Contestations of Liberal Order: The West in Crisis?

Contestations
of Liberal Order
The West in Crisis?
Edited by
Marko Lehti · Henna-Riikka Pennanen
Jukka Jouhki
Contestations of Liberal Order
Marko Lehti • Henna-Riikka Pennanen
Jukka Jouhki
Editors
Contestations of
Liberal Order
The West in Crisis?
Editors
Marko Lehti Henna-Riikka Pennanen
Tampere Peace Research Institute Turku Institute for Advanced Studies
Tampere University University of Turku
Tampere, Finland Turku, Finland
Jukka Jouhki
Department of History and Ethnology
University of Jyväskylä
Jyväskylä, Finland
ISBN 978-3-030-22058-7 ISBN 978-3-030-22059-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4
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Acknowledgements
The original idea for the book was conceived at a conference titled “The
West: Concept, Narrative, and Politics,” at the University of Jyväskylä,
Finland, in December 2016. The conference was organized by The West
Network (https://thewestnetwork.org/), an international, multidisci-
plinary research network focusing on “the West,” and coordinated from
the Department of History and Ethnology at the University of Jyväskylä.
During the past decade, the theme of our book, “crises of the liberal
West,” has become more topical year by year, although the understanding
of these crises has somewhat transformed after 2016.
This book project can be regarded as a continuation, or “volume two,”
to the book The Struggle for the West. A divided and contested legacy
(Routledge, 2010), jointly edited by Marko Lehti and Christopher
Browning. This project is also a logical continuation to the edited volume
in Finnish, Länsi: käsite, kertomus, ja maailmankuva (The West: Concept,
Narrative and Worldview, SKS, 2016), edited by Jukka Jouhki and Henna-
Riikka Pennanen, to which Marko Lehti contributed as an author.
We have presented our work on this volume at the International Studies
Association Annual Convention, European International Studies
Association Conference, and smaller workshops at our own institutions.
We wish to thank The Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), The
John Morton Center for North American Studies (JMC), The Turku
Institute for Advanced Studies (TIAS), and the Department of History
and Ethnology at University of Jyväskylä for generous collegial support for
the project. We also wish to thank a number of excellent scholars, who
have found the time to comment on our work and engage in valuable
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
discussion and debates on the main themes of the book. We are especially
indebted to Torbjørn Knutsen, Christopher Browning, Viatcheslav
Morozov, Pertti Joenniemi, Tarja Väyrynen, Robert Imre, Élise Féron,
Benita Heiskanen, and the whole JMC team.
Tampere, Turku, and JyväskyläMarko Lehti, Henna-Riikka Pennanen,

April 24, 2019 and Jukka Jouhki
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Marko Lehti, Henna-Riikka Pennanen, and Jukka Jouhki
2 B
eyond Liberal Empire and Peace: Declining Hegemony
of the West? 17
Marko Lehti and Henna-Riikka Pennanen
3 C
rises of the West: Liberal Identities and Ontological
(In)Security 61
4 F
rom Identification to Division: Contesting the Unity of
the West from Within 99
Johanna Vuorelma
5 T
he West: Divided in Freedom and Fear?123
Ville Sinkkonen and Henri Vogt
6 T
hey Hate Our Freedoms: Homosexuality and Islam in
the Tolerant West151
Roderick McGlynn
vii
viii CONTENTS
7 W
ho Owns the West? German Political Establishment
and the New Right175
Ann-Judith Rabenschlag
8 I magining the West in the Era of America First201

Henna-Riikka Pennanen and Anna Kronlund
9 R
esilience of the Humanitarian Narrative in US Foreign
Policy233
Noora Kotilainen
10 C
onfrontational Civilizational Identity in the Making?
The New Turkey and the West263
Toni Alaranta
11 A
Russian Radical Conservative Challenge to the Liberal
Global Order: Aleksandr Dugin289
Jussi Backman
12 A
Non-world: Chinese Perceptions of the Western
International Order315
Matti Puranen
13 B
alancing Between Narratives of the West and Hindu
Nationalism in Emerging India343
Jukka Jouhki
Index373
List of Contributors
Toni Alaranta The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki,

Finland
Jussi Backman University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
Jukka Jouhki University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
Noora Kotilainen University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
Anna Kronlund University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
Marko Lehti Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), Tampere
University, Tampere, Finland
Roderick McGlynn University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
Henna-Riikka Pennanen Turku Institute for Advanced Studies,
University of Turku, Turku, Finland
Matti Puranen University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
Ann-Judith Rabenschlag Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
Ville Sinkkonen The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki,
Finland
Henri Vogt University of Turku, Turku, Finland
Johanna Vuorelma Institute for Advanced Social Research, Tampere
University, Tampere, Finland
ix
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Three crisis narratives 89

Table 5.1 A sketch of categorisations of freedom for analysing foreign-
policy discourse 130
xi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Marko Lehti, Henna-Riikka Pennanen, and Jukka Jouhki
The most serious crisis of modern times is the weakening, if not the break-
down, of faith in the durability and purpose of traditional values, which are
a foundation of the European Union and, more broadly, of the whole polit-
ical community of the West. The West in civilizational, not geographical
terms. These are the values which bind all the main ideological currents in
Europe: liberalism, conservatism and socialism. Human rights, civil liber-
ties, including the freedom of speech and religion, free market and a com-
petitive economy based on private property, reasonable and fair
redistribution of goods, restrictions on power resulting from rules and tra-
M. Lehti (*)
Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), Tampere University,
Tampere, Finland
e-mail: marko.lehti@tuni.fi
H.-R. Pennanen
Turku Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Turku, Turku, Finland
e-mail: henna-riikka.pennanen@utu.fi
J. Jouhki
University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
e-mail: jukka.jouhki@jyu.fi
© The Author(s) 2020 1

M. Lehti et al. (eds.), Contestations of Liberal Order,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_1
2 M. LEHTI ET AL.
dition, tolerance and political pluralism; my generation knows this cata-

logue by heart.1
—Donald Tusk (2016)
The fundamentals of the world order are fraying, and some of its ideological
foundations are being challenged in a way that is seriously worrying. The
liberal global order, which has been astonishingly successful and whose wid-
ening and deepening has produced a golden quarter-century, was built on
strong security relationships and a commitment to an open global economy.
Now, those security relationships are under pressure as isolationist senti-
ments grow in key countries and revisionist powers become more
assertive.2
—Carl Bildt (2017)
We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the doctrine of

patriotism.3
—Donald Trump (2018)
We have replaced a shipwrecked liberal democracy with a 21st-century

Christian democracy, which guarantees people’s freedom, security.
—Victor Orbán (2018)4
We categorically reject the allegations of those who accuse Russia and the
new centres of global influence of attempting to undermine the so-called
‘liberal world order’. […] It is clear that such a system could not last forever.
Leaders with a sense of responsibility must now make their choice. I hope
that this choice will be made in favour of building a democratic and fair
world order, a post-West world order, if you will, in which each country
develops its own sovereignty within the framework of international law, and
will strive to balance their own national interests with those of their partners,
with respect for each country’s cultural, historical and civilisational
identity.5
—Sergey Lavrov (2017)
Crisis of the liberal order abounds everywhere. Indeed, it has in various

forms become a part of Western self-experience since the beginning of the
1
Tusk (2016).
2
“Judy Asks: Is the Crisis of the Liberal Order Exaggerated?” 2017.
3
Trump (2018).
4
Quoted in Janjevic (2018).
5
Lavrov (2017).
1 INTRODUCTION 3
twenty-first century. The first wave of crisis was experienced in the early
2000s during the Iraq War when the trans-Atlantic divide was declared.
The next wave hit the shore with the 2008 financial crisis, which crumbled
trust in the ability of the West to steer the global economic order, and
eroded Western claims to supremacy in the order. The current third wave
of crisis-talk has perhaps been the strongest and most broadly propagated
one. Not only European and US politicians, but politicians from around
the globe have been vocal in proclaiming that the liberal order is in crisis.
At the heart of this discussion has been the rise of illiberal tendencies and
populism within the West. The experience of crisis is widely shared among
civil society actors, too. Furthermore, crisis of the liberal order has (again)
become a phenomenon that attracts the attention of international rela-
tions (IR) scholars. Just look at the themes discussed in recent ISA and
other international relations conferences, the themes of Munich Security
Conference Reports,6 or the special issues7 and books8 published
after 2016.
Contestations of liberal values, norms, and principles; financial and eco-
nomic stumbling; increasing populism, nationalism, and tribalism; global
power shifts—all these phenomena have been turned into crisis narratives:
into signifiers of the frailty of the trans-Atlantic partnership between the
United States and Europe; erosion of liberalism among previously liberal
countries and peoples; or the weakness and failures of the liberal
international order. In this volume, we turn our attention to these narra-
tives of crisis. Effectively, this makes the recent crisis narratives rendered in
discussions on international relations the objects of our analysis. We reflect
on questions such as: What is perceived to be in crisis and by whom? What
these crisis narratives argue for, and what do they aim to defend or contest?
We expand our inquiry into the current crisis narratives by introducing
the questions: Why do these narratives willfully revolve around the notion
6
Munich Security Report 2017: Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?; Munich Security
Report 2018: To the Brink—and Back?; and Munich Security Report 2019: International
Order on the Brink?
7
See for example the Foreign Affairs theme issue “Out of Order: The Future of the
International System” 96 (1), 2017; and International Affairs issue “Ordering the world?
Liberal internationalism in theory and practice,” 94 (1), 2018.
8
See for example Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International
Politics in the 21st Century. 2018. Edited by R. Jervis, F. Gavin, J. Rovner, and D. Labrosse.
New York: Columbia University Press; Kagan, Robert. 2018. The Jungle Grows Back:
America and Our Imperiled World. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
4 M. LEHTI ET AL.
of “the West”? How the crisis narratives turn into the “Two Wests” debate,
the “Internal Division of the West over liberal values,” and the crisis of the
“Western-led International Order”? How the concept and idea of the
West is utilized and understood in these narratives? How the crisis narra-
tives, or experience of living in the era of crisis, condition our understand-
ing of global order and the West—and perhaps, how our understanding of
the West conditions the crisis narratives?
Naturally, we can take a variable, such as democracy, and turn to data
like the Democracy Index for Europe and North America showing a slight
decrease in pluralism, civil liberties, and political culture,9 or the surveys
suggesting that “the gloomy discourse on democracy dominating today is
exaggerated,”10 in order to assess whether the liberal West actually is in
crisis. However, statistics do not provide exhaustive answers to pertinent
philosophical, political, ideological, and theoretical questions relating to
the crises of the liberal West. Thus, our objective is not to verify or mea-
sure the depth of the crises, which in many terms is not possible as crisis is
primarily about experiences, and the term introduces overarching inter-
pretations for otherwise disconnected phenomena and events. Rather, we
consider crisis as something perceived, interpreted, and narrated. We hold
that these experiences are various and contingent, with diverse conse-
quences to (self-)identification, norms, and ordering practices. Thus, what
we aim to do is to analytically elaborate these relationships, multiple
truths, parallel perspectives, and realities. In this book, we use crisis narra-
tives as our entry point to scrutinize how the “Western liberal order,” and
its cherished norms and practices, are alternately embraced, accepted, and
contested.
By combining discussions on the liberal (order) and the West, we dis-
tance ourselves from such real political debates as the role of the United
States as a hegemon of the liberal order, and instead, consider the global
order from the perspective of the notion of the West as the (sole) bestower
of ordering principles and liberal values. We also elaborate on the norma-
tive contestations of the international order from a broader perspective
and emphasize that there are various simultaneous processes of contesta-
tion going on at the moment—processes that are only loosely connected.
Democracy Index 2018 (2019).

9
Despite concerns about global democracy, nearly six-in-ten countries are now demo-
10
cratic (2017); Jiménez (2017); The Global States of Democracy.

1 INTRODUCTION 5
By focusing on the idea of the West we are better able to contextualize

the current crisis discussion and reflect on its significance for the principles
and ideals of regional and global liberal orders. The notion of the West has
been incessantly conjoined with the modern world order. The West has
been invoked in creations of hierarchies, in introductions of ordering prin-
ciples, and in claims to the ability to be the sole actor to envision and
uphold global peace. Here, the West becomes closely associated with “lib-
eral,” as for the past decades, the Western-led global order has been legiti-
mized with the ideas and practices of liberal internationalism and liberal
peace. Liberal also has its connotations for domestic political, economic,
and cultural order, and what should be noted about the usage of liberal in
both the domestic and international frameworks, is that the meaning of
the word changes from one time, place, and speaker to another.11
As the chapters of this book demonstrate, the concepts of the West and
liberal are contingent and multiform. The West has multiple voices impli-
cated in its construction and like all concepts, it requires contextualization
to be understood. “The concept of the West does not refer to some empir-
ical reality,” as Viatcheslav Morozov notes; yet, it is neither an arbitrary
concept, open to all possible interpretations.12 The West is primarily a
narrative concept, since it exists and assumes meaning when it is invoked
in stories about the world. For Christopher Coker, the West is a social
imaginary that enables societies and nations to share particular narratives,
myths, and stories on “how they fit together with others,” and to imagine
“the deep normative notions and images that underlie” common expecta-
tions. These narratives create a sense of global agency and set up a moral
background for building and maintaining global order.13 As a narrative
concept, the West has taken three main forms (civilizational, modern, and
political) but these should be regarded more as ideal types, for in particu-
lar narratives they are always mixed and overlapping.
Civilizational narratives depict the West as a unique civilizational com-
munity possessing historical unity and common identity. The civilizational
discourse implies that the West has been only minimally influenced by its
outside. The emphasis is on asserting the West’s organic purity and its
cultural originality and distinctiveness. The classical approach to the civili-
11
For excellent definitions of liberal and liberalism, see Jahn (2013); Owen (2017);
Rosenblatt (2018); Schwarzer (2017), 24.
12
Morozov (2010).
13
Coker (2010), 73–74.
6 M. LEHTI ET AL.
zational narrative locates the Western origins in ancient Greece and

Rome.14 The claim is that this ancient civilization, and various cultural
practices associated with it (e.g. the art of reasoning, democracy etc.),
have been passed down from generation to generation, from Greece to
Rome, to Christendom, to Europe, to the West, so that today, the
“Westerners” can understand who they are by appealing to this unique
civilizational heritage. Moreover, the claim of its cultural and historical
organic nature implies that little space is available for reconciliation with
those outside the West. The difference of the “Others” is inscribed
through various binary oppositions (e.g. individualism-collectivism,
rational-mystical, Christian-pagan, democratic-autocratic). The “Other,”
as such, exists only as a mirror enabling the West to flaunt its own unique-
ness and radical distinction from other cultures.15
In contrast, the modern West narratives locate the West’s essence in the
legacy of the Enlightenment, industrialization, capitalism, and colonial-
ism, and typically invoke these to assert the West’s superiority over other
cultures, not least by tying the concept to processes of globalization and
“Westernization.”16 Interestingly, these narratives also eliminate any fun-
damental distinctiveness to “the West,” beyond being temporally ahead.
The modern West narrative is therefore based on a dichotomy between
the developed and undeveloped world, a dichotomy which, while legiti-
mizing a sense of Western superiority, also introduces a potentially more
dynamic relationship with the outside by opening up the possibility for
mutual rapprochement insofar as “the Other” transforms to become
like “us.”17
The political narrative usually refers “to the Cold War transatlantic
community and in particular its institutional grounding in the NATO
security community.” In this narrative, both the importance of shared val-
ues, such as democracy, and the ideological opposition to the Communist
East have been underlined. During the three decades after the Cold War,
the NATO as the core symbol of political communion has preserved the
narrative, but after the disappearance of the political “Other,” this narra-
14
See Bernal (1995); Gress (1998).
15
Said (1978).
16
Ifversen (2008), 240.
17
Browning and Lehti (2010).
1 INTRODUCTION 7
tive has merged with narratives of the liberal West and the Western-led
liberal order.18
“Drawing a boundary between the West and ‘Us’ is often a constitutive
exercise for non-Western communities, and is deeply embedded in their
historical narratives,” Morozov states, but continues that “the boundary
between the West and any other of the non-Wests is seldom absolute. This
is particularly evident in the case of the current global debate on the sig-
nificance of democracy and human rights.”19 How the boundary between
the West and the non-Wests is narrated has constituted a nodal point for
legitimization of the Western-led global order and this relationship is
(again) contested. Following Coker “the Western social imaginary was
unique because it was inclusive, not exclusive, which is why of course it
was so compelling,” and indeed successful. Yet, according to Coker, this
ability “is now breaking down. When societies crack under stress, they
crack down pre-determined fault lines, but the cracks can be exacerbated
by attempts to theorise social imaginaries, especially when the theories fail
to describe an existing reality.”20
How the West is regarded by those defining themselves as Westerners
or non-Westerners has been in continuous change, and the paradox of the
West comes from the mix of exclusive civilization narratives with inclusive
modernization narratives.
This idea that the West is primus inter paras (first among equals) is well
established. As Sophie Bessis argues, this is the paradox of the ‘West’, where
the Western societies see the West as, on the one hand, exceptional, but on
the other as grounded in values of liberty, democracy and equality it sees as
universal (cited in O’Hagan 2006). It is this which easily leads to the arro-
gance of believing the West somehow owns, or at least has been granted
special guardianship over, those values…. These tendencies and conflations
obviously create problems (not least in the form of antagonism towards the
West) and raises the question of whether a way out of these discursive traps
might be found.21
Although the universalist narration of the superior West has been his-
torically prevalent, for many commentators (including both ardent sup-
18
19
Morozov (2010), 187–188.
20
Coker (2010), 35, 75.
21
Browning (2010), 222–223.
8 M. LEHTI ET AL.
porters and critics), the West often appears fragile, weak, and on the verge
of disappearing. Indeed, from the coining of the West as a political con-
cept in the nineteenth century, the notion of “crisis” has been central to
many of its understandings.22 In this respect, the West has never been “a
particularly self-confident social actor… and has been in a condition of
perpetual crisis basically from the moment that the notion of ‘Western
Civilisation’ was initially formulated.”23 Decline, tragedy, even the possi-
bility of imminent death, is therefore one of the defining tropes of the
narratives of the West, which stands at odds with the modern West narra-
tive of the West leading the world’s drive to modernity and perpet-
ual progress.
Tropes of Western victory and decline are usually depicted as opposites
of each other, highlighting a conceptual problem that needs to be resolved
through empirical analyses proving either one or the other position cor-
rect. In particular, since the days of Enlightenment, modernity has been
associated with the idea of eternal progress, and thus degeneration and
deterministic decline contradicts this nodal point of modern West.
However, crisis-thinking may just express a need for reorientation of direc-
tion of progress. Indeed, the very idea of a decaying West contains within
itself assumptions of a prior superiority that the West is now losing. Thus,
crisis-talk constitutes an essential part of constructing Western superiority.
More than this, though, depictions of decay often work so as to confirm
or re-inscribe Western self-esteem and the West’s role as a key civilizational
actor in world politics, although today the West is increasingly appearing
in such depictions in changed form.
In this volume, the crises narratives offer one entry point to try to catch
up and conceptualize a multifaceted question of the change in normative
basis of the global order. The experience of crisis offers a moment for
renewal, but just as well, a chance to escape to exclusionist narratives. It is
a task of this volume to examine empirically how the experiences of crisis
contribute to social imaginaries, narratives, and “liberal” and “Western”
identities, and how they affect normative principles of the global order.
Today, it appears that the triumphalist narratives are quite muted and
the declinist narratives more vocal. We find that some narratives are sound-
ing alarm over the decline of Western liberal hegemony, although various
indexes and rankings—for example, in human development, empower-
22
See for example Heller (2006).
23
Jackson (2010), 58.
1 INTRODUCTION 9
ment, human rights, individual freedoms, GDP per capita24—point toward

the conclusion that there has not been a drastic change. It is, indeed, as if
“crisis” is central to some understandings of the West,25 and that in these
understandings, the West is anything but the self-confident global actor
from the triumphalist narratives.26
Many of the past crisis narratives have had conservative overtones, and
liberal values have been presented more as a cause of decay and weakness
than a source of pride and self-esteem. In this regard, a shift has taken
place with the Trump presidency, Brexit, and rise of anti-liberal populism.
Now, a number of crisis narratives come in the form of anguished defense
of liberal norms and liberal internationalism. After Trump and Brexit,
commentators have warned that the most serious contest for liberal order
is coming from within—propagated by some quarters of the conservative
movement, by populists, and the radical right. It has been declared that
“the liberal status quo of the West is in crisis,”27 and scholars have warned,
like Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, that the liberal West is on the
edge, and thus “the time has come to acknowledge this reality and push
for policies that can save the liberal order before it is too late.”28
We take this moment as an opportunity to pause and once more raise
the persistent and intricate question of the relations between the West,
world order, and liberal values and norms. What do liberalism and liberal
international order mean today? How to deal with the simultaneous
Western claims to universality and particularity? Should the West declare
ownership over “liberal” and guard these values and norms at home? Or,
should “liberal” be considered as universal and promoted everywhere in
the world, even if these values and norms are severely contested at the
receiving end? Or, from the perspective of those who identify themselves
as non-Western and liberal, should the notions of the West and liberal be
detached once and for all? The present crisis narratives introduce a yet
another intriguing question: how the West can declare the universal appli-
cability of liberal values and ordering principles, if Western peoples them-
selves are losing trust in, and rejecting, them?
24
GDP per Capita (2017); Human Development Data (1990–2017) (2018); Vásquez and
Porčnik (2018).
25
See for example Heller (2006).
26
Jackson (2010), 58.
27
Tharoor (2017).
28
Colgan and Keohane (2017).
10 M. LEHTI ET AL.
Currently, there co-exist crisis narratives that are each depicting a dif-
ferent West and imagining the fate of the West according to different
metahistorical frameworks. These narratives struggle over what the West
means, which suggests that the West is still needed in order to imagine
one’s own group and identity, world order, and that it continues to be
challenged and contested. We do not want to introduce a new, overarch-
ing perspective to tackle these questions, but instead the chapters of this
volume showcase the diversity of the current crisis narratives, and indicate
how crisis can be approached from various thematic, theoretical, and
methodological perspectives.
A broader geographical perspective is significant, too, for crisis narra-
tives about the West and Western-led order are not floated around only
within the imagined Western community. Countries like Turkey, Russia,
China, and India are particularly interesting in this regard, since in the heat
of the 1990s optimism it was not uncommon among liberals to think that
if only these countries were engaged, they would become fully integrated
into the liberal international order, and adopt liberal values and norms also
in their domestic politics. The leap from the sanguinity and confidence of
the earlier decades to the uncertainty and confusion of the 2010s seems
vast. The threat of the rising non-Western powers and postcolonial cri-
tique used to be one of the main crisis narratives in the Western nations,
but lately this has been partly sidelined. The experiences of the internal
crisis in the United States and EU have provided an opportunity for “non-
Western” powers to shape and redefine the discussions on the role of the
West in the world and on the form of the world order. Western economic
and military hegemony is one of the main points of contestation outside
the West, but so is the ideational hegemony of the West. The norms and
practices of the “liberal internationalist project” are vocally challenged in
areas like human rights, trade, R2P, and nuclear proliferation. However,
this does not mean that the current international order is outright rejected.
On the contrary, the principles of institutionalism, cooperative security,
democratic community, and collective problem solving continue to be
consented to and considered as legitimate ordering principles.29
Instead of making an inside/outside division between the West and
non-West, or liberal and non-liberal, we would like to introduce two main
themes covering all our chapters and approaches. The division is not abso-
lute but gives us a direction. The first theme focuses on the crises of the
29
Stuenkel (2016), 184.
1 INTRODUCTION 11
Western-led Liberal International Order: its ordering principles, underly-

ing values, hegemony, and contestations. Marko Lehti and Henna-
Riikka Pennanen elaborate the current crisis narratives attached to the
US/Western-led liberal international order in the “Beyond Liberal Empire
and Peace: Declining Hegemony of the West?”. They argue that Western
hegemony is embedded not only in material power but also in ideational
and cultural power and consensual legitimacy. The chapter introduces the
paradox between the assertions that liberal peace is the main ordering
principle and practice of the world order, and the assertion that liberal
peace requires liberal empire and liberal hegemony as its guardian.
Furthermore, the chapter shows that the Western liberal order has evinced
remarkable hegemonic resilience and the capability to transform its order-
ing principles and considers the possibility that these abilities might be
fading away.
Noora Kotilainen problematizes humanitarianism as the pivotal aspect
of the liberal international order and reflects on the resilience of the
humanitarian narrative in legitimizations of US interventionist foreign
policy in the era of Trump. The crisis narratives weighing the impact of
Trump administration’s “America First” foreign policy to the liberal inter-
national order are considered by Henna-Riikka Pennanen and Anna
Kronlund, according to whom crisis narratives, such as the declinist
America First-narrative, open up the possibility to redefine and reconcep-
tualize foreign policy—an opportunity that the Trump administration has
seized upon, prompting the critics to put forward their own crisis narra-
tives of declining US leadership and universal values.
China and Russia, too, covet more say in the world order, although
they have adopted different tactics to achieve their objective. Their contes-
tation and criticism on Western material and normative hegemony has
attracted a lot of scholarly attention. Moreover, the Chinese and Russians
have not only settled for critiquing the system, but also have presented
alternative models to challenge and substitute the Western-led liberal
international order. Matti Puranen introduces the potential alternative
ideal for world order derived from the Chinese Tianxia-theory, and ana-
lyzes the academic discussion surrounding this order-building. Puranen
argues that the Tianxia ideal is constructed partly against the perceptibly
failing Western liberal order and partly against the narrations of the his-
torical East Asian Sinocentric system. Jussi Backman, on the other hand,
examines the Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin’s challenge to the
liberal order and Western hegemony. Backman presents Dugin’s radical
12 M. LEHTI ET AL.
conservative theory as a part of Russian aim to profile itself as a regional,

if not global, power and construe a distinct identity in contrast to the
liberal West.
The second theme focuses on the Internally Divided West, or the crisis
of “liberal” and Western identities. The question is then about how liberal
is attached to the (self-)identification of various societies and how liberal
as an epithet of identification is resilient and protean. This broad theme
encompasses the current “Two Wests” debate, but the main emphasis is
on the division over cosmopolitan liberalism and the growing appeal of
nationalism, conservatism, and illiberal ideas in Europe and the United
States. This internal division is explored in more detail in the chapter
“Crises of the West: Liberal Identities and Ontological (In)Security” by
Marko Lehti and Henna-Riikka Pennanen. Lehti and Pennanen iden-
tify three crisis narratives of the West—the liberal internationalist, conser-
vative, and right-wing populist—prevalent in many European countries
and the United States, and analyze how the narratives contest, confirm, or
envision anew existing liberal identities.
Johanna Vuorelma compares the current “Two Wests” narratives with
the narratives of transatlantic rift that emerged in the early 2000s. Vuorelma
concludes that today the narrative is less about a simple geographical and
political split between different approaches to security and foreign policies
on the two sides of the ocean, and more about economic policies, identi-
fication, and forging of a critical and ironic self-image. Ville Sinkkonen
and Henri Vogt elaborate on the discussion by outlining European and
US political and theoretical understandings of freedom and security in
order to gauge the ways in which the foreign policies, and especially the
value structures underlying those policies, either divide or bring closer the
transatlantic allies.
Roderick McGlynn explores paradoxes in the internal Western debate
on liberalism by focusing on tolerance. McGlynn explores how in the
European and US discourses of tolerance toward homosexuality
distinctions are drawn between the East/Islam and the West, and how
these distinctions are utilized by nationalist political movements to further
illiberal objectives. Ann-Judith Rabenschlag examines the rhetoric of
nationalist New Right regarding Islam. Rabenschlag contrasts nationalist
rhetoric with the rhetoric of German political establishment in the context
of terror attacks in Germany and focuses especially on the notion of open
society as a site of contestation.
1 INTRODUCTION 13
Liberal identities have become an important site of struggle over identi-

ties also in the margins of the West (e.g. Turkey) as well as among rising
powers that are habitually regarded as “non-Western,” but that cherish
democracy and the liberal order (e.g. India). Toni Alaranta analyzes the
complicated and shifting relationship between Turkey and Western moder-
nity. Alaranta depicts the nationalist state transformation project initiated
by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and contemplates the pro-
cess of constructing Islamic-conservative Turkish identity in opposition to
the liberal-democratic West. During its history, also India has negotiated
its identity between Western modernity and Indian traditions and ideals.
As Jukka Jouhki demonstrates, the rise of political Hindu nationalism
and India’s geopolitical situation has made this negotiation all the more
strenuous. The domestic identity politics are somewhat disassociated from
discussions on India’s international role, and while India seeks more
weight in the world order, it largely does so within the confines of the
liberal international order.
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1 INTRODUCTION 15
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Foundation for Freedom.
CHAPTER 2
Beyond Liberal Empire and Peace: Declining

Hegemony of the West?
“The American-led liberal world order was never a natural phenomenon,”

Robert Kagan opens his book The Jungle Grows Back (2018). It has not
been the consequence of technological advances and spread of commerce,
and least of all, a culmination of some evolutionary process of universal
human nature or the nature of the international society. Quite the con-
trary, according to Kagan, the liberal international order is a historical
anomaly. It is the outcome of a specific set of events, circumstances, and
global power configurations. Kagan likens the order to a garden: an artifi-
cial, fragile, and transient creation, constantly “under siege from the natu-
ral forces of history.” A garden needs incessant tending, a gardener or
gardeners, who cut the vines and weeds threatening the orderly planted
trees, bushes, and flower beds. For Kagan, since 1945, this head gardener
of the order has been the United States. The United States has shaped and
defended the order, and it has managed to do so especially for two reasons:
M. Lehti (*)
Tampere, Finland
H.-R. Pennanen

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_2
18 M. LEHTI AND H.-R. PENNANEN
first, because of its preponderant military, economic, and moral power;

and second, because of the liberal values and norms it has inculcated into
the order.1
In this chapter, we tour this Garden of Eden. We critically assess the
idea of the necessity to have a superior gardener and the United States as
the sole suitable candidate for this position. If the preponderance, or even
survival, of the liberal international order is understood to require a hege-
mon to maintain stability, as Kagan among many others argues, then the
decline of US power would necessarily generate a crisis of the order.
Recent debates on the crisis of the liberal order have largely been
entrenched in this kind of approach. However, instead of focusing only on
US leadership, we place this order and hegemony into a larger context of
“the West” and “Western” hegemony. Here, hegemony refers less to mili-
tary and economic dominance, and more to social and cultural dominance
of ideas and constitutive normative principles. We aim to cross-read pre-
vailing Hegemonic Stability Theories (HST) with Gramscian ideas on
hegemony and cultural hegemony in order to understand better the com-
plexity of global hegemonic power and how it is constituted not only
through material, but also through ideational power.
We can detect certain ideas and narratives that build and support aspi-
rations to hegemony. We argue that the prime examples of such ideas are
“liberal”—in the senses of liberal order, liberal peace, and liberal empire—
and the West. In particular, this is the case when these ideas are portrayed
and utilized as (universal) ordering principles, as basis of construing hier-
archies, and as foundations for norms, institutions, and practices. Liberal
and the West are separate ideas. They do not necessitate each other, how-
ever they are often discursively conjoined. The liberal order with its norms
and practices is habitually treated as a synonym to the West, even though
in the next breath it is depicted as universal and commonsensical.
Moreover, liberal serves as a narrative legitimation of the superiority and
leadership of the West in the world order. While our discussion is focused
on the abstract level of these two ideas and their workings in the world
order, we acknowledge that such a focus runs the risk of perpetuating the
Eurocentrism in international relations (IR) literature and discourse.
Also, much of our discussion reverts to the level of states and interstate
relations. Therefore, even though we aim for openness and broadness in
our approach, we admit that our focus is still narrow, and overlooks, for
1
Kagan (2018), 3–4, 8–10, 25, 35–36, 57, 152.
2 BEYOND LIBERAL EMPIRE AND PEACE: DECLINING HEGEMONY… 19
example, much excellent theoretical and empirical scholarship on global

asymmetries of power and how these hierarchies and domination are
structured through intersections of race, gender, and class.2
Since its Greek origins, hegemony has been a two-sided coin, one of its
faces denoting to consensual leadership over an alliance, and the other to
coerced use of imperial power.3 The questions of authority, consent, and
legitimacy are inescapably entwined with questions of unequal power,
coercive force, hierarchy, and empire4; they also keep the latter more or
less invisible. For G. John Ikenberry, a legitimate order is an order “within
which states cooperate willingly,”5 and in the liberal international order,
Kagan argues, this willingness has emanated from the relative benignity of
US hegemony.6 Thus, we need to include in our inquiry on US/Western/
liberal hegemony the discussions on consent and legitimacy, and also the
instances of the opposite: contestation, critique, and challenges.
Deep down, the central theme in Kagan’s “Jungle Book” is the merci-
less constancy of change in which change represents a threat to the hege-
monic system. The jungle is ever attempting to grow back, ever attempting
to seize and suffocate the garden—a symbol of order in the midst of dis-
order. Struggle for power, beliefs, and ideas is eternal. Struggle to shape
the order is eternal. And in these struggles, world orders erode, collapse,
and get destroyed. Perhaps, you will not even notice it before the order is
already gone.7 Among the present-day international relations scholars and
observers, there appears to prevail a heightened sense that something is
about to profoundly change: a window of opportunity opening for some,
and a prognosis of looming crisis for others. For Kagan, this change por-
tends a crisis for the liberal international order. History is returning and
nations are reverting to their old habits and traditions: authoritarianism,
illiberalism, great power competition, geopolitics, territorial aggression,
2
See for example Hobson, John. 2012. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics:
Western International Theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hooper,
Charlotte. Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics.
New York: Columbia University Press; Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations:
Reading Race, Gender and Class. 2002. Edited by G. Chowdhry and S. Nair. London:
Routledge.
3
Anderson (2017), Origins I.
4
Hurrell (2007), 78–79.
5
Ikenberry (2011a), 116.
6
Kagan (2018), 56.
7
Kagan (2018), 24, 162, 143.
nationalism, and tribalism—all of which, historically speaking, manifest

themselves as something more “natural” than the tended garden of the
liberal order. These are the vines and weeds of the jungle, and the main
representatives of the jungle are nations such as China and Russia.8
Indeed, China and Russia have become increasingly vocal in their ques-
tioning of the legitimacy of the liberal order, on the one hand, and US/
Western hegemony, on the other. However, in Kagan’s account, the crisis
does not stem from either Chinese or Russian conservative Counter-
Enlightenment critique of globalized liberalism. Rather, the crisis brews
within the head gardener and the garden. The vines of the jungle are
slowly returning and re-rooting “even in the heart of the West.” There is
a pervasive feeling of skepticism about the viability and value of the liberal
order. And most ominously, the will and ability of the United States to
take on the responsibility to care for, and defend, the order has been on
the decrease for years. The order is not beyond saving, but it is unclear
whether the United States feels it is worth salvaging. If the liberal order is
not actively preserved, Kagan claims, the possible outcome is the creation
of a new order, or more likely, a descend into multipolar great power com-
petition updated to the age of nuclear weapons, and eventually, chaos and
disorder.9
Like for Kagan, the theme of change is our nodal point. Instead of
interpreting change as a threat or hegemony as constant, we are elaborat-
ing an alternative, more flexible and open, approach that can better reflect
on and accommodate change. We show that, during the past two centu-
ries, both Western hegemony and liberal order have gone through remark-
able historical changes in which one hegemon of the order has been
substituted with another and the basic ordering principles have gone
through transformations and reinterpretations. This points toward a prop-
osition that the resilience of Western hegemony and the liberal order
through ebb and flow of US or British dominance, in fact, trumps the
crisis narratives. It might be that the current anxiety over US hegemonic
decline or over the retreat of liberal principles turns out to be a false alarm.
But if not, then we need to ask the questions: Are there viable alternatives
that could either replace US hegemony or the cultural hegemony of the
West? Or, is the liberal order capable of once again metamorphosing itself?
8
Kagan (2018), 10–11, 105, 121, 150.
9
Kagan (2018), 11, 106, 121, 149–150, 153–154, 160–163.
Consensual Hegemony, Consensual Legitimacy

The West is a ubiquitous notion in International Relations literature. In its
simplest expression it is portrayed as a political community of like-minded
nations, geographically located in two—or three, depending on who you
ask—continents. It is an architect of several influential international insti-
tutions and organizations, and a mover and shaker in the global order. In
all these characterizations, the West is conceived as an actor in world poli-
tics with compelling economic, military, and political power resources.10
In other words, a hegemonic actor. However, the notion of the West can
also be regarded as a core organizing and legitimizing principle of modern
global order, at least since the late nineteenth century. It is a principle that
defines and legitimates hierarchies and supremacy, a Western-led world
order. Even more, it furnishes a normative basis for international peace as
well as for measures needed for maintaining that peace, including the right
to intervene. Legitimization of this order has revolved around particular
narratives: the nineteenth-century “standard of civilization,” the Cold
War “free world,” and for the past couple of decades, liberal international-
ism and the idea of liberal peace.
Hegemony is a “multifaceted and complex concept” that is interpreted
differently by different theories of international relations.11 To contextual-
ize the recent debates on crisis of the West (or the United States) as a
hegemon of the global liberal order, it is essential to understand the differ-
ences among the various theoretical approaches to hegemony, and how
they form the backbone for popular arguments in crisis-talk. One can dis-
tinguish between the theoretical schools of Realism, Neo-Realism, Neo-
Liberal, Neo-Gramscian, and Constructivism, even if none of them is a
uniform bloc, and in some instances, they are overlapping. The main dif-
ferences concern the role and significance of a single hegemon (a state),
the emphasis on material (coercive) power versus normative power, the
representation of hegemony either as domination or leadership, and the
question of legitimacy. It has been argued that, in essence, Realists and
Liberals are “predominantly materialist in orientation,” while it is the neo-
Gramscian and Constructivist approaches that “combine material power,
ideas, and institutions in a comprehensive theory of hegemony.”12
10
O’Hagan (2002), 1–2, 8–9.
11
Schmidt (2018).
12
Hopf (2013).
In the classical realist perspective, hegemony is understood as “over-

whelming power” of a state and “the ability to use this power to dominate
others.”13 Neoclassical realists remind, on the other hand, that hegemony
is less “an attribute of a single state and more property of what is termed
the international system.”14 Robert Gilpin, for example, envisions an
“imperial or hegemonic” structure in which “a single powerful state con-
trols or dominates the lesser states in the system.”15 Drawing from
Thucydides, Gilpin portrays an international system based on power dis-
tribution and hierarchies. This system remains stable and capable of shoul-
dering economic, political, strategic, and technological changes as long as
the power of the dominant, hegemonic power is not eroding or chal-
lenged.16 A systemic emphasis on hegemony implies the theory of hege-
monic stability. Susan Strange distinguishes between a “strong” and
“weak” version of this Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), the former
stating that a hegemon produces order and stability in the world order,
while the latter version states that hegemonic power is necessary, but not
always enough, to uphold order.17 The underlying idea of an anarchic
world introduces this need for hegemonic power, as only a hegemon “can
establish the international rules that facilitate orderly exchanges amongst
countries and should punish transgressors with predictable penalties.”18
Neo-liberal theorists have expanded the debate to “the mechanisms
and processes through which hegemony is exercised.” While neoliberalism
may be regarded as materialist, there is a visible tendency to emphasize
consent rather than domination. Robert Keohane, for example, argues
that hegemony is not about material superiority per se, but more about
the will and ability to use that material power “to maintain the essential
rules governing interstate relations.”19 Thus, hegemony is “less about
domination and more about consent” as the common rules cannot be
maintained “without a certain degree of consent from other states” even
though “hegemons construct international regimes to accord with their
material interests.”20
13
Schmidt (2018).
14
Schmidt (2018).
15
Gilpin (1981), 29; Schmidt (2018).
16
Gilpin (1988), 594–596.
17
Strange (1987), 554–555.
18
Yazid (2015).
19
Keohane (1984), 34–35.
20
Hopf (2013); Schmidt (2018).
When it comes to hegemonic behavior, hegemons come in all variet-

ies. David Rapkin and Dan Braaten argue that hegemonic behavior “can
be located along a continuum between coercive and exploitative, at one
extreme, and benevolent, or at least benign, at the other.”21 In addition,
one can distinguish a structurally advantaged hegemon, of which the
United States is a prime example. As Carla Norrlof and Doug Stokes
explain, the United States has molded the liberal international order into
a shape in which the system ensures structural advantages and privileges
for the United States.22 To complicate matters further, the question is
not only about the form of hegemonic behavior, but also about how that
behavior is experienced. An act intended as benevolent can be judged as
coercive. Indeed, for example, critical peace-building literature has
emphasized how a principally benevolent act, such as intervention in
support for peace and human rights, can be—and often is—interpreted
as coercive, as it undermines local ownership to process and objectives of
peace process.23
HST has introduced also the assumption that hegemonic powers are
“liberal by inclination,” and consequently, they persuade the others to
become more liberal, too, especially in the realm of economy and trade.24
Scholars of international politics often refer to two successful examples of
liberal hegemonic orders: the late nineteenth-century British Empire and
the late twentieth-century US-led liberal international order—the Pax
Britannica and Pax Americana. And it is especially in the latter, in which
the ideas of consent and liberal have coalesced. Immediately after the
Second World War, global power balance was first decidedly in favor of the
United States. According to HST, this unequal division of power and US
hegemony were conducive for the stability of the postwar-order. Being the
dominant power in the order, the United States had an unparalleled array
of means in its disposal to steer the order and cooperation within it.25
The United States took on the main responsibilities, such as the provi-
sion of global public goods, as well as the main privileges ensuing from
21
Rapkin and Braaten (2009), 119.
22
Norrlof (2010), 3, 11–12, 15, 17; Norrlof (2018), 76; Stokes (2018), 134, 141.
23
See for example Cubitt, Christine. 2013. “Responsible Reconstruction After War:
Meeting Local Needs for Building Peace.” Review of International Studies 1 (39): 91–112;
Mitchell, Audra. 2011. “Quality/Control: International Peace Interventions And ‘the
Everyday.’” Review of International Studies 4 (37): 1623–1645.
24
Strange (1987), 559.
25
Hurrell (2007), 71.
building and leading the order. As a result, the order had a distinctly
hierarchical character.26 Ideally, the order rested on consent, openness,
and capitalism. It was structured around the notions of internationalism,
multilateralism, institutionalism, regionalism, interdependence, and
democracy.27 US alliances, national interests, military power, liberal-dem-
ocratic political system, free-market capitalism, and currency were
coalesced into an order of a very unique kind—an order G. John Ikenberry
terms as “a liberal hegemonic order.” In essence, US hegemony and the
order became mutually dependent.28
A liberal hegemonic order is akin to an empire in the sense that both
embody unequal power relationships and hierarchy. Yet, what distin-
guishes the two, Ikenberry claims, is that liberal hegemony is a “bargained
order”—it is ideally based on consent and persuasion, not coercion. In the
post-Second World War US-led order, states remained formally sovereign
and joined the order out of conviction that their interests were best served
within the order. Moreover, the United States bound itself to the rules
and multilateral institutions established for cooperation, thus channeling
and toning down its power. And it exercised self-restraint, but only to an
extent.29 John Krige, on the other hand, defines the US-led order as an
“empire by consent,” as it has been founded on consensual hegemony, that
is, “a hegemony that was coproduced.”30
Now, Ikenberry and Doug Stokes consider relative lack of coercion,
voluntary membership, and the institutionalized “voice opportunities” for
weaker states to be the main factors legitimizing US liberal hegemony.31
While Thomas Wright, on the other hand, claims that it is the “liberal”—
in its traditional sense as democracy, open economy, multilateralism—that
makes US liberal hegemony legitimate and appealing to a wider set of
states. After all, without liberal, it would be only hegemony.32 In these
accounts, the entity obtaining consent varies. Alternately it is the leader-
ship and dominance of the United States that is being consented to, and
alternately it is the liberal principles.
26
Ikenberry (2011b), 60–61; Nye (2017), 11.
27
Alcaro (2018b), 2–4.
28
Alcaro (2018b), 6; Ikenberry (2011a), xi, 2; Stokes (2018), 138.
29
Alcaro (2018b), 6; Hurrell (2007), 73; Ikenberry (2011a), 18, 67, 70, 116; Peterson
(2018), 31.
30
Krige (2006), 5.
31
Ikenberry (2011a), 7, 116; Stokes (2018), 140.
32
Wright (2017), 192–193.
The concern over the declining power of the United States dates back
at least to 1980s and Paul Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers, and it has become increasingly prevalent in recent years. Much of
this discussion is premised on the assumption that the global order is built
and maintained by a single powerful state. From this perspective, “the
hegemon is identified as the state that possesses vastly superior material
capabilities including military, economic and, sometimes, diplomatic and
soft power.”33 Thus, if the power of this single hegemon depletes, the
whole global order is perceived to plunge into a deep crisis.
Many systemic theorists, like Gilpin, understand the material decline of
the hegemon as inevitable in the longer term, which then leads to a search
for a new hegemon, and potentially, to “hegemonic war.”34 This is one
facet of the current crisis-talk: if the global power of the United States,
entrenched in its (material) resources, is in relative decline due to emerg-
ing multipolarity, this leads to the decline of the US-led world order. As
Ikenberry has noted, as the global competition “over the distribution of
roles, rights, and authority within liberal international order” has begun,
the United States has faced a “crisis of authority.”35 But there is another
facet, and it concerns the way a hegemon uses its power. In this perspec-
tive, the US-led order is declining, because under President Trump, the
hegemon is not only unable and unwilling to maintain the order, but it is
fast losing its legitimacy to do so. When it comes to the legitimacy of
American power and leadership, Trump’s United States may soon find
itself suffering from a similar shortage of international legitimacy as George
W. Bush’s United States in the early 2000s.36
These discussions regarding the hegemony of the United States, in
particular, have habitually been extended to cover also the abstract agent
and community of the West, in general. Arguably, much of this is a car-
ryover from the Cold War. One can comfortably refer to the Cold War
era United States and its (European) allies as constituting the West and
the regional Western-led liberal order. Curiously, the rhetoric did not
change after the Berlin Wall crumbled. The only difference was that now
the “Western liberal democratic world,” or the “Western system,” was
33
Norrlof (2015); Schmidt (2018).
34
Gilpin (1988); Hopf (2013).
35
Ikenberry (2011a), xii.
36
See Kagan (2004), 108.
no longer c onsidered as regional, but as expanding and globalizing.37

