EE 4 Theories of Emotion Introduction Darwinian Evolutionary Theories ‘McDougall INTRODUCTION The theories of emotion are many and diverse. Approximately fifty theories exist in psychological literature, each with a different view- point about the process by which we experience emotion. It is not advisable to discuss each of these theories separately as such an at- tempt may reduce clarity about the conceptual distinctions among, them. Some reviewers, therefore, have attempted to organize these theories into fewer heads, for example, chronological order (carly/ lite), psychological construct (psychoanalytic/cogmitive/behaviour- istic), locus of control (central/peripheral), and temporal scquence in the experience of emotion (neural > cognitive/cognitive > neural).62 / Eonon ‘Their classification jj (a) The Darwinian evolutionary theories, (b) body-reac rics, (c) central neural theories, and (d) cognitive-arousal The Darwinian evolutionary theories trace out the on and functional significance (¢.g., adaptation) of the em sion. The major propounders of this viewpoint include (1923), Izard (1971, 1994), and Plutchik (1980a). The theories emphasize that emotions trigger distinct autonoms tions, and a perception of these autonomic reactions gives rise experience of emotion. This stand is attested by James (189 (with some conceptual modification) Ekman (1984). The c neural theorists focus on the structural correlates of pet pression, and experience of emotion, (In this chapter, we will nat; tempt to discuss the central neural theories as these are dealt wit Chapter 6, Laterality and Emotion.) The cognitive-arousal (namely, Schachter and Singer, 1962, and Schachter, 1964) that an emotional state is produced by a physiological arousal cognition about its causality. j Apart from these theories, we shall consider in some detail th mentalistic and interactionist viewpoints, The mentalistic (for example, Freud, 1920) argue that our emotional experiences unique despite a common physiological system. The int a (for example, Schwartz, 1977, 1978, and Leventhal, 1984) the argument about the temporal sequence of the physiological a# cognitive events in the experience of emotion, and emphasize cognitive coping strategics in the experience of qualitatively emotions. DARWINIAN EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES As already stated, the Darwinian evolutionary theorists ¢ the ontogenetic root and adaptational function of the emotion pression. The three iain theorists who advocated this notion McDougall, Izard, and Plutchik. McDougall McDougall (1923, 1928) proposed that all human behaviour for achieving a goal, cither to derive pleasure or to avoid pai two basic tendencies in human behaviour are termed as feelinTreomus oF EMoTion / 63 gre modified to a great extent according to the cognition, expecta tions, and experiences of the human being. At a rudimentary level, however, the complex range of emotions is reducible to two basic tendencies, namely, approach (pleasure) and withdrawal (pain). McDougall (1928) believed that these two basic tendencies are akin to instinctual behaviour and all i instinets serve the survival need of the organism. e ap- “Be thar help them survive by an innate It is argued that instincts of emotional ce produce ches following the cognition of a pleasurable or painful tt the experience of emo~ ; changes (¢.g., readiness) co-occur as a The specificity of goal-directed behaviour in the course of human evolution develops well-differentiated body movements and reac= tions to cope with varying situations. The primary emotions are con- sidered to be a function of the experience of these well-differentiated body movements. When any two well-differentiated body move- ments are in conflict, the resulting experience culminates into an emotional blending (see also Strongman, 1989). ‘ | ings differ from emotions in complexity in that the basic feelings ‘ | t | | Tzard Emotions are inherently adaptive according to Izard (197) and be- come the primary motivating source of human behaviour. Izard’s theory of emotion is based upon certain postulates, namely, (a) emotions are innate in nature; (b) emotions have different aspects or components, viz., neuro- physiological, expressive, and experiential; (c) emotions are discrete in nature, and the qualitatively differ- ent emotions have unique motivational properties; (d) emotions vary in intensity; and (c) the link between (the facial) expression and the emotion ex- is one- of the, subsystems of emotion activation (see lzard, Izard’s standpoint, all basic emotions are innate in nature. dence in support of his viewpoint has been drawn from stud-64/ Emonon ies of the young children and preverbal infants | et al, 1980, Izard et al, 1983, Abe and Izard, gest that the newborn infants are capable of making | of basic emotions and that their facial expression p phologically similar to those of adults (Izard ef al, 19 of his viewpoint regarding the