practical/clinical usefulness of tests for
SA. This is undeserved and such research may be highly
promising.
REFERENCES
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Causes and treatment. Pennsylvania:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New
York: International University Press.
Beck, A. T., Emery, G., & Greenberg, R. L. (1986). Anxiety disorders
and phobias: A cognitive perspective. New York: Basic Books.
Bijttebier, P. (1998). Monitoring and blunting coping styles in children.
Unpublished thesis, University of Louvain, Belgium.
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36,
129–148.
Bower, G. H. (1987). Commentary on mood and memory. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 25, 443–456.
Bower, G. H., & Forgas, J. P. (2000). Affect, memory and social cogni-
tion. In E. Eich, J. F. Kihlstrom, G. H. Bower, J. P. Forgas, & P. M.
Niedenthal (Eds.), Cognition and emotion (pp. 87–168). London:
Oxford University Press.
Bradley, B. P., Mogg, K., Millar, N., & White, J. (1995). Selective pro-
cessing of negative information: Effects of clinical anxiety, concur-
rent depression, and awareness. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
104, 532–536.
Broadbent, D. E., & Broadbent, M. (1988). Anxiety and attentional bias:
State and trait. Cognition and Emotion, 2, 165-183.
Cohen, J. D., Dunbar, K., & McClelland, J. L. (1990). On the control of
automatic processes: A parallel distributed processing account of
the Stroop effect. Psychological Review, 97, 332–361.
Driver, J., & Tipper, S. P. (1989). On the nonselectivity of selective
seeing: Contrasts between interference and priming in selective at-
tention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance, 15, 304–314.
Flavell, J. H. (1985). Cognitive development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Foa, E. B., Ilai, D., McCarthy, P. R., Shoyer, B., Murdock, T. (1993). In-
formation processing in obsessive–compulsive disorder. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 17, 173–189.
Fox, E. (1994). Attentional bias in anxiety: A defective inhibition hy-
pothesis. Cognition and Emotion, 8, 165–195.
Geller, V., & Shaver, P. (1976). Cognitive consequences of self-
awareness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12, 99–
108.
Holender, D. (1986). Semantic activation without conscious identifica-
tion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 1–66.
Hope, D. A., Rapee, R. M., Heimberg, R. G., & Dombeck, M. J. (1990).
Representations of the self in social phobia: Vulnerability to social
threat. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14, 177–189.
Kindt, M., Bierman, D., & Brosschot, J. F. (1996). Stroop versus Stroop:
Comparison of a card format and a single-trial format of the standard
color–word Stroop task and the emotional Stroop task. Personality
and Individual Differences, 21, 653–661.
Kindt, M., Bierman, D., & Brosschot, J. F. (1997). Cognitive bias in spi-
der fear and control children: Assessment of emotional interference
201
by a card format and a single-trial format of the Stroop task. Journal
of Experimental Child Psychology, 66, 163–179.
Kindt, M., & Brosschot, J. F. (1997). Phobia-related cognitive bias for
pictorial and linguistic stimuli. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
106, 644–648.
Kindt, M., & Brosschot, J. F. (1999). Cognitive bias in spider-phobic
children: Comparison of a pictorial and a linguistic spider Stroop.
Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Asessment, 21, 207–
220.
Kindt, M., Brosschot, J. F. , & Everaerd, W. (1997). Cognitive processing
bias of children in a real life stress situation and a neutral situation.
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 64, 79–97.
Kindt, M., Van Den Hout, M. A, Jong, de P., & Hoekstra, B. (2000).
Cognitive bias for pictorial and linguistic threat cues in children.
Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 22, 201–
219.
Klein, G. S. (1964). Semantic power measured through the interference
of words with color naming. American Journal of Psychology, 77,
576–588.
Lang, P. J. (1977). Imagery in therapy: An information processing anal-
ysis of fear. Behavior Therapy, 8, 862–886.
Lang, P. J. (1979). A bio-informational theory of emotional imagery.
Psychophysiology, 16, 495–512.
Lavy, E., & Van Den Hout, M. (1993). Selective attention evidenced by
pictorial and linguistic Stroop tasks. Behavior Therapy, 24, 645–
657.
Lavy, E., Van Den Hout, M., & Arntz, A. (1993). Attentional bias and
spider phobia: Conceptual and clinical issues. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 31, 17–24.
Lavy, E., van Oppen, P., & Van Den Hout, M. (1994). Selective pro-
cessing of emotional information in obsessive–compulsive disorder.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 243–246.
LeDoux, J. E. (1990). Information flow from sensation to emotion: Plas-
ticity in the neural computation of stimulus value. In M. Gabriel
& J. Moore (Eds.), Learning and computational neuroscience:
Foundations of adaptive networks (pp. 3–52). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
MacLeod, C. (1991). Clinical anxiety and the selective encoding of
threatening information. International Review of Psychiatry, 3,
279–292.
MacLeod, C. (1995). The information-processing approach to emotional
pathology: Adding a cognitive core to the best of behaviourism
(Keynote). In International Conference on Cognitive and Behav-
ioral Therapy (Abstract, p. 24). Copenhagen, Denmark.
MacLeod, C. (1998). Attentional Bias and Anxiety Vulnerability. In
World Congress of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies. Acapulco,
Mexico (Abstract, p. 106).
MacLeod, C. (1999). Anxiety and anxiety disorders. In T. Dalgleish &
M. Power (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp. 447–
477). New York: Wiley.
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century of research on the Stroop effect:
An integrative review. Psychological Bulletin, 109, 163–203.
MacLeod, C. M., Ebsworthy, G., & Rutherford, E. M. Selective attention
and emotional vulnerability: Assessing the causal basis of their
association through the experimental induction of attentional bias.