Thus, the West today, is understood effectively to be entwined with both
the liberal international order and US leadership,38 but not necessarily
vice versa. Nonetheless, we argue that hegemony of the West cannot
solely be reverted to the power or leadership of the United States, and
moreover, that the HST does not fully explain the hegemony of the
West. Indeed, the West has been more resilient and had a longer life than
the US global hegemony. Therefore, our understanding of the hege-
mony of the West should be elaborated before we can come to terms
with the current crisis narratives, and also with the remarkable resilience
of the liberal order.
Rather than treating the West as a classical hegemon in materialistic
sense, we propose that it is more fruitful to understand it as an ordering
principle and legitimizing narrative of global order. The narrative of the
West constitutes global hierarchies and sets the West as a self-appointed
bestower of the global order. In this respect, invocations of the West (also
when the term West is not explicitly mentioned) entail a considerable
amount of “legitimizing power,” as they are central to broader claims
about the “legitimate” nature of the international order, and about order-
ing practices. Thus, the crisis narrative of the US hegemony and legiti-
macy, translated into the crisis narrative of Western hegemony and
legitimacy, becomes a useful entry point for thinking about the changes in
the normative basis of this order. On the other hand, drawing from Pierre
Bourdieu’s conception of “symbolic power,” the effectiveness of invoking
the West is dependent on the extent to which “the West” is accepted as a
legitimate organizing concept. This is where the symbolic power steps in,
for this acceptance can be a largely unconscious process (at least for self-
identifying Westerners), because it is owing to people’s general socializa-
tion into a world inhabited by such concepts when speaking and thinking
about the international order.39
For further scrutiny along these lines, we first need to grasp what legiti-
macy is—not only as a property that can be gained and lost, but also as a
37
Ikenberry (1996), 79, 81, 89, 91; (2011a), 8.
38
Stokes (2018), 135.
39
Bourdieu (1991), 163–70. In Bourdieu’s terms this is a “tautegorical” argument, a myth
which refers to nothing outside itself for its legitimization. Hence, the West performs a legiti-
mizing function simply because people have come to accept it as a positive concept that does
just that.
process. S. P. Mulligan notes that “legitimacy is virtually indistinguishable

from order.” Furthermore, legitimacy “connotes a degree of justice (law,
right) in that order.”40 Thus, while legitimacy may be conjoined with
international order, in IR literature it is more traditionally associated with
particular states and actions rather than with the totality of an interna-
tional order. As Rapkin and Braaten argue, international legitimacy is “a
relevant property for states that, either collectively or singly, claim for
themselves an extraordinary systematic role,” that is, it is a property of
actors who maintain systemic stability in an order. But in conjunction with
hegemony, it is also a process. Rapkin and Braaten continue that hege-
mony is a contested political process consisting of “legitimation efforts by
hegemonic actors claiming legitimacy for their activities.”41
“Hegemonic legitimacy” may be sought from various sources.
“Substantive legitimacy derives from the normative substance of the prin-
ciple, rule, action or policy in question,” that is, from shared values and
norms. Procedural legitimacy stems from adherence to the “correct”
decision-making procedures and constitutionalism. Outcome legitimacy,
on the other hand, flows from successive and effective outcomes of the use
of hegemonic power.42 Ultimately, upholding hegemonic legitimacy
requires that key actors continually seek and claim legitimacy for certain
ideas, norms, and policies upon which the hegemonic order is founded.
Such claims must then be accepted (consciously or unconsciously) by a
relevant audience.43 However, the question then emerges: who is that rel-
evant audience giving or withholding legitimacy? Moreover, how do you
verify the consent of a domestic, transnational, or international audience?
How do you know when that consent is lost? And lastly, what is being
consented to? Material hegemony, or perhaps the hegemony of ideals,
such as liberal peace, that underlies a system aimed to mitigate conflicts
and maintain peace? Or, alternatively, a set of principles that are not con-
sidered as ideologically unsurpassed, but as ones that hold symbolic value?
In other words, principles that ensure wealth and relative stability, and
thus provide purely utilitarian reasons for accepting them and engaging in
the order they constitute.
40
Mulligan (2006), 364–365.
41
Rapkin and Braaten (2009), 118, 120.
42
Rapkin and Braaten (2009), 115, 122–124.
43
Rapkin and Braaten (2009), 114, 117, 119, 120.
Hegemonic legitimacy is a conceptual frame that turns our analytical

gaze from statistical comparisons of a hegemon’s material power to the
norms, values, and practices of order as well as to the various processes
of their often simultaneous and symbolic confirmation and contesta-
tion. It allows us to understand hegemonic positions primarily as
socially constructed relationships rather than absolute and relative
global power positions. Within this frame it would also be possible to
discuss the contingency and resilience of hegemony. HST often down-
plays the possibility of gradual transformation and depicts change as
something drastic. Yet, the empirical observation of two centuries of
“Western” dominance pinpoints to the resilience of Western hegemony
and liberal order. However, this resilience of Western hegemony has
been too often explained from a state-centric, and also Eurocentric,
perspective, while ignoring the non-state actors as well as non-West-
ern actors.
All this points us toward the idea of “cultural hegemony” and Robert
Cox’s “internationalization” of Antonio Gramsci’s thoughts on hege-
mony44; to the notion that “hegemony is not only coercion, but subscrip-
tion to a shared and legitimized ideology,” and therefore it “cannot be
reduced to pure material domination.”45 Gramscian hegemonic theories
depart from purely state-centric approach and instead emphasize the
importance of popular acceptance of normative principles for global hege-
mony. There is an unconscious element in here, too, namely the “taken-
for-granted” or “common-sense” truths about the world order and norms
that people assume without questioning. These truths include “hege-
monic ideas” that are couched in the rhetoric of universal interests, but
that, in fact, serve particular interests.46 Indeed, Viacheslav Morozov
argues that hegemony itself “is best understood as an operation through
which a particular, contingent representation of the reality is universalised,
i.e. comes to be accepted as true and natural by most members of the
community.”47
Following these propositions, we posit first that at the core of hege-
monic legitimacy there is the ability to create normative principles, ideals
44
See Cox (1993); Cox, Robert. 1981. “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory.” Millennium 10(2): 126–155.
45
Hopf (2013); Schmidt (2018).
46
Hopf (2017), 203–205.
47
Morozov, manuscript.
of global peace for example, and also the capability to devise and maintain
institutions for mitigating and mediating violent conflicts. Second, we
claim that hegemonic legitimacy is not gained or lost only in relations
between states. Rather, the popular acceptance or rejection of the global
community is crucial for the legitimacy of world order. These ideas become
eminently useful for our examination of whether the idea of a Western
liberal international order can be claimed to possess varying degrees of
consensual hegemony and consensual legitimacy. And in conjunction,
whether it is the lack of those attributes that contributes to the current
crisis narratives. The problem is that we unavoidably need to set off from
the premise that empirical verification of consent and legitimacy is elusive,
just as measuring hegemony is elusive, since these phenomena are never
uniformly revealed, omnipresent, or uncontested.
Below, we first focus on liberal internationalism—the cluster of ideas
and practices that is utilized to define the liberal international order—and
on liberal peace—the ordering principle of that order. Liberal internation-
alism could be approached from the point of view of hegemonic stability
theories. For example, we can discuss the significance of a hegemonic state
(or group of hegemonic states) as the guarantor of this liberal internation-
alist system. Liberal peace, on the other hand, could be approached from
the Gramscian hegemonic perspective. From this perspective, consensual
hegemonic legitimacy manifests itself in taken-for-granted principles and
seemingly self-evident practices—or, the universalization of the particular.
These are invoked to legitimize the everyday practices of global ordering.
We demonstrate how the legitimizing narratives and practices gradually
evolve and change, and rather than signaling a crisis, this continual trans-
formation is a sign of hegemonic resilience. Consent for an order is never
universal, on the contrary, contestation and criticism are ever-present. And
yet, contestation of the order does not automatically mark a crisis or
decline. At least, not for as long as the popular acceptance does not shift
to an alternative vision for order and hegemony.
Liberal Principles of International Order

Since the late nineteenth century, the West has been associated with the
liberal tradition and liberal values—this is the narrative of the liberal West.48
Yet, the meaning of “liberal” is shifting and unstable. As Helena Rosenblatt
48
Ifversen (2008), 239.
notes, “people use the term [liberal] in all sorts of different ways, often
unwittingly, sometimes intentionally.” In the early twentieth century, “lib-
eralism, democracy, and Western civilization” were merged together, and
the United States, because of its growing strength, was cast as the main
defender of this conceptual ensemble. Therefore, adherents of interwar
authoritarian ideologies in Europe defined themselves against liberalism,
democracy, and Western civilization. The Second World War cemented
the view of the United States as the prime representative and guardian of
“liberalism, democracy, and Western civilization, which by now in many
people’s minds were virtually the same thing.” Today, liberalism is consid-
ered “the dominant political doctrine of the West,” and yet, Rosenblatt
argues, it is steeped in coexisting narratives of triumph and pessimism.
While for others liberalism is “Western civilization’s gift to mankind,”
other see it as the reason for Western decline.49
According to John Owen, the history of the liberal ideal can be divided
in three phases. First, the earliest concept of “liberal” was identical with
the concept of “libertarian,” in the sense that state control was perceived
as the primary threat to the autonomy of economic actors and to individ-
ual freedom more broadly. This interrelation has proved to be a persistent
one, especially in the United States, where both self-identified libertarians
and liberals have emphasized their commitment to individual rights and
freedom. In the second phase, liberals somewhat reversed their position,
and called for the state to protect the autonomy of societal actors from the
threat of open markets and capitalism. In the last phase, liberalism has
come to connote the toleration of diversity and difference, and “liberal
society is marked by diversity in terms of beliefs, ethnicities, and styles
of life.”50
Rather than constructing clear-cut chronological phases of liberalism,
Rosenblatt depicts the history of liberalism as one of persistent debates
over the meaning of being liberal. She especially stresses the back-and-
forth shifts between humanitarian liberalism and laissez-faire liberalism:
At heart, most liberals were moralists. Their liberalism had nothing to do

with the atomistic individualism we hear of today. They never spoke about
rights without stressing duties. Most liberals believed that people had rights
49
Rosenblatt (2018), 1, 258–259.
50
Owen (2017), 75; Rosenblatt (2018), 264–266.
because they had duties, and most were deeply interested in questions of
social justice.51
However, after the Second World War and especially in the context of the
Cold War, US liberals with a progressive agenda—the ones who stressed
morality, equality, public good, and the responsibility of the state to guar-
antee those—ended up under siege. In the climate of fear of totalitarian-
ism, they had to redefine their stance, and accentuate their dedication to
individual rights. Rosenblatt claims that this Cold War era redefinition of
liberalism came to eclipse all previous history, so that today we tend to
view liberalism mainly as an Anglo-American tradition of individualism
and individual rights.52 In the current political divisions within Europe
and the United States, Liberals are often associated with one political bloc,
as an opposition to Conservatives. But from a broader perspective, for
example, both US Democrats and Republicans stand behind norms and
institutions having a strong liberal heritage, and indeed, it is only the pop-
ulist right that antagonizes many liberal norms. Nevertheless, the distinc-
tion that should be made is that between libertarian liberalism and
humanitarian liberalism, as it is the latter that has constituted the basis for
Western-led liberal world order since the nineteenth century.
“Liberal” has had shifting meanings in domestic political debates, and
the same applies also to the framework of international order. As Michael
Lind reminds us, there has never been “just one fixed liberal world
order.”53 Lind’s proposition is supported by a quick survey of the archives
of two leading international relations studies journals, the Foreign Affairs
and International Affairs. A search for terms liberal (international/
world/global) order not only discloses the multitude of meanings attached
to this word compound, but also that the usage of the term has been rela-
tively rare before the 1990s. In the 1980s issues of these journals, scholars
tended to understand the liberal order narrowly, as essentially an economic
and trading regime.54 References to the liberal international order in the
broader sense of post-Second World War US-led order were sporadic.
Michael Vlahos, for example, analyzed the US post-war drive to create “a
true,” universal liberal world order—an achievement that eluded Woodrow
51
Rosenblatt (2018), 4.
52
Rosenblatt (2018), 4, 7, 260–261, 271–272.
53
Lind (2017).
54
See Bailey (1972), 651; Currie and Vines (1992), 586; Russett (1981/1982), 44.
Wilson.55 Fouad Ajami, on the other hand, elucidated the Third World
revolt against “the liberal world order maintained by the West,” because
the US or the West were reluctant to militarily back up the order, but
more significantly, because of the disillusionment of non-Western states
with the ideals, values, and the “moral supremacy of the West.”56
Going further back in time, to year 1938, Arnold J. Toynbee, Robert
Cecil, Philip Henry Kerr, and Richard Austen Butler discussed the future
paths for British foreign policy. They noted that until the First World War,
the steady spread of liberalism had provided “new common ideology for a
Liberal world order.” However, the rise of anti-democratic ideals and
totalitarianism had shattered the prospects for such an order and left the
British wrestling with questions of the possibility of conducting interna-
tional relations “on a non-moral footing,” the desirability to hold on to
the Pax Britannica or a collective world order in an anarchic world, and the
general outlook for political and social liberalism.57 While liberalism had
been adopted as a political tradition and philosophy in Britain in the nine-
teenth century, in the United States it was consolidated as such only in the
early twentieth century. In 1917, President Wilson made the connection
between “liberal” and a specific foreign policy agenda.58 However, it
would appear that the concept conjoining liberal with international order
was not yet in wide circulation at the time.
Today, “liberal” in the context of international order is often associated
with the support of international law and multilateral institutions, with a
certain type of market-orientated economic order (recently defended most
fiercely by the Chinese president), and/or with the (universal) ideals of
“democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and a (regulated) market
economy.”59 According to Daniela Schwarzer, the liberal international
order is based on three main principles. The first is a “three-fold principle
of sovereignty, non-intervention, and a comprehensive prohibition on the
use of force to alter borders;” the second is “maintaining an open, non-
discriminatory world economy;” and the last building block is “the pro-
tection and promotion of human rights and democracy.”60
55
Vlahos (1987/1988), 1097–1099.
56
Ajami (1980/1981), 366, 375–376.
57
Toynbee et al. (1938), 329, 331.
58
Rosenblatt (2018), 3, 247, 259.
59
Owen (2017), 75.
60
Schwarzer (2017), 24.
Liberal tends to refer to internationalism as the core constitutive order-

ing or normative principle of the order. Then again, liberal international-
ism is often presented as a synonym to rules-based system,61 or liberal
institutionalism: a vision of an open, loosely rules-based, and progressively
orientated international order. Beneath the institutions of the order, the
force at work is liberal internationalism. Ikenberry argues that it provides
“the organizational principles, institutions and capacities to negotiate the
international contingencies and dislocations that threaten the domestic
pursuit of liberal democracy,” and thus this prevailing international order-
ing principle is essential also for the survival of liberal as a national order-
ing principle.62 Also Riccardo Alcaro claims that the liberal international
order is above all an ideational and normative project,63 and membership
of all states in the international society, multilateralism, (economic) inter-
dependence, and liberal democracy are its constituting normative
frameworks.
This order, according to Ikenberry and Kagan among others, is man-
aged by the West, and it necessitates US global hegemony, for the United
States acts as its ultimate guarantor or patron. Consequently, the decay
and decline of relative US global predominance is portrayed as a threat to
the order.64 However, according to Robert Cox, hegemony is not only
about dominance, but also about leadership and skills to set up and regu-
late the international system. Cox particularly emphasizes two aspects of a
hegemonic world order: the role of a “globally-conceived civil society”
and the ability of the order to regulate interstate conflict.65 Thus, his hege-
monic order includes a vision for global peace. Ikenberry underscores that
mediation requires an open rules-based system, security cooperation, and
the conviction that international society is corrigible—all of which form
the bedrock of liberal internationalism when it comes to the theory and
practice of organizing and ordering the world.66 Global peace warrants
institutionalism and international institutions, while for Cox, international
institutions and organizations are expressions of hegemony. These organi-
zations are products of hegemonic world orders, they co-opt elites from
peripheral states to support the order, “absorb counterhegemonic ideas,”
61
See for example Ikenberry et al. (2018).
62
Ikenberry (2018), 13.
63
Alcaro (2018a), 165.
64
Ikenberry (2018), 8. Also Kagan (2018).
65
Cox (1993), 50, 61.
66
Ikenberry (2018), 11–12.
and significantly, they “embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of
hegemonic world orders” and “ideologically legitimate the norms of the
world order.”67 From this perspective, it is the ideal of liberal peace and
the institutions that legitimate it that constitute the nodal point of
Western hegemony.
In the end, we are going full circle over and over again: liberal interna-
tionalism, liberal institutionalism, liberal peace, liberal hegemony, and the
liberal international order are so interwoven together that it is hard to
disentangle them and consider them separately. For example, focusing
solely on liberal institutionalism as an ordering principle, insofar as it is
understood as a synonym for a rule-based global order and multilateral-
ism, would not take us very far in contemplating the proposition that such
an order needs to be liberal or that the West (or the United States) is
required as the bestower of that principle. But if we shift our focus from
liberal institutionalism to the idea of liberal peace, we find that it not only
operates as an ordering principle, it is by its essence liberal, and in a sense,
Western. It provides the main legitimizing narrative and a source of con-
sensual legitimacy for Western/US hegemony and order. The paradox,
however, is that liberal peace also creates fundamental dichotomies and
hierarchies between the “civilized” and others, and thus, it stands for a
liberal empire.
The West as a Liberal Empire

Historical narratives in Europe and the United States tend to flaunt the
idea of Western superiority over others. The narratives of the West—as
they are woven around the binary dichotomy between the West and rest,
or the West and the East—tend to reinforce hegemonic structures, as well
as affirm and legitimize domination.68 Often in these narratives, moder-
nity becomes the source of Western distinction from the Other; and yet
at the same time, this modernity is also conceived as universal, and held
out as a model for the non-Western peoples to emulate.69 The West has
been actively engaged in fostering modernity beyond its shifting borders.
Thus, the other has become a target of modernizing or westernizing
67
Cox (1993), 62.
68
Conceison (2004), 58; Herborth and Hellmann (2017), 3.
69
Ifversen (2008), 240.
efforts, with the ultimate goal of transforming the other into something
resembling “us.”
In this regard, the West’s defining characteristics are not seen as inher-
ent and fixed but as learned and universal. By adopting certain forms of
governance and economics, all societies can become Western. Essentially,
the distinction between the West and the other is temporal, not qualita-
tive. The other is depicted as backward and as being late, but if they hurry,
they may catch the train heading to modernity.70 Think of, for example,
Francis Fukuyama’s claim that, at the end of history, there is only one,
Western road to modernity. Or Walt W. Rostow’s much earlier theory of
stages of economic growth, in which the United States and Western
Europe (and to some extent, Japan) epitomized the last, most developed
stage of “Age of High Mass Consumption.”71 The histories of
Westernization and Western domination are more than just narratives or
discourses. Arguably, the West has indeed shaped the world during the
past couple of centuries.72 What is crucial, is that the Westerners have had
the power to attract followers to their model and bend the will of those
reluctant to adopt it.
Since the late nineteenth century, the narratives of universal (Western)
modernity and civilization have been entangled with the ideas of liberalism
and empire. British liberals and US progressives of the time distinguished
between imperialism, that was “brute force over others,” and “genuine
colonialism.” Colonies and an empire were presented as consonant with a
“truly liberal foreign policy.”73 Beate Jahn argues that liberalism, in effect,
went hand in hand with the policies of colonialism. The nineteenth-
century empire-building was a liberal enterprise, systematically supported
by liberal international lawyers and political thinkers alike. In practice, lib-
eralism constituted a dynamic interrelation between a domestic space of
liberal freedoms and peace, and international space of colonialism and
normative expansion.74 Establishing any type of hegemony is premised on
a clear division between an inside and outside,75 and thus, the liberal
70
Ahiska (2003), 353–354.
71
See Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Free Press;
Rostow, Walt W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
72
Peterson (2018), 33.
73
Rosenblatt (2018), 247–252.
74
Jahn (2018), 54.
75
Morozov, manuscript.
hegemonic project called for a distinction between the “civilized” and

“barbarians,” and the latter—the non-Western Other—was relegated to a
sphere controlled by the consolidation, strengthening, and expansion of
liberal principles.
The prima facie example of the regulated and hierarchical relationship
between the West and rest was the notion of the “standard of civiliza-
tion,” developed by Western legal scholars and incorporated into inter-
national law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Europe and
the United States claimed the universality of their values, norms, and
institutions, as well as their idea of an international order—the “family of
civilized nations.” This order and the underlying standard of civilization
was effectively a set of asymmetrical power relations. The world was
expected to conform to the Western model, and yet the Eurocentric
international order and its norms were applied only in very particular
circumstances, that is, in relations between the “civilized” states. Thus,
the system distinguished between civilized, barbarian (which included
sovereign but “non-civilized” realms like the Ottoman Empire), and
savage states; or between those who had “developed further than others,
and thus should enjoy more rights and a greater say in politics” and
those who were not developed enough. The civilized were understood
to have a moral obligation to disseminate and promote civilized norms
among the undeveloped.76 Once the notion of the standard of civiliza-
tion was established, invocations of it implicitly served to further re-
inscribe the legitimacy of the order to which it referred, and the
superiority of the West within it.
The “standard of civilization” aimed to regulate interstate relations and
conflict, but the sphere outside the “civilized world,” was a world of colo-
nial wars and violence, detached from the ideological debate on the ideal
of perpetual peace. In this regard, liberalism was interwoven with the
ontology of perpetual peace as it was introduced by Immanuel Kant, as
well as with another intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment: the idea of
universal rights of people. For Kant, a permanent state of peace required
the establishment of a so-called league of peace, a vision, which greatly
influenced the later creations of the League of Nations and the United
76
Buruma and Margalit (2004), 2; Den Boer (2005), 56; Gong (1984), Donnelly (1998),
3–7; Bowden & Seabrooke (2007). States that failed to conform to the standard of civiliza-
tion were declared as legitimate sites of interference and intervention in the name of human-
ity and ultimately of colonial control. See Heraclides (2012); Neocleous (2011).
Nations. This league of peace would respect the equality of human beings
and republican form of government, and it would offer a framework in
which states could voluntarily mediate disputes before they escalated into
war.77 These requirements have often been complemented by a belief that
economic interdependence deters (armed) conflicts—one of the basic
tenets of liberal internationalism.78
All these four principles were conjoined in a new way in the 1990s under
the umbrella of liberal peace—a new, informal “standard of civilization.”
Liberal peace formed the cornerstone of the refashioned, more global,
Western-led liberal order. However, the first column of Kant’s vision, the
league of peace itself, is largely ignored in the new liberal peace ontology,
and instead, the belief in democracy, human rights, and liberal markets as
peacemakers have strengthened. As David Chandler writes: “Today, gov-
ernments and international institutions claim human rights as one of the
essential pillars of the international system, and they are proclaimed in the
same breath as peace, democracy and the rule of law as a universal value of
the highest order.”79 Also the earlier Kantian emphasis on republican form
of governance was replaced by the democratic peace theory introduced by
Bruce Russett in 1993. Essentially, Russett claimed that democratic gov-
ernments were less prone to conflict, which led to a conclusion that the
more there are democracies, the more peaceful the world is.80
Reflecting the modernist narratives of the model for historical develop-
ment, the idea of liberal peace is framed around the notion that all these
norms are universal. In extreme cases, their universality is backed up and
enforced with interventions, and when that happens, liberal peace and the
related concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) are usually invoked
to legitimize Western-led interventions in the name of international soci-
ety.81 To build and strengthen liberal peace, states and international orga-
nizations are licensed to intervene “to relieve humanitarian suffering, to
defend and promote democracy, to degrade hostile transnational move-
ments, to determine the outcomes of civil wars, and to build (and trans-
form) the institutions and capacities of ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ states.” Most
recently, “the protection of populations against genocide or in the face of
77
Pojman (2005), 62–66.
78
See for example Schweller (2018), 23.
79
Chandler (2002), 1.
80
Russett (1993).
81
Donnelly (1998); Bowden and Seabrooke (2007).
egregious violation of their human rights,” was added to the list.82 The
moral duty to intervene in order to build peace has become the glue that
holds the liberal empire together.
In traditional IR literature, non-intervention is regarded as the norm
and intervention the exception. On the contrary, John MacMillan consid-
ers intervention “as an ordering practice through which states have coer-
cively mediated the tensions that arouse between bounded territoriality
and transnational social forces in the modern world.”83 As practice, inter-
vention has been based on three partly overlapping hierarchies: first, the
hierarchy of production, trade, and finance following the expansion of
capitalism and industrialization; second, the hierarchy present in interstate
relations and power politics; and third, the hierarchy of culture and civili-
zation that is evident in such notions as the standard of civilization, race,
and liberal peace.84 It is only the last that is liberal in essence, but not in
the sense of tolerance and diversity, as “liberal” is currently understood in
popular narratives.
The declaration of human rights was included in the UN charter after
the Second World War, but the idea of human rights as a universal norma-
tive goal toward global peace was fashioned as the corner stone of the
liberal order only in the 1990s. Since then, Chandler claims, humanitari-
anism has become “an ambiguous concept” capable of justifying any form
of external intervention.85 The peak in humanitarian interventionism
began from Somalia (1992–1993) and Bosnia (1995) and came to its end
in Libya (2011). All the while, the declared universalism of this normative
basis has been widely contested from within and without of the West as an
embarrassing renewal of colonial legacy. Chandler considers that humani-
tarianism has created around it an “empire in denial”, in which Western
democracies wield hegemony over setting universal normative principles,
and simultaneously seek to reject the responsibilities that come with the
power they have gained.86 In effect, Chandler concludes, the humanitari-
ans have “gone from being angels of mercy who can do no wrong to being
seen as part of the problem.”87
82
MacMillan (2013), 1039–1040, 1044.
83
MacMillan (2013), 1041–1042.
84
MacMillan (2013), 1045–1047.
85
Chandler (2001), 698.
86
See Chandler, David. 2006. Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building. London:
Pluto Press.
87
Chandler (2001), 696.
Recently, for example in Syria, the humanitarian emphasis has already

been relegated to a secondary role in the fight against Daesh, and political
interests have become more explicit and even more acceptable as a source
for public legitimation. Still, humanitarian reasoning and rhetoric remains
widespread and utilized. Consider, for example, Russia, seeking to legiti-
mize its actions in Syria by stating that it was protecting human rights. But
human rights are also flatly rejected as a normative basis, as Chinese poli-
cies of peace- building show. Authoritarian governments have recently
engaged in international conflict management with no reference to liberal
norms, human rights, or democratic peace, but instead with an emphasis
on state authority and preservation of sovereignty. David Lewis, John
Heathershaw, and Nick Megoran contrast these “authoritarian modes of
conflict management” with the “liberal model of compromise, negotia-
tion and power-sharing,” and propose that the authoritarian approach
should be called “illiberal peace.” Notably, unlike liberal peace, illiberal
peace does not contain universalizing principles.88
Historically speaking, liberal (and then liberal peace) as an organizing
principle of the world order has required the existence of a clear distinc-
tion between democracies and non-democracies. It is overwhelmingly the
states conceived as “Western” that have taken upon themselves the “moral
duty” of spreading democracy to non-democracies by any means neces-
sary. According to the Democratic Peace Theory, it is a legitimate act for
building a more peaceful world. One case in point is President George W.
Bush’s attempt to legitimize the continuance of US-led intervention in
Iraq in 2008, five years after the intervention had begun, by arguing that
“we know from experience that democracy is the only system of govern-
ment that yields lasting peace and stability.”89 Interestingly, during his
campaign and first two years of his presidency, Donald Trump has con-
tested the universal applicability of democracy and the necessity of pro-
moting democracy for global peace, defining the “idea that we could make
Western democracies out of countries that had no experience or interest in
becoming a Western Democracy,” as “dangerous.” Moreover, Trump has
denounced the spread of all “universal values” and interventions to those
ends.90 This is a message he repeated, for example, during his first state
visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2017, stating that “We are not here to
88
Lewis et al. (2018), 14–15.
89
Bush (2008).
90
Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech (2016).
lecture—we are not here to tell other people how to live, what to do, who
to be, or how to worship.”91 While in practice the United States has still
largely relied on the normative basis of liberal peace, this rhetorical rejec-
tion of (nearly) taken-for-granted truths can hardly be inconsequential.
In the end, it is plainly visible that the Kantian perspective to global
peace, and the liberal international order largely espousing that perspec-
tive, presents a paradox. On the one hand, liberal values and liberal insti-
tutionalism are identified with cosmopolitanism and the idea that all
members of the international society are equal. On the other hand, it
gives rise to the imagery of the West as the liberal core of this society and
as the primary guarantor of global peace, stability, and wealth.
Christopher Coker claims that the West sees itself in a state of “becom-
ing” and the rest of the world in a state of merely “being.” He continues
that this image of the West is a “strongly internationalist and expansion-
ist,” in that it sees its values as universal, and aspires to export those
values for the sake of world peace and prosperity through its “empire as
liberation.”92
International hierarchies, as David Lake reminds, are pervasive and
enduring features of world politics. Even if one views the state of nature
in the international relations as anarchic, it is difficult to deny that states
escape the state of nature by creating hierarchies through domination
and subordination.93 Inderjeet Parmar argues that one of the prime vehi-
cles through which the Western states have produced dichotomies and
hierarchies, has been liberal internationalism. According to Parmar, lib-
eral internationalism produces a normative world-view dictating what
the world should look like, and based on that view, liberal international-
ists have constructed a “a class-based, elitist hegemony”—namely, the
liberal international order. Consequently, referring to Mark Mazower,
Parmar characterizes liberal internationalism as “imperial international-
ism,” intent on maintaining “a global hierarchy established by centuries
of colonial and semi-colonial rule over what is now called the
global South.”94
While Parmar conjoins “Liberal Empire” with coercive hegemony, in
Ikenberry’s view, liberal empire and liberal hegemony are two entirely
91
Trump (2017). On Trump administration and universal values, see also Chap. 8.
92
Coker (2010), 75–78.
93
Lake (2017), 2–3.
94
Parmar (2018), 152, 154–155, 159.
different types of order. Although both are hierarchical orders, they differ
in the manner in which power is exercised and in the degree to which
sovereignty is considered inviolable. While a liberal empire is imposed,
coerced, and often arranged as a hub-and-spokes system, a liberal hege-
monic order—such as the US-led post-Second World War liberal order—
is negotiated, multilateral, and most importantly, it is based on consent.95
Similarly, Lake envisions a social contract in which “the ruler provides a
political order of value to the ruled, who in turn grant legitimacy to the
ruler and comply with the restraints on their behavior necessary for the
production of that order.”96.
Western dominance has been real and concrete, but it has been
shrouded in notions of the West as both particular and universal. One
way to look at this is to frame the whole concept of the West as a hege-
monic idea: as an umbrella term for particular interests couched in the
rhetoric of universal interests. Consider, for example, the concepts asso-
ciated with the West, such as the standard of civilization or liberal peace.
They have universalist pretensions, but even universalist narratives are
particular in the sense that they are always recounted from a specific
location and from the viewpoint of specific actors.97 The situated par-
ticularity of universalist narratives cannot be avoided. From the perspec-
tive of those who are the objects, the legitimacy of universalist projects
often appears questionable, and therefore such projects are challenged,
rejected, and resisted.98 And as we will see next, it is the ideas and proj-
ects of liberal peace, liberal empire, and liberal hegemony—together and
separately—that form the main points of contestation.
Resistance, Contestation, and Resilience

Still in 2011, Ikenberry noted that the “deeper logic of open and loosely
rule-based international order” remained intact and widely accepted.
Although the US hegemonic bargain underlying the order was being chal-
lenged and power was fast becoming more equally distributed around the
globe, there were grounds for optimism regarding the future of the liberal
international order quite simply because there existed no viable
95
Ikenberry (2011a), 70–71.
96
Lake (2017), 3.
97
Hansen (2017), 292.
98
Hansen (2017), 292.
alternatives.99 This contention that there are no serious ideological con-

tenders for liberalism, democracy, and capitalism persists. The liberal inter-
national order has been more successful than any other order to date. Or
at any rate, it is the least bad alternative.100 However, increasingly in the
2010s, scholars are coming out and declaring the liberal international
order as a myth. Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, for
example, have referred to the prevailing narrative of the liberal interna-
tional order as “more or less a myth,” rather an aspiration than a descrip-
tion of state behavior in the world.101 Amitav Acharya denounces the
myths of liberal hegemony and the American World Order, and calls atten-
tion to the historical baggage that is seriously damaging the legitimacy of
the order.102 Also Graham Allison points to the “misconceptions about the
liberal order’s causes and consequences,” and continues that the whole
phrase “liberal international rules-based order” is so ambiguous that it is
practically devoid of any meaning.103
Effectively, these “myths” are points of criticism and contestation,
extending not only to the liberal international order, but to the whole
intertwined bundle of phenomena associated with it, such as the hege-
mony of the West and the United States, and the legitimacy and illegiti-
macy of liberal empire. One source of contestation is the practices of the
order, especially interventionism. Consider, for example, international
peace-building interventions which are carried out despite the mixed
record of these interventions, and despite the fact that in many instances,
“the intervening party’s hopes for a swift and decisive action were soon
disappointed,” as MacMillan notes.104 The typical peace-building mis-
sions generally prioritize liberal state-building through implementing
internationally endorsed blueprints for liberal peace, rather than “the
local politics of building peace.”105 For many observers, such interven-
tions are impregnated with renewed notions of the Western civilizing
mission, because they are premised on the idea of liberal peace as a uni-
versal truth.106
99
Ikenberry (2011a), xi–xii, 6–8.
100
Jervis (2017), 16; Peterson (2018), 32–33; Stokes (2018), 150.
101
Barma et al. (2013), 57.
102
Acharya (2018), 50–51.
103
Allison (2018), 125.
104
MacMillan (2013), 1039–1040.
105
Cubitt (2013), 94.
106
See Paris (2002).
During the past few years, there has been growing awareness among
scholars that the intrinsic universality of (liberal) norms cannot be taken
for granted, and consequently Jonas Wolff and Lisbeth Zimmerman
note that “the debate has turned from a focus on norm diffusion to an
interest in norm contestation and related discussion about norm local-
ization, appropriation, and subsidiarity.” This is neither anti-liberal nor
illiberal, but in a sense, post-liberal. Increasingly, such ideas as liberal
peace-building, for example, are presented from a critical perspective,
and “contestation, thereby, becomes itself a normative concept.”107 The
critique aimed at liberal norms can be viewed from the perspective of
contestedness, which is a principle reflecting the agreement that, “the
norms, rules and principles of governance are contested and that they
therefore require regular contestation in order to work,” as Antje Wiener
explains. Norms have a dual quality of being both structuring and con-
structed, and hence they must be contestable by all involved stakehold-
ers, “so as to both indicate potential legitimacy gaps and to overcome
them.”108 To contest the norms and practices of liberal peace, is to advo-
cate for change: for example, the substitution of the universalist preten-
sions with relativism, or the rejection of the duty to promote global
peace, as championed by various political actors from Trump to some
conservatives and right-wing populists.
The prevailing narrative holds that the decades leading up to the 2010s
can be characterized as an era of optimism and triumph of liberal
promises,109 or what Thomas Wright terms, the “era of convergence.”
According to John Peterson, this was an era when “virtually all states
sought to become members of the liberal order,” and were voluntarily
accepting the rules and norms of the order, including economic liberalism
and democracy, because of the promise the order held for prosperity and
international stability.110 Wright adds that convergence did not mean that
powers like China and Russia would become downright liberal or that
ideological and geopolitical friction would end, rather, it entailed increasing
cooperation and integration.111 This claim regarding the scope and accep-
tance of the order—its “inexorable magnetic attraction”—Barma et al.
107
Wolff and Zimmermann (2016), 514–515.
108
Wiener (2014), 1–4.
109
Jahn (2013), 1–2.
110
Peterson (2018), 30–31.
111
Wright (2017), ix–x.
describe as the “founding myth” of the liberal order.112 Edward Luce

writes how “remarkably arrogant” it has been to believe that the whole
world craves to be “Western,” and thus would “passively adopt” the
Western script.113 The conclusion of such critiques is that Europe and the
United States form the core of the order, and alone share the feeling of
ownership over it.114 In other words, liberal international order is, and has
always been, particular, not universal.
Another perceived myth is the claim that the liberal order has been
erected and expanded through consent, not coercion, and that it has been
benevolent. Acharya, Parmar, Richard Stubbs, and Paul Staniland, among
others, emphasize that the order has been often enforced by using mili-
tary, economic, and political power. While the people inside the “Western”
core may be blind to this, people dwelling outside of it are quick to note
the injustice, inequality, and abuse of power inherent in the system. The
consequence is that the order is constantly contested, and the “crisis of
authority” has become a permanent feature of the order.115 On one hand,
the criticism points toward the general question elaborated by Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, that “the problem with ‘actually existing’
liberal democracies is not with their constitutive values crystallized in the
principles of liberty and equality for all, but with the system of power
which redefines and limits the operation of those values.”116 On the other,
it is often linked to particular US foreign policies, either taken on unilater-
ally or channeled through the institutions of the liberal order, rather than
to the more abstract question about the nature of liberal hegemony or
liberal empire. The main target is the dissonance between the actions of
the United States—ignoring the struggles of decolonialization, engaging
in military interventions, backing up authoritarian regimes, aggressive
free-market capitalism, and allowing states with enough power to ignore
rules when it suits them—and its claim that the order it is leading repre-
sents benevolence and moral superiority.117 From this, it has been a small
step for skeptics to state that the liberal international order has only been
112
Barma et al. (2013), 58.
113
Luce (2018), 9.
114
Acharya (2018), 50–51; Staniland (2018); Stubbs (2018), 138–139.
115
Acharya (2018), 51–52; Parmar (2018), 159; Staniland (2018).
116
Laclau and Mouffe (2001), xv.
117
Acharya (2018), 52–53; Alcaro (2018b), 6–7; Staniland (2018); Stokes (2018), 133.
“a thin veneer for American power,” and moreover, that it is this “truth”
that the rhetoric and actions of the Trump administration have laid bare.118
The Trump administration’s attitude toward the liberal international
order has been complex and ambiguous. The most interesting turn in this
regard was the speech held by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the
German Marshall Fund in late 2018, in which he rejected the old order
and declared the creation of a new liberal international order through US
leadership. The first part of the speech reflected the understanding the
representatives of the administration have sounded often, that values and
ideals, such as human rights and freedom, are “Western” and thus not
universal. The following section of the speech put forward the administra-
tion’s claim that the institutions of the old liberal international order have
corroded and failed.119 One gets the impression that the administration is
not dispensing with the ideal of overwhelming US military and economic
power combined with ascendancy in certain international institutions, in
one word, hegemony. On the other hand, the administration seems very
keen to change the way the United States exercises its power.
If “multilateralism has been a key signaling mechanism for the United
States since 1945,” as Lake states, it is not so anymore. Resorting to more
unilateral decisions and actions, together with the reassertion of the pri-
macy of US national interests and sovereignty, can effectively undermine
the procedural legitimacy of US hegemony, if the global community
judges that the hegemon no longer submits itself to open and accessible
decision-making and exercises strategic restraint. This raises the question
of whether the international community is still willing to give its consent
to US hegemony or a “new” US-led liberal international order, especially
if we consider the myth about the scope and acceptance of the old order.
Parmar, for example, suggests that there is very little wholehearted accep-
tance of an order which was “conceived and developed as a system of the
West and the rest,” and has become a tool to preserve the power of the
Western core, and more precisely, the power of the transatlantic elites. He
supports this proposition by quoting Donald Tusk, the President of the
European Council, who called for “Euro-Atlanticism,” meaning coopera-
tion “to prevent post-West world order.”120
118
Jervis et al. (2018), xi.
119
Pompeo (2018).
120
Parmar (2018), 157, 172. For more on EU reactions to US foreign policies, see Chap. 4.
President Trump and his administration have repeatedly talked about

saving and preserving the “West,”121 but it is unclear whether the European
audience still chooses to grant the United States the legitimacy to speak in
the name of the West. There are already signs that Western European
countries are unwilling to subordinate to US leadership.122 It is highly
likely that any cracks in the transatlantic alliance and suggestions of a world
order no longer dominated by the West are warmly welcomed in Vladimir
Putin’s Russia. In his address at the 2017 Munich Security Conference,
Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov took an aim at “the so-called ‘lib-
eral world order,’” stating that it was “conceived primarily as an instru-
ment for ensuring the growth of an elite club of countries and its
domination over everyone else.” Essentially, Lavrov was putting forth the
same claim as Parmar. Instead, he called for “a democratic and fair world
order, a post-West world order, if you will.”123 Also, Russian foreign policy
analysts seem to be animated with the idea that “the 500-year-long domi-
nance of the West” is coming to an end, and we are entering a post-
Western world. Much sounding like HST proponents, they posit that
along with the downfall of Western power follows the downfall of the
Western world order, the whole system of rules and norms.124
Russia seems determined to seize this moment of crisis, to return as a
great power into a multipolar world, and influence the formation of a new
order, in which all universal isms are left behind.125 This is the rhetoric,
masking the possibility that rather than dispensing with universalism alto-
gether, Russia might covet to replace one, “Western,” universalism with
another, Russian, universalism. Russia is unlikely to wield enough power
by itself to rewrite the order, but there has been a long-standing effort to
rally the “non-Western” world to join Russia in challenging and resisting
the liberal international order and US hegemony.126 There appears to be a
hesitation that Russia cannot go it alone. It needs a country or countries
like China. Igor Ivanov, President of the Russian International Affairs
Council (RIAC), argues that “unlike the divided and politically polarized
Western societies,” China and Russia, with populations that are “politically
121
See for example Pence (2019); Pompeo (2018); Trump (2017).
122
Consider, for example, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
123
Lavrov (2017).
124
Karaganov and Suslov (2018). For more on proposed Russian alternatives to the pres-
ent liberal international order, see Chap. 11.
125
Karaganov and Suslov (2018).
126
Wright (2017), 49.
consolidated and united,” are uniquely capable of crafting a new, multipo-

lar world order.127
However, China has remained more of a question mark. Arguably,
there is an ongoing redistribution of global power and economically, at
least, the outcome is likely to turn out in China’s favor. China is not con-
tent with the United States dictating the rules and wielding dispropor-
tionate power within the institutions of the current order. Neither is China
content with many of the “universal norms” underlying the order. It
guards jealously the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and
rejects liberal democracy.128 But none of this automatically means that the
Chinese are poised to tear down the liberal international order if they get
a chance. The popular belief is that China is not like Putin’s Russia—striv-
ing to do away with some of the basic principles of the current order with
its definition of national sovereignty that applies only to the strongest of
world’s nations.129 On the contrary, China appears to tread carefully,
avoiding conflicts that might trigger a collective reaction from the United
States and its allies, serious enough to harm its interests.130
In China, the speculation around the increasing Chinese power and its
impact on the liberal international order has prompted a number of inter-
national relations scholars to contribute opinion-editorials to the tabloid
Global Times. Yuanzhe Ren, for example, argues that China’s rise is “part
of a bigger trend of the rise of Asia, shifting the world’s economic and
geopolitical centers of gravity from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—
which presages the end of the West’s five centuries of global dominance.”
The future international order, Ren underlines, will not be “based on US
leadership or Western values.” In other words, the United States is in rela-
tive decline, both regarding its power and international legitimacy, and
China is ready to fill the vacuum. However, Ren assures that the Chinese
are intent to only reform the system, not overturn it.131 China has eco-
nomically bound itself to the liberal international order. Accordingly, the
Chinese government White Papers state that China especially supports
and is committed to the multilateral trading system and global economic
governance. China is also willing to provide public goods and leadership
127
Ivanov (2018).
128
Allison (2017), 147; Breslin and Menegazzi (2017), 71–72; Cumings (2002), 166;
Peterson (2018), 33, 35; Stokes (2018), 148.
129
Wright (2017), 43–45.
130
Breslin and Menegazzi (2017), 71; Wright (2017), 76.
131
Ren (2018).
in the battle against climate change.132 However, the Chinese emphasize

that they are not engaged in wholesale propagation of a “Chinese model”
or “Beijing Consensus” to contend with liberal internationalism. Ying Fu,
chair of the foreign affairs committee of China’s National People’s
Congress, wrote in 2016 Financial Times op-ed, that the Chinese “are
dissatisfied and ready to criticise. Yet we are not ready to propose a new
design.” Nevertheless, Fu implied that China might be forced to do so,
since the “western-centred world order dominated by the US” is failing to
adjust to rising powers.133
If China would come up with a coherent alternative model for interna-
tional order, it would either need to elicit enough consent, or China would
have to gain such preponderance over other states that it could coerce the
order. But it seems doubtful that the Chinese are rejecting the liberal
international order in its entirety, only the West as its ordering principle
and some of its claims to universal values and norms. Consider, for exam-
ple, Xinbo Wu’s assertion that China will not “establish a new hegemonic
order,” for the Chinese vision for order is characterized by freedom, open-
ness, partnership, and greater inclusion of “political, economic and cul-
tural diversity” than in the current order “dominated by Western values
and culture.”134 From this, it is difficult to discern how such a vision would
translate into an international order, but the rhetoric of openness and free-
dom points rather toward the resilience of certain principles than drastic
change. Both within and outside “the West,” much of the contestation
seems to revolve around the notion of the West as a bestower of hege-
monic ideas in the liberal order, and less around the notion of “liberal”—
although the liberal in its varying meanings does get its share, too.
The Metamorphoses of Liberal Hegemony and Crisis

of Liberal Empire
The liberal international order remains in place, still largely untouched.