componential and of emotion. According to this theory, “emotions (which neural; expressive, and experiential tomponents) are inhere tive and . . . each discrete emotion has unique organizational and tivational properties” (Izard, 1994, 290). He identified t categories, namely, anger, contempt, disgust, s erest, joy, shame, and surprise, and opined t cach of these emotions has unique motivational characteristics. TI concept of multiple (limitless) emotions is rejected in DET. It’ lieved. that the basic emotions may be associated with a variet thoughts, images, or cognitive representations, Depending on association, emotions may vary in intensity, or contrasting Tepresentations may give rise to cmotional blends. Finally, i i ness, fear, guilt, rs are thought to be the sul rd noted that “there appears to be evolu biologically based connection between expressive behaviour Particular feeling or motivational state, but this connection uncoupled or modified by virtue of the capacity of human and human primates to voluntary control over innate expression” (Izard, 1994, 288, commenting on Jurgens and 1981). Plutchik Plutchik’s (1980a) theory offers strong supports to the Darv view of emotions. In addition, the theory suggests that (a) th limited set of primary emotions, (b) the primary emotions are tified cither on the basis of behavioural observation or of a functions, (c) emotions vary in terms of similarity, polarity, or sity, and (d) emotion does not refer only to a feeling state, but cates a chain reaction, Plutchik identified eight primary emotions, viz., joys ace” fear, anticipation, anger, disgust, sadness, and surprise (note ‘sTHEORIES OF EmoTion / 65. found these internally consis; tent with hi i ere ten & te his model of emotion, t emphasis on the understanding of emotion. Two forms of | meat elie jake theory, the behavioural and the functional, The behavioural language is utilized to refer to Certain motor actions, e.g, writing, crying, that ‘accompany a specific emotiénal state. The functional language is pre- : Protection (avoidance of dan- ger), destruction (culmination of barrier Sacer incorpo- ation (acceptance of an outside object), rejection (disowning an ob- ject already accepted), reproduction (transmission of traits to the fu~ ture generation), reintegration (signal for the loss suffered and attract asubstitute), orientation (reaction towards the unknown for seekith iB information), and exploration (anticipation about the surroundings) (see Plutchik, 1980a). The theory asserts that a functional language better classifies emotion relative to a behavioural language. __ The theory also posits that emotions, like colours, vary in intensity. For example, grief is the more intense and pensiveness is the less in- tense form of sadness. Likewise, the distinction between rage and an- noyance reflects the degree of intensity of the anger emotion. Each of Plutchik’s primary emotions also varies in polarity. The emotions of acceptance and disgust belong to opposite poles. Similar arrange- ments hold for the distinction of joy and sadness. Finally, emotions vary with the degree of similarity, For example, anger is more similar to disgust than joy. Plutchik’s theory also regards cognition as a necessary precondi- tion for the experience of emotion, Emotion, in fact, has been con- ceived not as a unitary phenomenon but rather as a chain reaction that involves (sce Plutchik, 1980b) Stimulus event > cognition > feeling > behaviour > function (deat by enemy) (danger) Acar) eS eS BODY-REACTION THEORIES Unlike the Darwinian evolutionary theorists, the body-reaction theorists believe that a perception of peripheral reactions gives rise (o66/ EMoTION the experience of emotion. The advocates of this proposi James and Cannon. James The theory of emotion by James (1884) is one of the earl triggered a lasting controversy in the world of psycholog theory posited a notion opposite to the common sense view. everyday life, we perceive some emotion-provoking situation death of a close relative) that results in some kind of emotion sadness) followed by an autonomic reaction (e.g., change ii ceral activity). In the opinion of James, an emotion-provoking sit tion (i.e., death of a close relative) directly induces a change i autonomuc activity (i.c., change in the visceral activity), the p tion of which gives rise to the state of emotion (i.e., sadn sence, the perception of bodily changes produces the feeling (ames, 1884). Lange (1885), a contemporary of James, extended similar theory of emotion with the suggestion that the phys changes take place in the cardiovascular system. The two th thus known conjointly as the James-Lange theory ofemotion. ‘The arguments of the James-Lange theory are based upon ce (a) the cerebral cortex directly produces a change in the vasomotor activity in response to an emotion-provoking situation, (b) the afferent feedback from the visceraVvasomotor produces a change in the cortical