RF Emergency Egress in Rail Tunnels

Review of Emergency Egress
and Rescue Challenges in Rail

Tunnels
Final Report by:
Hubert Biteau, PhD, P.E., CFEI

Josh Donovan
Andrew Went
Andrew Biery, P.E.
Austin Smith
Nate Birmingham, P.E.
Code Red Consultants
Southborough, MA (USA)
January 2024
© 2024 Fire Protection Research Foundation

1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169 | Web: www.nfpa.org/foundation | Email: foundation@nfpa.org
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Foreword
The Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, NFPA 130, specifies fire protection
and life safety requirements for underground, surface, and elevated fixed guideway transit and passenger
rail systems. The current language lacks technical substantiation for distances to point of safety for both 244
m (800 ft) spacing between cross passages, and 762 m (2500 ft) between exits to the surface. Cross
passages are tunnels that are constructed between twin tunnel bores in rail and road tunnels to provide
alternative means of egress or for operational maintenance purposes. Additionally, the minimum 610 mm
(24 in.) emergency walkway widths in NFPA 130 are based upon outdated research, which does not
accurately reflect current anthropometric data and limits evacuation to a single file. Narrow walkway widths
and long distances to exit increases egress time, which in some incidents, can increase exposure of
passengers to greater levels of heat and toxic gases, which hinder self-evacuation and endanger lives. These
conditions present greater challenges to safe evacuation compared to the experience in other public
structures. Additionally, the ability of emergency responders to perform rescues in smoke at the 2,500-ft
spacing is severely challenging, if not impossible, as their air supply is inadequate to reach evacuees, assist
them and return to safety.
The goal of this research is to establish a comprehensive understanding of the impact of changing criteria for
both exit distances and walkway widths on the probability of egress in rail tunnels, as well as the impact on
emergency response capabilities. This project included a literature review, case study analysis, modeling,
comparative analysis, gap analysis and the development of a research plan to achieve the research goal.
The Fire Protection Research Foundation expresses gratitude to the report authors Hubert Biteau, Josh
Donovan, Andrew Went, Andrew Biery, Austin Smith and Nate Birmingham, who are with Code Red
Consultants located in Southborough, MA. The Research Foundation appreciates the guidance provided by
the Project Technical Panelists, and all others that contributed to this research effort. Thanks are also
expressed to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) for providing the project funding through the
NFPA Annual Research Fund.
The content, opinions and conclusions contained in this report are solely those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Fire Protection Research Foundation, NFPA, Technical Panel or
Sponsors. The Foundation makes no guaranty or warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of any
information published herein.
About the Fire Protection Research Foundation
The Fire Protection Research Foundation plans, manages,

and communicates research on a broad range of fire
safety issues in collaboration with scientists and
laboratories around the world. The Foundation is an affiliate of NFPA.
About the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
—— Page iii ——
Founded in 1896, NFPA is a global, nonprofit organization devoted to eliminating death,
injury, property and economic loss due to fire, electrical and related hazards. The
association delivers information and knowledge through more than 300 consensus
codes and standards, research, training, education, outreach and advocacy; and by
partnering with others who share an interest in furthering the NFPA mission.
All NFPA codes and standards can be viewed online for free.
NFPA's membership totals more than 65,000 individuals around the world.
Keywords: challenges, egress, elevated, emergency, fire protection, fixed, fixed guideway, life
safety, NFPA 130, passenger rail, rail, rail systems, requirements, rescue, standard, surface,
transit, tunnels, underground
Report number: FPRF-2024-01
Project Manager: Jacqueline R. Wilmot, P.E.
—— Page iv ——
Project Technical Panel
Jarrod Alston, Arup, (New York City, NY)

Kevin Carr, NFPA (Quincy, MA)
James Convery, Amtrack (Philadelphia, PA)
Jason Eng, Bay Area Rapid Transit District (Oakland, CA)
Gary English, Underground Command and Safety (Seattle, WA)
Katherine Fagerlund, EKF Consulting (North Vancouver, BC, Canada)
Steve Kaitharath, NFPA (Quincy, MA)
Bernard Kennedy, US DOT (Cambridge, MA)
Max Lakkonen, Institute for Applied Fire Safety Research (Berlin, Germany)
Willard Lam, Bay Area Rapid Transit District, (Oakland, CA)
Enrico Ronchi, Lund university (Lund, Sweeden)
William Ventura, FDNY (New York City, NY)
Juliet Shoultz, U.S. Access Board (Washington D.C.)
Project Sponsors
—— Page v ——
Review of Emergency Egress and Rescue Challenges in Rail Tunnels
Final Report
Prepared for:
Fire Protection Research Foundation
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, Massachusetts
USA 02169-7471
Prepared by:
Hubert Biteau, PhD, P.E., CFEI
Josh Donovan
Andrew Went
Andrew Biery, P.E.
Austin Smith
Nate Birmingham, P.E.
February 8, 2024
© 2023 Code Red Consultants, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

410BFebruary 8, 2024
Project #: 231479
Executive Summary
NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passengers Rail Systems, provides life safety
and fire protection requirements for fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems, including
rail tunnels. The 2023 edition of NFPA 130 requires not more than 762 m (2,500 ft) between exits or
not more than 244 m (800 ft) between cross-passageways when used as egress routes. The basis of
these distance values is unclear and currently lacks relevant scientific validation. In addition, means
of egress within trainways must supply an unobstructed clear width of at least 610 mm (24 in.) at the
walking surface. This distance value originates from minimum means of egress widths listed in
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, assuming single file movement and may not properly address
emergency egress in rail tunnels for today’s population. Extended distances and constricted
trainway clear widths increase egress times leading to extended exposures to heat, smoke, and toxic
gases for the passengers as well as greater rescue challenges for fire services. Means of egress within
trainways are not designed for shared bi-directional movement hindering the ability of emergency
responders to reach evacuees, perform rescues, and mitigate the fire.
The aim of the overall research project is to evaluate the consequences on available egress time and
emergency response capabilities of new criteria for both distances between exits and means of egress
widths in rail tunnels. A literature review and case studies were used as the foundation to define
representative fire and egress scenarios in rail tunnels. The U.S. population physical and health
characteristics were reviewed for a period extending form the year 2000 to the year 2018. Fire and
egress models were developed and executed to evaluate the impact on egress times of:
• Over time changes of population characteristics

• Means of egress changes (i.e. increase of egress walkway width, reduction of exit spacing)
• Emergency responders counterflow during occupants’ egress
• Uni-directional egress
Population Characteristics
The proportion of elderly and obese within the U.S. population has increased over time. Results show
that for the defined fire scenarios, changes in population characteristics affect the egress time for large
occupant loads (2,000 persons) by up to 17%.
Means of Egress Changes
While reduction in egress time is limited for train systems with lower occupant loads (896 persons)
when the egress walkway width is increased and/or the exit spacing is reduced compared to current
NFPA 130 prescriptions, it becomes more significant (28% to 59% reduction in egress time for the
scenarios considered) when new egress means criteria are applied to train systems with large
occupant loads (2,000 persons). Congestion is observed by the railcar doors. Changes to the egress
means criteria allows for steadier occupants’ flow rates through the railcar doors as well as through
exit doors.
A critical challenge to achieve a successful egress is to adequately combine the ventilation and egress
strategies. Longitudinal ventilation was used for each fire scenario and tenability conditions were
compromised downstream of the fire before egress completed despite the change in egress means
criteria.
Emergency Responders Counterflow
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The actual NFPA 130 minimum requirement for egress walkway width does not allow for double file
movement. The egress modeling indicates that the egress time can be more than doubled if emergency
responders use the same egress walkway as the train occupants during evacuation. Egress time is
reduced when the egress walkway width is increased to 914 mm (36 in.) but conditions downstream
of the fire may be untenable before egress is completed.
Uni-directional Egress
Uni-directional egress happens when an exit or the walkway is blocked. Egress modeling indicates
that the egress time can be doubled under this scenario. The limitations of the egress walkway and
exit capacity impact the flow of occupants who may come to a complete stop when the incident train
carries large occupant loads.
Gap analysis
Over the span of the project, three (3) areas where additional research is needed have been identified:
1. Models Limitations
Additional research is needed to adequately characterize current tunnel geometries, train
characteristics, and occupant loads. In addition, developing representative physical and
health characteristics for train occupants, including occupants with impaired mobility, is a
topic that remains to be addressed.
2. Egress Gaps
The origin of the current NFPA 130 exit spacing requirements and their substantiations are
unknown. Their limits are highlighted by egress scenarios where access to the egress walkway
needs to be shared by train occupants and first responders as well as where occupants with
restricted mobility are present. A holistic approach needs to be developed to provide guidance
on the appropriate design of egress walkway widths and exit spacing by considering tunnels,
rail systems, and occupants characteristics as well as emergency ventilation strategies.
Additional research needs to be conducted to assess the impact from each of these input to the
overall egress design. To address the challenge of egress for occupants with restricted
mobility, the inclusion ADA standard requirements NFPA 130 egress means requirements
should be evaluated. Finally, occupant’s survivability profiles should be developed for fire in
rail tunnels to better define tenability criteria.
3. Fire Department Response Gaps
Although fire services have developed standard operating procedures and guidelines for fire
events in rail tunnels, there is a lack of emergency responders experience with NFPA 130
compliant tunnels due to the age of most rail tunnels in the U.S. A critical challenge faced by
emergency responders is related to the limitations of current breathing and protective
equipment to allow for extended work time during a fire event. Furthermore, each firefighter
is unique with their own physiology, complicating the ability to reliably estimate how long air
supply may last during operations. Firefighters’ capabilities are dependent on the
environmental conditions inside the rail tunnels. Tenability inside a rail tunnel can be
extended with adequate ventilation equipment and strategies. The case studies reviewed in
this research reinforce the need for periodic maintenance and testing of life safety equipment,
including ventilation. Proposals should be created to amend NFPA 130 to determine
appropriate scheduled maintenance and testing requirements for ventilation systems in rail
tunnels.
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
Literature Review .............................................................................................................................................. 7
Tunnel Trainway Design Strategies and Components for Emergency Evacuation ............................. 7
Egress Means Codes and Standards Provisions ...................................................................................... 18
Firefighting and Rescue Operations Guidance and Standard Practices .............................................. 36
Emergency Responders Support Technology.......................................................................................... 40
Case Studies ...................................................................................................................................................... 41
BART Transbay Tube Fire (January 1979) ................................................................................................ 41
Channel Tunnel Fires (1996, and 2008) ..................................................................................................... 46
WMATA L’Enfant Plaza Station Smoke Accident (January 2015)........................................................ 57
Chicago Transit Authority Train No. 220 Derailment (July 2006) ...................................................... 61
NFPA 130 Compliance Analysis ................................................................................................................ 65
Egress and Firefighting Key Aspects ........................................................................................................ 65
Modeling Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 67
Modeling Platform....................................................................................................................................... 67
Performance Criteria ................................................................................................................................... 67
Egress Scenario Background .......................................................................................................................... 68
Population Changes .................................................................................................................................... 68
Comparison to Tenability Criteria............................................................................................................. 71
Egress Scenarios ............................................................................................................................................... 71
Population Characteristic Scenarios .......................................................................................................... 71
Tenability Criteria Scenarios ...................................................................................................................... 74
Egress Modeling Summary ........................................................................................................................ 76
Fire Modeling Scenarios.................................................................................................................................. 78
Background ................................................................................................................................................... 78
Fire Modeling Scenario 1: Intercity or Commuter Rail Car Tunnel ..................................................... 78
Fire Modeling Scenario 2: Rapid Transit Car ........................................................................................... 86
Fire Modeling Scenario 3: Electrical Fire .................................................................................................. 88
Tunnel Construction and Dimensions ...................................................................................................... 89
Ventilation..................................................................................................................................................... 90
Fire Modeling Scenario Summary ............................................................................................................. 92
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Mesh Resolution and Models Parameters ................................................................................................ 93
Fire Modeling Results ..................................................................................................................................... 94
Times to Exceed Tenability Criteria .......................................................................................................... 94
Egress Modeling Results ................................................................................................................................. 96
Impact of Population Characteristics (EM1A/B through EM3A/B) .................................................... 96
Impact of Egress Means (EM3A/B through EM6A/B) ........................................................................ 100
Impact of Emergency Responders Counterflow (EM7A/B)................................................................ 106
Impact of Unidirectional Egress (EM8A/B)........................................................................................... 110
Analysis of the 2,500 ft Exit Spacing Impact on Egress Time .............................................................. 113
Comparative Analysis and Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................... 115
Population Characteristics ........................................................................................................................ 115
Means of Egress.......................................................................................................................................... 116
Emergency Responders Counterflow ..................................................................................................... 117
Unidirectional Egress ................................................................................................................................ 118
Gap Analysis................................................................................................................................................... 119
Model Limitations...................................................................................................................................... 119
Egress Gaps................................................................................................................................................. 122
Fire-Department Response Gaps ............................................................................................................. 123
Appendix A: Fire Modeling Results............................................................................................................ 126
FM1A Single Intercity Rail Car Mid-Train 16 MW Fire ....................................................................... 126
FM1B Single Intercity Rail Car Mid-Train 55 MW Fire ........................................................................ 138
FM2A Single Rapid Transit Rail Car Mid-Train 55 MW Fire .............................................................. 151
FM2B Single Rapid Transit Rail Car Mid-Train 16 MW Fire ............................................................... 168
FM2C Single Rapid Transit Rail Car End-Train 55 MW Fire............................................................... 180
FM3 Electrical Fire ..................................................................................................................................... 193
Appendix B: Occupants Flow Rate Through Rail and Exit Doors .......................................................... 209
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Introduction
NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passengers Rail Systems, provides life safety
and fire protection requirements for fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems, including
rail tunnels. The 2023 edition of NFPA 130 requires not more than 762 m (2,500 ft) between exits or
not more than 244 m (800 ft) between cross-passageways when used as egress routes. The basis of
these distance values is unclear and currently lacks relevant scientific validation. In addition, means
of egress within trainways must supply an unobstructed clear width of at least 610 mm (24 in.) at the
walking surface. This distance value originates from minimum means of egress widths listed in
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code 1, assuming single file movement and may not properly address
emergency egress in rail tunnels for today’s population. Extended distances and constricted
trainway clear widths increase egress times leading to extended exposures to heat, smoke, and toxic
gases for the passengers as well as greater rescue challenges for fire services. Means of egress within
trainways are not designed for shared bi-directional movement hindering the ability of emergency
responders to reach evacuees, perform rescues, and mitigate the fire.
The aim of the overall research project is to evaluate the consequences on available egress time and
emergency response capabilities of new criteria for both distances between exits and means of egress
widths in rail tunnels.
Task 1 provides an extensive review of available literature related to the design of emergency
components and egress and rescue strategies in rail tunnels, existing codes and standards pertaining
to fire and life safety in rail tunnels, as well as the best practices associated with firefighting and
emergency rescue operations in tunnels. Task 2 presents five (5) case studies of fire incidents that
occurred in rail tunnels where passengers’ evacuation, and rescue, and firefighting operations were
conducted. Analysis of the case studies will provide information related to tunnel geometry, life
safety and fire protection systems characteristics, evacuation, and firefighting strategies and
challenges, as well as event outcome. Task 3 presents the fire and egress modeling analyses and
includes the following actions:
• Task 3.1: Specify the evacuation platform used to simulate passenger evacuation from a rail
tunnel and establish performance criteria to evaluate the model results
• Task 3.2: Define representative fire scenarios and rail tunnel designs for the modeling
analysis.
• Task 3.3: Develop modeling plan to evaluate the impact of egress design in rail tunnels.
• Task 3.4: Implement the modeling plan defined in 3.3.
• Task 3.5: Analyze the modeling results using the performance criteria developed in 3.1.
A comparative analysis is presented in Task 4. It evaluates the impact of occupant’s physical
characteristics, means of egress clear width, distance between exits to the surface and spacing
between cross-passageways on the likelihood of safe egress. Finally, Task 5 provides a non-
exhaustive list of knowledge gaps related to egress analyses and emergency response in rail tunnels
identified during the study as well as recommendations \on how they could potentially be
addressed.
1 Section 7.2.1.2.3.2 (2), NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2024 edition.
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Literature Review
Tunnel Trainway Design Strategies and Components for Emergency Evacuation
Rail tunnels offer unique fire safety challenges. Their location and geometry limit the amount of
egress/access paths resulting in greater escape distances than what is required for buildings. While
egress requirements in buildings vary with occupant load, egress requirements in rail tunnels are
independent of the number of occupants in the train. In the event there is a fire within a rail tunnel,
standard emergency operating procedures typically recommend moving the train either to the nearest
accessible station or out of the tunnel entirely. This allows passengers and crew to evacuate more
efficiently and provides better access for emergency response teams. When the consequences of a fire
incident (poor visibility, extreme heat, system failure, etc.) are such that they require or cause the train
to stop inside a rail tunnel, a protected route offering tenable conditions needs to be available to
evacuate passengers, train/railway crew and to provide access to emergency responders.2 A
protected route supporting emergency evacuation is a critical aspect of a rail tunnels fire safety design.
Nevertheless, a protected route is not always feasible depending on the ventilation strategy, the size
and location of the fire.
The protected route consists of emergency support systems directly integrated to the design and
construction of rail tunnels. Its design relies on a thorough understanding of potential ignition and
fuel sources, the systems likely to be involved, human behavior in fire emergencies, firefighting tactics
and probable fire propagation patterns. 3
Typical emergency components include:
• Egress Walkways
• Emergency exits and Cross-Passageways
• Fire Resistance Rated Construction
• Portals
• Emergency Ventilation
• Water Supply
• Fire Protection Doors
• Emergency Lighting and Signage
• Emergency Communication Systems
• Fire Detection Systems
These components need to be carefully integrated with each other to achieve a level of safety necessary
to allow the safe evacuation of all passengers and train/railway crew while at the same time
supporting effective access for emergency responders.
Passengers and train crew should be able to safely disembark the train to an egress walkway leading
to either a surface exit, an adjacent station, or a cross-passageway. The tunnel’s emergency
components need to be designed to maintain tenable conditions along the path of egress for the
duration needed for the safe evacuation of all passengers and train/railway crew in the event of a fire.
2 BS 9999:2020, Fire Safety in the Design, Management, and Use of Rail Infrastructure – Code of Practice, Section 6, Tunnels and Viaducts.
3 BS 9999:2020, Fire Safety in the Design, Management, and Use of Rail Infrastructure – Code of Practice, Section 1, General.
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Egress Walkways 4
Obstruction-free walkways allow passengers, employees, and emergency responders to egress or

access the area of a tunnel in which there is an incident. The design of the egress walkways should
be commensurate with the layout of the tunnel infrastructure and the rail system. Access to a
walkway is usually expected from each track of a rail tunnel. Different configurations exist 5 and are
often constructed:
• On at least one side in a single-track tunnel tube

• On both sides of the tunnel.
• In-between each track for multiple-track tunnel tubes
Irrespective of the location of egress walkways, additional walkways can be provided and reserved
for emergency responders’ access6. Although such approach could improve egress and emergency
could improve egress and emergency operations, it would add a significant cost to the tunnel
construction. In addition to the number of egress walkways, the other critical design parameters
governing the flow rate of evacuating passengers and crew are:
• Clear width
• Clear height
• Continuity of the path
• Presence of constrictions
• Accessibility for Persons with Restricted Mobility (PRM)
Handrails are usually required along egress walkways for guidance and support.
Emergency Exits and Cross-Passageways
The most common solutions to access points of safety 7 are:

• Lateral and/or vertical emergency exits to the surface.
• Cross-passageways 8 between adjacent independent tunnel tubes.
• Portals.
Emergency exits to the surface, portals, and Cross-passageways offer self-rescue and protection
functions for escaping persons but also provide support and emergency access points from a safe
environment to emergency responders. The ITA-Committee in Operational Safety of Underground
Facilities (COSUF) indicates that cross-passageways, because of their limited space, are generally not
considered as a location of ultimate safety where passengers and train/railway crew can shelter but
rather a place of transit connecting to safe places. 9
4 In the present study, egress walkway refers to a walk surface located along the trainway and used asa means of egress in the vent of an
evacuation.
5 COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1303/2014 of 18 November 2014, section 4.2.1.6.
6 BS 9999:2020, Fire Safety in the Design, Management, and Use of Rail Infrastructure – Code of Practice, Section 28.2, Tunnel and viaduct
walkways.
7 NFPA 130, 2023 Edition, Section 3.3.42, “An enclosed exit that leads to a public way or safe location outside the structure, an at-grade point beyond
any enclosing structure, or other area that affords adequate protection for evacuating passengers.”
8 A Cross-passage is a connection between tunnel tubes, providing a safe separation between an incident tube and a non-incident tube.
9 ITA-COSUF – Regulations, Guidelines, and Best Practice, Current Practice on Cross-Passage Design to Support Safety in Rail and Metro
Tunnels, section 6.5, p. 10.
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The critical parameters affecting passengers and train/railway crew evacuation flow related to
emergency exits and cross-passageways are:9
• Railcar configuration (i.e. number and spacing of doors. Single or multiple compartments).
• Access dimensions (door clear width and clear height), types and characteristics (fire
resistance).
• Dimensions of emergency exits/cross-passageways and construction characteristics such as
fire resistance.
• Location and distance between emergency exits/portals/cross-passageways.
• Lighting and signage
• Communication systems
• Accessibility for PRM
• Fire detection
• Ventilation
The distance between emergency exits/cross-passageways needs to be contingent upon the estimated
potential occupancy during a fire incident, the dimensions of the egress walkways, and a
representative egress speed of the persons evacuating taking into account PRM.
The size of the escape route in the emergency exits and cross-passageways are essential components
of the egress and emergency responders’ access strategies. It should be harmonized with the expected
train occupant load and the capacity of the egress walkways. The dimensions of emergency
exists/cross-passageways depend on factors such as the expected number of escaping persons in case
of a fire incident, the planned sequence of evacuation, including area needed for emergency
responders and technical components installed. Geological conditions and cost also need to be
considered when developing the egress components of a rail tunnel.10 Figure 1 provides an example
of a rail tunnel cross-passageway arrangement. Figure 1 is not representative of all cross-passageways
whose dimensions and geometry vary considerably based on an expected occupant load in the case
of egress.
Tunnels, section 7.2, p. 14.
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(A)Example of Cross-passageway footprint
Components:
1. Cable and installation compartment
2. Technical compartment
3. Escape area
4. Rescue area (fire and medical support)
5. Ventilation
(B)Example of Cross-passageway vertical arrangement.

FIGURE 1 (A) CROSS-PASSAGEWAY EXAMPLE FOOTPRINT. (B) CROSS-PASSAGEWAY EXAMPLE OF
ARRANGEMENT (FROM REFERENCE 10)
Fire Resistance
The fire resistance of the tunnel structure and emergency components must guarantee the reliability
and the integrity of the structure over a certain defined time. A minimum of 2-hour fire resistance
rating is usually provided for the tunnel lining and supporting elements of the structure. 11 Fire
resistance is influenced by fuel load and structure geometry. Standards, Guidelines, and Best Practice
often rely on standard time-temperature curves (ISO 834-1, EUREKA, ASTM E119, UL 263) to
determine the fire resistance rating of construction assemblies like walls and components like doors.
Although the integrity of non-structural components is not required to prevent a tunnel collapse, these
elements are part of supporting systems whose proper operation is paramount during a fire incident.
Materials with specific fire resistance are generally required for emergency components such as fire
doors separating trainway to emergency exits/cross-passageways, fire detection, fire suppression,
communication, and electrical systems.
11 Rakoczy, A., Wilk, S., Jones, M., Research Report and Findings: Specifications and Guidelines for Rail Tunnel Design, Construction,
Maintenance, and Rehabilitation, FTA Report No. 0231, 2022, Section 3, p. 39.
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Emergency Ventilation
A successful emergency evacuation during a fire event depends on the intricate and timely integration
of all emergency components from the appropriate sizing of the egress path to the ability to guarantee
tenable conditions along this egress path for the duration of the evacuation. Ventilation is an essential
element of the emergency strategy of a rail tunnel. Heat, smoke and toxic gases released by a fire
affect the tenability of the surrounding environment. Ventilation is necessary to maintain tenable
conditions within the incident tunnel and facilitate rescue and firefighting operations.
Multiple types of ventilation systems exist and include natural, longitudinal, semi-transverse, and
full-transverse systems. Their effectiveness is intertwined with tunnel characteristics, such as
geometry and length and is discussed in the following sections 12.
Natural ventilation
Natural ventilation systems rely on the pressure differential created by the moving vehicles inside the
tunnel, the meteorological conditions (wind, temperature), and difference in elevations. In order for
natural ventilation to be effective, the pressure difference must be larger than the tunnel resistance,
which is a function of the tunnel length, cross-section area, wall roughness, air density and volume
occupied by the moving vehicles. The performance of natural ventilation systems is highly influenced
by environmental conditions. Such design is considered adequate for short tunnels with limited
traffic.
The 2023 edition of NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems (NFPA
130) does not require mechanical ventilation for a rail tunnel length shorter than 200 ft (61 m) 13 and
BS 9992 recommends relying on an engineering analysis demonstrating a natural ventilation system
would be able to maintain tenable conditions for the duration of the evacuation to validate the use of
such system 14.
Longitudinal ventilation
A longitudinal ventilation system creates a longitudinal airflow along the rail tunnel from one portal
to another by injecting air or extracting smoke and gases at a limited number of points. Ventilation is
achieved using air entrainment by supply shafts, by jet fans, sacardo nozzles, or by a combination of
injection/exhaust shafts and jet fans (see Figure 2).
(A)
12 KASHEF, A., Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering, Chapter 17, Fire and Smoke Control in Transport Tunnels, 2012.
13 NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, 2023 Edition. Section 7.1.2.3.
14 BS 9999:2020, Fire Safety in the Design, Management, and Use of Rail Infrastructure – Code of Practice, Section 27, Ventilation and Smoke
Control Systems.
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(B)
(C)
FIGURE 2. LONGITUDINAL VENTILATION SYSTEMS, (A) WITH SUPPLY SHAFT, (B) WITH JET FANS, (C) WITH A
COMBINATION OF SHAFTS AND JET FANS.
Longitudinal ventilation systems are effective in controlling smoke movement in unidirectional rail
tunnels. In the event of a fire within a unidirectional tunnel, one single train is usually assumed to be
involved in the incident. The emergency ventilation should be operated to provide airflow in the
direction opposite to the egress direction. The system must generate sufficient longitudinal air
velocity, called critical velocity, to prevent backlayering of smoke and hot gases 15. Challenges arise
when the fire location is defined as a mid-train fire. A mid-train fire is usually defined as a fire that
separates the passengers/train crew population into two different evacuation groups. Any fire
located between the two end-cars constitutes a mid-train fire. 16 Under such situation, and if the fire
grows beyond itsi incipient stage, it is likely that two egress paths, in opposite direction, will be
necessary as the fire will likely prevent a unidirectional egress. Unless the ventilation system was
designed to confine smoke flow within the car area, a sequential evacuation strategy may be required
with an appropriate emergency ventilation strategy. Depending on the information available on the
fire location, fire size, tenability inside railcars, the egress strategy could consider activating the only
after the complete evacuation of the first group, promoting smoke stratification, or reversing the initial
airflow used to protect the first group evacuation from smoke and hot gases to allow for the
evacuation of the second group.
For multi-track tunnels, longitudinal ventilation might not be appropriate as trains circulate along the
tunnel in upstream and downstream directions. Alternative measures should be provided, which
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
15 Backlayering is a phenomenon in which the hot smoke layer moves in the opposite direction of the intended ventilation airflow, creating
an environment potentially unsafe for the persons evacuating the tunnel as well as for emergency responders. [Klote, J., H., Milke, J., A.,
Turnbull, P., G., Kashef, A., Ferreira, M., J., Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering, 2012, p. 354.]
16 Colino, M., P., Rosenstein, E., B., Tunnel Emergency Egress and the Mid-Train Fire, ASHRAE Transactions, Volume 112, Part 2, pp. 251 –
265, 2006.
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Semi-transverse
Semi-transverse systems consist either of supply systems or exhaust systems (see Figure 3). This
ventilation method injects or collects air uniformly along the rail tunnel in ventilation ducts fitted with
supply outlets or exhaust inlets located at predefined distances. Semi-transverse ventilation is usually
used in tunnels with a length up to 6,600 ft (2,000 m). Beyond that length, equipment is not able to
provide the required air velocity for injection or extraction.
(A)
(B)
FIGURE 3. SEMI-TRANSVERSE VENTILATION SYSTEMS. (A) SUPPLY SYSTEM. (B) EXHAUST SYSTEM.
During a fire emergency, the ventilation system supplies fresh air to the tunnel to dilute the smoke
(supply system) or it removes the vitiated air, smoke, and hot gases from the tunnel space (exhaust
system). As the situation evolves, the ventilation system pushes the smoke and hot gases through
ceiling exhaust/dampers to create tenable conditions along the trainway allowing for evacuation and
firefighting.
Full-transverse
Full-transverse ventilation systems are usually recommended for long tunnels, beyond 6,600 ft (2,000
m) in length and are applicable to bi-directional rail tunnels. 17 They are balanced systems and
integrate both, supply and exhaust ducts to achieve a uniform injection of fresh air and extraction of
vitiated air throughout the tunnel length (see Figure 4). The goal of these systems is to maintain
smoke stratification to a level where relatively clear and breathable air is available below the smoke
layer while smoke is extracted through exhaust openings located at the tunnel ceiling. To achieve the
most effective results, fresh air is injected at the ground level to preserve smoke stratification and
prevent mixing of smoke and fresh air.
17 KASHEF, A., Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering, Chapter 17, Fire and Smoke Control in Transport Tunnels, 2012.
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FIGURE 4. TRANVERSE VENTILATION SYSTEM.
During a fire incident, smoke extraction should operate at the highest available capacity while air
supply should be maintained at a lower capacity with discharge air velocity kept to an adequate level
that prevents plugholing. 18 This approach preserves tenable conditions in the trainway by allows
fresh air to enter through the portals while maintaining the stratified smoke layer at a higher elevation
and being extracted by the exhaust system without mixing.
To limit smoke spread within the fire zone and enable evacuation on both sides of the fire, it is
recommended to set the extraction zone as short as practicable while still covering the fire area to
maximize the airflow to the incident location. The longitudinal velocity also needs to be controlled.
Independent ventilation sections have demonstrated their ability to supply a desired longitudinal
airflow in the fire section. The longitudinal velocity is usually kept below 2 m/s (394 fpm) in the
vicinity of the fire zone to prevent mixing of the hot smoke layer with fresh air over the whole tunnel
cross-section.
For systems without dampers and the ability to limit the extraction zone, the amount of required
extraction air along the length of the tunnel can be too large to successfully achieve smoke extraction.
Hybrid Ventilation Systems
The ventilation systems presented above can be combined to provide hybrid solutions and improve
systems performance. Single-point extraction can be added to transverse or semi-transverse systems
(see Figure 5). Remotely controlled or temperature activated dampers are installed on the exhaust
duct. These devices can be activated to extract smoke at the location of the fire. This technique works
well when used with jet fans and it has shown success in reducing temperature and smoke in tunnels.
One important challenge with such installation is achieving the adequate longitudinal velocity by
activating a correct number of jet fans within a few minutes after fire ignition.
18 Maevski, I., Guidelines for Emergency Ventilation Smoke Control in Roadway Tunnels, NCHRP Research Report 836, the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine, 2017, section 3.1.4.
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FIGURE 5. SINGLE-POINT EXTRACTION SYSTEM.
Exit spacing related to egress and firefighting activities is highly dependent on the ventilation
strategy. The ability to maintain tenable conditions over given areas of the tunnel and for given
periods of time assists with determining an adequate distance between exits for egress as well as
firefighting purposes.
Cross-passageways ventilation
In addition to ventilation in the trainway, emergency exits, and cross-passageways also rely on an
adequate ventilation to preserve tenable condition for the duration of the evacuation 19. To prevent
smoke from entering the emergency exits and/or cross-passageways, a positive pressure needs to be
established inside the emergency exit/cross-passageway relative to the incident tube. Heat removal
through ventilation may be needed due to heat transfer from the fire in the incident tube to emergency
exits/cross-passageways through openings (fire doors), wall assemblies. The key parameters for the
design of cross-passageways are:
• Airflow rates when the door connecting to the incident tube is opened (typically 0.75 to 1 m/s)
and door leakage when door connecting to the incident tube is closed.
• The pressure difference between the cross-passageway and the incident tube if the doors are
closed (usual ranges from 30 to 80 Pa (0.12 to 0.32 inches of water)).
• Noise possibly hindering communication.
The characteristic ventilation technical solutions put in place in cross-passageways are:
• Ventilation of the cross-passage by an independent ventilation system in the cross-

passageway. These systems offer independent control of the pressure difference in the cross-
passageway. When a door is opened, pressure balance and air velocity need to be carefully
adjusted to prevent smoke infiltration. Such ventilation system can become inoperant when
the doors of the cross-passageways to the safe tube and to the incident are both opened
depending on the ventilation capacity and its programming.
• Ventilation of the cross-passageway by an independent compartment ventilation system. The
cross-passageway is divided into 3 sections. The central section corresponds to the main area
of the cross-passageway while the two others serve as additional insulation from the tunnel.
The overpressure is generated by an independent ventilation system and controlled using
pressure relief dampers. The additional doors on the insulated sections serve as additional air
Tunnels, section 7.4.2, pp. 19-22.
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lock. Such systems have proven effective in reducing smoke infiltration to the cross-
passageway, but the additional doors may likely constrict the egress flow, slowing down the
evacuation. It is only recommended for long cross-passageways.
• Ventilation of the cross-passageway through an exploratory or service tunnel. The ventilation
system is installed in a exploratory gallery. This prevents air contamination from the tunnel
and a reliable fresh air supply.
• Ventilation of the cross-passageway through the non-incident tunnel. The tunnel ventilation
system creates a relative positive pressure in the non-incident tunnel compared to the incident
one and creates a cross flow through the cross-passageway.
Additional Emergency Components
Figure 6 presents additional support components needed for the development of an effective fire
safety strategy in rail tunnels. Each component is essential to provide an effective egress as well as
firefighting activities.
FIGURE 6. ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO SUPPORT FIRE SAFETY IN RAIL TUNNELS (FROM 20).
Tunnels, section 8.1.4.3, p. 34.
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Fire Protection Doors
Fire protection doors of emergency exits, and cross-passageways hold two paramount purposes
during a fire incident:
• Providing an escape path to a safe area