But the perception of change is in the air. Relative global power posi-
tions are shifting, the international community is showing signs of
132
China and the World Trade Organization (2018); China’s Peaceful Development
(2011).
133
Fu (2016). For more on proposed Chinese alternatives to the Western order, see Chap. 12.
134
Wu (2018).
discontentment with the order, and as Kagan asserts, the garden is

decreasingly taken care of. If we contemplate change from the view of
Hegemonic Stability Theory, decline in US global preponderance is
causally linked to the collapse of the US-led order, and hence a change
in the US hegemonic position constitutes a crisis. However, hegemony
is a many-sided and complex abstraction that escapes easy empirical veri-
fication and exact readings. If applied alone, hegemonic stability theories
direct your gaze to only one facet of hegemony and they condition your
conclusions. Thus, to tease out the complexity of hegemony in relation
to the liberal international order, we have complemented HST with
Gramscian ideas of cultural hegemony and hegemonic ideas.
Conjoining the two theories not only helps us to consider both the
material and ideational/cultural aspects of hegemony, but also assists us in
addressing the core question: how the theories of hegemony cope with
systemic change? While HST accommodates the idea that an order may
withstand small changes over time, it is premised on drastic, conflictual
changes—hegemonic wars. Yet, we argue that in the longer-term perspec-
tive, the era of liberal empire has lasted for over two centuries, and during
that period, not only has the leading hegemon of that order changed, but
also the understanding of its core organizing principles. This implies the
resilience of Western cultural and ideational hegemony, embedded in the
liberal order, through periods of transformation in material power posi-
tions and some redefinitions and adaptations of the norms and practices of
the order. In this regard, the liberal order appears resilient and capable of
shouldering change.
The choice of words reveals the theoretical and ideational perspective
from which the current order is viewed. A US-led liberal order betrays the
US hegemony within the order; the Western liberal order betrays Western
cultural hegemony; and plain liberal international order suggests that the
order is based on impartial and universal principles. In all these three for-
mulations, the order has been contested and resisted throughout the past
centuries and today the contestations are rather growing louder than sub-
siding. We may discern contestation of the multilateralism and liberal insti-
tutionalism of the order, of the existence of universal ideals and values, of
the legitimacy of US hegemony, and contestations of Western cultural
hegemony. Three major powers of the world, China, Russia, and the
United States, in particular, appear to welcome a post-Western world in
which the particularity of the West is affirmed and universalism rejected.
However, it should be noted that contestation in itself does not trigger a
crisis. On the contrary, from Gramscian view, contestation or counter-

hegemony is an inevitable consequence of hegemony, and from a systemic
point of view, contestation is necessary for the maintenance of the system.
Moreover, it is downright impossible to recognize which—if any—of
these challenges pose a serious threat to the order and US/Western hege-
mony. Any answer to this would necessarily be uncertain and vague, and
thus would merely add up to the narratives of crisis.
The perspective of cultural hegemony lays visible the paradox in the lib-
eral international order: the cosmopolitan emphasis of norms and rules—
the liberal peace—continues to be attached to the idea of liberal as a
particularistic heritage of Western civilization and to the need to create
dichotomies between “us” and “them”. The very essence of being “Western”
appears to entail the claim that the West is superior in comparison to the
non-West. The West self-declares itself as a natural hegemon of world order,
not just the hegemon of a liberal order, for this logic precedes liberal inter-
nationalism. The hegemonic power of the West has been based on the
(coercive) ability to maintain global power hierarchies and reproducing
them in new forms. Accordingly, the older legacy of Western superiority and
its responsibility to modernize or civilize the rest of the world was carried
over to the US-led post-Second World War liberal order, even though it
contradicts the core normative values of liberal internationalism. This para-
dox is an obvious source of criticism and contestation, but interestingly, this
contestation has largely taken place within the international system.
Some principles and norms of liberal internationalism appear resilient
despite ongoing contestation. Many members of the international com-
munity would probably not publicly balk at human rights, for example,
even though they might criticize the failings in executing and promoting
those rights. Quite the contrary, this criticism may have as its objective to
show that it is not only the Western nations that share ownership over
these principles, and that it is the lodestar of the West, the United States,
that has failed in upholding them. For instance, at the 2018 United
Nations General Assembly, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales criticized
that “the United States could not care less about human rights or jus-
tice,” and admonished the government for promoting torture.135 The
crucial idea here is consensual legitimacy, for on the one hand, the resil-
ience of human rights rhetoric could signal that some aspects of Western
cultural hegemony still retain legitimacy. On the other, it could signal
135
The Latest: Congo to boycott UN meetings about the country (2018).
that some principles are no longer perceived as flowing from Western

hegemony, but instead, they have become self-evident and taken for
granted. But there is also a third alternative: that despite appearances, the
principle of universal human rights is increasingly not considered as legit-
imate nor is it taken for granted. The EU has noted with mounting con-
cern the “aggressive attempts to undermine the universality of human
rights,” and some are already referring to a “post-human rights world.”
In this situation, the international community could be holding on to the
“current human rights law, in the absence of any genuine alternatives.”136
The legitimacy of the principles and norms of the liberal international
order are currently—perhaps most poignantly—contested inside the West.
According to Beate Jahn, liberalism initially created a clear distinction
between the domestic and international political spheres. The “dark side”
of policies was reserved for the outside (non-liberal) international sphere,
and that sphere was then expected to contribute to the wealth and peace
inside the (liberal) domestic sphere. However, Jahn claims that the later
application and spread of liberal principles (promise for global peace) also
into the international sphere has broken down the barriers and weakened
liberalism in the domestic sphere.137 If liberal principles lose legitimacy
within the West, this would effectively also undermine Western cultural
hegemony when it comes to these principles. This question of persuading
consent and legitimacy for cultural hegemony would haunt also any other
alternatives to the liberal international order that might emerge. Changing
understandings of what constitutes a legitimate order and legitimate hege-
mony is a pathway to changes in the world order at large, but it is far from
clear if such a radical change in these understandings has taken place. Even
if a counter-hegemonic alternative ordering principle—entirely different
from liberal internationalism, institutionalism, and peace—would now be
declared, it would still have a long way to go until gaining consent and
legitimacy from the international community.
Western liberal order has shown adaptiveness, but this time it is unclear
if there is willingness to respond to contestation and, as a response, to
metamorphose. To counter the main criticisms, Western nations and elites
would need to consider doing away with the incessant Western claim to
ownership over, and primacy within, the order. They would need to con-
sider whether it is possible to separate the liberal empire from the ordering
136
Foulkes (2016); Human Rights at UNGA! (2018).
137
Jahn (2018), 58–60.
principles of liberal peace, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internation-

alism. Would the West sacrifice the liberal empire or be prepared for a
metamorphosed liberal order that would be truly universal? Then again,
would discarding the empire be enough to save the liberal principles and
the order built on them? In other words, do we in the end come down to
that liberal empire and liberal ordering principles may be distinguished in
theory, but not in practice?
In HST, liberal hegemony and liberal ordering principles cannot be
disentangled. The order rests on US dominance and leadership. According
to these theories, if the United States desires to lead a liberal order, it
needs to act as a beneficent hegemony, and persuade legitimacy and con-
sent through liberal principles. Take away any of these pieces of the puz-
zle, and the picture will never be complete. Similar inseparability of
material, ideational, and institutional aspects of hegemonic order as is pre-
sented in HST is implied in Cox’s Gramscian reading, since according to
Cox, world hegemony is expressed through universal norms and the insti-
tutions and mechanisms upholding those norms. Cox’s understanding of
world hegemony is also state-centric, in that he presents the material
supremacy, coercive ability, and balance of power as factors adding up to
the hegemony of first Britain and then the United States.138 Ultimately,
however, his interpretation supersedes the level of states and his emphasis
on the global civil society and universal ordering principles points toward
the possibility of continuance of ideational hegemony as long as those
principles are not seriously challenged by the international community.139
Accordingly, general acceptance of liberal peace, for example, as a global
ordering principle supports and perpetuates the post-Cold War Western
liberal empire. What is noteworthy, however, is that this particular princi-
ple was embraced as late as in the 1990s. This hints at the possibility that
liberal peace as an ordering principle might transform in the future, con-
sidering that it already is a transmutation from earlier ordering principles
and ideals for global peace.
138
Cox (1993), 60–62.
139
In Cox’s formulation, the years 1875–1945 were a nonhegemonic period (as well as the
period following the late 1960s and early 1970s). Again, such categorizations come down to
choosing ones perspective and measurements for hegemony. One could also claim that
although especially the years preceding the two world wars witnessed serious contestation of
organizing principles, and even though the processes of changing the hegemon and reformu-
lating the organizing principles were underway, the cultural hegemony of the West did not
entirely cave in.
When it comes to reacting to change in the world order, it all comes

down to choosing your perspective. We essentially argue for theoretical
flexibility. Even if one would start with the (HST) question of the United
States losing global hegemony and its consequences for the liberal inter-
national order, the next question would need to be: would the loss of US
hegemony necessarily signal the loss of larger, and more invisible, Western
cultural and ideational hegemony? Turning our focus to the legitimacy
and consent of ideational hegemony, we argue that the hegemony of the
West is not only embedded in the material hegemonic power of any single
state, but above all in the acceptance of Western organizing and ordering
principles for mitigating inter- and intrastate violence as legitimate. And
this brings us to the question of contestation of ordering principles, the
conundrum of disentangling the ordering principles from Western hege-
mony, and the possibility of resilience and adaptation. We are prone to
agree with Chantal Mouffe that in a dynamic and necessarily conflictual
world, we need some ordering principles and practices to constrain con-
flicts and prevent them from escalating into violence.140 In this sense, the
jungle (disorder, or “anarchy”) at the gates of the garden of order is
indeed something that needs to be worried about and warded off.
However, without serious and broadly accepted alternatives, options for
order appear relatively narrow. Either the liberal order needs to weather
the current crisis-talk and maintain its legitimacy as it is—as a liberal
empire; or it needs to adapt and transform, even if this metamorphosis
would mean that the garden would end up being less “Western.”
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CHAPTER 3
Crises of the West: Liberal Identities

and Ontological (In)Security
It can hardly have escaped notice: the liberal international order has plunged
into crisis. Recent scholarly literature appears to be built upon the presupposi-
tion that crisis or decline of the liberal international order is a fact that can be
empirically verified.1 Indeed, the initial reaction in the past few years has been
to take the idea of a crisis for granted, to maybe list some indicators of crisis,
but then concentrate more on the implications of this supposed crisis for the
world, and especially, for the West—the main protagonist of the order. We
take an alternative position, and claim that there is no straightforward, causal
relationship between the perceptions of crisis and an actual decline of Western-
led liberal order, or of the West as its imagined owner. Rather, the relationship
is complex, vague, tacit, and contingent—and it cannot be conclusively verified.
1
Thus, we have seen meticulous reports, such as RAND Corporation study, measuring
certain input and output indicators to determine the “health of the liberal international
order.” See Mazarr et al. (2017).
M. Lehti (*)
Tampere, Finland
H.-R. Pennanen

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_3
Our aim in this chapter is to scrutinize the logic of this relationship, but
we refrain from trying to verify the existence or non-existence of crisis of
the West. Instead, we treat crisis as a narrative. By analyzing popular texts
and speech of mainly scholars, but also some politicians and political com-
mentators, we will identify current crisis narratives that revolve around the
notions of liberal, international order, and the West. We approach crisis-
talk as an expression of narrative power to contest, confirm, or constitute
anew existing liberal identities. We argue that this crisis-talk is largely
embedded in the question of securing symbolic agency, the role of a global
leader, in an era that is seen to be characterized by the rise of non-Western
actors and Western self-doubt regarding the liberal order.
We will take a closer look at three current crises narratives of the West: the
liberal (internationalist), conservative (/libertarian), and right-wing popu-
list. These categories are distinct, but they have porous boundaries, especially
because of the multiple meanings of “liberal.” Consequently, it is sometimes
challenging to make a distinction between the liberal and conservative crisis
narratives, for instance, as both in their own terms aim to defend liberal val-
ues and norms, but their understandings of liberal do not necessarily coin-
cide. We will put the three categories into the context of the long genealogy
of triumphalist and declinist narratives of the West. Our objective is to bring
closer together the prevailing IR understanding of the West as a political and
security community and a global actor with the understandings of the West
as a marker of civilization, social imaginary, and identity—thus continuing
the work begun in studies such as Conceptualizing the West in International
Relations and The Struggle for the West.2 In this chapter, we explore the ques-
tions: What constitutes “crisis” in the current crisis-talk? And how “crisis”
constitutes the (liberal) West? As we progress, also one additional question
invites itself: why much of the discourse regarding the mechanisms of coping
with the problems that plague the practices, institutions, and regulations of
the liberal international order is entwined with the narrative of an existential
crisis of the West, as this approach seemingly rules out the more pragmatic
approaches to revising the practices, regulations, and institutions of the order.
Past Crisis Narratives

There are many variations of the narrative of Western modernity, some of
them locating the “essence” of the West in the legacy of the Enlightenment,
and some of them emphasizing industrialization, capitalism, or colonial-
2
See Browning and Lehti (2009) and O’Hagan (2002).
3 CRISES OF THE WEST: LIBERAL IDENTITIES AND ONTOLOGICAL… 63
ism instead. What unites these narratives, according to Jan Ifversen, is

that they all portray the West as breaking free from pre-modernity and as
inherently “dynamic, expansive and changing.”3 Edward Luce writes that
a belief in progress is the “closest thing the modern West has to a
religion.”4 The belief in eternal progress and a universally applicable
Western-led pathway to modernity has been the mainstay of Western
modernity, and conversely, a synonym for the global superiority of the
West over the rest. Yet, a belief that the West is in decline and under a
threat has been a dogma held with equal fervor. From the late nineteenth
century, prophets have been prognosing that the last days of the modern
West are at hand.5
Since the West was imagined as a distinct entity and community, it has
remained restless: forever depicted as transcending, pre-eminent, and driv-
ing forward, or alternatively as decaying, dying, or collapsing. Often these
sentiments have held fast at the same time, and the crisis narratives have
gone hand in hand with the triumphalist vision of the West as the endpoint
of history. This contradicting duality between triumphalist and declinist
tendencies is one of the few core characteristics of the narratives of the
West during the past century and half. And, always, somehow the idea of
the West has persisted; the West has survived the crisis only to face another
crisis around the corner.
In the late nineteenth century, the crisis narrative enveloped around the
European and US ideas of a “yellow peril”—coming commercial, indus-
trial, and perhaps military contest between the thrifty, energetic “yellow
races” and luxurious, lethargic “white races.”6 Over a century later, rising
Asia has again been depicted as a fundamental threat for the global eco-
nomic hegemony of the modern West. Many authors, especially in Europe,
have understood a shift from Euro-Atlantic to Asia as inevitable, and char-
acterized the West as a land of falling sun with its aging population and
declining capacity for innovativeness.7 Such narratives portray a combina-
tion of external and internal threats to the West. The rising rest might
deliver the finishing blow, but it is the internal stagnation and moral decay
3
Ifversen (2008), 239–240.
4
Luce (2018), 4.
5
Bonnett (2004), 6. See also Heller (2006).
6
See for example Lafcadio Hearn (1896). “China and the Western World.” The Atlantic
Monthly 77(462).
7
See for example Cohen-Tanugi (2008); Delpech (2007).
that has first mortally injured the modern West. For those who contest the
dogma of Western modernity, it has often been liberalism—the main man-
ifestation of Western modernity—that has been imagined as the source of
the moral decay and weakness of the West. However, it should be remem-
bered that liberalism itself is also a contingent idea, and over time, the
concept has come to connote different things for different people.8
Oswald Spengler’s (1880–1936) conception of the Occident as a great,
yet spiritually and materially declining civilization, is a classical narrative of
the inevitable loss of Western global superiority due to internal stagnation
and decay.9 It is also one of most familiar expressions of Western hesitance
toward modernity and liberalism. Spengler—like many other prominent
German intellectuals—“denounced liberalism as a foreign philosophy and
the very antithesis of German culture.” And indeed, Spengler reserved for
Germany the role of a future leader of civilization, after the demise of the
Anglo-Saxon liberal Occident.10 Already in the late nineteenth century,
liberalism came to be seen as a mainly Anglo-American phenomena, asso-
ciated with the claims to superiority of Western civilization, but also with
“Anglo-Saxon” or “white” race. During and after the First World War,
Germany (and France) were depicted as illiberal within the English-
speaking world, and vice versa, the Germans denounced liberalism as an
Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, liberalism being “Germany’s archenemy.”11
The second half of the twentieth century was consumed by the Cold
War, and the West was predominantly associated with the transatlantic alli-
ance. From a global perspective, the Cold War era was, as Patrick Thaddeus
Jackson suggests, the real “clash of civilizations” between the “East” and
“the West.”12 It was a clash between the leading ideologies of these civili-
zations, Communism and Liberalism, taking place well before the publica-
tion of Samuel Huntington’s famed thesis depicting a handful of major
civilizations competing for territory and power.13 However, at the same
time, in the United States, alarm over totalitarianism prompted a shift in
8
See Rosenblatt (2018).
9
Spengler (1927).
10
11
Rosenblatt (2018), 253–258.
12
Jackson (2017), 93.
13
Huntington (1993), 25–26, 29.
what was understood as liberalism. From an earlier emphasis on duties and

patriotism, liberals began to underline individual rights and interests.14
Although the perceived enemy was external, another threat, namely
that of disunity, emanated from inside of the West. Already in the mid-
1960s Henry Kissinger warned that it was imperative that the two key
parts of the transatlantic West—Western Europe and the United States—
stick together to confront the external enemy.15 After the Cold War,
Kissinger’s concern materialized in the crisis narratives emerging during
the Second Iraq War, and depicting the core of the West, the transatlantic
alliance, as dissolving. Robert Kagan declared that Europe and the United
States had distanced from each other, and now represented two entirely
different universes of values—Venus and Mars. In particular, the proposi-
tion of a transatlantic rift was debated between US neoconservatives and
European liberal-leftist academics. Europeans tended to agree on the
notion of a divided West, while they also reminded that Europe was the
true cradle of Western civilization.16
A prime example of a crisis narrative antagonizing liberalism as an exis-
tential threat for the West came from the Cold War era declinist narrator
James Burnham, self-described as “a romantic conservative pessimist” and
anti-communist,17 who declared in his book Suicide of the West (1964) that
“liberalism is the ideology of western suicide.” Burnham argued that secu-
lar liberalism generated an overarching and widespread feeling of guilt
toward “wretchedness and oppression,” which translated into an obliga-
tion to do something for others. He associated this liberal guilt with uni-
versalism, relativism, materialism, and self-criticism, which then turned
into self-hatred, social and spiritual restlessness, and an endless desire for
reform. All this together made the West weak and vulnerable. The West,
Burnham claimed, was “a beleaguered civilization” to which liberalism
was an ill-suited ideology. What the West needed instead was the “pre-
liberal conviction that Western civilization, thus Western man, is both dif-
ferent from and superior in quality to other civilizations and
noncivilizations.”18
14
Rosenblatt (2018), 268–272.
15
Kissinger (1965).
16
Ikenberry (2008), 1–3; Kagan (2004); Lehti (2010).
17
Koch and Smith (2006), 8.
18
Burnham (1964), 24-6, 185, 188–203, 288.
Thus, there are certain recurring images and arguments in most, if not
all, narratives of Western crisis propagated from the nineteenth century
onwards: either the omnipresent superiority of the West is threatened by
outside forces or the authority of the West is threatened by internal forces
of moral decay, loss of self-confidence, and loss of authenticity. Liberalism
is alternately held to be the root cause of the fancied superiority of the
West and alternately its downfall. Curiously, one thing that distinguishes
present-day narratives of the West from previous incarnations, is that the
proponents of Western triumphalism—eminently visible just over a decade
ago—now appear to be few and far between. Today the crisis narratives are
espoused by scholars and commentators from all the main theoretical
approaches to international relations,19 as well as from all sides of the polit-
ical spectrum.
The West as a Civilization

The West is a constructed and contingent concept. It is highly contextual
and dynamic, with multiple voices engaged in its construction as well as in
its contestations. It is inherently pliable, and thus during its history, it has
come to embrace a wide variety of meanings and connotations.20 However,
the concept is not infinitely malleable, as the availability of accepted mean-
ings that one can invoke is necessarily limited. Thus, the different and even
contradicting representations of the West tend to draw from a common
set of discursive and cultural resources to support their claims. This makes
the West essentially a narrative concept, meaning that it exists and assumes
a form and character when it is invoked in stories about the world. Such
narratives are historically selective. They seek to create and emphasize con-
tinuity over dissonance by mapping out the West’s spatial borders and by
assigning varied functions and roles to the West. The West is therefore
profoundly grounded in grand narratives of history that are depicted by
those acting and thinking in the name of the West.
19
See for example Ferguson et al. (2017); Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. “The End of Liberal
International Order?” International Affairs 94 (1): 7–23; Jahn (2018); Kagan, Robert.
2018. The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World. New York: Alfred A. Knopf;
Mearsheimer, John. 2018. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities.
New Haven: Yale University Press; Parmar (2018); Walt, Stephen. 2017. “How Not to Fix
the Liberal World Order.” Foreign Policy, March 6. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/06/
how-not-to-fix-the-liberal-world-order/.
20
Herborth and Hellmann (2017), 1, 5; O’Hagan (2002), 8–9, 16.
One of the most persisting of the grand narratives has been the civili-
zational narrative, in which the West is invoked as a marker of “civiliza-
tion.” The world history has been habitually treated as a history of
civilization—either in singular or plural. The credits for popularizing the
meta-historical idea of civilization perhaps go to Oswald Spengler and
Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975).21 Decades later, in 1990s, for Samuel
Huntington, civilizations—identified with culture and religion—were a
driving force of global history. A focal point of this theory was to replace
Cold War bipolarity with a more profound source of global conflicts and
tensions, civilizations, which escape all efforts to be permanently solved or
obliterated.22 Such views have gained their share of acclaim, but also obvi-
ous criticism. In scholarly debate, the idea of civilizations as bounded,
coherent, consensual, and fixed entities has been rejected, and instead, it
has been argued that, like nations, civilizations are contested and are in a
constant state of flux. According to Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus
Jackson, “civilizations are better understood as ongoing processes, and in
particular, as ongoing processes through which boundaries are continually
produced and reproduced.”23 Peter Katzenstein breaks away from meta-
historical usages of civilization as an agent of history by describing civiliza-
tions as essentially multiple and multilayered.24
The roots of civilizational thinking go back to the Enlightenment era,
when both French and British thinkers and writers gradually endorsed the
new noun, civilisation, formed by adding the suffix “-ation” to the verb
civiliser.25 The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a period of
European expansion, colonialism, and of arising European bourgeois,
searching for a global role for their nations and for themselves. In this
context, civilizational thinking developed in parallel with the idea of
nationhood, and civilization became the universal framework within which
European national identities could nestle. This framework had two co-
existing and seemingly contradictory renditions: civilization as singular
and civilizations as plural. Civilization in singular was understood as a pro-
gressive evolution toward increasing sophistication and growing political
and social complexity. Civilization was an irresistible and undeviating
21
See for example Spengler (1927); Toynbee, Arnold. 1963 (1934). A Study of History.
Vol. I.: Introduction: The Geneses of Civilizations, part one. London: Oxford University Press.
22
Huntington (1996).
23
Hall and Jackson (2007), 6–8.
24
Katzenstein (2008).
25
Bowden (2009), 7–8; Lepenies (2008), 215–216; Pennanen (2015), 54–58.
process, but it was also envisioned as the predestined endpoint of history.

Thus, it was an ontological concept, giving a destination and rationale for
global history. Furthermore, it effectively made the West the sole owner of
global history; a superior agent with the power to bestow others the one
and only model of civilization.26
The narrative of multiple civilizations allowed the Europeans to draw
boundaries between themselves—as representatives of Western civiliza-
tion, which embodied modern individuality and progress—and other
communities—which were characterized by primordial stagnation and
collective obedience. Then again, the narrative of a uniform process of
civilization allowed the distinction between the representatives of this civi-
lization in singular, and others whom were designated as semi-civilized,
barbarians, and savages. The boundary drawn between the civilized and
barbarians was institutionalized during the nineteenth century through
the so-called “family of nations.” In theory, this European international
society was open to all members who fulfilled the membership require-
ments, that is, who had adopted the elusive “standard of civilization” and
acquired the identity of a member. In practice, however, for much of the
nineteenth century, only the “Western powers” were considered as civi-
lized enough to be included in the family of nations.27
In recent years, civilizational narratives have re-entered the discussion
on international order and relations, or perhaps they never left.
Civilizational thinking—particularly the idea of civilization in singular—
has constituted the core principle, and the organizing and legitimizing
practice, of global governance since the nineteenth century. The classical
“standard of civilization” and the more recent notion of “liberal peace”
are both firmly grounded in civilizational thinking. These ideas are pre-
mised on a belief in the universal applicability of “Western values” and
“Western civilization” as well as the universality of Western path to moder-
nity. Furthermore, both of them entail clear global hierarchies, built on
basis of culture (and race). In these hierarchies, the “non-western” is pre-
sented as uncivilized, backward, and undeveloped, while the West is fash-
ioned as a model, global leader, and protagonists of Civilization.28 Once a
26
Goody (2010); Ifversen (2008), 239; Mazlish (2001), 293–300; Pennanen (2015),
67–68.
27
Gong (1984), vii, 14–22; Hurrell (2007), 40–41; Pennanen (2015), 103; Suzuki
(2009), 5, 27.
28
See for example Bessis (2003), 3–5.
concept akin to the standard of civilization or liberal peace is established,

and once it is understood to constitute the underpinning for an order,
invoking the concept serves to further reinforce the legitimacy of that
order, but also implicitly the superiority of the West within it. From here,
it is rather evident that there exists a connection between civilizational
thinking and the idea of the post-Second World War Western- or US-led
After Huntington’s theory, the concept of “civilization” was revived
and reintroduced to vocabulary of international politics, and “civiliza-
tional identities and borders” again appeared significant for policymakers.
According to Gregorio Bettiza, one example of the return has been the
foreign policy discussion in the United States following the September 11
attacks, in which the Muslim world was depicted as constituting one uni-
form entity, much in the tradition and style of Orientalist discourses.29 For
Hamid Dabashi, the return of civilizational thinking within the West is a
defensive reaction, and an effort to update colonial worldview to the
twenty-first century.30 Dabashi’s postcolonial critique, however, ignores
the difference between civilization in singular and plural, and in fact, it
could be argued that civilization in singular never disappeared from
Western narratives; it has just been expressed through other notions. Yet,
since Huntington, and in particular 9/11, civilization in plural has gained
popularity in a form that reflects certain elements of colonial thinking, as
Dabashi suggests, but unlike the nineteenth-century British and US colo-
nial discourse, these newer narratives distance themselves from the idea of
a civilizing mission, and instead emphasize rivalry, tensions, and conflicts
between civilizations.
Thus, the West (or Western civilization) is depicted as an actor in inter-
national politics, an agent and endpoint of history, a protagonist of moder-
nity, and a reference point for building a global hierarchy. But perhaps
even more importantly, the West can be understood as a civilizational
identity narrative.31 The West serves as a reference point for the creation
and re-creation of both political and cultural identities. The West, as an
identity, constitutes of essentialized images, ideals, values, traditions, insti-
tutions, ways of life, and history that are believed to be the common
29
Bettiza (2015), 575–600.
30
Dabashi (2001), 361–368.
31
O’Hagan (2002), 6.
property of a “Western community” and “Western peoples.”32 For

Christopher Coker, the West is a social imaginary through which “people
imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how they
co-exist, how they meet their expectations and the deep normative notions
and images that underline these expectations.” Social imaginaries lack
“the strength of imperative” but they resonate “with an inclination, a way
of thinking that people espouse.”33 Ultimately, the West is as an invented,
“imagined community,” following Benedict Anderson’s conceptualiza-
tion34 Being imagined, however, does not mean that the West does not
have genuine meaning to people and concrete ramifications. It produces a
dual sense of belonging and exclusion, and it serves as a principle for
thinking and ordering the world. It is a tool for categorization, character-
ization, and classification.35
In essence, all civilizational narrations stand as universalizing expres-
sions that inevitably brush off and minimize the explanatory power of
other identities, such as class, gender, nationality, and culture. In Edward
Said’s view, civilizational labels therefore reflect an imperial legacy by
which a dominant (Western) culture has “eliminated the impurities and
hybrids that make up all cultures,” including their own. Accordingly, Said
has been critical of Huntington’s reification of civilizational identities,
which, he argues, have failed to “address how the histories of the West and
many Islamic nations are mutually imbricated.”36 In contrast, Said claims
that all cultures are hybrid, mixed, impure, and interdependent by nature,
something that civilizational analyses generally ignore. Nevertheless, it is
specifically this image of a uniform West that the recent narratives depict-
ing the crises of the West are revisiting and reviving—even if only to pro-
nounce that the unity and cohesion of the West is falling apart.
The West as a civilizational identity narrative provides a source of self-
esteem for actors claiming a Western heritage. As Kathleen Margaret
Heller notes, “Histories of Western civilization are often stories of heritage
meant to evoke responses of identification or counter-identification”
32
Hansen (2017), 280; Miklóssy and Korhonen (2010): ix; Morozov (2013), 7–8;
O’Hagan (2002), 2.
33
Coker (2010), 73–74.
34
O’Hagan (2002), 13; Weber (2017), 181.
35
Bonnett (2004), 6; Jouhki and Pennanen (2016), 2, 5; Herborth and Hellmann (2017),
1; Weber (2017), 181.
36
Chowdhry (2007), 110–111.
among key audiences.37 The idea of the West has (both positive and nega-
tive) emotional appeal to the extent that actors of all stripes—both insiders
and outsiders—frequently invoke the West to locate themselves in the
world. In many discourses of the West, especially those invoked by self-
proclaimed “insiders,” the key audiences are often internal to the West
itself, the goal being to seek recognition from the rest of the club for the
claims one is making about either the nature of the West, or one’s role
within the community. Thus, for insiders invoking the West can serve as a
tool for legitimizing one’s political actions. But also, such invocations can
be understood as enhancing the self-esteem and ontological security of
nations, as they endow the national community “with higher significance
by linking it to world history,” and a heritage associated with modernity,
progress, and civilization. Following Christopher Browning, Pertti
Joenniemi, and Brent Steele, a sense of ontological security (of a nation)
is then generated through vicarious identification with the Western civili-
zation.38 Being Western is portrayed as being about riding the wave of the
future, and it is in such processes that the West gains symbolic power.
Moreover, in those processes the whole imagined community of the West
fortifies its ontological security.
In Randall Collins’ terms, the privileged position of the West as a source
of self-esteem and ontological security has historically established the West
as a zone of prestige and attraction for those considered to be outside the
West or on its margins.39 For example, as Zarakol argues, for countries like
Russia, Japan, and Turkey, which used to be regarded as non-Western but
subsequently recreated themselves as “modern states,” incorporation into
(Western) international society has often been a traumatic experience as
non-Western states were stigmatized as “inferior, backward, barbaric,
effeminate, childish, despotic and in need of enlightenment.” Living in a
“semi-civilized” country became a source of shame, while modernization
and westernization became synonymous with salvation.40
Even if identification with the West provides ontological security in
some contexts, there is nothing automatic in it. Furthermore, identifica-
tion with the West can just as well become a source of anxiety and shame,
and generate ontological insecurity, when it is coupled with, for example,
37
Heller (2010).
38
Heller (2010). See also Browning et al. (manuscript).
39
Collins (2004), 132–147. See also Browning et al. (manuscript).
40
Zarakol (2010, 10, 2011).
a perceived loss of previous primacy, agency, and acclaim, or with a feeling

of guilt over what has been done in a name of the West. For Richard
Lebow, self-esteem enables agency and preserves ontological security,
while shame stands as its opposite.41 However, a feeling of shame and an
experience of anxiety can also encourage renewal and revision, and in that
way act as a prerequisite for resilient identification. Following Sara Ahmed,
“By witnessing what is shameful about the past, the nation can ‘live up to’
the ideals that secure its identity or being in the present.” Thus, it is the
absence of shame that is truly shameful. Shame itself becomes a positive
force and a resource for revisiting self-esteem and prerequisite for a revi-
sion of identification.42 Therefore, we need to elaborate on what poten-
tially constitutes a source of anxiety, how is shame and guilt experienced,
and when these constitute a crisis.
Three Current Crisis Narratives

The three decades following the end of Cold War bipolarity have already
witnessed the emergence of several crisis narratives involving the West: rise
of Asia, loss of global stature and hegemony, losing ownership to modernity
and trust in progress, and the fear of a transatlantic divide. Simultaneously,
an increasing number of people in the so-called West feel that the liberal
order is incapable of addressing such fundamental questions as climate
change or globalization. Quite the contrary, the order itself is perceived to
produce global problems, such as inequality and poverty. In addition to the
anti-globalization movement, we can detect three competing crisis narra-
tives with different social imageries: the conservative (/libertarian), populist
(right), and liberal (internationalist).43 Many of these crisis narratives draw
from earlier narratives of the West as a stagnating community, declining
global power and economic player, or decaying civilization that has lost its
authenticity, morality, and purpose. In these narratives, the present moment
is envisioned as a critical juncture in which harsh choices need to be made if
the historical agency and self-esteem of the West is to be revived. Previously,
in the more conservative and reactionary narratives, liberal was often
41
Lebow (2008), 61–67.
42
Ahmed (2004), 109; Browning et al. (manuscript).
43
Outside the “Western sphere,” we find crisis narratives such as those cherished in
Moscow and Ankara, that emphasize the ideological distance of Russia and Turkey from the
“degenerate” liberal West. See for example Chap. 10.
portrayed as the root cause of weakness and decay, and now these narratives
are repeated and reformulated by various populist and far-right movements
and politicians. As a response, the anguished liberals have rallied to preserve
the liberal norms and liberal internationalism that have prevailed since the
end of the Second World War.
In the most recent liberal narratives, the internal threats of retreating
liberalism and growing illiberalism are portrayed as a decidedly bigger
threat to the West, and more precisely, to the Western-led liberal interna-
tional order, than any external threat. And here lies a marked difference
between the earlier and recent narratives: perhaps for the first time in the
history of Western crisis narratives, liberal observers seem to have lost their
trust in the progressive ability of the liberal West to overcome its crisis and
remain the global pacemaker of modernity.
It is not that liberal pessimism has not been around, but that it has recently
entered into scholarly and popular IR discussion with a bang. Writing in
2011, G. John Ikenberry was still optimistic. The liberal order was “alive and
well,” and it had no serious competitors. It was an order capable of assimilat-
ing states with various cultural and political backgrounds, and thus, in essence,
it was a universally inclusive system. The liberal order was “not really American
or Western—even if, for historical reasons, it initially appeared that way;” it
was something much broader.44 Now, a few years later, tones are decidedly
more alarmed. Indeed, the notion that the world is living in the age of crisis
is widely shared in so-called West and politicians and scholars pinpoint vari-
ous dislocating events contesting the Western superiority and its normative
order. But what are these events and how they challenge the West differs
among the three crisis narratives. Even more importantly, it is the segments
of Europeans and Americans themselves who are calling the liberal order into
question, resisting and rejecting some of its constitutive elements. Thus, the
critical fault lines run within the West, not between the liberal democracies of
the West and authoritarian, revisionist non-Western nations.45
In the liberal narrative, the first wavering pillar of the liberal interna-
tional order is the global and local decline of representative democracy, the
universal victory of which was declared just a couple decades ago.46 World
Values Surveys indicate that the support for democracy among younger
European and US generations is on the decrease and that the citizens of
44
Ikenberry (2011), 57–58, 61, 64–65, 67–68.
45
Leonard (2017).
46
Alcaro (2018), 7; Luce (2018), 12, 121; Peterson (2018), 35.
mature democracies are becoming “more cynical about the value of

democracy as a political system, less hopeful that anything they do might
influence public policy, and more willing to express support for authoritar-
ian alternatives.”47 On the other hand, we are still living “in a democratic
era with more than half of all countries qualifying as democratic,” but
simultaneously, setbacks and autocratic tendencies are evident “in coun-
tries as diverse as Brazil, Burundi, Hungary, Russia, and Turkey.”48 Second
pillar is the trust in economic globalization. The 2008 financial crisis and
the following stagnation have cooled down the public enthusiasm for eco-
nomic integration and free trade. Luce argues that the strongest glue
holding a liberal democracy together is economic growth. However, trust
in economic globalization has not revived hand in hand with the economy.
A generation of Europeans and Americans has witnessed unemployment,
sluggish or non-existent growth in their wages, and widening income
inequality due to automation, delocalization, recession, increasing inter-
national competition, and domestic policies. At the same time, the globe’s
richest 1 per cent—majority of them citizens of the United States—has
grown richer. The middle classes of the West are then led to believe that
they are the biggest losers of the global liberal economic order, while all
the benefits accrue to elites, or the migrants and other “undeserv-
ing poor”.49
Low trust in the economic elite has been combined with a low trust in
the political elite and political institutions. Concurrently, order has broken
down in, for example, Syria and Iraq, resulting in refugee flows heading
toward the European Union. The EU has proved to be institutionally ill-
prepared to cope with the challenge, and to make matters worse, the refu-
gee crisis has come to be fused with terrorism. If, as Beate Jahn explains,
the liberal order has previously needed the external Other as an object to
be modernized as well as a resource to be utilized; the refugee crisis has
shown that the external, non-Western, Other is no longer perceived as a
promise for progress and wealth, but as a threat.50 The resentment and
misgivings about the capabilities of European political leaders to handle
the situation has been channeled into nationalist-populist movements,
47
Foa and Mounk (2016), 6–8.
48
Lührmann and Lindberg (2018), 1.2.
49
Alcaro (2018), 8; Norrlof (2018), 64; Luce (2018), 12–13, 71; Stokes (2018), 145–l46;
Wright (2017), x.
50
Jahn (2018), 59–60.
challenging the fundamental values and principles underpinning the order,

such as free trade, tolerance, and open societies. The mainly right-wing
populist movements of Europe, together with the conservative-populist
movement of the United States, can be considered as a reassertion of the
will of the people over the “corrupt” elites.51 Yet, such “illiberal demo-
cratic response to undemocratic liberalism” may eventually lead to democ-
racy being used to establish and consolidate authoritarian or
semi-authoritarian rule.52 These trends materialized in two of the biggest
seismic shocks of the 2016: Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as
the President of the United States.
Taken all together, these developments sum up into what Mark Leonard
characterizes as “the West … rejecting the order that it created.”53 Or,
indeed, the West contesting its own self-esteem. Thus, in this prevailing
liberal—or liberal internationalist—narrative, which has multiple authors,
the crises of the liberal are mainly located in the West and they constitute
much of the crisis of the international order. Rosenblatt discerns a wide-
spread belief that liberalism is suffering from a crisis of confidence, and if
only “liberals would clarify what liberalism stands for and have courage to
defend their creed,” the crisis would be resolved.54 Similarly, Jeff D. Colgan
and Robert O. Keohane call for people to defend the liberal international
order, to “push for policies that can save the liberal order before it is too
late.”55 Liberal narrators widely share an understanding that there are no
preferable alternatives to current liberal internationalism. As Ikenberry,
Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes write, criticism of the current order is
easy, but in practice, the “menu options are thin.” According to them, if it
is not the West who will carry the project forward, then perhaps no one
will.56 However, it is reasonable to ask whether this is more a weighed
conclusion reached through scholarly analysis or rather a cry to arms to
defend the prevailing state affairs.
The right-wing populist crisis narratives, emanating most prominently
from politicians and political commentators, have tapped onto this liberal
crisis narrative and blended it with the storyline of Western civilization
51
Alcaro (2018), 7–8; Luce (2018), 120, 138; Peterson (2018), 37; Wright (2017),
54–55.
52
Mudde (2015).
53
Leonard (2017).
54
55
Colgan and Keohane (2017).
56
Ikenberry et al. (2018), 2.
being in jeopardy as well as with the Huntingtonian clash of the civiliza-

tions myth. One of the most visible expressions of the narrative was culti-
vated in the United States by Trump supporters during the 2016
presidential campaign. For example, the conservative commentator Ann
Coulter, at the time a vocal Trump supporter and author of books such as
In Trump We Trust: E Pluribus Awesome! and Demonic: How the Liberal
Mob is Endangering America, declared dramatically in a video published
by Breitbart media that “this election will determine the survival of
Western civilization. And it is because of cultures, and demographics.”57
Also European right-wing populists utilize the narrative of crisis of Western
civilization and often add to the mix theories like clash of civilizations and
dystopias like “Eurabia.” They champion “Western and democratic values
as a way of countering Islam,” and in this manner they strive “for legiti-
macy by inoculating [themselves] from accusations of racism and xeno-
phobia, while pursuing [their] ultimate quest for ethnic homogeneity.”58
Inflowing migrants and refugees are presented as a source of fatal exis-
tential threat as they represent non-Western civilizations that are not—and
cannot be—integrated and assimilated into a Western society. One of the
most recent examples has been the insistence of Viktor Orbán, the Premier
of Hungary, that Islamization is a grave threat to Europe.59 In the right-
wing populist narrative, the inflow of Muslims and other non-Western
peoples is a real and local menace, not just symbolic and global. A real war
is going on and what is at stake is the survival of Western civilization.
There is a significant emotional load in this narrative, a feeling that
Westerners are living on edge and if they fail to stay vigilant, they will per-
ish. Ultimately, this feeling and narrative is conducive for the adoption of
violence as an acceptable form of political action, occasionally carried even
to very extreme forms, as in Christchurch, New Zealand (2019), and
Utøya, Norway (2011). Even though all the current crisis narratives
describe the present as an extraordinary moment, in which the peoples
and governments of the West need to make decisions on what kind of
57
“Coulter: Election ‘Will Determine Survival of Western Civilization.” 2016. Breitbart,
October 6. http://www.breitbart.com/video/2016/10/06/coulter-election-will-deter-
mine-survival-western-civilization/. See also Müller, Jan-Werner. 2017. “Donald Trump’s
use of the term ‘the people’ is a warning sign.” The Guardian, January 24. https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/24/donald-trumps-warning-sign-populism-
authoritarianism-inauguration.
58
Zúquete (2017), 109–110, 116.
59
See for example Boffey (2018).
future they are choosing, it is the populist narratives that contain an apoca-
lyptic moment in its barest form, which justifies the usage of
extraordinary means.
The right-wing populist voices are heterogeneous, varying from US
media outlets such as Fox News and Breitbart to “new right” parties in
Europe. Usually they are pro-democracy, but decidedly against liberal
internationalism and globalization, for these are believed to form the core
of the crisis. They especially clamor for immigration control, more effec-
tive enforcement of order, and weeding out crime. For now, it seems that
these voices might make more noise than the numbers of anti-liberalists
would suggest. However, one interesting finding is that in Europe these
voices present “a radicalization of mainstream attitudes and concerns,”
that is, there is a vast amount of potential voters, who are concerned about
the same issues as the far-right-wing parties, but who are not voting for
them, at least not yet.60 Of course, there is no knowing how far and wide
these voices and the right-wing populist narrative will resonate in the
future, but what is clear is that the liberals have singled them out as the
main impediment for the continuation and support for liberal internation-
alism and comprehend them as a cause for existential “threat.” Of course,
this invites a question whether the populist challenge actually constitutes
a threat to the liberal international order, or is antagonizing the right-
wing populists and singling them out as the foe of the order a strategy to
preserve the stability and former glory of the order? And furthermore, if
there exists an internal illiberal threat, is it resolvable or has the order lost
its power to integrate and accommodate plurality and variety of visions?
Like the liberal and right-wing populist narratives, also conservative (/
libertarian) ones are multiple. Some of them argue that Western economy
has stagnated and that the West is irrevocably losing its superiority, some
of them focus on the passing away of Western leadership in the global
order, and some of them depict the decay of liberal norms as a source of
crisis. Many of these crisis narratives set off from the defense of liberal
norms as the essence of the West, but for them “liberal” does not necessarily
mean the same things as for liberal internationalists. Kupchan, for exam-
ple, identifies the West with liberal democracy, industrial capitalism, and
secular nationalism, and thus he anchors the West firmly to the modernist
tradition.61 Bruckner provides a similar definition, asserting that “hatred
60
Ignazi (2017), 329; Jahn (2018), 59; Mudde (2017, 613–615, 2018).
61
Kupchan (2012), 7.
of the West is still hatred of human rights and democracy,” and thus he
pairs the West to the norms of liberal peace.62 In contrast, for Moyo,
democracy appears more as source of economic stagnation than a solution,
because it sets barriers for dynamism and for the radical reforms needed to
rescue the West.63 Ferguson, on the other hand, views democracy and rule
of law as lying at the heart of Western (civilizational) particularity. Yet,
rather than searching for a solution to the crises of the West from democ-
racy, Ferguson turns to the classical libertarian ideals of deconstructing
state regulation and effectively rejects humanitarian liberalism.64 Self-
identifying himself as a “classical liberal,” Ferguson appears not to extend
his support to the liberal international order. An invited contender at the
2017 Munk Debate on the topic: “Is this the End of the Liberal
International Order,” he concluded that the liberal international order is
beyond saving, and in fact, the order had hardly ever existed in the
first place.65
Interestingly, though the modernist tradition usually emphasizes the
universal applicability of Western norms and practices and offers the “non-
West” the option to follow “the path to modernity,” the conservative nar-
rators have instead adopted the multiple modernities perspective, to utilize
Shmuel Eisenstadt’s term69—that is, a discovery of a world in which states
pursue different paths to development. Moreover, they tend to see liberal
as something exclusive to the West, as something inherited rather than as
acquired. Charles Kupchan points out that “the rest” are “developing ver-
sions of modernity divergent from the West’s,” and thus the Western
model is no longer the only path to modernity, prosperity, and security. In
fact, the pluralistic Western system is probably not even the most efficient
path to prosperity and security in the new global setting, as it appears that
centralized states fare better in coping “with a fast, interdependent, and
porous world.” Autocracies, such as China, have indeed succeeded in
combining economic success with an illiberal political order.66 The adop-
tion of modern technology, global economy, consumerism, or global sci-
entific norms has not been necessarily followed by the adoption of, for
example, liberal norms. As Pascal Bruckner notes, the world has modern-
62
Bruckner (2010), 37.
63
Moyo (2011). See also King, Stephen D. 2017. Grave New World. The End of
Globalization, the Return of History. New Haven: Yale University Press.
64
Ferguson (2011); Ferguson (2014), 11, 24–25, 40, 54–62, 133–138.
65
Ferguson et al. (2017), 6–10.
66
Kupchan (2012), 89–92.
ized itself, but not Westernized.67 Similarly, Niall Ferguson infers that the
world can never be fully transformed into Western, or liberal.68 Such state-
ments appear to refute the idea of universal West and fall back on the idea
of the West as particular and the sole proprietor of liberal ideals.
Martin Jacques argues that “the West is no longer the exclusive home
of modernity, with the rest of the world cast in a state of pre-modernity.”
Jacques continues by noting that while Europe is losing faith in the mod-
ern project, at the same time a new, different form of modernity has
emerged in East Asia. A new era of contested modernity is therefore inevi-
table69. Jacques claims that this era will be characterized by “an overarch-
ing cultural contest” in which: “the histories, cultures and values of these
societies will be affirmed in a new way and can no longer be equated with
backwardness or, worse still, failure. On the contrary, they will experience
a new sense of legitimacy and, far from being overawed by or deferential
towards the West, will enjoy a growing sense of self-confidence.”70
Such crisis narratives are further supported by global power shifts: the
so-called “rise of the rest,” and rise of China in particular. These have
sparked predictions of hardships for Europe, as in the debates revolving
around the economic dynamic of the rising Asian powers. The prognosis
is that not only is European economic power diminishing, but its innova-
tiveness and vitality are slowly decaying.71 There is also a visible tendency
to interpret the Western decline as inevitable over the longer term. This
decline is perceived to go hand in hand with the decline of the liberal
democratic order, de-Americanization, and emergence of a multipo-
lar world.72
Accordingly, Kupchan has argued that, unlike in the past when the
West was predominant and at “the leading edge of history,” future global
order is unlikely to be dominated by any one state or civilization. Kupchan
suggests that the West should give up the belief in liberal democracy as the
only legitimate form of governance and give up the practice of denounc-
ing as illegitimate those governments that divert from the Western model.
The rising rest, he argues, will challenge Western superiority economically
67
Bruckner (2010), 36–37.
68
Ferguson (2011), 37–38.
69
See Multiple Modernities. 2002. Ed. S. N. Eisenstadt. New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers.
70
Jacques (2009), 140–150. See also Moyo (2011), 3; Ferguson (2014), 1–2.
71
See Cohen-Tanugi (2008); Delpech (2007).
72
Cohen-Tanugi (2008).
and militarily. Moreover, the rising powers will want to set their own rules
of international order.73 That countries such as China should “fail” to
democratize and socialize into the Western-led liberal international order
and instead turn into “revisionist powers,” has been a prospect haunting
the advocates of that order.74
The West is suddenly perceived to lose its primacy, even agency. There
is a painful realization that “A World Without the West”75 is possible, per-
haps even probable, which has prompted calls for the West to take back
control. Accordingly, in 2008 Ikenberry appealed to the United States to
revive and strengthen the Western system and accommodate China into
the Western order, before it is too late.76 Kagan, on the other hand, pro-
posed that as an antidote against capitalist autocracies, the Western gov-
ernments should establish “a global concert or league of democracies” to
protect their interests and defend their principles.77 The discovery of mul-
tiple modernities and changing global power positions lie underneath the
three types of recent crisis narratives, yet they provide only a backdrop. As
we will see, in these crisis narratives, the meanings of the West are being
defined and redefined, exalted and criticized. In the narratives, the present
moment of crisis is alternately envisioned as a risk to liberalism, liberal
international order, and the West; and alternately as a golden opportunity
to revisit “liberal” or liberal international order and “Western” self-esteem.
Kupchan proposes that to slow down and reverse its declining position
in the world order, the West needs to capitalize on its uniqueness, recover
its sense of cohesion, and reinvigorate its politics and economy. For
Kupchan, Western revival is vital for the whole world, for only the West
has the ability to guide and control the ongoing global transition of power
and order.78 If the West fails to take a lead in anchoring the transition to a
post-Western world, the threats of disorder and great power rivalries
loom large.
In the 1960s, Henry Kissinger argued that the West’s ability to rein-
force its self-esteem was closely connected to its ability to remain “dynamic,
creative and vital,” an ideal and model to be imitated—despite “all the
73
Kupchan (2012), 3–5, 87.
74
Weber (2017), 183–185.
75
Barma et al. (2007).
76
Ikenberry (2008), 23–25, 37.
77
Kagan (2008), 97.
78
Kupchan (2012), 146, 150, 183, 187–190.
wrongs it committed.”79 In contrast with this classical, modernist view,

what Bruckner as well as Kupchan, Martin Jacques, Robert Koch, Chris
Smith, and Ferguson effectively argue is that the West needs an attentive
Western audience.80 They view the indifference and loss of self-esteem
among the Western audience as the main cause of the decay of the West.
They would wish to reaffirm the West’s role as a major actor in the world,
an owner of both history and future. But unlike in many earlier visions,
they tend to believe that the West does not need to modernize or appeal
to non-Western others to legitimize its superiority. The social imagery of
the world appears as civilizations in plural, in which struggle among civili-
zations is a state of normalcy.
What all these narratives do is that they struggle over the meaning of
the West and engage in a debate on what is the relationship between the
West and liberal. The current sense of crisis has provided an opportunity
for a variety of political actors to contest liberal ideas, norms, and order, to
reinterpret them, and to present alternative visions to replace them—
thereof adding up to the liberals’ perception of crisis. Next, we will turn to
the question, how and why these “crisis” narratives constitute what is
“the West.”
The Constituting Power of Crisis

“Crisis is an omnipresent sign in almost all forms of narrative today,” Janet
Roitman notes,81 and, indeed, this omnipresence of crisis-talk can be
regarded as a feature of Western modernity.82 Already in nineteenth cen-
tury but particularly since the twentieth century, the declaration that we
are living in the midst of crisis has become commonplace in all walks of
life. And yet, crisis-talk has not entirely lost its drama and power to signify
the present as an extraordinary moment. The term may have been inflated
in media usage, but when it is used by prominent politicians or academics
it is still often taken seriously, especially if the notion of crisis becomes
widely disseminated in the society. It is not so much a question of the
authority and formal position of the speaker, but a question of how cred-
79
Kissinger (1965), 250.
80
See Bruckner (2010); Kupchan (2012); Jacques (2009); Koch and Smith (2006);
Ferguson (2011).
81
Roitman (2011).
82
We do not claim that crisis narratives do not abound in other times and places.
ibly crisis is presented and how it resonates with wider economic, political,
and societal trends.
Yet, even though crisis-talk is presented as intrinsic to (Western) moder-
nity, the concept remains undertheorized in international relations litera-
ture. In international political analysis, international crises follow each
other, and there is little in-depth analysis of the significance or nature of
crisis. “Crisis” is often presented as an undisputable description of a cer-
tain event or phenomenon and as a synonym to “conflict.” In recent years,
“crisis” has been in prolific use among IR scholars especially in two con-
secutive connotations: the global financial crisis and the crisis of Western-
led liberal order. As we have seen in this chapter, much of this discussion
has concentrated on the questions whether there is a crisis, and if so, what
are its causes and effects, and finally, should the crisis be resolved and how?
Only few studies concentrate on the concept and idea of crisis. These
include, for example, the 1970s and 1980s studies that adopted a behav-
iorist approach to crisis and investigated how crisis and crisis behavior
could be managed.83
More profound debates about “crisis” have taken place in the fields of
conceptual history and sociology. For sociologists, this question has been
attached to theories about the essence of (Western) modernity. Jürgen
Habermas, for example, considered crisis as a permanent feature of moder-
nity. Following Habermas, modernity has made a distinction between
morality (conscience) and politics (the state). In other words, morality has
become excluded from politics, and it is crisis-talk that can once again
facilitate moral claims over politics. Systemic theorists like Talcott Parsons
and Niklas Luhmann, on the other hand, have concentrated on the rela-
tion of a systemic crisis and the systemic differentiation in a modern soci-
ety. Parsons wrote about Western cultural malaise and how the West is, in
a long-term perspective, “loosening [its] cultural and political grip over
the remainder of the globe” and how “the cutting edge of modernity may
have moved elsewhere.”84 In other words, sociology has grappled for a
long time with the same questions as the current crisis narratives.
Reinhart Koselleck, Michaela Richter, and Janet Roitman focus on cri-
sis narratives and the usage of crisis metaphor. For them, “crisis” is primar-
ily a historico-political concept. During and after the French Revolution,
the modern understanding of “crisis” departed from its original medieval
83
See Phillips and Rimkunas (1978); Brecher and Wilkefield (1982).
84
Holton (1987), 508, 511–517.
religious connotation and ancient Greek medical connotation.85 The

modern understanding is that crisis is a breakdown, pathology, and a dra-
matic deviation from social and political normalcy. It is often, though not
always, experienced as something unacceptable. This unacceptability calls
for a reaction and solution. Robert J. Holton explains that an immanent
perspective presupposes the idea that crisis is not a permanent state and that
its resolution is possible through social analysis of the causes of the crisis
and the conditions for its resolution. On the other hand, a transcendental
deployment of the crisis metaphor sets crisis pathologies “within a more
utopian politics calling for thorough-going change in the social totality.”86
Crisis is a multilayered and ambiguous concept with narrative power to
signify and judge history, and to mark the present as an exceptional
moment. It has “metaphorical flexibility,” that is, it can be manipulated to
create an “inherent demand for decisions and choices,” which explains
why crisis has become “a central catchword (Schlagwort)” and why crisis-
talk has become so popular.87 Koselleck and Richter explain that
Not only can “crisis” be conjoined with other terms, it is easy to do so.
While it can be used to clarify, all such coinages then require clarification.
“Crisis” is often used interchangeably with “unrest,” “conflict,” “revolu-
tion,” and to describe vaguely disturbing moods or situations. Every one of
such uses is ambivalent. Indeed, “this lack of clarity is often welcome, since
it makes it possible to keep open what it may mean in the future.”88
Crisis-talk involves criticism, a “judgement of the validity of institu-

tions and concepts themselves.” Narrative construction of “crisis” marks a
“moment of truth” from which it is possible to judge “history,” and
indeed, “the very etymology of the term speaks to the requirement of
judgement.”89 Holton notes that the “use of crisis metaphor in social criti-
cism” directs our attention to what is considered as normal and unprob-
lematic, and what is then called into question. And thus, it assists us in
conceptualizing “social change as a discontinuous process in both time
and space.”90
85
See Koselleck and Richter (2006); Roitman (2011).
86
Holton 1987, 504.
87
Koselleck and Richter (2006), 358, 367; Roitman (2011).
88
Koselleck and Richter (2006), 399.
89
Roitman (2011).
90
Holton (1987), 505.
Above all crisis is “a non-locus from which one claims access to history
and knowledge of history.” As Roitman writes “crisis is a criterion for what
counts as ‘history’ and is a means of signifying change.” Therefore, it is
justifiable to argue that “crisis marks history and crisis generates history.”
Crisis declares a putative temporal situation, or a “unique, immanent tran-
sition phase,” that requires knowledge of both the past and the future
which “is fundamentally open.” As crisis indicates and intensifies “the end
of an epoch,” it is also associated with temporalization of Last Judgment
and Apocalypse. This seems to be the case when “crisis-talk” includes
moral judgment and is implicitly directed toward a normative basis of
the prevailing socio-political system.91
Parmar notes that in the hegemonic liberal discourse “crises and chal-
lenges” tend to be “explained as resolvable within the system’s governing
principles through socialization, integration and assimilation.”92 The per-
spective has been immanent, but in the recent narratives of crisis of the
Western-led liberal order the perspective tends to shift toward crisis
pathology, and they are thus related more with the earlier narrations of
decaying Western civilization. What used to be two distinct and parallel
narratives of the decay of the liberal West and its normative basis on the
one hand, and narratives of a transatlantic rift or decreasing authority of
the West within the global order on the other, seem now to be merging.
All three current crisis narratives—the liberal, conservative, and (right-
wing) populist—appear to perceive crisis in terms of the normative basis of
the liberal order, the future of that order, and the future of the West as the
protagonist of that order. They also involve the ideas of the West as a civi-
lizational and identity marker. Interestingly, much of the current crisis-talk
emphasizes existential threats rather than portrays the crisis as a resolvable
challenge.
This conclusion does not implicate that there is a crisis of the liberal
West or the Western-led liberal international order. Indeed, from a narra-
tive perspective, crisis and non-crisis are not empirically observable phe-
nomena. Empirical observations of phenomena like alienation, loss of
meaning, or downsides of globalization are not observations about the
existence of a crisis; rather, it is the “crisis narrative” that produces the
meaning of these observations. As Roitman notes, crisis can be compre-
hended as “a logical observation that generates meaning in a self-referential
91
Roitman (2011).
92
Parmar (2018), 155.
system, or a non-locus from which to signify contingency and paradox.”93