activity, thus allowing an of the changed bodily state, ahd (c) a conscious awareness of the body reaction determines # quality of emotion. The important features of the James-Lange theory are (5 Thompson, 1988) . (a) emotions cannot be produced without a sensory input, 1 (b) emotional experience is not a voluntary process, ratheh it evolves mechanically, and (c) basic emotions are triggered by strong and distinct p ological reactions while blended or less intense emotions are ac panied by a weak and diffuse physiological activity,Troms oF Emorion / 67 Cannon Cannon (1929) developed his theory of emotion in the process of criticizing the James-Lange theory. He raised a number of critical is- sues with experimental evidence, namely (see Thompson, 1988), (a) a dissection of nerve fibres to the visceral organs does not climinate emotional experience, (b) an artificially-induced physiological arousal dees not allow ‘one to experiewce emotion, and (c) the transmission of sympathetic arousal is much slower than the process of expericncing emotion. Besides these, a visceral sensation is much less sensitive for cliciting qualitatively different emotional experiences. Cannon thus proposed his own theory in the light of these criticisms. The evidence cited by Cannon against the James-Lange theory was drawn from the experimental work of Bard (1928, 1934) and the theory is thus known.as the Cannon-Bard theory of emotion. The theory proposes that a subcortical site of the thalamus is the primary locus for the mediation of emotion. The experience of emotion is considered to be the product of a chain reaction, viz., the receptor organ stimulates. the cortical activity which, in turn, stimulates the thalamic activity following which the nervous activity in the thala- mus induces bodily reactions (activation in the visceral and skeletal muscles) and almost simultaneously relays the information back to the cortex via a feedback loop. It is, therefore, possible that the expe- rience of emotion and body reaction ¢o-occur in the event of an envi- ronmental stimulation. Although Cannon has been heavily criticized by many (for example, Mandler, 1984), he has been credited for two reasons: one, in contrast to James who used introspection as the d of studying emotion, he utilized the experimental evidence ophysit studies, and two, he was one of the first inves- propose a subcortical site for the regulation of emotional ‘THEORIES Jamesian model of emotion has been brought of theorists, for example, Ekman (1984), Izard -(1984b), with fresh views and newer empiricalTroms oF Emorion / 67 Cannon Cannon (1929) developed his theory of emotion in the process of criticizing the James-Lange theory. He raised a number of critical is- sues with experimental evidence, namely (see Thompson, 1988), (a) a dissection of nerve fibres to the visceral organs does not climinate emotional experience, (b) an artificially-induced physiological arousal dees not allow ‘one to experiewce emotion, and (c) the transmission of sympathetic arousal is much slower than the process of expericncing emotion. Besides these, a visceral sensation is much less sensitive for cliciting qualitatively different emotional experiences. Cannon thus proposed his own theory in the light of these criticisms. The evidence cited by Cannon against the James-Lange theory was drawn from the experimental work of Bard (1928, 1934) and the theory is thus known.as the Cannon-Bard theory of emotion. The theory proposes that a subcortical site of the thalamus is the primary locus for the mediation of emotion. The experience of emotion is considered to be the product of a chain reaction, viz., the receptor organ stimulates. the cortical activity which, in turn, stimulates the thalamic activity following which the nervous activity in the thala- mus induces bodily reactions (activation in the visceral and skeletal muscles) and almost simultaneously relays the information back to the cortex via a feedback loop. It is, therefore, possible that the expe- rience of emotion and body reaction ¢o-occur in the event of an envi- ronmental stimulation. Although Cannon has been heavily criticized by many (for example, Mandler, 1984), he has been credited for two reasons: one, in contrast to James who used introspection as the d of studying emotion, he utilized the experimental evidence ophysit studies, and two, he was one of the first inves- propose a subcortical site for the regulation of emotional ‘THEORIES Jamesian model of emotion has been brought of theorists, for example, Ekman (1984), Izard -(1984b), with fresh views and newer empirical68/EmMonion evidences. Because we have already discussed Izard’s t tion, we shall in this section deal only with Ekman and Za Ekman Like Izard (1971), Ekman (1984) considered emotion as mechanism. He argued that emotion perception (a) g cial and postural responses at a rudimentary level, which, activate the atitonomic nervous system, (b) prodticés body’ and (c) allbws the emotion experience to occur followed by nition of the whole process. Cognition, a product of behaviour, may facilitate or inhibit the facial/postural programme, the expressions of which may be modified by constant learning and display rules. For example, a felt emoti be expressed more intensely than what is expected (inte! hi less intensely than what is expected (deintensification), or may © be masked by another emotion (masking), depending on the di norms prevailing in the culture. ’ These display norms, however, cannot completely e Spontaneous emotional reactions. In his study of deception, Blt found that very few people can purposefully conceal a felt Deception thus increases to autonomic arousal and invites ab emotional reactions, ¢.g,, anxiety and depression. Although’ plays a role in the mediation of emotion (for example, increas decreasing the intensity of a felt emotion), Ekman believed. autonomic nervous system is integrated and differentiated wit emotional process. In support of his theory, Ekman cited numerous empirical dences, for example, a guided instruction to contract certain fd muscles generates a distinctive pattern of autonomic nervous ity (Ekman ef al, 1983). The finding has been replicated in cultures (western, eastern) and conditions (posed, sp (Levenson ef al, 1991). On the basis of these findings, (1992b) proposed that (a) there is a “central, hard-wired con between the motor cortex and other areas of the brain if directing the physiological changes that occur during (b) “emotion-specific ANS. [autonomic nervous system] might be learned in those cultures that teach its membersTiiponies oF EMOTION / 69 adaptive behaviours for an emotion”, and (c) there is a “peripheral feedback from the facial actions themselves, rather than a central con- nection between the brain areas which direct those facial movements and other brain arcas” (65). Ekman’s theory is criticized because of its lack of emphasis on cog- nition in eliciting emotion, Cognition-oriented theorists are of the opinion that the cognitive appraisal determines the quality of emo- tion to be perceived, expressed or experienced (Schachter, 1964; Lagarus, 1982). We shall discuss the cognitive theories in a separate section. , Zajonc Like other body-reaction theorists, Zajonc (1984b), argued that emo- tion is not solely a function of cognition and the two mental mecha- nisms (emotion and cognition) are minimally related. He rephrased the term cognition at its carliest level as “untransformed sensory in- put” and believed that such an input may determine the motoric ori- entation (approach/avoidance) of the organism towards the stimulus. The major features of Zajonc's theory, as summarized by Thompson (1988), are chat (a) the emotional judgements are often preconscious, (b) the emotional reactions may be learned with a very little cognitive input, (c) in the course of development, the capacity to reach an emo- tion-laden situation comes first followed by the capacity to evaluate the situation at a cognitive level, (d) the structures that control the emotional processes (¢.g., the limbic system) are evolutionarily older than the structures (c.g, the neocortex) that control cognition, and {c) the emotional reactions may be reflexive at a rudimentary In view of these, the two subsystems of human behaviour, cognition and emotion, may be considered independent. COGNITIVE-AROUSAL THEORIES The arousal theorists believe that the emotional states are determined purely by the sympathetic nervous activity. Of the arousal theorists a70 / Emonone those who have gained prominence include Dufty (1941, 1: ‘Young (1961). The cognitive theorists, on the other hand, view Hon as a function of arousal when integrated with perceptual o zation. The prominent cognitive theorists include Schachter (196 and Lazarus (1968). Duffy Dufly (1962) consideted the term emotion misleading and pro * that it be dropped from behavioural science. She argued that (a) all behaviours are located in a continuum of arousal, and. emotional reactions fall into one extreme end of this continuum, — (b) the state of emotion produces a change in the energy level with high energy giving rise to the fecling of excitement and low ergy to the feeling of depression, (c) the level of energy is proportionately related to the st of motivation, (d) emotions are extreme forms of motivation, and the emo tional responses, because of their purposive nature, are adaptive i function, and (c) the emotional state involves conscious awareness (form details, see Strongman, 1989). idea in Schachter’s (1964) theory supports the notion that emotion is a product of the interaction between the physiol arousal and cognition. The theory was developed on the basis of experiments that exami: in advance about its effect in terms of autonomic reactivity gave Propriate cognitive ¢xplanations for the induced arousal, wheres those who had not been informed about its effect, albeit