• Providing a protective barrier against smoke and heat
Normative requirements exist around the following parameters 21:
• Dimensions (width and height) to achieve the desired predicted flow rate of persons calculated
of people (Calculated flow).
• Opening direction (Swing or sliding doors)
• Self-closing to minimize hot gases and smoke entry.
• Opening mechanism
• Fire resistance (common range of 30 to 90 minutes)
• Door tightness
• Resistance to pressure changes
Standpipe
For tunnels where typical firefighting equipment cannot access the trainway; the installation of
standpipes is necessary to combat fires. Standpipes should be equipped with sufficient water supply
and accessible to emergency responders. They should be easily identifiable, reliable (fed from two or
more locations with isolation valves in the vicinity of cross-passageway or exit entries) and installed
in locations allowing an adequate firefighting response.
Emergency Lighting and Signage
Tunnel emergency lighting is needed for passengers and train/trainway crew egress. They should
provide a clear indication of the egress path. They should be sufficient to enable people to find the
cross-passage readily in the event of a fire or smoke emergency.
Signage should be provided to indicate the position of any emergency equipment. Fixed exit signs
are provided to indicate both the distance and directions to exits, cross-passages and portals.
A backup electrical power supply should be present to prevent loss of emergency lighting.
Emergency Communication System
Most standards require two-way radio systems to be installed along the trainway and inside cross-
passageways. The effectiveness of the communication system is a critical part of the tunnel
infrastructure. The tunnel structure and the communication system need to be appropriately
designed conjointly to prevent catastrophic issues such as radio interference and loss of signal.
Tunnels, section 7.4.1, p. 18.
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The communication system should be adequately maintained and tested regularly to ensure its
reliability. Emergency responders should be able to conduct regular checks on the system to be well
familiarized with it as well as verify its compatibility with their equipment.
Fire Detection
Fire detection systems installed in rail tunnels can assist in rapidly identifying the location of a fire
and alerting operations and emergency responders that a fire is occurring within the tunnel.
Nevertheless, the presence of fire detection and fire alarm systems within tunnel bores is generally
beyond standard and code requirements and are usually not provided unless such systems are
specifically required for the tunnel emergency ventilation or required by the local Authority Having
Jurisdiction (AHJ). A fire detection and fire alarm system installed within a tunnel needs to be suitable
for the environment. The information provided by the fire detection and fire alarm system should
support the selection of the appropriate ventilation mode. BS 9992:2020 indicates that any cross-
passage fire detection and fire alarm system should provide remote indications of fire detection and
the fire detection system health status. Verification of the presence of any fire alarm within a cross-
passageways should be possible through the use of a Closed-circuit television (CCTV) system. 22
The selection of an adequate fire detection device type should be based on the fire safety objectives
and approaches. Common fire detection devices are11:
• Linear Heat Detection (LHD). These devices allow for rapid detection of a fire through
changes of semiconductor resistance, component melting or light scattering. They are reliable
but can be influenced by airflow conditions.
• CCTV video image smoke detection. These devices identify fires through changes in
brightness, contrast, and flame motion. They can be used for other purposes than only fire
detection but require multiple detections before alarm activation due to detection
inaccuracies.
• Flame detectors. These devices detect flame through their radiative emissions. They operate
well in harsh environments but can be misled by other light emissions such as welding, arcing,
or lightning.
• Spot-type heat and smoke detectors. These devices identify the presence of a fire, respectively,
through the detection of large temperature changes or smoke. They are widely available but
are prone to inadvertent activation.
Egress Means Codes and Standards Provisions
The present report focuses on standards and codes requirements associated with egress walkways
and emergency exits and cross-passageways in rail tunnels.
Egress Walkways Standards Requirements
As discussed in the section “Emergency Exits and Cross-passageways”, the clear width and clear height
are two key parameters of the design of egress walkways as they regulate the egress flow. A
22 BS 9992:2020, Fire Safety in the Design, Management, and Use of Rail Infrastructure – Code of Practice, Section 28.7, Tunnel fire detection
and fire alarm systems.
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comparison of the egress walkway dimensions requirements listed in different standards and codes
is presented in Table 1
TABLE 1. MINIMUM WIDTH AND HEIGHT STANDARDS REQUIREMENTS FOR EGRESS WALKWAYS.
Min. Height of
Standard/Guideline Region Min. Width of Egress Walkway Escape Walkway
(m)
Height above walkway Min. Width
0 mm (0 in.) 610 mm (24 in.)
NFPA 130 23 USA 1575 mm (62 in.) 760 mm (30 in.) 2025 mm (80 in.)
2025 mm (80 in.) 430 mm (17 in.)
[6.3.2.1] [6.3.2.1]
800 mm (31 in.) 2250 mm (89 in.)
TSI-SRT 2014 24 EU
[4.2.1.6] [4.2.1.6]
1000 mm (39 in.) 2250 mm (89 in.)
SIA 197/1 2019 25 CH
[8.8.3.5] [8.8.3.5]
2000 mm (79
700 mm (28 in.)
ITI – 98 300 26 France in.)
[3.1.2]
[3.1.2]
1000 mm (39 in) 2250 mm (89 in.)
BS 9992:2020 27 UK
[28.2] [28.2]
AS 4825:2011 28 Australia 850 mm (33 in.)
Code of Practice for Fire
800 mm (31 in.)
Precautions in Rapid Singapore N/A
[9.3.5]
Transit Systems 29
Guidelines on
Formulation of Fire 2200 mm (87
850 mm (33 in.)
Safety Requirements for HK in.)
[2.4.2 (vii)]
New Railway [2.4.2 (vii)]
Infrastructures 30
700 mm (28 in.), optimally 1200
UIC 779-9 31 EU mm (47 in.) N/A
[I-40]
DECRETO 28 ottobre 900 mm (35 in.) if tunnel ≥ 2000
2005. m (6,562 ft)
Italy N/A
Sicurezza nelle gallerie 500 mm otherwise
ferroviarie. 32 [1.3.1]
23 NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, 2023 Edition.
24 European Commission, Commission Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014 of 18 November 2014 concerning the technical specification for interoperability
relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’ of the rail system of the European Union, TSI-SRT, 2014.
25SIA 197/1:2019, Schweizer Norm 505 197/1, Design of Tunnels, Railway tunnels, 2019.
26 Ministère de l’Intérieur, Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transports et du Logement, Instruction technique interministérielle relative à la
sécurité dans les tunnels ferroviaires, N°98-300 du 8 juillet 1998.

27 BS 9992:2020, Fire safety in the design, management and use of rail infrastructure - Code of practice.
28 AS 4825-2011, Australian Standard, Tunnel Fire Safety.
29 Code of Practice for Fire Precautions in Rapid Transit Systems 2022, Singapore Civil Defence Force.
30 Guidelines on Formulation of Fire Safety Requirements for New Railway Infrastructures, Hong Kong Fire Services, January 2013.
31 UIC 779-9, Safety in Railway Tunnels, 2002.
32 DECRETO 28 ottobre 2005. Sicurezza nelle gallerie ferroviarie.
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The British Standard BS 9992:2020 recommends the use of additional walkway dedicated to
emergency response teams and their firefighting efforts:
o Section 28.2 of BS 9992:2020, states: “Irrespective of the location of the walkway used for escape, an
additional walkway at least 0.45 m wide and opposite the escape walkway should be provided to allow
fire and rescue services access to the undercar of the train.”
For multitrack tunnels, standards generally require that an egress walkway can be accessed from each
track:
o Section 4.2.1.6, (a) of TSI-SRT 2014 states that “Walkways shall be constructed in a single track
tunnel tube on at least one side of the track and in a multiple track tunnel tube on both sides of the
tunnel tube. In tunnel tubes with more than two tracks, access to a walkway shall be possible from each
track.”
o Section 6.3.1.1 of the 2023 Edition of NFPA 130 states that “The system shall incorporate a walk
surface or other approved means for passengers to evacuate a train at any point along the trainway so
that they can proceed to the nearest station or other point of safety. ”
The egress walkway minimum clear widths compiled in Table 1 vary from 610 mm (28 in.) in NFPA
130 to 1000 mm (39 in.) in BS 9992:2020 and SIA 197/1:2019. The average egress walkway minimum
clear width from the values listed in the different standards reviewed is 812 mm (32 in.) ± 132 mm (5
in.).
The egress walkway minimum clear heights vary from 2025 mm (80 in.) in NFPA 130 to 2250 mm (89
in.) in TSI-SRT 2014, BS 9992:2020 and SIA 197/1:2019. The average egress walkway minimum clear
height is 2162 mm (85 in.) ± 118 mm (5 in.).
Historical Determination of Egress Walkways Dimensions
One can note that unlike other standards listed in Table 1, the egress walkway clear width required
by NFPA 130 changes with the height above the walkway surface. The clearance of the egress
walkway “envelope” defined in NFPA 130 (See Figure 7) appears to follow the human body
morphology with a larger width towards the shoulders and narrower width towards the head and
feet. It also follows the curvature of a tunnel bore.
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FIGURE 7. NFPA 130 EGRESS WALKWAY MINIMUM CLEAR WIDTH REQUIREMENTS.23
Review of Report On Proposals / Report On Comments
To identify the origin of the minimum clear width requirement for egress walkway in rail tunnels, a
review of the various revisions of NFPA 130 was conducted. The NFPA process to develop and revise
a standard has evolved over the years but continues to rely on the following fundamental steps 33:
1. For a new standard, a technical committee focused on the topic of interest for the standard is
formed, and a first draft document is created and published. For existing standards, the last
published edition serves as a starting document for the revision process. The new revision
cycle starts with the acceptance of Public Inputs for a given period.
2. The draft or existing standard and the received Public Inputs are reviewed and may be used
to develop proposed revisions to the standard. Each proposed revision is reviewed by the
Technical Committee and balloted to decide on a response. The Technical Committee can
decide to develop the proposal or reject it. A First Draft Report, previously known as Report
on Proposals (ROP), is produced and compiles all the proposed revisions that were approved
by at least two-third of the Technical Committee.
33https://www.nfpa.org/en/For-Professionals/Codes-and-Standards/Standards-Development
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3. A Public Comment period is opened to review the First Draft Report (previously ROP) and to
further comment on the changes proposed. At the end of the Public Comment period, The
Technical Committee gathers and provides an action or response to each comment. The
proposed revisions and the Technical Committee actions/responses are compiled in a
document, previously known as a Report on Comments (ROC), which assists with the
development of the Second Revisions to the standard. These actions result in the Second Draf
that also include the final position of the Technical committed established by ballot. The
Second revisions that pass the ballot by at least two-thirds of the Technical Committee are
gathered and published as the Second Draft Report. Once published, the public can review
the document to determine if further standard development considerations are needed.
4. The NFPA Technical Committee meets to discuss final amendments motions to the proposed
standard and a final vote takes place to decide definitive recommendations to the standard
text.
5. The Standard Council convenes to consider potential appeals and proceeds to issue an NFPA
standard.
The first edition of NFPA 130 was published in 1983 to establish life safety and fire protection
requirements for fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems. The first NFPA 130 draft
produced in 1982 states that 34,
“A suitable method shall be provided for evacuating patrons in the uncontaminated trainway, for protecting
patrons from oncoming traffic and for evacuating patrons to a nearby station or other emergency exit. Exception:
in underwater tubes where this is not physically possible, special consideration should be given to enhance the
safety of passengers by special ventilation and fire protection designs.”
Although the draft suggests that an egress method is required to evacuate passengers and allow them
access to the uncontaminated trainway, an egress path is not specifically required and there are no
provisions related to an egress walkway clear width and clear height. The comment 130-109 from the
1982 Report on Comments for NFPA 130 (ROC) 35 recommended adding a provision for a minimum
egress walkway clear width of 44 in. (1118 mm). The NFPA 130 Technical Committee rejected the
recommendation on the basis that it was overly restrictive and possibly not technically feasible.
Proposal 130-30 from the 1989 Report on Proposals (ROP) for the 1990 Edition of NFPA 130
recommended requiring an egress walkway on one side of the tunnel with a minimum clear width of
30 in. (762 mm). The NFPA 130 Technical Committee agreed to add a new section related to means
of egress for passengers, but the change did not specifically require the presence of an egress walkway
as well as a minimum clear width and clear height. 36 The NFPA 130 Technical committee indicated
that requirements should be “performance oriented”.
Proposal 130-5 from the 1997 ROP for the 1997 Edition of NFPA 130 represents the first identified
instance where the addition of a provision for maintaining “a two-foot wide by 6 foot eight inch high clear
vertical envelope” along the egress walkway is accepted by the Technical Committee. 37 Several
comments were published during the 1997 ROC process in response to proposal 130-5: 38
34 Report of Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit Systems, Report on Proposals, 130-1, section 3.2.4.3.(e).
35 1982 Report on Comments, NFPA 130, comment 130-109.
36 1989 Report on Proposals, NFPA 130, Proposal 130-30.
37 1997 Report on Proposals, NFPA 130, Proposal 130 -5.
38 1997 Report on Comments, NFPA 130.
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o Comment 130-35 indicated that a 24 in. clear width would be “too narrow to allow safe evacuation
in many cases”. Supervised egress for passengers in wheelchairs could not be performed with
a 24 in. clear width.
o Comment 130-38 from the 1997 ROC also recommended deleting the proposed clear width
provision from 130-5 as it conflicted with other standards. It noted that ADA Standards for
Accessible Design required that the minimum clear width at the vehicle doors for passenger
egress in a single wheelchair was 32 in. (815 mm). 39 ADA standards also required a 36 in. (914
mm) clear width along passageways 40. The comment suggested using a 32 in. (815 mm) clear
width for egress walkways. The Technical Committee accepted the comment in principle but
requested further study from the task group in charge of developing new recommendations.
o Comment 130-39 from the 1997 ROC stated that no substantiation was provided for the
proposed egress walkway minimum clear width.
o Comment 130-40 states that the egress walkway should be “wide enough to allow two people to
pass”. It also notes that NFPA 130 requires egress walkways in stations to have a minimum
clear width of 44 in. (1120 mm) and that the same width should be applied to egress walkways
in trainways. This width derives from two exit lanes providing two lanes of travel and
supposedly allows for counterflow. Nevertheless, one needs to note that egress walkways in
stations need to address higher occupant loads than for a single train that would be stopped
on a trainway. The comment also references NFPA 101, Life Safety Code (NFPA 101), and
indicates that, “an egress door must have a minimum 32-inch clear width (5-2.1.3.1); an exit access
path must have a minimum width of 36 inches (5-3.4.1)”.
o Comment 130-46 indicated that “a two-foot clear envelope would not allow for bi-directional traffic
flow”.
The Technical Committee ultimately decided to postpone changes to the egress walkway design
requirements until the next revision cycle to continue gathering information on the issue.
Proposal 130-55 from the 2003 ROP for the 2003 Edition of NFPA 130 recommended to add the
following design requirements 41:
“The minimum unobstructed width of egress facilities located within or directly adjacent to the trainway shall
be 610 mm (24 in.) measured at the walkway surface and 762 mm (30 in.) measured at a height of 1422 mm (56
in.) above the walkway surface.”
Although the Technical Committee accepted the proposal, one dissident vote suggested that there
was a lack of information to demonstrate that the proposed clear width dimension was adequate.
Comment 130-25 from the 2003 ROC for the 2003 Edition of NFPA 130 42 warned that the proposed
dimensions lacked justification and would limit access by emergency response personnel and
equipment as well as limit passengers’ emergency evacuation. The Technical Committee indicated
that the minimum required clear widths were based on the anthropomorphic analysis of reach for the
95th percentile referenced in NFPA 101 and was added a minimum benchmark for designers.
The upper and intermediate boundary dimensions were revised for the 2014 Edition of NFPA 130.
Proposal 130-119 of the 2013 ROP for NFPA 130 suggested reducing the upper boundary limit clear
39 28 CFR Part 36, ADA Standards for Accessible Design, Revised as of July 1, 1994, Section 4.13.5.
40 28 CFR Part 36, ADA Standards for Accessible Design, Revised as of July 1, 1994, Section 4.2.1.
42 2003 Report on Comments, NFPA 130, Comment 130-25.
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width. The proposal noted that the annex of NFPA 101 43 providing anthropometric data for male
adults which had been used to develop the clear width criteria made no mention of head breadth.
The authors of Proposal 130-119 proposed a reduction of the upper boundary limit based on NASA’s
Man-System Integration Standards Volume 1, Section 3 - Anthropometry Biomechanics (Anthropometric
Dimensional Data). The document indicates that for the 95th percentile, a head breadth of 168 mm (6.6
in.). Using a calculation similar to the one described in the annex of NFPA 101, the head breadth value
was rounded to 180 mm (7 in.) and 250 mm (10 in.) were added for side-to-side sway yielding an
upper boundary clear width of 430 mm (17 in.). The change was accepted and included in the 2014
Edition of NFPA 130. The height of the intermediate boundary limit listed in the 2003 Edition of
NFPA 130 was based on the 50th percentile and not the 95th percentile as believed. The NASA data for
shoulder height of the 95th percentile indicates a value of 1573 mm (61.9 in.). This value was rounded
to 1575 mm (62 in.) in the proposal, was approved by the Technical Committee and included in the
2014 Edition of NFPA 130.
A summary of the changes made to the egress pathway dimensions requirements are presented in
Table 2.
43 NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2012 Edition, Annex A, Section A.7.3.4.1.
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF NFPA 130 CODE CHANGES RELATED TO EGRESS WALKWAY CLEAR WIDTH.
NFPA 130 Min. Clear Width Requirement for

Comments
Year Edition Egress Walkway in Trainways
Means of egress are required to evacuate
passengers in a trainway but no specific egress
walkway requirements are included in the
standard.
1983 N/A A comment was published suggesting a 44 in.
minimum clear width but was rejected by the
Technical Committee as overly conversative
and possibly unfeasible.
A proposal recommended a minimum clear

width of 30 in. The Technical committee
1990 N/A
decided not to add a specific requirement to
have egress walkways.
A proposal recommended the use of an
envelope two-foot wide and 6 feet 8 inches
high. Several comments stated that the 24 in.
clear width at the walkway surface was too
narrow for safe evacuation and would not
allow bi-directional movement, possibly
1997 N/A
impeding emergency responders’ access to the
incident site. It also conflicted with
requirements from ADA Standards. The
Technical Committee decided to postpone
changes to gather additional information on
the matter
1. 610 mm (24 in.) at the walking The Technical Committee approved proposed
surface minimum benchmark dimensions for egress
2. 760 mm (30 in.) at 1420 mm (56 in.) walkways. The minimum criteria were
2003
above the walking surface developed using an anthropomorphic analysis
3. 610 mm (24 in.) at 2050 mm (80 in.) of reach for the 95th percentile male referenced
above the walking surface. in the annex of NFPA 101.
The upper and intermediate boundary limits
were revised using data from NASA (NASA’s
1. 610 mm (24 in.) at the walking Man-System Integration Standards Volume 1,
surface Section 3 - Anthropometry Biomechanics
2. 760 mm (30 in.) at 1575 mm (56 in.) (Anthropometric Dimensional Data)) and
2014
above the walking surface following the same approach as in the NFPA
3. 430 mm (17 in.) at 2050 mm (80 in.) 101 Annex. NFPA 101 lacked head breadth
above the walking surface. information and it appeared that the data used
for the height of the intermediate boundary
limit was inaccurate.
Egress Walkway Clear Width Analysis
Review of the ROP and ROC associated with various editions of NFPA 130 indicated that the
minimum requirements for egress walkway clear dimensions originated from an anthropomorphic
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analysis of reach of 95th percentile male based on information referenced in NFPA 101 and from NASA
(NASA’s Man-System Integration Standards Volume 1, Section 3 - Anthropometry Biomechanics
(Anthropometric Dimensional Data)) 44.
Minimum clear boundary limits criteria have been included in NFPA 130 since the 2003 Edition.
Revisions were made to the upper boundary limit and the height of the intermediate boundary limit
in the 2014 Edition.
Several limitations related to these minimum criteria need to be emphasize:
1. The requirements only allow for unidirectional movements. Emergency responders would
not be able to access the train or egress path while passengers are self-evacuating requiring to
stage the evacuation and access to the train/egress path (unless they use an interior car path
between vehicles which would also disrupt occupants’ egress).
2. People with Restricted Mobility (PRM) such as people in wheelchairs would not be able to
self-evacuate through the egress-walkway and would require assistance from the train crew,
train passengers, or first-responders.
3. Adequacy of the minimum criteria is contingent to the relevance of the anthropomorphic
analyses.
The authors reviewed revisions of NFPA 101 between 2000 and 2023. The anthropometric data (see
Figure 8) included in the annex of the standard has been the same during that timeframe. The origin
and age of the data is unknown. The size of the adults represented represents the 50th percentile while
some dimensions include the 97.5th percentile adults. The use of dimensions associated with larger
individuals provides some precaution with regards to the relevance of the minimum dimensions
criteria in egress walkways.
The anthropometric data from NASA was limited to the range of person representative of space
module crewmembers and vising personnel, full adults from the year 2000 of an average age of 40.
The average male height was 1799 mm (70.8 in.) Anthropometric data from the National Center for
Health Statistics 45 indicates that the average height for adult males between 2015 and 2018 was 1753
mm (69 in.) which is taller than the average males height data presented in NFPA 101 (approximately
1730 mm (68.1 in.) but smaller than the average height data from NASA. Anthropometric changes in
time and with population. The current minimum dimension criteria for egress walkways rely on
anthropometric data and, thus, need to account for its evolution over time and by location.
References, such as ISO 7250-1:2017, Basic human body measurements for technological design or
anthropometric data from the National Center for Health Statistics provide description of
anthropometric measurements that can be used as a basis for comparison of population groups.
44 NASA’s Man-System Integration Standards Volume 1, Section 3 - Anthropometry Biomechanics (Anthropometric Dimensional Data).
https://msis.jsc.nasa.gov/sections/section03.htm
45 Anthropometric Reference Data for Children and Adults: United States, 2015 – 2018, National Center for Health Statistics, Vital and Health
Statistics, Series 3, Number 46, January 2021, p. 15.
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FIGURE 8. ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (IN IN.0 FOR ADULTS (MALES AND FEMALES OF AVERAGE, 50TH
PERCENTILE, SIZE; WITH SOME DIMENSIONS REPRESENTATIVE OF 97.5 PERCENTILE ADULTS. 46
The increase of walkway width is not without potentially creating safety issues. Wider walkways
where occupants would not be able to use the tunnel wall or a handrail to follow the egress path under
smoke conditions increase the likelihood of occupants falling into the trackway.
Emergency Exits and Cross-passageways Standard Requirements
The distance between emergency exits and cross-passageways is a fundamental element of the egress
strategy of a rail tunnel. An optimal distance can be estimated through an engineering analysis
considering the following factors 47:
• Probability of a design fire event

• Probability of a train evacuation taking place within the tunnel, away from a point of safety
• Expected fire spread during the evacuation phase of the design fire event
46 NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2021 Edition, Annex A, Figure A.7.3.4.1.1(a), Anthropometric Data (in in.) for Adults; Males and Females of
Average, 50th Percentile, Size; Some Dimensions Apply to Very Large, 97.5 Percentile (97.5 P), Adults.
47 NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, 2023 Edition, A.6.3.1.4.
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• Maximum expected fire load during the evacuation phase of the design fire event
• Expected fire resistance of the rolling stock
• Expected occupant load and occupants representative characteristics (age, body dimensions,
health conditions).
• Maximum time necessary to complete the evacuation of the train after its immobilization
• Maximum time necessary for all passengers to reach the nearest station or other point of safety
• Ability of the tunnel emergency ventilation system to maintain tenable conditions along the
egress path to the nearest point of safety
• Firefighter response capabilities (SCBA limitations, ability to transport the necessary
equipment to the incident train location.)
Standards do not usually prescribe a methodology to calculate the distance between egress points but
provide maximum separation distance requirements. A comparison of several standards provision
related to separation distances between egress points is presented in Table 3.
Among the various standards and codes reviewed, the provisions for maximum distance between
emergency exits vary between 760 m (2,493 ft) from the Singapore Code of Practice for Fire
Precautions on Rapid Transit Systems to 1,000 m (3,281 ft) from the European standards TSI-SRT 2014
and UIC 779-9 with an average maximum spacing of 848 m (2,780 ft) ± 120 m (392 ft).
The provisions for maximum distance between cross-passageways listed in Table 3, vary between 240
m (787 ft) from AS 4825:2011 to 800 m (2,625 ft) in the French standard ITI – 98 300 with an average
value of 410 m (1,354 ft) ± 203 m (664 ft).
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TABLE 3. SPACING BETWEEN EMERGECNY EXITS AND BETWEEN CROSS-PASSAGEWAYS.
Maximum Distance Maximum Distance

Standard/Guideline Region between Emergency between Cross-
Exits passageways
762 m (2500 ft) 244 m (800 ft)
NFPA 130 48 USA
[6.3.1.4] [6.3.1.6]
1000m (3281 ft) 500 m (1640 ft)
TSI-SRT 2014 49 EU
[4.2.1.5.2 (b) (1)] [4.2.1.5.2 (b) (2)]
800 m (2625 ft) 800 m (2625 ft)
ITI – 98 300 50 France
[4.1.2] [4.1.3]
500 m (1640 ft)
BS 9992:2020 51 UK N/A
[28.5]
AS 4825:2011 52 Australia N/A 240 m (787 ft)
Code of Practice for Fire Precautions 760 m (2493 ft) 250 m (820 ft)
Singapore
in Rapid Transit Systems 53 [9.3.2 (b)] [9.3.3 (b)]
Guidelines on Formulation of Fire
762 m (2500 ft) 244 m (800 ft)
Safety Requirements for New Railway HK
[2.4.2 (i)] [2.4.2 (iii)]
Infrastructures 54
1000 m (3281 ft) 500 m (1640 ft)
UIC 779-9 55 EU
[I-43] [I-43]
Single bore tunnel:
4000 m (13,123 ft),
DECRETO 28 ottobre 2005. 500 m (1640 ft) for
Italy 2000 m (6,562 ft) in
Sicurezza nelle gallerie ferroviarie. 56 cities
[1.3.5]
[1.3.5]
Historical Determination of Maximum Separation Distances.
Distance between Emergency Exits
NFPA 130 requires spacing of emergency exits at intervals no greater than 762 m (2500 ft). The source
of this length is unknown.
One should note that the previous edition of NFPA 130 prescribed a minimum travel distance instead
of a maximum exit spacing. The intent of a prescribed maximum travel distance was often
misinterpreted as an exit spacing requirement of 381 m (1250 ft). As explained in the Annex of NFPA
48 NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, 2023 Edition.
49 European Commission, Commission Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014 of 18 November 2014 concerning the technical specification for interoperability
relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’ of the rail system of the European Union, TSI-SRT, 2014.
50 Ministère de l’Intérieur, Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transports et du Logement, Instruction technique interministérielle relative à la
sécurité dans les tunnels ferroviaires, N°98-300 du 8 juillet 1998.

51 BS 9992:2020, Fire safety in the design, management and use of rail infrastructure - Code of practice.
52 AS 4825-2011, Australian Standard, Tunnel Fire Safety.
53 Code of Practice for Fire Precautions in Rapid Transit Systems 2022, Singapore Civil Defence Force.
54 Guidelines on Formulation of Fire Safety Requirements for New Railway Infrastructures, Hong Kong Fire Services, January 2013.
55 UIC 779-9, Safety in Railway Tunnels, 2002.
56 DECRETO 28 ottobre 2005. Sicurezza nelle gallerie ferroviarie.
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130 57, the emergency exits spacing requirement mirrors the egress strategy developed in NFPA 101.
NFPA 101 requires, at a minimum, two means of egress within a building, or structure, and prescribes
a maximum travel distance to an exit. Under such egress configuration, the maximum travel distance
is at the midpoint between the two exits. In the case of rail tunnels, the maximum travel distance
should not exceed 381 m (1250 ft). As an illustrative example, one can consider a 2,000 ft train in a
2,500 ft tunnel with exits at each end and no cross-passageways. If this train stops partly out of tunnel
(i.e. with half of train (1,000 ft) outside the tunnel, and 1,000 feet in the tunnel), a 'mid-train fire' located
1,500 feet from the front of train would be 500 feet inside the tunnel. Assuming a ventilation strategy
where smoke is pushed towards the rear of the train (i.e. protecting the 500 feet end of train upstream
of the fire), passengers in the rear 500 feet of the train would need to evacuate towards the emergency
exit located 1,500 feet from them. This appears to conflict with the commonly accepted expected
maximum distance of 1250 feet to safety which is part of the basis for the maximum 2,500 ft spacing
between emergency exits.
NFPA 130 allows the distance between exits to be modified when the proposed value is substantiated
by an engineering analysis accounting for:
1. Probability of a design fire event.
2. Probability of a train evacuation being conducted other than at a point of safety.
3. Probability that another compartment in the train is a point of safety for the design fire event.
4. Fire growth rate during the evacuation phase of the design fire event.
5. Maximum expected fire load during the evacuation phase of the design fire event (including
fire load carried by passengers).
6. Expected fire resistance characteristics of the rolling stock.
7. Maximum time necessary to evacuate the train after immobilization of the train.
8. Maximum time necessary for all passengers to reach the nearest station or point of safety.
9. Ability of the tunnel vent system to provide a tenable environment along the path to the
nearest station or other point of safety.
10. Firefighter response capabilities (e.g., SCBA limitations) and incident response procedures as
determined through consultation with the responding fire service prior to final design.
Distance between Cross-passageways
NFPA 130 allows using cross-passageways as egress means in lieu of emergency exits. NFPA 130
requires the distance between cross-passageways to not exceed 244 m (800 ft). 58 This spacing
represents approximately 1/3 of the emergency exit spacing (762 m). The cross-passageway listed in
NFPA 130 was derived from the design of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(MARTA) Subway at the end of the 1970s. The value was estimated based on “the distance people could
walk downstream of a train fire before flashover occurred and made the environment untenable.“ 59
Like emergency exits, the spacing between cross-passageways can be modified when the proposal
distance is substantiated by an engineering analysis. 60
57 NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, 2023 Edition, Annex, A.6.3.1.4.
58 NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, 2023 Edition, Section 6.3.1.6.
59Edenbaum, J., Cox, S., English, G. Cross-passageways vs. Emergency Exit Stairways in Rail Tunnels, APTA Rail Conference 2015.
60 NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, 2023 Edition, Section Annex A.6.3.1.6. and Section 6.3.1.11.
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Review of NFPA 130 Report On Proposals / Report On Comments
The first draft of the first edition of NFPA 130 was published in 1982 and already proposed maximum
spacing requirements for emergency exit stairways and cross-passageways:
“Emergency exit stairways shall be provided throughout the tunnel spaced so that the distance to an emergency
exit shall be not greater than 1250 ft unless otherwise approved by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.” 61
This proposed requirement is consistent with the current provision requiring a maximum spacing
between exit of 762 m (2500 ft) where the maximum travel distance is considered at the mid-point
between the two exits 62.
The following section of the first draft allowed the use of cross-passageways as egress paths instead
of emergency exits under the following conditions: “
(a) Cross-passageways shall not be farther than 800 ft apart
(b) Openings in open passageways shall be protected with fire door assemblies having a fire protection
rating of 1 1/2 hours with a self-closing fire door
(c) A system of positive ventilation shall be maintained in the uncontaminated trainway
(d) A ventilation system for the contaminated tunnel shall be capable of removing smoke from the
vicinity of the patrons
(e) A suitable method shall be provided for evacuating patrons in the uncontaminated trainway for
protecting patrons from oncoming traffic and for evacuating the patrons to a nearby station or other
emergency exit
Exception: In underwater tubes where this is not physically possible, special consideration should be
given to enhance the safety of passengers by special ventilation and fire protection designs.”
The provision for the maximum distance between cross-passageways proposed in the first draft of
NFPA 130 is similar to the current requirement.
The 1982 ROC for the 1983 Edition of NFPA 130 contains several comments proposing to change the
spacing between emergency exits and cross-passageways. 63 Comments 130-108 through 130-110
proposed to reduce the distance between cross-passageways from 244 m (800 ft) to 91 m (300 ft). These
proposals raised the concern that 244 m (800 ft) spacing may not provide adequate protection to
people evacuating, if, for example, the emergency ventilation system is to fail or if a cross-passageway
is compromised or blocked. Comment 130-110 also added that there was a consensus between fire
departments that they “must be afforded cross-passages, water supply (wet), and communication facilities not
over 300 ft distance.” For similar reasons, comment 130-111 proposed reducing the spacing between
cross-passageways to 107 m (350 ft). The NFPA 130 Technical Committee rejected these comments
stating that the proposed changes were too restrictive and unnecessary given that the document’s
scope to provide minimum requirements. Comment 130-112 proposed to increase the spacing
between cross-passageways from 244 m (800 ft) to 488 m (1600 ft). The reasoning used to substantiate
the comment was that the use of component materials with limited flammability and an adequate
ventilation system eliminate the use for cross-passageways. A spacing of 488 m (1600 ft) would
61 Report of Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit Systems, 1st Draft of Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit Systems, NFPA 130, 1982,
Section 3.2.4.2.
62 The prescribed maximum travel distance relies on the assumption that both exits are operable. NFPA 130 as well as NFPA 101, recognize
that there are scenarios where one of the two exits may be compromised and that individuals in the vicinity of the affected exit may need
to travel further than the prescribed maximum travel distance.
63 1982 Report on Comments, NFPA 130, comments 130-108, 130-109, 130-110, 130-111, 130-112, and 130-113.
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provide an “extra measure of assurance”. The NFPA 130 Technical Committee rejected the comment on
the basis that 800 ft spacing offered a reasonable exiting criterion.
In the 2003 ROP for the 2003 Edition of NFPA 130, Proposal 130-41 64 suggested to add egress
requirements for shared use (passenger and freight) underground trainways. It was proposed that
for underground trainways with passengers and freight trains, the maximum distance to an exit was
305 m (1000 ft), and the maximum distance to a cross-passageway was 183 m (600 ft). The NFPA 130
Technical Committee stated that there was “insufficient technical justification to support the changes as
proposed.” Proposal 130-45 suggested changing the wording related to the number and location of
means of egress route from a maximum travel distance provision to a maximum distance between
exit provision for consistency with other NFPA 130 requirements and to prevent confusion. The
proposal recommended the following text:
“3-2.4.2 Number and Location of Means of Egress Routes. Within underground or enclosed
trainways, the maximum distance between exits shall not exceed 762 m (2,500 ft).”
The NFPA 130 Technical Committee approved the proposal. A negative opinion on the proposal
indicated that the change combined with the extension of the duration to get full operation of the
ventilation system from 120 seconds to 180 seconds (Proposal 130-63) and the ability of people to self-
evacuate would prevent adequate egress design. The change revealed a misinterpretation of the
wording of the previous edition where some people believed that the maximum distance between
exits was 381 m (1250 ft) instead of the maximum travel distance. The correct interpretation of the
maximum travel distance provision in the previous edition of NFPA 130 assumes that no emergency
exit is blocked or compromised. Under this assumption, the maximum spacing between emergency
exit is then 2 x 381 m (1250 ft) = 762 m (2500 ft). 65 To clarify the misunderstanding, Comment 130-65
proposed to add the following annex section:
“A-3-2.4.2. Previous editions of NFPA 130 addressed this requirement by prescribing the
maximum travel distance to an exit. The intent of this requirement was often misinterpreted.
NFPA 101 requires, at a minimum, two means of egress be provided within a building or
structure and prescribes the maximum travel distance to an exit. This same requirement is
applied in NFPA 130. Where two means of egress are required, the maximum travel distance
to an exit occurs at the midpoint. For example, in a building with two exits, in the event of a
fire adjacent to an exit rendering an exit unavailable, NFPA 101 recognizes that an individual
in proximity to the affected exit must travel twice the prescribed exit travel distance to the
alternate exit. Since two means of egress are required at any one point in a tunnel, the exits
cannot be more than twice the travel distance or 2,500 feet apart.”
The language in sections 3-2.4.2 and A.3-2.4.2 of the 2003 Edition of NFPA 130 is similar to the
language present in the subsequent revisions up to the current 2023 Edition.
Comment 130.53 in the 2006 ROC of the 2007 Edition of NFPA 130 66 added additional language to
clearly state that the distance between cross-passageways and stations, tunnel portals shall not exceed
244 m (800 ft). The rationale of the comment was to account for a scenario where access to a portal or
station was compromised and where the travel distance could be greater than what had been
established for cross-passageways.