Applying Luhmann’s theory, Roitman describes “crisis” as “an enabling
blind spot for production of knowledge” that “allows certain questions to
be asked while others are foreclosed.” This enabling blind spot implies
how “what was once perfectly intelligible and construed as productive is
now taken to be without basis and construed as a negative value form.”94
The way in which Chiara Bottici and Benoit Challand conceptualize the
Huntingtonian “clash of civilization” not as a theory but a political myth,
reflects well the logic of an enabling blind spot. According to Bottici and
Challand, the Huntingtonian vision should not be taken as a representa-
tion of the real world, but rather as a political myth that is empirically
unverifiable. This myth constitutes a framework through which people
interpret individual events and give meaning to them. Thus, the myth
becomes self-realizing and it offers legitimization for counter-reaction.95
Similarly, the narratives of the crisis and decline of the liberal West are best
understood as frames for making sense of global order and should be
regarded as a self-constituting political myth akin to the “clash of civiliza-
tions” narrative. Crisis narratives, like any political myth, offer a cognitive
scheme or prism through which individual events are interpreted, and they
also offer guidelines for planning and anticipating horizons for various
(political and economic) decisions. Therefore, when particular events,
such as the European refugee crisis or the success of populist movements,
are signified through “crisis” as a pathological breakdown of the West, the
existence of “crisis” appears to be confirmed. In other words, crisis has a
constituting power to coalesce various singular experiences into a political
prognosis.
The relevant question then is how crisis-talk wields this constitutive
power and how the usage of crisis-talk constitutes (political) agency. The
narrative power of crisis-talk is in its ability to become a widely spread and
accepted, politically and socially constituting and enabling discourse, and
a blind spot for knowledge. One can make a distinction between (a) the
dissemination and attractiveness of crisis-talk, and (b) how narratives as
discursive acts constitute and deconstruct agency and identities. To study
the first requires empirical observation of the society in general and to
study the latter, one needs to focus more on particular narratives, or clus-
93
Roitman (2011).
94
Roitman (2011, 2013), 39.
95
Bottici and Challand (2012), 2–4.
ters of narratives. In both respects, Habermas’ definition that “only when

members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for contin-
ued existence and feel their social identity threatened can we speak of
crisis,”96 assists in the development of a pragmatic research agenda. In this
regard, we can start from Riccardo Alcaro’s claim that “the notion that we
are experiencing a change in times whereby an old ‘order’ of the world is
giving way to a new era has been gaining legitimacy in international
debates among experts, policymakers and practitioners.”97 But as we have
noted, in fact, these experiences are not one but many, so the next step is
to find out how the experiences differ from each other.
Jörg Kustermans and Erik Ringmar argue that, historically, modernist
narratives of continual progress, prosperity, and peace have often had stul-
tifying effects on the public, generating a sense of boredom and purpose-
lessness. In some cases, the narrative of perpetual advancement and
betterment can also be alienating, if it does not endow any meaning for life
and agency. Thus, according to Kustermans and Ringmar, a conflict or a
war may be a welcome chance for people to restore the experience of
meaningful agency and a sense of being part of great historical events.98 In
this respect, fantasies of decline seem to offer the required counter-image
to triumphalist Western narratives of modernity by depicting a drama of
struggle, conflict, and recovery to evoke strong emotions. Further, the
heroic narrative of (violent) defense of a declining civilization may revive a
sense of agency. This could explain why declinist narratives gained wide-
spread popularity after the great catastrophic events of the twentieth cen-
tury: the world wars, and again in the twenty-first century era of
(overshooting) globalization.
Considering experience of crisis as an elementary part of the crisis nar-
rative itself, the focus is not only on personified emotional experiences,
but on the question how in the crises narratives the “crisis” is experienced
as a source for an existential or ontological security or insecurity, and how
the narratives build or contest self-esteem, shame, identity, and agency.
According to Anthony Giddens, to preserve ontological security, one
requires an ongoing big narrative that incorporates a story about the self
and past experiences. This narrative, then, contributes to identity-building
96
Holton (1987), 506.
97
Alcaro (2018), 1.
98
Kustermans and Ringmar (2011), 1777, 1790–1792.
and self-esteem.99 Jennifer Mitzen, on the other hand, associates self-

esteem and ontological security with routinized practices. Mitzen argues
that a prerequisite for being an ontologically secure agent is to act through
routinized practices in a stable cognitive environment. Conversely, a dis-
ruption in these routinized practices generates ontological insecurity.100
Brent Steele adds that there needs to be coherence between the identity,
great narrative, and actions undertaken by the agent. If actions are not in
accordance with values and principles of the agent, the result is shame,
which could lead to revisions of identity.101 Thus, the traditional approaches
to ontological security emphasize the necessity to maintain (strong) iden-
tity and/or routines. More recently, scholars like Trine Flockhart,
Browning, and Joenniemi102 have instead underlined the ability to cope
with change and disruption as a source of ontological security. However,
rather than excluding each other, these two approaches appear
complementary.
From the point of view of the second approach, ontological security
may be thought of as an identification process that is by essence reflective
and continuously seeking to maintain a sense of “self” through “being”
and “doing” in a changing environment. Flockhart notes “how reflexivity
towards identity within a constantly changing world requires continuous
processes of identification and narrating the influence of ‘dislocating
events’ that often compel agents to undertake action or to change their
practice and to reflect on how events and actions impact established iden-
tification and narrative processes.”103 Flockhart thus departs from the pre-
supposition that life is only about routinized activities; instead, what one
needs is the ability to cope with inevitable change. Thus, it is the ability or
inability to cope with dislocating events that constitutes the source for
ontological (in)security.
If we understand “crisis-talk” as a power to mark and signify a “dislo-
cating and de-stabilizing moment of transition,” we should then ask
whether a particular narrative can simultaneously imagine a pathological
breakdown and a way to cope with such a fundamentally dislocating
event—a source of ontological security and insecurity. Crisis, then, is not
99
Giddens (1991), 47. See also Flockhart (2016), 802–803.
100
Mitzen (2005), 2702–2785.
101
Steele (2008), 2–3, 7.
102
See Browning et al. (manuscript).
103
Flockhart (2016), 799–820.
a dislocating event as such, but a position or a blind spot through which

particular dislocating events gain significance, are embedded into a single
narrative, and which also allows one to make a judgment of an epochal
change. From this perspective, the question is how particular events are
embedded in “crisis” and does “crisis” eventually provide reflexivity that
re-constitutes agency and self-esteem or does it instead generate inflexibil-
ity toward change and reform.
Here, also the question of how an experience of shame is manifested in
crisis-talk becomes essential. Shame can explain away uncertainty and
replace it with performative certainty, it can provide a motivation for revi-
sion, but just as well, it can incite a furious defense of the prevailing moral
standing. If we consider the West as a civilizational identification and its
association with either pride or shame, we find that it has been mutable
and inconsistent: at one moment it has constituted a source of pride over
Western modernity, while at the next moment the pride has turned into
anxiety and shame over the consequences of the Western modernity for
the non-Western world. Related to this, a second distinguishable element
in the recent crisis narratives is the existence or non-existence of an antag-
onized Other. When shame is attached to this antagonized Other, and
feelings of guilt externalized, it helps to maintain the stability of one’s
identity and routines. The risk is, however, that shame then becomes a
source of stagnation and precludes the ability to cope with disruption and
change. On the other hand, when shame is internalized, it opens up the
possibility for renewal, but only when coupled with the ability to cope
with dislocating events and the duality between trust in the liberal project
and guilt over its shortcomings.
The Crises of Liberal

The liberal West used to represent a grand narrative of global ordering
that built ontological security through maintaining routinized practices
and hierarchies. In a changing environment, with an increasing number of
dislocating events (challenges from both within and outside), the narrative
of the liberal West is seriously tested, and it is not clear how the ontologi-
cal security provided by the idea of the West can be revived—or whether
it even should be revived. A reference to “crisis” may signify both an abil-
ity and inability to cope with dislocating events, it may be both a source
for renewal and loss of self-esteem, and both a source for recovering dig-
nity and uncovering shame. Given the Western claims to pre-eminence
and agency of history, shame could result from a sense that the West is
failing to live up to its heritage and past achievements, and then, shame
could translate into ontological insecurity. There is a hint of this shame
shared in all three current crisis narratives, but otherwise, the narra-
tives have certain fundamental differences.
Crisis is something experienced, perceived, and narrated rather than
empirically verifiable. Therefore, rather than measuring crisis itself, we
compare the three recent crisis narratives by introducing six variables:
How the perception of crisis (1) generates anxiety, (2) (de)constructs self-
esteem, (3) internalizes/externalizes feelings of shame, and (4) creates an
antagonized Other. In addition, (5) how crisis is interpreted, and (6) what
is the temporal positioning of an ideal world (see Table 3.1). The percep-
tion of crisis generates anxiety, a fear that something will be lost, but what
precisely is in danger, varies in different crisis narratives, and thus forms
our first variable. The second variable focuses on the relation between
crisis and self-esteem, that is, whether crisis provides an opportunity for
revisiting and strengthening self-esteem, or whether it forms a threat to it.
Third and fourth variables concern the perceived source of shame and
whether that shame is internalized or attributed to an antagonized Other.
Table 3.1 Three crisis narratives

Conservative (Right-wing) Liberal (Internationalist)
(/Libertarian) Populist
Anxiety Loss of global hegemony Loss of Western Loss of the liberal order
culture/civilization
Self-esteem Revisiting ontological Strengthening Generating
security ontological security ontological insecurity
Shame Internalized shame Externalized shame Externalized shame
Antagonized (External Other: rising External Other: Internal Other:
Other and challenging powers) immigrants; illiberalism and right-
Internal Other: wing populists
liberals
Crisis Crisis as necessary for Crisis as the new Crisis as an existential
revision of hegemony normalcy threat for liberal values
and order
Time Revisionist: past as a Nostalgic: past the Presentism: present the
(change) model for a new best of possible best of possible worlds
revisioned world in the worlds
future
The fifth variable, the question whether one understands crisis as an exis-
tential threat, constancy, or opportunity, is interrelated with the sixth:
whether this vision of the end of an epoch is translated into an ability or
desire to dream of an alternative. As Roitman explains, crisis-talk can pro-
duce a “hope that the world could be otherwise” and, indeed, it is a dream
that is needed “if politics is the place for passage from imagination to
history.”104 The crisis narratives containing a promise for an alternative
order can then be distinguished by three temporalities: past, future, and
the present, depending on how the alternative order is situated temporally.
For liberals, the crisis concerns above all the liberal international order.
This sense of crisis overshadows any opportunities to envision the liberal
order anew and situate it as a new alternative in the future. Instead, liberal
narratives suggest minor reforms and fixes to the current liberal interna-
tional order,105 but otherwise they cherish and exalt the order that until
now has continued to prevail. Especially when it comes to the internal
challenges of illiberalism and populism, crisis does not appear as an epochal
moment for renewal of the liberal order, but as a moment to treasure the
institutions, ideals, and norms that for decades have been criticized, even
by the liberals themselves. The present moment is the best of possible
worlds, even if it is a world of crisis. Furthermore, the challenge of
illiberality translates into an experience of shame, as it appears that the
West is not able to stay true to its values and norms because of the emer-
gence of an internal antagonized Other—illiberalism and right-wing pop-
ulism. To add to the sense of shame, the liberal order appears to be
incapable of accommodating and assimilating this internal threat. All in
all, it is a narrative generating ontological insecurity.
In contrast with the liberal narrative, the right-wing populist narratives
declare an apocalyptic moment and offer an enabling blind spot with
which to signify all particular events. Thus, these narratives also give mean-
ing and agency through the storyline of heroic resistance against the exter-
nal antagonized Other: immigrants, who threaten the Western civilization;
and the internal antagonized Other: the liberals, who have betrayed the
104
Roitman (2011).
105
For example, Fareed Zakaria’s suggestion to restrict immigration (Ferguson et al. 2017,
22), Carla Norrlof’s notion that domestic policies could be updated to keep up with the
economic globalization and to promote equal distribution of wealth (Norrlof 2018, 77), and
Thomas Wright’s proposition that the United States should safeguard the order through
“responsible competition,” that is, competing with economic rather than military weapons
(Wright 2017, 188–191).
West. The moment of crisis and the struggle for the West becomes a new
source of identification, and thus a source for ontological security. While
the populists perceive an almost mythical alternative of pure and homog-
enous Western civilization existing in the past, they do not appear to hold
out an alternative for the future or hope for renewal. Rather, the con-
flict and crisis is continuous. Imagining a constant “crisis,” embedded
with violent imagery, serves as a source of self-esteem and hence also of
ontological security.
Conservative (and libertarian) narratives picture an alternative that is
temporally situated in the past, in the glorious days of the superior West,
but they also entertain the possibility that this alternative could be envi-
sioned anew and projected into the future: a new (liberal) West within a
non-liberal global order. While the liberal narratives tend to look back to
the post-Second World War era, the conservative narratives look back to
the West as a protagonist of modernity. This rhetorical move enables the
conservatives to praise the relative superiority of the West, and to extend
this claim also into the future. What appears as a nostalgic gaze into the
past is effectively utilized for envisioning renewed Western leadership in
the world of multiple modernities or of civilizations in plural. This is
believed to be possible, if just the right choices are made in this extraordi-
nary moment of crisis. As Kupchan, for example, insists, the West pos-
sesses the ability to guide and “anchor” the global transition in an orderly
way toward a post-Western world order, but first, it needs to reinvigorate
itself by recovering its sense of cohesion and its political and economic
vitality.106 In this regard, “crisis” constitutes an authority to judge history,
but it is also an enabling blind spot that is easy to replicate and dissemi-
nate, since the crisis narrative offers a meta-historical frame to explain and
justify particular politico-economic demands and decisions as necessary
and crucial. The vision of future primacy and unity also provides a sense of
ontological security, which in the present moment of crisis is wavering.
What these three crisis narratives show is that although scholars have
declared the death of the West repeatedly for over a century, it seems that
even at this point we are not yet invited to attend its funeral. As an idea
and concept, the West still appears to be very much needed in discourses
on global order, hierarchies, politics, and identity, and it may be that
intense crisis-talk only makes the West more vital as a marker of identity.
Such re-identification may strengthen, preserve, or contest ontological
106
Kupchan (2012), 146, 150, 166, 183; see also Bruckner (2010), 217–218.
security of the actors claiming to be part of the West, or outside of it. What
is noteworthy is that unifying civilizational imageries and identity narra-
tives seem almost as universal at the moment and the voices contesting the
straight-jacket of civilizational uniformity appear muted. Besides having a
great significance for (civilizational) identification, the crisis narratives
have a bearing on the legitimacy of Western-led global order. Moreover,
the multiple crisis narratives engage in political struggles over the liberal
and the West and provide building blocks for self-esteem and a source of
ontological security in the midst of complex global currents. Crisis-talk
recovers certainties, generates antagonized dichotomies, and perhaps even
confirms the imagined superiority of the West. But first and foremost, the
current perceptions of crisis provide an epochal moment for the ideas of
the liberal order and liberal. The crises of the liberal, declared particularly
by the liberal internationalist and conservative narratives, force us to envis-
age the West beyond the liberal frame, but also the liberal beyond the
Western frame.
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CHAPTER 4
From Identification to Division: Contesting

the Unity of the West from Within
Johanna Vuorelma
In this chapter, two hypotheses concerning the crisis of the liberal West are
put forward and developed. It is argued that while the debate over ‘two
Wests’ in the early 2000s and the late 2010s share some characteristics,
they diverge in terms of their main dividing lines. In the earlier one the
main dividing line was drawn on geographical terms with a strong empha-
sis on the trans-Atlantic divide and security policies. In the more recent
wave, however, the boundary is more ideological, focusing on conserva-
tive and liberal networks that transcend the geographical division. The
latter debate includes a wider range of issues ranging from security to
economy and the style of governing. In other words, in the early 2000s
there were depictions of how Americans and Europeans are inherently dif-
ferent in their values and therefore cannot unite around shared norms,
while the late 2010s debate is essentially about how liberals and conserva-
tives are inherently different and cannot stand as a united West.
The second hypothesis developed in the chapter focuses on the moral
direction in the ‘two Wests’ debate. It is argued that in the early 2000s
debate the moralising gaze was directed towards the ‘other West’, while in
the late 2010s debate it has been increasingly directed towards the self—
whether European or American. The chapter suggests that there has been
J. Vuorelma (*)
Institute for Advanced Social Research, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
e-mail: johanna.vuorelma@tuni.fi

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_4
100 J. VUORELMA
an ironic turn in the ‘two Wests’ debate, which contains a self-critical

approach that has two different policy implications. The first one empha-
sises hegemony and the second one focuses on justice. As such, it can be
argued that although the debate in the late 2010s concerning the future
of the liberal West in general and the ‘two Wests’ in particular shares some
narrative elements with the early 2000s debate, it diverges from it to such
an extent that it forms its own narrative cycle and represents a new wave
in the ‘declining West’ narrative tradition.
What is also distinctive about the debate on ‘two Wests’ in the Trump
era is that while the formative moment is often located in the 2016 presi-
dential elections in the United States, it can be argued that the formative
moment was, in fact, the global economic crisis that erupted in 2008. As
such, while the earlier ‘two Wests’ debate grew as a response to the crisis
of political liberalism, the latter one has been essentially a reaction to the
crisis of economic liberalism. It can be argued that the ‘two Wests’ crises
resulted from ‘the two events which mark the beginning and the end of
the first decade of the twenty-first century: the attacks of September 11,
2001, and the financial meltdown of 2008’.1 While the contemporary
interpretations concerning the crisis of the liberal West can be seen as part
of the long tradition of the ‘West in crisis’ narrative, it is important to tap
into the particular features that define the latest incarnation of it. The
chapter employs a paradigmatic study of narratives and seeks to find
instances of three different concepts.
Firstly, it focuses on three different conceptualisations of the West: (1)
the ‘civilisation West’, (2) the ‘modern West’, and (3) the ‘political West’.2
Secondly, instances of the moralising impulse3 are examined in the narra-
tives. Finally, the concept of irony is employed to tease out the specific
features in the narrative battle.4 The research task is not simply to discover
or describe the categories that identify particular occurrences within the
data but also to note relationships among categories.5 This means that the
chapter adopts a comparative approach to the ‘two Wests’ debate in the
early 2000s and the late 2010s, analysing ruptures and continuities
between the two debates. The ‘two Wests’ debate will be analysed as a
1
Žižek (2009), 1.
2
3
White (1987), 14.
4
Vuorelma (2019).
5
Polkinghorne (1995), 14.
4 FROM IDENTIFICATION TO DIVISION: CONTESTING THE UNITY… 101
narrative battle in which different narrative traditions overlap and chal-

lenge each other. The chapter focuses on those interpretations of the
West’s division that have been particular influential in the debate on ‘two
Wests’. The reason for focusing on elite discussions in scholarly, journalis-
tic, and administrative circles rather than on more grassroots debates is
that the chapter analyses narratives that have most shaped the idea of
‘two Wests’.
Debating the Idea of the West

There are three different narratives that can be distinguished in the debate
concerning the nature of the West.6 Firstly, the West is often described as
a civilisation in a historical, geographical, and cultural sense with roots dat-
ing back to ancient Greece and Rome, boundaries limiting it to particular
continents, and cultural traditions deriving from the Judeo-Christian lega-
cy.7 The idea of the West as a civilisation that dates back to ancient history
has been criticised for lacking in a historical depth. It has been argued that
the idea of the West is actually a recent invention that can be traced back
to the late 1800s as an articulation of the modern world.8 Indeed, it is
important to note that the West as a rhetorical claim was part of the
European identity-making exercise in the late 1800s.9 The ‘civilisation
West’ narrative is perhaps the most criticised of the three Western narra-
tives because it arguably neglects the intertwined nature of world history
and is arguably maintained to advance the hegemonic interests of the few.10
Secondly, the West is often defined as a modern entity that shares com-
mon values. Those values can be, for example, about liberty,11 reason, and
prosperity,12 but also about the legacy of the Enlightenment, industrialisa-
tion, capitalism, and colonialism.13 Finally, the West is also depicted as a
political community that is held together through common institutions
and policy practices. The ‘political West’ narrative is a Cold War idea in
that it connects the idea of the West to the key post-war institution,
6
Browning and Lehti (2010); see also Ifversen (2008).
7
See Patterson (1997).
8
See for example Bonnett (2004), 25; see also Gillespie (1999), 7.
9
GoGwilt (1995a, b).
10
See for example Wolf (1982); Davies (1996), 28–29.
11
McNeill (1997).
12
Gress (1998).
13
Browning and Lehti (2010); see also Hall (1993).
102 J. VUORELMA
NATO, and perceives the West as an institutional entity forming around

the security community. The ‘political West’ narrative is framed around
peace and security, and during the Cold War it had a strong anti-communist
impulse attached to it. The debate about the relationship between Europe
and the United States is an important element in the ‘political West’ nar-
rative because the founding idea of the common institutions and practices
was to find a practical alliance between them.14 After the Second World
War, the United States assumed the leading role in NATO when Europe
was preoccupied with post-war reconstruction efforts. This asymmetrical
relationship still echoes in the idea of ‘two Wests’ as speculations are
repeatedly raised as to whether Europe is finally ready to cut her depen-
dency on the United States and choose a more independent policy line
particularly in the area of security.
All the three narratives can be located in the ‘two Wests’ debate, which
shows that they overlap and challenge one another. The West is a floating
signifier without a fixed meaning, which means that it is particularly useful
in producing foreign policy imagination and providing a fertile narrative
ground for debates on shared values and practices. In addition to these
narrative traditions, the chapter also examines how a moralising impulse
manifests itself in these debates. American historian Hayden White has
argued that ‘every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose
the desire to moralize the events of which it treats’.15 It is argued here that
the moralising impulse is clearly recognisable in the idea of ‘two Wests’. It
partly connects to the third conceptual tool that is employed here, irony,
which is also apparent in the more recent wave of the narrative battle.
Irony here refers to a critical approach towards the self that is unable to
live up to its own standards.16 There is, in other words, a contradiction
between the ideal self and the actual self, which can rise ‘in an atmosphere
of social breakdown or cultural demise’.17
The ironic gaze has been part of the United States’ self-image for a long
time,18 which is well captured in the famous words of American political
scientist Samuel Huntington in his book American Politics: The Promise of
Disharmony (1981): ‘Critics say that America is a lie because its reality falls
14
See for example Harries (1993); Kupchan (2002).
15
White (1987), 14, emphasis added.
16
See for example Bernstein (2016); Rorty (1989); Steele (2010); Vuorelma (2019).
17
Domanska (1998), 178.
18
See for example Bercovitch (1978); Niebuhr (1952); Pfaff (2010).
so far short of its ideals. They are wrong. America is not a lie; it is a disap-
pointment. But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope’.19
As can been seen here, irony is not only about cynicism—there is always
the potential for self-betterment but that requires, firstly, the recognition
of the self’s weakness in fulfilling the ideals and, second, conscious and
laborious efforts to find adequate, even radical solutions to reach a solu-
tion to the current impasse.
This ‘double character’ of America’s ironic experience20 is also present
in Western self-image, which is particularly evident in the ‘modern West’
narrative that represents values such as freedom and democracy alongside
with values such as colonialism. As Pfaff argues, the ‘West’s history is dis-
tinguished by a creativity and dynamism that have allowed it to shape the
modern world, and also by much violence and ruthless aggrandizement as
well’.21 There are different types of ironic narratives that can be distin-
guished in debates concerning the West. Radical irony is a self-critical gaze
that seeks to advance justice, while conservative irony aims to strengthen
hegemony.22 They both attempt to narrow the gap between the ideal self
and the actual self, but their strategies and policy implications are different.
In his classic work A Rhetoric of Motives, American literary theorist
Kenneth Burke argued that ‘one need not scrutinize the concept of “iden-
tification” very sharply to see, implied in it at every turn, its ironic coun-
terpart: division’.23 Burke showed that identification and division are
intertwined in such a way that they cannot be separated. As he noted, ‘put
identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know
for certain just where one ends and the other begins’.24 The identification
as being Western illustrates Burke’s notion that identification and division
are tightly connected. The idea of the West relies on a shared belief that a
unified West exists, but the potential for division is always present. In fact,
the potential for division has for a long time provided creative energy that
has kept the idea of the West in existence.
As IR scholar Patrick Thaddeus Jackson has argued, the idea of the
West was born in crisis through narratives of its possible decline.25 It has
19
Huntington (1981).
20
Niebuhr (1952), 11.
21
Pfaff (2010).
22
Vuorelma (2019).
23
Burke (1969), 23.
24
Burke (1969), 25.
25
Jackson (2010).
104 J. VUORELMA
been convincingly shown how ‘the idea of the West in its fullest sense
arises as the idea of the end of the West, as the retrospective recognition of
a horizon that we have now transcended’.26 The dramatic rhetoric of divi-
sion and demise can be seen as a strategy to advance particular policy
options in political language. A crisis rhetoric can have a mobilising effect
and legitimise policies that are unpopular or controversial. According to
Jackson, different narratives of the West’s decline contain ‘a kind of funda-
mental anxiety that accompanies debate and discussions about Western
action; this makes an appeal to the West’s immanent demise an attractive
trope for advocate of particular policies to deploy, since the audience—
raised in the same “West” tradition—is already familiar with the basic line
of argument’.27
Indeed, in the ‘two Wests’ debate, the crisis discourse describes and
produces not only Western disharmony but also optimistic visions for a
stronger Western unity. For example, in arguing in 2003 that there is an
‘emotional estrangement’ within the West, French political scientist
Dominique Moisi suggested that the alliance needs to be ‘reinvented’.28
Moisi promoted a new alliance because ‘Europe is the best protection that
the United States has against its inner evils: its isolationist narcissism, its
ignorance of the way others feel and think’.29 Europe, Moisi argued, is
similarly dependent on the United States for military reasons. The revi-
sionist instinct and ambitious nature of the United States can and should
be reconciled with the postmodern instinct and modest nature of Europe.30
In his analysis, Moisi focused on inherent characteristics of Europe and
the United States, locating the point of divergence in their inner qualities.
The ‘two Wests’ were depicted as inherently different, which did not mean
that they cannot form rational cooperation around shared interests. In the
midst of the ‘two Wests’ debate in 2003, Princeton University’s Professor
of Politics and International Affairs Andrew Moravcsik adopted a rational-
ist approach towards Western unity, advocating a roadmap to the troubled
partnership: ‘To get things back on track, both in Iraq and elsewhere,
Washington must shift course and accept multilateral conditions for inter-
vention. The Europeans, meanwhile, must shed their resentment of
26
Gillespie (1999), 11.
27
Jackson (2010), 67.
28
Moïsi (2003), 67.
29
Moïsi (2003), 70.
30
Moïsi (2003), 73.
American power and be prepared to pick up much of the burden of con-

flict prevention and postconflict engagement. Complementarity, not con-
flict, should be the transatlantic watchword’.31 A similar conciliatory tone
has been often present in the later wave of the ‘two Wests’ debate in the
2010s: ‘To effectively address these challenges (to Western democracies),
the United States and Europe need to act together […] It’s an imperfect
relationship but it’s the best one we’ve got.’32 In the following sections,
the ideas concerning ‘two Wests’ in the early 2000s and the late 2010s will
be examined more closely.
The ‘Two Wests’ Debate: A Geographical Division

When American historian and foreign policy commentator Robert Kagan
wrote in 2003 around the time of the Iraq War that it is ‘time to stop pre-
tending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world,
or even that they occupy the same world’, he drew the diving line between
a realist, Hobbesian America and an idealist, Kantian Europe. ‘Europeans
have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian
world of perpetual peace. In fact, the United States solved the Kantian
paradox for the Europeans’, Kagan argued.33 The focus was strongly on
security and the different approaches towards security policies in the
United States and Europe. Kagan argued that there are profound differ-
ences in the nature, character, and conduct of Europeans and Americans,
which made it impossible for the West to remain intact. Kagan viewed
Europe as a weak and impotent power that is lacking in a realist perception
of the international system and simply relying on American security
guarantees.
The picture painted in IR scholar Charles A. Kupchan’s narrative of the
trans-Atlantic rift was different in that Kupchan represented Europe not as
a weak and impotent power but as a strong and threatening force that is
competitive and ambitious. Kupchan wrote at the time that ‘the rising
challenger is not China or the Islamic world but the European Union, an
emerging polity that is in the process of marshaling the impressive resources
and historical ambitions of Europe’s separate nation-states’.34 Kupchan
31
Moravcsik (2003).
32
Smith and Rizzo (2018).
33
Kagan (2003), 3, 57.
34
Kupchan (2002).
106 J. VUORELMA
predicted that the trans-Atlantic rivalry ‘will inevitably intensify. Centers

of power by their nature compete for position, influence, and prestige’.
And finally, in his dramatic prediction, the EU ‘will come to dominate the
geopolitics of Eurasia, gradually replacing America as the arbiter of the
globe’s strategic heartland’. Kupchan even argued that the rivalry between
America and Europe can reach a point where ‘the coming clash of civiliza-
tions will be not between the West and the rest but within a West divided
against itself’.35 There was a sharp geographical division drawn in the
debate, depicting the divided West in terms of the trans-Atlantic rift.
The question of the trans-Atlantic division largely arose as a result of
the highly controversial Iraq War that was widely opposed in Europe’s
public opinion. This ‘two Wests’ debate in the early 2000s largely rested
on the idea that the Cold War had united America and Europe under the
same battle against the perils of the common enemy, the Soviet Union.
They shared the common narrative concerning the Second World War and
were united behind the same threat perception, which made the alliance
seem robust and natural.36 Both American and European interlocutors
focused on the shared Cold War experience that was shaped by the mem-
ory of the Second World War. Kagan37 noted that ‘during the Cold War,
“the West” did mean something. It was the liberal, democratic choice of a
large segment of humanity, standing in opposition to the alternative choice
that existed on the other side of the Berlin Wall. This powerful strategic,
ideological, and psychological need to demonstrate that there was indeed
a cohesive, unified West went down with the Berlin Wall and the statues of
Lenin in Moscow’. In 2002, Kupchan even compared the situation to the
fate of the Roman Empire that at the end of the third century split into
two halves with two capitals, Rome and Constantinople. Kupchan went
on to argue: ‘As Byzantium did with Rome when it separated from its
former overseer, the EU is making a run at the United States. And just as
the Byzantines and the Romans parted ways over values and interests, so
have the Europeans and the Americans’.38
In Europe, Moisi39 similarly emphasised the legacy of the World War II:
‘Transatlantic tensions of the past—the Suez debacle, the French d eparture
35
Kupchan (2002).
36
See also Chap. 5.
37
Kagan (2003), 81.
38
Kupchan (2002).
39
Moïsi (2003), 67.
from NATO in 1966, the Vietnam War, and the Euromissiles crisis in the
1980s—were contained by painful memories of World War II and the
unifying effects of the Soviet threat.’ The West was now narrated through
rivalry and opposing ideals also in Europe. European philosophers Jürgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida argued in 2003 that ‘the reduction of poli-
tics to stupid and costly alternative of war or peace simply doesn’t pay. At
the international level and in the framework of the UN, Europe has to
throw its weight on the scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateral-
ism of the United States’.40 There was an element of scapegoating in the
narratives of the West’s division. The idea was that it had become increas-
ingly difficult to identify with the ‘other’ West because of its repugnant
actions and character. The threat was not seen as coming from outside but
from within the West. Moisi argued that the new threats—‘Islamic funda-
mentalism, international terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction’—do
not have the same unifying effect as the Soviet threat because the United
States and Europe have a very different approach to them.
Moisi called the approach of the United States after the September 11
attacks as ‘Bismarckian’ as it focused on military might and hard power.
Europe, on the other hand, was arguably engaged in idealistic foreign
policy akin to the early 1900s American strategy, which represents the
Wilsonian foreign policy tradition in Walter Russell Mead’s41 typology.
Indeed, the debate concerning the separation of the West contained a
strong moralising impulse that directed the critical gaze towards the other
party. Moisi, for his part, argued that ‘Europeans have always found it dif-
ficult to understand Americans. This particularly true today, when less
savory sides of the American character—its nationalist religiosity, its intol-
erant suspicion of others—have returned to the fore’.42 Moisi continued
that ‘Europe feels that is must exist as an alternative to the United States—a
different and better West.43 The early 2000s debate on whether the West
is getting divided within was the first time after the Cold War that the
identity of the Western self was being truly questioned.44 In short, the
‘two Wests’ debate in the early 2000s was essentially a gulf between
Europe and the United States over different political visions in general and
40
Habermas and Derrida (2003), 293.
41
Mead (2017).
42
Moïsi (2003), 68.
43
Moïsi (2003), 69.
44
See for example Friedman (2003); Lieven (2002); Gordon (2003); Neuhold (2003);
Ash (2004); Stevenson (2003); Anderson et al. (2008).
108 J. VUORELMA
security issues in particular. The moralising impulse was directed towards

the ‘other West’ that failed to uphold the values that previously
united the West.
The Divided West in the Age of Trump: Towards

an Ideological Division
In the 2010s, the narrative of the ‘divided West’ arouse again in response
to the presidency of Donald Trump in 2016. Foreign policy author James
Traub put it very bluntly in his Foreign Policy article in 2018: ‘RIP the
Trans-Atlantic Alliance, 1945–2018’. There was an equally sober conclu-
sion a year later in Foreign Affairs: ‘The Atlantic alliance as we know it is
dead.’45 It was suggested that the Western alliance had been weakening
since the end of the Cold War, but the values of the liberal post-war order
had kept the relationship between Europe and the United States alive—
until the arrival of Donald Trump. According to Traub, however, Trump
only represented a wider shift that was taking place, inevitably taking the
two allies in separate directions.46 As Traub argued: ‘Obama wanted the
United States to face toward the future, not the past. The American peo-
ple, meanwhile, preferred to face home. They wanted a pivot to America,
and they voted for the candidate who promised to deliver it. It has thus
fallen to Trump to deliver the coup de grâce to the alliance that has defined
the postwar world’.47 The main dividing line was once again drawn
between Europe and the United States, but this time the moralising
impulse was not directed towards the ‘other West’. The prospect of the
West getting divided for good was narrated with an emotional tone: ‘The
mind reels. No, the heart breaks.’48
When the ‘two Wests’ debate in the 2010s is followed more closely,
however, it becomes clear that the geographical division between Europe
and the United States was getting replaced by a more ideological division.
The idea that the West was getting divided along geographical lines was a
more marginal narrative as the focus was instead on ideological networks
that were forming across the West. The alliances that were seen to be
building up and weakening the unity of the West were divided along the
45
Gordon and Shapiro (2019).
46
See also Cohen (2017).
47
Traub (2018).
48
Traub (2018).
lines of conservative–liberal, national–international, authoritarian–demo-

cratic, or tolerant–xenophobic networks that included not only some
political actors or parties but even countries. It was argued, for example,
that France’s Marine Le Pen ‘applauded Trump a year ago not because he
was American but because of his white nationalism’.49
It was suggested that if the Atlantic alliance would be brought back,
‘the alliance could be reborn as a populist, nationalist, and racist partner-
ship between the United States and governments in Hungary, Poland,
Italy, or others. Such a transatlantic alliance, one based on the shared val-
ues of hating Islam and immigrants, would not be worth having’.50 Indeed,
Kupchan argued that while the post-war version of American exceptional-
ism was about liberal values, multilateralism and later on increasingly
about pluralism and tolerance, Trump’s racial, nationalist, and protection-
ist language was in stark contrast to that: ‘For Trump, making America
great again means making it white again’.51 The ideological division in the
‘two Wests’ debate is evident when examining the movement between
distinguishing the West as a particular or a universal entity. Jackson has
argued that while the early years after the Cold War were an era when the
West was represented as a particular entity in the US foreign policy rheto-
ric, this changed during the Bush and Obama administrations that wit-
nessed the West being narrated more as a universal entity.52
The universalist understanding of the West provided a conducive
ground for the ‘modern West’ narrative. Jackson argued in reference to
the Bush and Obama administrations that ‘we hear a great deal about
putatively universal values like “freedom” and “liberty”, values that are
taken to be less the possession of a particular historical or cultural tradition
and more the common endowment of human beings per se’.53 In other
words, foreign policy rhetoric moved from a ‘clash of civilisations’ frame
towards a more universal frame in which all actors can join the universal
community of Western values. It can be argued that a return to a particular
understanding of the West has been taking place during the Trump admin-
istration—a shift that is in line with a move away from the ‘modern West’
narrative towards a ‘civilisation West’ narrative.
49
Nougayréde (2017).
50
51
Kupchan (2018), 145.
52
Jackson (2017).
53
Jackson (2017), 86, emphasis in the original.
110 J. VUORELMA
Once again, in the words of Jackson, the ‘usefulness of the West, in

other words, seems to have changed.54 In the US foreign policy rhetoric
under Trump, the idea of the West has been employed to emphasise shared
characteristics based on blood and soil, which brings back older ideas of
the West. This particular understanding of the West as a civilisation is
shared by European counterparts who emphasise the need to defend the
West as a civilisation that is built upon ethnic and cultural attributes. This
shared ideological ground forms around political parties that are situated
in the far-right spectrum of Europe’s political map. Paradoxically, they
often identify with nationalist values, but nevertheless advocate a transna-
tional network of political actors who share the civilisational imagination
that is not universal but particular.
In a situation where the European Union was voicing deep concerns
that Poland is not upholding the values of democracy and the rule of law,
Trump was already setting Poland as a virtuous example to follow: ‘So,
together, let us all fight like the Poles—for family, for freedom, for coun-
try, and for God.’55 It was often argued that although the unity of the West
had been in crisis before, Trump was the first president who simply did not
value the alliance with Europe.56 It would be more accurate to argue that
Trump did value cooperation with European partners but only with those
actors that shared the more conservative ground that was rapidly in the
making. Indeed, in 2018 Dutch first vice president of the European
Commission Frans Timmermans used the old metaphor of ‘battle for soul
of Europe’ to define the 2019 European parliamentary elections as a fight
against nationalist and protectionist forces that challenge the liberal idea
of Europe.57
The ‘liberal West’, on the other hand, was seen to be forming not
around Europe as a whole but around Germany’s Merkel who was largely
represented as one of the final Western leaders upholding liberal ‘modern
West’ values. Chief Diplomatic Correspondent Europe for the New York
Times Steven Erlanger argued in 2017 that ‘Merkel has reluctantly been
thrust into the role of the West’s most outspoken defender of the liberal
democratic order.58 The dividing line was narrated as running between
54
Jackson (2017), 86, emphasis in the original.
55
White House (2017).
56
See for example Gordon and Shapiro (2019).
57
Schaart (2018).
58
Erlanger (2017).
Europe’s Merkel who is the last defender of liberal Western values and the
United States’ Trump who is challenging those values. The ‘modern West’
narrative was seen as being seriously under threat with Trump advocating
a very different reading of what actually constitutes the West. There were
two policy statements in particularly that have been seen as representing
the drifting apart of the West. Firstly, Merkel attempted to set the policy
agenda with her speech in May 2017 when she declared: ‘We Europeans
truly have to take our fate into our own hands’. She continued that ‘we
have to know that we Europeans must fight for our own future and
destiny’.59 Merkel envisioned a more independent policy line for Europe,
but at the time of her speech, the idea of a united and liberal Europe was
already being fiercely challenged at home.
As such, those who put faith in the idea of a liberal West were not only
liberal allies in Europe but also those in the United States. It was no longer
possible to draw the line between an idealist Europe and a realist United
States that dominated the early 2000s debate. The narrative battle was
moving towards a more complex rift between a ‘modern West’ and a ‘civil-
isation West’ narratives as was evident in the second policy statement,
Trump’s speech in Poland in July 2017. In the speech Trump first
employed the ‘political West’ narrative by referring to the ‘victory over
communism by a strong alliance of free nations in the West that defied
tyranny’. He then talked about the dire threat of ‘another oppressive ide-
ology’, Islamic terrorism, ‘to our security and to our way of life’ in the
West. Other threats included ‘new forms of aggression, including propa-
ganda, financial crimes, and cyberwarfare’ and ‘the steady creep of govern-
ment bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people’.60
Trump’s speech, however, soon began to turn into a ‘civilisation West’
narrative, referring to ‘the bonds of culture, faith and tradition that make
us who we are’. He went on to declare that ‘the West was saved with the
blood of patriot’ and that ‘our civilization will triumph’ if new generations
show similar courage and heroism. And finally: ‘Our own fight for the
West does not begin on the battlefield—it begins with our minds, our
wills, and our souls. Today, the ties that unite our civilization are no less
vital, and demand no less defense, than that bare shred of land on which
the hope of Poland once totally rested. Our freedom, our civilization, and
our survival depend on these bonds of history, culture, and memory.’ The
59
Paravicini (2017).
60
White House (2017).
112 J. VUORELMA
racial, religious and cultural characteristics have been at the heart of the
‘civilisation West’ narrative of the Trump administration, sharing the ideo-
logical ground with Europe’s far-right.61
According to Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev, the speech in
Poland showed that in the ‘heady days of the Cold War, “the West”
referred to the so-called free world—a liberal democratic order. Today it
has been replaced by a cultural, rather than political, notion. But unlike in
the 19th century, when a “white man’s burden” took pride of place, today
what dominates are the “white man’s fears”’.62 Another notable difference
in the ‘two Wests’ debate between the early 2000s and the late 2010s is
the direction of the moralising impulse. It has been turning towards the
Western self, which is clearly seen in the analyses both in the United States
and Europe. American political scientist Graham T. Allison, for example,
wrote about the ‘myth of the liberal order’ in the United States in 2018:
‘The fact that in the first 17 years of this century, the self-proclaimed
leader of the liberal order invaded two countries, conducted air strikes and
Special Forces raids to kill hundreds of people it unilaterally deemed to be
terrorists, and subjected scores of others to “extraordinary rendition,”
often without any international legal authority (and sometimes without
even national legal authority), speaks for itself.’63
The Self-ironic West

The highly self-critical narrative provides a very different self-image of the
‘American West’ than the one featuring in the earlier debate on ‘two
Wests’. There is an ironic gaze towards the gap between the ideal self and
the actual self. As Allison continues: ‘The overriding challenge for
American believers in democratic governance is thus nothing less than to
reconstruct a working democracy at home’.64 In other words, when it
comes to democracy promotion and leading by example, the United States
should start the arduous task from home. A similarly self-critical attitude
can be seen in European analyses that adopt an ironic approach towards
the grave failing of the self. They usually start from an idealist self-image
of the past and move on to describe Europe’s current fall from grace. The
61
Foster (2017).
62
Krastev (2017a, b).
63
Allison (2018), 126.
64
Allison (2018), 133.
narratives often follow a jeremiad tradition that contains a three-fold

structure: first setting out the communal norms, then drawing the actual
declinist state of the community, and finally providing a prophetic vision
that ‘unveils the promises, announces the good things to come, and
explains away the gap between fact and ideal’.65
Here the formative moment is not the election victory of Trump but,
most often, the economic crisis in Europe that erupted in 2008. As such,
there is clearly a move from a security perspective to a more economic
perspective. Greek academic and politician Yanis Varoufakis has been one
of the most vocal critics of the European self. Varoufakis argued in 2016
that in Europe ‘a titanic battle is being waged for Europe’s integrity and
soul, with the forces of reason and humanism losing out, so far, to grow-
ing irrationality, authoritarianism and malice. The rest of the world,
America in particular, are concerned but not as much as they ought to
be’.66 In his narrative, Merkel was certainly not the beacon of democratic,
liberal, and tolerant values as represented by many others in the ‘two
Wests’ debate. Instead, Merkel and many other European leaders such as
France’s Nicolas Sarkozy were depicted as ironic figures who do not act
according to the values that they claim to hold.
Referring to Merkel and Sarkozy, Varoufakis argued that a ‘cynical ploy
that transferred hundreds of billions of losses from the books of the French
and German banks to Europe’s taxpayers was presented to the world as
the manifestation of European solidarity’.67 The moralising impulse was
firmly directed towards the European self that is unable to uphold her
outspoken values. The United States, ‘a global minotaur’,68 is very much
part of the narrative and subject to fierce criticism, and as such there is no
clear normative distinction between the ‘American West’ and the
‘European West’. Instead, Varoufakis’ West has been an alliance with its
own deep establishment with illiberal and illegitimate practices and values.
Varoufakis argued that ‘for years before the arrival of Trump, Brexit and
other populist disruptions, the West’s establishment had itself practiced
character assassination, truth reversal, loony economics and downright
illiberalism’.69
65
Bercovitch (1978), 10.
66
Varoufakis (2018), 250.
67
Varoufakis (2018), 157–158; see also Marsili and Milanese (2018).
68
Varoufakis (2015).
69
Varoufakis (2017), 1.
114 J. VUORELMA
This dark state was in a stark contrast to the image of the past West that
was truly able to act as a beacon on the hill, inspiring the world to come
together and unite not around a common enemy but common values of
democracy, human rights, and reason.70 Also Krastev emphasises the ironic
gap in the European project when analysing the continent’s political, eco-
nomic, and cultural decline: ‘The European Union has always been an
idea in search of a reality. But there is a growing worry that what once kept
the union together no longer holds’.71 Krastev offers a similar reading as
Varoufakis about the role of European leaders in failing to truly promote
democracy at home. In 2017 Krastev argued: ‘Rather than Brussels sym-
bolizing the glory of a common European home, the EU’s capital has
come to represent the unrestricted power of the markets and the destruc-
tive power of globalization’.72
Germany’s former Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor Joschka
Fischer has been similarly critical towards the European self, arguing that
Europe has failed to live up to its political ideals.73 Also Fischer locates the
formative moment in the economic crisis that has called into question
European identity and the whole existence of the European Union as a
modern value community. Fischer argued in 2014 that Europe is increas-
ingly lacking in solidarity both in economic and political terms while the
European Union is lacking in democracy. The role of the United States
was central also to Fischer’s analysis as the 2008 economic crisis originated
in the United States, resulting in a situation akin to the stock market crash
that erupted in 1929 and resulted in unprecedented political and eco-
nomic crises.74
Interestingly, this self-critical attitude was somewhat diminishing with
the arrival of Trump who, in the words of Fischer in 2018, sought ‘to
disrupt virtually all that has defined the West since the end of World War
II’.75 As a result, Fischer called for more European sovereignty, abandon-
ing the highly self-critical gaze and focusing on self-defence: ‘The rebal-
ancing of power that is already underway could determine the fate of
Europe’s democracies, welfare states, independence, and way of life […]
The question now is whether the EU will reclaim its full sovereignty and
70
Varoufakis (2018), xi–xii.
71
Krastev (2017a, b).
72
Krastev (2017a, b), 67.
73
Fischer (2015).
74
Fischer (2015).
75
Fischer (2018).
assert itself as a power on the global stage, or let itself fall behind for
good’.76 Here the constant interplay between identification and division is
clearly seen. The narrative evolved from Western unity to European divi-
sion, only to return to European unity against the threat coming from the
‘other West’ that Europe used to identify with. The seeds for both identi-
fication and division are always present and can be harnessed to the narra-
tive task. Krastev has noted, similarly, that it is ironic that the fear of
European disintegration might actually enhance integration.77 It can be
seen that ironic narratives advance both justice and hegemony, leading to
different political visions. A narrative of the weak self can lead to calls for
more solidarity and empathy towards others, but it can also employ the
image of a threatening other to call for more strength and hegemony.
A Common Western Ground in the Making?