experiend arousal, could not offer any cognitive explanation. In a second expe™ ment, the epinephrine-injected subjects, uninformed about its EHEC were given environmental cues for diverse emotional reactions. D° pending on the mature of cues made available (¢.g,, happiness, ange!)Tronics oF EmoTion /71 the subjects reported their feclings (see Schachter and Singer, 1962; fora contradiction to this finding, sce Mezzacappa et al, 1999). ‘On the basis of his findings, Schachter put forward a self-attribu- tion theory of emotion. The theory advocates that a peripheral physi- ological arousal with an appropriate (self-) explanation induces an overt ora reported emotional state. In the absence of an appropriate explanation, the individual develops an evaluative need and looks for the environmental cuts to define the arousal, The three basic propo- sitions, thereforein Schachter’s theory are: (a) with a peripheral physiological arousal but without.an appropriate information, the subjects depend on self-explanation, (b) with a peripheral physi- ological arousal and an appropriate explanation, the subjects do not accept the alternative cognitive accounts, and (c) with such [as stated against (a) and (b)] repeated experience, the subjects view cognitions as emotions (see Buck, 1976; Strongman, 1989). Lindsley Lindsley’s (1966) theory of emotion is similat to that of Duffy. Ac- cording to him, the experience of emotion is due to neural arousal. A. cortical arousal produces such emotions as worry and anxicty. A vis~ ceral arousal stimulates the ANS functions, e.g, sweating and heartthrobbing, and a somatomotor arousal gives rise to behavioural manifestations, e.g, facial expression. Lindsley's view is based upon certain empirical findings. For instance, the emotional experience is associated with alpha-blocking in the EEG (clectroencephalogram) activation (cortical arousal) which (alpha-blocking) may be produced by an activation of the brain stem reticular activating system. The latter activation is abolished by destruction of the basal diencephalon. With this observation, he atgued that emotion may be a product of the interaction between the arousal produced at the cortical level (re- ticular formation) and the diencephalic/limbic system, In sum, Lindsley argued in favour of an arousal theory to explain the behavioural phenomena, namely, emotion and motivation (see: also Strongman, 1989). b Lazarus Lazanas (1968, 1984) assumes that the emotional behaviours are de- |__ termined by an evaludtive perception because there is a temporal pri- " { ( ( {pipe HY TBuUEDUE SW099q © UOHOWID 10) jesnore jereBoporskuyd 5 peop 2 0} HOROANP © S9Ard pestesdde aanoa{qns req) asisut sist Jong 2anmdO9 Ot) ‘tonOULa s39npoid saduerp (je199514 pur a1et0s) } sore pousaned jo uondassad ayy Ie MIA DY) INOAEy AISLIOSI. ‘ -Apog IU stausyyy “s0U9tadx> uonoUL. 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Hindu tradition Basic proposition All human behaviour strives for achie~ ving goal either to derive pleasure ot to avoid pain Emotions are inherently adaptive and diserete in nature Emotions are identified either by behavioural observation or by adap- tive functions, and vary in terms of similarity, polarity, and intensity Situations di- ‘rectly induce change in autonomic ac tivity, the perception of which gives ise ta state ofemotion ‘Experience of emotion and body reac~ tion co-occur in the event of emo= tional stimulation » Emotions are aroused by an innate af- feet programme, the expressions of which may be modified by culture- constant learning Emotion is not solely 2 function of cognition, and that emotion and cog- nition are independent The term emotion is misleading and all emotional behaviour may be located ‘ona continuum of arousal Emotion is product of interaction be- ‘pween physiological arousal and cog- nition, Experience of emotion is a function of neural arousal ‘There is a temporal priority of cogni- tion over emotion: ‘Sources of mind (mana), namely, pu ity (sattua), energy (rajas), and iner= tia (tamas), give rise to basic emotions Pleasure, pain, and neutral feeling (positive fecling of indifference) are basic to human emouon Spiritual pleavure (enjoyment of sell) thar is not dependent on physical or mental element is central to: human emotion74/7 Buono words, the specificity of an motional reaction is 1 mechanism of the peripheral system (ANS) by the theorists. The supposition is contradicted by the co as they lay emphasis on the regulatory mechanism of the: vous system. A close look at these theories reveals that contradiction in opinion is largely due to the differential v emotion-eliciting conditions (emotion-antecedent co praisal vs. innate autonomic arousal). The debate on the temporal sequence in these theories ( > physiological change or physiological change > cog been minimized to a great extent by the interaction ( physiological change) theorists. Prominent amongst the actionists include Leventhal (1980, 1984) and Schwartz (1977, 19 Leventhal (1984) proposed that an emotional state is produ the interaction of the cognitive and biological processes and that: an interaction is a function of motor commands for the fee and feedback impulses. The theory, known as the percep n theory, has two control systems, a non-emotional volition system an emotional system. Both the systems operate via three stages’ processing, namely, “(a) a stimulus representation stage, (b) a ning execution stage, and (c) an appraisal stage” (Thompson, 300). Leventhal was not in favour of a distinction between cognit and emotion, and maintained that both the emotional and nor tional control systems process the external and internal stimuli 12 identical fashion. The difference in experience (emotional or 20% emotional) occurs as a result of matching or mismatching of feedforward and feedback signals of the central nervous system- Schwartz (1977, 1978) also supported the interactionist Vie and developed a theory that attempted to account for individual & ferences in emotional reactions, He argued that each discrete ® tion is experienced as a function of the unique pattern of in between the cognitive and physiological activities. The pattern © teraction differs from individual to individual. For example threatful situation may trigger a cognitive anxicty (a left hen function) as well as a somatic anxiety (a right hemisphere fu! depending on the coping strategy of the individual. A cluster viduals however may exhibit a similar pattern of emotiot due to the similarities in the physiological activation patter: fitTenomies oF EMonos /75, \ | Both Leventhal and Schwartz were of the view that a discrete emo- | tion is clicived as an interaction of the cognitive and physiological ac~ | tivities, and that the cognitive coping strategy determines the emo- | tional state. In essence, the interactionist viewpoint allows us to avoid | the debate on the temporal sequence of the cognitive and physiologi- | cal activities during an emotional reaction (Thompson, 1988). ‘The mentalistic and behaviouristic theorists have somewhat differ- ent views on emotion and de-emphasize the role of cognition. Theo- rists belonging, to the»psychoanalytic tradition argue that the indi- viduals’ emotional experiences are unique despite a common physi- ological system (Freud, 1926, 1933; Rapaport, 1950). Emotions are thought to be regulated by the unconscious mechanism of the mind and have an instinctual origin. According to the psychoanalytic theo- rists, the state of emotion is produced when the psychic energies of opposing nature are in conflict. The psychic energies are released to derive pleasantness (a function of id), inhibit unpleasantness (a fune- tion of superego), or induce equilibrium (a function of ego) (see Kaplan et al, 1994). Unlike psychoanalysts, the behaviouristic orien- tation to an understanding of emotion is focused on the nature of reinforcement and the strength of conditioning with the affect-elicit- ing situations. The most influential theorist adhering to this notion was Gray (1987). According to him, the common element in all kinds of emotion is the reaction to the “reinforcing event” or the “signals of impending reinforcing events”, The reinforcing event results in re- ward or punishment and the specific quality of an emotion is deter~ mined by “the particular type of reinforcing events involved, and the person's knowledge of these vents” (Gray, 1987, 3) Overall, we find that these theories do differ in many respects, with the emphasis varying on the control mechanism (central vs. pe- ripheral), and in eliciting conditions (cognition vs. body reaction), origin (innate vs. culture-specific), quality (differentiated arousal ys. specific activation), and components (perception, expression, experi- ence) of emotion. Besides these mainstream theorists, the motivational theorists also explain the concept of emotion cither as a pracess of disruption of organized sequences of activity (for example, Simon, 1967; Mandler, 1984) or as a form of motivation (for example, Young, 1961; Bindra, 1970) (sce Toates, 1988). Mandler (1984) argues that the organism76 / Exorion: responds both with physiological preparedness ; cognitive and behavioural restructuring as Soon as takes place. In a negative affective situation, a human | reduce the undifferentiated (autonomic) arousal. The ¢ ofan interruption may also have a positive valence. For ting an unexpected reward produces a discriminal arousal. In Simon’s (1967) view, an interruption of the tivity allows the organism to seta new goal. The res tion (rather than disruption) is adaptive in nature, the which is equated with emotion. Bindra (1970) argues that and emotion are two-subsystems of a construct, viz., state, This state of the organism exists duc to an interaction the physiological state and the incentive stimulus. Bindra, the central motive state exerts a species-specific act creased likelihood