65 2003 Report on Comments, NFPA 130, Comment 130-23.
662006 Report on Comments, NFPA 130, Comment 130-54.
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Proposal 130-122 of the 2013 ROP of the 2014 Edition of NFPA 130 67 suggested reducing the maximum
emergency exit spacing to 500 m (1640 ft) when an engineering analysis is done. Reductions were
proposed based on the tunnel grade. Without engineering analysis, the proposal recommended
limiting the emergency exit spacing to 250 m (820 ft). The reason for the proposed reduction was that
emergency exit spacing must consider emergency ingress. Firefighters carry equipment (breathing
apparatus, hose, tools) and according to the authors of the proposal, informal discussions with fire
departments in Seattle and Hong Kong, have estimated the maximum zero grade distance of 500 m
(1640 ft) to be the greatest distance a firefighter can walk to in non-contaminated air and adequately
perform firefighting operations. In addition, the authors of the proposal believe that emergency exit
spacing should be determined on a performance basis, accounting for egress and ingress demands.
The NFPA 130 Technical Committee rejected the proposal because the authors did not provide
adequate technical substantiations for the proposed changes.
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TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF NFPA 130 CODE CHANGES RELATED TO EGRESS ROUTES SPACING.
NFPA 130 Maximum Emergency Exit/Cross-

Comments
Year Edition Passageways Spacing
Several comments proposed reducing the
distance between cross-passageways from 244
m (800 ft) to 91 m (300 ft) or 107 m (350 ft) to
provide adequate protection but was
considered too restrictive and unnecessary by
Emergency Exit Maximum Travel the Technical Committee.
Distance: 381 m (1250 ft)
1983 Another comment suggested increasing the
Cross-passageways Spacing: 244 m distance between cross-passageways from 244
(800 ft) m (800 ft) to 488 m (1600 ft) by using materials
with limited flammability combined with an
adequate ventilation system. The Technical
Committee rejected the proposal stating that
the 800 ft spacing was appropriate.
The intent of the proposal was to clarify a

previous misinterpretation that the distance
between emergency exits was 381 m (1250 ft).
Emergency Exit Maximum Distance: The maximum travel distance requirement
762 m (2500 ft) assumed that no emergency was compromised
2003 or blocked. The proposed change was
Cross-passageways Spacing: 244 m developed to prevent any further confusion.
(800 ft). In addition, an annex was added to explain the
reasoning behind the emergency exit
maximum distance.
Emergency Exit Maximum Distance:

Language was added to require a maximum
762 m (2500 ft)
distance of 244 m (800 ft) between a cross-
2007
passageway and a tunnel portal, or station.
Cross-passageways Spacing: 244 m
(800 ft).
A proposal to reduce emergency exit
maximum distance to 500 m (1640 ft) with
Emergency Exit Maximum Distance: additional reductions based on grade was
762 m (2500 ft) published. The proposal also stated that the
2014 calculation of egress spacing should be
Cross-passageways Spacing: 244 m performance based. The Technical Committee
(800 ft). rejected the proposal explaining that it lacked
technical substantiation.
Emergency Exit/Cross-Passageways Maximum Spacing Analysis
The rail tunnels spacing requirements listed in NFPA 130 for emergency exits and cross-passageways
have remained unchanged since the first edition of the standard. Despite extensive research through
a literature review, the rationale behind maximum distance between emergency exit maximum
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remains unknown. The maximum distance between cross-passageways originates from an analysis
conducted during the design of the MARTA Subway in Atlanta at the end of the 1970s. The value
was estimated based on the distance people could walk downstream of a train fire before flashover
conditions were reached. The authors of the current report asked for a copy of the MARTA study
through the MARTA open records request process. MARTA is actively looking for a copy of the
study, but the document was still not available at the time the present report was published.
Although the exact parameters of the MARTA analysis are unknown, the description of the egress
analysis suggests that the results would have been related to the following non-exhaustive factors:
• Size and growth rate of fires.
• The tunnel geometry.
• Train characteristics (number of exits, geometry, materials).
• Egress walkway dimensions.
• Occupant loading
• Occupants’ evacuation characteristics (number of people who can self-evacuate, number of
people who need assistance to evacuate, assumed egress walking speed)
Among the several factors listed, the train characteristics and the occupants’ characteristics can be
expected to have changed over the last 40 years. NFPA 130 requires vehicle materials to comply with
fire performance criteria. These fire performance criteria have evolved to become more stringent over
the years to increase the fire resistance of vehicle materials.
The current occupants’ characteristics may be different than they were at the end of the 1970s when
the MARTA study was performed. Although limited information is available, it is critical to consider
demographic changes in egress calculations. Changes in anthropometry and health could affect the
adequacy of the required maximum distances between emergency exit and cross-passageways. As
an example, information from the Center from Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicates that
from the period 1999 – 2000 to the period 2017-2018, obesity68 among American adults increased from
30.5% to 42.4% within the population. 69. It can be anticipated that these changes would result in a
population that on average is bigger, less physically fit. Consequently, the distances the average
person can walk, and their average walking speed would likely be affected.
The maximum egress travel speed along platform and corridors in the 1983 Edition and 2023 Edition
of NFPA 130 was, respectively, .021 m.s-1 (200 ft/min) and 0.63 m.s-1 (124 ft/min). There is a 1.61 ratio
between the two values. The travel speed reduction was introduced to address higher occupant
densities. Unlike for platforms and corridors, the impact on egress time of larger occupant loads for
egress on rail tunnel walkways and to emergency exit/cross-passageways is a question that has not
currently been addressed.
Pathway survivability may also have changed over the years. Materials present inside the tunnel and
in the trains that are NFPA 130 compliant under the current requirements have different fire resistance
and toxicity characteristics than older generation tunnels and trains. There is a lack of information
regarding pathway survivability and the release of toxic gases during fires in rail tunnels.
68 The CDC defines obesity in adults as a Body Mass Index ((BMI), derived from the ratio of mass by the square of height) of greater than or
equal to 30 kg.m-2.
69 Hales, C., M., Carroll, M., D., Fryar, C., D., Ogden, C., L., Prevalence of Obesity and Severe Obesity Among Adults: United States, 2017–
2018, NCHS Data Brief, No. 360, February 2020.
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Firefighting and Rescue Operations Guidance and Standard Practices
Tunnel emergencies pose several unique challenges to fire departments. Despite the protection
features provided, the threat of accidents (e.g. derailment) or fire events, cannot be fully mitigated.
As an example, fire protection systems are not designed against intentional acts (arson). It is
paramount that the capabilities of the fire department be considered when designing underground
rail tunnels. Emergency responses to incidents are driven by three tactical objectives: life safety,
incident stabilization, and property protection. Fire departments recognize that emergencies within
tunnels of any sort provide additional layers of complexities to completing tactical objectives. Fixed-
guideway light rail tunnels provide further hazards & complexities due to the possibility of a high
occupant load (life hazard), limited access/egress, and additional environmental hazards (e.g. third-
rail power, lack of ambient light, trip hazards). A fire in a light rail tunnel would qualify as a “high-
risk, low frequency” event. These incidents pose a significant risk to civilians and firefighters alike,
however the frequency of them occurring is relatively low (compared to the majority of incidents a
fire department responds to).
These incidents necessitate a response that is deliberate and methodical. In addition to the hazards
mentioned in the above paragraph, fire departments are also required to analyze and evaluate large
quantities of information: reports from civilianizes/bystanders on scene, 911 reports. Fire
departments must also be capable of working with outside agencies including, but not limited to, local
and state police, governing rail authority and their police, and federal agencies.
The present study queried several fire departments who have fixed guideway rapid transit rail
systems within their jurisdictions to examine their response procedures and capabilities. The purpose
of this query was to understand standard practices as it relates to fire department response to fires in
rapid transit system tunnels. As part of this query, fire departments were asked about tunnel systems
within their jurisdictions, previous incidents within light rail tunnels, response capabilities & limiting
factors, and technologies available to assist with their response. Surveyed fire departments were
asked about a typical emergency response to a report of a fire in a light rail tunnel.
Departments reported having a standardized response (box alarm or 1st alarm assignment), with
similar resource allocation (in terms of manpower and equipment) to a commercial structure fire. In
addition to this standardized response, the report of a tunnel fire would also necessitate a technical-
rescue incident response where specialized equipment is mobilized and highly trained personnel are
dispatched along with the balance of the assignment.
In response to a tunnel fire, an increased command staff presence can be expected. While a chief is
sent to the incident location for the purpose of establishing the incident command system and being
the incident commander, a chief-level officer is also dispatched to the governing rail-authority control
center. This command staff position creates a liaison between the rail authority and the incident
commander, allowing for interoperability between the two agencies. The liaison has access to fan
controls, surveillance systems, mass communication equipment, and can control these functions as
necessary based on the incident commanders’ strategy. Two of the surveyed departments stated that
they were moving away from a response liaison strategy to create a permanent fire department liaison
position within the rail authority control center. Such an approach effectively creates a 24/7 liaison
within the control center, allowing the liaison to become the resident subject matter expert for the fire
department. This strategy has been identified as a best practice among response procedures.
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Upon arriving at the scene of a tunnel incident, the fire department will evaluate the situation and
work towards determining the scope of the incident. Unlike an above-grade structure fire which may
provide clues indicating fire location (e.g. smoke or fire emanating from windows), the location of the
fire may not be readily apparent to initial responding units. Ventilation systems combined with
tunnel distances may very well conceal the location of the fire from the outside. Fire departments
must perform reconnaissance to determine the incident location and subsequent access points.
Reconnaissance is performed by “recon teams” comprised of groups (companies) of firefighters that
enter the tunnels to find the incident and determine necessary resources.
Where surveillance systems or train location tracking features are available, pinpointing the location
of an incident, and appropriate access points, is a task that can be supplemented by the assistance of
the fire department liaison in the rail authority control center.
The deployment of recon teams into a tunnel requires the coordinated effort between fire department
personnel and the rail transit authority to ensure that:
(1) the third rail/overhead catenary/train power has been shut-down and,
(2) that trains operating on the same track have ceased operation.
(3) Other trains operating on different tracks but traveling in the same tunnel bore have stopped.
Fire Departments often use the railway invert structure as part of their emergency response
procedures and confirmation that third-rail/overhead catenary/train power has been shut down and
no other train is operating on the track is critical for the success for their operations.
Upon confirmation of the above, recon teams are then able to make entry into the tunnel. Several fire
departments stated that they use a two-station deployment model for recon teams: they deploy two
teams; one team is positioned from the closest station on one side of the train (e.g. northbound side)
and a second one from the opposite side (e.g. south side). Fire departments utilize the information
gathered from both teams to determine the best access for resource deployment, firefighting and
rescue operations.
The location of the incident within the tunnel is a significant factor that can change the scope of an
emergency response. For example, a distance of 200 ft (61 m) between a station and an incident train
is considered a relatively short distance. Deployment of resources from the station into the tunnel
may not require complex logistics or significant manpower. On the other hand, an incident where a
train is 2,000 ft (610 m) into a tunnel, and equidistant between two stations, poses a much greater
challenge. If a clean air environment is not provided for fire department personnel, they may need to
access the train utilizing a breathing system. Walking 2,000 ft (610 m) to the incident to investigate
and 2,000 ft (610 m) back, in a standard 45-Minute Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) with
full personal protective equipment may deplete the “working” capacity of the SCBA without having
completed any rescue or firefighting operations at the scene. The information gathered from the recon
team incident evaluation is critical to the success of the emergency response.
Once the scope of the incident has been assessed by the recon team, the incident commander (IC) is
able to make informed decisions regarding the necessary actions based on the three tactical objectives.
Despite the unique fire theater, firefighting operations remain much the same: hose lines must be
deployed to extinguish the fire, a water supply must be established (to engines pumping the fire or
fire department connections which feed standpipes), search and rescue operations must be conducted,
and the fire must be overhauled.
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Performing life safety operations may involve a coordinated effort of fire suppression in conjunction
with rescue efforts. The procedure may involve the deployment of thousands of feet of hose to reach
the fire, requiring a large number of emergency responders from several fire stations. Search and
rescue operations are complicated by the long distances to reach occupants who need to be evacuated
(patients). Ambulatory patients are able to be guided away from the incident under their own power,
if they haven’t already self-evacuated and if environmental conditions permit. Non-ambulatory
patients require assistance from emergency responders. Wheeled stretchers are unable to work
efficiently within the track bed and are too wide for the narrow tunnel egress walkways. Rescue
personnel rely on extrication assistance devices (e.g. SKEDco, backboards) to assist patients from the
tunnel. Evacuating a single patient could involve several firefighters from multiple companies if, for
example, a patient needed to be carried 2,000 ft (610 m) along the tunnel. Evacuating multiple
seriously injured patients from crush-capacity trains/ during rush-hour presents the risk of quickly
depleting emergency resources. Fire departments have reported that transit authorities are willing to
provide trains for use as “rescue trains” to facilitate the transportation of fire department resources,
emergency responders, and to assist with the evacuation of victims from the incident scene. This is
another critical component supervised by the transit authority liaison.
Firefighting and rescue scenarios become further complicated where incidents occur remote from
entry/access/egress points and the atmosphere is an immediate danger to life and health (IDLH)
requiring specialized breathing apparatus with long-duration capabilities. Based upon the risk-
profile of the incident, fire departments may elect to only send specialized, high-trained personnel
with technical rescue equipment within such a hazard zone. Fire Department Response Capabilities
and Limitations
The response to a fire in a transit tunnel is complex coordination of numerous agencies working
together, highly skilled personnel executing mission objectives, and the collective manpower efforts
of all personnel operating on the scene. Fire departments recognize the extraordinary challenges
presented by these incidents and prepare for them accordingly. Their preparation includes
specialized training for personnel, acquiring equipment, and recognizing limitations of both
personnel and equipment.
Some fire departments recognize a tunnel event as a “technical rescue” incident and have a “tunnel
rescue” discipline as part of their technical rescue capabilities. Several surveyed fire departments
reported specialized training including traveling to Europe for large-scale and live fire incidents.
They also mentioned conducting periodic training exercises. Technical rescue training aside, all
surveyed fire departments stated that they perform training on a regular basis. This includes at least
annual company level inspections of stations and tunnels within their district and large-scale, multi-
company cross-jurisdiction exercises.
Few fire departments across the country are responsible for the emergency response in modern tunnel
systems fitted with adequate ventilation that allows firefighters to reach a train fire and conduct
firefighting operations in an ambient air atmosphere. In most cases, fire departments operate within
tunnel systems that are antiquated and do not meet modern NFPA 130 requirements or ventilation.
Tunnels can be several miles long with limited access points, or long stretches of distance between
access points.
A universal capability of any fire department is the ability to operate in an IDLH environment by use
of a SCBA. SCBA’s typically have three available breathing duration configurations: 30-minute, 45-
minute, and 60-minute. However, the rating does not directly correlate to the actual working duration
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while wearing the SCBA. A 45-minute SCBA does not necessarily mean the wearer will be able to
operate in an IDLH atmosphere for 45-minutes at maximum output. Further, the user must take into
consideration that the air supply of an SCBA can be broken into three parts: 1/3 supply to get to and
work at an incident, 1/3 supply to evacuate the IDLH atmosphere, and 1/3 supply as a reserve in the
event of an emergency. Assuming a firefighter with a 45-minute SCBA bottle has a 30-minute reserve
of air supply. He or she has a 10-minute window to get to the incident and work before needing to
evacuate. Therefore, the average firefighter utilizing an SCBA may not be physically able to reach an
incident within a rail tunnel, remote from an entry point, and operate for a meaningful duration of
time before needing to evacuate.
Recognizing the shortfalls of SCBAs, fire departments use specialized breathing apparatus with
extended operating durations such as rebreathers. A rebreather “scrubs” the carbon dioxide out of
an exhaled breath, adds supplemental oxygen, and recirculates the exhaled breath as clean air. These
systems allow for extended duration operating periods, up to 4-hours, allowing firefighters to operate
on incident scenes remote from access points. Rebreathers do have limitations: these breathing
apparatus are more expensive than a normal SCBA and require specialized training. Fire departments
usually have a limited number of these systems and not all personnel are trained in how to use them.
Fire departments have also raised concerns regarding the use of rebreather systems as they are not
“rated” for use in firefighting operations.
Every surveyed fire department stated that they had access to emergency carts in the event of a rail
incident. These carts operate on the train rails and are useful for transporting equipment to and from
an incident location in addition to transporting injured civilians. Carts were either manual (push/pull
carts), motorized, or in some instances, electric. The deployment of these carts varies greatly; some
carts are provided and maintained by the transit authority and kept within the stations for use. Others
kept carts at firehouses/equipment caches that must be brought to the scene of a rail incident. When
carts are utilized for the evacuation of injured persons, logistics must be carefully considered as a
rescue cart leaving the incident area should not be impeded by rescue carts coming to the scene from
the opposite direction.
Equipment caches were identified as another operational best practice. Surveyed fire departments
reported having the ability of accessing pre-staged equipment caches to expedite the mobilization of
necessary equipment. These caches, strategically placed within stations, can accommodate fire hoses,
extrication equipment, and greatly enhance speed of access and search in low visibility. (e.g.
backboards, SKEDs, extra rail carts, prepackaged emergency medical equipment, collapsible search
sticks and other necessary equipment). Fire departments lacking the resources to store equipment
within a station have opted to create dedicated vehicles or trailers (e.g. a vehicle dedicated to Tunnel
Rescue) that can bring large amounts of equipment to any scene.
Communication within tunnels was a limitation identified by every surveyed fire department. The
below-grade operating environment often renders the above-grade strategically placed repeaters,
antennas, and bidirectional amplifiers useless. Surveyed fire departments indicated that
communications inside tunnels had improved over the years as many of them had been equipped
with leaky feeders 70 and repeaters.
70 A leaky feeder is a communication system consisting of a cable running along the tunnel, which emits and receives radio waves,
functioning as an extended antenna.
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Emergency Responders Support Technology
Surveyed fire departments did not offer any “futuristic” technologies (e.g. robots, drones, etc.) readily
available for their use. Several fire departments reported advancements in thermal imaging
capabilities (e.g. more thermal imaging cameras being used across all members of the departments),
but as a general firefighting function and not specifically in response to tunnel emergencies.
One fire department mentioned that they model their tunnel response procedures after lessons
learned training with fire departments in Europe. Their equipment now includes a specific, light-
weight single jacketed fire hose. The training also provided them with a more efficient hose-packing
methodology. This fire department reported that they can now deploy several hundred feet of hose
easily with minimal manpower. The authors of the present report also learnt that the European
approach for long-duration air supply relies on using a two-bottle SCBA system. This solution allows
for an extended operating period for firefighters using equipment similar to the common-use SCBA.
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Case Studies
The following case studies provide examples of incidents where safe egress and emergency responses
were a challenge in rail tunnels.
BART Transbay Tube Fire (January 1979) 71
Tunnel Design and Fire Safety Features
The Transbay tunnel system under the San Francisco Bay is approximately 3.7 miles (5.95 km) long.
It is a double bore tunnel system with an 8 ft wide gallery between the two tracks. Each bore has an
approximate open-air radius of 6.5 ft (2 m) (See Figure 9). The gallery contains electrical, mechanical,
and communication support facilities. Closed emergency doors providing access from the gallery to
each running tunnel are located approximately every 330 ft (100 m). Under normal conditions, these
doors are closed and locked. A key is required to open from the gallery side. On the running tunnels
side, the doors can be opened electrically by activating the emergency door hardware. The upper
portion of the gallery provides air exhaust and is fitted with dampers (6 ft long (1.8 m) by 3 ft (0.9 m)
high) located above every third doorway.
A main water supply dedicated to firefighting activities runs along the entire length of the Transbay
tunnel system. Valves with hose connections are located at every doorway. 30 in. (760 mm) egress
walkways are present in each running tunnel on the side adjacent to the gallery. They are illuminated
by fluorescent lights every 50 ft (15 m). Small electrical substations installed in the gallery provide
electrical power to the third rail. Every 5000 ft (1524 m), gaps are located in the third rail for isolation
purposes.
Access points to the tunnel system are at the Oakland and San Francisco ventilation structures.
FIGURE 9. TRANSBAY TUNNEL SYSTEM CROSS-SECTION. 71
71 Bay Area Rapid Transit District Fire on Train No. 117 and Evacuation of Passengers while in the Transbay Tube, San Francisco, California,
January 17, 1979, Railroad Accident Report NTSB-RAR-79-5, National Transportation Safety Board, July 19, 1979.
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Fire Event
On January 17, 1979, the fifth and sixth cars of a seven-car westbound train of the Bay Area Rapid
Transit (BART) caught fire while in the Transbay tunnel located between San Francisco and Oakland.
The train departed from Oakland West Station at 6.00 PM PST and was traveling towards
Embarcadero Station. Forty (40) passengers, a train operator and a line supervisor were on board. At
approximately 6.06 PM PST, the train operator indicated that the train emergency brake had activated
and that a fire might have started on the train. He was unable to determine the origin of the fire as
smoke had significantly reduced visibility.
The train operator was instructed to try to uncouple the lead portion of the train from the one on fire.
The poor visibility in the tunnel prevented the train operator from moving the train.
Passengers were instructed to move towards the lead car. At approximately 6.08 PM PST, ventilation
fans were activated on the Oakland side and an exhaust damper located approximately 500 ft (152 m)
ahead of the train was opened.
Egress
At 6.15 PM PST, power to the third rail was switched off to allow for passengers and crew evacuation.
A few minutes later, the line supervisor indicated that the visibility outside the train was too limited
to evacuate. One of the passengers was blind.
At 6.23 PM PST, an exhaust damper located approximately 1000 ft (305 m) to the rear of the train was
opened. The exhaust damper located ahead of the train was closed and ventilation fans on the San
Francisco side were activated. Oakland firefighters boarded a train from Oakland West to take them
to the incident train. The train carrying the firefighters stopped about 200 feet (61 m) from the incident
train. When firefighters exited the train, they were welcomed by thick smoke. Some firefighters made
it to Door No. 44 leading to the gallery and entered. Communication was by Door No 45 of the gallery
whose was also open. Smoke started to enter the gallery through Door No. 45, forcing the firefighters
to go back to the train they traveled with. Door No. 45 was left open.
At 6.21 PM PST, a train with over 1000 passengers waiting at Embarcadero station was directed to go
into the non-incident tunnel to pick up the passengers and crew evacuating the incident train. The
rescue train stopped by the gallery Door No. 43 (See Figure 10). Smoke had started to enter the non-
incident tunnel through the opened gallery doors. Power to the third rail had been shut off for both
trains.
Firefighters started evacuating passengers from the incident train along the egress walkway to the
gallery Door No. 43. The environment was filled with black smoke. The conditions in the incident
tunnel worsened and passengers started to call for help. 35 passengers including the blind person
were evacuated by the firefighters through the gallery Door No. 43. As the visibility conditions were
improving towards the front of the incident train, the last 5 passengers accessed the train operator
compartment, exited through a window and walked to the gallery Door No. 42. All passengers were
evacuated into the gallery. Some were given oxygen prior to boarding the rescue train. At 6.59 PM
PST, power was restored to the third rail allowing the rescue train to drive back to Oakland West
Station. As the rescue train accelerated, smoke was drawn from the incident tunnel into the gallery
and the non-incident tunnel through opened gallery doors (piston effect). The intensity of the airflow
knocked down several BART employees and firefighters who were standing in the gallery.
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FIGURE 10. TRANSBAY TUNNEL SYSTEM SCHEMATIC.71
As the smoke entered the gallery, some firefighters on scene depleted their oxygen supply.
Firefighters formed a chain, holding hands to find a smokeless portion in the incident tunnel and a
phone box to call for assistance. A train at Oakland West station was sent into the incident tunnel to
recover the firefighters. At approximately 7.48 PM PST, the firefighters had boarded the train and
reached Oakland West station by 8.10 PM PST where firefighters who had exhausted their oxygen
supply were taken to area hospitals. A lieutenant who was the first to deplete his oxygen supply later
died of smoke inhalation and cyanide poisoning.
Firefighting Operations
At approximately 8.15 PM PST, Hose lines were placed through the Doors No. 43, 44, and 45 from
standpipes located in the non-incident tunnel. After it was established that the third rail in the
incident tunnel was de-energized and earthed, firefighting started. The heat from the fire and radiated
from the concrete lining was so intense that firefighters needed to be protected with a second hose
line. Due to the ambient conditions, firefighters were relieved at 5-minute intervals. The fire was
declared under control at about 1.31 AM PST on January 18, 1979.
Incident Analysis
It was determined that the probable cause of the fire was the breaking of a collector shoe assembly 72
when struck by a line switchbox cover that had fallen from an earlier train. The damage likely resulted
in short-circuits created by undercar arcing which provided enough energy to ignite components of
72 A train collector shoe assembly carries the current from the third rail to the train.
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the train and start the fire. The first three (3) cars of the incident train sustained smoke damage while
the rest of the cars were destroyed by the fire.
The concrete lining of the incident tunnel sustained significant damage from heat in the area of the
fire seat. Spalling had occurred in several locations, revealing the steel reinforcement of the tunnel
assembly. Sections of the steel handrails on the egress walkway were warped where the fire was most
intense. Overhead radio and train controls were also destroyed.
Egress
The line supervisors instructed the passengers to walk towards the lead car. Given the limited number
of passengers (40), there was no issue in having them move to the first car and shelter there per BART
emergency procedure. 73 Following the BART emergency procedure entailed uncoupling the non-
burning train section from the burning one and exit the tunnel. 9 minutes elapsed before the train
operator indicated that he was unable to uncouple the train. During that time, the fire grew, and the
ambient conditions worsened (lack of visibility, hot gases, and smoke) so that self-evacuation was not
possible. Studies by emergency services suggest that the first 10 minutes of a tunnel fire are critical
for a successful evacuation. The consequences of a similar fire with an occupant-load representative
of rush-hour conditions would have been dramatic as passengers would have been unable to all
shelter in the leading car and been trapped in wagons directly involved in the fire. At the time, train
component materials were not required to comply with fire resistance criteria.
Doors from the incident tunnel to the gallery were spaced at 330 ft (100 m) intervals which helped the
firefighters reach the trapped passengers without having to stay in the incident tunnel for an extended
period. Had the passengers evacuated and located a gallery door, they would have had to activate
the door electric hardware which operational status was unknown. Passengers could have been
trapped by the gallery door unable to enter until the emergency response team opened the door from
the gallery side.
Communication
Several miscommunications impacted the egress operations:
• Intervention from SFFD was delayed. At 6.09 PM PST, BART attempted to contact the
Oakland Fire Department (OFD) but unintentionally called the San Francisco Fire Department
(SFFD). BART did not provide any information regarding the fire and indicated to disregard
the call. At 6.19 PM PST, CFFD called BART to inquire about a possible fire somewhere. They
were told that a train was stopped in the Transbay tube on the Oakland side and that large
amounts of smoke were released. At 6.32 PM PST, OFD indicated to SFFD that they were
riding a train to the fire site. At 6.36 PM PST, SFFD dispatched units to Embarcadero station
to standby. They were held until 7.52 PM PST due to issues getting information from BART
and OFD.
• BART did not follow the emergency procedure.
o OFD should have boarded the BART emergency vehicle at the maintenance access
point and one single rescue train for tunnel entry and evacuation should have been
used with no passengers on board when going towards the incident train.
73 BART emergency procedure instructed to not evacuate a train between stations.
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o OFD realized 10 to 15 minutes after being notified by BART that a train was stranded
and on fire in the tunnel. OFD initially thought that the incident train was at Oakland
West station.
o The previous confusion prevented OFD from correctly assessing the situation and
adequately managing their oxygen supply.
• BART did not know the exact location of the incident train and their initial ventilation strategy
(airflow from Oakland to San Francisco) was inadequate as it pushed smoke towards the front
of the train preventing self-evacuation of the passengers and crew. As BART was notified that
the smoke was thickening towards the front of the train, they reversed the airflow pushing
smoke towards the train sent with OFD firefighters on board.
• Communication issues between BART, OFD, and SFFD to obtain confirmation that power to
the third rail had been shutdown, delayed water application to the fire by about 45 minutes.
NTSB Recommendations
After the incident, NTSB provided several recommendations to BART. Their emergency procedure
should be revised to:
• Emphasize the necessity to evacuate passengers and crew immediately after the incident train
stops.
• Prevent sending rescue train with other passengers than emergency response team members.
• Ventilation procedure to account for the location of the fire, passengers, and emergency
responders.
• Notify both OFD and SFFD when a smoke/fire incident is detected in the tunnel.
• Allow emergency response teams to be able to use their emergency communication
equipment.
• Improve the fire resistance of train materials.
This incident also helped identify the need to develop life safety and fire protection guidance in rail
systems.
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Channel Tunnel Fires (1996, and 2008)
Tunnel Design & Fire Safety Features 74
The Channel Tunnel is a 50.5 km (31.3 miles) railway tunnel that connects Folkestone (England) with
Coquelles (France). It runs below the Channel at the Strait of Dover. It is composed of underground
and immersed sections, the latter being approximately 38 km (23.6 miles) long. The tunnel
infrastructure consists of 3 tunnels: two unidirectional single-track tunnels and one service tunnel (see
Figure 11 and Figure 12).
Each rail tunnel is divided into 3 intervals and connected between each interval by a large diameter
crossover (see Figure 11). The crossover allows trains to be directed from one running tunnel to the
other so that interval(s) can be taken out of service without full closure of the tunnel system. The two
rail tunnels are 7.6 m (25 ft) in diameter each and located 30 m (98 ft) apart from each other. They
mostly include a single rail track, 25 kV overhead power line, and two walkways. One walkway is
used for maintenance, the other one adjacent to the service tunnel is designed for emergency
evacuation.
The service tunnel allows access to the rail tunnels when maintenance is needed as well as during
incident when evacuation and emergency responders access is needed. The service tunnel is 4.8 m in
diameter and is approximately 15 m (49 ft) away from each rail tunnel. The service tunnel is fitted
with Service Tunnel Transport System vehicles allowing movement of personnel, people in the case
of evacuation as well as equipment. Access to the service tunnel from the rail tunnels is achieved
through cross-passageways located every 375 m (1230 ft). The cross-passageways are isolated from
the rail tunnels by sealed fire-resistant doors. They are usually controlled remotely from the rail
control center but can also be operated manually by 2 electrical or manual control devices. The service
tunnel operates at a higher pressure than the rail tunnels to prevent smoke intrusion in the case of a
fire incident.
The passage of trains induces pressure changes withing each tube. Piston Relief Ducts (PRD) connect
the rail tunnels to balance the pressure between the two rail tunnels. PRDs are equipped with
dampers to prevent fire and smoke spread in the event of a fire incident.
The Channel tunnel system is equipped with two ventilation systems which are part of the fire safety
strategy:
• The Normal Ventilation System (NVS) supplies air to the service tunnel and maintains a
positive pressure compared to the rail tunnels.
• The Supplementary Ventilation System (SVS) is present to direct and increase the flow of
ventilation air in case of an emergency such as a fire. The system only operates when smoke
or fume clearance is needed. They can provide an airflow rate in the tunnel of up to 2.5 m/s.
The configuration of the two ventilation systems is scenario specific.
Smoke and flame detectors are installed every 1500 m (4921 ft) in each rail tunnel. A fire main is
provided in the service tunnel to assist emergency responders with extinction activities. Smoke
detectors are installed in the leading and rear loading wagons of freight trains.
74 https://www.getlinkgroup.com/en/our-group/eurotunnel/channel-tunnel/.
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There is a main water supply in the service tunnel. The water is supplied from both ends of the tunnel,
enabling twice a water flow rate of 120 m3 per hour (528 gallons per minute (gpm)). Fire hydrants are
present on each side of each cross-passageway in each rail tunnel.
The egress walkway is approximately 800 mm (32 in.) wide. 75
75 Technical Investigation Report concerning the Fire on Eurotunnel Freight Shuttle 7412b on 11 September 2008, BEATT-2008-015, BEA-TT
– RAIB, November 2010, p. 21.
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FIGURE 11. SCHEMATIC OF THE CHANNEL TUNNEL SYSTEM (FROM GETLINK 76).
76 https://www.getlinkgroup.com/en/our-group/eurotunnel/channel-tunnel/
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FIGURE 12. CROSS SECTION OF THE CHANNEL TUNNEL SYSTEM (FROM GETLINK 77).
77 https://www.getlinkgroup.com/en/our-group/eurotunnel/channel-tunnel/
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1996 Fire Event
On November 18, 1996, at approximately 8.45 PM BST, security guards on the French side of the tunnel
system saw flames on a Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) train (HGV can pull 28 trucks on freight wagons)
traveling to the UK. The train had entered the tunnel with 31 passengers and 3 crew members. Upon
detection of the fire, France sent their emergency response team into the tunnel system. The Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) for fires in the tunnel system was to have the train continue its course
through the tunnel and extinguish it once it is outside. UK fire services were also notified about the
fire but stayed put, awaiting the train to exit the tunnel before beginning their extinction efforts. High
levels of CO (2 times the IDLH levels) were detected, and the UK emergency response team decided
to proceed inside the tunnel to a mid-point. At approximately 9.04 PM BST, a warning light on the
train control panel activated requiring the train to be brought to a controlled stop. When the train
stopped the Chef de Train (i.e. conductor) opened an exterior door, allowing the smoke to enter the
passengers’ compartment. Under normal conditions, the ventilation system would have directed the
airflow from the front of the train to the rear. The airflow was reversed when the train stopped due
to the “piston effect” created by the incident train, the ones preceding it, as well as a freight shuttle
that entered the tunnel behind it. The only occupant of the freight shuttle was the driver who self-
evacuated the tunnel through a cross-passageway.
Egress Strategy
France emergency response team arrived on the scene at 9.15 PM BST and started to evacuate the 34
passengers and crew on the train. Eight people suffered from smoke inhalation and were taken on
ambulances designed for the tunnel system from the service tunnel. Among the eight persons injured,
the driver and a pregnant woman required were more seriously injured and were evacuated by
helicopter. A shuttle going through the non-incident rail tunnel was stopped and the uninjured
passengers came on board and were transported to the UK.
The UK emergency response team arrived at approximately 9.30 PM BST. There were some
communication issues between the two emergency response teams due to a language barrier. In
addition, information about the incident was sparse as most of the train crew suffered severe smoke
intoxication. It was decided that the France emergency response team would continue to provide
assistance to the passengers and crew while the UK emergency response team would evaluate the
fire. The UK emergency response team entered the incident tunnel at approximately 9.40 PM BST
from a cross-passageway. The entry team had portable radios, a charge hose line and a thermal
imager. Thick smoke was present in the tunnel. The entry team proceeded from the front of the train
towards the rear. They verified that all passengers had been evacuated. Smoke conditions started to
improve with the activation of the SVS. The entry team observed important damage in the tunnel and
identified the location of the fire. The fire originated from a truck located towards the rear of the train.
They exited the tunnel through a cross-passage to report on their findings.
A joint strategy was decided to fight the fire. The UK emergency response team would attack closer
to the fire while the France emergency response team would attack from upstream. A positive
pressure was maintained in the service tunnel relative to the incident one. Airflow had been increased
in the incident tunnel to blow from the UK side on the west towards the French side on the East. The
combined airflows of SVS in the incident tunnel and from the cross-passageway were able to create a
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safety “bubble” of about 3.2 feet (1 meter) into the incident tunnel where an emergency responder
could safely stand. Beyond this boundary, emergency responders had to be in full gear and were
facing intense heat and smoke allowing not more than 8 to 10 minutes outside the safety “bubble”. In
addition to heat and smoke, Emergency responders had to avoid concrete debris falling from the
tunnel ceiling and walls and accumulated on the tunnel walkways, creating additional obstacles along
the access path. Only two hose lines (one on each side of the train) were able to be used. The UK
emergency response team indicated problems with the water supply for two hours until the tunnel
engineers were able to reconfigure the water distribution. The water system was likely overloaded
by the demand. A broken water line was also identified. Most of the fire was extinguished by 5.00
AM BST and fully extinguished at 11.15 AM BST. The UK emergency responders used more than 200
air breathing cylinders during the operations.
1996 Incident Analysis
Egress
The train driver brought the train to a controlled stop in proximity to a cross-passageway. Despite a
limited number of passengers, 8 suffered smoke inhalation due to the combination of an airflow going
towards the passengers’ location and the opening of a passenger compartment door.
The emergency responders assisted the evacuation of the passengers and crew. They established their
support in the cross-passageway and with the evacuation of the injured passengers through the
service tunnel.
Firefighting Strategy
Eight trucks were destroyed during the fire and the train suffered major damage. The incident tunnel
was significantly damaged. The concrete lining had experienced spalling in multiple locations.
Smoke was able to spread to the adjacent rail tunnel through unsealed crossover doors. The
engineering management system failed preventing engineers to know the status (open/close) of cross-
passageway fire doors and affecting the ventilation strategy effectiveness. Analysis of the incident
indicated that the ventilation system was unable to limit fire spread but provided emergency
responders with a safe working area in proximity of the fire. However, the airflow also fed the fire
and worsened the thermal and smoke conditions around the fire. Outside of the safety area, the
conditions required the emergency responders to wear full protective equipment and could only fight
the fire for a limited time. Many firefighters were needed to fight the blaze. Firefighters rotated every
8 to 10 minutes due to the thermal and smoke conditions in the fire area.
Communication
Communication difficulties existed between the emergency response teams with a communication
system overwhelmed early in the incident. Notification of part of the UK emergency responders was
delayed due to a failed communication system.
Water Supply
The amount of water needed to extinguish the fire exceeded the design capacity of the system.
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2008 Fire Event 78
On September 11, 2008, a fire occurred on a freight train carrying 25 trucks and 2 vans. 32 people
were on board at the time of the event. The amenity coach car in which the lorry/truck drivers are
travelling in is located behind the leading locomotive. The freight train departed from the English
terminal at 3.36 PM CET. A fire is detected at approximately 3.54 PM CET with a rise of Carbon
Monoxide (CO) level. The Chef de Train observes a fire in the area around the first loaded wagon and
closes the ventilation dampers in the amenity coach.
The SVS was started when the fire was identified. At first, the smoke spread in the same direction as
the freight train which resulted in filling the atmosphere surrounding the amenity coach and the
locomotive with smoke. After the SVS reached full capacity, the smoke was pushed back towards the
UK side, allowing the emergency responders to access the scene.
Egress
After detection of the fire, the Chef de Train (i.e. conductor) provided breathing masks to the
passengers. The train driver performed a controlled stop of the train in the vicinity of a cross-
passageway (See Figure 13). 3 cross-passageways are located along the train: one towards the front
of the train, one towards the middle of the train, and one towards the rear of the train. The Chef de
Train opened the right-hand rear door of the amenity coach which allowed smoke to enter the car.
He then went to the cross-passageway. Passengers and a member of the catering staff had already
arrived after breaking a window to exit the train. The door of the cross-passageway was remotely
opened by the Emergency Management System (EMS) Controller, allowing passengers and crew to
access the service tunnel and to breathe fresh air. 4 passengers were missing. Two were recovered
by emergency responders near the next cross-passageway. The other two had initially gone in the
wrong direction and later turned around to find the cross-passageway with the rest of the passengers.
The passengers and crew were evacuated from the service tunnel on a service car.
6 injured persons were identified among the passengers and crew who evacuated the incident tunnel:
two people were injured by glass and four suffered from smoke inhalation.
FIGURE 13. POSITION OF THE FREIGHT TRAIN COMPARED TO CROSS-PASSAGEWAYS78.
– RAIB, November 2010.
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The France and UK Emergency Response teams arrived at a cross-passageway close to the scene,
respectively, at 4.13 PM CET and 4.15 PM CET. Information from the freight inventory system
indicates the presence of dangerous goods on several trucks loaded on the freight train.
The emergency response teams prepared 3 hose lines in the cross-passageway closest to the fire area.
The first assault is conducted at approximately 4.55 PM CET from the of the train using the 3 hose
lines. The fire has spread from the time it was first detected. It is more than 100 m (328 ft) away from
the emergency response teams’ access point. Their progress is slow due to the heat, smoke, and
narrowness of the walkways in the tunnel. A decision is taken to open the doors of cross-passageways
approximately aligned with the middle and rear of the freight train.
At approximately 6.19 PM CET, a combined attack is decided. The France Emergency Response team
will fight the fire from the middle of the train towards the rear while the UK Emergency Response
team will attack the fire from the rear of the freight train. Coincidently, the airflow from the SVS will
be reduced.
Execution of the combined firefighting strategy was delayed by a water supply issue. The fire hydrant
by the cross-passageway where the UK Emergency Response team was positioned had no water due
to a closed valve. A technician finally opened the valve at 7.35 PM CET and the combined firefighting
strategy can be executed.
The firefighters faced difficulties during the operation:
• Debris were present on the walkways.