There is an interesting intersection between the ‘civilisation West’ and the
‘political West’ narratives in the late 2010s debate on ‘two Wests’. Traces
of the early 2000s debate can be clearly seen in the more recent wave.
Trump’s demand that European states must contribute more towards
NATO is in line with Kagan’s thesis that Europe is simply taking advan-
tage of the United States to achieve its peace and security. Kagan wrote in
2003: ‘How nations could achieve perpetual peace without destroying
human freedom was a problem Kant could not solve. But for Europe the
problem was solved by the United States. By providing security from out-
side, the United States rendered it unnecessary for Europe’s supranational
government to provide it.’78
Trump’s rhetoric is less refined, but the moralising impulse and the
meaning is the same. As he noted in the 2017 speech in Poland: ‘Words
are easy, but actions are what matters. And for its own protection—and
you know this, everybody knows this, everybody has to know this—
Europe must do more. Europe must demonstrate that it believes in its
future by investing its money to secure that future.’ This is also what
Kupchan has argued: ‘Although Trump’s diplomacy lacks tact, he is right
to insist that U.S. allies shoulder their fair share’.79 Or as Security Studies
76
Fischer (2018).
77
Krastev (2017a, b).
78
Kagan (2003).
79
Kupchan (2018), 147.
116 J. VUORELMA
scholar Barry R. Posen stated in relation to Trump: ‘As a candidate, he

regularly complained about the failure of U.S. allies, especially those in
NATO, to share the burden of collective defense. However uninformed
these objections were, they were entirely fair’.80
Perhaps paradoxically, then, the seeds for a potential common ground
for a renewed Western alliance can be found in a Cold War narrative that
imagines the West as a political community that is kept together through
rational interests that are channelled through institutional and practical
arrangements. This would certainly represent a move away from the idea
of the West as a liberal alliance that shares common values and normative
underpinnings—it would mean ‘giving up the high ground’.81 It would
also mean a step away from a civilisational narrative that emphasises blood
and soil. A ‘political West’ narrative in the 2020s would focus on mutual
security and economic interests that are not intertwined with strong nor-
mative underpinnings like during the Cold War. Many argue that this sort
of rational trans-Atlantic alliance is possible and ‘worth fighting for’.82
Given the trans-Atlantic ideological bond between different actors, the
‘political West’ narrative that emphasises mere rational interests could,
however, simply turn into an illiberal version of the ‘political West’ narra-
tive and as such become a highly normative institutional arrangement that
talks about rational interests but is kept together through ideological
underpinnings. Many argue that contrary to expectations, Trump has not
completely abandoned the institutional arrangements and norms of the
international order but simply turned towards more illiberal hegemonic
practices. Posen, for example, has noted, ‘Although the Trump adminis-
tration has pared or abandoned many of the pillars of liberal international-
ism, its security policy has remained consistently hegemonic. Whether
illiberal hegemony will prove any more or any less sustainable than its
liberal cousin remains an open question’.83
The ironic interpretation of the Western international order provides
fuel for new institutional arrangements. Foreign policy expert Jake
Sullivan, for example, has argued that ‘a badly needed effort to reinforce
and update the international order’ must start by acknowledging the
‘growing disillusionment with some of its core assumptions. This disillu-
80
Posen (2018), 21.
81
Margon (2018).
82
83
Posen (2018), 27.
sionment has been stoked by forces of nativism and illiberalism, but it is

rooted in the lived experience of many who have seen few promised ben-
efits flow to them’.84 While this ironic awareness can indeed lead to a
process of renewed institution building that seeks to widen justice and
tolerance in the international order, the ideological networks that have
been forming around the trans-Atlantic alliance suggest that there is more
political potential for calls towards a greater hegemony—a Western hege-
mony based on illiberal values.
Conclusion
The debate on whether the West is splitting up into two separate entities—
a European West and an American West—is one manifestation of the long
‘declinist West’ narrative tradition that has been an integral part of Western
identity-making since the 1800s. The ‘two Wests’ debate offers a narrative
arena where different ideas of the West can be imagined, contested and
rendered meaningful. The debate itself already limits the boundaries of the
West to the trans-Atlantic alliance rather than to a wider geographical area.
The chapter has shown that the narrative battle around ‘two Wests’ is not
simply descriptive but highly normative in nature, putting forward moral-
istic interpretations concerning the West. Approaching the topic from a
narrative approach allows for a more nuanced analysis of the storied struc-
ture of the ‘two Wests’ debate.
It is evident that older ideas of the West as a civilisation, a modern value
community, and a political entity all feature in the debate, attaining new
forms and meanings in different eras and in relation to various events.
What is notable in the more recent manifestation of the ‘two Wests’ debate
is the presence of a stronger ironic gaze, which produces calls for more
justice but also calls for more hegemony. It is equally noteworthy that
geographical significations matter less in the ‘two Wests’ debate in the
2010s than in the 2000s.
Ideological networks transcend the trans-Atlantic divide, resulting in
new alliances and cooperative practices. While many are hoping that the
Western alliance could be strengthened in the rational realm of common
institutions and practices, it seems credible to suggest that the cooperative
potential for a stronger Western unity lies rather in these informal net-
works that are ideologically driven—and often imagine the West as some-
84
Sullivan (2018), 15.
118 J. VUORELMA
thing else than a liberal democratic project. The informal networks might
be further energised by ironic calls for more hegemony and as a result
push towards stronger institutional arrangements—an illiberal hegemony
that forms a new ‘political West’ narrative.
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CHAPTER 5
The West: Divided in Freedom and Fear?
Ville Sinkkonen and Henri Vogt
One wonders today, whether a profound sense of alienation has replaced

the sense of community that used to underwrite the West, the framework
of cooperation between the United States and Europe. After decades of
shared efforts to shape the politics of the world, two mutual strangers now
seem to exist on both shores of the Atlantic, with waning agreement on
the desired future direction of the international system. Yet, upon closer
scrutiny, this prevalent story of an impending transatlantic breakup appears
too simplistic.
The present chapter approaches, and at times challenges, the estrange-
ment thesis from the standpoint of a—if not the—core value of the trans-
atlantic community, namely freedom. We examine to what extent the (dis-)
similarities found in articulations of freedom in US and European foreign-
policy discourses can function as a metric for gauging how fundamental
the current impasse between the two sides of the Atlantic really is. One
may also recognise a normative agenda here. If we wish to preserve the
most valuable features of the transatlantic order—namely rule-based pat-
terns of global governance—it is important to inquire how Europe, or the
V. Sinkkonen (*)
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: ville.sinkkonen@fiia.fi
H. Vogt
University of Turku, Turku, Finland
e-mail: henri.vogt@utu.fi

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_5
124 V. SINKKONEN AND H. VOGT
European Union, and the United States could find a common ground to
reconcile arising differences. Converging articulations of freedom might
indeed serve this purpose.
We start off by reviewing the central tenets of the transatlantic linkage
since the Second World War. This consensual-hegemonic relationship has
been built upon what IR scholarship knows as “rationalism”; a peculiar
mixture of realist threat perceptions and liberal interdependencies have
informed the bond across the Atlantic. In every-day political decision-
making on both sides, this combination of realism and liberalism has gen-
erally materialised by way of joint security concerns, on the one hand, and
mutually related identity constructions, on the other. What is crucial here,
however, is that this rationalist paradigm has been both constituted and
continuously challenged by various ideas and ideals of freedom; freedom,
as we will illustrate, stands in an intimate relationship with both security
and identity. In order to make sense of these sensibilities after 2014, we
introduce a conceptual categorisation of freedom in the middle section of
the chapter. We then employ this framework in the final section as we
explore, in a contrastive manner, a number of central foreign-policy docu-
ments from the European Union and the United States. We do find differ-
ences of emphasis, different nuances, in these actors’ parlance, but are they
merely a matter of electoral tides?
The Rationalism of a Consensual Community

of Values
More than thirty years ago, historian Charles S. Maier argued that the
grand bargain reached across the Atlantic Ocean in the wake of the Second
World War was a manifestation of what he called consensual hegemony.1
The post-war transatlantic order was in effect built on reciprocal consent.
Western Europeans, on the one hand, agreed to abide by the rules of an
order, which was to a considerable extent of the American hegemon’s
making. In return, the United States would not only cater to the allies’
security needs in the face of the Soviet threat, it would also prop up its
allies economically, and make America’s hegemonic attainment bearable
by tying the country’s power to the order’s rules, norms and institutions.2
1
Maier (1977).
2
Cf. Ikenberry (1998).
5 THE WEST: DIVIDED IN FREEDOM AND FEAR? 125
The undergirding logic of this order was first and foremost “rational-
ist”, a combination of realist articulations of threat and liberal values of
interdependency. It was essentially designed to keep both sides of the
Atlantic “sane” for mutual security and economic benefit. For its part, the
United States, as superpower arbiter of intra-European squabbles, allowed
its allies to build working and (ultimately) trusting relations with each
other,3 possibly even paving the way for European integration. Europe, in
turn, was granted permanent “access” to the hegemon through ever-
proliferating mutual dependence and institutional channels. European
states could even at times use these channels to have an impact on United
States’ policy choices, effectively making American “power safe for the
world”, or at least for Europe.4 Through the heady years of the Cold War,
the consensual-hegemonic order, the order of the West, thus took on the
trappings of a security community wherein “war or the threat of force to
settle disputes within the region is unthinkable”,5 and “dependable expec-
tations of peaceful change” rule the day.6
There is also another well-known conceptual viewpoint, related to what
we call “rationalism” above, with which we can make sense of the post-war
transatlantic political constellation. Judith Shklar coined the notion of lib-
eralism of fear in the late 1980s to denote a political doctrine, the ultimate
purpose of which is to prevent the evil, evil political ideologies, from
reigning.7 In a sense, we can interpret the entire course of political devel-
opments in Western Europe from 1945 until the mid-1970s, the inherent
desire to push forward the continent’s political integration, from this per-
spective: bringing Europe’s nation-states under a shared political umbrella,
with the European Commission as a Leviathan of sorts, represented a
form of constitutionalised anti-totalitarianism and institutionalised pater-
nalism that was to guarantee that the evil of war would never again pre-
vail.8 Indeed, democracy, liberal democracy, was deemed too unpredictable
without a strong counterbalancing factor of technocratic, enlightened
leadership. Advancing individual freedoms or freedom of choice was
bound to remain only a secondary objective for the liberal-democratic
3
Kydd (2005).
4
Ikenberry (2008), 10; cf. Risse-Kappen (1996).
5
6
Adler and Barnett (1998), 34.
7
Shklar (1989).
8
Müller (2014).
political systems in this context.9 This type of liberalism did not seek to
draft positive Utopias for the future but was rather an exercise in “warding
off destructive visions of transformation”, such as communism
and fascism.10
In light of the above, it would, of course, be possible to present a long
list of essential elements that have bound Americans and Europeans
together since the mid-1940s.11 Two overarching factors, however,
deserve particular attention here: security and identity. As regards the for-
mer, there is a strong realist case to be made that the extraordinary conflu-
ence of security interests after the Second World War was the key driver
behind the original consensual-hegemonic bargain; persistent shared
threat perceptions were essential in deepening and maintaining the trans-
atlantic link.12 Arguably, the awareness of a common foe allowed the com-
munity to paper over various transatlantic cracks during the Cold War
years, crises that could have otherwise led to the community’s demise.
Examples abound from each decade: the Suez Crisis in 1956, the incep-
tion of German Ostpolitik in the late 1960s, the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system and the oil crises of the 1970s, and Ronald Reagan’s drive
to up the ante in the Cold War confrontation in the early 1980s.13 One
interpretation is that issues as contentious as these could still be resolved
because they “were either seen as being secondary to […] or could be
folded into the larger East–West competition”.14
The end of the Cold War left the community without such an overarch-
ing existential threat. Western Europe rediscovered its Eastern neighbour-
hood almost overnight, and the United States—triumphant in its own
“indispensability”—had become the global superpower par excellence, the
pinnacle of a “unipolar” world order.15 Although America’s international
attainment had been global throughout the Cold War, it was only after the
9
It is important to bear in mind, though, that intra-European differences were large in this
respect: while les six original EU member states subjugated themselves to the tutelage of
Brussels, the efforts to build functioning national welfare states accelerated in Northern
Europe, and Southern Europe remained under right-wing authoritarianism.
10
Gourevitch (2007), 32.
11
See for example Risse (2008).
12
Walt (1985), 34–41.
13
Anderson (2018), 624; Green Cowles and Egan (2016).
14
Cox (2012), 75.
15
Ikenberry et al. (2008). On the idea of the United States as the “indispensable nation”,
see Albright (1998).
demise of the USSR that Europe really began to lose its “special” status in
the eyes of the American hegemon.16 The terrorist attacks of 9/11, instead
of functioning as a new galvanising impulse for the West, brought into
starker focus the different geopolitical approaches prevalent on two sides
of the Atlantic.17 The conduct of the “War on Terror” and the invasion of
Iraq exposed divisions between the “two Wests” on opposite sides of the
Atlantic, and—to use Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s worn out
phrase—between “old” and “new” Europe.18 If anything, this dynamic
has been accelerated by the impending power transition in the interna-
tional system, as the (economic) importance of Asia has increased steadily.19
The divergence of security interests on the two sides of the Atlantic has,
therefore, been posited by many as the paramount driver behind the
impending transatlantic divorce.20 One can also argue, however, that
Europe’s own experiences of terrorism in the 2000s have had the opposite
effect of galvanising cooperation between the two shores of the Atlantic in
the security sphere, a dynamic which the Ukraine crisis has accentuated
further. In fact, the Trump administration, despite abrasive calls for more
equitable burden-sharing from European allies, has actually increased, in
monetary terms, America’s commitment to Europe’s defence.21 It seems
that a real divorce would be too expensive for both.
Be that as it may, any posited dissonance of security interests, and its
implications for the community, cannot easily be separated from questions
of identity—of religious values, of “shared” educational institutions, of
common ethnic and linguistic roots. Indeed, a liberal institutionalist and
social constructivist case can be made that the sustainability of the transat-
lantic link is, in no small part, a function of the gradual evolution of a
collective identity based on a (broadly speaking) common value base,
which further strengthened within the proverbial West during the Cold
War years.22 Both the European Union and the United States have also
asserted their liberal identities in international society by way of distinct
policies of value promotion, comprising of democracy, human rights, rule
16
Wallace (2016), 359–60.
17
Layne (2008).
18
Kagan (2003); Forsberg and Herd (2006); see also Chap. 4.
19
Cf. Nye (2011); Zakaria (2011); Acharya (2018); Mahbubani (2018).
20
Layne (2008); Nau (2008); Wallace (2016).
21
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (2018).
22
See for example Risse-Kappen (1996) and Fuchs and Klingemann (2008). On a different
view, consult Kupchan (2002).
of law and freedom, the core concern of our exposition.23 Hartmut Mayer
has even argued that the United States and its European partners have a
shared “special responsibility” towards guaranteeing the functioning of
both the transatlantic alliance and the (liberal) international order, given
that the latter still remains very much a Euro- and US-centric creation.24
In this sense the term security community might even be misleading—it is
better, perhaps, to speak of a community of values.
In drafting actual policies, however, identity constellations often func-
tion in a virtually “rationalist” manner. The defence of values and, by
extension, identity can even undermine an actor’s material interests. The
European Union’s sanctions strategy towards Russia is a telling example in
this respect: in spite of the inevitable and also disproportionate blows to
the member state economies, the Union imposed a series of restrictive
measures against Russia following that country’s illegal annexation of the
Crimean peninsula—and this was done with a surprisingly high degree of
unanimity among the European Union’s constituent parts.25 Of course,
identities can also be exploited by policymakers to pursue less benign
objectives by way of inherently rational calculation. A case in point is the
strategy of securitising immigrants, ruthlessly utilised by the Trump
administration and European right-wing populists.
As indicated at the outset, the lead idea of this chapter is that the
rationalism(s) of security concerns and identity politics are undergirded by
an element that is much less “rational” and therefore often difficult to pin
down. We refer to the mechanisms by way of which various ideals of free-
dom inform these polities’ acting and being in the world—their security
and identity, in fact. To these ideals and their defining features we now turn.
Freedom: A Core Value of the Transatlantic

Community
The notion of freedom features prominently in the foundational docu-
ments of both the United States and European integration. The First
Amendment of the US Constitution famously refers to freedom of reli-
gion, the press and peaceful assembly.26 In fact, for the sociologist Gunnar
23
Nicolaïdis (2005), 102–3; Sinkkonen (2015); Lucarelli (2006).
24
Mayer (2006).
25
Sjursen and Rosén (2017).
26
US Const. amend. 1.
Myrdal, the notion of freedom was a central component of the “American

Creed”, the foundational mythology of the nation.27 It is effectively a con-
cept that the United States can anchor its “exceptional” attainment to.28
Twentieth-century Presidents from Woodrow Wilson and Franklin
D. Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush have habitually
articulated America’s international forays in terms of the defence of
freedom(s). In Europe, in turn, the Treaty of Rome (1957) already lays
out the four freedoms of the integration project (goods, persons, services
and capital)—although, admittedly, it was peace, not freedom, which con-
stituted the original rationale for the EEC escapade. In the Treaty of
Lisbon, the current constitutional framework, it is stated that the Union
wishes to “offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice with-
out internal frontiers”.29 As Eastern Europeans began dreaming of mem-
bership in the European Union after the collapse of communism, they
essentially believed that membership would somehow fulfil their new-born
category of freedom.
But how can we analyse a concept that so centrally informs the Dasein
of many political communities and that is time and time again uttered by
political elites? A concept that is seldom defined in any substantive sense,
and regularly even employed as an empty signifier? We need to resort to
writings on freedom in political theory and philosophy for conceptual
guidance.30
The most well-known point of departure in this respect is, of course,
Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive freedom.31 The
former refers to an actor being free from external constraints imposed by
others, to non-interference. The latter underlines the opportunity to make
a free choice between available options. Berlin’s original contribution
hardly addresses the nature of that choice, but to speak of positive free-
dom in any fruitful sense, it appears that the choice has to be both
meaningful and reasonable, and the chooser must have access to the fruits
27
Myrdal (1964).
28
The idea of American exceptionalism naturally has diverse meanings for different iden-
tity-political groups. It can, for instance, accommodate both an aloof, even “isolationist”,
approach to the world or serve as a justification for a drive to remake the world in America’s
image. For recent discussion, see for example Kupchan (2018) and Cha (2015).
29
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3, 2010 O.J. C 83/01, at 17.
30
For a more in-depth discussion on the categorisation presented below, see Sinkkonen
and Vogt (2019).
31
Berlin (1969).
Table 5.1 A sketch of categorisations of freedom for analysing foreign-policy

discourse
Categorisations of freedom in elite political discourse
Positive- Positive Freedom as the opportunity to make a choice

negative between available options
dimension Negative/ Freedom from external constraints
non-interference
Non-domination Freedom as the ability not to serve the powerful
Level of focus Individual Civil liberties associated with liberal democracy

dimension Systemic Freedom achieved through elite-driven
maintenance, change or restoration of the essential
building blocks of a political community
Socio-institutional Freedom realised through emergent “bottom-up”
creation of socio-political institutions by collections
of individuals in an egalitarian setting
of her choice.32 A simple negative/positive dichotomy, however, fails to

take into account how active interference by others is not necessary for an
actor to feel restrained by external constraints: in a social system such hin-
drances can encompass, for instance, norms, taboos, rules, practices or
even a hegemonic order as a totality. True freedom would, from this
standpoint, require non-domination, the ability not to serve the power-
ful—or, what is also important here, the ability not to let emotional
impediments such as fear prevail.33 The positive-negative distinction thus
begs a tripartite categorisation of freedom, one encompassing non-domi-
nation (see Table 5.1).
To further shed light on the distinction between non-interference and
non-domination, the notions of coercive, institutional, structural and pro-
ductive power, as categorised by Barnett and Duvall, prove particularly
useful.34 The first of these refers to the direct exercise of power by one
actor over another, in the sense of A preventing B from doing
X. Institutional power, in turn, reflects the ability of the dominant to con-
strain others within institutionalised settings. The structural dimension
captures direct power-relations of super- and subordination (e.g. master-
slave). Productive power, finally, pertains to discursive frameworks of
32
Kioupkiolis (2009).
33
See for example Pettit (1996) and Skinner (2002).
34
Barnett and Duvall (2005).
power that constrain actors, perhaps even without their explicit knowledge
or realisation. While non-interference clearly pertains to the coercive logic,
non-domination can be approached in terms of the latter three.
Since our exposition is concerned with external affairs discourses, it is
pertinent to make another tripartite distinction, one that philosophical cate-
gorisations of freedom do not usually address. Namely, it is possible to distin-
guish between the levels of focus (or analysis, or abstraction) where freedom is
found, promoted and achieved (see Table 5.1).35 Freedom is most often con-
ceptualised as an individual-level phenomenon. The plethora of civil liberties
associated with liberal democracy—whether freedom of speech, religion,
assembly, inquiry or movement—are, in the most basic sense, something to
be enjoyed by singular human actors. These can evidently be framed in both
negative and positive terms. On the other hand, it is also possible to identify
articulations of freedom whose intention is to change, maintain or restore
the essential building blocks—values, norms, principles, habits, practices and
so on—of a political community, often in an elite-led, top-down manner.
Such systemic freedom is usually addressed in the context of distinguishable,
functionally undifferentiated and spatially bounded entities, for instance,
states, civilisations, cultural spheres and regions.
It does not seem far-fetched to argue that the (liberal) right tradition-
ally saw itself as the defender of the rights of the individual and hence of
his/her freedom and liberty. The left, in contrast, pushed for systemic (or
rather collective) freedom that was to be achieved by way of individual
equality. In the post-Cold War world, however, this constellation has all
but turned around. Left-leaning politicians have tried to fill the ideological
vacuum that they have found themselves in by strongly emphasising (indi-
vidual) human rights, whereas those leaning towards the right have been
concerned with the systemic freedom of the economy in the framework of
(often and paradoxically highly regulated) neo-liberal policies.36
In terms of the level of focus, a third distinguishable category of free-
dom emerges in the space between the individual and the systemic.
Individuals can obviously join together in groups and undertake projects
to realise their goals and, in the process, produce realms of freedom. Such
emergent “bottom-up” creation of differentiated socio-political institu-
tions by collections of individuals, insofar as the creation takes place
35
On the level-of-analysis problematique in the study of international politics, see Waltz
(2001) and Singer (1961).
36
See for example Gauchet (2016).
through mutual recognition of others as equals and negotiation of shared

interests, can be termed socio-institutional freedom.37 Individuals in other
words seek to, or come to, empower themselves by way of collective coop-
eration. In this respect, the distinction between individual and socio-
institutional freedom brings to mind what in political theory have been
described as the two ultimate aims of human emancipation—emancipation
as individual autonomy (Locke, Mill) or as collective power (Rousseau).38
The above discussion on the conceptual complexity of freedom can also
be presented in the form of a table (Table 5.1). In fact, the two tripartite
categorisations we have laid out will function as an analytical toolbox that
allows us to make sense of the manifold articulations of freedom in the
foreign-political elite discourses on both sides of the Atlantic. The tempo-
ral focus of our exposition is on the period after the Ukraine crisis, which
has proven to be a formative moment for a new phase of geographically
focused and threat-perceptive transatlantic security cooperation in the
post-Cold War era.
We have systematically read recent key foreign-policy-related speeches
by European Union leaders (Ashton, Mogherini, van Rompuy, Tusk,
Barroso, Juncker), including the central figures who sit in the (intergov-
ernmental) European Council (especially Macron and Merkel). A number
of core external affairs documents, The Global Strategy of 2016 and The
European Consensus on Development (2017) above all, also inform our
analysis. In the case of the United States, the primary focus is on speeches
of the foreign-policy leadership, the two previous Presidents (Obama and
Trump) in particular, along with the most recent Secretaries of State
(Kerry, Tillerson, Pompeo). In addition, we have also taken stock of key
US policy documents such as the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review (QDDR, 2015), the two most recent National Security Strategies
(NSS, 2015 and 2017) and the publicly available synopsis of the National
Defense Strategy (NDS, 2018).
It is obvious that the two polities are so different that the “match”
between these empirical materials is suboptimal at most if we were to cre-
ate an illusion of systematic comparison. That is not our aim, however. We
rather seek to show what kinds of discursive seeds, prevalent articulations,
one can identify in terms of freedom in the case of these two polities; the
exposition is suggestive and contrastive rather than comparative.
37
Cf. Honneth (2011).
38
Cf. e.g. Rosanvallon (2006).
Turning to the Inside: Emphasis on Sovereignty

The most important recent freedom-related storyline proved fairly easy to
distinguish in both cases. Both sides of the Atlantic spill a lot of rhetorical
energy on emphasising their (new-born?) desire for sovereignty, vis-à-vis
the United States in the case of EU-Europe, against the rest of the world
in the USA of Donald Trump—an evident contrast to the tone struck by
his predecessor Barack Obama. In a sense this denotes a turn to the inside,
to the realist idea that one first needs to guarantee one’s own security,
means for self-help and survival, even if one still affirms the basic blessings
of a multilateral world order; this is, perhaps, a paramount example of IR
rationalism, indeed = liberalism plus realism.
The speeches of the selected politicians offer a number of expressive
illustrations of this new accent on sovereignty, of the ability to follow one’s
preferred course of action. In a speech to EU Ambassadors in September
2018, Federica Mogherini, the former Italian foreign minister in charge of
EU external affairs since 2014, strongly emphasised Europe’s distinct
identity, the continent’s own space of manoeuvre, its “own compass”. She
also expressed her unreserved support for a multilateral international
order, for a system that should not tolerate badly behaving hegemons—a
view widely shared by current European leaders.
We believe it is essential for us to focus on this: the whole world is going

through a moment of chaos. And the question is: is it a moment or a long-
term trend? In both cases, we need as Europeans, as the European Union,
to be extremely clear, united and firm with our own compass in mind: the set
of values, principles and interests that guide our actions on the global scene.
Because the number of global powers continues to rise, but instead of hav-
ing a system that governs this multi-polar world through multilateral institu-
tions, the very idea of multilateralism is being challenged more every day.
There is a return to the logic of bilateral transactions between powers—if
not between individual leaders; a situation where “might makes right”, and
the world is split in spheres of influence. This is not our logic and many oth-
ers in the world do not want to go this way.39
This arguably represents a strong formulation of systemic freedom; or

perhaps we can here see an idea(l) of the world as based on non-domination
that, at the end of the day, makes (intergovernmental) cooperation more
feasible. Moreover, within the European Union, one can even wonder
39
Mogherini (2018), emphases added.
whether there is a sense of coming of age, of getting rid of the illusions of

one’s youth, after decades of ultimately unsuccessful aspirations to develop
the parameters of Union governance in an inherently self-sufficient man-
ner. Perhaps we even witness a desire to finally leave the realm of an insti-
tutionalised liberalism of fear that called for some sort of protection from
the outside. Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker seemed to echo
this mental framework in his last State of the Union speech (September
2018) entitled “The Hour of European Sovereignty”. He summarised the
logic as follows:
The geopolitical situation makes this Europe’s hour: the time for European
sovereignty has come. It is time Europe took its destiny into its own hands.
It is time Europe developed what I coined “Weltpolitikfähigkeit”—the
capacity to play a role, as a Union, in shaping global affairs. Europe has to
become a more sovereign actor in international relations.40
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, a cautious but determined

European, has also echoed this type of thinking, emanating both at
national and regional levels, in her recent public addresses.41 The follow-
ing extract is from a speech that she gave to her country’s diplomats in
July 2018. The German word in the original, Schicksalsgemeinshaft (“a
community with a common destiny”), is here key, almost in a paradoxical
manner: sovereignty, the defending of one’s own interests, is fully justified
but it must materialise with due consideration to the wishes and interests
and values of the others and the sustainable limits of the earth:
[…] working together in many ways—multilateralism—is not a form of

altruism. Every country needs to assert its interests and work in the interna-
tional community to ensure that what is specific to its own people and coun-
try is heard. But in view of the many challenges, we sense that as a global
community we are also a community with a common destiny. That is why
we will continue to play our part in global, joint multilateral cooperation
and to try to strengthen it in any way we can.42
40
Juncker (2018).
41
On Merkel cf. Chap. 4.
42
Merkel (2018a). The original German formulation reads thus: “Nun ist es natürlich so,
dass vielfältige Zusammenarbeit, der Multilateralismus, kein Altruismus ist. Vielmehr muss
jedes Land seine Interessen vertreten und in der Weltgemeinschaft so zusammenarbeiten, dass
das, was das eigene Volk, das eigene Land ausmacht, auch zur Geltung kommt. Aber angesichts
vieler Herausforderungen spüren wir doch, dass wir als globale Gemeinschaft eine
A vision, fundamentally similar to the articulations above, was, in fact,

laid out by President Barack Obama in his final address before the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2016. For the outgo-
ing White House incumbent, the state of the world brought forth a para-
dox, wherein heretofore unimaginable prosperity has been offset by
disenchantment in post-industrial societies. In Obama’s view, the world
thus faced a choice between a “better model of cooperation and integra-
tion” and “a world sharply divided” into exclusive identity-based constel-
lations, ones based on “nation and tribe and race and religion”.43 The
speech also rehearses a theme that proliferated in the President’s parlance
throughout his tenure, the idea that human agency can alter the shape of
history, move it towards a higher moral plane and even combat what he
terms the “retreat of freedom”.44 Making the right kind of choice, a ratio-
nal choice, between engagement and retrenchment, in short, necessitates
commitment to institutions on the part of the powerful:
Sometimes I’m criticized in my own country for professing a belief in inter-

national norms and multilateral institutions. But I am convinced that in the
long run, giving up some freedom of action—not giving up our ability to
protect ourselves or pursue our core interests, but binding ourselves to
international rules over the long term—enhances our security. […] We are all
stakeholders in this international system, and it calls upon all of us to invest
in the success of institutions to which we belong. And the good news is, is
that many nations have shown what kind of progress is possible when we
make those commitments.45
In Obama’s vision, therefore, the way forward is trading ideas of non-

interference for an agenda of positive freedom that also embraces non-
domination, one ultimately attainable through commitment to
Schicksalsgemeinschaft sind. Deshalb werden wir uns auch weiter in die weltweite, gemeinsame,
multilaterale Zusammenarbeit einbringen und versuchen, sie zu stärken, wo immer wir das
können” (Merkel 2018b).
43
Obama (2016a).
44
Ibid. Obama often returned to the idea that the “arc of history” can be steered in the
direction of justice. See for example Goldberg (2016). The notion is also taken up, in a criti-
cal vein, by the Trump administration in its National Security Strategy: “[t]here is no arc of
history that ensures that America’s free political and economic system will automatically
prevail”, Trump (2017a), 37.
45
Obama (2016a), emphasis added.
international institutions.46 However, this approach would not entail

rescinding the capacity to protect oneself and pursue cherished goals. In
Obama’s vision, sovereignty is ultimately exercised through “collective
action”.47 Security, stability and, we dare add, the realisation of systemic
freedom, necessitate the creation of genuinely inclusive fora wherein actors
with potentially conflicting identities can find common cause.48
Such eloquent articulations have been hard to come by during Donald
Trump’s tenure in the White House. Unlike Obama, Trump has called for
US disengagement from global commitments such as the Paris Agreement
on Climate Change, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA,
Iran Nuclear deal) and the UN Human Rights Council. Such forays reflect
Trump’s long-held animosity towards international constraints, as well as
his opposition to Obama’s foreign-policy legacy at large.49 This fledgling
Trumpian approach to the world—“America First”—has also been mar-
keted, to global and domestic audiences alike, as a marriage between free-
dom and sovereignty. Such a framing of freedom took centre stage in
Trump’s most recent address to the UNGA in September 2018:
In America, we believe in the majesty of freedom and the dignity of the

individual. We believe in self-government and the rule of law. And we prize
the culture that sustains our liberty—a culture built on strong families, deep
faith, and fierce independence. We celebrate our heroes, we treasure our
traditions, and above all, we love our country. […] To unleash this incredi-
ble potential in our people, we must defend the foundations that make it all
possible. Sovereign and independent nations are the only vehicle where free-
dom has ever survived, democracy has ever endured, or peace has ever pros-
pered. And so we must protect our sovereignty and our cherished
independence above all. […] Let us choose peace and freedom over domi-
nation and defeat.50
At present it seems that such calls for non-interference are hardly an

exercise in creative renegotiation of stale institutions of global governance.
Instead, the Trump administration is trying to further unbind the American
Gulliver so it can strike self-serving transactional bargains with the
46
Obama (2015).
47
Obama (2016b).
48
Obama (2016c).
49
Laderman and Simms (2017) and Daalder and Lindsay (2018).
50
Trump (2018).
Lilliputians.51 In particular, the Trumpian worldview conflicts with

Obama’s by equating sovereignty with non-interference. The President
refuses to see an acceptable level of checks on American power as the price
to pay for a qualitatively different amalgamation of liberty and sovereignty,
one that would allow the United States to enjoy freedom in the positive
sense by opening up novel avenues for cooperation, and potentially fosters
(a semblance of) non-domination in a complex 21st-century world. This
is reflected, for instance, in his remarks to the Faith and Freedom Coalition
in June 2017, shortly after he had announced the United States exit from
the Paris agreement:
To protect […] jobs and the sovereignty and freedom of the United States,
I followed through on my promise to withdraw from the Paris climate
accord. […] You understand it. You understand how bad it was for our
country. It’s going to strip us of our jobs, our wealth, our companies. And
they keep saying, oh, it’s nonbinding—so innocent. I figure between that
deal, the Iran deal, NAFTA—we’ve got some beauties, don’t we? […]
[W]hat we won’t do is let other countries take advantage of the United
States anymore and dictate what we are doing and dictate our future. From
now on, we will follow a very simple rule: Every day I am President, we are
going to make America first—not somebody else, not some other country.52
This focus on sovereignty as something to be built in order to ensure

actorness—a positive notion of freedom, perhaps—in the world, even if for
the more value-driven causes of justice and human freedom, has also
gained purchase on the other side of the Atlantic over the past few years.
The European Union’s Global Strategy, for example, “nurtures the ambi-
tion of strategic autonomy for the European Union”.53 France’s President
Emmanuel Macron has assumed the role of a leading propagator in this
respect, echoing, no doubt, traditional (and at times desperate) French
status-hunting on the world arena. To the extent Macron’s celebrated
speech of September 2017 at Sorbonne represents the future of the
European Union, this emphasis on sovereignty à la independent actorness,
possibly based on material power resources, will not vanish any time soon.
Sovereignty offers the primary point of departure, or an organising prin-
51
See esp. Bolton (2018).
52
Trump (2017b).
53
EEAS (2016).
ciple, for the entire speech.54 The pronoun “we” plays an important role
here—just as it does in Trump’s rhetoric:
As I have done at every point in front of the French people, I would today
like to say with resolute conviction: the Europe of today is too weak, too
slow, too inefficient, but Europe alone can enable us to take action in the
world, in the face of the big contemporary challenges. Only Europe can, in
a word, guarantee genuine sovereignty or our ability to exist in today’s
world to defend our values and interests. European sovereignty requires
constructing, and we must do it. Why? Because what constructs and forges
our profound identity, this balance of values, this relation with freedom,
human rights and justice cannot be found anywhere on the planet.55
The World Outside: Real-Political Resilience

and Strategic Competition
The new emphasis on sovereignty thus assumes more or less similar rhe-
torical forms on both sides of the Atlantic. As the reported differences in
views vis-à-vis multilateral cooperation indicate, however, the ways in
which these two actors wish to shape or simply relate themselves to the
world around them display attitudes that operate wide apart from each
other. The USA, for its part, fundamentally posits itself into a framework
of global-level competition—a competition that takes place in every cor-
ner of the world with other great and emerging powers, China in particu-
lar. The European Union, by contrast, focuses on functioning relations
with its neighbouring areas in addition to its long-term development part-
ners, particularly the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The
Union’s global reach and ambition is, in a sense, qualified.
54
In the autumn of 2018, in connection with the 100th anniversary celebrations of the end
of the First World War, Macron even started to propagate in favour of an independent
European army. The proposal was, however, met with a healthy dose of scepticism in many
an EU member state—and even by the American president, despite his incessant calls for
more equitable burden-sharing.
55
Macron (2017a), emphasis added. The speech in the original French reads as follows:
“Comme je l’ai assumé à chaque instant devant les Français, je le dis aujourd’hui avec une
conviction intacte: l’Europe que nous connaissons est trop faible, trop lente, trop inefficace, mais
l’Europe seule peut nous donner une capacité d’action dans le monde, face aux grands défis
contemporains. L’Europe seule peut, en un mot, assurer une souveraineté réelle, c’est-à-dire notre
capacité à exister dans le monde actuel pour y défendre nos valeurs et nos intérêts. Il y a une
souveraineté européenne à construire, et il y a la nécessité de la construire. Pourquoi? Parce que
ce qui constitue, ce qui forge notre identité profonde, cet équilibre de valeur, ce rapport à la lib-
erté, aux Droits de l’Homme, à la justice est inédit sur la Planète” Macron (2017b).
The European Union seems to have realised, at least in its official docu-
mentation, what inherent difficulties the imposition of liberal values, and an
order informed by them, may spell to those whose values remain fundamen-
tally different. Different contexts and constellations require different policy
measures; a sense of realpolitik and pragmatism needs to prevail in relations
with other states and regions—or of what Joris Larik calls “nuance”.56 The
new catchword to be promoted is therefore “resilience”, defined as “the
ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering
from internal and external crises”.57 The European Union’s framework of
action thus comprises multilateral cooperation in terms of resilience and
realpolitik instead of a full-hearted agenda of global competition. The Global
Strategy formulates this trust towards resilience in an unequivocal manner:
Together with its partners, the EU will […] promote resilience in its sur-
rounding regions. A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for
prosperity and democracy. But the reverse holds true as well. To ensure
sustainable security, it is not only state institutions that we will support.
Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resilience is a broader con-
cept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient soci-
ety featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development
lies at the heart of a resilient state.58
It is worth noting that the European Union’s self-image has tradition-

ally been that of a provider of opportunities to the individuals—of positive
individual freedom, one might add. It seems that this traditional liberal-
positive idea also pertains to the current talk on resilience, or at least it is
possible to identify a bottom-up (rather than systemic) emphasis in terms
of how society is generally being understood; this reflects, perhaps, an
underlying idea of socio-institutional freedom. The European Consensus
on Development of 2017, effectively an extension of the Global Strategy,
reiterates the Union’s basic adherence to resilience—for example “support
to resilience at all levels” and “fostering a dynamic and multidimensional
approach to resilience”59—but it also includes several lists of individual-
level pledges of benevolence drafted in terms of what has often been called
the capability approach.60 For example:
56
Larik (2018).
57
EEAS (2016), 24.
58
Ibid., 23–24.
59
European Commission (2017), §9.
60
For example, Ibrahim (2006).
The European Union and its Member States will implement a rights-based
approach to development cooperation, encompassing all human rights.
They will promote inclusion and participation, non-discrimination, equality
and equity, transparency and accountability. The European Union and its
Member States will continue to play a key role in ensuring that no-one is left
behind, wherever people live and regardless of ethnicity, gender, age, dis-
ability, religion or beliefs, sexual orientation and gender identity, migration
status or other factors. This approach includes addressing the multiple dis-
criminations faced by vulnerable people and marginalised groups.61
The realpolitik of resilience and cooperation—flexible cooperation—is

not meant to be altruistic in any sense, of course; it is designed to serve the
long-term interests of European citizens. No wonder, then, that there is
currently a lively debate whether we need to see this type of resilience-talk
as a novel mode of neo-liberal neo-colonialism, or whether it truly repre-
sents an unprecedented turn in defining the relations between the West
and “the Rest”, something which can be combined with resistance
(against, for instance, unfair global conditions).62 Federica Mogherini has
repeatedly made a point about this non-altruism, while also emphasising
the Union’s possible role as a kind of powerful assistant in world affairs:
So we are there in difficult times. We are there in positive times, we are there
when it is a matter of investing in infrastructures or in difficult institutional
reforms, or in difficult judiciary reforms, or in difficult political transitions.
And the list could continue, case by case, capital by capital. Because we know,
as Europeans, that it is when we invest in peace, cooperation, good neigh-
bourly relations that our people are better off. This is simply our experience
inside the European Union and it is quite easy and simple: it is only sometimes
difficult to remind ourselves in these difficult times. This is the European way
in this new reality. Where others see fault lines and spheres of influence, we try
to bridge differences and create spaces for win-win solutions and cooperation.63
Whereas the European Union rhetorically wishes to “stand by” its part-
ners, all possible partners, and thus shows respect to local ways of life, the
unfolding changes in the international (geo)strategic environment have
led the United States to underscore unhindered access to the global arenas
upon which a functioning and open inter- and transnational order depends.
61
European Commission (2017), §16.
62
For example, Bourbeau and Caitlin (2018) and Mckeown and Glenn (2017).
63
Mogherini (2017).
This sentiment of maintaining systemic freedom on a grand, global scale

was succinctly enshrined in Barack Obama’s 2015 National Security
Strategy under the rubric of “shared spaces”:
The world is connected by shared spaces—cyber, space, air, and oceans—

that enable the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas. They are the
arteries of the global economy and civil society, and access is at risk due to
increased competition and provocative behaviors. Therefore, we will con-
tinue to promote rules for responsible behavior while making sure we have
the capabilities to assure access to these shared spaces.64
The United States, the hegemon, wants to stand in the centre of these
spaces, on the podium in fact—and from there fundamentally shape them.
This also means retaining the ability, the positive freedom, to gain access
for oneself and grant others the same possibilities.65 The Obama adminis-
tration, moreover, insisted that ensuring sustainable and unimpeded use of
these arenas would necessitate a mixture of multilevel collaboration with
actors beyond and below the state, as well as a willingness to engage in
“rules-based” contestation with “emerging powers”.66 In fact, the notion
of a renegotiated (liberal) international order, where China and perhaps
even Russia should ultimately assume the role of stakeholder, remained
part of US foreign-policy discourse until the end of the Obama era,
although in increasingly tenuous coexistence with less benign interpreta-
tions of Beijing’s and especially Moscow’s international conduct.67
This approach may have represented a vision of non-domination, one that
64
Obama (2015), 12, emphasis added.
65
This is compatible with its predominant post-Second World War grand-strategic leitmo-
tif, namely that “deep engagement” with the world serves US interests (Brooks and
Wohlforth 2016).
66
Obama (2015), 7, 29; see also U.S. Department of State (2015), 9.
67
Cf. Obama (2016a); Goldberg (2016). America’s China policy, for instance, has, for the
better part of the post-Cold War era, been beset by a dilemma. On the one hand, it has been
deemed important to pursue deepened immersion of China into the institutions of the liberal
international order. On the other hand, there has always been an element of fear in the back-
ground, a fear that China might use that very immersion to grow powerful and seek to
overthrow the incumbent hegemon, along with the order that the United States has fostered
since the end of the Second World War. See for example de Graaff and Van Apeldoorn
(2018); Campbell and Ratner (2018); and Foreign Affairs (2018). With respect to Russia,
each US president since the end of the Cold War has arguably entered office with the wish to
improve relations—none of them has succeeded due to a confluence of divergent interests,
worldviews and perceptions between Washington and Moscow. Katz (2018).
pertained to both regional constellations (e.g. the Asia Pacific or Europe)

and the global level (e.g. systems of economic exchange or the high seas).
The strategic documents produced by Donald Trump’s national secu-
rity team have, unsurprisingly, shifted US preoccupations further away
from the realm of norm-bounded cooperation towards strategic competi-
tion—a state of affairs that the administration has claimed to “embrace”.68
The January 2018 synopsis of the National Defense Strategy lays out the
logic of US global engagement in the Trump era in terms of perceived
threats to systemic freedom:
The National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly complex

global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free
and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic
competition between nations. These changes require a clear-eyed appraisal of
the threats we face, acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare,
and a transformation of how the Department conducts business. The central
challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term,
strategic competition by […] revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that
China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian
model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic,
and security decisions.69
The National Security Strategy published in December 2017 is similarly

blunt regarding the threats that the United States faces. The document
places great stress on great-power dynamics but also singles out “rogue
regimes”, “transnational threat groups”, “jihadist terrorists” and “crimi-
nal organizations” as further perils. The challenges posed by these mani-
fold (and multifaceted) actors are framed in the language of freedom, this
time of the individual variety:
While these challenges differ in nature and magnitude, they are fundamen-
tally contests between those who value human dignity and freedom and
those who oppress individuals and enforce uniformity. These competitions
require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades—
policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their
inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn
them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this
premise turned out to be false.70
68
McMaster and Cohn (2017).
69
Mattis (2018), 2, emphasis added.
70
Trump (2017a), 3.
In this vein, the administration perceives the world in dualistic terms, as