Manuscript submitted for publication.
MacLeod, C., & Hagan, R. (1992). Individual differences in the selective
processing of threatening information and emotional responses to a
stressful life event. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30, 151–161.
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1988). Anxiety and the allocation of
attention to threat. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology:
A, Human Experimental Psychology, 38, 659–610.
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. M. (1991a). Cognitive-experimental ap-
proaches to the emotional disorders. In P. R. Martin (Ed.), Hand-
book of behavior therapy and psychological science: An integrative
approach (pp. 116–150). New York: Pergamon.
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1991b). Biased cognitive operations in
anxiety: Accessibility of information or assignment of processing
priorities? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 29, 599–610.
202
MacLeod, C., & Ng, V. Initial attentional bias to threat predicts later
emotional response to acculturation stress. Manuscript submitted
for publication.
MacLeod, C., & Rutherford, E. N. (1992). Anxiety and the selective
processing of threatening information: Mediating roles of aware-
ness, trait and state variables, and personal relevance of stimulus
materials. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30, 479–491.
Martin, M., Horder, P., & Jones, G. V. (1992). Integral bias in naming of
phobia-related words: Brief report. Cognition and Emotion, 6(6),
479–486.
Martin, M., & Jones, G. V. (1995). Integral bias in the cognitive process-
ing of emotionally linked pictures. British Journal of Psychology,
86, 419–435.
Martin, M., Williams, R. M., & Clark, D. M. (1991). Does anxiety lead
to selective processing of threat-related information? Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 29, 147–160.
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1985). Selective processing of threat
cues in anxiety states. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23, 563–
569.
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1986). Discrimination of threat cues with-
out awareness in anxiety states. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
95, 131–138.
Mathews, A., Mogg, K., Kentish, J., & Eysenck, M. (1995). Effect of
psychological treatment on cognitive bias in generalized anxiety
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 293–303.
Mattia, J. I., Heimberg, R. G., & Hope, D. A. (1993). The revised Stroop
color-naming task in social phobics. Behaviour Research and Ther-
apy, 31, 305–313.
McNally, R. J. (1995). Automaticity and anxiety disorders. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 33, 747–754.
McNally, R. J., Amir, N., & Lipke, H. J. (1996). Subliminal processing
of threat cues in post traumatic stress disorder? Journal of Anxiety
Disorders, 10, 115–128.
McNally, R. J., Riemann, B. C., & Kim, E. (1990). Selective processing
of threat cues in panic disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
28, 407–412.
McNally, R. J., & Steketee, G. S. (1985). The etiology and maintenance
of severe animal phobias. Behavior research and Therapy, 23, 431–
435.
Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., Millar, N., & White, J. (1995). A follow-up
study of cognitive bias in generalized anxiety disorder. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 33, 927–935.
Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., Williams, R., & Mathews, A. (1993). Sublimi-
nal processing of emotional information in anxiety and depression.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 304–311.
Mogg, K., Mathews, A., & Weinman, J. (1989). Selective processing of
threat cues in anxiety states: A replication. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 27, 317–323.
Moradi, A. R., Taghavi, M. R., Neshat Doost, H. T., Yule, W., &
Dalgleish, T. (1999). Performance of children and adolecents with
Kindt and Van Den Hout
PTSD on the Stroop color-naming task. Psychological Medicine,
29, 415–419.
Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1975). On data-limited and resource-
limited processes. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 44–64.
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1987). Toward a cognitive theory of
emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 1, 29–50.
Ray, C. (1979). Examination stress and performance on a color word
interference test. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 49, 400–402.
Riemann, B., & McNally, R. J. (1995). Cognitive processing of person-
ally relevant information. Cognition and Emotion, 9, 325–340.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., & Lushene, R. E. (1970). Manual
for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting
Psychologists Press.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 225, 643–662.
Thrasher, S. M., Dalgleish, T., Yule, W. (1994). Information processing
in posttraumatic stress disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
32, 247–254.
Taghavi, M. R., Neshat-Doost, H. T., Moradi, A. R., Yule, W., &
Dalgleish, T. (1999). Biases in visual attention in children and adole-
cents with clinical anxiety and mixed anxiety-depression. Journal
of Abnormal Child Psychology, 27, 215–223.
Van Den Hout, M. A., Tenney, N., Huygens, K., Merckelbach, H., &
Kindt, M. (1995). Responding to subliminal threat cues is related
to trait anxiety and emotional vulnerability: A successful replication
of MacLeod and Hagan (1992). Behaviour Research and Therapy,
33, 451–454.
Van Den Hout, M. A., Tenney, N., Huygens, K., & de Jong, P. J. (1997).
Preconscious procesing bias in specific phobia. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 35, 29–34.
Vasey, M. W., Daleiden, E. L., Williams, L. L., & Brown, L. (1995). Bi-
ased attention in childhood anxiety disorders: A preliminary study.
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 23, 267–279.
Vasey, M. W., Elhag, N., Daleiden, E. (1996). Anxiety and the processing
of emotionally-threatening stimuli: Distinctive patterns of selective
attention among high-and low-test-anxious children. Child Devel-
opment, 67, 1173–1185.
Warren, R. E. (1972). Stimulus encoding and memory. Journal of Ex-
perimental Psychology, 94, 90–100.
Warren, R. E. (1974). Association, directionality and stimulus encoding.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 102, 151–158.
Watts, F. N., McKenna, F. P., Sharrock, R., & Trezise, L. (1986). Color
naming of phobia-related words. British Journal of Psychology, 77,
97–108.
Williams, J. M. G., Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1996). The emotional
Stroop task and psychopathology. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 3–
24.
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1997).
Cognitive psychology and the emotional disorders. Chichester, NY:
Wiley.