• Limited space was available to deploy the hose lines.
• The distance between the cross-passageways (access-points) and the firefighting locations.
• Poor visibility from the smoke produced by the fire.
• High temperatures in the area of the fire.
The UK emergency response team was located downstream of the fire and was exposed to smoke and
heat from the fire fed by the airflow generated by the SVS. The latter was reduced to improve the
working conditions of the UK emergency response team. UK firefighters were battling the fire with
10 minutes rotations.
Given the difficult conditions, the firefighting strategy was later modified. Two water curtains were
placed at the rear of the train. The UK and France Emergency Response teams combined their efforts
to attack the fire in the middle of the train. The SVS airflow was increased to reduce the CO
concentration and the ambient temperature. Three additional hose lines and a portable water cannon
were deployed. Emergency response teams encountered worsened fire conditions with wagons
transporting goods with high calorific values.
Firefighting was stopped at the rear of the train and a wall of water was created over the last carrier
wagon to protect the rear locomotive. All the teams were working from the middle of the train
location with 4 hose lines in operation. Water consumption was then 100 m3 per hour (440 gpm), 83%
of the available water supply. The fire was under control at approximately 7.50 AM CET, and was
considered extinguished at 11.46 AM CET.
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2008 Incident Analysis
Egress Strategy
3 cross-passageways were located along the location of the train (See Figure 13). However, because
of the concentration of smoke around the amenity coach, the Chef de Train does not know if the train
has stopped by a cross-passageway and if the fire-resistant cross-passageway door is opened.
Although the controlled stop procedure was correctly followed, the front right-hand door of the
amenity coach was not in front of the cross-passageway preventing visual identification of egress
path. 79
When the cross-passageway door remotely opened, smoke moved away by the positive airflow in the
cross-passageways allowing the passengers to locate its location. Communication between the train
crew and the passengers was challenging since most of them do not speak English or French.
Although the Chef de Train instructed the passengers to follow him, they instead broke the window
beside the cross-passageway and evacuated in about 2.5 minutes. Some passengers cut themselves
with glass bits remaining on the window frame and others fell onto the walkway. Being able to
appropriately relay information from the crew to passengers is paramount to make sure that the
correct egress path is used.
4 passengers had left the amenity coach prematurely on the maintenance walkway instead of the
egress pathway. They split into 2 groups. Both groups started to walk away from the fire. Once the
SVS cleared some of the smoke, one group turned around and walked back towards the cross-
passageway where the other passengers and crew had evacuated. The second group continued to
walk away from the fire until they located the next cross-passageway whose door had been opened
as part of the evacuation procedure. The second group walked approximately 340 m (1115 ft) inside
the incident tunnel in about 6 minutes before locating the cross-passageway door (approximate
average walking speed of 0.9 m/s (3 ft/s). They were latter collected in the service tunnel by the
France Emergency Response team. Adequate signage and the ability of the SVS to clear some of the
smoke present in the environment was critical to allow these passengers to find a cross-passageway
and evacuate without endangering their lives.
Firefighting strategy
The overall firefighting strategy of the emergency response teams is presented in Figure 14. Before
the emergency response intervention started, the overhead catenary had to be de-energized and
earthed. The agents responsible for this task were not equipped to conduct the intervention near the
fire site and had to performed it form the ends of the incident tunnel, requiring that all the trains
present I the tunnel had left. The ability to provide electrical protection could be improved by
implementing remote earthing or in situ operation procedures.
The reliability of some of the emergency equipment was questioned. The electric control of fire-
resistant doors of cross-passageways failed due to the heat generated by the fire and doors had to be
open manually which required a longer time. A water control valve that should have been in an open
position was closed which delayed the firefighting operations. Regular inspections are required and
necessary to confirm that fire protection systems/equipment are operational. A fire hydrant also
79 The controlled stop procedure is homogeneous between passenger and freight trains. However, the dimensions of train features used to
determine proper alignment with the cross-passageway are different.
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failed due to the heat. The reliability of fire protection features under high temperatures and smoke-
filled environment is also important and needs to be verified prior to installation.
Knowledge of the fire location is important to develop an adequate firefighting strategy. The tunnel
emergency procedure in case of fire limits the number of cross-passageway doors that can be open at
once to two doors, the emergency responders had to make sure all the passengers and crew had been
evacuated before locating the fire.
The incident tunnel sustained significant damage. The tunnel concrete lining was destroyed over a
length of 750 m (2460 ft). Spalling was observed in multiple locations up to a 40 cm (16 in.) depth.
Studies from emergency services suggest that to successfully extinguish a fire similar to the September
11, 2008, fire and limit damage to the tunnel structure, firefighting operations should take place within
the first 10 minutes of ignition. The ability to be rapidly reach the fire area and start attacking the fire
depends on several parameters such as:
• Time to locate the train and fire.

• Time to access the incident section of the tunnel.
• Time to evaluate the situation and develop a firefighting strategy, possibly before evacuation
is completed.
• Time to initiate the firefighting strategy, possibly before the evacuation is completed.
• Water Supply.
• Train stopped in front of cross-passageway.
• Evacuation successful and crew supervised evacuation.
• Fire detected by sensors.
Lessons Learned From The 1996 and 2008 Channel Fires
Lessons learnt from each Channel fire event are listed in Table 5.
TABLE 5. LESSONS LEARNT FROM 1996 AND 2008 FIRE EVENTS.
Fire Event Egress Fire-Fighting Strategy
1996 • SOP needs to consider a scenario where train • Cross-passageway location and spacing are
stops inside tunnel. critical to support occupants’ evacuation and
• Emergency ventilation strategy needs to prepare fire suppression actions.
account for “piston’s effect”. • Emergency Ventilation System supports the
• SOP needs to include railcars door opening, creation of a safe working area.
ventilation procedures in case of fire. • Emergency response crew needs to count
• Engineering management system needs to enough members to allow for fire suppression
provide reliable information with regards to activities with fast rotations.
cross-passageways door status (open/close). • The water supply needs to be adequately
dimensioned.
• Communication system in and between UK and
France needs to be more reliable.
2008 • Improve evacuation procedure (crew to be • Develop procedures to better locate fire/fire
trained in providing clear instructions to spread, and rapidly develop firefighting
passengers). strategy.
• Improve tunnel signage and lighting under • Water supply and mains need to be adequately
smoke conditions. maintained and tested.
• Verify reliability of emergency equipment.
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FIGURE 14 -. INCIDENT FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY.78
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WMATA L’Enfant Plaza Station Smoke Accident (January 2015) 80
Tunnel Design & Fire Safety Features
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), aka Metro, is a transit system
serving the District of Columbia and adjacent sections of Maryland and Virginia. The Metrorail
system opened in 1976, and currently operates six lines; Blue, Red, Yellow, Green, Orange, and Silver,
with a combined total of 91 rail stations, 50.5 miles (81.3 km) of tunnels, and 118-mile network.
WMATA oversees operations at a Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC).
The L’Enfant Plaza station opened in 1977 and has two levels. Green and Yellow line trains pass
through the station on the upper level, Orange, Blue, and Silver line trains are on the lower level.
Green and Yellow line trains share inbound and outbound platforms in the upper level, and south of
the station the rail lines separate into tunnels for the Green line (inbound and outbound), outbound
Yellow line, and inbound Yellow line (See Figure 15).
The inbound and outbound Yellow line tunnels rejoin prior to crossing the Potomac River.
The rail tunnel system contains fan shafts and vent shafts, some of which provide emergency egress,
as well as dedicated egress shafts. The L’Enfant Plaza station is also equipped with under-platform
fans. Vent fans and under-platform fans are controllable locally and at the ROCC and can operate in
exhaust or to supply fresh air. Rail cars also have internal ventilation systems, which are controllable
by the train operator with the permission of the ROCC.
Trains operate via a 750-VDC contact (third) rail. Power to the third rail may be disconnected via
emergency trip stations located within tunnels and at platform ends, remotely at the ROCC, or by
disconnecting substation breakers.
80 National Transportation Safety Board. 2015. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority L’Enfant Plaza Station Electrical Arcing
and Smoke Accident, Washington, DC, January 12, 2015. Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-16/01. Washington, DC.
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FIGURE 15. METRORAIL YELLOW AND GREEN LINE TUNNEL CONFIGURATION SOUTH OF L’ENFANT PLAZA.
Fire Event
On January 12, 2015, at 3.04 PM EST, a smoke detector in the Yellow Line tunnel south of L’Enfant
Plaza activated in response to smoke from electrical arcing near vent shaft FL-1, however the signal
was not received by the ROCC due to a faulty wire. Subsequent smoke detectors activated, and were
received by the ROCC, however no specific procedure was in place for response to alarms in tunnels.
Shortly thereafter, a northbound Yellow Line train on Track 1 encountered heavy smoke in the same
area prior to entering L’Enfant Plaza and reported the smoke to the ROCC. At 3.15 PM EST,
southbound Yellow Line Train 302 departed L’Enfant Plaza on Track 2 and was directed to look for
smoke by the ROCC. The train, approximately 450 ft (137 m) long with six cars and carrying 386
passengers, stopped after proceeding 836 ft (255 m) from L’Enfant Plaza station when it encountered
heavy smoke.
The train operator requested to reverse direction and return to the station, powered down the lead
train control console and walked to the rear of the train to power up the rear console. The smoke was
also reported to the ROCC by two transit police officers who were riding Train 302. While the train
was stopped, passengers reported heavy smoke, the need to crouch on the floor, and difficulty
breathing.
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Green line Train 510 southbound on Track 2 later was directed by the ROCC to stop short of L’Enfant
Plaza due to the emergency with Train 302. At 3.23 PM EST, a supervisor at ROCC told Train 510 to
proceed into the station. Upon entering the station, transit police officers evacuated all occupants,
including the operator. The operator later returned to the train to try to reverse it out of the station to
accommodate Train 302 returning, but the third rail power had been disconnected and the train was
unable to move.
As the operator of Train 302 powered the rear console to attempt to return to L’Enfant Plaza, they
were directed to shut off train ventilation by ROCC, and they were also unable to move the train (due
to brake activation from loss of third rail power). At that point, the operator reported that passengers
had begun to self-evacuate.
Incident Analysis
Egress Strategy
Passengers from Train 302 either self-evacuated or were assisted by the fire department. They were
reported to have exited via a rear door to a safety walkway. Firefighters reached the rear of the train
at 3.50 PM EST, and all passengers were evacuated by 4.27 PM EST. All passengers except for one
were reported to have walked from the train; one passenger who was fatally injured was carried.
Passengers reported difficulty navigating the emergency walkway due to a lack of lighting (post-
incident investigation revealed 0 foot-candle illumination in areas) and wall-mounted obstructions.
Firefighting Strategy
The fire/arcing incident occurred at the FL-1 vent shaft. As the shaft is an emergency egress location,
the tunnels for Tracks 1 and 2 are connected, and there is an emergency platform with exit stairs to
the surface. To prevent passengers in the track bed from having to step over the third rail, it terminates
at opposite ends of the platform and is bridged by electrical cables that are covered with a step. Water
intrusion at the cable connections, and unapproved connections and materials were cited as the cause
of the arcing, which consumed wiring, insulation, and the cable covers.
At 3.16 PM EST, an operator in the ROCC manually activated the under-platform fans in L’Enfant
Plaza station to exhaust. The ROCC did not have a specific procedure for controlling smoke
movement in tunnels via fans at the time. This pulled smoke from the incident source towards the
stopped Train 302, which was still operating its internal ventilation. Fans at FL-1 were not activated
to exhaust until 3.24 PM EST, and the post-incident investigation revealed that 2 of the 4 fans there
did not operate.
The ROCC reported the incident to DC Fire and EMS at 3.22 PM EST, units were dispatched at 3.24
PM EST, and started arriving at L’Enfant Plaza at 3.31 PM EST. Initial units arriving at the station
operated an emergency third rail disconnect and entered the tunnel to search for the train. A separate
reconnaissance team entered the station via a separate entrance and entered the Track 1 tunnel instead
of Track 2. The team had to backtrack after discovering that the smoke was dissipating, and they were
in the wrong tunnel.
Throughout the incident, communication between agencies was reported to be difficult. A unified
command was not established. The ROCC had recently relocated to Maryland, and the DC Fire and
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EMS liaison at the ROCC was unable to communicate with units at the scene with the base radio in
the building; the liaison had to leave the building to use a vehicle radio.
Post-accident Safety Recommendations
Recommendations made by the NTSB post-incident included:
• Improving rail tunnel fan capabilities to meet NFPA 130.

• Improving procedures for ROCC response to smoke alarms.
• Implement regular testing of smoke detectors.
• Increased training for the ROCC and train crews in emergency procedures and ventilation.
• Routine inspection of lighting, emergency walkways and track beds, and increased signage
in tunnels.
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Chicago Transit Authority Train No. 220 Derailment (July 2006) 81 82
Tunnel Design & Fire Safety Features
The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) Blue Line is a rapid transit system that spans 33 stations along
approximately 27 miles (43.5 km) of at-and-below grade track. The line has three sections, all of which
are connected: O’Hare Branch, Milwaukee-Dearborn Branch, and the Forest Park Branch. The CTA
Train 220 Derailment occurred within the Milwaukee-Dearborn branch in a tunnel between the
Clark/Lake and Grand/Milwaukee Stations.
The construction of the Milwaukee-Dearborn branch began in 1939 and was operational by 1951. It
consists of two bores, side-by-side, with one bore for each direction (northbound/southbound). Bores
were originally 25 ft (7.6 m) in diameter, reinforced with steel and covered in concrete. Emergency
egress and cross-passageways are provided within the tunnels at unspecified intervals. It is unknown
if standpipe hose connections are provided within the tunnels.
Tunnels within the Milwaukee-Dearborn branch are provided with a ventilation system consisting of
blast shafts and vent shafts. Blast shafts provide passive pressure relief and are not provided with
motorized dampers or fans. Blast shafts are typically located directly outside of the station within the
tunnel, with 2 shafts for each tunnel (located at opposite ends of the station). Vent shafts are provided
along tunnels and are provided with motorized fans and dampers. One vent shaft was provided
between the Clark/Lake and Grand/Milwaukee Stations.
Emergency ventilation is provided by means of motorized fans located throughout the tunnel. Fans
within the Milwaukee-Dearborn branch were generally under-platform fans, with several fans with
dual-direction (reversible) capabilities. Fans were capable of being operated remotely by the rail
controller or activated locally at each fan. Note: The fan closest to this incident (Fan 108) was removed
from service in 2001 and was not replaced.
Access to the tunnels was provided via the stations (egress walkways are provided along the track)
with primary access via the train bed. Additional access was provided via the emergency exits along
the track (counter-flow to emergency egress). Tunnels were provided with emergency call boxes,
located at exits. Boxes were assigned numbers which indicated location within the tunnel. Tunnels
were provided with limited surveillance at unspecified distances. Emergency lighting and an
announcement system were provided at each emergency exit and controlled by the rail power
controller.
Train power was supplied via 600-Volt DC third rail, located outside of the track, parallel to the
running rail.
Fire Event
On June 11, 2006, at approximately 5.06 PM CST, the last of an eight-car train with approximately
1,000 occupants derailed and caught fire after coming into contact with the third-rail. The train was
traveling northbound, having departed Clark/Lake Station heading towards Grand/Milwaukee
stations when the train operator received an indication of an issue with the train. The operator
81 National Transportation Safety Board. 2007. Derailment of Chicago Transit Authority Train Number 220 Between Clark/lake and
Grand/Milwaukee Stations, Chicago, Illinois, July 11,2006. Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-07/02. Washington, DC.
82 https://www.chicago-l.org/operations/lines/dearborn_subway.html
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attempted to trouble shoot the issue but was unable to visualize the entire train due to track curvature.
The operator decided to proceed towards the next station (Grand/Milwaukee) to investigate further.
After proceeding a short distance, the train operator received notification of an automatic emergency-
breaking mode activation and the train had derailed.
The operator radioed the rail controller at approximately 5.07 PM CST that the automatic emergency-
braking mode had activated and that he was to leave the control car to investigate. Upon exiting the
control car, the operator noticed smoke emanating from the rear of the train. As the operator made
his way towards the rear of the train, he noticed emergency doors had been opened with occupants
self-evacuating. The operator assisted with opening the remaining emergency doors and assisted
occupants evacuating along the egress walkway.
Egress
At 5.09 PM CST, the CTA power controller “noted anomalies on the Blue Line in the area of the
derailment and manually shutoff power to the third rail.”
Occupants began self-evacuating shortly after the train operator radioed the rail controller stating the
train had entered emergency braking mode at 5.07 PM CST. At 5.13 PM CST, a CTA Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition log indicated that a door alarm activated at the emergency exit located
at 300 North Clinton Street. This emergency exit was located approximately 200 ft (61 m) north of the
train.
At 5.15 PM CST, a passenger activated emergency call box 52379 and was connected to the CTA power
controller. The CTA power controller was unable to determine the location of the call box but advised
the caller that the emergency lights and announcement system had been activated (note, the
emergency lights and announcement system had been activated at emergency exits further north than
the closest exit). The power controller activated the emergency lights and announcement system at
the appropriate emergency exit (300 North Clinton Street) at approximately 5.24 PM CST.
The derailment of train 220 resulted in several trains becoming stalled along the tracks. Evacuation
of these trains began at approximately 5.22 PM CST at the Clark/Lake stations.
All occupants from this incident were evacuated via the 300 North Clinton Street emergency exit. “In
spite of the buildup of heavy smoke at the emergency exit, the operator remained in the tunnel and
directed” passengers to safety. The Fire Department reported encountering a smoke condition upon
entering the tunnel. The commanding officer noted that two passengers fell from the egress walkway
and were assisted by fire department personnel.
The Chicago Fire Department reported that the train and tunnel were clear of occupants as of 5.49
PM CST.
The first 911 call occurred at approximately 5:09 PM CST reporting that an accident occurred on the
Blue Line between Clark/Lake and Grand/Milwaukee stations, that the train was on fire and that
there was a smoke condition. Initial response from the Chicago Fire Department was directed to the
Clark/Lake Station consisting of four engines, four ladders, a heavy rescue, a command vehicle, five
advanced life support ambulances, and a mobile ventilation unit.
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At 5:16 PM CST, a police officer that reported smoke was visible inside of Grand/Milwaukee station.
Additionally, 911 callers had reported exiting via the emergency exit at 300 North Clinton Street. The
Chicago Fire Department had re-directed units to both of these locations.
The Fire Department, having made access at the 300 North Clinton Street emergency exit, reported
locating the fire at approximately 5.49 PM CST. The fire was extinguished with a dry chemical
extinguisher and a pressurized water extinguisher.
Efforts to remove smoke from the tunnels were delayed due to non-functional fans and sequencing
which caused fans to pull “against each other from opposite sides of the smoke source.”
The fire department reported a total of 152 people were treated and transported from this incident
with the “majority of the injuries due to smoke inhalation.” No fatalities were reported.
Incident Analysis
The cause of the derailment was determined to be the failure of “multiple rail fastener devices”
causing the rail to move “laterally outward under load.” Subsequently, the train came into contact
with the third rail, causing an arcing electrical fire. Fire damage was limited to the last rail car. The
fire caused extensive damage to the current collector assembly, the forward pickup shoe, electrical
cables, and the fiberglass flash shield which covers the current collector assembly.
Egress
Each train car is provided with emergency instructions that advise passengers to wait in the train for
further instructions.
In accordance with CTA operating procedures, the train operator notified the rail controller and
attempted to trouble shoot the cause of the emergency brake activation. While investigating the cause
of the emergency brake observation, the train operator encountered smoke and passengers self-
evacuating. The train operator notified the rail controller of the situation and assisted passengers
evacuating, including opening emergency exit doors for each car, and directing passengers to the
nearest emergency exit. However, since the train operator had left the control car, a train-wide
emergency evacuation announcement was not conducted. The investigation found that the actions of
the operator were “not unreasonable” given the circumstances, however during post-incident
interviews “some occupants stated they did not hear the operators’ instructions.”
Communication
Upon activation of the emergency brake at 5.07 PM CST, the train operator immediately radioed the
rail controller stating the train was stopped on the northbound track, approaching the
Grand/Milwaukee station. Shortly after at 5.09 PM CST, the first 911 call correctly reported the
incident location on the Blue Line between Clark/Lake and Grand/Milwaukee. Subsequent
communications, some erroneous, complicated the response effort:
• A police officer was dispatched to Clark/Lake station at 5.10 PM CST for the report of a train
crash.
• At 5.12 PM CST, a police officer contacted their dispatcher that there was no smoke at the
Clark/Lake Station and was informed the accident occurred at Grand/Milwaukee station.
• At 5.15 PM CST, a passenger called for assistance utilizing an emergency call box within the
tunnel (Box 52379). The passenger was able to provide the CTA power controller with the box
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number, but the CTA power controller was unable to determine the location of the box.
During the investigation it was revealed that each emergency call box had recently received
new 5-digit box numbers, however the maps utilized by the CTA power controller still had
old 7-digit box numbers.
• Due to the mixed reports of the incident location, the emergency lights and announcements
did not get activated at the closest emergency exit location (300 North Clinton Street) until 5.24
PM CST, 17-minutes after the train operator had called reporting an emergency brake
activation with a smoke condition and passengers self-evacuating.
NTSB Recommendations
The NTSB provided several recommendations to the CTA including:
• Improve ability to communicate with passengers and to perform emergency evacuations.

• Perform a study of the existing ventilation system to identify deficiencies and make
improvements including reinstalling out-of-service fans.
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NFPA 130 Compliance Analysis
Table 6 provides a NFPA 130 compliance review for some of the components of the tunnels included
in the different case studies. None of the tunnels investigated appear to be fully compliant with the
standard.
TABLE 6. NFPA 130 COMPONENTS COMPLIANCE REVIEW FOR THE DIFFERENT CASE STUDIES.
Tunnel NFPA 130 (2023) Compliance?

Case Study Egress
Walkway Exit Spacing Ventilation Standpipe Communication
Width
1979 BART
Transbay Tube Yes Yes No Yes No
Fire
1996 Channel
Yes No Yes No* Yes
Fire
2008 Channel
Yes No Yes No* Yes
Fire
2015 WMATA
L’Enfant Plaza Unk* Unk* No No 83 Unk*
Smoke Incident
2006 CTA Train
Unk* Unk* No Unk* No
Derailment
*Unk: Unknown
Egress and Firefighting Key Aspects
Egress
Although the various cases studies did not identify issues with exit spacing, they demonstrated the
evident benefit of having emergency procedures requiring a train undergoing a fire incident to stop
in the vicinity of an exit to ease occupants’ egress.
Smoke movement appears as a major cause hindering safe egress. The ability to maintain tenable
conditions inside the tunnel during a fire event is essential. Therefore, adequate railcar door opening,
ventilation, and emergency engineering management (cross-passageway door activation and position
status (open/close), exit positive pressure, etc.) strategies appear as critical parameters to support the
evacuation of occupants.
The emergency ventilation system must be dimensioned for a representative fire design but also
account for overcoming possible detrimental scenarios such as “piston’s effect”. In addition, the
emergency ventilation system as well as other emergency equipment (remote door control, etc.)
should be maintained and tested regularly to ensure it can operate as intended in case of emergency.
83Metro Yellow Line Rehabilitation Project. https://www.wmata.com/about/news/Metro-seeking-proposals-to-fast-track-Yellow-Line-

Bridge-and-tunnel-rehabilitation-project.cfm
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Successful ventilation strategies also rely on the ability to correctly identify the location of the train
and the fire in the tunnel to prevent excess of smoke in areas where occupants are escaping. They
should be reviewed regularly to maintain personnel awareness in the correct emergency procedures.
Firefighting strategies
Exit spacing is essential in providing support for firefighting activities in the vicinity of the fire.
Maintaining tenable conditions inside exit areas allows first responders to organize evacuation and
develop firefighting strategies in a safe environment without the need of wearing full protective
equipment. Firefighters may also need to travel long distances inside an incident tunnel where
untenable conditions may exist. The presence of “refuge” areas is indispensable to allow them resting,
replenishing their air supply and suitably continuing their evacuation and extinction efforts.
Redundancy in communication systems is important to provide the needed information to first
responders as well as between first responder crews.
Adequate water supply needs to be easily located, as well as maintained and tested appropriately to
ensure proper operation when needed.
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Modeling Methodology
Modeling Platform
Evacuation modeling will be performed using the software Pathfinder, which is an agent-based egress
and human movement simulator. Pathfinder has two separate simulation behavior models.
“Steering” behavior is a mode in which occupants use a steering system to move and interact with
others, with no specified flow rates. In the “SFPE” behavior mode, occupants make no attempt to
avoid one another and can interpenetrate, but doors impose a flow limit and velocity is controlled by
density. The SFPE behavior mode relies on the concepts presented in the 2016 edition of the SFPE
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering. The software has been subject to a documented verification
and validation process, which demonstrates that the software is capable of evaluating egress
behaviors that are important during a rail tunnel fire emergency, including passenger flows along
narrow widths, physical interaction with other occupants, and varying occupant characteristics. 84,85
The representation of evacuation movement in smoke for tunnels using Pathfinder has been
validated. 86 Nevertheless, it should be noted that additional research remains needed to evaluate the
ability of egress models to correctly evaluate movement in tunnels where the geometry of the egress
path may be different than a “conventional” building corridor.
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) will be used to evaluate conditions within varying rail tunnel
geometries during severe-case fire scenarios. Specifically, Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), as
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), will be used. FDS is
designed and optimized for low-velocity, buoyancy-driven fluid flows that are characteristic of fires. 87
Validation and verification documentation is available demonstrating that the software can model can
reasonably model the physics associated with heat and smoke movement for large fires in tunnels. 88,89
Performance Criteria
Two separate series of evacuation studies will be performed to evaluate different sets of criteria.
The first study will evaluate how physical changes to the population impact evacuation times with an
egress system designed to current NFPA 130 requirements. Current egress width requirements in rail
tunnels are based on population data to the year 2000 and earlier, with 98th percentile measurements
used to determine widths. Anthropometric measurements in the population have changed
significantly since that time.
These changes will be assessed by modeling a baseline case in which average occupant characteristics
will be assigned to all occupants, matching those used to develop the NFPA 130 egress requirements.
It should be recognized that this baseline scenario does not presume that the egress widths were
84 Thunderhead Engineering. Pathfinder User Manual, Version 2021-3. Manhattan, KS. 2021
85 Thunderhead Engineering. Pathfinder Verification and Validation, Version 2021-3. Manhattan, KS. 2021.
86 Fridolf, Karl, Enrico Ronchi, Daniel Nilsson, and Håkan Frantzich. 2019. “The Representation of Evacuation Movement in Smoke- Filled
Underground Transportation Systems.” Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 90 (April): 28–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tust.2019.04.016.
87 McGrattan, K. et al. NIST Special Publication 1019, Sixth Edition, Fire Dynamics Simulator User’s Guide. National Institute Standards and
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD. 2023.

88 McGrattan, K. et al. NIST Special Publication 1018-2, Sixth Edition, Fire Dynamics Simulator Technical Reference Guide Volume 2: Verification.
National Institute Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD. 2023.