“[a] geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world
order”71 and also derides the wisdom of “liberal-democratic enlargement
and inclusion” adhered to by Trump’s predecessors, so-called globalists.72
On occasion, the president has even framed this all-embracing liberal
internationalist agenda as a threat to the preservation of American identity
and, more broadly, Western civilisation.73 Fear, but not a liberalism of fear,
becomes an indispensable starting point of politics.
When thinking in terms of freedom, it is also noteworthy that unlike
the 2015 NSS, the 2017 document speaks of “domains” instead of “shared
spaces”. This terminological reframing may constitute more than a mere
rhetorical shift; it appears symptomatic of a different vein of thinking
about global order. In a world of zero-sum games and “America First”,
competing for access to delineated domains—land, air, maritime, space
and cyberspace—becomes the sine qua non.74 In this reading, ensuring
free access is less and less a shared or pooled responsibility. Instead, various
manifestations of freedom (of navigation, of trade, of movement etc.) are
framed as goods that the blatantly self-interested hegemon provides of its
own volition and is, in extremis, willing to render excludable. Distributing
access to domains and controlling the global flows that enable states to
exercise power across space and time should allow the United States to
retain its position as the sole global superpower into the foreseeable
future.75 Such practices of restricting access are by no means novel, but the
Trump administration might be willing to go further than its predecessors
in imposing control over vital choke points. Here it is evident that
America’s pursuit of freedom, of non-interference, may serve to produce
profound unfreedom for others.
Conclusion
The reflections above show how different understandings of freedom
(possibly) inform new turns, new propositions, in the foreign policies of
the European Union and the United States, often in connection with or
71
Ibid., 45.
72
Ibid., 27; Trump (2018).
73
Trump (2017c); see also Chap. 8.
74
Raik et al. (2018), 15–22.
75
On the notion of global flows and their relevance for US power, see Aaltola et al. (2014).
through such elementary categories of human political life (and transat-

lantic relations) as security and identity. The new emphasis on sovereignty,
easily identifiable on both sides of the Atlantic although with dissimilar
connotations, is a paramount manifestation of the centrality of freedom
for both these actors. The implications of this are not necessarily positive:
if great powers overly emphasise sovereignty, one becomes sceptical about
the possibilities of finding global governance solutions to the pressing
common challenges humanity currently faces.
Two particular differences in terms of freedom conceptions are worth
replicating, however. First of all, the United States, at least with Trump at
the helm, sees the politics of the world through the lenses of non-
interference. The European Union instead, true to post-Cold War transat-
lantic multilateral consensus, promotes a world based on non-domination.
Secondly, the European Union’s rhetoric is clearly less systemic than that of
the United States, the latter having a distinct mental map of global strate-
gic competition. In many contexts, for example in its development work,
the Union embraces an individualist and/or socio-institutional freedom
agenda; its view on society follows a bottom-up logic. This difference may
of course simply be owing to the fact that the European Union’s relations
with the world have always been reactive rather than transformative or
productive; the Union has, in other words, had a much more limited space
of manoeuvrability than the United States. The hegemon, by virtue of its
enviable position in the international power hierarchy, not only possesses
a more global gaze, it also has greater ability than any other international
actor to upend hitherto accepted practices and the normative frameworks
that structure the global arena.
It may be that these differences are also related to, in one way or the
other, the sense of fear that these actors recognise. In the case of the
European Union of the 2010s, the prevailing insistence on a multilateral
global order founded on the rule of law may be seen as an echo of the
anti-utopian, technocratic liberalism of fear that underlined the structura-
tion of the European political system during the post-Cold War decades.
A rule-based liberal order still represents the ultimate guarantee against
the evil, against overly large concentrations of power and ideology.
President Trump’s desire for shelter against diffusions that emanate from
the global arena, whether in the form of people, products or even princi-
ples, reflects a qualitatively different fear, a fear that flows of inclusion
dilute the American (and Western) “self” as an ontological, identity-
political category.
Finally, although there is no doubt that various categories of freedom in

many respects still bind these two polities together, it is evident that the use
of the notion of consensual hegemony is no longer justified. Instead, the
European Union clearly aspires towards a more balanced relationship with
the world outside, the United States included. The objectives of the Union’s
articulated policies, in fact, point to what we would like to name proportion-
ate hegemony, a system where the dominant powers non-hypocritically act in
the name of the global good. The United States, by contrast, seems, at least
for the time being, to be heading in a different direction. Its global engage-
ment is increasingly premised on a sovereign, even solitary, existence in a
dangerous world, where strategic competition between actors within differ-
ent domains represents the new order of the day.
Of course, the perseverance of this type of an aloof approach is contin-
gent upon the ebb and flow of America’s electoral politics. It seems
increasingly likely that the oscillation between more and less engaged
global postures—and, by implication, between prevalent understandings
of what it means to be free and to promote freedom—will become more
pronounced. It is not impossible that some years down the line, Europe
and America will find common cause, united in freedom and together
aspiring for a shared proportionate hegemony.
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CHAPTER 6
They Hate Our Freedoms: Homosexuality

and Islam in the Tolerant West
Roderick McGlynn
In the April 2012 elections, the National Front took almost 26% of the
vote from gay Parisians—ten points more than their heterosexual counter-
parts—after promising to defend gay citizens from the threat of a homo-
phobic Islam. This is part of a growing trend across the West, where the
language of liberalism—of tolerance and individual freedom—is used to
further decidedly anti-liberal ideas. This trend is a new retelling of a story
as old as the West itself, one which uses sexuality to construct a culturally
inferior ‘Orient’ and to recreate the East/West binary which have long
been fundamental tropes of Western imperialism.
This chapter begins with an exploration of Western narratives of prog-
ress and goes on to explore how discourses of tolerance towards homo-
sexuality are used across the world to construct and shape the boundaries
of belonging between East and West. The binary between homosexuality
and Islam forms a key part of this discourse in Western Europe and the
United States in the years after 9/11, where the trope has been success-
fully used to shore up support for nationalist political movements, which
have adopted the language of liberalism to pursue decidedly illiberal aims.
In August 2018, as part of a public debate about the place of the burqa
in British public life, Conservative Member of Parliament Nadine Dorries
tweeted that ‘you cannot expect a society that celebrates gay pride and
R. McGlynn (*)
University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_6
152 R. MCGLYNN
embraces gay marriage to live harmoniously when condoning the suppres-

sion of women forced to cover up’.1 Dorries voted against marriage equal-
ity at every possible opportunity and in 2012 called it a ‘divisive’ idea
pursued by ‘metro elite gay activists’ and called for the policy to be ‘put
into the bin’.2
Dorries’ changing relationship to the gay community is not unique.
Across the West, public figures and politicians who have spent careers
arguing against equalising the age of consent, marriage equality and same-
sex adoption have become increasingly vocal supporters of gay rights. Like
Dorries, this support often arises during conversations about the role of
Islam in the West and references Islam’s intolerance towards homosexual-
ity. This chapter explores how this tolerance, invoked in opposition to the
‘liberal West’, is selectively policed to create and shape a non-Western
Other in the guise the homophobic Muslim. It illustrates how the com-
plex histories of in/tolerance towards homosexuality are overlooked and
replaced with the myth of a tolerant, liberal West and an intolerant—and
therefore conflicting—Islam. In doing so, this chapter traces the shifting
foundations of the West and the ever-changing values which constitute it.
Gender equality has long dominated discussions of Huntington’s
much-contested ‘Clash of Civilisations’ theory. However, in recent years,
scholars have noticed a new kind of public attention towards gay rights.3
Acceptance of homosexuality (or, more accurately, passive tolerance
thereof) has become a defining feature of Western modernity and a totemic
representation of ‘liberalism’s most cherished values of tolerance, accep-
tance and diversity’.4 However, these values are rather new additions to
our understanding of liberalism, an ideology which historically has been
more closely linked with the rights to ‘life, liberty and estate’ as originally
described by John Locke in the seventeenth century.5 While tolerance has
been a part of the liberal lexicon since the time of John Stuart Mill a cen-
tury later, acceptance of women’s rights and gay rights are increasingly
described in political and journalistic rhetoric as core tenets of liberalism
in the twenty-first century as the clash of civilisations is reimagined follow-
ing the attacks of 9/11.
1
Dorries (2018).
2
Dorries (2012).
3
Puar and Rai (2002); Duggan (2004); Puar (2007); Haritaworn et al. (2008) and Butler
(2008).
4
Quoted in Poorthuis and Wansink (2002) and Bellafante (2018).
5
Locke (2003) [1689], 67.
6 THEY HATE OUR FREEDOMS: HOMOSEXUALITY AND ISLAM… 153
However, while the terms of debate have changed, the narrative remains
the same. The deviant sexual desires of the Orient of old were key to the
civilisational discourses that placed the West as morally and culturally
superior. In the West today, the inclusion of certain queer bodies into the
fold of the nation allows for the promulgation of discourses of moral and
cultural superiority vis-à-vis the homophobic Other. In pre-modern times,
‘the Orient’ was a place where lust and desire could be given free rein; the
modern Other to the East is sexually repressed. The terms of deviance
have reversed but the story remains the same. The West is modern, devel-
oped and ‘civilised’; the East is trapped by tradition, morally and culturally
lacking, and ‘barbaric’. This false binary has allowed for certain actors in
the West to construct Islam as an existential threat to the freedoms that
gay people in the West enjoy today.
The opposition between homosexuality and Islam is especially harmful
given that neither are homogenous, fixed entities. Islam is, ‘what Muslims
define and practice as Islamic at a certain place and at a certain time’—a
delicate mix of a numerous of spatial, temporal and individual factors and
certainly not a monolithic entity.6 Sexuality is the same. Just as Islam is
better understood as a mosaic than a monolith, so too with (homo)sexuality.
It is not some kind of natural given, but rather a historical construct spe-
cific to each time and place.7 The Ancient Greeks would not have called
themselves homosexuals; neither would many people who practice same-
sex sexual intercourse in the contemporary non-Western world. I use the
words ‘homosexuality’ and ‘Islam’ throughout this chapter not to ignore
this fact but to attempt to establish a common thread across the globe and
across centuries as I attempt to trace how the queer body has historically
been a sight of cultural contestation between East and West.
In the past, the Orient was the land of ‘sexual promise, […] untiring
sensuality, unlimited desire’, a marker of barbarity which served to rein-
force Western civilisation narratives.8 Today, an idealised tolerance of gay
citizens has become a key marker of modernity in the West and has become
an ‘optic, and an operative technology’ in the production and disciplining
of Muslim Others.9 Just as liberal Western tolerance is an idealised con-
struct rather than a fundamental truth, Islam is not inherently
6
Krämer (1999), 25–26.
7
Halperin (1989) and d’Emilio (1993).
8
Said, Orientalism (2003), 190.
9
Puar (2007), xiii.
154 R. MCGLYNN
omophobic—there is a rich history of the celebration of same-sex desire

h
in the mediaeval Islam world. Sexuality has, however, long been a vehicle
for value contestation between East and West.
In May 2018, Malaysia’s newly elected President Mahathir Mohamad
vowed to take a stand against the tolerance of homosexuality in Malaysia
as part of a wider stand against the creep of Western values into the coun-
try’s society, stating his disappointment that ‘sometimes Asians will accept
western values without questioning’.10 Across the non-Western world,
homosexuality is widely seen as a Western import: 47% of Egyptians sur-
veyed in 2016 and 46% of Saudi Arabians agreed that ‘same-sex desire is a
Western World phenomenon’.11 In many non-Western countries, to reject
homosexuality is to reject Western values.
However, to place homosexuality and Islam in binary opposition to
each other is simply ahistorical, erasing the infinite ways that people have
lived and loved within and between these two identities. Indeed, the
Orientalist project relies on collapsing multiple identities into one homog-
enous, ‘knowable’ whole. Much of the secondary literature, from the
nineteenth century to today, conflates Arab with Middle Eastern with
Muslim with Other. When I refer to these sources, it is not to agree with
this conflation. It is instead to make use of the very limited academic
resources concerning Islam and homosexuality. They are overwhelmingly
produced in the Western academy and the knowledge created there
regarding the Orient/Middle East/Islam is often ahistorical, inaccurate
and politically problematic. Likewise, when I speak of ‘the Orient’, it is
not to attempt to describe a geographic location, but rather to describe a
part of the Western imaginary which—like ‘Muslim’ today—acts as a
placeholder for the unknown.
‘The West’ is similarly an intangible and unknowable descriptor, and
Islam is a rich and diverse theological tradition spanning centuries and
continents. To attempt a comprehensive survey of the past and present
relations between these two markers would be impossible. Instead, this
chapter explores the relationship between Islam and the West through a
series of snapshots, from nineteenth-century Iran to twenty-first-century
Germany, and suggests that two such malleable identities could never be
inherently incompatible; they are constantly in flux and are reimagined as
new political configurations emerge.
10
Marlow and Thanthong-Knight (2018).
11
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (2016).
Islam today does not represent an existential threat to gay people in the
West. There is, however, a growing threat which does threaten the foun-
dations upon which the liberal West is built. Far-right, decidedly anti-
liberal actors now couch their views in the language of the liberalism, as
ethnic nationalists across Europe and the United States have increasingly
come to weaponise ‘diversity’ and ‘tolerance’ in their war on Islam. Far
from being threatened by barbarians at the borders, the crisis of the mod-
ern West comes from within.
Liberalism, Tolerance and Western Modernity

‘Progress is with the West’, wrote British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour in
1908. A century later, these words were echoed by the former Editor-in-
Chief of The Economist, when he wrote that ‘to be Western has meant to be
at the forefront of science, social change, of culture, of affluence, of influ-
ence, of power in all its forms’.12 For its inhabitants, the West has always
been synonymous with progress, civilisation and modernity. Modernity
today is signified by the acceptance of liberal democracy which Fukuyama
famously deemed ‘the end of history’—the apex of civilisation which the
West had reached and which the rest would eventually attain. Modern lib-
eralism, as described by John Stuart Mill, is an ideology wherein ‘the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others…. Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’.13 It is an
ideology hallmarked by the principles of pluralism and individual freedom.
It is this tolerance which opponents of Islam purport to defend from
outside attack. After the attack on the Twin Towers, President Bush gave
an address to Congress in which he declared that Al Qaeda ‘hate our free-
doms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to
vote and assemble and disagree with each other’. President Bush went on
to declare the fight against the terrorist group as ‘civilization’s fight […]
the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and free-
dom’. His speech was the wellspring for a discussion on Islamic funda-
mentalism that dominated public and political discussion for years to
come. This public conversation, which drew heavily on Orientalist tropes,
acted in tandem with practices of racial profiling in the name of anti-
terrorism to contribute towards the ‘racialization of Islam’, wherein bod-
12
Emmot (2017), 2; Balfour (1908).
13
Mill (2008) [1859], 68–69.
156 R. MCGLYNN
ies which appeared to be Arab, Middle Eastern or South Asian were read
as ‘Muslim’.14 Islam became a sweeping identity, occupying the geographic
and mental space as ‘the Orient’ of old. ‘Islam’, like ‘the Orient’, came to
be a placeholder for difference and the barbarism of the Other. The sud-
den public and political recognition of Muslims living in the West after
9/11 precipitated a new panic about the clash of values between a tolerant
West and an intolerant Islam. The justification for the War on Terror, like
all Western incursions into ‘the Orient’, was intimately linked with civilis-
ing discourses. Tolerance has become one of the key weapons with which
this ideological war is fought and across the West and politicians have
weaponised this perceived intolerance to homosexuality to shore up sup-
port for anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, ethnic nationalist movements.
This is, however, not to suggest that there are no homophobic Muslims.
In March 2019, hundreds of Muslim parents in Birmingham, in the
United Kingdom, signed a petition demanding that their children not be
taught about LGBT relationships as part of their school education and
decrying the ‘promoting of homosexuality and LGBT ways of life to our
children’.15 Similarly, a 2017 survey in the United States found that fewer
American Muslims thought homosexuality ‘should be accepted by society’
than the general population, polling at 52% and 63%, respectively.16
However, American Muslims polled at exactly the same rate as their
Protestant counterparts, and far above the 34% acceptance rate of evan-
gelical Christians who took part in the survey. Similarly, as discussed in
further detail below, in 2014 Christian parents in Germany also petitioned
their children’s schools to stop teaching LGBT issues in class. Like toler-
ance, homophobia is not unique to one group. Instead, far-right, illiberal
actors in the West have sought to legitimise their actions by framing all
Muslims as uniquely homophobic and, in doing so, frame Islam as incom-
patible with the tolerant, liberal West.
Gay Men and Islam: The Creation of a Binary

The American queer theorist Jasbir Puar argues that the binary between
Islam and homosexuality, as two monolithic and opposing identities, came
to prominence in the aftermath of the attacks on the Twin Towers.17
14
Volpp (2002).
15
Parveen (2019).
16
Pew Research Center (2017).
17
Puar (2007).
Tolerance of homosexuality, despite its recent ascension to the realms of

(relative) acceptability, has become intimately linked to notions of moder-
nity. Indeed, gay rights have only ‘recently and inconsistently become
legitimate credentials of modernisation in the West’.18 This inconsistence
is key. The boundaries of belonging have been lightly redrawn, welcoming
certain queer bodies into the arms of the state. Those queers who seek
inclusion within existing political, economic and kinship systems are
rewarded with citizenship. This is what Lisa Duggan has termed ‘homo-
normativity’: a form of neoliberal sexual politics that does not contest
dominant assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, as
part of an ideology which ‘rhetorically remaps and recodes freedom and
liberation in terms of privacy, domesticity, and consumption’.19
It is here that Heidi Nast’s description of a ‘queer patriarchy’ is pre-
scient. She argues that white gay men are unique among queers in their
ability to position themselves as the ideal neoliberal citizen, their ability to
accumulate capital (and consume) unaffected by economic realities such as
racism and the wage gap.20 Nast’s claims are verified by those who would
quantify ‘diversity’ and its economic benefits: one article found that ‘the
leading indicator of a metropolitan area’s high-technology success is a
large gay population’, in a study which defined ‘gay population’ as gay
male couples cohabiting in a normative family structure.21 Bruce Bawer, a
gay American writer who also authored While Europe Slept: How Radical
Islam is Destroying the West from Within, argues that ‘the lifestyle of main-
stream gays is indistinguishable from that of most heterosexual couples in
similar professional and economic circumstances’ and Andrew Sullivan—
also a white gay writer—argues that what gay and lesbian people really
want is simply to be the same as the rest of society.22
Both Sullivan and Bawer take their experience to be the universal expe-
rience of homosexuals worldwide. It is this assumption of a universal
homosexuality that allows Hilary Clinton to stand before the United
Nations Human Rights Council and declare that ‘gay rights are human
rights, and human rights are gay rights’. This statement implies that gay
people all over the world experience their sexuality in the same way, that
18
Rahman (2014), 275.
19
Duggan (2004), 50; Manalansan (2005), 142.
20
Nast (2002).
21
Florida and Gates (2001), 1.
22
Bawer (1993), 33–34; Sullivan (1995).
158 R. MCGLYNN
they practice and are motivated by the same desires the world over. It is
one that suggests gay people, ‘whether white or black, male or female,
soldier or civilian, rich or poor, Palestinian or Israeli, can be comprehended
and interpolated through the same rights framework’.23 The creation of
this universal homonormative citizen—who wants what everyone else
wants—involves ‘shoring up of the respectability of homosexual subjects
in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologised perverse
sexuality of racial others’.24 The homonormative citizen is folded into the
nation, creating the space for gay rights discourses to be used to position
the West as exceptional vis-à-vis an uncivilised Other. The intrusion of the
uncivilised Other into the West is then figured as an existential threat to its
foundational values.
Homonationalism, as defined by Puar, is ‘a facet of modernity and a
historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as
worthy of protection by nation-states’.25 This new benevolence is contin-
gent upon, among other things, gender and kinship normativity and con-
sumption capabilities. Puar goes on to argue that the recognition and
inclusion of the homonormative subject is ‘contingent upon the segrega-
tion and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national
imaginary’.26 Homonationalism is, as all nationalisms, an exclusionary dis-
course, only offered to the ‘good gays’. However, this identity is taken as
universal, as seen with Florida and Gates’ conflation of ‘gay male couples
in a metropolitan area’ with a ‘gay population’.
This conception of a universal homosexuality in the shape of homo-
sexuality as it experienced by the homonormative Western subject is essen-
tial to the homonational project. It creates and sustains the age-old tropes
of the West as a land of modernity, with non-Western sexualities posi-
tioned as somehow ‘backward’ and primitive rather than simply different.
Discourses of gay rights, built on exclusionary terms, are now used to
shore up Orientalist fantasises of non-Western intolerance towards homo-
sexuality, ignoring the violence and intolerance that many gay (and trans-
gender) citizens still face within the West’s borders.
In a post-9/11 world, homophobia has been portrayed as one of many
ways in which the Muslim world is not just different to, but lesser than,
23
Mikdashi (2011).
24
Puar (2013b), 23–43.
25
Puar (2013a), 336–339.
26
Puar in Kuntsman and Miyake (2008), 14.
the West; one 2002 paper produced at the Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard argued that ‘the cultural gulf separating Islam from the West
involves Eros far more than Demos’.27 The reasons offered for this gap are
plenty. One typical example argues that economic development and politi-
cal stability are the defining societal characteristics which determine how
public opinion is shaped towards non-normative groups: the ‘Muslim
world’ is often less economically developed than the West and therefore
tends towards intolerance.28 Another argument is that the relationship
between socioeconomic development and democracy creates the condi-
tions for the acceptance of homosexuality.29 These arguments are more
nuanced than ‘Islam is inherently homophobic’ yet still place Muslim soci-
eties temporally behind the West and construct them as societies playing
catch-up to ‘evolve’ to supposed Western values of tolerance and accep-
tance. This position is also echoed by non-Western LGBT activists: one
Singaporean campaigner noted that ‘the western world … finds it hard to
comprehend how backward we are when it comes to LGBT and human
rights’.30 Nonetheless, these statements themselves serve to buttress con-
ceptions of Western modernity, temporally ahead of the rest of the world.
Homonationalism in Western Europe

After the United States, there is perhaps no country in the West which, in
the aftermath of the attacks on the Twin Towers, so strongly cast Islam as
an existential threat to its values as the Netherlands.31 The gay identity in
the Netherlands today is one of world’s most mainstream and socially and
politically integrated. The Dutch sociologist Jan Duyvendak argues that
this is in part due to Dutch political reactions to the AIDS epidemic, a
point in history where the Western gay identity as we know it today began
to crystallise. For Dutch gay people, the campaign against AIDS was
waged in consultation with the gay population and as a result a radical
politics never emerged. Instead, they have a ‘gay and lesbian movement
[which] has accommodated itself to the parameters of the political, cul-
tural and power balance’ almost since its inception.32
27
Norris and Inglehart (2002).
28
Inglehart and Welzel (2005); Inglehart and Baker (2000).
29
Andersen and Fetner (2008).
30
Quoted in Mosbergen (2015).
31
Mepschen et al. (2010), 963.
32
Schuyf and Krouwel (1999).
160 R. MCGLYNN
This history paved the way for Pim Fortuyn: the gay sociology profes-
sor who made his way into politics on anti-immigration platform, famous
for his repeated statement that ‘I refuse to start again with the emancipa-
tion of women and gays’.33 Fortuyn hailed ‘tolerance and permissiveness
as the great glories of western civilisation’ and repeatedly warned the
Dutch public that Islam was an existential threat to the liberal West.34 It
has been further argued that gay rights discourses achieved such popular-
ity in the Netherlands because gay men—as unattached and autonomous
subjects—represent the ‘ideal citizen of neoliberal modernity’.35 Pim
Fortuyn utilised his homosexuality to present himself as the embodiment
of the nation and positioned both as under attack from Islam.
In France too, rather than acting as ‘dissenting, resistant, and alterna-
tive’, the gay community has instead come to underpin dominant political
formations.36 French gay liberation narratives have long drawn on the
national tradition of republican universalism. French gay organisations,
such as AIDES, founded in 1985 by Daniel Defert after the death of his
partner, Michel Foucault, ‘persisted in regarding their action as removed
from any element of gay activism and, in good republican tradition, with-
out any reference to a so-called homosexual identity’.37 SOS Homophobie,
one of France’s biggest LGBT organisations, states in its aims that ‘it is
only about bringing respect of human beings and equal rights, not to pro-
mote particular rights’.38 From its inception, the French gay movement
fought not for liberation, but for tolerance—the supposed birthright of
Western citizens. Today, this fight has come at the expense of a racialised
Other. In 2012, sociologist Éric Fassin wrote that
France is not the Netherlands. There, the supposed homophobia of migrants

is a reason to close the door to them. Sarkozy has never used gay rights to
draw a line between ‘us’ and ‘them’—we should not over exaggerate the
homonational phenomenon in France.39
Much has changed since then. Today, the National Rally (formerly the
National Front) polls almost ten points higher among gay Parisians than
33
Fortuyn in Poorthuis and Wansink (2002).
34
Chanellor (2002).
35
Mepschen et al. (2010), 970.
36
Puar (2007), 205.
37
Fillieule and Duyvendak (1999), 195.
38
Charter of Intervention, quoted in Dard-Dascot (2012).
39
Fassin in Birnbaum (2012).
their heterosexual counterparts. The party’s former leader, Jean Marine Le

Pen, was a vocal homophobe who declared on national television in 1982
that homosexuality was a ‘biological and social anomaly’ and who was
ultimately expelled from the party in 2011 for repeated Holocaust denial.
His daughter Marine, who took up her father’s mantle, has aggressively
courted groups—including Jewish people and gay people—that were once
historic enemies of the National Rally. She has done so by promising them
tolerance, promising them protection from an intolerant Islam. In doing
so, the National Rally has drawn gay people into the arms of the ethno-
nationalist state at the expense of a racialised Other.
This was not done without collaborators. The strategic director of Le
Pen’s 2011 Presidential campaign, Florian Philpott, is gay, as is her former
Chief Strategist, Sébastien Chenu. Following the murder of 49 people in
a gay club in Florida by a self-professed follower of ISIS, Chenu stated that
Islam is a fundamentally intolerant and homophobic religion that repre-
sents an existential threat to the freedoms that the West is built on.40
Chenu was far from alone in his beliefs. A 2017 poll by Hornet, a dating
app for gay men, found that almost half of respondents under 30 intended
to support Le Pen in that year’s Presidential election.41 One gay voter in
Paris, interviewed by the Associated Press, explained that ‘faced with the
current threats, particularly from radical Islam, gays have realized they’ll
be the first victims of these barbarians, and only Marine is proposing radi-
cal solutions’.42
Not only has tolerance of homosexuality come to represent a liberal,
‘civilised’ society, like in the Netherlands, it has also become increasingly
co-opted by far-right actors in their war on Islam. The increasing promul-
gation of gay men (and very rarely women) as leading figures in far-right
movements has, like in France, led to tolerance of homosexuality becom-
ing lauded in illiberal circles in words, if not in actions (Le Pen’s manifesto
promises to abolish gay marriage). Instead, homosexuality has become a
rhetorical tool, which calls upon liberal ideas of tolerance to figure Islam
as an existential threat to the West. Why then, do gay men in the West
both lead and follow these movements?
Gay men have previously been documented participants in movements
which would seem hostile to them. The most infamous of these is perhaps
40
Parrot (2017).
41
Howell (2017).
42
Adamson (2017).
162 R. MCGLYNN
Ernst Röhm, an early Nazi and head of the Sturmabteilung whose homo-
sexuality was an open secret until his murder during the Night of the Long
Knives in 1934. However, the shift in the twenty-first century has seen gay
men take part in illiberal movements not despite being gay, but because
they are gay. After the attacks of 9/11, political and journalistic rhetoric
seized upon the Taliban’s treatment of women to justify the War on
Terror, with First Lady Laura Bush stating in 2001 that ‘the fight against
terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women’. Since the
attacks, human rights discourses have underpinned Western portrayals of
its enemy to the east—whether the Taliban specifically or Islam more gen-
erally. In whatever form it is mobilised, the ‘enemy to the east’ is figured
as a threat to liberal values and therefore to the freedom of gay people to
live freely in the West. The far-right has exploited these discourses for its
own gain. By drawing upon gay rights discourses, far-right actors are able
to simultaneously increase their support among a new constituency while
detoxifying their image among the general public.
This approach has worked. In May 2018, the British newspaper The
Sunday Times published an article under the headline ‘Heil Hipsters!’ in
which it described how the British far-right ‘are rebranding with skinny
jeans, trainers and honeyed words’.43 The language of hatred has been left
in the twentieth century. Instead, far-right groups speak of their desire to
protect the liberal order, to protect women and gay people, to protect the
West from an external, intolerant threat. In stoking intolerance under the
pretence of fighting for tolerance, the far-right poses a far bigger threat to
the West than anything outside it.
Homosexuality and Islam

Outside the West, opposition to homosexuality has become a means of
creating and affirming an identity distinct from the West.44 Indeed, in
numerous Middle Eastern states, homosexuality is perceived as a ‘western
import’ which threatens the social and moral order. Like Western percep-
tions of homosexuality and Islam as inherently incompatible, this does not
stand up to historical scrutiny—the silence surrounding sexuality in the
modern Middle East is a far cry from the scientific, legal and cultural
43
Gilligan (2018).
44
Katerina Dalacoura (2014).
engagement in earlier centuries.45 However, homosexuality in the Middle

East has become a means of cultural contestation—to reject homosexual-
ity is to reject Western modernity and claim a modernity of one’s own.
While Islam has been portrayed as monolithically homophobic by both
those who would seek to shore up Western identity and by those who
would seek to exclude a racialised Other, the reality is rather more com-
plex than these Orientalist fantasies would portray. The study of sexuality
in the Arab-Islamic world today is a complex one, not least because of its
ethnic, linguistic and political diversity. The ‘Middle East’ is a vast geo-
graphic region which cannot easily be described (accurately), and one
which boasts of a complex history. Likewise, sexuality cannot easily be
translated outside of its cultural context. For this reason, I do not attempt
to speak for the Middle East, the Arab-Islamic world or Islam as a whole,
but rather to suggest a general trend for the region through a snapshot of
the past and present states of homosexuality in two different Muslim-
majority states: Iran and Egypt. The two were chosen for their different
histories with relation to the West, their present and past relationship with
homosexuality, as well as a generous range of English-language scholar-
ship about the relationship between Islam and same-sex desire within the
countries.
Homosexuality has long been a means of cultural contestation. One
Orientalist travel writer in the seventeenth century noted his disgust at the
licentiousness he saw during his travels in Algiers, writing that
This horrible sin of Sodomy is so far from being punish’d amongst them,
that it is part of their ordinary Discourse to boast of their detestable Actions
of that kind. ‘Tis common for Men to fall in Love with Boys, as ‘tis here in
England to be in Love with Women.46
While these encounters were often sensationalised to exaggerate the

uncivility of the Orient, the sentiments were corroborated by Muslim trav-
ellers to Europe, who expressed surprise that ‘flirtation, romance and
courtship for them take place only with women, for they are not inclined
to boys or young men. Rather, that is extremely disgraceful to them’.47
While Khaled El-Rouayheb, in his seminal history of same-sex desire in
45
Dialmy and Uhlmann (2005), 16.
46
Pitts, quoted in El-Royhayeb (2005), 123.
47
al-Saffar, quoted in El-Royhayeb (2005), 123.
164 R. MCGLYNN
the pre-modern Arab-Islamic world, argues that although the concept of

homosexuality did not then exist, there is much evidence to suggest that
the Arab-Islamic world was a (relatively) tolerant place for non-heterosexual
desire.48 Today—despite many documented histories of same-sex desire in
the Islamic world—the view in many modern Muslim societies is that
homosexuality is incompatible with the faith.49
Because of this belief, gay people face extreme prejudice in many Middle
Eastern countries. In 2007, Iranian President Ahmadinejad went as far as
to declare that ‘in Iran, we don’t have homosexuals like in [the United
States]. We don’t have that in our country’.50 Ahmadinejad’s claim is a far
cry from Iran’s relationship with gender and sexuality in the nineteenth
century. The queer historian Afsaneh Najimabadi’s history of the Qajar
period (1785–1925) documents how gender and sexuality were increas-
ingly influenced by the West and how, by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, queerness had come to be reviled by elite Iranians in the same way
Europeans did.51 She notes the effect that Christian Orientalist writers had
on elite urban men, who began to disavow and deny same-sex practices as
they became acutely aware that ‘Europeans considered love and sex
between older and younger men as prevalent in Iran and that they consid-
ered it a vice’.52 The disavowal of same-sex practices led to the adoption of
the Western ontological distinction between homo- and heterosexuality as
two binary identities. During this period, mediaeval Islamic discourses on
sexual practices were selectively dropped and partially replaced by
adaptations of European medical treatises.53 In Iran today, homosexuality
is criminalised and sodomy is punishable by death.
In 2005, the criminalisation of homosexuality in Iran was the source of
a global campaign after two young men were convicted and hanged for
raping a 13-year-old boy. Human Rights Watch issued a statement
stating that
The bulk of evidence suggests that the youths were tried on allegations of
raping a 13-year-old, with the suggestion that they were tried for consensual
48
El-Royhayeb (2005).
49
Babayan and Najmabadi (2008); McDonnel (2010).
50
Quoted in Washington Post (2007).
51
Najmabadi (2005a).
52
Ibid., 80–97.
53
Najmabadi (2005b).
homosexual conduct seemingly based almost entirely on mistranslations and

on cursory news reporting magnified by the Western press.54
Nonetheless, Peter Tatchell and the British gay rights group, OutRage!,
alleged that the two teenagers were arrested for consensual sex and started
a campaign to condemn Iran for its treatment of homosexuality. Faisal
Alam—director of Al-Faitha, a support organisation run by and for queer
Muslims—noted that three ‘homosexual’ Nigerian men were stoned to
death earlier that year without any such indignation.55 Instead, the fixation
on Iranian homophobia forms part of a wider discourse which produces an
imagined liberal West and intolerant Islam.
Like Iran, Egypt today has a fraught relationship with homosexuality. It
is de facto illegal in the country, and 95% of the population believe it
should not be accepted.56 However, like Iran, same-sex desire was part of
Egyptian society before the nineteenth century, with one European travel-
ler in 1801 noting that,
The passion contrary to nature, […] the inconceivable appetite which dis-
honoured the Greeks […] constitute the delight, or to use a juster term, the
infamy of the Egyptians. It is not for the women that their amorous ditties
are composed: it is not on them that tender caresses are lavished.57
Political attitudes have shifted in Egypt as they have in Iran. In May

2001, Egyptian police raided a gay party boat, arresting 52 men. Domestic
press coverage focused on the main defendants’ travels to Europe and
Israel, playing on the belief among many Egyptians that homosexuality is
a Western phenomenon.58 Sexual identities and identities are ‘an arena of
constant surveillance and control’ and, with elections looming in
November, the clampdown offered the government an opportunity to
perform its ‘Egyptianness’.59 It was the most highly publicised crackdown
on same-sex practices in an Arab country, with international media using
the case ‘to make pronouncements on the overall situation of same-sex
practices in Arab and Islamic countries’.60
54
Quoted in Puar (2007), 17.
55
Alam (2005).
56
Pew Research Center (2013).
57
Sonnini, quoted in El-Royhayeb, Before Homosexuality: 251–252.
58
Dawoud (2001).
59
Altman (2001), 2.
60
Awwad (2010), 318–336.
166 R. MCGLYNN
Though today, there are numerous cases of intolerance towards homo-

sexuality among Muslims in the West and Middle East, this is not inherent
to the faith. Instead, the state’s relationship to homosexuality offers the
change to stake a claim to their own version of modernity. Today, the West
portrays itself as a tolerant society in which homosexuality is protected and
individuals are free to live as they please. However, in a West where 30% of
French people surveyed in 2006 said that they would not want a homo-
sexual neighbour, this tolerance seems somewhat misplaced.61 As well as
being uneven across the West today, tolerance of gay men in the West was
nowhere to be seen in the late twentieth century.
Homosexuality and the West

The story of the liberal West is a series of myths about Islam and about the
West; they ‘mobilise a system of power/knowledge that constructs the
Muslim other as a negation of an idealised Western secular self’.62 Indeed,
the story we tell of the West is one of neat distinctions between politics
and religion, public and private and one of complete sexual liberation.63
This is of course not true—Christianity is deeply embedded in Western
life. In the United Kingdom Queen Elizabeth II is both the head of state
and Supreme Governor of the Church of England. In addition, the United
Kingdom, with 26 bishops granted automatic seats in the House of Lords,
still allows unelected Christian leaders to write laws in parliament. Beyond
anachronisms like this, there are more mundane examples: state-mandated
holidays on Christmas and Easter or the expectation that when one dies,
there will be a cemetery and church to be buried in.
The story of sexual liberation is also a myth. The pre-modern West
attacked medieval Islam’s sexual licentiousness; today it attacks its repres-
sion of sexual freedom in the present. From a sign of barbarity, the toler-
ance of certain expressions of homosexuality has become a marker of
civilisation—despite the fact that the social tolerance of homosexuality in
the West is recent and at best partial. The construction of ‘the Muslim
world’ (as if it were one monolithic entity) as uniquely homophobic and
misogynistic is tied to what Anne McClintock calls the ‘eroticisation of
61
World Values Survey, Wave 5 (2005–2008).
62
Mavelli (2013), 163.
63
Mavelli (2012), 68–74.
domination’, whereby sexual politics play a fundamental part in construct-

ing a barbaric Orient.64
Puar’s study of atrocities committed at the Abu Ghraib detention cen-
tre during the Iraq War illustrates the way in which the Islam/homosexu-
ality binary was quite literally weaponised in order to torture detainees.
Prisoners were forced to simulate homosexual acts upon one another, in
the belief that, in the words of one Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at
New York University, ‘such dehumanisation is unacceptable in any cul-
ture, but it is especially so in the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against
Islamic law and it is humiliating for men to naked in front of other men’.65
This statement, with its conflation of Arab and Muslim and sweeping
statements about the Arab/Muslim world, is typical of Orientalist percep-
tions of the relationship between homosexuality and Islam. This binary is
constructed by Western Orientalists and by the elevation of ‘the excep-
tional Muslim’. The exceptional Muslim is the ‘native informant’ who
corroborates Orientalist narratives about Islam and homosexuality.
One such case is that of the aforementioned Faisal Alam, founder of the
Al-Fatiha Foundation. Alam corroborated Western narratives about what
happened at Abu Ghraib, adding that ‘sexual humiliation is perhaps the
worst form of torture for any Muslim […] Iraq, much like the rest of the
Arab world, places great emphasis on notions of masculinity. Forcing men
to masturbate in front of each other and to mock same-sex acts or homo-
sexual acts is perverse and sadistic in the eyes of many Muslims’.66 Forcing
prisoners to strip naked, to masturbate and to sexually assault each other
would be perverse and sadistic in the eyes of most people.
However, Puar understands these statements as part of a ‘complex
dance of positionality’ that Muslim groups in the West are forced to play.67
Drawing on the cultural critic Rey Chow’s concept of ‘coercive mimeti-
cism’—a process in which ‘those who are marginal to mainstream
Western culture are expected […] to resemble and replicate the very
banal preconceptions that have been appended to them’—queer Muslims,
more than many other minority groups, are forced to legitimate Orientalist
tropes in order to escape suspicion.68 Additionally, Tamsila Tauqir, a queer
64
McClintock (1995).
65
Haykel (2004), cited in Puar (2007), 106.
66
Al-Fathia Press Release (2004), quoted in Puar (2007), p. 91.
67
Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: 91.
68
Chow (2002), 107.
168 R. MCGLYNN
Muslim activist and scholar, adds that there is almost no way to get mass
media attention without acting as the ‘exceptional Muslim’. Tauqir reports
that she received numerous requests, from both the gay and mainstream
press, to ‘respond to the difficulties of being gay and Muslim in Britain’.
When she suggested that they report on progressive imams who officiated
nikahs (Muslim marriage contracts) for same-sex couples, Muslim parents
who supported their gay children or the considerable liberal and progres-
sive work being done within Islam, these journalists ‘reacted with silence’.69
Gay rights are used as a disciplinary tool to create and shape the folk devil
that is the homophobic Muslim, constructed as an existential threat to
Western values.
During the 1980s, gay men themselves were the Western folk devil du
jour—to be homosexual was to exhibit ‘exemplary and admonitory’ signs
of Otherness.70 They enjoyed demonisation by both the media and the
public at large, with the treatment of gay men just 40 years ago illustrating
how easily the limits of citizenship and belonging are recast. Indeed, less
than 40 years before Hilary Clinton stood before the United Nations and
declared that ‘gay rights are human rights’, President Reagan’s
Communications Director said publicly that ‘homosexuals […] have
declared war upon nature, and now nature is exacting an awful retribution’.
The tolerance that homosexuality enjoys in the West today is recent indeed.
Stanley Cohen, in his work on folk devils, argues that a moral panic
occurs when ‘a person or group of persons emerges to become defined as
a threat to societal values and interests’.71 During the AIDS epidemic,
images of traditional morality and family values were called upon to be
defended against the sex-crazed and disease-ridden homosexual; today
tolerance and diversity are imagined as foundational Western values which
is under attack from an intolerant and homophobic Islam.
Values like ‘acceptance’ and ‘tolerance’ have become the barometer by
which to measure Westernness. This is exemplified in the (since retracted)
so-called Muslim Test, introduced in the German state of Baden-
Württemberg in 2006 for prospective citizens applying from states which
were members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which asked
questions such as:
69
Tauqir in Haritaworn et al. (2008), 14.
70
Watney (1987), 98.
71
Cohen (2011), 16.
• ‘Imagine your full-grown son comes to you and declares that he is

homosexual and would like to live with another man. How do
you react?’
• ‘In Germany various politicians have made themselves publicly
known as homosexuals. What do you think about the fact that there
are homosexuals in public office in Germany?’72
In 2014, the conservative state was embroiled in a debate over the

teaching of homosexuality in schools, with plans to include homosexuality
in sexual health lessons leading to over 60,000 people petitioning ‘against
the ideology of the rainbow’. The ‘Muslim Test’ was clearly not one
designed with the interests of queer Germans at heart. Tolerance of homo-
sexuality has become the marker of the ‘civilised’ and ‘modern’ West,
homophobia a symbol of a ‘traditional’ and ‘backward’ Other. Like the
concept of gender equality, same-sex relationships function as paradig-
matic examples of tolerance—same-sex relationships are used by the media
and by politicians to ‘teach tolerance’ to those who are framed as lacking
it. Gay rights have been recast as an operative technology in the produc-
tion and disciplining of Muslim Others in the West and to buttress the
construction of an idealised tolerant West.
It is not, for many, oxymoronic to describe oneself as both Scottish and
British, or as a secular Jew. Neither is it impossible to be both Western and
Muslim. Indeed, the irreconcilable binary between Islam and the West is a
relatively new creation. Richard Southern, in his history of mediaeval
Europe, ‘found only one mention of the name Mahomet [before 1100] in
literature outside Spain and Southern Italy. But from about the year 1120,
everyone in the West had some idea of what Islam meant’.73 Islam has, in
one form or another, been part of Europe for almost a millennium. Indeed,
the histories of the West and of Islam are not two separate stories. They are
two strands of a history woven across centuries and continents, connect-
ing and crossing across time and space.
The Future of the Liberal Project

To be Western is to adhere to a constantly changing set of values and
boundaries that are redrawn according to the political configuration of the
time. Liberal democracy is today figured as the pinnacle of modernity,
72
Quoted in Haritaworn (2015), 10–11.
73
Southern (1962), 28.
170 R. MCGLYNN
with tolerance and individual freedoms celebrated as the foundations upon

which a modern society like the West is built. Tolerance towards homo-
sexuality has become a key marker of this modernity, despite its recent and
inconsistent appearance across the West.
The queer Westerner has, within living memory, been transformed
from a figure of death to a figure of life, mobilised against the new enemy
from the East in the guise of the homophobic Muslim. Acceptance of
homosexuality has come to be intimately linked to notions of Westernness,
despite its recent ascension to the realms of (relative) acceptability.
Following the gay liberation movements of the late twentieth century and
more recent citizenship advances such as legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships and antidiscrimination laws, gay rights have become main-
stream in the Western world and the institution of such policies has been
figured as part of a teleological progress towards a more liberal democracy.
However, the language of liberalism has, perversely, become weap-
onised by those who would seek to make the West a decidedly illiberal
place. Tolerance of homosexuality has become more than a marker of
modernity—it has been weaponised in a war on the West’s racialised
Other. Following the 2016 attack on the Pulse nightclub, then-Presidential
candidate Donald Trump, promised to ‘do everything in [his] power to
protect LGBT citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful for-
eign ideology’.74 Since his election, President Trump has appointed anti-
gay Mike Pence as his Vice President, attempted to reinstate a ban on
transgender people serving in the military and, without explanation, fired
all members of the Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS. Before
and during his Presidency, the American President has been, at best,
ambivalent to the idea of gay rights. A rare public statement in favour of
the LGBT community came only as part of an attack on an external
threat—‘Islam’. The tale has come full circle—‘Islam’ has replaced ‘the
Orient’ and tolerance of homosexuality has become vaunted, not
denounced. The story remains the same: the West is civilised and the
East is not.
Stories of sexual liberation and gender equality are told and used to
frame the West as the ‘avatar of both freedom and modernity’ while simul-
taneously depicting Muslims as backward and homophobic.75 In marking
Muslims as uniquely intolerant and homophobic, the far-right across the
74
Quoted in Bruni (2018).
75
Butler (2008).
West has succeeded in shoring up support from gay citizens on both sides
of the Atlantic. However, neither Islam, homosexuality nor the West is
timeless, unchanging entities with intrinsic qualities. They are cultural cre-
ations which are of their time and place and constantly in flux.
We live now in one such time where the story of the West is changing.
The post-war consensus of liberal democracy in the West is now con-
fronted a threat unlike any other it has faced. It does not come from the
Other to the East, but from the rising tide of the far-right within. Through
co-opting liberal values of tolerance, anti-liberal politicians like Marine Le
Pen or Donald Trump continue to further an exclusionary, ethnic nation-
alist agenda that, unless challenged at its core, may usher in the end of the
liberal experiment.
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CHAPTER 7
Who Owns the West? German Political

Establishment and the New Right
Ann-Judith Rabenschlag
On December 19, 2016, Germany became the target of a major Islamist

terror attack.1 The 24-year-old Tunisian Anis Amri drove a truck into the
crowd on the Berlin Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz killing and
injuring several. Amri managed to escape but was eventually shot by the
Italian police in Milano. The day after, the Islamic State claimed responsi-
bility for the deed.2 Reactions by German politicians and the media came
fast: The actual target, so the conclusion ran, had been neither the
Christmas market nor the city of Berlin itself. Rather, these spots were
seen as symbolic targets representing a larger entity, which by many was
1
Attacks on a smaller scale had taken place before in, for example, Hannover, Essen,
Würzburg and Ansbach. Compare the information by the German intelligence service.
“Verfassungsschutz.”
2
Newspapers with different political affiliations agree on these facts. Compare, for exam-
ple, Spiegel, December 23, 2016, 16–26; taz, December 21, 2016, 1–3 and December
24/25/26, 2016, 4; FAZ, December 20, 2016, 1, December 21, 2016, 1–3 and December
24, 2016, 1f.; SZ, December 20, 2016, 1f., December 21, 2016, 1–3, December 24, 2016,
1–3.
A.-J. Rabenschlag (*)

Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: ann-judith.rabenschlag@historia.su.se

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_7
176 A.-J. RABENSCHLAG
referred to as the West. “The entire free world,” so said the mayor of
Berlin, was mourning.3
Warnings about the endangerment of the West have also been articu-
lated by the populist right. In 2014, the populist movement PEGIDA4
held its first demonstration in Dresden, claiming to protect the West
against Islamization. In 2016, the right-wing Populist Party Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD) promised in its party program “to preserve […]
our occidental Christian culture.”5 And just recently, Thilo Sarrazin, a
Social democrat who has made headlines with xenophobic and
Islamophobic statements, has published his latest bestseller warning about
a “hostile takeover” of Western societies by high birth rates among Muslim
citizens.6
While “the crisis of the West”, hence, appears to be a key notion in
public German (and European) debate, the nature of the West remains
blurred as different actors are using the concept differently. A famous
attempt within German discourse to define the West has been undertaken
by the historian Heinrich August Winkler. Winkler understands the West
as a normative project rooted in the old Occident, the region dominated
by the Roman Western church. Decisive events such as an early separation
between ecclesiastical and worldly power, the renaissance, the reformation
and the enlightenment led, according to Winkler, to the formation of
genuinely Western features: the respect for human rights, the division of
powers, the rule of law and the rule of parliamentary democracies.7
Instead of defining the West, this chapter acknowledges the diverse uses
of the West, highlights its contingency and places it in the field of concep-
tual history. The chapter takes inspiration from recent studies by Anglo-
Saxon and German researchers who have convincingly demonstrated that
the West has been negotiated upon, influenced and reshaped over time
both along the lines of changing sociopolitical circumstances and due to
different political interests.8 As Browning and Lehti have pointed out,
3
Müller, “Terroranschlag Breitscheidplatz.”
4
Abbreviation for “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes”
(Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident).
5
AfD, “Programm für Deutschland.”
6
Sarrazin (2018).
7
Winkler (2009–2015).
8
Trautsch (2017), 58–66; Osterhammel (2017), 101–114; Bavaj and Steber (2017);
Browning and Lehti (2010); Bonnett (2004); Hochgeschwender (2004), 1–30; Gassert
(2001); Doering-Manteuffel (1999).
7 WHO OWNS THE WEST? GERMAN POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT… 177
“speaking ‘West’ will invoke a different cluster of concepts amongst

American and European audiences than many audiences in the Middle
East or Africa.”9 The West, this study argues, cannot be defined “as such,”
but only in relationship to the circumstances under which it is being artic-
ulated. Both context, speakers and the audience take part in the meaning-
making process. Therefore, the West can be integrated with different,
even contradictory, ideas and worldviews.
The terror attack in Berlin mentioned above serves as a case study for
this chapter. By analyzing reactions to, and interpretations of, this event,
the chapter traces and compares different uses of the West. Speeches by
leading politicians, newspaper articles and posts in the social media serve
as source material. The focus lies on the comparison between utterances
by representatives of Germany’s political establishment on the one hand
and representatives of the German New Right on the other. The chapter
includes a transnational perspective by comparing German reactions to the
terror attack with responses from other European politicians to similar
attacks in their home countries.
An Attack Against “Us”: Statements by the Political

Establishment
Both German media and politicians considered the Berlin Christmas mar-
ket and the city of Berlin to be symbolic targets in the fight of Islamist
terrorists against the West. It remains to be seen, however, whether differ-
ent actors referred to the same idea when talking about the West. Who or
what exactly was targeted on December 19, 2016? Let us have a look at
the reactions of German state representatives first.
If one compares the first public statements by Angela Merkel, chancel-
lor of the Federal Republic, Joachim Gauck, then President of the Federal
Republic, and Michael Müller, mayor of the city of Berlin, there are strik-
ing similarities in the description of the target. All three representatives
refer to a collective “us” which fell victim to the terror attack. Gauck uses
the pronoun “we” repeatedly as the first word in the initial sentences of his
speech: “We are united in grief today, indivisibly united with the relatives
of the victims of the attack of Berlin. We mourn the dead. We fear for the
injured. And we feel with their families, their friends. We will not leave
9
Browning and Lehti (2010), 23.
them alone in their pain.”10 Also Merkel uses the collective “us.” At first
sight, however, she seems to refer to all Germans or all inhabitants of
Germany when talking about the grief “we” are feeling: “All of us, an
entire country, are united with them [the victims] in deep grief. All of us
hope, and many of us are praying for them, that they shall find comfort
and support, that they shall recover, and that they are able to go on living
after this terrible blow.”11 Likewise, Michael Müller addresses the collec-
tive “us”: “We are bewildered today, deeply shaken. So shortly before the
holiday, many of us have been looking forward to a couple of happy and
contemplative Christmas days with their families and friends. However,
since yesterday evening we are filled with deep sorrow.”12
The collective “us,” Gauck, Merkel and Müller are addressing, is sup-
posedly united in grief, worries, pain, compassion and shock. The reason
for this alleged companionship between the victims and the addressed
audience does not, despite Merkel’s reference to Germany, lie in a shared
national identity. All three politicians refer to an entity larger than the
community of German citizens. Indirectly referring to terror attacks out-
side of Germany, Gauck states: “But we know that this attack, as those
before it, was aimed for all of us. This was an attack against our midst,
against our way of life.” Clearly, the president emphasizes that he is not
talking about a mere German way of life:
We are shaken now, but those deeds do not shake our convictions. We stand
on firm grounds and we stand together, in Germany, in Europe, and wher-
ever people do live and want to live in freedom […] We in Germany realize
today that we live in a strong community ruled by law and humanity. […]
This community reaches far beyond our national borders.13
Merkel speaks about defending the life, “as we want to live it in