either by a process of selective attention alteration of the effectiveness of sensory input) or by a motor facilitation (with the alteration in the neural d Young's (1961) theory is based more on the concept of: rather than emotion. He proposed that all behaviours are g rected and may be:located on a hedonic continuum. The may vary in valence (approach/avoidancc), intensity (from approach to intense avoidance), and duration. The essential in Young's theory are that the affective processes (a) are from the sensory processes, (b) involve motivation, (c) can be! ditioned, (d) regulate behaviour, and (e) exert a control over neurobehavioural functioning of the body (for more details © Strongman, 1989): Buck (1985) also holds the view that emotions” not separate from motivation. An emotional expression serv adaptive function of the organism and signals the state of mot Buck distinguishes four levels of the state of motivation, viz. @) regulation of the homocostatic functions of the body, (b) the sive movement that serves the social functions, (c) the & that governs the state of the subject, and (d) the analytic proP that represents the conceptual basis of the motivatio! Feyereisen, 1989). : This confusion “stems from an unwillingness to grant me conceptual status to emotion” (Leventhal and Tomarken, 1986 Leventhal and ‘Tomarken (1986) further noted that this aucitudeTroms oF Emorion / 77 developed because of the (a) traditional behaviourists who do not accept the subjective state as an important compone: nt of emotion, (b) cognitively-oriented researchers who believe that emotion ig a process secondary to cognition, and © jnteractionists who are of the view that emotion isa product of arousal and cognition. , event approaches to emotion have, therefore, gone beyond these orthodox Positions, and have reduced the theoretical plurality in terms of the similarities of and differences in the biological, cultural, ae constituents of emotion (Thompson, 1988). ly, we come to the ancient Indian theories of emotion. In the Indian tradition, emotions are believed to ‘originate from three sources: purity (sattva), energy (raj and inertia (tamas), These three sources of the mind (mana) give rise to the basic emotions. Sattva produces joy, delight, and pleasure. Discontent, anxiety, and sadness originate from rajas. Sexuality, annoyance, pride, and con- tempt are the derivatives of rajas. Tamas gives rise to delusion or false knowledge which is produced by some intellectual confusion, These roots of human emotions are discussed in The Mahabharata and The Bhagavadgita (sce Sinha, 1986). f “According to samkhya, picasure, pain, and dejection originate from sattva, rajas, and tamas, respectively (see Krsna, 1911). Pleasure and pain are considered the unconscious counterparts of the cognitive processes. These constituents ‘of emotion evolve as a function of na- ture. Though pleasure and pain are unconscious, consciousness has the ability to regulate them with merits and demerits of cognition. In the Indian tradition, pleasure is rooted in desire and pain in aversion, ‘When a desire is fulfilled, it gives rise to pleasure, and when it is un- it ise to pain, Pleasure is of two kinds: worldly and is derived empirically and is invariably as- with pain. Heavenly pleasure is derived from desirelessness nt from passions or longings). an ancient Hindu scholar, gave physiological account of pain. He identified three kinds of bodily humours: the bilious, and the phlegmatic. An equilibrium of these s about pleasure and their disequilibrium produces787 Emotion In the Buddhist tradition, feeling (emotion) is of three: Sure (experience of a desirable object), pain (experience sirable object), and neutral (positive feeling of indifferen place of neutral feeling is unique in the Buddhist explanation tion, It is neither pleasure nor pain, rather, it arises from the ex ence of an object which is neither desired nor undesired. ‘The Jaina account divides cmotion into two classes: saikSaya (ty sient fecling, e.g, anger, pride, deceit, and greed) and akSaya nent feeling, c.g., pleasure, sorrow, fear, lust, and disgust). Like other ancient Indian literature, the Jaina doctrine recognizes | Kinds of pleasure: physical, mental, and spiritual, Spiritual pleasu considcred the state of pure feeling, that is, the enjoyment of the sel by itself, not depending on physical and mental pleasure. ] Put together, the concepts of spiritual pleasure (in the Jaina trad tion), neutral feeling (i ii of emotion. The ancient Indian theories however advocate a senst organ (perception)-object (environment) interaction, the cognil motion. These theories, like the western that emotions are expressed function of the innate and natural (prakrit) processes. But unlike the Darwinian view, the ancient Indian theories Propose that the humaf beings can control these emotions (self-control) to a point of neutral fecling with minimal or little physiological manifestarons