89 McGrattan, K. et al. NIST Special Publication 1018-3, Sixth Edition, Fire Dynamics Simulator Technical Reference Guide Volume 3: Validation.
National Institute Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD. 2023.
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adequate for tunnel evacuation even at the time the requirements were put in place. It is only used as
a basis for comparison to heterogenous scenarios with varying population characteristics.
The results of the baseline scenario will be compared to two models with the same egress layout, but
with varying occupant characteristics in the modeled population that correlate to the U.S. population
at a given time. One model will use population data from the year 2000, while a second will use more
current data from 2018 and after. Specific emphasis will be placed on the effect of population changes
with respect to occupant size and walking speeds. A significant difference in evacuation times
between the updated population model and the models using older population data will serve as the
criteria for evaluating whether changes to the requirements may need to be considered.
The second study will compare evacuation modeling results to the expected conditions within the
tunnel during a fire scenario, per the data collected from the CFD fire modeling simulations.
Tenability criteria will be based on the guidance found in Appendix B of NFPA 130, described as
follows:
Smoke Obscuration Levels: Per NFPA 130 Annex B, Section B.3.2, when occupants are traveling in a
fixed path such as a trainway, required wayfinding capacity is not as critical as survivability criteria
based on heat effects or smoke toxicity. In these circumstances, smoke obscuration could be
maintained at a reduced level such that an exit sign is discernible at no less than 10 m (33 ft) and doors
and walls are discernible at no less than 3.75 m (12 ft). Given that occupants will be traveling along a
narrow path in the tunnel for these simulations, these visibility criteria will be used. It is assumed that
walkways will be provided with illumination of at least 2.7 lx at the walking surface, and that
illuminated directional and exit signs will be provided at intervals at a maximum of 82 feet in
accordance with Section 6.3.5 of NFPA 130.
Heat Effects: Per NFPA 130, Annex B, Section B.3.3., heat exposure for occupants during fires is a
function of exposure temperature and radiant heat flux. Data show that occupants can tolerate
exposure temperatures up to 60°C (≤140°F) with a radiant heat of less than 2.5 kW/m2 for 10 minutes.
Beyond that time, occupants may become incapacitated.
Carbon Monoxide: Per NFPA 130, Annex B, Section B.3.4, the carbon monoxide exposure dose
(expressed as FED) criteria will be equal to a threshold limit of 0.3 which corresponds to a level were
some occupants may start to become susceptible to CO toxicity.
Velocity: Per NFPA 130, Annex B, Section B.3.5.2, air velocities will be limited to less than 11 m/sec
(≤2200 fpm) along the path of egress.
Egress Scenario Background

Two separate egress modeling studies will be performed for this study and are described as follows.
Population Changes
The development of egress requirements is challenged by changing populations, including an

increasingly aging population, along with rapid changes to average anthropometric measurements
that can adversely affect mobility and lead to increased egress times.
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As indicated in the Task 1 Literature Review, current NFPA 130 egress width requirements for tunnels
are based on 95th percentile anthropometric measurements for males, taken from a NASA data
collected during the year 2000 or earlier. Assumed unimpeded walking speeds in egress modeling are
also commonly based on a single value, with movement profiles not accounting for specific
demographics. A recent effort commissioned by the SFPE Foundation recognizes the need to account
for demographic data and has begun the effort to collect specific movement data based on specific
occupant demographics. 90 The first study will compare the commonly used approach of uniform
occupant characteristics to the impact of assigning characteristics based on changing populations.
A baseline scenario will model a homogenous population with standard default anthropometric data
from Pathfinder, which is based on data prior to the year 1998 and roughly aligns with the NASA data
that forms the basis for the current NFPA 130 egress walkway width requirements. 91,92 The default
setting assumes that all occupants have a diameter of 45.58 cm (17.9 in), which is based on average
shoulder width for worldwide populations per the data cited in the referenced surveys.92 Using the
average shoulder width implies that part of the population is underrepresented and that walkway
width may be under-dimensioned for them. Their movement may be impaired resulting in slower
walking speed.
Walking speeds will be analyzed using the methodology described in a study published by Fridolf et
al, which provides quantitative recommendations for walking speed in smoke based on a review of
available literature and empirical data. 93 The walking speed is set to 1.0 m/s when visibility is greater
than 3 meters, which is based on Method 1 published in the report and is representative of the mean
speed (1.35 m.s-1) minus 1.5 of the standard deviations based on data published by Fruin. 94 This
walking speed is also approximately equal to the travel speed specified by NFPA 130 for concourses
and areas with lower population densities.
The results from this analysis will be compared to two models with heterogenous populations that
account for specific occupant characteristics, and the changes in those characteristics from 2000 to
2020. Obese occupants will be modeled with larger diameters to account for the higher prevalence of
obesity in the population since 2000. Accounting for larger body sizes is an important factor given the
narrow clear widths permitted by NFPA 130, with the means of egress in a walkway required to be
only 24 in. at the walking surface and 30 in. wide at 62 in. above the walking surface.
The prevalence of larger body sizes has increased significantly since the late 1990’s, when the data
used to inform the default Pathfinder body sizes was collected. From 1988 to 1994, the adult
population defined as obese was equal 22.9%, which rose to over 40% in 2018. 95 Designing for higher
rates of obesity has resulted in challenges due to anthropometric dimensional variability. Most safety
systems and clear paths are designed for individuals with anatomical measurements that do not
match many obese individuals, given that they are often underrepresented in sample population.
The Pathfinder default diameter of 45.58 cm (17.9 in) is different from the average shoulder width of
a person in the U.S., and does not account for the larger proportion of the obese population in the U.S.
A study performed by the University of Michigan was conducted to address the need for
90 Gales, John, et al. Anthropomorphic Data and Movement Speeds. SFPE Foundation. 2020.
91 Thunderhead Engineering. Pathfinder User Manual, Version 2021-1. Manhattan, KS. 2021
92 Still, G. Keith. Crowd Dynamics. PhD thesis, University of Warwick. http://gkstill.com/ Support/Links/Documents/2000_still.pdf. 2000.
93 Fridolf, Karl, et al. “Walking Speed in Smoke: Representation in Life Safety Verifications.” SFPE Europe. Q2, Issue 10. 2018.
94 Fruin, J. Pedestrian Planning and Design. New York Metropolitan Association of Urban Designers and Environmental Planners. 1971.
95 Wiggerman, Neal et al. “Anthropometric Dimensions of Individuals with High Body Mass Index.” Human Factors. Vol. 61, No. 8, December
2019. pp. 1277-1296.
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anthropometric dimensions in the obese population. Anthropometric measurements were taken of a
total of 208 women and 80 men, all with a body mass index (BMI) of greater than 30 kg.m-². The mean
measurement for bideltoid breadth (shoulder width) in this population was 57.1 cm (22.5 in) for
women and 61.4 cm (24.2 in) for men, with a total width mean value of 58.3 cm (23 in) for the total
sample, which are significantly larger measurements than the default diameter. 96 A survey of U.S.
army personnel in 2012 found an average shoulder width of 50.8 cm (20 in) for men and 45 cm (17.7
in) for women. 97 Given the lower prevalence of obesity in this dataset, the average shoulder width of
men and women of 47.9 cm (18.9 in) can be used as an approximation for the average occupant
diameter in the non-obese population. This increase in occupant size will be studied in a simulation
and compared to a simulation with the default occupant diameter.
Changes to maximum walking speeds as a result of population changes will also be considered,
considering both the increase in obesity and the elderly population. The elderly population (greater
than 65 years old) has increased significantly since the year 2000, from 12.4% of the population to
16.8% in 2020. 98
Method 2 from the Fridolf et al study will be used to incorporate these population changes. Three
walking speeds are proposed when visibility is greater than 3 meters, based on population
characteristics:
• Average walking speed: 1.35 m.s-1 (4.4 ft.s-1). ~50% of the population would be expected to
move faster than this value based on data published by Fruin.
• Slow walking speed [85%]: 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1). ~85% of the population would be expected to
move faster than this value.
• Slow walking speed [97%]: 0.85 m.s-1 (2.8 ft.s-1). ~97% of the population would be expected to
move faster than this value.
The methodology leaves it to the user to determine which proportion of the population is assigned
these values.
The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) commissioned a study to gather more detailed data
on walking speeds in for various occupancies, locations, and physical characteristics. Data gathered
at a tennis stadium and pedestrian village found that there was an approximate 21% reduction in
horizontal walking speeds for obese adults when compared to non-elderly, non-obese adults, and a
20% reduction for the elderly when compared to non-elderly adults. Occupants with restricted
mobility (i.e. with a cane, crutches, wheelchair, etc.) were observed to have a walking speed of 33%
less than those without these needs. 99 Based on the data from this study, the following populations
will be assigned the values recommended by Fridolf et al:
• Non-obese, non-elderly adults: 1.35 m.s-1 (4.4 ft.s-1)

• Obese, non-elderly adults: 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
• Non-obese, elderly adults: 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
• Obese, elderly adults: 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
96 Wiggerman, Neal et al. “Anthropometric Dimensions of Individuals with High Body Mass Index.”
97 Gordon, Clair C. et al. “2012 Anthropometric Survey of U.S. Army Personnel: Methods and Summary Statistics.” U.S. Army. December
2014.
98 United States Census Bureau. “U.S. Older Population Grew From 2010 to 2020 at Fastest Rate Since 1880 to 1890.”
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2023/05/2020-census-united-states-older-population-grew.html. 2023.
99 Gales, John, et al. Anthropomorphic Data and Movement Speeds. SFPE Foundation. 2020.
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• Occupants with mobile disability: 0.85 m.s-1 (2.8 ft.s-1)
The heterogenous studies will also include a scenario with an occupant in a wheelchair at the middle
of the train, who will require assistance from first responders to evacuate (i.e. occupant is removed
from wheelchair and is evacuated using an alternate mode of transportation such as emergency
evacuation chair or a rescue stretcher.
Comparison to Tenability Criteria
The second egress study will compare a set of egress simulations to the tenability data taken from the
scenarios described in Fire Modeling Scenarios Section of this report. An initial study will use an
egress design that is fully compliant with NFPA 130 to study whether travel distances and egress
widths permitted by the standard will allow for safe evacuation during severe-case fire scenarios. The
results of those simulations will then be used for comparison to egress models with altered travel
distances, egress widths, and fire department response. Taken together, the full set of simulations is
intended to inform the suitability of the current requirements to modern tunnel designs, and which
factors require further study for potential updates to the requirements.
Egress Scenarios
Population Characteristic Scenarios
Egress Scenario 1A/1B: NFPA 130 Compliant, Uniform Occupant Characteristics
Occupant Loading: Scenario 1 inputs will be applied for two separate train configurations matching
those to be studied in the fire modeling scenarios. Scenario 1A will consider an intercity train with the
physical characteristics described for Fire Modeling Scenario 1, with sixteen cars, each holding 56
passengers to be consistent with the loading for modern trains used in the Channel studied in the
Case Study Review. 100 Scenario 1B will consider a rapid transit car consistent with that studied in Fire
Modeling Scenario 2, comprised of ten cars, each with a crush capacity of 200 occupants to be
consistent with modern loading in trains on the BART system. 101 All occupants will be assumed to be
evenly distributed throughout each car to start the simulation.
Occupant Characteristics: Occupant characteristics are assumed to be representative of populations
used to inform the egress requirements in NFPA 101 and NFPA 130, which is based on data gathered
prior to the year 2000.
The diameter of all occupants is set at 45.58 cm (17.9 in), which is the default value from Pathfinder
and the value used for verification and validation of the underlying egress model. Although there was
a significant obese population at the time of development of the egress requirements in the NFPA
standards, movement studies used to develop these requirements did not typically account for body
types at the upper bounds of the population distribution. Therefore, all occupants are assigned the
same default size.
100 “Eurostar Unveils First new 200 mph E320 Train.” Rail Technology Magazine. https://www.railtechnologymagazine.com/Rail-
News/eurostar-unveils-first-new-200mph-e320-train. 2014
101 “Car Types.” Bay Area Rapid Transit. https://www.bart.gov/about/history/cars. 2023
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Unimpeded walking speed is set at 1.0 m.s-1 (3.3 ft.s-1) based on Method 1 from the Fridolf et al study.
Egress Elements: Egress elements will be designed to be compliant with NFPA 130, with walkway
widths equal to 24 inches (610 mm, minimum width at walkway level) 102, and distance between cross-
passageways equal to 800 feet (244 m). Note that distances to cross-passageways are the primary focus
of this study, as these were the egress paths used in the case studies evaluated.
Occupants will be assumed to start the scenario on the train, with train egress elements equal to those
described in the Fire Modeling Scenario Sections of this report. Door and aisle widths match those
typically seen in intercity and rapid transit cars in the U.S.
Egress Scenario 2A/2B: NFPA 130 Compliant with Year 2000 Population Data
Occupant Loading: The same occupant loading described in Egress Scenario 1 will be used in Egress
Scenario 2, with 2A representing an intercity train scenario, and 2B representing a rapid transit train. 103
Occupant Characteristics: Occupant characteristics will be assigned based on 2000 population data.
Two percent (2%) will be assumed to have a mobile disability, independent of obesity and age.
Although the proportion of the U.S. population with a mobile disability is significantly higher than
2%, it is assumed that the percentage using a rail station will be lower due to the high prevalence of
stations lacking accessibility features. 104,105 Higher usage rates for people with mobile disabilities may
be warranted for systems with fully accessible stations throughout. However, for the purposes of this
study, the percentage of mobility impaired occupants is assumed to remain the same for the
heterogenous simulations.
Of the remaining population, 87.6% will be assumed to be non-elderly, with the remaining 12.4%
assumed to be elderly. Obesity rates (77.1% non-obese to 22.9% obesity) will be assigned
proportionally to the elderly and non-elderly populations based on a roughly evenly distribution of
obesity characteristics in the U.S. population.
Obese occupants (22.9%) will be assigned a diameter of 58.3 cm (23 in) to align with mean
anthropometric data. The remaining 77.1% will be assigned a diameter of 47.9 cm (18.9 in) to represent
the average non-obese occupant in the U.S (See Table 7).
102 Egress width is assumed constant over the height of the walkway (i.e. egress walkway cross-section is a rectangle with a smallest
dimension of 24 in.
103 See Fire Modeling Scenarios Section for a description of the different rail systems considered in the present study.
104 Bureau of Transportation Statistics. “Travel Patterns of American Adults with Disabilities.” https://www.bts.gov/travel-patterns-with-
disabilities. January, 2022

105 Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Transportation Statistics Annual Report. December, 2022.
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TABLE 7: EGRESS SCENARIO 2 OCCUPANT CHARACTERISTICS.
Percentage of
Occupant Type Assumed Diameter Maximum Walking Speed
Population
Non-elderly, Non-obese 66.2% 47.9 cm 1.35 m.s-1 (4.4 ft.s-1)

Non-elderly, obese 19.6% 58.3 cm 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
Elderly, Non-obese 9.4% 47.9 cm 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
Elderly, Obese 2.8% 58.3 cm 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
Mobility Impaired 2% 47.9 cm 0.85 m.s-1 (2.8 ft.s-1)
Weighted Average 1.26 m.s-1 (4.1 ft.s-1)
widths equal to 24 inches, and distance between cross-passageways equal to 800 feet.
Egress Scenario 3A/3B: NFPA 130 Compliant with Updated Population Data
Occupant Loading: The same occupant loading described in Egress Scenario 1 will be used in Egress
Scenario 3, with 3A representing an intercity train scenario, and 3B representing a rapid transit train.
Occupant Characteristics: Occupant characteristics will be assigned based on current population data.
One percent will be assumed to be in a manual wheelchair, independent of obesity and age. Of the
remaining population, 83.2% will be assumed to be non-elderly, with the remaining 16.8% assumed
to be elderly. Obesity rates (60% non-obese to 40% obesity) will be assigned proportionally to the
elderly and non-elderly populations based on a roughly evenly distribution of obesity characteristics
in the U.S. population (See Table 8).
Diameter sizing and walking speeds are assigned to each population as they are with Egress Scenario
2.
TABLE 8: EGRESS SCENARIO 3 OCCUPANT CHARACTERISTICS.
Percentage of
Occupant Type Assumed Diameter Maximum Walking Speed
Population
Non-elderly, Non-obese 48.9% 47.9 cm 1.35 m.s-1 (4.4 ft.s-1)

Non-elderly, obese 32.6% 58.3 cm 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
Elderly, Non-obese 9.9% 47.9 cm 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
Elderly, Obese 6.6% 58.3 cm 1.10 m.s-1 (3.6 ft.s-1)
Mobility Impaired 2% 47.9 cm 0.85 m.s-1 (2.8 ft.s-1)
Weighted Average 1.22 m.s-1 (4.0 ft.s-1)
widths equal to 24 inches, and distance between cross-passageways equal to 800 feet.
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Tenability Criteria Scenarios
For consistency, all tenability scenarios will assume occupant characteristics matching Egress Scenario
3A and 3B. These scenarios are considered more representative of current population characteristics
for accurate comparison to tenability criteria from the fire modeling scenarios. Walking speed will be
reduced when occupants encounter smoke using the methodology from Fridolf et al, which has been
included as a feature in Pathfinder when the results are coupled with FDS simulations. 106 The walking
speed reduction factor, 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓 , is calculated based on the visibility through smoke in meters, 𝑥𝑥.
𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓 = min �1; max�0.2; 1 − 0.34 ∗ (3 − 𝑥𝑥)��
The maximum speed of the occupant is then reduced by the walking speed factor, as illustrated in
Figure 16.
FIGURE 16: SPEED REDUCTION IN SMOKE (FRIDOLF ET AL)
As with the population characteristic egress models, each tenability criteria scenario will be modeled
with intercity car and rapid transit car characteristics. All egress scenarios ending in “A” will be
compared to the conditions in Fire Modeling Scenario 1, while all egress scenarios ending in “B” will
be compared to Fire Modeling Scenarios 2A, 2B, 2C, and 3.
Each scenario will evaluate the effects of altering the minimum requirements from NFPA 130, with
focus on walkway widths, cross-passageway travel distance, cross flow from responding fire
personnel, and egress direction. Like the Population Characteristic scenarios, all occupants are
assumed to start the scenario on board the train car before reaching the egress walkways.
Egress Scenario 4A/4B: 36” Wide Tunnel Walkways
Egress Scenarios 4A and 4B will consider the effects of a wider walkway, with an increased width
from 24” (610 mm) to 36” (914 mm) to match the minimum width of level egress components in NFPA
Thunderhead Engineering. Pathfinder Verification and Validation, Version 2021-3. Section 5.4, “Walking Speed Reduction Due to Smoke.”
106
Manhattan, KS. 2021.
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101, and that has been proposed several times over the revisions of NFPA 130 as minimum value. The
distance between cross-passageways will be equal to 800 feet (244 m). Egress will be in two directions.
Egress Scenario 5A/5B: Reduced Cross-passageway/Exit Travel Distance
Egress Scenarios 5A and 5B will consider the effects of a shorter travel distance to the nearest cross-
passageway, with a 25% reduction in distance between cross-passageways from 800 feet (244 m) to
600 feet (183 m). Egress will be in two directions.
Another set of 5B Egress Scenarios is also run with an exit spacing reduced from 2,500 ft (762 m) to
1,250 ft (361 m).
Egress Scenario 6A/6B: 36” Wide Tunnel Walkways with Reduced Cross-passageway Travel
Distance
Egress Scenarios 6A and 6B will consider the effects of both widening the walkways to 36” (914 mm)
plus a shorter travel distance to the nearest cross-passageway, with the distance between cross-
passageways equal to 600 feet (183 m). Egress will be in two directions.
Egress Scenario 7A/7B: Responding Fire Department Counterflow
Egress Scenarios 7A and 7B will assume an NFPA 130 compliant width of 24” (610 mm), with
compliant distances between cross-passageways of 800 feet (244 m). Ten minutes into the simulation,
10 fire department personnel will be assumed to be moving through the tunnel in the opposite
direction of the egressing occupants. 107 It will be assumed that the responding firefighters need to
reach a disabled occupant located at the middle of the train. The default wheelchair shape from
Pathfinder will be used for the occupant in the wheelchair, with dimensions of 132 cm x 76 cm (52 in
x 29.9 in). Note that this occupant will not be capable of using the walkway and will remain in the
train car until being reached by the responding fire department.
The egress time calculated from the models will inform on the ability of first responders to perform
rescue operations with current air supply capacities.
Egress Scenario 8A/8B: Egress in Only one Direction
Egress Scenarios 8A and 8B will assume an NFPA 130 compliant width of 24” (610 mm), with
compliant distances between cross-passageways of 800 feet (244 m). The scenario will assume that all
occupants must travel in the same direction to reach the same cross-passageway due to fire conditions
blocking access to one of the routes.
Additional Egress Model Assumptions
To prevent occupants from traveling back into the train cars all of the train car doors within the
egress models were defined as “one-way” doors such that occupants can’t reenter the train cars once
exited. In order to resolve further flow inconsistencies when occupants are evacuating in the rapid
– RAIB, November 2010, p. 115.
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rail transit scenarios, occupants were assigned a specific exit to evacuate from depending on their
location on the train. As an example, for the egress models combined with FM2C occupants located
on train cars 1-5 were assigned to exit via the west exit located by the front of the train. Occupants
on train car 6 were not assigned an exit and occupants located on train cars 7-10 were assigned to
exit via the east exit located by the end of the train. All occupants in the intercity rail scenarios are
not assigned a specific exit to travel to due to the low occupant load.
Egress Modeling Summary

TABLE 9: EGRESS SCENARIO SUMMARY – POPULATION CHARACTERISTIC STUDY.
Population Distance
Occupant
Characteristic Occupant Occupant Walkway Between
Train Type Walking
Egress Modeling Load Diameter Width Cross-
Speed
Scenario Passageways
EM1A: Uniform
Occupant Intercity 896
Characteristics
45.58 cm 610 mm 244 m
1.0 m/s
diameter (24”) (800 ft)
EM1B: Uniform
Occupant Rapid Transit 2,000
Characteristics
EM2A: 2000
Intercity 896 77.6%: 47.9
Population Data
cm diameter 610 mm 244 m
See Table 7
22.4%: 58.3 (24”) (800 ft)
EM2B: 2000
Rapid Transit 2,000 cm diameter
Population Data
EM3A: Current
Intercity 896 60.8%: 47.9
Population Data
cm diameter 610 mm 244 m
See Table 8
39.2%: 58.3 (24”) (800 ft)
EM3B: Current
Rapid Transit 2,000 cm diameter
Population Data
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TABLE 10: EGRESS SCENARIO SUMMARY – TENABILITY CRITERIA STUDY.
Tenability Criteria Occupant Distance Between

Train Occupant Occupant Walkway
Egress Modeling Walking Cross-
Type Load Diameter Width
Scenario Speed Passageways
EM4A: 36” Walkway 914 mm 244 m

Intercity 896
Width (36”) (800 ft)
EM4B: 36” Walkway Rapid 914 mm 244 m

2,000
Width Transit (36”) (800 ft)
EM5A: Reduced Cross-

610 mm 183 m
passageway Travel Intercity 896
(24”) (600 ft)
Distance
EM5B: Reduced Cross-

Rapid 610 mm 183 m
passageway Travel 2,000
Transit (24”) (600 ft)
Distance
EM6A: 36” Walkway with

Reduced Cross- 914 mm 183 m
Intercity 896 60.8%: 47.9
passageway Travel (36”) (600 ft)
cm diameter
Distance See Table 8
39.2%: 58.3
cm diameter
EM6B: 36” Walkway with
Reduced Cross- Rapid 914 mm 183 m
2,000
passageway Travel Transit (36”) (600 ft)
Distance
EM7A: Responding Fire 610 mm 244 m

Intercity 896
Department Counterflow (24”) (800 ft)
EM7B: Responding Fire Rapid 610 mm 244 m

2,000
Department Counterflow Transit (24”) (800 ft)
EM8A: Unidirectional 610 mm 244 m

Intercity 896
Egress (24”) (800 ft)
EM8B: Unidirectional Rapid 610 mm 244 m

2,000
Egress Transit (24”) (800 ft)
For each egress scenario, the clear width of the exit is assumed to be 1,118 mm (44”) in accordance
with NFPA 130.
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Fire Modeling Scenarios

Background
Fire modeling scenarios have been developed based on the cited case studies in Task 2, along with
data on expected fire characteristics in rail tunnels. Model inputs have been altered to align with the
objectives of this study and the scope of NFPA 130, while also representing severe-case fire events
that could occur within a passenger rail tunnel.
For simplicity, all fire models assume a unidirectional, level tunnel. Tunnel slope has a significant
effect on the effectiveness of ventilation in controlling smoke spread in a fire and necessitates further
study but is outside the scope of this analysis.
References to the train types “intercity”, “commuter”, and “rapid transit” are defined as follows: 108,109
• Intercity: Rail service that provides transportation between cities or metropolitan areas at
speeds and distances greater than that of commuter or regional rail. Stops are more limited
than on a commuter train. In the U.S., the Amtrak Acela express provides services between
Washington D.C. and Boston and can be considered intercity rail per the Federal Railroad
Administration Glossary.
• Commuter: Shorter-haul rail passenger transportation in metropolitan and suburban areas.
Usually has morning and evening peak period operations. Standard Amtrak service can be
classified as commuter or regional rail service.
• Rapid Transit: Rail with capacity for heavy volume of traffic, characterized by multi-car
trains, and usually operating within a city. Also known as “subway” or “metropolitan
railway (metro).” The BART system evaluated in the Case Study Review can be considered
rapid transit.
Intercity and commuter rail cars in the U.S. often run on the same tracks and use similar rail cars, they
have been combined into a single category for the purposes of this analysis 110.
Fire Modeling Scenario 1: Intercity or Commuter Rail Car Tunnel
The first set of fire scenarios will study the conditions in a tunnel designed for intercity or commuter
rails designed to carry passengers over long distances. The case study analogs to these scenarios are
the Channel Tunnel fires that occurred in 1996 and 2008 as described in the Case Study Review.
Both events in the Channel Tunnel involved heavy good freight trains carrying passengers in an
amenity car. The amenity passenger cars provide a comparable condition to rolling stock within the
scope of NFPA 130. However, freight trains and their associated cargo are outside the scope of NFPA
130. The fire scenario will therefore alter the specifics of the event to resemble a passenger train more
closely.
108 Federal Railroad Administration. “Glossary and Acronyms.” https://www.fra.dot.gov/necfuture/pdfs/tier1_deis/c13.pdf. 2023

109 American Public Transit Association. Glossary of Transit Terminology. https://www.apta.com/wp-
content/uploads/Resources/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/Transit_Glossary_1994.pdf. July 1994
110 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Guide to Commuter Rail, https://www.mbta.com/guides/commuter-rail-guide.
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Fire Characteristics
Fire sizes and characteristics associated with rail vehicles in tunnels are dependent on a wide variety
of factors, including combustible loading within the cars, window sizes, and ventilation within the
tunnel. Because this study is intended to be a general analysis of egress requirements in tunnels, a
detailed analysis of expected fire sizes for each type of rail car will not be performed. Instead,
simplifications will be used to determine a reasonable severe-case fire scenario for evaluating
conditions in a tunnel during an emergency.
As described in the Chapter “Fire Vehicles in Tunnels” in the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection
Engineering, large-scale fire tests of intercity, commuter rail style train cars show that these fires can
range from 10 to 80 MW with a wide range of growth and decay curves. Testing data varies widely
on fire growth rates in rail cars, with some fires growing slowly and then rapidly reaching peak heat
release rate, and others growing at a more gradual rate to peak. Many tests show that peak heat release
rates are sustained for relatively short periods of time. 111 The initial growth rate is highly sensitive to
the ignition source, combustible materials, onboard rail ventilation systems, and the number of open
doors and broken windows in the car.
Table 11 provides information on the fuel load, ignition source, ventilation characteristics, and
measured peak HRR from various fire test data conducted in the last thirty (30) years. The heat release
rate measurements from the reviewed testing highlight two general types of fire behavior influenced
by the ignition source, fuel load, and ventilation:
1. Non-Arson Fires: Fires initiated with wooden sticks as the ignition source show a linear fire
growth rate of approximately 0.5 MW per minute until a peak HRR is reached. During these
tests, the peak HRR varies between 13 MW and 19 MW with an average peak HRR of 16
MW. 112
2. Arson-Type Fires: Fires initiated with an ignitable liquid such as gasoline generally follow a
two-step process: 113 114 The first step constitutes the incipient phase of the fire and can
generally be characterized by a rapid linear fire growth (0.5 to 1 MW per minute) for
approximately 260 seconds after ignition, although the factors governing the incipient phase
duration are not well established. The second step of the fire (development phase) is
characterized by a very rapid and linear fire growth rate (approx. 16 MW per minute) with a
peak HRR achieved in a few minutes. The peak HRR measured during the large-scale fire
testing varies from 31 MW to 77 MW with an average peak HRR of 55 MW.
Much of the available fire data is based on train cars with materials that would not comply with
Chapter 8 of NFPA 130 for rail vehicles. According to a study by Zicherman et al., limited or slow fire
propagation is expected with initiating fires of between 200 kW to 300 kW for rail cars equipped with
NFPA 130 compliant materials, similar to the behavior observed in Test #1 and Test #2 listed in Table
111111 Lattimer, B., & Beyler, C. (2005). “Heat Release Rates of Fully-Developed Fires in Railcars.” Fire Safety Science-Proceedings of the
Eighth International Symposium, pp. 1169-1180.

112 Ingason, H., Gustavsson, S., and Dahlberg, M., “Heat Release Rate Measurements in Tunnel Fires”, SP Swedish National Testing and
Research Institute, SP Report 1994:08, Borås, Sweden, 1994.

113 G. Hadjisophocleous, D.H. Lee & W.H. Park “Full scale experiments for heat release rate measurements of railcar fires” Proceedings from
the Fifth International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security (ISTSS 2012), pp. 457–466, New York, USA, 14–16 March, 2012.
114 Lönnermark, A., Lindström, J., Li, Y. Z., Claesson, A., Kumm, M., and Ingason, H., “Full-scale fire tests with a commuter train in a tunnel”,
SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden, SP Report 2012:05, Borås, Sweden, 2012.
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5. 115. Large-scale testing has shown that small fires sustained long enough to ignite the walls and
ceiling could result in rapid fire spread, growing to involve the entire car in less than 5 minutes, even
with NFPA 130 compliant materials. However, an initiating fire sustained long enough to result in a
propagating fire on the order of 30 MW or larger is likely to be an arson event as represented by Tests
# 3 through 7 in Table 5. 116,117
A 2015 survey of testing and design fire data suggests a risk-based approach to emergency tunnel
design with respect to design fires. The study points out that no accidental post flashover fires with
rail cars with NFPA 130 mandated materials had occurred at the time of publication.115 However, the
authority having jurisdiction may choose to design for a more severe but more improbable fire
scenario, including an arson event. NFPA 130 currently does not provide requirements for the level
of risk or size of the design fire to be considered. However, for the purposes of this study, it will be
assumed that the tunnel will be designed to accommodate severe-case fire scenarios.
As previously mentioned, the data presented in Table 11 suggests two fire sizes depending on fuel
load, ventilation, and the type of ignition source. Full-scale fires initiated with wooden sticks
presented a slower linear fire growth rate and lower peak HRR (average peak HRR of 16 MW) than
full-scale fires initiated with ignitable liquids or flammable gas characterized by a two-step growth
rate and an average peak HRR of 55 MW. Full-scale fire testing results with peak HRR beyond 30
MW are representative of arson fires. Ventilation has the potential to “feed” the fire with air,
increasing the fire growth. Fuel load also needs to be carefully considered. Tests #6 and #7 included
additional fuel load in the form of luggage. A study has shown that luggage is an important fire
growth parameter that needs to be evaluated. 118
Based on these observations, two fire design scenarios are considered in the present study, (1) a Non-
Arson Fire Scenario, and (2) an Arson Fire Scenario. Each fire scenario involves a single-car incident
are defined as follow:
1. Scenario 1: Non-Arson Fire:
The fire follows a linear growth rate (𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ) of 0.5 MW per minute up to a 16 MW steady
state and remains at that HRR level for the rest of the simulation. The HRR (𝑄𝑄) is expressed
as follow:
a. For 𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡 < 16 MW, 𝑄𝑄 = 𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
[1]
b. For 𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 16 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 𝑄𝑄 = 16 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
2. Scenario 2: Arson Fire

a. Incipient Phase: the fire follows a fast quadratic growth rate up to 260 seconds. The
HRR for the incipient phase is defined as follow:
For 𝑡𝑡 < 260 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑄𝑄 = 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑡𝑡 2 with 𝛼𝛼 = 4.4 10−5 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. 𝑠𝑠 −2 [2]
115 Zicherman, Joe et al. “Challenges in Establishing Design Fires for Passenger Rail Vehicles.” Conference: Fire and Materials. San Francisco.
January 2015.
116 White, J., Zicherman, et al. “Predicting the Fire Heat and Smoke Release Rates of Railcars for the SFMTA Central Subway Project: Fire
Scenarios Report.” Revision 0b, July 27, 2010.

117 Coles, Lautenberger, et al. “Using Computer Fire Modeling to Reproduce and Predict FRP Composite Fire Performance.” Composites &
Polycon 2009. American Composites Manufacturers Association, Tamp, FL. January 15-17, 2009.
118 Lönnermark, A., Ingason, H., Claesson, A., Lindström, J., Li, Y. Z., and Kumm, M., "Laboratory fire experiments with a 1/3 train carriage
mockup", SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden, SP Report 2012:06, Borås, Sweden, 2012.
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b. Development Phase: 260 seconds after ignition, the fire follows a linear fire growth
rate (𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) of 16 MW per minute until it reaches a peak HRR of 55 MW and
then remains steady for the rest of the simulation.
For t > 260 seconds, the HRR (𝑄𝑄) is expressed as follow:
For 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 260 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑄𝑄 = 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑡𝑡 [3]
The two design fire curves are shown on Figure 17. The single-car HRR for the purposes of this study
are assumed to remain at the peak HRR value for the full duration of the simulation after the growth
stage, which is intended to bound growth and decay behavior seen in the fire testing data. The
selected rapid growth rates and steady state HRRs allow accounting for the presence of luggage as
additional fuel load.
The initial time (t= 0 s) of each simulation corresponds to the ignition of the fire. The fire is assumed
to be detected rapidly and the train brought to an emergency stop. Using braking distance and
duration calculations from the Australian Rail Track Corporation Ltd. (ARTC) 119, and assuming a
passenger’s train with a travel speed of 75 miles per hour representative of intercity trains, one
estimates that it would take approximately 1 minute for the train to stop after activation of the brakes.
This value is assumed to be conservative for both intercity and rapid transit train systems. For each
simulation, the railcar doors will open 90 seconds after the start of the simulation, to account for
detection 120, emergency stop, and start of evacuation of the train (t = 90 s). The assumption of
simultaneous door opening is used to simplify the models by limiting the number of model inputs as
additional criteria would be needed to determine when other car doors should open. Windows in the
incident train will remain closed until flashover conditions (incident heat flux of 20 kW/m2 on floor
level 121) are reached in the incident car. The model will simulate the breaking of the windows using
activation control logic. An average heat flux estimated from four (4) heat flux devices located on the
floor of the incident car is calculated at each time step. The control logic activates (i.e. the windows of
the incident ca break) when the average heat flux at floor level reaches 20 kW/m2.
119 https://extranet.artc.com.au/eng_signal_tools.html
120 The present study assumes that detection can either be performed by pon-board smoke/heat/fire detection system or train occupants.
121 Mowrer, F., Enclosure Smoke Filling and Fire-Generated Environmental Conditions, SFPE Handbook, 5th Edition, Chapter 33, 2015, pp.
1066 – 1101.
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TABLE 11. TUNNEL FIRE TESTING CHARACTERISTICS FROM SEVERAL STUDIES.
Time to Phase
Transition (s) Peak HRR
Test # Fuel Load Ignition Source Ventilation
(HRR @ (MW)
Transition (MW))
Intercity Style
Railway Carriage
1 N/A 13
(EUREKA EU499,
Longitudinal
1992)112
Wooden sticks airflow before test
ICE Style Railway
< 0.4 m/s
Carriage
2 N/A 19
(EUREKA EU499,
1992) 112
Non-Arson Type Average N/A ∼ 16
Subway Carriage 6.2 kg of Longitudinal

240
3 (EUREKA EU499, isopropanol in 2 airflow before test 35
(∼1.5 MW)
1992) 112 large fuel pans < 0.4 m/s
Intercity Style 0.7 m2 square
Railway Carriage propane sand Ventilation:
240
4 (Carleton burner: 75 kW for Extraction at 50% 31
(∼ 6 MW)
University, 120s then capacity (approx.
2011)113 increased to 150 66 m3/s) but
Subway Carriage kW for 480 s rapidly increased
(Carleton positioned to 100% (132 m3/s) 260
5 52
University, 2011) between the 2 rear after start of test (∼ 2 MW)
113 most seats
Subway Carriage
with “Old” style
furnishing and
extra 7.2 GJ fuel 240
6 77
load from added (∼2 MW)
luggage.
(METRO Project, Ignition with
Longitudinal flow
2011)114 Gasoline/Petrol
before test: 2 - 2.5
Subway Carriage on one seat
m/s
with “Modern” (Arson)
style furnishing,
and extra 7.2 GJ 420
7 77
fuel load from (∼ 3.5 MW)
added luggage.
(METRO Project,
2011) 114
Arson Type Average ∼ 260 ∼ 55
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FIGURE 17. DESIGN FIRE CURVES.
Rail Car Dimensions
Rail car dimensions are based on the amenity car from the 2008 Channel Tunnel fire event, as shown
in Figure 18 and Figure 19. In the actual event, this car was the only passenger car connected to a
series of freight cars. The fire scenario will consider multiple passenger cars with the same dimensions
as the amenity car to match a scenario within the scope of NFPA 130. Sixteen (16) amenity cars
matching these figures will be used to match the size of a typical passenger train used in the
Channel. 122
The dimensions and seating arrangement of this car provides a close comparison to common intercity
rail cars used in the U.S. Aisles will be assumed to be 24” and doors will be 36” width to match intercity
rail cars that are not designed to accessibility standards. 123,124
122 “Eurostar Unveils First new 200 mph E320 Train.” Rail Technology Magazine. https://www.railtechnologymagazine.com/Rail-
News/eurostar-unveils-first-new-200mph-e320-train. 2014
123 U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Railroad Administration. Inclusive and Universal Accessible Design Considerations for Next
Generation of Passenger Railcars. Final Report. July 2020.