Germany—free, together and open.”14 By this choice of formulation,
Merkel does not refer to a German way of life. Rather she speaks of a way
of life that cherishes values, such as freedom, togetherness and openness,
and calls it a lifestyle Germans want to share. The Mayor of Berlin is very
close to Merkel’s formulation when stating: “This act is an attack against
10
Gauck, “Statement zum Anschlag.”
11
Merkel, “Press statement.”
12
13
Gauck, “Statement zum Anschlag.”
14
Merkel, “Pressestatement.”
our way of life, against our values and against our democracy.” It was “the
entire free world,” which mourned for the victims of the attack.15 “It is up
to ourselves to shape our cosmopolitan city peacefully. Respect, tolerance,
non-violence: These are our common values.”16 All three politicians refer
to a community based on common values and convictions and a certain
way of life. Keywords mentioned in this context are freedom, justice,
humanity, togetherness, tolerance and respect. All three presuppose that
the audience they address sees itself as being a part of this community and
cherishes the values that Merkel, Gauck and Müller connect to it. Müller’s
statement about the “entire free world” is an obvious reference to the
cultural and political West. Its opponent, however, is no longer fascist
Germany or the communist East behind the Iron Curtain as it used to be
in the past decades, but everyone who disrespects and violates the values
of the common “us” Merkel, Gauck and Müller are referring to. Against
the background of the debate on refugees coming to Germany, this “us”
sketches furthermore the picture of an integrative society and thereby
turns against the attempts of the extreme right to put all immigrants under
the general suspicion of being terrorists.
It is remarkable, indeed, that neither Merkel nor Gauck nor Müller
literally use the notion of the West or of Western values, respectively. This
might be a coincidence. However, considering the fact that none of the
speeches was a spontaneous statement, it seems more likely that the choice
of formulation was a conscious one: Merkel, Gauck and Müller are trying
to avoid the construction of an opposition between the West and its ene-
mies. Instead, they are addressing a societal “us” which is inclusive to
everyone willing to share the values and lifestyle of Western democracies.
However, as a look at speeches by heads of states in similar situations
shows, the strong reference to a transnational community of values is far
from being a common feature. It seems reasonable to discuss whether it
proves to be a typically German one.
On June 4, 2017, one day after an Islamist terror attack on London
Bridge and Borough Market, the British Prime Minister Theresa May
addressed the public at Downing Street. Already in the first sentence of
her speech, May pointed out, whom she considered to have been the tar-
get of the attack: “Last night,” May stated, “our country fell victim to a
brutal terrorist attack once again.” The notion of the “country” appears
15
16
Ibid.
six times in her eight-minutes-long speech, in addition to references to

“Britain,” “the United Kingdom” and “our society.” At one point only,
May mentions a wider, international context when stating that Islamist
extremism was “an ideology that claims our Western values of freedom,
democracy and human rights are incompatible with the religion of Islam.”
Otherwise, the community she addresses is the British people. Islamist
extremism, May claims, “will only be defeated when we turn people’s
minds away from this violence and make them understand that our val-
ues—pluralistic British values—are superior to anything offered by the
preachers and supporters of hate. […] The whole country needs to come
together to take on this extremism, and we need to live our lives not in a
series of separated, segregated communities, but as one truly United
Kingdom. […] As a country,” May concludes, “our response must be as it
has always been when we have been confronted by violence. We must
come together, we must pull together, and united we will take on and
defeat our enemies.”17
Likewise, the first official response by the Swedish Prime Minister
Stefan Löfven to the Islamist terror attack in the city center of Stockholm
on April 7, 2017, addressed explicitly the Swedish people. “Today, we
have been confronted with a terrible attack in the heart of our capital,”
Löfven opened his speech. “An entire country” was united in “grief, anger
and decisiveness.” The prime minister uses the notion of Sweden five
times in his three-minutes-long speech. The comment that “leaders from
the entire world have gotten in touch in order to express their sympathy”
is the only reference to a community larger than Sweden. According to
Löfven, the intention of the terrorist was “to undermine democracy” and
to spread hate and mistrust. The defense of democracy, however, is going
to be taken care of by Swedish society itself. “Such actions,” Löfven refers
to the terrorist’s alleged intention to undermine democracy and social
solidarity, “are never going to succeed in Sweden. […] In this difficult
hour, Sweden shows its strength […] I know that many are worried and
shaken now. Many of us are going to hug those we love especially tightly
tonight. […] Take care of each other and together we will take care
of Sweden.”18
When Paris was hit by a series of Islamist terror attacks on November
13, 2015, also president Hollande appealed to national feelings of
17
May, “PM statement.”
18
Löfven, “Uttalande.”
togetherness. In his four-minutes-long speech Hollande uses the notion

“la France” eight times, the notion of “the country” four times along with
other references to the “homeland” and “the republic.” He calls the
attacks an act of war “against France, against the values that we defend all
over the world, against what we are, a free country, which speaks to the
entire planet.”19 While Merkel and Gauck refer to values of a transnational
community shared by Germany, Hollande turns the chain of dependency
upside down speaking of French values shared by a transnational commu-
nity. By means of an anaphor, Hollande puts the French nation in the
focus of the speech: “France is strong and even though she may be hurt,
she will always rise again and nothing will be able to break us down, even
though we are troubled by grief. France is solid, she is active, France is
brave and she will triumph over barbarism.”20
The official press statement by the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano
Rajoy, commenting on the Islamist terror attack in Barcelona on August
17, 2017, differs to some degree from the statements by May, Löfven and
Hollande. Rajoy emphasizes the international dimension of Islamist ter-
rorism by stating that “the neighbors at places such as Madrid, Paris, Nice,
Brussels, Berlin or London have experienced the same pain and the same
uncertainty as the people of Barcelona are suffering from today.” The
tragedy of Barcelona “unites us in pain with so many other countries in the
world.” Nota bene, however, that Rajoy only lines up cities located in
Western Europe. “Today,” Rajoy states, “the fight against terrorism is the
first priority of free and open societies as ours. […] All of us, who share the
same love for freedom, for the dignity of being human, and for a society
based on justice and not on fear and hate, we are united in this cause.”
Also Rajoy, however, closes his speech by emphasizing the importance of
national strength. Against the background of the domestic struggle
between the national government and separatist activists in Catalonia,
Rajoy uses the attack to demonstrate national unity: “We shall never forget
that Spain is a united people.” Reminding of the terror attacks committed
by ETA, Rajoy states: “We have fought many battles against terrorism in
the course of history. We have always won them. Also in this situation we,
the Spanish people, shall overcome.”21
19
Hollande, “L’intégralité de l’allocution.”
20
Ibid.
21
Rajoy, “Declaración institucional.”
At least in the light of this short comparison, it appears to be a typical

German feature to downplay national identity and instead emphasize the
transnational community of values. Almost 70 years after Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer launched his policy of “Westintegration,” a political and
cultural orientation westward still dominates the argumentation of
Germany’s political establishment. While Merkel, Gauck and Müller
avoided the notion of the West, other representatives of Germany’s politi-
cal elite, who were not obliged to represent the ethnically and culturally
heterogeneous entities of the German nation and the city of Berlin
respectively,22 did name the West as the target of the attack. In an inter-
view with Bild, Cem Özdemir, then party leader of Die Grünen, called the
incident an attack “against the West and its values.”23 Özdemir did not
explain what kind of values he considered Western but presupposed a
common understanding. A clear utterance concerning the nature of the
West was made by Wolfgang Schäuble, then minister of finance in Merkel’s
cabinet and one of the grand seigneurs in German politics. Holding a
speech on the celebration for Klaus Kinkel’s 80th birthday (a former
German foreign minister and front figure of Germany’s liberal party)
which happened to take place the day after the attack, Schäuble stated,
Klaus Kinkel embodies a great deal of what we urgently need—in Germany,

in Europe, in the entire Western world—that is to say that we do not allow
anyone to confuse us concerning the foundations of our Western model, as
Winkler […] has defined it: Democracy, human rights, the dignity of every
individual […], the state of law, open-mindedness and tolerance, but also a
sufficient degree of security […], openness towards the world […].24
Schäuble’s reference to Winkler is remarkable, indeed.25 Schäuble did

not only adopt Winkler’s definition of a Western model but also the histo-
rian’s normative impetus to consider the West to be a societal model to
fight for. Schäuble articulates what Merkel, Gauck and Müller have hinted
at but avoided to express explicitly. He connects the societal “us” with
“Germany, Europe and the entire Western world” and thereby rephrases
22
By the end of 2017, ca. 10.6 million persons with an exclusively foreign nationality were
registered in Germany; https://www.destatis.de. Almost one-fifth of Berlin’s citizens are
foreigners; “Statistik-berlin-brandenburg.”
23
Kautz, “BILD-Interview.”
24
Freie Demokratische Partei, “Wolfgang Schäuble.”
25
Likewise in Die Zeit: Schäuble (2016), 6.
not only Winkler’s hypothesis of Germany’s successful road to West26 but

relates to the popular way of framing German contemporary history as a
continuous, successful Westernization. Having left its national Sonderweg,
so reads the core argument of this narrative dominating German academic
and political discourse alike, Germany has eventually found guidance and
orientation in the close cooperation with Western Europe and the United
States, exchanging the ideas of 1914 with those of 1789.27 The West, as
prominent members of Germany’s political establishment understand it, is
hence not just a synonym for democratic societies ruled by law, the protec-
tion of human rights and the dignity of the individual. It represents, fur-
thermore, a core piece of the self-image of a society eager to assure to itself
that it has left the road to nationalism and fascism once and for all.
The West as “Open Society”? Reactions of the Press

As to be expected, German press published intensively on the terror attack
in Berlin.28 Articles published in the direct aftermath of the attack mainly
deal with the reconstruction of the events on December 19, 2016.
Headlines are dominated by the reactions of eyewitnesses, relatives to vic-
tims, and the citizens of Berlin. It is a mixture of shock, fear and grief that
finds its expression on the front pages. “Terror on Berlin Christmas mar-
ket,” titles Bild, the Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel speaks about an “Attack
on Berlin,” “The shock of Berlin” writes Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and,
referring to the Christmas song “Holy Night, Silent Night”, the front
page of Der Spiegel reads: “Silent night. Christmas in times of terror.”29
Two days after the attack, Der Tagesspiegel claims that the terrorist hit
“the heart of the West.”30 It is a headline playing with multiple meanings
of the West. The tower of the Gedächtniskirche, the church located right
next to the Breitscheidplatz, where the terror attack took place, was
destroyed in the Second World War. Its damaged tower has since then
served as a symbol for peace and non-violence. The Breitscheidplatz,
26
Winkler (2000).
27
Conze (2005), 5; Levsen and Torp (2016), 11f.; Doering-Manteuffel (1999), 21;
Gassert (2001), 15f.
28
The analysis is based on all articles dealing with the terror attack published in Bild, Der
Spiegel, Der Tagesspiegel, Die Welt, Die Zeit, FAZ, JF, ND and SZ and taz during the period
December 20, 2016–January 2, 2017.
29
Bild, “Terror”, 1; Schmidt (2016), 1; Zoch (2016), 1; Spiegel, “Stille Nacht.”
30
Schröder (2016), 10.
directly next to the famous shopping street Kurfürstendamm and the

shopping mall Kaufhaus des Westens, was one of the central places in old
West Berlin. In December 2016, the place obviously presented a symbolic
target for a perpetrator hating Western culture. To hit a target such close
to these symbolic spots, Der Tagesspiegel concludes, proved “that the per-
petrator did not only have a viciously optimized plan, but also a feeling for
the most vulnerable spots of the Christianly influenced Western society.”31
In the weekly Der Spiegel, journalist and historian Nils Minkmar resonates
on the cultural and political effects of Islamist terrorism in Europe and con-
cludes that Islamist terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 has managed “to
shake the fundaments of the United States, indeed of the entire West.”32
According to Minkmar, these fundaments consist in “the liberal society,”
“the open society,” a societal model based on “universal human and citizen
rights,” a “reasonable welfare state,” a press and a constitutional state acting
responsibly and supporting the European integration. Minkmar sees these
values threatened both by external and internal enemies represented by radi-
cal Islam and German right-wing populists. The open society as a symbol for
the West has become the new political utopia to strive for.33 Minkmar thereby
refers to the societal model developed by the philosopher Karl Popper.
Closely linked to the ideas of liberalism, Popper’s model of the open society
focuses on the freedom of the individual and considers the state to be a nec-
essary evil to assure basic rules of social togetherness. In contrast to closed
societies presented by all forms of dictatorship, the open society distinguishes
itself by the respect for the rights of the individual and equalitarian justice.
Political decisions are following the guidelines of human reason and are freed
from ideological taboos. Discourse in an open society allows for questioning
existing power structures and a reverse of ruling political mindsets.34
Direct or indirect references to Popper’s model of the open society can
be found in several big German dailies and weeklies such as Die Zeit,
Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ), SZ, Die Welt, or Der Tagesspiegel. An arti-
cle in the latter one even carries the headline: “The open society and its
enemies.”35 Confronted with terrorism, the “open society” is said to be
31
Matthies (2016), 11.
32
Minkmar (2016), 30.
33
Ibid., 31.
34
Popper (1947), especially 153, 165, 166 and 177.
35
Flade (2016), 1; Di Lorenzo and Wefing (2016), 1; Münkler (2016), 42; Kohler (2016)
1; Truscheit (2016), 1; Deckers (2016), 1; Kister (2016b), “Hass”, 4; Emcke (2016), 5;
Jansen (2016), 2.
threatened not only from the outside but equally by domestic politics
turning the open society into a closed one. The main conflict, chief editor
of Die Zeit Josef Joffe argues, cannot be described as “the rest against the
West.” Instead, European domestic politics was “poisoned” by fear and
the call for a police state. What is at stake is “the liberal state of law”
[Rechtsstaat].36 Likewise, SZ-journalist Kurt Kister argues: “It is astonish-
ing over and over again, how xenophobes and Islamist fanatics promote
each other.”37
When Popper wrote his famous text, he did so against the background
of Hitler’s aggressive expansion policy and the spread of fascism in
Europe.38 Nevertheless, Popper identified totalitarian tendencies in the
works of Marx, too. At the beginning of the Cold War, his harsh critique
of the Soviet system as a totalitarian, closed society provoked the anger of
the intellectual European left. This skepticism against Popper remained
very much alive among the members of the student rebellion of 1968.
Positive references to Popper’s societal model in Germany’s most influen-
tial left-wing daily die tageszeitung (taz) are therefore remarkable: on the
front page of its issue of December 21, taz calls the attack in Berlin an
“attack on the open society.”39 A leading politician of the party Die Grünen
expresses his worries that right-wing populists might take advantage of the
terror attack: “Those, who want to split our liberal and open society and
to damage the state governed by law [Rechtsstaat], are going to try to
exploit the attack.”40 And the day after, taz-journalist Jan Feddersen makes
another positive reference to Popper, when criticizing the traditional aver-
sion of Germany’s political left, which he himself belongs to, toward state-
security measures: “Especially the friends of an open society have to engage
for a public life which is secure.”41
The open society serves as a synonym for a West which is to be pro-
tected against the external threat of terrorism but also against domestic
attempts to limit individual rights—attempts which in this understanding
are presented to be non-Western. This understanding of the West is hence
closely connected with the image of the societal “us” and the “free Western
world” Merkel, Gauck and Müller are referring to. It furthermore appears
36
Joffe (2016), 43.
37
Kister (2016a), “Tod”, 4.
38
The first edition was published in 1945.
39
taz, “Herausforderung,” 1.
40
taz, “Interview,” 2.
41
Feddersen (2016), 1.
to be just another reproduction of Winkler’s definition of the West as a

normative project based on the values of democracy, human rights, the
dignity of the individual and a state of law.
A different interpretation of the West can be found in the socialist
newspaper Neues Deutschland (ND), the former press organ of the state
party Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) in East Germany,
which outlived both the political system of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) and its party. Commenting on the attack in Berlin, also
ND considers the West to have been the target. However, in contrast to
the quoted print media above, ND does not consider the West a societal
model to be worth fighting for. Instead, ND focuses on foreign politics
and considers the West to be an imperialistic global player. Due to its
aggressive foreign politics, ND argues, the West is partly responsible for
violence and misery in the world: “One would like to agree with the mor-
ally steadfast guardians of values of the West who warn against populists,
since they were—no less than the perpetrators of terror—crisis profiteers,”
ND states. “However, this is only one part of the truth. […] The over-
whelming political consensus says that the world is not acceptable until it
is shaped according to the Western model—violently.”42 Following a
Marxist approach, ND declares modern terrorism to be the expression of
an international class struggle: “It is still a fight between the owners of
means of production and those who are depending on them or have
already been outdistanced by them.”43 Terrorism could only be prevented
for good if the West was ready to abandon its role as imperialistic player
and to meet with Muslim states on an equal basis, “free from regulatory
missionary work.”44
Another exception from the mainstream media coverage represent the
articles of Bild, organ of the yellow-press with the highest press circulation
in Germany. These articles differ in so far as they do not refer to the West
at all. Instead, Bild identifies Germany and the Germans as targets.
“Germany and the Germans are being tested,” concludes the commenta-
tor on December 21, 2016.45 Besides describing brutal details of the attack
and the horrors of terrorism as such, Bild focuses on mistakes made by
42
Kalbe (2016), 3.
43
Schweppenhäuser (2016), 9.
44
Seifert and Winter (2017), 10.
45
Blome (2016), 2.
state organs in preventing the attack.46 “Make our country more secure,”
Bild demands on December 22, 2016.47 In an interview with the priest of
the Gedächtniskirche, Bild refers to the Germans as a Christian commu-
nity. The interview bears the title: “Only God can forgive this,” a rough
paraphrasing of one of the answers of the priest. Bild continues: “As the
attack targeted a symbolic place, one can state: It was also an attack against
our values.”48 By means of intertextuality, both Islam and immigrants, in
general, are pointed out as threats to these alleged Christian values. “A
partial ban of the Burka is coming,” Bild prints on the same page as an
article on Germany’s alleged “failure of deportation.”49 “How is it possi-
ble that Anis Amri was released so quickly in summer from prison?” Bild
writes and continues on the following page: “How is it possible that we do
not get rid of criminal refugees but take back so many?”50 A clear reference
to the West, however, can be found on the extreme right. Let us, hence,
have a look how Germany’s New Right reacted to the terror attack.
Another West? Argumentative Structures Within

Right-Wing Populist Circles
One of the latest national parliaments in the European Union where a
right-wing Populist Party has managed to take seats, the German
Bundestag today includes the right-wing Populist Party AfD. AfD is try-
ing to change the political tone in German public debate, which according
to the party is controlled by taboos set by the political establishment.
These efforts concern, not the least, the concept of the West. A charis-
matic representative of the New Right who gained wide attention in con-
nection with the Berlin-attack is Marcus Pretzell, then the head of AfD in
Nordrhein-Westfalen, and a member of the European Parliament. The
same evening the Christmas market was hit, Pretzell published a tweet
causing strong reactions. Pretzell wrote: “When does the German state of
law [Rechtsstaat] strike back? When does this damn hypocrisy finally stop?
46
Compare, for example: Bild, “Abschiebe-Versagen,” 1; Bergmann et al. (2016), 2; Bild,
“Land sicherer,” 4; Bild, “Wie kann es sein, dass Anis Amri,” 2; Bild, “Schließt endlich,” 2;
Bild, “Wer trägt Schuld,” 3.
47
Bild, “Land sicherer,” 4.
48
Link and Solms-Laubach (2016), 5.
49
Bild, “Teil-Verbot,” 1; Bild, “Abschiebe-versagen,” 1.
50
Bild, “Wie kann es sein, dass Anis Amri,” 2; Bild, “Wie kann es sein, dass wir kriminelle,” 3.
They are Merkel’s dead! #Nice, #Berlin.”51 With this tweet, Pretzell
referred to Merkel’s reaction to the European migration crisis of late 2015
and her decision to open German borders for about one million refugees
mainly coming from the Middle East.52 By the time Pretzell posed his
message, the perpetrator of the attack was still unknown. With his accusa-
tion of Merkel, Pretzell nevertheless presumed that an immigrant had
committed the murders.
Frauke Petry, then party leader of the AfD, today member of the
right-wing splinter party Blaue Partei and married to Pretzell, sup-
ported this judgment. On Facebook, she commented: “This [the terror
attack] is not only an attack on our freedom and our way of life, but also
on our Christian tradition. Regarding the question of immigration
Germany is politically a divided country […] Germany is not secure
anymore. It would be the duty of the chancellor to tell you this. Since
she is not going to do it, I am telling you.”53 Pretzell was supported
even internationally. Marion Maréchal-Le Pen of the French New Right
tweeted: “#Berlin: the Islamist terrorist is an immigrant. #Merkel
responsible. In France and in Europe, let’s stop these ignorant political
leaders!”54 The Dutch right-wing populist Geert Wilders published a
photo-collage on his Twitter account showing Angela Merkel with
blood on her hands.55
In his tweet, Pretzell did not mention the West. A couple of weeks ear-
lier, however, on occasion of October 3, Germany’s national holiday cel-
ebrating German-German reunification, Pretzell had outlined his idea of
how the West, Islam and immigration were intertwined. In his speech,
Pretzell connected the oppression of the East German people in the for-
mer GDR with the alleged suppression of the European peoples by the
European Union and the alleged loss of European identity due to Muslim
immigration. While Pretzell partly used the notion of Europe when refer-
ring to the European Union, he also utilized the notions Europe, West
and Western Europe synonymously. As their opposite and enemy, he
51
Pretzell, “twitter-account.” By “Nice” Pretzell refers to the Islamist terror attack which
had been taken place in the French city in July 2016.
52
The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) names a net migration
of 1.1 million for 2015. BAMF, “Migrationsbericht 2015.”
53
AfD, “Facebook-account.”
54
Maréchal, “twitter-account.”
55
Wilders, “twitter-account.”
named “the Oriental world,” “the Arab world” and Islam. “Today,”
Pretzell stated,
the great colonial power of Europe […] is about to let itself being colonial-
ized—by people who to a major part consider the laws of their religion to be
more mandatory than the laws of the states they [these people] have immi-
grated into. About half of them lives mentally in the 7th century. Many of
the immigrants from the oriental world do not think anything of democracy,
a state of law, gender equality, religious freedom and the freedom of speech.
Instead, most of them consider the Western lifestyle to be decadent. […]
They bring neither aqueducts nor wine [as the Romans], but analphabetism,
veiled women and the jihad to Europe.56
Pretzell outlines an opposition between the West on one side, which

he connects with democracy, a state of law, gender equality, religious
freedom and freedom of speech, and immigrants from “the oriental
world” on the other, whom he considers as the opposition to these
allegedly Western values. A differentiation between several migrant
groups (be it due to their home country, their religious or social back-
ground, their age or sex) is missing. Instead, it is a collective other,
“the” migrant from Muslim countries who is said to threaten Europe
and Western culture. Just as other voices quoted above, Pretzell warns
about the decline of the West. However, while media and politicians of
the political establishment see the West threatened by restrictions to
the “open society,” Pretzell identifies Muslim immigration as the
major threat. As Pretzell states in the quote above, the typical migrant
is uneducated, fanatically religious, willing to use violence, and male—
the “veiled women” whom this migrant supposedly brings to Europe,
appear just as objects. Female migrants as actors are missing in
Pretzell’s speech—a contradiction to his supposed concern about gen-
der equality.
The request by mainstream media and politicians to show tolerance and
openness toward multiculturalism, Pretzell calls to be an expression of
“Western cultural self-hate.” Praising the Hungarian head of state Viktor
Orbán for his decision to hold a plebiscite on immigration, Pretzell states:
“While the Eastern European rediscover their will for self-preservation,
many Western European mistake the elementary desire of a people, that is
56
Pretzell, “Rede.”
to stay alive, for racism.”57 This line of argumentation reflects an argumen-

tative pattern commonly used by the New Right. The so-called concept of
ethnopluralism conceives peoples as groups with specific characteristics
which need to be protected against foreign cultural influences. The New
Right also speaks about “the right to difference”—a right being sup-
pressed by political actors creating multi-ethnical and multicultural nation-
states.58 Building on ideas of Germany’s Conservative Revolution during
the interwar period, ethnopluralism rejects the assumption that multicul-
tural societies can be functional. By presenting the separation of different
ethnic groups as a natural desire of humanity, ethnopluralism presents
itself less aggressive than racism. Thereby the ideas of ethnopluralism are
attractive not only for right-wing extremists but also for broader circles of
society.59 Following the logics of ethnopluralist thinking, Pretzell’s under-
standing of the West is not compatible with the idea of a multicultural and
pluralistic society but stands in clear opposition to Popper’s model of the
open society. Instead, Pretzell draws up a scenario of a social Darwinist
struggle taking place between Western and oriental culture.
Outside the social media, Germany’s New Right commented on the
terror attack in Berlin among others in the weekly Junge Freiheit (JF).
Founded 1986 in the Federal Republic, JF has advanced to one of the
most influential press organs of the German New Right. The newspaper
has successfully reached out to the academic spectrum of the political
extreme right. According to the paper’s own judgment, their readers are
“educated, high-income and politically interested.”60 The paper has a
close political affiliation to the AfD.61 The article commenting on the
attack in Berlin was written by the chief editor of JF, Dieter Stein. Stein,
who has a past in several right extremist political parties, criticizes the reac-
tions of the German public: “The silence after the terror,” reads the head-
line and Stein continues: “Odd, almost spooky is the tranquility with
which the people of Berlin, the Germans react to the terror attack in the
heart of their capital. It seems as if one has expected it long-since—and
taken into account. However, has the sympathy not already been greater
57
Ibid.
58
Eckert (2010), 26ff.
59
Pfeiffer (2004), 55–57.
60
JF, “Leser der JF.”
61
Alexander Gauland, party leader of the AfD, stated: “If you want to understand the AfD,
you need to read Junge Freiheit”. Erk and Schirmer, “Journal national.”
in other cases?”62 In this formulation, Stein clearly keeps his distance to

the—according to him—calm public reactions by avoiding the usage of
the formulation “we.” The common “us,” however, comes into the pic-
ture when Stein identifies the target of the attack: “Our nation, our soci-
ety, our way of life has been the target of this attack.” It is remarkable that
Stein, when talking about “our way of life,” uses the identical formulation
as Gauck, Müller and Merkel. It is furthermore close to Merkel’s formula-
tion of “defending the life as we want to live it in Germany.” In addition,
Stein addresses a collective larger than Germany when drawing a parallel
to other Islamist terror attacks in Europe: “A bloody trail leaves its marks
through over the continent: Paris, Brussels, and Nice. […] Germany,
however, has been spared a major attack so far. Until December 19th,
2016.”63 Hence, equally to Merkel, Gauck and Müller, Stein refers to a
cultural community larger than the nation-state which was targeted
in Berlin.
It is, however, not only Stein’s political background, which makes it
obvious that the cultural community he has in mind does not equal the
notion of the “free world” Merkel, Gauck and Müller are referring to.
Also, in the article itself, Stein marks a clear distance to the worldview of
the three representatives of German political mainstream. Stein writes:
So far the growing danger of terrorism has not caused the implosion of the
illusion of the “colorful, open society” decades of uncontrolled immigration
policy of former federal governments should lead to. However, the country
gets creepingly out of control: With a mixture of lax justice, cuddling peda-
gogic at schools, neglected authorities, contempt for the own religion, a
disrespected sense of community—in other countries to be called patrio-
tism—Germany helplessly faces the challenge of a culture, which is patriar-
chal, male, not peaceful, and traditionally and religiously marked.64
Considering Stein’s academic education, it is reasonable to assume that

he chose the formulation of the illusion of “the colorful, open society,”
and thereby the reference to Popper, on purpose. The adjective “colorful”
is furthermore a reference to multiculturalism, non-heterosexuality, and
left-wing political point of views. Stein clearly takes his distance from a
society marked by such a colorfulness, which he sees represented and cre-
62
Stein, “Die Stille.”
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
ated by all German governments in power during the past decades. As

both conservatives, liberals, social democrats and the greens have been in
power during this period, Stein criticizes the entire political establishment.
Instead, he proposes an authoritarian society in order to keep “control”
and defend itself against the culture of Islam. It is, indeed, an entire cul-
ture, which Stein identifies as the enemy, not political groups or
nation-
states. And, likewise Pretzell, Stein claims that it is due to an
“uncontrolled immigration policy” that a “clash of civilizations” in the
spirit of Samuel Huntington is already taking place.
That Muslim immigration does not only threaten the German nation-
state but the fundaments of Western civilization, JF claimed already in
April 2016. “Finally electable: The defense of Western values,” the right-
wing weekly states referring to the AfD. “Thank you, AfD,” the author
continues. “This is […] the first word one should dedicate to the AfD for
their declaration of war on Islam.”65 AfD had indeed made it clear already
in its party program that it was their main goal “to preserve […] our occi-
dental Christian culture.”66 While also conservative politicians and
researchers like Winkler connect the West with Christianity, references to
Christian values and culture are more outspoken in comments by the New
Right. The main function of these references, however, seems to be to
establish an opposition to Islam. In an interview with JF in April 2017,
Beatrix von Storch, deputy chairman of the AfD in the national parlia-
ment, stated: “I have said several times that for me our main topic is Islam.
[…] Islam means Stone Age. […] There must not be any compromises
with Islam. We have to and we are going to defend our culture—against
Islam.”67 And Björn Höcke, head of the AfD in Thüringen, stated on
Facebook: “There are simply certain cultures, which are less compatible
with our Western values than others. And one can clearly name them. […]
No asylum for Muslims in Germany!,” Höcke concludes.68
Another reaction by the German New Right to the attack in Berlin took
place in a symbolic form. The right-wing extremist movement Ein Prozent
(one percent) called for a picket in front of the Federal Chancellery in
65
Fest, “Endlich wählbar.” The author is the son of Joachim Fest, a famous conservative
German historian and journalist who passed away in 2006. This may serve as one example for
the close connection between the conservative establishment and the New Right in Germany.
66
AfD, “Programm für Deutschland,” 6.
67
Krautkrämer, “AfD-Vize von Storch.”
68
Höcke, “Facebook-account.”
Berlin, which took place on December 21, two days after the attack.69
Responsible organizers were Philip Stein and Götz Kubitschek, two front
figures of Germany’s New Right. Among the protesters attending the
picket were, among others, Björn Höcke, the AfD-politician named above,
and Alexander Gauland, party chairman of the AfD. Their presence was
promised by the organizers already in advance in order to advertise the
event.70 The picket demonstrated an alleged connection between
Christianity, Western values and German nationalism. No long speeches
were held at the meeting, the organizers had decided to express their grief
for the victims and their protest against Merkel’s migration policy by their
plain presence in front of the Chancellery. “We will be silent and look at
the Chancellery,” it said in the call of the organizers.71
Apart from AfD-politician Franz Wiese, who guided through the
event, the only person talking for a longer time was a Protestant priest. As
he noted in the beginning of his sermon, he was not sent by his superiors
but had “followed his conscience.”72 The priest commented on the attack
the following way: “When innocents are attacked and threatened with
murder and manslaughter, the word of Jesus to turn the other cheek does
not apply.” Instead, the priest suggests another Bible passage to be more
accurate: “What you have done to one of the least, you have done to me.
When our fellow human beings are being killed and injured, also we as
Christians do have the right to resistance.”73 It is the parable of the judg-
ment of the Son of man over the peoples (Matthew 25:31–46) the priest
is referring to. His interpretation of the parable matches with the ideol-
ogy of the New Right in several ways. Firstly, the priest calls for protest
and activism, instead of acceptance and passivism. Secondly, the parable
builds on a clear dichotomy, as Jesus divides the peoples into those who
are blessed and those who are damned. Also, the ideology of the New
Right builds on clear dichotomies and othering-processes, a friend-or-
enemy conceptualization in the spirit of Carl Schmitt. Thirdly, and this
point corresponds directly with the dichotomist thinking, in his interpre-
tation of the parable the priest constructs the image of a supranational
community, the community of all Christians, which fell victim to the ter-
69
Ein Prozent, “Morgen.”
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Guten Morgen mit Sat 1, “Aktuell.”
73
Ibid.
ror attack. He explicitly addresses “us, the Christians,” who have the right
to resistance. German Muslims are thereby excluded from this societal
“us.” Furthermore, the participants of the picket were listening to the
German national anthem. German and Christian identity were thereby
indivisibly intertwined.
The West was not literally mentioned at the picket. However, if one
takes into consideration the promise of the AfD-party program to preserve
occidental Christian culture and the comments made by well-known
right-wing populists (such as those quoted above), the notion of the West
needs to be added to the semantic web created by the New Right. The
vagueness and the blending of the notions West, Christianity and Germany
are intentional. They open up—just as the concept of ethnopluralism—for
voters beyond the right extremist circles.
From a historical perspective, the fact that Germany’s New Right is
talking about the West with a positive connotation is remarkable, indeed.
As the West was associated with France, Great Britain and the United
States, Germany’s “conservative revolutionaries” of the 1920s and 1930s
expressed strong hostility against the West. Germany’s New Right, how-
ever, has chosen a different path. Instead of constructing the West as the
enemy, German right-wing extremists of today are trying to take over the
concept. German right-wing ideology is not about rejecting the West any-
more—it is about owning the West.
Conclusion
By analyzing reactions to the terror attack on the Berlin Christmas market
on December 19, 2016, this chapter has shown that the West is a con-
tested concept in recent German debate and less stable than both the
media, politicians and the historiographic narrative of Germany’s
Westernization make it appear to be. Different actors attach different
meanings to the West—depending on their political affiliations and
motivations.
Both leading representatives of Germany’s political establishment,
such as Angela Merkel, Joachim Gauck and Michael Müller, and the
majority of the German press interpret the West along the lines of
Popper’s concept of the open society. This interpretation is furthermore
reflected in Winkler’s definition of the West. This West is characterized by
democratic values, the rule of law, the protection of human rights, the
respect for the dignity of the individual and tolerance toward difference
within the frame of constitutional boundaries. As Winkler put it, this
West is a normative project to strive for. In recent German discourse, this
interpretation of the West has been so dominant that even Germany’s
most influential left-wing daily die tageszeitung refers positively to Popper,
the former bogeyman of Europe’s intellectual left. Furthermore, as a
short transnational comparison has shown, it appears to be a typical
German feature to downplay national identity and to refer to this inter-
pretation of the West instead. To representatives of Germany’s political
establishment, the construction of a societal “us” embedded in suprana-
tional structures serves as a self- assurance that Germany has left all
national Sonderwege leading to dictatorship and fascism. The German
interpretation of the West as an open society hence includes the norma-
tive impetus to “learn from history” and prevent national sentiments
from growing. It thereby distinguishes itself from other European inter-
pretations of the West such as the French or British ones, where features
of the open society are not only represented as Western but also con-
nected with the idea of the nation.
A different definition of the West as the one of an open society can be
found in Germany’s leading socialist newspaper ND which criticizes the
West as an imperialist global player. It is, however, above all the New
German Right which presents an influential alternative understanding of
the West. Germany’s New Right constructs the West in opposition to
Islam and considers Muslim immigration to be a threat to the fundaments
of Western civilization. This argumentation is based on the concept of
ethnopluralism which focuses on the protection of single national cultures
and regards multicultural and pluralistic societies to be doomed to break
apart. The model of a closed society, involved in a social Darwinist strug-
gle with societies representing different cultures, replaces the idea of an
open society. Just as conservative and left-wing voices, also representatives
of the New Right claim to protect the West. However, as they reject the
idea of a pluralistic society—a key word in the understanding of the West
as the established parties are using the concept—they are referring to a
different model of society, though with the same signifier. Semantically
intertwined with the notions of Christianity and Germaneness, the West,
as the New German Right uses the concept, mainly serves the function to
define an enemy—the non-Western world that is represented in an alleged
dangerous Islam.
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CHAPTER 8
Imagining the West in the Era of America

First
Henna-Riikka Pennanen and Anna Kronlund
After the US presidential elections in November 2016, NBC News turned

to Twitter to find out the world’s reaction to Donald Trump’s victory.
Among a collage of front pages, the headline of the German tabloid B.Z.
proclaimed the election as “the night the West died.”1 Fareed Zakaria,
journalist and a member of the Berggruen Institute, was more refrained in
his assessment in the Washington Post: “Trump might not cause the end of
the Western world,” he wrote, but “he could end the United States’ role
at its center.”2 Stewart Patrick, from the Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR), did not portend the demise of the West but warned that Trump’s
foreign policy would “unleash forces beyond his control, sharpening the
crisis of the Western-centered order.”3 From these excerpts we learn that
1
Smith (2016).
2
Zakaria (2017).
3
Patrick (2017), 52.
H.-R. Pennanen (*)

A. Kronlund
e-mail: anna.p.kronlund@jyu.fi

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_8
202 H.-R. PENNANEN AND A. KRONLUND
the West, Western world, or a Western-centered order is in crisis, and that

the Trump presidency not only coincides with it but directly contributes
to the crisis. Yet, what exactly is the West, and what kind of crisis is it facing?
This chapter analyzes the crisis narratives in the setting of debates on
Trump administration’s “America First”-foreign policy in the United
States. Our analysis covers approximately the first year and a half of
President Trump’s term and concludes at the June 2018 G7 summit in
Quebec, in which one of the narratives culminated. Three overlapping
crisis narratives, in particular, stand out: crisis of Western values, crisis of
the liberal international order, and crisis of US leadership. We will examine
each of these in the pages that follow. Our second focus is on the idea of
the West present in these narratives. In 2002, Jacinta O’Hagan published
her treatise Conceptualizing the West in International Relations Thought,
which has become one of the key studies in the usage of the idea and con-
cept of “the West” in discussions on international relations and world poli-
tics. O’Hagan notes that the concept is frequently deployed, but that it
has no single specific and uncontested definition.4 We treat the West as a
concept, idea, and rhetorical tool. The questions we ask are: how is the
concept of the West utilized, in what kind of contexts is it used, and what
kind of meanings and definitions are ascribed to it? To understand the
meanings of the concept, and what the author is doing with it, requires
contextualization.5 In this case, relevant contexts are, for example, US
foreign policy traditions, politics, and rhetorical commonplaces as well as
the audience of the speech.
The sources of the analysis include speeches and documents presented
by President Trump and the representatives of his administration, the
speeches and documents of former and current US politicians, and political
commentary in US newspapers and magazines. The selected sources do
not present a comprehensive overview, but they give a glimpse of the actors
engaged in discussions on US foreign policy. The US Constitution grants
responsibility for framing and formulating foreign policy to the executive
branch—the president, his advisors, and the bureaucracy—and to a lesser
extent, to the legislative branch, the Congress. Congress has the powers of
the purse, oversight, and balancing the president. Public opinion, too,
plays a part, and media amplifies the voices of the public. Media provides a
platform also for political influencers and commentators,6 some of whom
4
O’Hagan (2002), 8–9.
5
See for example O’Hagan (2002), 16; Skinner (2006), 42, 86–87; Whatmore (2016), 100.
6
Kaufman (2017), 2, 14, 19–20, 22.
8 IMAGINING THE WEST IN THE ERA OF AMERICA FIRST 203
are also members of think tanks. Arguably, think tanks constitute a major
actor in the making of US foreign policy. As Howard Wiarda explains, they
shape the debate, propose policies, advice the executive administration,
attend White House briefings, and testify before the Congress.7
However, the most influential actor is the president, who is perceived to
head, personify, and speak for the nation. He or she is not only specially
positioned to set foreign policy priorities and articulate the policies that
will best serve the national interest but also, as the head of the government,
the president decrees those policies to be implemented. The documents
and speeches of US presidents and their administrations form a corpus of
texts that are expected to express more or less coordinated and coherent
views of the world and politics. Accordingly, in the texts presented by the
Trump administration, we have recurring policy slogans, such as “America
First,” “peace through strength,” and “principled realism.” However, we
also have a steady flow of tweets, official documents, speeches, and com-
ments with diverging and occasionally contradicting messages, which
prompts the question: which one of these embodies the administration’s
views and foreign policy doctrines? Take, for example, the National Security
Strategy (NSS). Michael Anton, former spokesman for the National
Security Council, has explained that the document is based on the major
speeches Trump held during his campaign and first year as a president. Yet,
can we be certain that the NSS accurately reflects Trump’s views, consider-
ing that Anton could not affirm whether the president had “read every
line” of the document?8 Moreover, the document was the handiwork of
National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster and his team, and McMaster
has now stepped down possibly due to his views not aligning with Trump.9
This is the caveat that must be kept in mind, when analyzing the presi-
dent’s and his administration’s foreign policy rhetoric and use of concepts.
Crisis of Western Values

In July 2017 in Warsaw, on his second international trip, President Trump
delivered a speech which attracted a great deal of attention. Trump com-
menced the speech by recounting the history of Poland. He congratulated
the Polish people for seeking freedom, defending civilization, and main-
7
Wiarda (2010), 29–30.
8
WH adviser (2017).
9
Glasser (2018).
taining their national identity and spirit throughout the hardships of the
twentieth century. In all their struggles, Trump added, Poland had been
supported “by a strong alliance of free nations in the West.” However, just
as during the Cold War, the West is again confronted by “dire threats to
our security and to our way of life.”10 The question then, according to
Trump, is: Do the Americans and Europeans have the desire to defend
their civilization like the Polish have done? Do they have the courage to
protect this community of nations, in which people honor God, empower
women, and treasure art, innovation, rule of law, and freedom? Does the
West still have “the will to survive?” The survival and triumph of the West
and “our civilization,” Trump emphasized, depends on the patriotism of
the people: their confidence in inherited values and readiness to protect
their borders.11
The profuse use of the concepts of the West, civilization, and national
spirit has prompted speculations as to who wrote the Warsaw speech.
Analysts have detected the imprint of Stephen Miller (Trump’s chief
speechwriter), Steve Bannon (White House strategist at the time), and
H. R. McMaster. The influence of McMaster is thought to show in the
excerpts emphasizing US commitment to NATO and allies, the influence
of Miller in the emphasis on nationalism, and that of Steve Bannon in the
overall theme, which bordered on the “clash of civilizations”-theory pop-
ularized12 by Samuel Huntington. Journalists also uncovered that the
administration had received help from a Polish historian and right-wing
commentator in writing the speech.13 Reportedly, the Polish audience of
the speech in attendance consisted mainly of supporters of the conserva-
tive Law and Justice party (PiS), who were likely to be receptive to a
nationalist message. Yet, the mixture of nationalism and the much more
overarching idea of the West in the speech is intriguing. How can the two
be reconciled?
Steve Bannon has a track record of emphasizing the inalienable sover-
eignty of states, national cultures, and identities. He has combined them
with a marked disdain for intergovernmental organizations with suprana-
tional features, particularly the European Union, and then throwing into
the mix a message that the Judeo-Christian civilization is under dire
10
Trump (2017c).
11
Ibid.
12
Jackson (2017), 90.
13
Glasser (2018), Krastev (2017), Nazaryan (2017), Porter (2017).
threat.14 Michael Anton, too, had no qualms about uniting nationalism

and Western civilization in an article he wrote for American Affairs. In
pressing the importance of prestige as an element in international politics,
Anton wrote that
People like to be a part of something greater than themselves. This
emphatically includes their nation. Patriotism is thus a natural phenome-
non—A related aspect of prestige is the fate and health not just of one’s
nation but one’s civilization, religion, or “sect” (in the Machiavellian sense
of overarching cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, “civilizational” frame-
work). Western ennui today stems partly from the sense that our “sect” is
going down.15
Thus, both Anton and Bannon seem to conclude that people feel affin-
ity not only with their nation but with a larger civilization, and thus the
two go together naturally. Moreover, if nations are confident and strong,
so is the greater civilization. By the same token, in the declinist narratives
of Anton, Bannon, and Trump, the Western civilization is in danger
because of the weakening spirit, power, and sovereignty of Western nations.
President Trump’s speeches abroad have been targeted just as much at
his audience back home as at the audience present in the event. In the case
of the Warsaw speech, the home audience quickly seized on Trump’s
words, and opinion pages of US newspapers and magazines flooded with
debate. David Frum, the editor at The Atlantic and affiliated with the R
Street Institute, found fault not with the speech itself, but with the speaker.
Frum pointed out the hypocrisy of Trump defending the idea of the West
when so much of his previous comments and acts were clearly intended to
push aside and undermine the Euro-American unity of the West. Moreover,
the Western values Trump brought up were precisely the same values “he
has put at risk every day of his presidency—and that he will continue to
put to risk every day thereafter.”16 Journalist Alexander Nazaryan, in
Newsweek, was on the same page, arguing that Trump defending the val-
ues he treads on every day was “preposterous.”17
Ivan Krastev noted in the New York Times that the speech effectively
redefined the meaning of the West. According to Krastev, Trump no lon-
ger seemed to adhere to the political notion of the Cold War West as a
14
See for example Crowley (2017) and Panda (2017).
15
Anton (2017).
16
Frum (2017).
17
Nazaryan (2017).
liberal-democratic order but instead espoused a notion based on culture.