124Amtrak. Specification for PRIIA Single-Level Passenger Rail Car, No. 964. February 2011.
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FIGURE 18: CHANNEL TUNNEL FIRE AMENITY CAR
FIGURE 19: CHANNEL TUNNEL FIRE AMENITY CAR SECTION
Opening sizes used in the model correspond to the dimensions shown in the figures are summarized
in Table 12.
TABLE 12: INTERCITY RAIL CAR OPENINGS.
Commuter Rail Openings

Opening Side Quantity Dimensions (Width x Height)
1’-0” x 2’-2”
Door Front (Window) 1
(0.30 m x 0.66 m)
1’-0” x 2’-2”
Door Back (Window) 1
(0.30 m x 0.66 m)
3’-0” x 7’-6”
Door Side Front 2
(0.91 m x 2.29 m)
3’-0” x 7’-6”
Door Side Back 2
(0.91 m x 2.29 m)
4’-7” x 2’-8”
Side Windows 18
(1.40 m x 0.81 m)
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Rolling Stock Material Properties
Combustible materials within a rail car vary widely from vehicle to vehicle. The simulation assumes
a simplified weighted average for expected materials within a typical rail car. 35% of the car’s material
is assumed to consist of non-combustible metal and other materials. Windows are assumed to account
for approximately 15% of the car, consisting of polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA), a common product
used in shatterproof windows. The remaining 50% of materials are assumed to be split between
polypropylene (PP) and polyurethane flexible foam (GM21) to account for upholstered seating and
plastic material.
Based on these reactions, the heat of combustion will be 28.7 kJ/g, the carbon monoxide yield is 0.07,
and the soot yield will be 0.059. 125 These properties are summarized in Table 13.
TABLE 13: COMMUTER RAIL CAR MATERIAL PROPERTIES.
Heat of Combustion Carbon

Combustible Material Soot Yield
(kJ/g) Monoxide Yield
Non-Combustible (35%) N/A N/A N/A

PPMA (25%) 24.2 0.1 0.022
PP (25%) 38.6 0.024 0.059
Polyurethane (GM21)
17.8 0.1 0.131
Flexible Foam (15%)
Weighted Average
(Combustible Material 28.7 0.07 0.059
Only)
Fire Location
These properties assume a well-ventilated fire. Supply and exhaust fans are assumed to begin
operation at five minutes into the scenario, providing ample oxygen to sustain a free-burning fire.
As discussed in the Literature Review, the location of the car where the fire originates is important for
operation of the ventilation system. A longitudinal ventilation scheme will be assumed for all fire
modeling scenarios.
A single fire location will be used to evaluate the intercity rail car scenario. To simulate the most
challenging location, the fire will be assumed to originate in a car located at the middle of the train.
The ventilation system will not be assumed to activate until five (5) minutes after the start of the fire
which corresponds to the assumed time for the incident to be annunciated to the control center and
for the evacuation order to be notified to the occupants. Two fire designs will be used: scenario 1A
will follow a non-arson fire design (16 MW peak HRR) while scenario 1B will follow an arson fire
design (55 MW peak HRR).
125 SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering: 5th Ed. Quincy, MA Bethesda, MD: National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Society of
Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE), 2012. Print.
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Additional fire locations will be considered for the rapid transit tunnel scenarios, given that the
assumed tunnel dimensions are smaller and represent more challenging conditions for maintaining
tenability.
Fire Modeling Scenario 2: Rapid Transit Car
Scenario 2 will study the conditions in a tunnel designed for rapid transit designed to carry passengers
within a city or region. The case study analog to this scenario is the BART Transbay Tube fire event
described in the Case Study review.
The same fire designs used for the intercity rail will also be used for the rapid transit car. All doors
will be assumed to open 90 seconds after the start of the simulation. Windows will be assumed
closed until flashover conditions are attained. The same activation control logic as with intercity rail
cars will be used (breaking of windows triggered by a 20 kW/m2 average heat flux from four (4)
heat flux devices located in the incident car at floor level).
Rapid Transit Car Material Properties
The same material properties assumed for the intercity car will also be utilized for these scenarios.
Although the proportion of each material is likely to be different between the two (2) train systems,
the overall carbon monoxide and soot yields are believed to remain relatively similar given the
proximity of each material’s yields from one another. Consequently, the same CO and soot yields are
assumed for the intercity and rapid transit train systems.
Rail Car Dimensions
Rail car dimensions are based on the train from the BART Transbay Tube fire event, as shown in
Figure 20 and Figure 21. Ten of these cars will be assumed in the tunnel per the maximum number of
trains per car running in the BART system. 126 The crush capacity will be modeled for egress purposes,
with mostly standing occupants. The width of each set of double doors will be modeled at 4 feet wide.
FIGURE 20: BART TRANSBAY CAR. 127
126Bay Area Rapid Transit. “Car Types.” https://www.bart.gov/about/history/cars

127 Bay Area Rapid Transit. “BART Seeks Proposal That Would Give New Life to Retired Train Cars.”
https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/docs/Legacy%20Fleet%20Decommissioning_091720.pdf
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FIGURE 21: BART TRANSBAY CAR SECTION.
Opening sizes used in the model correspond to the dimensions shown in the figures are summarized
in Table 14.
TABLE 14: RAPID TRANSIT RAIL CAR OPENINGS.
Rapid Transit Car Openings

Dimensions (Width x
Opening Side Quantity
Height)
2’-8” x 3’-9”
Windshield Front 1
(0.81 m x 1.14 m)
2’-8” x 3’-9”
Windshield Back 1
(0.81 m x 1.14 m)
2’-0” x 7’-6”
Door Openings 8
(0.61 m x 2.29 m)
1’-10” x 2’-7”
Side Window Front Small 2
(0.86 m x 0.79 m)
4’-0” x 2’-7”
Side Window Front Large 2
(1.22 m x 0.79 m)
8’-5” x 2’-7”
Side Windows Middle 4
(2.57 m x 0.79 m)
6’-10” x 2’-7”
Side Windows Back 2
(2.08 m x 0.79 m)
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Fire Location
Three (3) fire locations will be evaluated to examine the challenges when using a longitudinal
ventilation system.
In the first scenario (2A), an arson fire (55 MW peak HRR) will be assumed to originate in the rear car,
with the fan behind the train in exhaust mode and the fan in front of the train in supply mode. The
fire will be assumed to be contained in a single car. Egress will be in the direction of the front of the
train. All windows will be assumed to be open to account for the possibility of the fire breaking all
windows.
In the second and third scenarios (2B, 2C), the fire will originate in a car at the middle of the train,
which represents a challenge for a longitudinal system in which airflow can only be directed in one
direction. Airflow will again be assumed to move from the front of the train to the rear, with the rear
fan in exhaust mode and the fan in front of the train in supply mode. It will also be assumed that the
fans will not begin operation until five (5) minutes after the start of the fires which should represent
the time elapsed before the incident is annunciated to the control center and for the evacuation order
to be notified to the occupants. Scenario 2B will follow the non-arson fire design (16 MW peak HRR)
while scenario 2C will follow the arson fire design (55 MW peak HRR).
Fire Modeling Scenario 3: Electrical Fire
Scenario 3 will study the conditions in a rapid transit tunnel a tunnel, with the fire located at a remote
location ahead of the train. The case study analog to this scenario is the WMATA L’Enfant Plaza
Station fire event described in the Case Study review.
The fire is assumed to involve cabling, started by electrical arcing. Based on the L’Enfant event, the
fire involved 16’ of cabling. From NUREG-6850, Volume 2, Appendix R, a conservative heat release
rate per unit area for PE/PVC cabling is 589 kW/m², or 54.8 kW/ft².128 Materials properties are shown
in Table 15. The L-Enfant fire involved a length of cables 16 feet long, with a conservative assumed
width of approximately 4 feet. For a fire area of 64 ft², the heat release rate is assumed to be
approximately 3.5 MW. The fire is assumed to grow at a t-squared, fast-growth rate and remain at
steady state for the duration of the simulation after the growth period to account for fire spread in the
cabling throughout the tunnel.
128 US Nuclear Regulatory Agency. NUREG/CR-6850. EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities. September, 2005.
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Fire Material Properties
TABLE 15: PE/PVC CABLING MATERIAL PROPERTIES.
Heat of Combustion Carbon Monoxide

Combustible Material Soot Yield
(kJ/g) Yield
PE/PVC Cabling 1 31.3 0.100 0.076

PE/PVC Cabling 2 25.1 0.050 0.115
PE/PVC Cabling5 20.9 0.147 0.136
Average 25.8 0.099 0.109
Tunnel Construction and Dimensions
Tunnel dimensions for the intercity car scenarios will utilize the dimensions from the Channel Tunnel
to match the events described in the Case Study Review. Dimensions for the rapid transit and electrical
fire scenarios will utilize approximate dimensions from the BART Transbay Tunnel, except that
square cross sections will be used for simplicity. Refer to Figure 22 and Figure 23 for cross-sections of
each tunnel used as the basis for the simulations.
FIGURE 22: CHANNEL TUNNEL CROSS-SECTION 129
129 Department for Transport: Rail Accident Investigation Branch. Technical Investigation Report concerning the Fire on Eurotunnel Freight Shuttle
7412b on 11 September 2008. BEATT-2008-015, BEA-TT – RAIB, November 2010.
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FIGURE 23: TRANSBAY TUNNEL SYSTEM CROSS-SECTION 130
All tunnels will be assumed to be concrete lined to match the materials in the Case Study review.
Default material properties from Fire Dynamics Simulator will be used, as follows:
Emissivity: 0.85
Heat Conductivity: 2.0 W.m-1.K-1
Specific heat: 950 J.kg-1.K-1
Density: 2100 kg.m-3
Ventilation
Tunnel ventilation is assumed to be a longitudinal system with vent shafts containing reversible fans
at either end of the domain. The ventilation system is assumed to meet NFPA 130 requirements and
guidelines, including the following:
• Will provide a tenable environment along the path of egress from a fire incident (Section
7.2.1)
• Will provide sufficient airflow to provide critical velocity (Section 7.2.1)
• Will be capable of reaching full operation at 180 seconds (Section 7.2.1)
• Individual emergency ventilation fan motors must meet full operating speed at 30 seconds
(Section 7.3.1.1)
• Airflow velocity will be limited to ≤2200 fpm (11 m/sec) along path of egress (Appendix B)
• System will maintain required airflow rate for a minimum of 1 hour but not less than
required time of tenability
The critical velocity is calculated using the methodology in the Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering,
Chapter 17, “Fire and Smoke Control in Transport Tunnels” and Annex D of NFPA 502, Standard for
Road Tunnels, Bridges, and other Limited Access Highways.
National Transportation Safety Board. Bay Area Rapid Transit District Fire on Train No. 117 and Evacuation of Passengers while in the Transbay
130
Tube, San Francisco, California, January 17, 1979, Railroad Accident Report NTSB-RAR-79-5. July 19, 1979.
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1/3
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐 = 𝐾𝐾1 𝐾𝐾2 � � [4]
𝜌𝜌∞ 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹
𝑄𝑄
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = � � + 𝑇𝑇∞ [5]
𝜌𝜌∞ 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐
where:
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐 = the critical velocity, ft/s (m/s)
𝑔𝑔 = acceleration of gravity, ft/s² (m/s²)
𝐻𝐻 = tunnel height, ft (m)
𝑄𝑄 = fire heat release rate, Btu/s (kW)
𝐴𝐴 = tunnel cross-sectional area, ft² (m²)
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = specific heat of air, Btu/lb-°R (kJ/kg-K)
𝜌𝜌∞ = density of ambient air, lb/ft3 (kg/m3)

𝑇𝑇∞ = temperature of ambient air, °R (K)
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = average temperature of fire site gases, °R (K)
𝐾𝐾1 = constant (𝐾𝐾1 = Fr-1/3)
Fr = Froude Number for a flow ventilation fire (Fr = 4.5)
𝐾𝐾2 = grade factor (𝐾𝐾2 = 1 + 0.0374[grade%]0.80)
For the intercity rail simulation, the tunnel height is 7.62 meters (25 feet), with a total area of 58.1 m²
(625 ft²). The heat release rate is set to a peak fire size of 55 MW, with a grade of 0%. The ambient
temperature is assumed to be 20°C. Using equations [3] and [4], the fire gas temperature 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 is equal
to 265°C, and the critical velocity is 3.20 m.s-1 (10.50 ft.s-1). For the 16 MW fire, the fire gas temperature
is 96°C and the critical velocity is 2.98 m.s-1 (9.78 ft.s-1).
For the rapid transit fire scenario, the same assumptions are used, except that the tunnel height is set
to 5.18 m (17 feet), with an area of 26.8 m2 (289 ft²). For the 55 MW fire, the fire gas temperature is
equal to 559°C (1,038°F), and the critical velocity is 3.15 m.s-1 (10.33 ft.s-1). For the 16 MW fire, the fire
gas temperature is equal to 175°C (347°F) and the critical velocity is 3.18 m.s-1 (10.43 ft.s-1). Although
it is non-intuitive that the critical velocity is lower for a larger design fire, this outcome is supported
by multiple studies showing that there is a critical velocity reached that is capable of controlling
increasingly larger fire sizes. 131
131Carvel, Ricky et al. “Fires in Vehicle Tunnels.” SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering. 5th Ed. Quincy, MA Bethesda, MD: National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE), 2012. Print.
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The electrical fire scenario is modeled with the same dimensions as the rapid transit scenario. With a
heat release rate of 3.5 MW, the fire gas temperature is equal to 99°C, and the critical velocity is 2.33
m.s-1 (7.64 ft.s-1).
For the purposes of the study, operation of the fans will be assumed such that smoke is exhausted in
the opposite direction of the direction of egress. Therefore, for a fire at the back of the train, the fan in
the downstream location will be assumed to operate in exhaust mode and the fan upstream of the
train in supply mode, and vice versa for a fire location at the front of the train. For a fire location in
the middle of the train, the fan behind the train will operate in exhaust mode and the fan in front of
the train will operate in supply mode, and occupants will be assumed to egress toward the supply
fan.
Fan operation will be assumed to begin at 5 minutes into the simulation to account for the time for the
train operator to notify the central command center where fans are controlled. A linear, 180 second
ramp up time to full operation will be assumed in accordance with NFPA 130 requirements. Fans
provide their prescribed airflow 480 seconds after the start of the fire.
As reviewed during the Case Studies, delayed ventilation can be catastrophic to the ability of
occupants to evacuate. Occupants can only spend limited time in a smoke-filled atmosphere before
conditions become untenable. The fire modeling assumes that the ventilation strategy is NFPA 130
compliant.
Fire Modeling Scenario Summary
Fire model scenarios are summarized in Table 16.

TABLE 16: FIRE MODELING SCENARIO SUMMARY.
Fire Modeling
Fire Source Fire Size Tunnel Dimensions Critical Velocity [m/s]
Scenario
Single Intercity Rail 25’ (7.62 m) High x
FM1A: Intercity 2.98
Car: Middle of 16 MW 25’(7.62 m) Wide x 2500’
Train (9.78 ft.s-1)
Train (762 m) Long
Single Intercity Rail 25’ (7.62 m) High x
FM1B: Intercity 3.20
Car: Middle of 55 MW 25’(7.62 m) Wide x 2500’
Train (10.50 ft.s-1)
Train (762 m) Long
Single Rapid 17’ (5.18 m) High x 17’
FM2A: Rapid 3.15
Transit Rail Car: 55 MW (5.18 m) Wide x 2500’
Transit (10.33 ft.s-1)
Back of Train (762 m) Long
3.18
FM2B: Rapid Transit Transit Rail Car: 16 MW (5.18 m) Wide x 2500’
(10.43 ft.s-1)
Middle of Train (762 m) Long
3.15
FM2C: Rapid Transit Transit Rail Car: 55 MW (5.18 m) Wide x 2500’
(10.33 ft.s-1)
Middle of Train (762 m) Long
17’ (5.18 m) High x 17’
2.33
FM3: Electrical Electrical Fire 3.5 MW (5.18 m) Wide x 2500’
(7.64 ft.s-1)
(762 m) Long
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Mesh Resolution and Models Parameters
Each fire scenario was modeled using FDS. Each simulation has a 30-minute time duration. The mesh
size was 0.66 ft (0.2 m) in x, y, and z directions, from the area of fire origin up to 330 ft (100 m) upstream
and downstream. Beyond this distance, the mesh size was increased to 1.31 ft (0.4 m). For each model,
the geometry was subdivided into 17 individual meshes. The mesh resolution parameter was
calculated for each fire size and results are presented in Table 17. The mesh resolution is adequate
based on a comparison of the mesh resolution for validated FDS models investigating smoke
movement in tunnels. 132
TABLE 17, MESH PARAMETERS AND RESOLUTION.
3.5 MW
Parameter 16 MW Fire 55 MW Fire
(Electrical)
≤ 100 m (330 ft) away from fire origin: 0.2 m (0.66 ft)
Mesh size
> 100 m (330 ft) away from fire origin: 0.4 m (1.31 ft)
Number of meshes 17
Characteristic Fire
2.9 4.7 1.6
Diameter D*
Mesh Resolution
14 23 8
Parameter D*/δx
Fire Dynamics Simulator Technical Reference Guide Volume 3: Validation. NIST Special Publication 1018-3, 6th Edition, 2023, pp. 152 –
132
153.
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Fire Modeling Results

Temperature, visibility, and Fractional Effective Dose for Carbon Monoxide (FEDCO) estimations are
obtained for each of the six (6) designed fire models for each cell in the geometry. The fire model
results provide information on the tenability conditions inside the tunnels over time and are also used
as tenability parameters for the egress models.
A detailed review of the temperature, visibility, and FEDCO results at 2 m (6.6 ft) above the egress
walkway surface is presented in Appendix A: Fire Modeling Results. The choice of an analysis at a
2 m (6.6 ft) height above the walkway surface originates from a conservative assumption that the
smoke extraction system is designed to prevent the smoke layer to descend below a threshold height
to allow occupants to escape without exposure to smoke, radiative and convective heat while
standing. The authors acknowledge that in the event of an evacuation due to an incident involving
heat, smoke, and toxic gases spread, occupants may decide to crawl or move to an invert. Although
temperature, visibility, and CO concentration results below a 2 m (6.6 ft) height above the egress
walkway are not presented in the report, smoke visibility data at any location above the egress
walkway is used as an input for the egress model to estimate occupants walking speed during egress.
Common trends are seen between the fire models. For all scenarios, hot gases spreads upstream and
downstream of the fire occurs before the ventilation is activated. The ventilation activates at 300
seconds after the start of the fire and reaches its operating condition at 480 seconds after the start of
the fire. Backlayering occurs and extends from a few meters to more than a hundred meters upstream
of the fire. It is eventually overcome by the ventilation 400 seconds to 600 seconds after the start of
the fire. There is a transient period after the time when fans can operate at full capacity to establish
the needed airflow to prevent backlayering. Once the latter is overcome, the ventilation maintains
tenable conditions upstream of the fire for the remainder of the simulation.
The following sub-section provides information on the available safe egress time (ASET) for each
physical parameter (temperature, visibility, CO toxicity) assuming a 2 m (6.6 ft) high smoke layer.
This data is essential to the egress analysis. Its comparison to the calculated egress times for the
various scenarios considered (see Egress Modeling Results section) reveals egress scenarios where
the evacuation of all occupants may not be feasible (i.e. ASET < Required Safe Egress Time (RSET)).
Times to Exceed Tenability Criteria
Results for each fire model determine the duration to exceed tenability criteria. In the present section,
the time to exceed tenability criteria is defined as the duration, from the time the rail car doors are
opened and egress begins, to the time when a tenability criterion (temperature, soot visibility, FEDCO)
is exceeded at 2 m (6.6 ft) above the walkway, over a region that extends from the area of fire origin
to the upstream/downstream end of the tunnel. It can be assimilated to an Available Safe Egress
Time (ASET) before conditions become untenable over the length of the tunnel located downstream
of the fire.
For all fire models, conditions downstream of the fire exceed tenability criterion before the end of the
simulation as the ventilation pushes the smoke. Downstream ASETs are presented in Table 18.
Results suggest that, downstream of the fire, ASET is driven by soot visibility and that egress becomes
compromised when visibility falls below the tenability criterion.
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With regards to the scenario FM3, the fire starts outside the train in the tunnel and the smoke spread
rapidly upstream and downstream of the fire location. Within 200 seconds, the train is surrounded
by smoke reducing the visibility below the tenability criterion. Nevertheless, by the time the
simulation reaches 500 seconds, the ventilation is able to overcome smoke backlayering and push the
smoke downstream of the tunnel allowing for safe egress upstream of the fire where the train is
located.
TABLE 18. ASET BASED ON TENABILITY CRITERION FOR EACH FIRE MODEL.
Downstream of Fire Location

Fire Model Time to Exceed Tenability Criterion (s)
Temperature Visibility FEDCO
FM1A N/A 810 N/A
FM1B 510 410 N/A
FM2A N/A* N/A* N/A*
FM2B N/A 1,010 N/A
FM2C 410 310 1,210
FM3 N/A N/A** N/A
*Conditions downstream of the fire are below temperature (360s), visibility (300s), and FEDCO (750s) tenability criteria but
fire is located on the last rail car of the train and tenability conditions are maintained along the whole length of the train
(upstream of the fire).
**Egress conditions on the walkway along the train and upstream of the fire are below the smoke tenability criterion between
110 seconds and 410 seconds.
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Egress Modeling Results

An extended description of the assumptions and input of the egress models are discussed in section
Egress Scenarios. Each egress model uses the geometry, fire location, and visibility data from the fire
models. The geometry provides the path of egress to the occupants. The fire location informs the
behavior of the occupants. The visibility data obtained from the fire models is used to calculate the
egress walking speed of the occupants.
In addition, the present analysis assumes a rail-based system in a tunnel with a side-walkway used
for emergency evacuation from trains stranded in a tunnel. The authors acknowledged that the
study covers a limited number of rail systems, train equipment and tunnel design. Results are
intended to be used as a qualitative analysis of the impact on egress time of changes applied to
several egress parameters. They should not be generalized to any rail system, train and tunnel
design or ventilation strategy.
Impact of Population Characteristics (EM1A/B through EM3A/B)
Intercity Rail Scenarios
Results for the egress models with varied population characteristics for intercity rail scenarios are
presented in Table 19. For comparative purposes, the scenario EM1A (uniform characteristics for
diameter and walking speed) is considered as a reference egress time. EM3A (Occupant’s diameter
and movement based on 2018 population data) is also used for the egress means comparative analysis.
Despite the difference in steady state heat release rate, egress times associated with the fire models
FM1A and FM1B are of similar magnitude. Results suggest that the occupant load is low enough such
that the impact of the magnitude of the heat release rate is limited.
Egress scenarios EM1A, EM2A, and EM3A allow analyzing the impact of the population
characteristics on egress times for an NFPA 130 compliant system. The egress time is reduced when
using 2000 and 2018 population characteristics. Although the occupants’ diameter based on 2000 and
2018 population data was larger than for the reference case EM1A, occupants were generally
characterized by higher walking speed with the 2000 and 2018 population data. The results show that
the walking speed contributes more to the egress time than the occupants’ diameter.
Occupants’ flow rates through railcar doors and exit doors show similar trend between the difference
egress scenarios (See Appendix B, Figure 45 through Figure 47).
The proportion of obese occupants increased between the 2000 and the 2018 population data which
contributed to a decrease in their average walking speed, explaining the increase in egress time
between the egress scenarios EM2A and EM3A.
The egress models’ results suggest that the egress time decreases by 9% when occupants’
characteristics are based on the 2018 population data compared to the reference occupants’ set but
increases by 2% to 5% compared to occupants’ characteristics based on the 2000 population data.
For each egress scenario, egress times are shorter than the estimated times available before the
visibility tenability criterion is exceeded downstream of the area of fire origin (see Table 20).
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TABLE 19. EGRESS TIMES FOR EM1A, EM2A, AND EM3A EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
Egress Walkway Distance
Fire Occupant Occupant Walking Egress % Diff**
Model Width Between
Model Load Size (cm) Speed Time (s) (%).
Scenario* (mm) Exits (m)
(m/s)
EM1A 45.58 1 385 (-)

FM1A
(16MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2A See Table 1 331 -14%
Mid- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%) -9%
EM3A See Table 2 244 349
58.3 (39.2%) 610 [+5%]***
896 (800 ft)
EM1A 45.58 1 (24 in.) 380 (-)
FM1B
(55MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2A See Table 1 337 -11%
Mid- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%) -9%
EM3A See Table 2 344
58.3 (39.2%) [+2%]***
*As a reminder, EM1A uses uniform occupant characteristics. EM2A occupants’ characteristics are based on 2000 population data. EM3A
relies on 2018 population data.
** % Difference based on reference case EM1A.
*** % Difference based on reference case EM2A (2000 population data).
TABLE 20. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR EM1A THROUGH EM3A EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
Egress Downstream
Fire Occupant Occupant Size Walking Egress
Model ASET @ 2m ASET > RSET?
Model Load (cm) Speed Time (s)
Scenario* (6.6 ft) (s)
(m/s)
EM1A 45.58 1 385 Yes

FM1A
(16MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2A See Table 1 810 331 Yes
Mid- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%)
EM3A See Table 2 349 Yes
58.3 (39.2%)
896
EM1A 45.58 1 380 Yes
FM1B
(55MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2A See Table 1 410 337 Yes
Mid- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%)
EM3A See Table 2 344 Yes
58.3 (39.2%)
Rapid Rail Transit Scenarios
Results for the egress models based on different population characteristics for intercity rail scenarios
are presented in Table 21. The egress times associated with the rapid rail transit scenarios are
dependent on the steady state heat release rate. Egress times associated with the fire models FM2A
(55 MW end-train fire), and FM2C (55 MW mid-train fire) are longer than the egress times associated
with the fire models FM2B (16 MW, end-train fire) and FM3, (3.5 MW, electrical fire), by an order of
12 to 20 minutes.
Egress scenarios EM1B, EM2B, and EM3B allow analyzing the impact of the population characteristics
on egress times for an NFPA 130 compliant system. For fire models FM2B, FM2C, and FM3, egress
times for the egress scenario EM2B based on 2000 population characteristics data are shorter than for
the reference case EM1B using uniform occupants’ characteristics, likely due to the increase in average
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occupant walking speed. Inversely, comparison of the egress times based on EM1B and EM2B egress
scenarios for the fire model FM2A shows a slight increase (about 1%) with the 2000 population
characteristics data. The cause of this increase is unclear but is likely within the uncertainty of the
model.
For fire models FM2A, FM2B, and FM3, egress times estimated for the egress scenario EM3B relying
on the 2018 population data, are longer than egress times estimated using uniform characteristics (5%
to 9% increase) as well as egress times estimated using occupant load based on the 2000 population
data (7% to 17%). A decrease in egress time is measured for FM2C when using 2018 population
characteristics (-8% compared to the reference case EM1B and -2% compared to the scenario EM2B,
with an occupant load based on 2000 population characteristics data). Except for FM2C, a longer
increase in egress times is measured for the rapid transit rail system cases than for the intercity rail
ones. These results suggest that the combination of walking speed and occupant load has a major
impact on the egress times. Occupant loads beyond a certain threshold appear to be able to create
longer slowdowns along the egress path while a higher average walking speed can reduce egress time
as seen with EM2B.
The flow of occupants through the exit doors shows more variation over time for the egress scenarios
with occupants’ characteristics based on 2000 and 2018 population data (EM2B and EM3B) than for
the egress scenario with uniform occupants’ characteristics (EM1B) (See Appendix B, Figure 53
through Figure 54). The range of walking speeds in EM2B and EM3B may explain the flow rate
fluctuations observed.
The proportion of obese occupants increased between the 2000 and the 2018 population data
contributed to a decrease in their average walking speed, possibly explaining some increase in egress
times between the egress scenarios EM2B and EM3B.
The egress model results indicate that beyond a threshold occupant load, the egress time increases
with occupants’ characteristics based on the 2018 population data compared to the reference and 2000
population data occupants’ characteristics. The observed impact of occupants’ characteristics on
egress times is as large as a 16% increase when using 2000 and 2018 population data.
Egress times for the rapid rail transit egress scenario with a mid-train fire are longer than the time
available before the visibility tenability criterion is exceeded downstream of the area of fire origin (see
Table 22). Occupants downstream of the area of fire origin may be unable to evacuate under the
current assumptions.
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TABLE 21. EGRESS TIMES FOR EM1B, EM2B, AND EM3B EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
Model Width Between
Scenario (mm) Exits (m)
(m/s)
EM1B 45.58 1 2,423 (-)
FM2A
(55MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2B See Table 1 2,457 +1%
End- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%) +8%
EM3B See Table 2 2,624
58.3 (39.2%) [+7%]***
EM1B 45.58 1 1,763 (-)
FM2B
(16MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2B See Table 1 1,641 -7%
Mid- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%) +9%
58.3 (39.2%) 610 244 [+17%]***
2,000
EM1B 45.58 1 (24 in.) (800 ft) 2,465 (-)
FM2C
(55MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
Mid- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%) -8%
58.3 (39.2%) [-2%]***
EM1B 45.58 1 1,453 (-)
FM3 47.9 (77.6%)

(3.5MW) 58.3 (22.4%)
47.9 (60.8%) +5%
58.3 (39.2%) [+12%]***
*As a reminder, EM1B uses uniform occupant characteristics. EM2B occupants’ characteristics are based on 2000 population data. EM3B
relies on 2018 population data.
** % Difference based on reference case EM1B.
*** % Difference based on reference case EM2B (2000 population data).
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TABLE 22. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR EM1B THROUGH EM3B EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
Egress Downstream
Fire Occupant Occupant Walking Egress
Model ASET @ 2m ASET > RSET?
Model Load Size (cm) Speed Time (s)
Scenario (6.6 ft) (s)
(m/s)
EM1B 45.58 1 2,423 Yes
FM2A
(55MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2B See Table 1 N/A 2,457 Yes
End- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%)
EM3B See Table 2 2,624 Yes
58.3 (39.2%)
EM1B 45.58 1 1,763 No
FM2B
(16MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2B See Table 1 1,010 1,641 No
Mid- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%)
EM3B See Table 2 1,915 No
58.3 (39.2%)
2,000
EM1B 45.58 1 2,465 No
FM2C
(55MW, 47.9 (77.6%)
EM2B See Table 1 310 2,338 No
Mid- 58.3 (22.4%)
Train) 47.9 (60.8%)
EM3B See Table 2 2,280 No
58.3 (39.2%)
EM1B 45.58 1 1,453 Yes
FM3 47.9 (77.6%)

EM2B See Table 1 N/A 1,356 Yes
(3.5MW) 58.3 (22.4%)
47.9 (60.8%)
EM3B See Table 2 1,521 Yes
58.3 (39.2%)
Rail Systems Analysis
Egress times for the rapid transit scenarios are longer than for intercity rail scenarios. The increase in
egress time is likely related to the difference in occupant loads, the assumed occupant load for the
rapid rail transit scenarios being more than two (2) times the occupant load assumed for the intercity
rail scenarios. In addition, below a given threshold occupant load, egress times do not appear to be
relatively independent of the heat release rate steady state.
For most egress scenarios, an increase in egress time was observed when modeling occupants based
on 2018 population characteristics data.
Impact of Egress Means (EM3A/B through EM6A/B)
The impact of changing the egress walkway widths and exit spacing is analyzed using occupants’
characteristics following the 2018 population data (Egress scenarios EM3A through EM6A). Results
are presented in Table 23.
Change in egress time is limited to a few seconds when only the exit walkway width is reduced. For
the fire model FM1A (16 MW fire), a decrease in egress time of 17% compared to the reference case
EM3A is calculated when the exit spacing is reduced to 183 m (600 ft, EM5A). For a similar egress
scenario with FM1B (55 MW fire), the egress time only decreases by 3% compared to the reference
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scenario EM3A based on the 2018 population data. This last result is surprising as a larger reduction
in egress time would be expected with smaller exit spacing. However, it was realized that when
reducing the exit spacing, one exit was located close to the fire area where environment conditions
exceeded tenable criterion early in the simulation preventing the use of this exit. The egress time was
reduced to approximately 300 seconds when moving the additional exit further from the fire area.
For fire models FM1A and FM1B, egress times are reduced by, respectively, 9% and 15% compared to
the reference case EM3A when an increase in egress walkway width to 914 mm (36 in.) is combined
with a reduction in exit spacing to 183 m (600 ft).
Although the largest impact on the egress time is obtained when both changes (increase in egress
walkway width and reduction of exit spacing) are applied for FM1B, the largest reduction in egress
time for FM1B is estimated when only the exit spacing is reduced. The last result is counter-intuitive
and suggests that changes in egress means alone may not be effective in reducing egress times and
may need to be established based on Occupant Load.
Egress times for scenarios EM3A, EM4A, EM5A, and EM6A are shorter than the estimated times
available before the visibility tenability criterion is exceeded downstream of the area of fire origin (see
Table 24). Egress is complete before reaching untenable conditions along the tunnel section located
downstream of the area of fire origin.
Occupants’ flow rates though exit doors and railcar doors for the fire model FM1B are presented in
Appendix B, Figure 47 through Figure 50. A wider egress walkway allows for higher peak occupants’
flow rates through the rail car doors, while the flow at exit doors remains relatively steady over the
course of the simulation. Reduced exit spacing appears to allow for more steady flow through the
railcar doors. Occupant’s flow rates are higher through the exit doors than through the railcar doors
indicating that most congestion occurs when exiting the railcar to access the egress walkway.
TABLE 23. EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3A THROUGH EM6A EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
Model Width Between
(m/s)
610 244
EM3A 349 (-)
(24 in.) (800 ft)
FM1A 914 244
EM4A 346 -1%
(16MW, (36 in.) (800 ft)
Mid- 610 183
EM5A 291 -17%
Train) (24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6A 316 -9%
47.9 (60.8%) (36 in.) (600 ft)
896 See Table 2
58.3 (39.2%) 610 244
EM3A 344 (-)
(24 in.) (800 ft)
FM1B 914 244
EM4A 347 +1%
(55MW, (36 in.) (800 ft)
Mid- 610 183
EM5A 336 -2%
Train) (24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6A 293 -15%
(36 in.) (600 ft)
*As a reminder, EM3A through EM6A relies on 2018 population data.
** % Difference based on reference case EM3A (2018 population data).
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TABLE 24. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3A THROUGH EM6A EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Egress Distance Downstream

Fire Walkway Egress Time
Model Between ASET @ 2m ASET > RSET?
Model Width (mm) (s)
Scenario Exits (m) (6.6 ft) (s)
610 244
EM3A 349 Yes
(24 in.) (800 ft)
FM1A 914 244
EM4A 346 Yes
(16MW, (36 in.) (800 ft)
810
Mid- 610 183
EM5A 291 Yes
Train) (24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6A 316 Yes
(36 in.) (600 ft)
610 244
EM3A 344 Yes
(24 in.) (800 ft)
FM1B 914 244
EM4A 347 Yes
(55MW, (36 in.) (800 ft)
410
Mid- 610 183
EM5A 336 Yes
Train) (24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6A 293 Yes
(36 in.) (600 ft)
The impact of changing the egress walkway widths and exit spacing is analyzed using occupants’
characteristics following the 2018 population data (Egress scenarios EM3B through EM6B). Results
are presented in Table 25. For each fire model fire, the most significant decrease in egress time is
obtained for the egress scenarios where both egress changes are implemented (increase in exit
walkway width to 914 mm (36 in.) and a 25% reduction in exit spacing from 244 m (800 ft) to 183 m
(600 ft)). A 28% to 59% reduction in egress times compared to the reference case EM3B is estimated.
Reduction in egress times is also noted when only one egress change is applied. A 16% to 29%
reduction in egress times is obtained when the egress walkway width increased from 610 mm (24in.)
to 914 mm (36 in.). An 18% to 42% decrease in egress time is estimated when the exit spacing is
reduced from 244 m (800 ft) to 183 m (600 ft).
Egress times for rapid rail transit egress scenarios associated with the fire models FM2B, and FM2C
are longer than the time available before some of the tenability criteria are exceeded downstream of
the area of fire origin (see Table 26). Although downstream ASET were estimated at a 2 m (6.6 ft)
height, it is possible that occupants downstream of the area of fire origin may be unable to evacuate
under the current assumptions. With regards to the egress scenarios associated with the fire model
FM2A, the fire is located at the end of the train and the ventilation prevents untenable conditions to
settle upstream of the fire allowing safe egress for the occupants.
Occupants flow rates through exit doors and railcar doors for the fire model FM2C are presented in
Appendix B, Figure 55 through Figure 58. Results suggest that a wider egress walkway allows for
more steady occupant’s flow through the exit doors and railcar doors. Reduced exit spacing allows
for a steadier flow at the railcar doors throughout the duration of the simulation. It also appears to
enable steadier discharge with higher flow rates at the exit doors. Flow rates at the exit doors are
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higher than at the railcar doors suggesting that egress is most congested at the transition from the
railcar to the egress walkway.
TABLE 25. EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3A THROUGH EM6A EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
Occupant Occupant Walking Egress % Diff**
Fire Model Model Width Between
Load Size (cm) Speed Time (s) (%).
(m/s)
610 244
EM3B 2,624 (-)
(24 in.) (800 ft)
914 244
FM2A EM4B 2,190 -17%
(36 in.) (800 ft)
(55MW,
610 183
End-Train) EM5B 1,512 -42%
(24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6B 1,088 -59%
(36 in.) (600 ft)
610 244
EM3B 1,915 (-)
(24 in.) (800 ft)
914 244
FM2B EM4B 1,362 -29%
(36 in.) (800 ft)
(16MW,
610 183
Mid-Train) EM5B 1,403 -27%
(24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6B 1,192 -38%
47.9 (60.8%) (36 in.) (600 ft)
2,000 See Table 2
58.3 (39.2%) 610 244
EM3B 2,280 (-)
(24 in.) (800 ft)
914 244
FM2C EM4B 1,905 -16%
(36 in.) (800 ft)
(55MW,
610 183
Mid-Train) EM5B 1,433 -37%
(24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6B 1,273 -44%
(36 in.) (600 ft)
610 244
EM3B 1,521 (-)
(24 in.) (800 ft)
914 244
EM4B 1,248 -18%
FM3 (36 in.) (800 ft)
(3.5MW) 610 183
EM5B 1,242 -18%
(24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6B 1,102 -28%
(36 in.) (600 ft)
*As a reminder, EM3B through EM6B relies on 2018 population data.
** % Difference based on reference case EM3B (2018 population data).
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TABLE 26. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3B THROUGH EM6B EGRESS SCENARIOS.

Walkway Egress
Fire Model Model Between ASET @ 2m ASET > RSET?
Width (mm) Time (s)
610 244
EM3B 2,624 Yes
(24 in.) (800 ft)
914 244
FM2A EM4B 2,190 Yes
(36 in.) (800 ft)
(55MW, N/A
610 183
End-Train) EM5B 1,512 Yes
(24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6B 1,088 Yes
(36 in.) (600 ft)
610 244
EM3B 1,915 No
(24 in.) (800 ft)
914 244 1,010
FM2B EM4B 1,362 No
(36 in.) (800 ft)
(16MW,
610 183
Mid-Train) EM5B 1,403 No
(24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6B 1,192 No
(36 in.) (600 ft)
610 244
EM3B 2,280 No
(24 in.) (800 ft)
914 244
FM2C EM4B 1,905 No
(36 in.) (800 ft)
(55MW, 310
610 183
Mid-Train) EM5B 1,433 No
(24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6B 1,273 No
(36 in.) (600 ft)
610 244
EM3B 1,521 Yes
(24 in.) (800 ft)
914 244
EM4B 1,248 Yes
FM3 (36 in.) (800 ft)
N/A
(3.5MW) 610 183
EM5B 1,242 Yes
(24 in.) (600 ft)
914 183
EM6B 1,102 Yes
(36 in.) (600 ft)
A summary of the impact on egress time of an egress walkway width increase and an exit spacing
reduction is presented in Table 27. Changes to egress means, such as increase of egress walkway
width and reduction in exit spacing, can reduce occupants egress time. Their benefits appear to be
dependent on the occupant load. Results suggest that a larger reduction in egress time is obtained
with larger occupant loads (such as the one used for the rapid transit system scenarios). For the
intercity rail system scenarios, increasing the walkway width had very limited impact on the egress
time. Therefore, occupant load needs to be considered to develop adequate egress means dimensions
and spacing.
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TABLE 27. EGRESS CHANGE IMPACT ON EGRESS TIME.
Impact on Egress Time of Egress Means Change (%)

Fire Model
Walkway Width
Exit Spacing Reduction Both Egress Changes
Increase
FM1A
-1% -17% -9%
(16MW, Mid-Train)
FM1B
+1% -2% -15%
(55MW, Mid-Train)
FM2A
-17% -42% -59%
(55MW, End-Train)
FM2B
-29% -27% -38%
(16MW, Mid-Train)
FM2C
-16% -37% -44%
(55MW, Mid-Train)
FM3
-18% -18% -28%
(3.5MW, Electrical)
To better understand the impact of occupant load on egress time, the egress scenario EM3B (2018
population characteristics) was run using fire model inputs from FM2C (Rapid Transit System, 55
MW. Mid-Train Fire) with different occupant loads (250 occupants, 500 occupants, 896 occupants,
1,400 occupants, and 2,000 occupants). Egress Time results are shown in Figure 24. The data suggests
that for occupant loads of 896 occupants, 1,400 occupants and 2,000 occupants, the evolution of egress
time follows a linear regression. A growth rate reduction is observed below 500 occupants, suggesting
a possible “minimum egress time” below a specific occupant load. Additional research should be
conducted to better evaluate the impact of occupant load on egress time.
FIGURE 24. EGRESS TIME VS. OCCUPANT LOAD (250, 500, 896, 1,400, AND 2,000
OCCUPANTS) FOR FM2C AND EGRESS SCENARIO EM3B.
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Images from the egress models show that no accumulation of occupants is observed at the exit doors.
Rather, bottleneck appears to be located at the rail car doors (See Figure 25) which is consistent with
the decrease in egress times observed when the occupant load decreases. The time it takes for
occupants to exit a rail car increases as a flow is created along the egress walkway. Insertion into the
egress walkway is impeded by the occupants already walking on it. This interpretation is supported
by the comparison of the occupants’ flow rates at the exit doors and railcar doors (See Appendix B,
Figure 47 through Figure 50 and Figure 55 through Figure 58). Lower flow rates are estimated at the
railcar doors suggesting that congestion is occurring at the transition from the railcar to the exit
walkway. In addition, wider egress walkway appears to allow for steadier (and larger in average)
occupants’ flow rates at exit doors while a reduction in exit spacing seems to allow larger discharge
at exit doors combined with steadier discharge at the railcar exit doors.
The estimated time for the occupants to exit the rail car is a critical factor that depends on multiple
parameters including the train door width, the occupant load, the size of the egress walkway, and the
occupant characteristics. Planned sequential s evacuation 133 is outside the scope of this report but
should be studied to assess its potential benefit on egress time. Planned sequential evacuation would
limit accumulation at the rail car doors due to the already on-going flow along the egress walkway.
(A) 610 mm (24 in.) Egress Walkway
(B) 914 mm (36 in.) Egress Walkway

FIGURE 25. SNAPSHOT FROM THE EM3B (A) AND EM4B (B) EGRESS MODEL SHOWING OCCUPANTS MOVEMENT.
An additional interesting note from the egress time results is that a larger reduction is obtained for
the 55 MW fires than for the 16 MW fires and the electrical fire when both egress changes are combined
and when only the exit spacing is reduced.
Impact of Emergency Responders Counterflow (EM7A/B)
Egress time results for the reference case EM3A and the egress scenario including emergency
responders counterflow are presented in Table 28. No significant change (about 1 %) in egress time
is observed when emergency responders create a counterflow along the egress walkways when the
fire scenario follows models FM1A and FM1B. Occupants flow rates are not affected by the
emergency responders counterflow as seen in Appendix B, Figure 51.
One possible explanation is related to the occupant load. The latter may be low enough that the
addition of the first responders counterflow does not affect the occupants egress flow.
133 Planned sequential evacuation consists in first evacuating the car where the fire originates. Downstream cars are then evacuated after
egress from the incident car is completed.
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Egress times for egress scenario EM7A are shorter than the estimated times available before the
visibility tenability criterion is exceeded downstream of the area of fire origin (see Table 29). Egress
is complete before reaching untenable conditions along the tunnel section located downstream of the
area of fire origin.
TABLE 28. EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3A AND EM7A EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
(m/s)
FM1A EM3A 349 (-)
(16MW,
Mid-Train) EM7A 47.9 (60.8%) 610 244 344 -1%
896 See Table 2
FM1B EM3A 58.3 (39.2%) (24 in.) (800 ft) 344 (-)
(55MW,
Mid-Train) EM7A 339 -1%
*As a reminder, EM3A and EM7A rely on 2018 population data.
TABLE 29. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3A AND EM7A EGRESS SCENARIOS.

Walkway Egress
Width (mm) Time (s)
FM1A EM3A 349 Yes

(16MW, 810
Mid-Train) EM7A 610 244 344 Yes
FM1B EM3A (24 in.) (800 ft) 344 Yes
(55MW, 410
Mid-Train) EM7A 339 Yes
Egress times for the reference case EM3B and for the egress scenario EM7B that includes first
responders counterflow are presented in Table 30. While limited impact on the egress times was
observed for the intercity rail cases, the counterflow resulting from the actions of emergency
responders increases the egress times by 103% to 208% for the rapid rail transit fire scenarios when
compared with the case EM3B. The counterflow created by emergency responders significantly slows
down the occupants’ egress. The difference in egress time impact between the intercity rail cases and
the rapid transit rail cases is likely related to the occupant load that much larger for the latter cases.
Occupants’ flow rates at the exit doors and railcar doors for the emergency responders egress scenario
(EM7B) are presented in Appendix B, Figure 59 for the fire model FM2C. Large variations in flow
rates are estimated at the exit doors. Occupant flow at the exit doors is stopped (0 person per second
flow rate) multiple times throughout the duration of the simulation confirming the negative impact
of the counterflow on occupants’ egress.
For egress scenarios associated with FM2B, and FM2C, egress times are longer than the time available
before the visibility tenability criterion is exceeded downstream of the area of fire origin (see Table
31). For these egress scenarios, the fire is located in the middle of the train and occupants located
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downstream of the fire may not be able to safely egress. In the case of FM2A and FM3, the fire is
located, respectively, in the most downstream car of the train, and downstream of the train. The
ventilation is able to push the smoke away from the train allowing occupants egress.
Egress means and/or procedures need to be adapted to allow occupants self-evacuation and first
responders access to the incident scene simultaneously. Several options can be investigated:
• Walkways dedicated to emergency responders could be created.

• First responders could use the rail tracks to access the incident scene.
• The egress walkway width could be increased to allow for bi-directional movement.
An egress scenario EM7B(2) was defined based on the scenario EM7B but including a 914 mm (36 in.)
wide egress walkway. The aim of this additional scenario is to evaluate the impact on the egress time
of a larger egress walkway when a counterflow is present. Results are shown in Table 30. Increase
of the egress walkway width to 914 mm (36 in.) when a counterflow exists allows significant reduction
in egress times compared to counterflow egress scenario with a 610 mm (24 in.) wide egress walkway.
The egress times measured for the egress scenario EM7B(2) are 16% to 21% less than the ones calculated
for the reference case EM3B. The egress times for EM7B(2) also compares to the ones obtained for the
egress scenario EM4B (increase egress walkway width to 914 mm (36 in.) with no counterflow). The
results suggest that an increase in egress walkway width to 914 mm (36 in.) would support the actions
of first responders without significantly impacting the self-evacuation of occupants.
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TABLE 30. EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3B, EM4B, EM7B AND EM7B* EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Egress Occupant Walkway Distance

Occupant Occupant Egress % Diff**
Fire Model Model Walking Speed Width Between
Load Size (cm) Time (s) (%).
Scenario (m/s) (mm) Exits (m)
EM3B 610 2,624 (-)
FM2A EM7B (24 in.) 5,324 +103%

244
(55MW,
EM4B (800 ft) 2,190 -17%
End-Train) 914
(36 in.) -16%
EM7B(2) 2,208
[+1%]***
EM3B 610 1,915 (-)
EM7B (24 in.) 3,922 +105%

FM2B
244
(16MW,
EM4B (800 ft) 1,362 -29%
Mid-Train) 914
47.9 (36 in.) - 24%
EM7B(2) 1,460
(60.8%) [+7%]***
2,000 See Table 2
58.3
EM3B 610 2,280 (-)
(39.2%)
FM2C EM7B (24 in.) 5,839 +156%
244
(55MW,
EM4B (800 ft) 1,905 -16%
Mid-Train) 914
(36 in.) -16%
EM7B(2) 1,908
[+0.2%]***
EM3B 610 1,521 (-)
EM7B (24 in.) 4,684 +208%

FM3 244
(3.5MW) EM4B (800 ft) 1,248 -18%
914
(36 in.) -21%
EM7B(2) 1,206
[-3%]***
*As a reminder, EM3B, EM4B, and EM7B rely on 2018 population data.
***% Difference between EM4B (36 in. walkway width, No FD counterflow) and EM7B* (36 in. walkway width, with FD counterflow)
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TABLE 31. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3B, EM4B, EM7A, AND EM7B(2) EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Egress Walkway Distance Downstream

Egress
Fire Model Model Width Between ASET @ 2m ASET > RSET?
Time (s)
Scenario (mm) Exits (m) (6.6 ft) (s)
EM3B 610 N/A 2,624 Yes
FM2A EM7B (24 in.) N/A 5,324 Yes
244
(55MW,
EM4B (800 ft) N/A 2,190 Yes
End-Train) 914
EM7B(2) (36 in.) N/A 2,208 Yes
EM3B 610 1,915 No
FM2B EM7B (24 in.) 3,922 No

244
(16MW, 1,010
EM4B (800 ft) 1,362 No
Mid-Train) 914
EM7B(2) (36 in.) 1,460 No
EM3B 2,280 No
610
FM2C EM7B (24 in.) 5,839 No
244
(55MW, 310
EM4B (800 ft) 1,905 No
Mid-Train) 914
EM7B(2) (36 in.) 1,908 No
EM3B N/A 1,521 Yes

610
EM7B (24 in.) N/A 4,684 Yes
FM3 244
(3.5MW) EM4B (800 ft) N/A 1,248 Yes
914
EM7B(2) (36 in.) N/A 1,206 Yes
The level of impact on the egress time of a counterflow depends on the occupant load. Lower occupant
loads are not affected by the first responders counterflow. However, above a certain occupant load
threshold, the egress time increases and can more than double. Egress means modifications and/or
egress procedures updates need to be investigated to address the issue. An increase in egress
walkway width can be a solution.
For large occupant loads, the counterflow force occupants to fully stop (0 person per second flow rate)
their movement increasing egress time.
Impact of Unidirectional Egress (EM8A/B)
Unidirectional egress may result from different events:
• The fire prevents access to an exit.

• The environmental conditions (heat, smoke) are untenable in one of the directions.
• An obstruction (debris, luggage) exists on the egress walkway.
• Evacuees may attempt to reverse evacuation route if slowdown is experienced in one
direction.
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Egress times for the egress scenario EM8A are presented in Table 32. The unidirectional egress
scenario presents an egress time that is more than doubled compared to the egress scenario EM3A for
both fire models FM1A and FM1B. The occupants’ flow rate at the exit door and rail car doors in
shown in Appendix B, Figure 52. After following a trend that is similar to the exit door flow rate seen
for the reference case EM3A (Appendix B, Figure 47), the occupants’ flow rate at the exit door
decreases below 0.5 person per second once the railcars are evacuated which is much lower thant the
average flow rate experienced in EM3A (> 1.0 person per second).
The results suggest that egress limited to one single direction can have major consequences on the
egress time in the event of a fire incident.
In the case of unidirectional egress (egress scenario EM8A), egress times are longer than the estimated
time available before the visibility tenability criterion is exceeded downstream of the area of fire origin
(see Table 33) for fire model scenarios FM1A and FM1B. This result suggests that some occupants
may face untenable conditions during egress and may not be able to reach an exit.
TABLE 32. EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3A AND EM8A EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
(m/s)
FM1A EM3A 349 (-)
(16MW,
Mid-Train) EM8A 47.9 (60.8%) 610 244 961 +175%
896 See Table 2
FM1B EM3A 58.3 (39.2%) (24 in.) (800 ft) 344 (-)
(55MW,
Mid-Train) EM8A 1,519 +342%
*As a reminder, EM3A and EM8A rely on 2018 population data.
TABLE 33. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3A, AND EM8A EGRESS SCENARIOS.

Walkway Egress
Width (mm) Time (s)
FM1A EM3A 349 Yes

(16MW, 810
Mid-Train) EM8A 610 244 961 No
FM1B EM3A (24 in.) (800 ft) 344 Yes
(55MW, 410
Mid-Train) EM8A 1,519 No
Egress times for the egress scenario EM8B are presented in Table 34. The unidirectional egress
scenario presents an egress time that is 1% to 93% longer than the egress time obtained for the
reference case EM3B. A significant impact on the egress time is noted for unidirectional egress in the
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case of mid-train fire (+ 92% (FM2B) and + 66% (FM2C)), while the egress time for the end-train fire
(FM2A) remains almost unchanged. The location of the fire compared to the occupants can prevent
multi-directional egress. For mid-train fires, the results suggest that a limitation on the available
directions for egress can have major consequences on the egress time in the event of a fire incident.
The occupants’ flow rates through the exit door and railcar doors for the unidirectional egress scenario
related to the fire model FM2C are shown in Appendix B, Figure 60. The flow rate through the exit
door presents important variations with periods where the occupants flow either is very slow or
comes to a complete stop. This is likely due to congestion created at the only exit door available.
In the case of unidirectional egress, egress times for the fire scenarios FM2B, and FM2C are longer
than the time available before the visibility tenability criterion is exceeded downstream of the area of
fire origin (see Table 35). The results suggest that occupants located downstream of the fire may face
untenable conditions during egress and may not be able to reach an exit.
TABLE 34. EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3B AND EM8B EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
(m/s)
FM2A EM3B 2,624 (-)
(55MW, End-
Train) EM8B 2,659 +1%
FM2B EM3B 1,915 (-)
(16MW, Mid-
Train) EM8B 47.9 (60.8%) 610 244 3,673 +92%
2,000 See Table 2
FM2C EM3B 58.3 (39.2%) (24 in.) (800 ft) 2,280 (-)
(55MW, Mid-
Train) EM8B 3,782 +66%
EM3B 1,521 (-)

FM3 (3.5MW)
EM8B 2,936 +93%
*As a reminder, EM3B and EM8B rely on 2018 population data.
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TABLE 35. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR EM3B, AND EM8B EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Egress Walkway Distance Downstream

Egress
Fire Model Model Width Between ASET @ 2m ASET > RSET?
Time (s)
Scenario (mm) Exits (m) (6.6 ft) (s)
FM2A EM3B 2,624 Yes

(55MW, End- N/A
Train) EM8B 2,659 Yes
FM2B EM3B 1,915 No
(16MW, Mid- 1,010
EM8B 3,673 No
Train) 610 244
FM2C EM3B (24 in.) (800 ft) 2,280 No
(55MW, Mid- 310
EM8B 3,782 No
Train)
EM3B 1,521 Yes
FM3 (3.5MW) N/A
EM8B 2,936 Yes
For both train systems investigated, a limitation of the egress flow to one single direction can
significantly increase the egress time. The impact on egress time is more pronounced for the intercity
rail system. The two main differences between the rail systems are the occupant load and the length
of the train. Both parameters should be studied to understand their contribution to the egress time.
Occupants’ flow rates show that the blockage of an exit slows down their movement to the point
where occurrences will exist where occupants move very slowly through the exit door or even come
to a complete stop.
Analysis of the 2,500 ft Exit Spacing Impact on Egress Time
The egress study has focused on the spacing of cross-passageways when used for egress in lieu of
exits. NFPA 130 requires exits to be spaced no more than 762 m (2,500 ft) apart. Using inputs from
the fire model FM2C, several egress scenarios with exit spacings of 762 m (2,500 ft) and 381 m (1,250
ft) were analyzed to evaluate egress times. Results are presented in Table 36.
The first egress scenario analyzed assumes 762 m (2,500 ft) exit spacing and a counterflow on the
egress walkway created by the first responders. The calculated egress time is approximately 2 hours
and 40 minutes. Although the ventilation should be able to maintain tenable conditions upstream of
the fire, the downstream conditions will become untenable before egress is completed. In addition,
first responders will need to adapt their rotation strategy as air supply and fatigue will be an issue.
The section of the tunnel upstream of the fire will need to be used as a support area.
The impact on egress time of increasing the walkway width and reducing the exit spacing by 50%
without considering first responders counterflow is also investigated. Each analyzed change to the
egress means design reduces the egress time to a range of 36 to 47 minutes. The largest egress time
reduction is obtained when the egress walkway width is increased to 914 mm (36 in.) combined with
a reduction of exit spacing to 381 m (1,250 ft).
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For each egress scenario analyzed, the conditions downstream of the fire likely become untenable
before egress is completed (See Table 37).
TABLE 36. EGRESS TIMES FOR 762 M (2,500 FT) AND 381 M (1250 FT) EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Occupant
Egress Distance
Occupant Occupant Walking Walkway Egress Time
Fire Model Model Between Exits
Load Size (cm) Speed Width (mm) (s)
Scenario (m)
(m/s)
610 762
EM7B 9,820
(24 in.) (2,500 ft)
914 762
FM2C EM4B 2,587
47.9 (60.8%) (36 in.) (2,500 ft)
(55MW, Mid- 2,000 See Table 2
58.3 (39.2%) 610 381
Train) EM5B 2,772
(24 in.) (1,250 ft)
914 381
EM6B 2,169
(36 in.) (1,250 ft)
TABLE 37. COMPARISON OF ASET AND EGRESS TIMES FOR 762 M (2,500 FT) EXIT SPACING AND 381 M (1,250 FT)
EXIT SPACING EGRESS SCENARIOS.
Egress Distance
Walkway Downstream Egress Time
Fire Model Model Between Exits ASET > RSET?
Width (mm) ASET @ (s)
Scenario (m)
610 762
EM7B 9,820 No
(24 in.) (2,500 ft)
914 762
FM2C EM4B 2,587 No
(36 in.) (2,500 ft)
(55MW, Mid- 310
610 381
Train) EM5B 2,772 No
(24 in.) (1,250 ft)
914 381
EM6B 2,169 No
(36 in.) (1,250 ft)
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Comparative Analysis and Concluding Remarks

Performance criteria were developed to analyze the modeling results. Two transit systems were
studied: intercity rail and rapid transit rail systems. The impact of the following model inputs was
analyzed:
• Population characteristics
• Means of egress dimensions and spacing
• Emergency responders counterflow
• Unidirectional Egress
Each input is discussed separately in the following sections. As a general overview, occupant loads,
fire sizes, and ventilation strategies are parameters that significantly affect egress time.
Population Characteristics
• For intercity rail cases,

o The egress times estimated for occupant characteristics based on 2000 and 2018
population data were shorter than the reference case based on uniform occupants’
characteristics. The average walking speed was higher for occupants’ characteristics
driven by population data. The egress times obtained using uniform occupants’
characteristics were the most conservative.
o Egress times were 2% to 5% longer when estimated using occupants’ characteristics
based on 2018 population data compared to occupants’ characteristics based on 2000
population data, due to the change in population morphology.
• For rapid rail transit cases,

o A reduction in egress times was obtained when using occupants’ characteristics based
on 2000 population data compared to uniform occupants’ characteristics.
o With the exception of the 55MW mid-train fire scenario, 5% to 9% longer egress times
were estimated when using occupants’ characteristics based on 2018 population data
compared to uniform occupants’ characteristics.
o 7% to 17% longer egress times were estimated when using occupants’ characteristics
based on 2018 population data compared to occupants’ characteristics based on the
2000 population data. The change was likely due to the decrease in average walking
speed due to larger proportions of obese and elderly occupants.
• The impact of the population characteristics is contingent to the occupant load of the rail
system. The increase in egress time with the occupant characteristics based on 2018
population data was more prominent for the rapid rail transit cases where the occupant load
(2,000) was more than double the occupant load of the intercity rail cases (896). Larger
occupant loads increase egress times when considering population characteristics as a
parameter.
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Means of Egress
• For intercity rail cases,

o Limited change in egress times is observed when the width of the egress walkway is
increased to 914 mm (36 in.). Further analysis is required to evaluate if the occupant
load is a contribution factor to the identified outcome.
o The benefit from only reducing the exit spacing is dependent on the fire size and the
exit location compared to the train and fire location. Traffic to and through an exit
located in the vicinity of the fire may be negatively affected by smoke and heat
generated by large fires increasing the egress time. On the other hand, the additional
exit created by reduced spacing may decrease the egress time for smaller fires with
lower smoke and heat generation.
o Combination of wider egress walkway and reduced exit spacing presented a 9% to 15%
decrease in egress times when compared to egress times estimated for current NFPA
130 compliant systems with the same occupants’ characteristics based on 2018
population data.
o Adequate ventilation is likely to maintain tenable conditions within the tunnel
upstream of the fire for the duration of egress.
• For rapid transit cases,

o For railway car fires, the decrease in egress times was most significant (28% to 59%
reduction compared to NFPA 130 compliant systems with the same occupants’
characteristics based on 2018 population data) when increased egress walkway widths
was combined with decreased exit spacing. The present study considered 215 m (700
ft) long rapid transit trains. For an NFPA 130 compliant system with 244 m (800 ft) exit
spacing, assuming only one exit available along the train, a second one is a minimum
of 33 m (100 ft) away from the train. With exit spacing reduced to 183 m (600 ft), 2 exits
may be available along the train, with a 3rd one at least 152 m (500 ft) away from the
train (See Figure 26). Although exits may be closer, the size of the train may be a
contributing factor to the reduction in egress time obtained from the reduced exit
spacing.
FIGURE 26. NFPA 130 COMPLIANT AND REDUCED EXIT SPACING COMPARISON.
o For external electrical fires (FM3) downstream of the train, the combination of a larger
egress walkway and smaller exit spacing reduced the egress times by 26% compared
to current NFPA 130 compliant systems with the same occupants’ characteristics based
on 2018 population data. When applied individually, increase in egress walkway
width, and decrease in exit spacing reduced the egress time by 17% compared to
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current NFPA 130 compliant systems with the same occupants’ characteristics based
on 2018 population data.
o The ventilation may not be able to maintain tenable conditions downstream of the fire
for the duration of egress in the case of mid-train fires. Occupants located downstream
of the fire may be exposed to environmental conditions that exceed tenability criteria.
The development of a staged egress may be required where the direction of the
ventilation flow is reversed during the process to allow occupants on both sides of the
fire to evacuate under tenable conditions. Such approach would require some of the
occupants to shelter in the railcars until the ventilation is reversed and relies on the
assumption that fire spreads between railcars can be prevented.
• Large occupant loads constitute a challenge with regards to egress. The fire size, the
location of exits relative to the train, and to the fire area become critical variables that can
impact the egress times.
• Results show that tenability will not be maintained for all occupants inside the train in the
case of large mid-train fires. While tenable conditions are maintained for the 3.5 MW and
16 MW fire scenarios, tenability is compromised downstream of the fire for the 55 MW fire
scenarios with a large occupant load despite ventilation. The airflow from the ventilation
is insufficient to dilute the quantity of smoke, heat, and CO gases generated by the fire and
prevent an untenable atmosphere from spreading downstream of the fire.
• For the various scenarios studied, increasing egress walkway width reduces egress times.
• Smaller exit spacing can reduce egress times, but the impact of such change is also
dependent on the occupant loads, the fire size, and the location of the exits compared to the
train size and the fire area.
The occupants flow rate is generally higher at the exit doors than at the railcar doors (See
Appendix B). Congestion happens at the transition from the railcar to the egress walkway.
The occupants moving along the egress walkway slow down the movement of the
occupants exiting from the railcars. Egress walkway width increase and exit spacing
reduction allow stabilizing the egress flow rates from the railcar and through the exit door
at higher levels than with current NFPA 130 egress dimensions and spacing minimum
requirements.
• The challenge created by 2,500 ft exit spacing with regards to egress time can only be partly
solved by a change in walkway width and exit spacing reduction. Because of the distance
between exits, the egress time remains possibly larger than the ASET. Ventilation is critical
to maintain tenable conditions upstream of the fire and provide a safe area to first
responders who will likely need to conduct assisted evacuation in addition to firefighting
efforts. The ability to provide air supply and prevent first responders fatigue needs to be
further investigated.
Emergency Responders Counterflow
• The impact of the presence of emergency responders moving in the opposite direction of
occupants during egress depends on the occupant loads. Results suggest that for occupant
loads beyond 896 persons, the counterflow created by emergency responders can negatively
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affect the egress time. Some of the presented egress models showed that a 36” wide egress
walkway could help reduce the egress time. Nevertheless, the egress model input related
to the physical characteristics of the emergency responders did not include their gears and
equipment which would have an impact on the egress flow and egress time. Previous
studies have shown that the counterflow created by first responders walking in the opposite
direction as occupants along a stairwell would generate stops and slowdowns along the
egress pathway. 134
• For large occupant loads, results show that the counterflow created by emergency
responders can double the duration of egress for current NFPA 130 compliant systems.
• For mid-train fires where the ventilation is critical, the effect of such counterflow may
expose occupants to environmental conditions that exceed tenability criteria.
Unidirectional Egress
• Results suggest that unidirectional egress can more than double egress times.
• The occupant load is likely to be a major contributor to egress time in the case of
unidirectional flow.
134 Averill, J., D., Mileti,D., S., Peacock, R., D., Kuligowski, E., D., Groner, N., Proulx, G., Reneke, P., A., Nelson, H., E., NIST NCSTAR 1-7,
Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster, Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications,
Chapter 10, p. 154.
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Gap Analysis
Several model limitations and knowledge gaps have been identified during the project.
Model Limitations
The results presented are dependent on the assumptions that were made with regards to:
• Tunnel geometry: The tunnels geometry was based on information collected during the cases
studies and cannot represent a comprehensive representation of all tunnel designs. As an
example, no slope was considered in the geometries. Slope has a recognized impact on smoke
movement (i.e. buoyancy) and the performance of ventilation systems. Additional research
should be conducted to determine the effect of slope on egress.
• Rail systems: The analysis focuses on two (2) types of rail systems: intercity rail systems, and
rapid transit systems. Additional systems exist and may present differences in terms of tunnel
design, train characteristics, occupant load with the ones considered. Assumptions had to be
made regarding the design and occupant load of the models. Results only allow for a
qualitative analysis of the impact on egress times of egress means modifications and the egress
time values derived from the analysis should not be directly applied to rail systems with
different characteristics. Additional research should be conducted to better identify the
different rail systems using tunnels and their characteristics.
• Train characteristics, such as train length, properties of materials present: The authors relied
on case studies and literature to determine train characteristics.
1. The designs of the train used in the models are more than 25 years old and may not
represent current geometries. A review of current and modern train designs should be
conducted. It would provide valuable information related to the geometry as well as
the fuel load present in this equipment.
2. The materials selected as fuel loads may not be representative of current rail cars. A
literature review should be conducted to identify the properties of NFPA 130
compliant materials.
3. In addition to materials, current rail cars may also be equipped with fire detection and
fire suppression devices. A review should be performed to investigate the type of
existing detection, their location, the type of fire suppression systems and their design
equipping currently built rail cars.
• Occupant loads: Occupant loads in the present study were established based on available
literature on train occupancy for several major cities. To be conservative, the upper range of
occupancies were used.
1. The present study highlighted the dependency of egress times on occupant load (See
Figure 24). Results indicate that increasing egress walkway widths or reducing exit
spacing may not necessarily reduce the egress time for “low” occupant loads. Further
research should be conducted to better evaluate the correlation between occupant
loads and egress means dimensions when related to egress times.
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2. The impact on egress time of occupant load when first responders counterflow exists
or when evacuation is only possible along one single direction also needs to be
examined in more detail.
3. The present study shows that egress times are more sensitive to population
characteristics for “large” occupant loads. This information is critical but needs to
be investigated in more detail.
4. Model results show that the egress bottleneck is located at the rail car doors. The
flow at the rail car doors decreases as occupants walk along the egress walkway. The
potential benefit and limitations of different evacuation strategies such as, but not
limited to, shelter-in-place, or planned sequential evacuations, should be studied.
However, the human behavior aspect will be critical and will need to be evaluated
carefully. Case studies have shown that when occupants become aware of smoke
and/or fire conditions, they will initiate self-evacuation even if it implies breaking
windows to gain access to the egress walkway.
• Population Characteristics:
1. General
An essential assumption of the present study was that the occupant load is
representative of the US population characteristics. Two (2) components need to be
investigated to evaluate the adequacy of this assumption:
1. There is a large diversity in population anthropomorphic characteristics over
different regions of the US as well as over the entire world. Research should
be conducted to evaluate population characteristics in different States of the
US as well as in other parts of the world.
2. There is a lack of information regarding the population characteristics of
train system users. The present study assumes that train occupancy follows
the same anthropomorphic trends as the US population. The latter
hypothesis has not been verified and its relevance should be investigated.
3. To better understand the analyze the impact of exit spacing on egress time of
with regards to occupants’ characteristics, population characteristics from the
late 1970s should be identified and reviewed to conduct an egress
comparison using 1970s data and 2018 data. Results could inform of needed
changes to the exit/cross-passageway spacing requirements on a population
characteristics basis.
4. Rail tunnels are built and operated for an extensive period of times.
Information related to changes in anthropometric data over time should be
identified and reviewed to evaluate the ability to develop population
characteristics predictive models. Such models could be used to inform of
egress means needs beyond the time of construction of a tunnel and into its
future.
2. Impaired Mobility Occupants
Occupants with impaired mobility represent a challenge during egress. They may be
unable to evacuate or increase the egress time given their slower walking speed and
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the narrow egress walkway that does not allow for occupants to walk side by side.
Occupants in wheelchairs are not able to self-evacuate a rail car in the event of an
incident as there is likely a difference in height between the rail car interior floor and
the walkway surface. In addition, the width of the wheelchair (815 mm, 32 in.) is larger
than the egress walkway width. Wheelchairs were only considered in the egress
scenario with first responders counterflow. It was assumed that first responders would
access the rail cars to evacuate the occupants in wheelchairs.
Other egress scenarios only considered occupants with impaired mobility. The present
study assumes that 2% of the occupants that are not elderly or suffering from obesity
are mobility impaired with a walking velocity of 0.85 m/s. The CDC estimates that
12.1% of the US adults population have a mobility disability. 135 The CDC estimates
includes parts of the elderly and obese population proportions accounted in the
occupant types of the egress scenarios. Nevertheless, the authors performed additional
egress analyses by increasing the proportion of occupants with impaired mobility from
2% to 12.1%. Egress time results for several egress scenarios using FM2C inputs are
presented in Table 38. The increase in egress times is limited to less than 10%.
TABLE 38. IMPACT ON EGRESS TIME OF INCREASED IMPAIRED MOBILITY POPULATION FROM 2% TO
12.1%.
Occupant % % Diff. from

Egress Model Egress Time
Fire Model with Impaired 2% Impaired
Scenario (s)
Mobility Mobility
2% 2,280 (-)
EM3B
12.1% 2,374 +4%
2% 1,905 (-)
EM4B
FM2C 12.1% 2,108 +10%
(55MW, Mid-
Train) 2% 1,433 (-)
EM5B
12.1% 1,393 -3%
2% 1,273 (-)
EM6B
12.1% 1,308 +3%
No information was found on the proportion of occupants with impaired mobility in

rail systems. Research should be performed to better evaluate the number of train
users with a mobility disability.
Additional research should also be conducted to assist with the development of
egress models allowing for a better estimation of the movement of occupants with
impaired mobility in rail tunnels. No methodology has been currently identified to
accurately model the assisted-evacuation of occupants with impaired mobility and
in wheelchairs.
135“12,1 percent of U.S. adults have a mobility disability with serious difficulty walking or climbing stairs.” Disability Impacts all of us. CDC
Infographic, May 15, 2023, Disability Impacts All of Us Infographic | CDC
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• Fire design: Two fire designs were developed using literature data. The non-arson case has a
heat release rate steady state of 16 MW while the arson case has a steady state heat release rate
of 55 MW. These intensities were based on testing conducted between 1992 and 2011. It has
to be noted that in several of the testing reviewed, the ignition source had to be modified or
the fuel load increased for the fire to develop. The fire designs developed are on the upper
side of the heat release rate ranges. Additional research should be conducted to determine
the likelihood of propagation of a fire involving a rail car based on the ignition source and
its location.
The additional fuel load from occupants’ luggage and equipment needs to be carefully
evaluated for the various rail systems as differences will exist in fuel load carried by occupants.
Luggage is expected in intercity rail while smaller bags are anticipated to be found in rapid
transit systems.
Fire emissions (CO) are based on well-ventilated fire data. Literature review or research
studies should be conducted to identify and determine the concentration of toxic gases
observed during rail tunnel fires.
• Ventilation: Adequate ventilation is critical for successful egress and first responders’
activities. The case studies all show this aspect. The benefit of changes to egress dimensions
and spacing is non-existent if the ventilation cannot prevent backlayering and provide tenable
conditions upstream of the fire.
The present research assumed longitudinal ventilation with a system able to provide enough
airflow to reach the critical velocity preventing backlayering. The critical velocities used in the
fire models varied between 2.33 m.s-1 (7.64 ft.s-1) and 3.20 m.s-1 (10.50 ft.s-1). The case studies
related to the two (2) Channel fires reviewed indicate that the supplementary ventilation
system of the tunnel activated in case of emergency can provide a flow up to 2.5 m.s-1 (8.20 ft.s-
1). Additional research should be performed to determine the relevance of the ventilation
velocity used in the fire models. Also, the longitudinal ventilation approach does not allow
the preserve tenable conditions downstream of the fire. The performance of hybrid
ventilation systems including single point extraction should be evaluated with regards to
how it can inform the design of egress means. The ability to use such ventilation system
may provide valuable information for evaluating the need to modify requirements related
to egress means dimensions and spacing.
Additional research should also be conducted to determine how ventilation performance
informs the design of egress means.
• Modeling approach: A deterministic approach was used to perform the egress modeling. An
actual egress follows a probabilistic process where pre-evacuation behaviors, greater
variability of body sizes, and range of movement speeds should be considered. Additional
research should be conducted to implement a probabilistic approach for the egress models.
Egress Gaps
• Additional research is recommended to determine the origin of the egress walkway width
and exit spacing requirements from NFPA 130 as well as for the other international
standards identified in the literature review.
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• ADA Standards: Although ADA standards do not apply to rail tunnels, meeting ADA
requirements would help with the challenge of egress for occupants with impaired mobility.
Additional analysis should be conducted using ADA requirements for egress walkway
widths.
• Guidance should be developed to determine appropriate exit spacing and egress walkway
width based on tunnel and rail systems characteristics.
• Occupant’s survivability profile should be developed for rail tunnel fires to define
adequate set of tenability criteria.
• Similar to any other structure fire, early detection is paramount to limit fire growth and
support egress under tenable conditions. The NFPA 130 technical committee should
investigate the benefits and limitations of adding fire detection inside tunnels and train
equipment. Valuable information could be obtained from European train agencies and
codes/standards where the requirement is already in place.
Fire-Department Response Gaps
• Lack of firefighting experience in NFPA 130 Tunnels.
The experiences of fire departments outlined in this report are largely based on fire events
within tunnels that are not compliant with NFPA 130 (e.g. tunnels lack adequate ventilation
systems, egress distances are not standard, etc.). This is simply based on the age of most
existing rapid transit systems within the United States.
Despite this, the experiences of the fire departments expressed in this report are still valid
towards understanding how a fire department responds to a rail tunnel fire. Based upon on
the complex nature of fire incidents, and that no two incidents will ever be the same, the fire
service perspective must be broad and encompassing of many factors.
The fire departments interviewed as part of this study have developed robust standard
operating procedures/guidelines (SOP/Gs), have procured necessary equipment, and train
regularly for emergency events within rail tunnels. As with structure fires, it is the building
construction - tunnel construction and infrastructure in this case - which poses the most
variability. Providing further regulation on egress/ingress distances and cross passageway
locations can reduce variability that fire departments must plan for.
• Scope of report considers fire events only.
The scope of this report is narrow in that it considered fire events only. The authors of this
report recognize that there are other emergency events that may introduce their own set of
unique challenges to occupant egress and fire department response. NFPA 130 Section 9.3
details a list of emergencies that must be addressed in an emergency management plan. It is
recommended that the committee evaluate egress/ingress requirements holistically, utilizing
the results of this study and the balance of the emergencies that must be addressed that have
not been covered as part of this report.
• Effective work time for FFs/work time/limitations of fire service.
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A major limitation of this study is establishing effective work times for firefighters operating
within an immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) environment in rail tunnels with
self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Although literature exists which discusses the
physiological capabilities and measured work times of firefighters wearing SCBA, it is
important to consider how firefighters are trained to use SCBA in regard to air consumption.
SCBAs allow firefighters to enter an IDLH, operate within the environment, and safely exit.
This effectively creates three distinct air consumption time frames: 1/3 of the air supply to
enter the environment and conduct firefighting operations, 1/3 of the air supply to safely exit
from the environment, and 1/3 of the air supply kept in reserve in the event of an emergency.
Emergency in this case relates to a firefighter emergency which would prolong the time
needed to exit the IDLH environment (e.g. a firefighter is incapacitated and needs assistance
to escape the IDLH environment).
Each firefighter consumes air at different rates based on their individual physiology.
Furthermore, firefighters operating within unfamiliar environments (rail tunnel fires are a low
frequency event and are not as common as structure fires) may consume more air than usual
with a heightened sense of awareness.
It is recommended that the committee carefully evaluate any literature or report presented
which quantifies effective firefighter SCBA work times.
• Establishing rigorous testing standards for emergency ventilation systems.
NFPA 130 relies heavily on emergency ventilation systems within tunnels to maintain
tenability and to justify distances from egress/ingress for passengers and first responders,
respectively. Although NFPA 130 addresses the design and commissioning testing criteria
associated with the emergency ventilation system, it does not include inspection, testing, and
maintenance requirements of the system. The standard views the importance of an emergency
ventilation system much in the way a building relies on fire alarm, sprinkler, and smoke
control systems; however, minimum periodic testing criteria has not been identified. The cases
studies presented within this report further reinforce the importance of a periodic testing
program as several historic rail tunnel fires have exposed a lack of care and maintenance of
emergency ventilation fans.
As a point of comparison, NFPA 502 requires that periodic testing of life safety systems
including emergency ventilation, however performance requirements are not specified and
the intervals for periodic testing, 5 years, are longer than those for comparable building
systems.
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It is recommended that the committee add rigorous periodic testing standards for
emergency ventilation systems within rail tunnels, including but not limited to:
o Ensuring system functionality operates as initially commissioned,

o All fan controls are operational,
o Visual inspection of fan and power components,
o Performance testing of fans to ensure airflow output is within acceptable ranges.
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Appendix A: Fire Modeling Results

FM1A Single Intercity Rail Car Mid-Train 16 MW Fire
Results for the temperature, visibility, and FEDCO along the center of the tunnel walkway at a 2 m (6.6
ft) height above its surface are presented between 300 seconds and 1800 seconds with 300 seconds
intervals.
Temperature
Temperature results for FM1A are presented in Figure 27. Between 300 seconds and 400 seconds after
the start of the fire, a 20 m (66 ft) to 40 m (131 ft) long zone is created along the walkway where the
temperature at 2 m (6.6 ft) high is above the temperature threshold of 60°C (140°F). Conditions above
the temperature tenability criterion persist in this region until the end of the simulation. The region
corresponds to the area of origin of the fire where the heat transfer is most intense.
. Prior to 480 seconds into the simulation, the region with temperatures above the tenability criterion
extends approximately 10 m (33 ft) to 20 m (66 ft) upstream and downstream of the fire.
Backlayering 136 is created through buoyancy and persists until the critical airflow velocity is reached
in the vicinity of the fire area.
Once the ventilation reaches full operational mode and the airflow critical velocity is reached, the
region with temperatures above the tenability criterion extends only downstream of the area of origin
of the fire and no backlayering exists upstream of the fire.
Backlayering is defined as the phenomenon where hot gases move against the provided ventilation upstream of the fire.
136
Reference: Kashef, A., Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering, Chapter 17, p. 354, 2012.
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 900 s
Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 27. TEMPERATURE THE ALONG TUNNEL AT 300 SECONDS INTERVALS.
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Visibility
Visibility is calculated using the light extinction coefficient, K, and a non-dimensional characteristic
constant. 137 Results for FM1A are presented in Figure 28. In the vicinity of the area of fire origin, the
visibility on the walkway at 2 m high (6.6 ft) falls below the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft) between
300 seconds and 400 seconds after the start of the fire. At 400 seconds, a 50 m (164 ft) long region
around the area of fire origin is present. Ventilation is activated at 300 seconds and reaches full
capacity at 480 seconds. At 400 seconds, backlayering exists upstream of the area of fire origin. A 10
m (33 ft) long region with visibility below the tenability criterion is maintained until approximately
1000 seconds. After 1,000 seconds, the visibility remains clear upstream of the fire.
Visibility downstream of the fire starts to deteriorate after 400 seconds. The 3.75 m (12 ft) tenability
criterion is reached in the region extending from the area of fire origin to the end of the tunnel between
900 seconds and 1,000 seconds. Conditions downstream of the fire remain below the tenability
criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft) until the end of the simulation.
The ventilation is able to limit backlayering at a 2 m height to a 10 m (33 ft) long zone. It is able to
push the smoke downstream of the fire allowing clear visibility conditions upstream of the fire after
1,000 seconds.
137 McGrattan, K., et al., Fire Dynamic Simulator User’s Guide, NIST Special Publication 1019, Sixth Edition, April 18, 2023, p. 338.
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 900 s
Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 28. SOOT VISIBILITY ALONG THE TUNNEL AT 300 SECONDS INTERVALS.
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Toxicity
FEDCO results were calculated using the Carbon Monoxide Molar Fraction (XCO) determined by FDS
and are presented in Figure 29.
The FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3 is first reached on the walkway at a height of 2 m (6.6 ft), in the
vicinity of area of origin of the fire at approximately 600 seconds after the start of the fire. From 600
seconds until the end of the simulation, a 30 m (100 ft) region develops upstream and downstream of
the area of origin of the fire where the FEDCO tenability criterion is exceeded. CO toxicity remains
below the tenability criterion beyond this region. The FEDCO is close to null upstream of the fire once
the ventilation reaches full capacity.
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t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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t = 900 s
Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 29. FEDCO ALONG THE TUNNEL AT 300 SECONDS INTERVALS.
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FM1B Single Intercity Rail Car Mid-Train 55 MW Fire
Results for the temperature, visibility, and Fractional Effective Dose for Carbon Monoxide (FEDCO)
along the center of the tunnel walkway at a 2 m (6.6 ft) height above its surface are presented between
Temperature
Temperature results for FM1B are presented in Figure 30. Between 300 seconds and 400 seconds after
the start of the fire, an approximately 20 m (66 ft) long zone is present on the walkway where the
temperature at 2 m (6.6 ft) high is above the temperature threshold of 60°C (140°F). When the
simulation reaches 500 seconds, the region of the walkway with temperatures above the tenability
criterion of 60°C (140°F) is 110 m (360 ft) long. By 600 seconds, the region of the walkway where the
temperature at 2 m high (6.6 ft) is above the tenability criterion of 60°C (140°F) extends over 400 m
(1,312 ft) on the walkway downstream of the area of fire origin. Conditions above the temperature
tenability criterion persist in this region until the end of the simulation. The ventilation reaches full
operating capacity at 480 seconds. Temperatures above the 60°C (140°F) tenability criterion only exist
downstream of the fire. Temperatures upstream of the fire indicate no backlayering.
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 30. TEMPERATURE ALONG THE TUNNEL BETWEEN 300 SECONDS AND 1,800 SECONDS.
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Visibility
Visibility results for FM1B are presented in Figure 31. In the vicinity of the area of fire origin, the
around the area of fire origin is present with a visibility estimated to be less than the tenability criterion
of 3.75 m (12 ft). A second region with visibility conditions below the tenability criterion is present
approximately 180 m (590 ft) downstream of the area of fire origin over a 120 m (394 ft) length along
the walkway.
Ventilation is activated at 300 seconds and reaches full capacity at 480 seconds. At 400 seconds, smoke
backlayering is present and visibility below the tenability criterion is estimated over an approximately
10 m (33 ft) long region upstream of the area of fire origin. By 500 seconds, the ventilation is able to
prevent backlayering and push the smoke downstream of the fire allowing clear visibility conditions
upstream of the fire.
Visibility downstream of the fire deteriorates after 400 seconds. The 3.75 m (12 ft) tenability criterion
is reached in the region extending from the area of fire origin to the end of the tunnel at 500 seconds.
Conditions downstream of the fire remain below the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft) until the end
of the simulation.
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t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 400 s
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Train footprint
t = 500 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 31. SOOT VISIBILITY ALONG THE TUNNEL BETWEEN 300 SECONDS AND 1,800 SECONDS.
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Toxicity
The FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3 is first reached on the walkway at a height, in the vicinity of area
of origin of the fire at approximately 500 seconds after the start of the fire. From 500 seconds until
1,200 seconds into the simulation, a 20 m (66 ft) long region develops downstream of the area of origin
of the fire where the FEDCO tenability criterion is exceeded. From 1,300 seconds until the end of the
simulation, a region with FEDCO above the tenability criterion of 0.3 is present downstream of the area
of fire origin. The region grows from 40 m (131 ft) at 1,300 seconds to 90 m (295 ft) at 1,800 seconds.
A second region with FEDCO above the tenability criterion exists from 1,600 seconds until the end of
the simulation. It is located downstream of the area of fire origin towards the end of the tunnel
geometry and grows from 95 m (312ft) to 160 m (525 ft) at the end of the simulation. The FEDCO
remains below the tenability criterion upstream of the fire over the duration of the simulation.
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t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 500 s
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
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t = 1,200 s
Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 32. FEDCO ALONG THE TUNNEL BETWEEN 300 SECONDS AND 1,800 SECONDS.
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FM2A Single Rapid Transit Rail Car Mid-Train 55 MW Fire
Results for the evolution of temperature, visibility, and Fractional Effective Dose for Carbon
Monoxide (FEDCO) along the center of the tunnel walkway at a 2 m (6.6 ft) height above its surface are
presented between 300 seconds and 1800 seconds.
Temperature
Temperature results for FM2A are presented in Figure 33. Between 300 seconds and 390 seconds after
criterion of 60°C (140°F) is approximately 300 m (984 ft) long, downstream of the area of fire origin
and extends to the end of the tunnel. Conditions above the temperature tenability criterion persist in
this region until the end of the simulation. The ventilation reaches full operating capacity at 480
seconds. Temperatures above the 60°C (140°F) tenability criterion only exist downstream of the fire.
Temperatures upstream of the fire indicate no backlayering.
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t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 390 s
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Train footprint
t = 450 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 900 s
Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
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Visibility
Visibility results for FM2A are presented in Figure 34. In the vicinity of the area of fire origin, the
visibility on the walkway at 2 m high (6.6 ft) falls below the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft) around
300 seconds after the start of the fire. At 365 seconds, two regions, a 75 m (246 ft) long upstream of
the area of fire origin and a 95 m (312 ft) long approximately 100 m (330 ft) downstream of the area of
fire origin exist with visibility estimated to be less than the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft).
Ventilation is activated at 300 seconds and reaches full capacity at 480 seconds. At 390 seconds,
backlayering is present and visibility below the tenability criterion extends approximately 20 m (66 ft)
upstream of the area of fire origin. By 450 seconds, the ventilation is able to prevent backlayering and
push the smoke downstream of the fire allowing clear visibility conditions upstream of the fire.
Visibility downstream of the fire deteriorates within 300 seconds. By 390 seconds, the 3.75 m (12 ft)
tenability criterion is reached in the region extending over 300 m (984 ft) from the area of fire origin
to the end of the tunnel. Conditions downstream of the fire remain below the tenability criterion of
3.75 m (12 ft) until the end of the simulation.
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Train footprint
t = 360 s
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
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Train footprint
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Toxicity
The FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3 is first reached on the walkway at a height, in the vicinity of area
of origin of the fire at approximately 450 seconds after the start of the fire. From 450 seconds until 840
seconds into the simulation, a region develops downstream of the area of origin of the fire where the
FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3 is exceeded. The region grows from 20 m (66 ft) to 300 m (984 ft) over
that time period. From 840 seconds until the end of the simulation, a region with FEDCO above the
tenability criterion of 0.3 is continuously present downstream of the area of fire origin up to the tunnel
end. The FEDCO remains below the tenability criterion upstream of the fire over the duration of the
simulation.
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Train footprint
t = 690s
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t = 750s
Train footprint
t = 870 s
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Train footprint
t = 900 s
Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
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Train footprint
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FM2B Single Rapid Transit Rail Car Mid-Train 16 MW Fire
300 seconds and 1800 seconds with 300 seconds intervals.
Temperature
Temperature results for FM2B are presented in Figure 36. Although the 60°C (140°F) temperature
tenability criterion is reached on the walkway approximately 100 seconds after the start of the fire,
untenable conditions are only experienced at the location of the open doors of the incident rail car. As
the fire grows, the region of the walkway where the temperature tenability criterion is exceeded
expands to approximately 30 m (100 ft) long around the area of fire of the fire from 300 seconds until
1,000 seconds. From 1,100 seconds until the end of the simulation the region of the walkway where
temperature is above the tenability criterion extends from 40 m (131 ft) to 60 m (197 ft).
Despite the ventilation, backlayering is estimated by the model. An approximately 10 m (33 ft) long
region upstream of the fire presents temperatures above the tenability criterion between 400 seconds
and 600 seconds.
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 900 s
Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 36. TEMPERATURE ALONG THE TUNNEL AT 300 SECONDS INTERVALS.
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Visibility
Visibility results for FM2B are presented in Figure 37. The visibility worsens within 300 seconds after
the start of the fire upstream and downstream of the area of fire origin but only remains below the
tenability criterion in the vicinity of the area of origin of the fire.
At 400 seconds, the 3.75 m (12ft) tenability criterion is exceeded upstream of the fire over a region
extending approximately over 5 m (16 ft). Results suggest that limited backlayering is present at the
time. By 600 seconds into the simulation, the ventilation has reached full operational capacity. The
visibility conditions upstream of the fire improved with no backlayering. The visibility downstream
of the fire origin continues to decline. By 1,100 seconds and until the end of the simulation, the
visibility on the walkway section downstream of the area of fire origin is estimated to be below the
3.75 m (12 ft) tenability criterion.
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 900 s
Train footprint
t = 1,100 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
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Toxicity
The FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3 is first reached on the walkway by the area of fire origin
approximately 600 seconds after the start of the fire. The region where the FEDCO tenability criterion
of 0.3 is exceeded is limited to the area of origin of the fire between 600 seconds and 1,200 seconds
into the simulation.
After 1,200 seconds, the FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3 is exceeded downstream of the area of fire
origin over a 20 m (66 ft) to 25 m (82 ft) long region.
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 900 s
Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 38. FEDCO ALONG THE TUNNEL AT 300 SECONDS INTERVALS.
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FM2C Single Rapid Transit Rail Car End-Train 55 MW Fire
Temperature
Temperature results for FM2C are presented in Figure 39. Between 300 seconds and 400 seconds after
criterion of 60°C (140°F) is 400 m (1,312 ft) long. Conditions above the temperature tenability criterion
persist in this region until the end of the simulation.
The temperature profile indicates that backlayering is present upstream of the area of fire origin
between 300 seconds and 500 seconds. During that time-period, a 5 m (16 ft) to 10 m (33 ft) long region
upstream of the fire exists with temperatures above the tenability criterion. The ventilation reaches
full operating capacity at 480 seconds and backlayering is overcome by 600 seconds. After 600
seconds, temperatures above the 60°C (140°F) tenability criterion only exist on the walkway
downstream of the fire. Temperatures upstream of the fire indicate no backlayering.
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 400 s
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Train footprint
t = 500 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
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Visibility
Visibility results for FM2C are presented in Figure 40. In the vicinity of the area of fire origin, the
extending downstream of the area of fire origin is present with a visibility estimated to be less than
the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft). The region also extends a few meters upstream of the area of
fire origin (backlayering).
Ventilation is activated at 300 seconds and reaches full capacity at 480 seconds. By 500 seconds, the
ventilation is able to overcome the backlayering and push the smoke downstream of the fire allowing
clear visibility conditions upstream of the fire.
Visibility downstream of the fire continues to deteriorate after 400 seconds. The 3.75 m (12 ft) tenability
criterion is reached in the region extending from the area of fire origin to the end of the tunnel at 500
seconds. Conditions downstream of the fire remain below the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft)
until the end of the simulation.
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 400 s
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Train footprint
t = 500 s
Train footprint
t = 600 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
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Toxicity
The FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3 is first reached on the walkway at a height of 2 m (6.6 ft), in the
vicinity of area of origin of the fire at approximately 300 seconds after the start of the fire. From 300
seconds until 1,100 seconds into the simulation, a 20 m (66 ft) to 40 m (131 ft) long region develops
around the area of origin of the fire where the FEDCO tenability criterion is exceeded. The FEDCO
exceeds the tenability criterion of 0.3 over a few meters upstream of the area of fire origin but remains
below the tenability criterion further upstream for the duration of the simulation.
From 1,300 seconds until the end of the simulation, a region with FEDCO above the tenability criterion
of 0.3 is present on the walkway from the area of fire origin until the end of the tunnel over a 400 m
(1,312 ft) length.
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 400 s
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Train footprint
t = 600 s
Train footprint
t = 800 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,000 s
Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,300 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
FIGURE 41. FEDCO EVOLUTION ALONG THE TUNNEL BETWEEN 300 SECONDS AND 1,800 SECONDS.
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FM3 Electrical Fire
Results for the evolution of temperature, visibility, and Fractional Effective Dose for Carbon
Monoxide (FEDCO) along the center of the tunnel walkway at a 2 m (6.6 ft) height above its surface are
presented between 300 seconds and 1800 seconds.
Temperature
Temperature results for FM3 are presented in Figure 42. Within 100 seconds after the start of the fire,
a 20 m (66 ft) long region forms upstream of the area of fire origin where the temperature at 2 m (6.6
ft) high is above the temperature threshold of 60°C (140°F). Backlayering is observed until 400 seconds
into the simulation. A region extending up to 35 m (115 ft) upstream of the area of fire origin presents
temperatures are estimated to be above the temperature threshold of 60°C (140°F).
When the simulation reaches 400 seconds, backlayering has been overcome by the ventilation.
Between 400 seconds and 500 seconds, a 25 m (82 ft) to 100 m (328 ft) long region on the walkway
downstream of the area of fire origin is characterized by temperatures above the tenability criterion
of 60°C (140°F). After 500 seconds, conditions above the temperature tenability criterion persist until
the end of the simulation in a region extending 35 m (115 ft) to 40 m (133 ft) downstream, of the area
of fire origin.
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Train footprint
t = 100 s
Train footprint
t = 300 s
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Train footprint
t = 400 s
Train footprint
t = 500 s
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Train footprint
t = 600 s
Train footprint
t = 900 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
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Visibility
Visibility results for FM3 are presented in Figure 43. Within 100 seconds after the start of the
simulations, two regions of the walkway (one upstream of the area of fire origin, a second
approximately 60 m (197 ft) downstream of the area of fire origin) are characterized by visibility below
the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft). Between 300 seconds and 400 seconds after the start of the
fire. By 200 seconds, the two regions have merged into one, and the length of walkway with visibility
below the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft) is approximately 320 m (1,050 ft) long and extends
upstream and downstream of the area of fire origin.
Backlayering is present at 200 seconds. a 120 m (394 ft) long region exists upstream of the fire area
with visibility below the tenability criterion. The region increases up to 180 m (591 ft) at 300 seconds.
Ventilation is activated at 300 seconds and reaches full capacity at 480 seconds. After 300 seconds, the
ventilation reduces the backlayering which appears to be overcome by 500 seconds.
At 300 seconds, a 450 m (1476 ft) long region extending upstream and downstream of the area of fire
origin is present with a visibility estimated to be less than the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft). The
ventilation is able to push the smoke downstream of the fire and by 500 seconds, the region The region
with a visibility estimated to be less than the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft) only extends
downstream of the area of fire origin over a 280 m (919 ft) length.
After 500 seconds, the extension of the smoke region stabilizes and conditions downstream of the fire
remain below the tenability criterion of 3.75 m (12 ft) until the end of the simulation from the area of
fire origin over 280 m (919 ft) downstream of the tunnel.
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Train footprint
t = 100 s
Train footprint
t = 200 s
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Train footprint
t = 300 s
Train footprint
t = 400 s
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Train footprint
t = 500 s
Train footprint
t = 900 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,200 s
Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
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Toxicity
The FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3 is never reached on the walkway at a height of 2 m (6.6 ft), over
the simulation duration (1,800 seconds). The maximum value of FEDCO is estimated to be
approximately 0.18 and is located approximately 100 m (328 ft) upstream of the area of fire origin.
The ventilation of the tunnel was sufficient to prevent exceeding the FEDCO tenability criterion of 0.3.
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Train footprint
t = 100 s
Train footprint
t = 300 s
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Train footprint
t = 600 s
Train footprint
t = 900 s
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Train footprint
t = 1,500 s
Train footprint
t = 1,800 s
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Appendix B: Occupants Flow Rate Through Rail and Exit Doors

Figure 45 through Figure 52 present the flow rates through exit doors and railcar doors from wagon
#1, 8, and 16 of the intercity train system egress scenarios.
Fire Model FM1B Egress Scenario EM1A
Population
Rail System Fire Size Fire Location Occupant Load
Characteristics
Intercity 55 MW Mid-Train 896 Uniform
Emergency
Egress Walkway Exit Spacing, m Unidirectional
Responders
Width, mm (in.) (ft) Egress?
Counterflow?
610 (24) 244 (800) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
FIGURE 45. FLOW RATES THROUGH RAILCAR AND EXIT DOORS FOR THE FIRE MODEL FM1B AND EGRESS
SCENARIO EM1A.
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Population
Characteristics
Intercity 55 MW Mid-Train 896 2000 Pop. Data
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
610 (24) 244 (800) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM2A.
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Population
Characteristics
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
610 (24) 244 (800) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM3A.
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Population
Characteristics
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
914 (36) 244 (800) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM4A.
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Population
Characteristics
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
610 (24) 183 (600) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM5A.
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Population
Characteristics
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
914 (36) 183 (600) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM6A.
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Population
Characteristics
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
610 (24) 244 (800) Yes No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM7A.
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Population
Characteristics
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
610 (24) 244 (800) No Yes
Exit Door
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM8A.
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Figure 53 through Figure 60 present the flow rates through exit doors and railcar doors from wagon
#1, 5, and 10 of the rapid transit train system egress scenarios.
Fire Model FM2C Egress Scenario EM1B
Population
Characteristics
Rapid Transit 55 MW Mid-Train 2,000 Uniform
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
610 (24) 244 (800) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
FIGURE 53. FLOW RATES THROUGH RAILCAR AND EXIT DOORS FOR THE FIRE MODEL FM2C AND EGRESS
SCENARIO EM1B.
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Population
Characteristics
Rapid Transit 55 MW Mid-Train 2,000 2000 Pop. Data
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
610 (24) 244 (800) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar
Doors
SCENARIO EM2B.
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Population
Characteristics
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
610 (24) 244 (800) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar
Doors
SCENARIO EM3B.
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Population
Characteristics
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
914 (36) 244 (800) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM4B.
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Population
Characteristics
Egress
Emergency
Walkway Exit Spacing, Unidirectional
Responders
Width, mm m (ft) Egress?
Counterflow?
(in.)
610 (24) 183 (600) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM5B.
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Population
Characteristics
Egress
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
(in.)
914 (36) 183 (600) No No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM6B.
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Population
Characteristics
Egress
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
(in.)
610 (24) 244 (800) Yes No
Exit Doors
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM7B.
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Population
Characteristics
Egress
Emergency
Responders
Counterflow?
(in.)
610 (24) 244 (800) No Yes
Exit Door
Railcar Doors
SCENARIO EM8B.
Page 224

RF Emergency Egress in Rail Tunnels

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Review of Emergency Egress

and Rescue Challenges in Rail

Final Report by:

Hubert Biteau, PhD, P.E., CFEI

© 2024 Fire Protection Research Foundation

About the Fire Protection Research Foundation

The Fire Protection Research Foundation plans, manages,

About the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

Report number: FPRF-2024-01

Project Manager: Jacqueline R. Wilmot, P.E.

Jarrod Alston, Arup, (New York City, NY)

© 2023 Code Red Consultants, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

• Over time changes of population characteristics

Obstruction-free walkways allow passengers, employees, and emergency responders to egress or

• On at least one side in a single-track tunnel tube

Emergency Exits and Cross-Passageways

The most common solutions to access points of safety 7 are:

Tunnels, section 6.5, p. 10.

Tunnels, section 7.2, p. 14.

(A)Example of Cross-passageway footprint

(B)Example of Cross-passageway vertical arrangement.

FIGURE 4. TRANVERSE VENTILATION SYSTEM.

Hybrid Ventilation Systems

Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine, 2017, section 3.1.4.

FIGURE 5. SINGLE-POINT EXTRACTION SYSTEM.

• Ventilation of the cross-passage by an independent ventilation system in the cross-

Tunnels, section 7.4.2, pp. 19-22.

Additional Emergency Components

Tunnels, section 8.1.4.3, p. 34.

• Providing an escape path to a safe area

Emergency Lighting and Signage

Emergency Communication System

Tunnels, section 7.4.1, p. 18.

Egress Means Codes and Standards Provisions

Egress Walkways Standards Requirements

and fire alarm systems.

sécurité dans les tunnels ferroviaires, N°98-300 du 8 juillet 1998.

Historical Determination of Egress Walkways Dimensions

FIGURE 7. NFPA 130 EGRESS WALKWAY MINIMUM CLEAR WIDTH REQUIREMENTS.23

Review of Report On Proposals / Report On Comments

NFPA 130 Min. Clear Width Requirement for

A proposal recommended a minimum clear

Egress Walkway Clear Width Analysis

Statistics, Series 3, Number 46, January 2021, p. 15.

Emergency Exits and Cross-passageways Standard Requirements

• Probability of a design fire event

TABLE 3. SPACING BETWEEN EMERGECNY EXITS AND BETWEEN CROSS-PASSAGEWAYS.

Maximum Distance Maximum Distance

Historical Determination of Maximum Separation Distances.

Distance between Emergency Exits

sécurité dans les tunnels ferroviaires, N°98-300 du 8 juillet 1998.

Distance between Cross-passageways

64 2003 Report on Proposals, NFPA 130, Proposal 130-41.

67 2013 Report on Proposals, NFPA 130, Proposal 130-122.

NFPA 130 Maximum Emergency Exit/Cross-

The intent of the proposal was to clarify a

Emergency Exit Maximum Distance:

Emergency Exit/Cross-Passageways Maximum Spacing Analysis

2018, NCHS Data Brief, No. 360, February 2020.

functioning as an extended antenna.

BART Transbay Tube Fire (January 1979) 71

Tunnel Design and Fire Safety Features

FIGURE 9. TRANSBAY TUNNEL SYSTEM CROSS-SECTION. 71