The speech envisioned a very dark future for the West, being surrounded
by threats both from within and without. Krastev concluded that building
this new Western identity around the idea of a fortress under siege risked
the fate of a man “who, so panicked by death, decides to commit suicide.”18
Journalist and political commentator Peter Beinart, on the other hand,
opined in The Atlantic that the West is not a geographical, ideological, or
economic term but a racial and religious one. A Western country or per-
son is Christian and white. Thus, Beinart concluded, when Trump charac-
terized American identity as Western at its core, he excluded a large part
of US citizens from his vision of what is American.19
These interpretations of the Warsaw speech drew the ire of more con-
servative and right-wing commentators. The conclusion many of these
commentators arrived at was aptly summarized in John Hinderaker’s
headline in the Power Line blog: “It’s True: Liberals Hate Western
Civilization.”20 Journalist Robert Merry, for example, denounced in The
American Conservative the “anti-Western” attitude of Beinart and all the
others who attack “the West” or label talk of “our civilization” as “white
nationalism or tribalism.” According to Merry, there are “elements within
the West bent on destroying any civilizational consciousness,” and these
polemical assaults on “the American and Western heritage” are daily
occurrences. However, he reminded that “many Americans, perhaps most,
hate to see their national and civilizational heritage coming under attack.”21
Merry noted that such attacks against “the Western heritage” were a
relatively recent phenomenon. Also, John Fonte from the Hudson
Institute recalled in the American Greatness that during the twentieth cen-
tury, liberal presidents had attached “the possessive pronoun ‘our’ to con-
cepts such as nation, religion, civilization, culture, and freedom” with
pride and at the time no one had thought of accusing them of being Alt-
Right or white nationalists. But then, during the past few decades, the
elites and intellectuals of the Left had turned against such rhetoric. They
had become not so much anti-Western, but post-Western, as they had
“‘deconstructed’ the idea of the West using the ideological tools of post-
modernism and multiculturalism.” Fonte observed that in this intellectual
18
Krastev (2017).
19
Beinart (2017).
20
Hinderaker (2017).
21
Merry (2017).
climate, Western leaders had become hesitant to defend—let alone cele-

brate—the Western civilization. Moreover, Fonte continued, as the recep-
tion of Trump’s speech demonstrated, this hesitance has spread to even
“mainstream liberals.”22 Such analyses resemble the conspiracy theory of
“Cultural Marxism,” expounded by US conservative and far-right circles
alike since the 1990s. The theory claims that Cultural Marxist elites,
namely academics representing the Frankfurt School, are imbued by a
totalitarian ideology seeking to destroy Western culture and values. The
weapons of the academic attacks are political correctness, denouncement
of white males and Christians, and hurling epithets such as “racist” and
“fascist” at their enemies.23
Essentially, these opinion pieces debated the definitions of the West:
whether it is a political association, community of values, or a civilization.
However, another set of writers focused on an equally controversial ques-
tion: is Western civilization unique or universal? One of the authors to
present the question was journalist Damon Linker in The Week. Linker
noted that the critique of the Warsaw speech flowed from the fact that
Trump was clearly speaking about the West as “a place on a map, with an
inside and an outside, with specific languages, achievements, and a com-
mon history;” not about the West as a set of cosmopolitan principles.
Adherence to universalism, according to Linker, is in itself a very Western
view, based on the proneness of the Westerners to identify the highest ide-
als of the West “with the negation of its own distinctiveness.” In this view,
the only elements of Western civilization to be championed are those
which have universal appeal, such as democracy and egalitarianism.24
Some of the opinion texts drew a contrast between the Warsaw speech
and rhetoric of previous US presidents.25 For example, when George
W. Bush visited Poland in 2001, he described Europe and the United
States as sharing a common history and civilization. The values of that
civilization, Bush argued, were universal, even if they did pervade the
transatlantic community and alliance “in a unique way.”26 Barack Obama,
on the other hand, utilized the term “West” speaking at Cairo University
in 2009. Amid tense relations between “Islam and the West,” Obama
22
Fonte (2017).
23
Jamin (2018), 1, 5–7.
24
Linker (2017).
25
Beinart (2017), French (2017), Hanson (2017).
26
Bush (2001).
noted the debt of Western civilization to Islam and argued that the two
shared common principles. In fact, Obama announced his “unyielding
belief that all people yearn for certain things:” freedom of speech, rule of
law, equal administration of justice, and a transparent and uncorrupt gov-
ernment. He added that these were not just American ideas, but human
rights, and thus universal.27 Two years later, giving a speech to the joint
Houses of Parliament at Westminster Hall, Obama declared that “the
longing for freedom and human dignity is not English or American or
Western—it is universal, and it beats in every heart.”28 And again, address-
ing the United Nations General Assembly in 2012, he reiterated that free-
dom and self-determination are “not simply American values or Western
values—they are universal values.”29
David French, a fellow at the National Review Institute, rejoiced in the
National Review that in contrast to Bush and Obama, Trump firmly relo-
cated Western principles and values to the context of the West—the con-
text in which these values were born and where they belong. He continued
that the “universalist view of human nature and human freedom” was
“totally and completely wrong,” describing universalism as a “false ideol-
ogy” and “a burden and a cancer on our body politic.” For, according to
French, “not all people have the same desires, and not all faiths teach the
same things. Some cultures are superior to others.”30
This view of civilizations as unique bears affinity with Samuel
Huntington’s thesis of civilizations. According to Huntington, peoples of
different civilizations have:
different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and
the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife,
as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsi-
bilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.
These differences have formed throughout centuries, and they are “far
more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and politi-
cal regimes.”31 In defining Western civilization as unique, Huntington,
French—and Trump himself in the Warsaw speech—end up refuting the
27
Obama (2009).
28
Transcript in Landale (2011).
29
Obama (2012).
30
French (2017).
31
Huntington (1993), 25.
triumphalist narrative of Westernization. According to this narrative,

Western civilization and values are universal and destined to spread all over
the world. Once the process is complete, Western civilization has ceased to
be Western and become global instead. In other words, when everything
is Western, the West will disappear.32 The Huntingtonian idea of the clash
of civilizations may have vanished from serious US foreign policy debates
after its heyday in the 1990s, as Patrick Thaddeus Jackson has argued,33
but it has not entirely loosened its grip of the popular imagination. Quite
the contrary. As the Warsaw speech and the ensuing opinion pieces sug-
gest, the Huntingtonian themes of unique Western values and ideals, of
the moral decline of Western civilization through divisive multicultural-
ism, and of potential clash with other civilizations are alive and well.
Despite the Trump administration’s emphasis on Western ideals and
values, they seem to play second fiddle in the America First-foreign policy.
As (now dismissed) Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained to his staff
in spring 2017, this policy is characterized by the separation of values from
policies. Tillerson acknowledged that the fundamental values of freedom
and human dignity underlie US foreign policy, but he emphasized that
when they conflict with national security or interests, values cannot condi-
tion policies.34 In this regard, the America First-policy appears to conform
to the realist view of states pursuing their core national interests: wealth
and the “protection and continuity of the state and people.” They also
pursue power, because it translates into security. Realists define power in
mainly material terms, and in the strive for maximizing power, values tend
to get ignored.35 Realism is certainly flexible enough to accommodate
America First-principles, but more generally, analysts have struggled with
the question of how to categorize and theorize Trump’s foreign policy
orientation, except for the notions that it is transactional, based on bar-
gains, and sees world politics as a zero-sum game.36
The self-assigned label of the Trump administration—“principled real-
ism”—adds to the confusion. In December 2017, President Trump
unveiled his NSS, laying out the administration’s view of world politics,
security, and US foreign policy goals. The administration describes the
32
Delanty (2006), 1; Ifversen (2008), 240.
33
Jackson (2017), 83, 98.
34
Tillerson (2017a).
35
Barnett (2018), 9–11; Kaufman (2017), 10–11.
36
Barnett (2018), 8; Jervis (2018), 5.
strategy as being imbued with first “realism,” since it recognizes that the
world is made up of sovereign states, that power is the key element in
international politics, and that it spells out US national interests. The
strategy and the foreign policy emanating from it are also “principled,”
because they are “guided by our values and disciplined by our interests.”
Interestingly, the administration affirms that “America’s values and influ-
ence” make the world more prosperous, secure, and peaceful, and thus the
government commits to “championing” American values.37 In his speech
at the Wilson Center in November 2017, Tillerson delivered a similarly
mixed message. The United States and Europe are being tested, he
declared, and their way of life and “core Western principles” are being
challenged by outside forces. To survive, they need to remain strong,
prosperous, and sovereign. But they must also be committed to cultivat-
ing and defending the shared, foundational principles on which the
“Western civilization is built: Liberty, equality, and human dignity.”38 Also
McMaster specifically emphasized such shared values and ideals as democ-
racy, liberty, individual rights, free enterprise, equality, and rule of law
when he spoke at the Munich Security Conference in 2018.39
As already noted in conjunction with the Warsaw speech, the ideals,
principles, and values McMaster, Tillerson, and Trump are referring to are
held to be specifically American, Euro-American, or Western. They are
particular, not universal. In the president’s speeches, what we often hear is
that all strong, sovereign nations have the right to “chart their own path.”
Nations with different values, different cultures, and different dreams
can—and should—coexist, respect each other, and cooperate. The United
States,. as Trump and his administration have repeatedly stressed, does not
seek to impose American values or way of life upon any other state. Instead,
it will serve as an inspiration and example for others.40 In his Foreign
Policy Speech during the presidential campaign, Trump promised to
“work with our allies to reinvigorate Western values and institutions,”
again implying that these were in decline and in crisis. He underlined that
this “strengthening and promoting Western civilization” would be vastly
more beneficial than trying to spread universal values—which “not every-
body shares or wants.”41
37
NSS (2017), 38, 55.
38
Tillerson (2017b).
39
McMaster (2018).
40
NSS (2017), 4; Trump (2017a, b, e).
41
Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech (2016).
Crisis of the Liberal International Order

According to some politicians and political analysts, the West is in jeop-
ardy also in the sense of the liberal international order, as the two are often
treated as synonyms for each other. First, there is the post-Second World
War regional international order, or as G. John Ikenberry elucidates, “the
West” as a “transatlantic order or security community, embodied as it is in
the Atlantic alliance.”42 This order—already fractured during the George
W. Bush presidency43—is seen to be under great duress. Misgivings about
the durability of the order began before President Trump’s inauguration.
Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2017, the then vice
president Joe Biden called the Europeans and Americans to resist “small-
minded” nationalism, protectionism, isolationism, and xenophobic politi-
cal rhetoric and instead to invest in the transatlantic alliance. He especially
made the case for reinforcing universal liberal values, because the transat-
lantic superiority and hegemonic position are entrenched in them. He
explicitly claimed that these values were the foundation of “the West’s
historically unprecedented success,” and “paramount to retaining the
position of leadership Western nations enjoy and preserving the progress
we have made together.”44
The anxiety over the transatlantic alliance has built up during Trump’s
term and came to a head at the G7 summit in June 2018. The summit
convened among tensions and disputes over trade policies and tariffs, and
it ended with Trump withdrawing from the joint communique and calling
Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as weak and dishonest in his
tweet. Again, journalists and political scientists took to writing. The opin-
ion pieces had alarmed headings such as “Trump plunges West into crisis
over summit spat,” “Trump Tries to Destroy the West,” and “The
Murder-Suicide of the West.” In his contribution to the CFR blog, Stewart
Patrick even characterized Trump as “one of America’s most consequen-
tial foreign policy presidents,” who is clearly intent on abandoning both
the notion of the transatlantic alliance and order, and the concept of
the West.45
42
Ikenberry (2008), 5. Also “the North Atlantic community, the Atlantic political order,
or the Western system.” p. 6.
43
Ikenberry (2008), 1–3.
44
Transcript in Chan (2017).
45
Patrick (2018).
Journalist David Leonhardt, in his opinion piece in the New York Times,
entertained the idea that perhaps President Trump had a “secret plan to
break up the West” or the “Western alliance,” while his CNN colleague
Stephen Collinson concluded that the “West is in crisis” as the summit
brought to the fore the immense ideological divisions between Trump and
the Western allies.46 Like Biden in his Davos speech, the writers also
brought up the theme of shared values. Patrick argued that Trump had
betrayed “the notion of the ‘West’ as a collection of like-minded democra-
cies, united in their defense of human liberty and the rule of law rather
than the law of the jungle.” According to the analysts, nowhere was
Trump’s perceived contempt for the West more visible than in his proposi-
tion to readmit Russia—which was suspended from the G8 after its annex-
ation of Crimea—to the group. In New York Times, David Brooks, a
member of the radical centrist public policy institute New America,
described Trump’s “embrace of Putin” as “a victory dance on the Euro-
American tomb.”47 Leonhardt urged his readers to keep in mind that this
alliance and the ideals on which it was based were the real stakes in the
2018 midterm elections.48 A month after the G7 meeting, President
Trump was set to travel to a NATO summit in Brussels. Before the sum-
mit, the Congress attempted to take back some control over US foreign
policy and its rhetorical representation. The Senate passed a nonbinding
resolution with a 97–2 vote reaffirming US commitment to NATO’s
Article 5 and to the NATO “alliance as a community of freedom, peace,
security, and shared values, including liberty, human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law.”49
The transatlantic West is held to be the core of the liberal international
order, but since the Cold War, that order has assumed global pretensions.
Even this more global order is often conceptualized and represented as
“Western.” Arguably, this is partly because the order carries within it an
ultimate aim of shaping “the world in the West’s image,”50 a strive for
cultural hegemony in a sense, and partly because this order is still largely
“Western-led,” and thus embodying Western political, economic, and
military hegemony. Lately, a considerable number of political scientists
46
Leonhardt (2018).
47
Brooks (2018), Collinson (2018), Patrick (2018).
48
Leonhardt (2018).
49
Congressional Record (2018), S4863; Jones (2018).
50
Leonard (2017).
have argued that this more global liberal international order is wavering,
remarkably because parts of the West are rejecting the Western order.
Authoritarian and anti-liberal ideas attract followers, and such values and
principles underpinning the liberal order as democracy, free trade, toler-
ance, open societies, transparent governance, and an independent judi-
ciary are increasingly being challenged.51 According to Amitav Acharya,
the decline of the American—or liberal—world order is a long-term
structural process, which was not set in motion by Trump. But, Acharya
adds, he could very well hasten the downfall and further encourage illib-
eral trends along the way.52
Late Republican Senator John McCain echoed these worries in the
speech he held at the 2017 Munich Security Conference. His address
opened a panel titled “The Future of the West: Downfall or Comeback?”
and forcefully fended not only for the idea of the West but also US support
for a Western world order. Born from the ashes of the Second World War,
McCain narrated, was “a new, and different, and better kind of world
order.” This order, the West, was not based on “blood-and-soil national-
ism, or spheres of influence, or conquest of the weak by the strong, but
rather on universal values, rule of law, open commerce, and respect for
national sovereignty and independence.” The order had succeeded because
of the appeal of Western values. This was largely the same argument that
Biden made at Davos. Even more importantly, McCain stressed, the order
had endured to this day because Americans had backed up those values
with their army, navy, and weapons. Upholding the Western order required
constant effort, but now, McCain lamented, “many of our peoples, includ-
ing in my own country, are giving up on the West.” They reject universal
values, and with their thoughts and actions, they are calling the “rightness
and goodness of the West” into question. Consequently, whether the West
will survive has become an urgent question to be treated with “deadly
seriousness.” Ultimately, McCain portrayed this as a question of decline
and fall of the world order.53
Rather than countering the pessimist assessments regarding the crisis of
the liberal international order, Trump’s NSS appears to be built on them.
First, the document notes, in the 1990s it was assumed that the US mili-
tary superiority was unchallengeable and that the inevitable spread of
51
Ikenberry (2011), 68; Walt (2016).
52
Acharya (2018), xiii–xiv; Ikenberry (2017), 2.
53
McCain (2017).
democracy would replace competition with cooperation. However, this

assumption, the document states, has proved to be entirely unfounded.
Instead of democratic peace, great power competition returned. Political,
economic, military, and strategic competition is now being waged between
the United States and “authoritarian states,” or between “free and repres-
sive visions of world order.” The United States is facing three main sets of
challengers: “the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states
of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particu-
larly jihadist terrorist groups.”54
Thus far, the strategy reads much like The Return of History and the
End of Dreams (2008), in which Robert Kagan declares the post-Cold War
glimpse of a free, just, and democratic world to have been an illusion.
Great power competition has reemerged as a force in history, and so has
the age-old rivalry between liberalism and autocracy. Thus, Kagan claims,
the world has “become normal again.”55 One thing that separates these
two visions, however, is the choice of words. It is hardly an accident that
the NSS does not identify the rivals of authoritarian states as “liberal.” In
fact, the term liberal appears in the text only twice, and in both those
instances, it is connected with failure—failure of the “liberal economic
trading system” and failure of the “liberal-democratic enlargement” to
deliver peace and cooperation.56 This contrasts with the National Security
Strategies of presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton,
George H. W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan, in which the principles of eco-
nomic and trade liberalization were a staple. In Clinton’s 1994 strategy it
is proclaimed, for example, that “Our national security strategy is based on
enlarging the community of market democracies—. The more that democ-
racy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world,
particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our
nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”57
Trump administration’s strategy largely dismisses the notion of the lib-
eral order as a source for wealth, security, and peace. Moreover, as com-
pared to the two NSS documents produced by the Obama administration,
in 2010 and 2015, the document of the Trump administration does not
54
NSS (2017), 3, 25, 27, 33, 45.
55
Kagan (2008), 3–4, 53.
56
NSS (2017), 17, 27.
57
See NSS (1988), 31; NSS (1990), 1; NSS (1994), 2; NSS (1998), 34; NSS (2002), 19;
NSS (2015), 17.
stress the ideal of a “rules-based international order,”58 nor does it express

the idea that “a just and sustainable international order” is to be sought as
an end in itself.59 States are in fierce competition with each other and in
the last resort, the United States can only rely on itself, not on interna-
tional rules and institutions. To get ahead in the struggle, the government
has announced that it will strengthen the sovereignty of the country and
put the American people and homeland first, just as other states do. After
all, “it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first,” as Trump
maintained in his inaugural speech. Thus, the government will protect US
borders, reform the immigration system, promote American prosperity,
address trade imbalances, maintain regional power balances, and preserve
“peace through strength” by ensuring that the US army remains the
strongest in the world. The last point is also where the United States
expects its allies and partners to step in, to “shoulder a fair share of the
burden.” It should be in their national interests to do so, since the threats
are common.60
Amid a prolonged economic crisis, unemployment, disappearing indus-
tries, and widening disparity of income, US citizens have increasingly felt
betrayed by the government. The government is believed to serve the
interests of elites and big corporations alone, while the ordinary citizens
have experienced the American Dream eluding them.61 One could argue
that the unequal distributions of the fruits of globalization and the inter-
national economic order is largely a result of domestic political decisions—
tax and fiscal policies, and lack of investment in health care and education.62
Yet, a segment of disappointed voters has turned to foreign policy in their
search for a remedy. They have yearned for a foreign policy reintroducing
a sense of national purpose,63 serving US national interests, and relin-
quishing excessive and unfair responsibilities abroad.64
58
NSS (2015).
59
NSS (2010), 5, 40. Nevertheless, in the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
(NDS), signed and enrolled by then Secretary of Defense James (Jim) Mattis, it is noted that
one of the most formidable security challenges for US defense is the “decline in the long-
standing rules-based international order.” NDS (2018), 1.
60
NSS (2017), 2–4, 25–26, 28, 45; Trump (2017a).
61
Schoen (2012), 5–6, 8.
62
Chaudoin et al. (2018), 62; Norrlof (2018), 64.
63
Schoen (2018), 65–66.
64
Kagan (2017), Nye (2017b), 15–16.
The Trump administration is hoped to deliver just such a policy. Randall

Schweller claims that this is precisely why someone like Trump was elected
at this moment in history: the world is fast becoming more competitive
and the electorate senses that the United States cannot fare in the compe-
tition if the definition of national interest is not narrowed down, if the
country does not adopt economic nationalism, and if the country does not
pursue a more self-interested foreign policy.65 However, it is debatable
how much the Trump voters were weighing in the merits of deep engage-
ment in the context of shifting the global distribution of power. Moreover,
it should be noted that researchers have reached contradictory conclusions
through their selection and analysis of public opinion polls. While John
Peterson cites 2016 polls suggesting that a majority of the US voters
wanted a president, who would concentrate on domestic rather than for-
eign policy and who would steer the country to the direction of more
unilateral conduct in world politics, Joshua Busby and Jonathan Monten
cite polls showing that there is a “relatively robust support” among the US
public for “elements of liberal internationalism, including multilateral
institutions, globalization, and a willingness for America to play an active
role in the world.”66 Yet, more than the public, it is the representatives of
the US foreign policy elite who advocate for internationalism and engage-
ment. Many, but certainly not all, of them have been vocal in their concern
that the United States is about to retreat from the norms and institutions
of the liberal international order and—as we will see next—that “America
first” will supplant “American leadership.”67
Crisis of Leadership
Richard Haass, president of the CFR, notes that international orders are
not self-sustaining. An order is fortified by a balance of power and eco-
nomic interdependence, but these can only go so far. International order
benefits from talented statesmen providing guidance, but a strong and
stable order should survive without the diplomatic acumen of its leaders.
What any international order most desperately needs is widely shared rules
and principles, as well as accepted processes for applying them.68 To sur-
65
Schweller (2018), 22–23, 28–29.
66
Busby and Monten (2018), 51; Peterson (2018), 37.
67
Alexandroff (2017), Guidetti (2017), Kagan (2017).
68
Haass (2017), 26–28, 103.
vive, the current liberal international order needs all these, but in addition,
analysts advocating different versions of the Hegemonic Stability Theory
would argue that it also requires a hegemon.69 It needs a state, or a group
of states, with enough hard and soft power resources to guarantee peace,
deter threats, secure stable economic development, and intervene in
humanitarian crises. A state with an ability to provide global public goods
so that the world may escape the Kindleberger Trap. Since the immediate
postwar era, this state has been the United States—whether in the role of
a “benevolent hegemon” or a “reluctant sheriff.” After the Second World
War, this idea of a unique and vital American responsibility to build and
steer the liberal order has played a significant part in US foreign policy
thinking.70
Accordingly, Joe Biden has called for the Trump administration and
Congress to fulfill the “historic responsibility” of the US to act as “the
indispensable nation.”71 Also Senator McCain characterized the US as
“the last best hope of earth” and the defender of “a liberal world order”
in his speech at the Liberty Medal Award Ceremony in 2017. McCain
argued that it has been—and still is—the moral obligation of the United
States to lead and champion its ideals abroad.72 The former president
George W. Bush chimed in, too. In October 2017, Bush noted in his
“Spirit of Liberty” speech the “trend in western countries” of moving
“away from global engagement and democratic confidence” and instead
toward nativism and protectionism. Bush contrasted this movement with
US postwar history, during which “the presidents of both parties believed
that American security and prosperity were directly tied to the success of
freedom in the world,” and they knew that “the success depended, in large
part, on U.S. leadership.” Bush brought up the strong belief in the
American mission to advance democracy, free markets, and free societies in
the world, and he emphasized that these had not served only idealistic
goals, but raw national interests.73
The possibility that the Trump administration is about to abandon US
engagement and global leadership has elicited sharp criticism across party
lines from both Republican and Democrat politicians. In these critiques
69
Strange (1987), 554–555.
70
Alexandroff (2017); Haass (2017), 287, 299; Kagan (2008) 51; Kagan (2017); Norrlof
(2018), 12; Nye 2017a; Walt (2016).
71
Transcript in Chan (2017).
72
Transcript in Lui (2017); Congressional Record (2016), S3646.
73
Transcript in Blake (2017).
we can detect affirmations of liberal internationalism, of neoconservative

foreign policy stance, and also of traditional conservative and Republican
rhetoric on the obligation of the United States to “follow moral princi-
ples” in its foreign policy.74 We even hear echoes of the idea of a civilizing
mission, which was based on the belief that the United States represented
the latest stage in the universal process of human, social, and civilizational
progress, and hence it was their responsibility to share their enlightenment
and prosperity with the less fortunate.75
While some US politicians and scholars have concentrated on coaxing
the Trump government to maintain the country’s traditional leadership
position, other commentators have begun the search for a new caretaker
for the international order, setting their hopes especially on China. China
is indeed presenting itself as a committed, proactive, and responsible
stakeholder, ready to assume leadership in the face of global challenges.76
The Trump administration, however, could not disagree more. In the
NSS, China is characterized as a repressive and revisionist state. The
administration views China—together with Russia—as an ambitious state,
growing and refining its military and weaponry, striving to destabilize its
immediate regions, creating spheres of influence, and attempting to spread
its authoritarian system. According to NSS, China operates on the fringes
of international law and maneuvers just “below the threshold of open mili-
tary conflict.” In doing so, the Chinese challenge US power projection,
security, prosperity, and geopolitical advantages.77
The document criticizes previous governments for basing their policy
on the assumption that if the United States engages with China, supports
its rise, and integrates it into the international order, China will become a
liberal, benign, and reliable partner. This premise has proved to be false,
the NSS states, and instead China has violated the sovereignty of other
states, discredited democracy, and advanced “anti-Western views and
spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies,
and our partners.”78 The Trump administration rejects the idea of the
liberal order having the power to attract and integrate non-liberal states.
74
See for example “Foreign Policy Attitudes Now Driven by 9/11 and Iraq. Part Four;”
Peterson (2018), 37; Republican Party Platform (2008); Republican Party Platform (2016),
46; Pletka (2013).
75
Iriye (1967), 6–7.
76
Guidetti (2017), Huang (2017), Tao (2017), Xi (2017).
77
NSS (2017), 2–3, 25–28, 38, 40, 46.
78
NSS (2017), 3, 25.
They also reject the traditional US policy of “engage but hedge,” in which
the State Department and Department of Treasury have welcomed China
to international institutions and arrangements, while the Intelligence
Agencies and the Department of Defense have made preparations for a
potential conflict between the two countries. For example, in President
Obama’s 2015 NSS it was stated that the United States “welcomes the rise
of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China” and seeks cooperation with it,
yet closely monitors that the Chinese act according to international rules
and norms. The goal of this policy, according to Graham Allison, has been
to urge China to follow the same road that Germany and Japan treaded
after the Second World War toward becoming responsible democracies.79
In Trump’s NSS, China is portrayed as a threat to US economic, politi-
cal, and strategic interests, and ultimately to world order.80 But the NSS
also represents China as a competitor and states that “Competition does
not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict.”81 Thus,
the document appears to fuse two different narratives: a narrative of rising
China challenging the United States and a narrative of rising China threat-
ening the United States and world order. The “China threat” theory of a
rising China, intent on seriously imperiling the United States or the
“West,” has known advocates in and around the Trump administration. At
the time of writing this chapter, one of the main formulators of the “China
threat” theory, Peter Navarro, serves as Trump’s economic advisor and
Director of the White House National Trade Council. For example, in his
book Death by China (2008), coauthored with Greg Autry, Navarro first
denounced the engage but hedge policy: “For far too long, we in the West
have waited for a growing Chinese economy to somehow magically trans-
form a ruthless totalitarian regime into a free and open democratic nation.”
And then he declared that it was time to confront China.82 In March
2018, before his nomination, current National Security Advisor John
Bolton echoed Navarro’s stance in a Breitbart interview. “For a long time,
the West has bought into the argument, China’s illusion of a ‘peaceful
rise’—the buzz phrase that you hear that they’re going to be a ‘responsible
stakeholder’ in world affairs,” Bolton noted, and continued that in his
79
Allison (2017), 219–220; NSS (2015), 24.
80
These views accord with the 2016 Republican Party Platform, suggesting that overall, a
harder US line on China has the backing of the party. Republican Party Platform (2016), 2,
15, 41, 48, 53.
81
NSS (2017), 3, 21.
82
Navarro and Autry (2011), 259–260.
opinion this scenario was unlikely, considering the “belligerent conduct”

of the Chinese.83 However, the China threat theory has not been particu-
larly popular in the United States,84 and altogether it seems that China has
not taken the place of the Soviet Union as the antagonist of the West in
the US imagination.
However, the view of China striving to reorder the world into a shape
“antithetical to U.S. values and interests,” and vying for influence and
leadership in multilateral institutions of the liberal international order,
prompted the Trump government to clarify its position regarding US
leadership. “We learned the difficult lesson that when America does not
lead, malign actors fill the void to the disadvantage of the United States,”
the NSS states. And when these “malign actors” take over international
leadership, the United States misses the opportunity to shape global devel-
opments to its own advantage. Thus, the United States will join the com-
petition also in the arena of multilateral, international organizations and
seek authority within them. But not all international organizations are
deemed relevant. The United States is going to prioritize those that serve
national interests, do not impinge on US sovereignty, and do not conflict
with the constitution.85 This conforms to traditional conservative skepti-
cism toward multilateral cooperation and agreements, and the outright
rejection of multilateralism when it is considered to decentralize power
and undermine US sovereignty or self-determination.86 This is “America
First” in the liberal international order. The United States will assume
leadership and shape institutions, agreements, and rules, but only in
relevant instances and strictly according to its own interests. Some practi-
cal applications of this policy are the Trump administration’s rejections of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal, Paris Agreement, and Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as the withdrawals from UNESCO
and the United Nations Human Rights Council.
Questions of leadership, responsibilities, formal alliances and agree-
ments, and of integration and engagement with the international order are
contested and persisting ones in the United States. In effect, they are
inherited from the early days of the federal republic. Answers to these
questions have depended on the contexts and political leaders, and in
83
Hayward (2018).
84
Weber (2017), 183.
85
NSS (2017), 3, 25, 38, 40.
86
Hendrix (2016).
practice, the US foreign policy orientations have fallen somewhere in

between the ideal types of isolation, unilateralism, and internationalism.
They have been further affected by tensions between realist and liberal
stances and debates on how these stances should be applied to the military,
political, commercial, and financial spheres.87 Yet, as Robert Jervis explains,
after the Second World War, there has been a general consensus on certain
pillars of US foreign policy: the significance of alliances, involvement in
world politics and international institutions, emphasis on human rights to
a certain extent, and lowering barriers on trade.88 In these respects, the
Trump administration’s foreign policy appears to go somewhat against the
grain of the traditional consensus.89 This, in turn, has inspired scholars to
turn to theories on agency and structure, in a bid to find out to what
extent structures can limit and condition the president’s freedom of
maneuvering regarding foreign policy. Jervis, for example, promotes
Trump as a valuable theoretical test case of Kenneth Waltz’s theory of
three images: individuals, the state, and the international system.90
The first step is to identify the potentially meaningful structural con-
straints on the agency of US president. The US political system with its
checks and balances is one. The legislative branch oversees the executive
branch, and the Congress can steer foreign policy, for example, through
opposition to the president’s executive actions, legislation, and the
appropriations process. The judicial branch may also step in when it comes
to executive orders, passing of laws, and interpretations of the Constitution.
Moreover, political and economic actors within and below the federal gov-
ernment may continue their support for certain international accords,
such as the Paris climate agreement, despite president’s disengagement.
There is also the pressure of the conservative bureaucracy, foreign policy
professionals, and establishment politicians from both leading parties,
combined with institutions, such as universities, think tanks, and media.91
87
Kaufman (2017), 1, 15–18; Strange (1987), 553–554.
88
Jervis (2018), 4. The consensus has not been perfect, though, for some strategists have
advocated for mercantilism while some have denounced values as the basis of foreign policy.
Wright (2017), 193.
89
Kagan argues that the turn toward the United States behaving more like a “normal
country” in its foreign policy and refusing to shoulder abnormally “great moral and material
burdens,” came already with the election of Obama. Kagan (2018), 13–14, 100–103.
90
Jervis (2018), 3–4.
91
Chaudoin et al. (2018), 62; Jervis (2018), 6; Kauffman (2017), 20; Parmar (2018),
156, 171; Peterson (2018), 38–39.
Domestic politics can play a role, as well as the extent of public support for
the chosen foreign policy. Furthermore, global power politics and interde-
pendence cannot be escaped. International institutions and agreements
have restricting effects, making complete isolation impossible and multi-
lateralism a prevailing feature of the system.92 Overall, as Carla Norrlof
and Stephen Chaudoin et al. argue, also the US position as the primary
beneficiary from the liberal international order acts as a structural
restraint.93
None of these structures, however, curbs the rhetorical power the pres-
ident wields over foreign policy. Considering that the President of the
United States occupies a central position in the politics and ideology of the
country, presidential rhetoric is “a potent force and a significant political
resource,” as Mary Stuckey argues. The president has the power to make
national definitions and redefinitions, and this rhetorical power has con-
crete ramifications on policies.94
The Rhetoric of the West, Crisis, and “America

First”
Utilizing such political concepts as the West allows politicians to argue
their perspective and convince their audiences of the truthfulness and
rightness of that perspective. It allows them to try and persuade both
those whose support they need and those who will carry out the poli-
cies.95 Political rhetoric, representations, and emotions shape people’s
perceptions and misperceptions, which then affects the way people inter-
pret and analyze the situation at hand, and finally the policies they are
willing to support.96 Two factors make the concept of the West emi-
nently useful and effective in political rhetoric: its familiarity97 and its
plasticity. US politicians and political commentators may ascribe a vast
variety of meanings to the concept depending on the setting, audience,
and the argument they are striving to make. They can draw from the
lengthy and variegated history of the concept, and reasonably expect
92
Hill (2003), 239, 242.
93
Chaudoin et al. (2018), 63; Norrlof (2018), 64.
94
Stuckey (2010), 40–41, 48.
95
Finlayson (2004), 530, 532, 538–539.
96
Allison (2017), 39, 54; O’Hagan (2002), 2.
97
Jackson (2017), 95.
that their message is understood. The concept can be utilized to identify

and classify regions and peoples, as well as to articulate and structure
thought. The West can be used to create “Us versus Them” divisions
and to build transnational identities around the perception of shared
culture, values, and interests. It strengthens the idea of belonging to a
political and/or cultural entity, and it potentially generates allegiance
and engagement in that specific community.98
Arguably, this is what the writers of President Trump’s Warsaw speech
were seeking to do: to define a collective called the West in their own
terms and to foster feelings of affinity and loyalty toward that collective.
The argument was all the more emphatic, as the writers envisioned the
West to be surrounded by enemies, who threatened the whole way of life
and even the existence of the Westerners.99 Calling nations to stand up for
the West and fight “our” enemies is a familiar rhetorical tactic, as it was
frequently resorted to during the Cold War.100 Moreover, the speechwrit-
ers were utilizing the concept of the West to further Trump’s political
agenda: to denounce the ideas of universal civilization, values, and princi-
ples of government. At the same time, they rejected the foreign policy
options often going hand in hand with the universalist ideology, such as
the option of the United States acting like a “crusader nation” and impos-
ing its values on other states.
Similarly, commentators of the Warsaw speech as well as (often neo-
conservative or liberal) critics of the Trump administration have found
the concept useful, as the concept has yielded to redefinitions and rein-
terpretations which accommodate a whole variety of different argu-
ments, ideologies, and foreign policy stances. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson
has argued that after the Cold War, there has been little room for the
West in the US political vocabulary, as it has fit neither the foreign policy
strategies of the neoconservative camp nor the Obama administration.101
Nevertheless, instead of disappearing, the concept has resurged in the
narratives depicting the crises of values, the transatlantic alliance, the
liberal international order, and global leadership. However, politicians
such as Biden, Bush, and McCain have employed the concept of the
98
Bonnett (2004), 6; Jouhki and Pennanen (2016), 2, 5; O’Hagan (2002), 9, 13.
99
This emphasis on dangers, forces of chaos and destruction, and threats to “everything
we cherish and value” is a recurring feature in Trump’s speeches. See for example Trump
(2017d).
100
Jackson (2017), 94.
101
Jackson (2017), 104.
West only when they have deemed it relevant to their argument and
suited to the context of their speech. Similarly, in most instances, the
Trump administration clearly finds the concept less useful. Consequently,
in the NSS embodying the government’s “America First”-foreign policy
and view of world politics, the relevant political actors are great powers,
not the West.
The foreign policy orientation of the Trump administration—as well as
the rhetoric surrounding it—has been relatively unsettled. However, there
has been one stable element at the heart of Trump and his administration’s
rhetoric: Trump’s own crisis narrative of the United States being in
decline. Hence the drive to “Make America Great Again” through the
policy of “America First.” The whole idea of a crisis opens a window of
opportunity for redefinitions and reconceptualizations, and the adminis-
tration has seized upon it by reverting to a narrower, realist interpretation
of the national interest—the survival of the United States. In this, US
leadership and dominance in the world order is still called for, but other-
wise it seems to be of little import whether that order is Western or
liberal,102 or even “American” in the sense of the US project of shaping the
world according to its values and norms. In turn, the declinist America
First-narrative has triggered crisis narratives regarding the liberal interna-
tional order and the idea of universal values. In all these narratives, it is
sometimes difficult to discern whether the real issue is, in fact, the down-
fall of Pax Americana and US hegemony. Curiously, the United States may
be in a similar situation which Susan Strange detailed in 1987: “pessimism,
despair, and the conviction that, in these inauspicious circumstances, the
only thing to do is to ignore everyone else and look after your own indi-
vidual or national interests.” These “bouts of declininism,” as Robert
Keohane calls them, have recurred over and over again during the past
decades. All caused, Strange notes, by the relentless fear and “myth of lost
hegemony.”103
102
Outside the scope of this chapter is Secretary of State Michael (Mike) Pompeo’s key-
note speech at the German Marshall Fund in November 2018, in which he attempted to
redefine a “new” US-led liberal international order. See: Pompeo, Michael. “Restoring the
Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order.” U.S. Department of State,
December 4, 2018. https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287770.htm.
103
Keohane (2012), 1; Strange (1987), 552.
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———. 2017b. The U.S. and Europe: Strengthening Western Alliances.

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ac268314929e.
CHAPTER 9
Resilience of the Humanitarian Narrative

in US Foreign Policy
Noora Kotilainen
At the brink of the end of the Cold War Francis Fukuyama famously
declared the triumph of the international liberal order, or the “the end
point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”1 The
victorious order, which Fukuyama was celebrating, was the liberal inter-
national order (LIO), the US-led world order that has strongly marked
post-Second World War international politics. The order is habitually pre-
sented by commentators, politicians, strategists and academics—who
explain the world order and, in particular, liberal internationalists—as
building on rule-based internationalism, multilateral institutions, democ-
racy, security cooperation and economic openness.2
This chapter was written while working in a project “Multilayered Borders of

Global Security” (GLASE) funded by Strategic Research Council (STN) at the
Academy of Finland, decision numbers 303480 and 303529.
1
Fukuyama (1989).
2
The LIO is often presented as such in political discussions and described as such by many
international relations theorists, as well as by proponents who believe in the system. See, for
N. Kotilainen (*)
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_9
234 N. KOTILAINEN
In addition, noble values such as the rule of law, pluralism, regard for
individual freedom, equality and human rights are habitually presented to
be at the core of the LIO. Liberalism and progressive internationalism are
in many ways entwined with the modern international proliferation of the
ethics of human rights and humanitarianism. The ideas of a common
shared humanity—a global human polity with universal rights and moral
commitments toward each other—are inherent to the modernist liberal
project.3 In the post-Second World War era, institutionalization of inter-
national, transboundary care for humanity and protection of human lives,
spread of global NGO humanitarianism and developmentalism became
increasingly apparent components of the liberal, US-led world order.4
After the Cold War the standing and emphasis of human rights and
humanitarianism within the liberal international orientation further forti-
fied. The post-Cold War period, during which human security and human-
itarianism have been emphasized in foreign political settings, has been
termed the “age of liberal humanitarianism”5 as well as the “age of human-
itarian World politics.”6 This period witnessed the fortification of interna-
tional interventionism in the name of liberal principles—the protection of
humanity, human rights and liberal democracy—in the foreign political
toolbox of the Western states. Watersheds in this respect are the NATO
Kosovo bombings 1999, the 2005 setup of the UN Responsibility to
Protect principle (R2P), as well as the military interventionism of the
United States and its allies during the so-called war on terror era. As schol-
ars critical of the tendency have argued, during the post-Cold War era
humanitarianism and human security emerged as central causes that
became to legitimate foreign policy, even military interventions and war.
Humanitarianly legitimized military interventions of the Western states
into global crisis zones, breeding instability—terrorism, sickness, military
threats and irregular migration—became a central feature of Western
international politics. Increasingly after 9/11, political and rhetorical uti-
example: Ikenberry (2012, 2017, 2018), Nye (2017), Jahn (2018), Wolf (2018), Duncombe
and Dunne (2018a, b), Speck (2016), Kagan (2018). However, many taking a critical view
doubt the discourse of such order and take a doubtful stance on its foundations and the
existence of such a liberal order. See, for example: Parmar (2018), Garfinkle (2017), Allison
(2018), Rothkopf (2009), Staniland (2018).
3
Aaltola (2009), Duncombe and Dunne (2018a, b).
4
Barnett (2011).
5
Barnett (2011).
6
Barnett (2011), Aaltola (2009). See also, Kotilainen (2016).
9 RESILIENCE OF THE HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE IN US FOREIGN POLICY 235
lization humanitarianism became entangled with the outright political,

strategic objectives of state actors.7
During the post-Cold War era humanitarianism became a world politi-
cal key frame through which multifarious world actors started to evaluate
each other’s legitimacy and determine their roles in the world.8 During
the time US foreign politics became to be habitually rationalized in the
name of a moral obligation to protect human rights and co-opted the
rhetoric of saving fellow humans from oppressive, undemocratic leaders,
poverty, gendered oppression, terrorism and instability globally.9 Scholars
critical of global humanitarian politics have argued that political co-option
of humanitarianism by (Western) states has been a significant form of
global governance, designed to benefit the “West,” the core of the LIO
itself.10 Therefore, humanitarianism in world politics has been seen as a
central instrumental tool of legitimization, a politically convenient rheto-
ric and a narrative practice under which also interest-orientated acts have
been carried out. The ever-stronger integration of humanitarian rhetoric
in the international political vocabulary became the liberal international
norm, constitutive for the upholding the international order.11 The chap-
ter derives from this critical tradition and identifies the political utilization
of humanitarian rhetoric as a narrative practice and central form of legiti-
mization within the LIO.
Now less than 30 years after the declaration of the end of history by
Fukuyama, there is a virtual unanimity about the demise of the US-led
LIO, especially among “liberal internationalists,” the proponents of the
order.12 Concerned tones have noted that the contemporary rise of the
populist, anti-liberal, isolationist trajectory—represented in particular by
Donald Trump’s presidency—contests, even marks a crisis of the liberal
order. Liberal internationalists, such as Kagan, Nye and Ikenberry, pin-
7
Belloni (2007), Barnett (2011), Chandler (2006), Douzinas (2007), Aaltola (2009),
Duffield (2007), Bentley (2017), Fassin (2011), Hunt (2002). See also McCormack and
Gilbert (2018).
8
Aaltola (2009, 1).
9
Belloni (2007), Barnett (2011), Chandler (2006), Douzinas (2007), Aaltola (2009),
Duffield (2007), Bentley (2017), Fassin (2011), Hunt (2002). See also McCormack and
Gilbert (2018).
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
On the recent discussion on the crisis of the liberal internationalism, see, for example:
Ikenberry (2018), Speck (2016), Wolf (2018), Nye (2017), Jahn (2018), Ikenberry (2017),
Kagan (2018).
236 N. KOTILAINEN
point the trajectory headed by Trump, as producing an endogenous crisis

for the LIO, and marking America’s stepping down from the role of the
interventionist world power, strong “leader of the liberal world order.”13
This, according to the proclaimers of the crisis of the LIO, denotes a turn
away from multilateralism, regard for human rights globally and overall a
liberal humanitarian orientation, and a turn toward an “America First”
program abroad in which protectionism and non-interventionism are par-
amount. In particular, Trump’s presidency has been seen to signal a rhe-
torical turn from the cosmopolitan humanitarian narrative toward a
storyline of exclusivity that emphasizes caring for “ourselves” first. This
involves disregarding the needs and rights of others, especially the rights
of geographically, culturally or politically distant global others, and aban-
doning the humanitarian spirit that has hitherto characterized US interna-
tional politics.14 For instance, the release of the Trump administration’s
National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2017 was widely seen to
concretize the rejection of US humanitarian precepts as well as the narra-
tive character that upheld the liberal order.15
This chapter asks whether the trajectory headed by Trump means aban-
doning the liberal practice of co-opting humanitarian rhetoric to legiti-
mize foreign political acts and ends. And, on the other hand, the chapter
inquires, whether the humanitarian narrative frame of international politi-
cal discourse still proves useful to legitimize US foreign policy during the
Trump era? Is the narrative of transboundary care and regard for human
well-being being reframed and altered in President Trump’s rhetoric?
What implications might these possible alterations have in (re)defining the
international duties of the United States, and understanding humanitari-
anism more broadly in the global setting?
To investigate whether the narrative practice of framing US politics as
global humanitarian is contested, or even abandoned, and to trace and
evaluate the persistence, resilience and possible reframing of humanitarian
narrative in President Trump’s foreign political rhetoric, I use an empirical
approach. Donald Trump’s rhetorical choices are compared namely with
the wording and framing of his predecessor, Barack Obama, and assessed
13
Ikenberry (2018), Kagan (2018), Nye (2017).
14
Ikenberry (2018), Speck (2016), Wolf (2018), Nye (2017), Jahn (2018), Ikenberry
(2017), Kagan (2018).
15
Duncombe and Dunne (2018a, b). Stokes (2018), Garcia Encina (2018), “The Trouble
with Trump’s New National Security Strategy” (2017), “Trump’s National Security Strategy
isn’t much of a strategy at all” (2017).
by means of narrative analysis16 and rhetorical framing analysis.17 Trump’s

resort to humanitarian narrative frames is analyzed in two contemporary
cases. First, references to the rhetorical frame of liberal international
humanitarianism are assessed in the Trump administration’s December
2017 NSS,18 which has been said to mark a clear break from the liberal,
humanitarian internationalist ethos of previous Security Strategies.19 In
order to trace possible revisions and alterations, the rhetorical choices of
the Trump administration’s NSS are compared with the Obama adminis-
tration’s February 2015 Security Strategy.20 Secondly, Trump’s humani-
tarian narrative framing is analyzed in a case of actual military intervention,
namely the US April 2017 air strike on Syria. President Trump’s state-
ments and speeches when rationalizing the April operation are compared
with those of President Obama in relation to the planned humanitarian
military strike on Syria in the aftermath of the 2013 Ghouta chemical
weapons attack. My empirical analysis indicates that humanitarian narra-
tive frames still seem to be convenient and persistent during the Trump
era. There is some modification of the humanitarian narrative used to
legitimize US foreign policy, more emphasis on national interest and
weight on domestic political addressing and reframing of the discourse of
the humanitarian subject and narrowing down of the frames of protectable
life toward global exclusivity, even exclusion. Nevertheless, despite the fact
that the Trump administration’s rhetoric is often labeled as emblematically
illiberal in ethos, it still principally adheres to the humanitarian frame on
the level of narrative practice.
Humanitarian World Politics and Narrative Framing

As defined by Roberto Belloni, “Humanitarianism describes the world-
view, aspirations, professional vocabularies and actions affirming the com-
mon dignity of humankind regardless of differences in race, gender,
religion, national belonging, political creed, or any other accident of birth
16
Pierce (2008), 279–306; Kim (2016).
17
Kuypers (2010), 286–311.
18
National Security Strategy of the United States (December 2017).
19
Duncombe and Dunne (2018a, b), Stokes (2018), Garcia Encina (2018), “The Trouble
with Trump’s New National Security Strategy” (2017), “Trump’s National Security Strategy
isn’t much of a strategy at all” (2017).
20
National Security Strategy (February 2015).
238 N. KOTILAINEN
or contextual circumstance.”21 Modern ideas of a shared human commu-

nity with rights and the birth of modern international humanitarianism are
habitually traced to mid-eighteenth-century enlightenment thinking.
From the Enlightenment onward, internationalist humanitarianism has
enlarged the progressive narrative of the human polity to include, for
example, the moral obligation to save others in need and alleviate the suf-
fering of those in despair. This chronicle leads from the fight against slav-
ery and the vindication of the rights of minorities and women to the
development of the laws of war, the Geneva Conventions, the founding of
the Red Cross, the UN declaration of universal human rights, the expan-
sion of global humanitarian NGOs and the adoption of the R2P. The
Western humanitarian narrative is inherently modernist, and often high-
lighting rationality, as well as the ethical, universalist, neutral and apolitical
nature of the project. Consequently, humanitarianism in everyday think-
ing is often understood to be the practice of neutrally and altruistically
attending to the needs of those in despair: a practice of doing good.
However, instead of an altruistic aspiration to help, humanitarianism may
alternatively be perceived as an influential system of political power rela-
tions and global hierarchies.22
Modern Western humanitarianism has emerged as a combination of
conflicting ambitions: self-interest, social improvement, scientific, reli-
gious and moral objectives, philosophical ideas, as well as economic and
political aims. Humanitarianism tends to be a mixture of moral and ethical
imperatives and political stain.23 As with actual practices, so too the legiti-
mizing rhetoric, narrative practices, forms of speech and meaning making
of global humanitarianism have changed according to the surrounding
political, societal and cultural atmosphere and therefore poignantly exem-
plify the political ethos and global power relations of particular points in
time.24 The history of international liberalism and humanitarianism is in
many ways entangled. Simon Reid-Henry argues that humanitarian rea-
soning is constitutive of the political rationality of liberalism and that
humanitarian discourse has always been central to liberal global gover-
nance. The ways in which humanitarian ethical imperatives have been for-
mulated through time are central for the narrative of Western liberalism.25
21
Belloni (2007), 1.
22
Aaltola (2009), 6–10; Sliwinski (2011), 35–47; Barnett (2011), Kotilainen (2016), 25.
23
Reid-Henry (2014).
24
Barnett (2011), Douzinas (2007), Duffield (2007), Kotilainen (2016).
25
Reid-Henry (2014).
The ties of humanitarianism and liberalism lead from the Enlightenment

to the nineteenth-century international system, the hybrid of liberal ideas
and Western interventionism manifested in Western imperialism and
colonialism.26 At the start of the era of imperial humanitarianism
(1800–1945), humanitarian rhetoric was invoked to discuss civilizing the
“savage” and “uncivilized” populations of the colonies. The colonial pow-
ers justified their conquest of new areas and peoples in terms of a civilizing
mission. The French had their mission civilisatrice, the British the white
man’s burden and the US manifest destiny. It was then believed that devel-
oping, “civilizing” and governing—even forcefully—underdeveloped
areas, and taking care of the Indigenous people, was a benevolent act in
the long run. Paternalistic ideologies, accompanied by racial theories based
on the notion of the inferiority of non-white races, formed new kinds of
hierarchies of humanity and were very much part of the colonial humani-
tarian project.27 The colonial project points to the inherent violence of
humanitarianism. Violence is integral to humanitarianism, rather than
humanitarianism being a response to the suffering inflicted by violence.
Violence is in-built in the logic of humanitarianism itself. Humanitarianism
may be—and often is—used to legitimize bloodshed: the use of violence is
regularly justified by claiming to improve or protect the lives of those who
are at immediate risk. This contradiction is evident and ever-present, for
instance in the case of humanitarian military intervention.28
The institutionalization of international humanitarianism and global
safeguarding of human rights accelerated in particular after the Second
World War. Michael Barnett dates the age of neo-humanitarianism as start-
ing from the end of the Second World War (1945) and spanning all the
way up to the end of the Cold War (approximately 1989). The end of the
Second World War, and the pain and horrors induced by the war—the
horrors of the Nazi Holocaust in particular—led to the affirmation of
“Never again,” and new international endeavors to protect a fragile
humanity from perils and human rights violations. The founding of the
United Nations in 1945 and the UN Declaration of Universal Human
Rights (1948) marked a new era in the apprehension of universal human-
ity and the institutionalization of human rights, and the same era saw the
rise of the U.S.-led LIO. In addition to its benevolent and altruistic
26
Vick (2018), 939–960; Barnett (2011); Aaltola (2009).
27
Barnett (2011), 60–64.
28
Barnett (2011), 171.
240 N. KOTILAINEN
motives, the liberal international system sought to safeguard the political,

strategic and economic interests of the Western states in particular through
humanitarianism and development. The humanitarian sector expanded,
and state and NGO humanitarianism intertwined. In the politically and
ideologically divided global settings of the Cold War, humanitarianism
and the rhetoric of regard for the suffering other was often harnessed to
advance superpower interests. During the era of neo-humanitarianism,
new ideologies and forms of global governance emerged: the global rich
and powerful were felt to have obligations to the less fortunate, and those
in the “Third World” needed to be taught to help themselves.
Developmentalism became the new watchword.29 The strategic utilization
of the humanitarian narrative frame to legitimize foreign political ends has
a long tradition in Western liberalism.
After the Cold War, Western states became increasingly committed to
saving “failed states,” in order to create the liberal peace, security and
development. Barnett calls the era starting from the end of the Cold War
(1989) the age of liberal humanitarianism. He argues that toward the end
of the century and increasingly after 9/11, saving and securitizing states
and areas in turmoil became a human security issue, one that was far too
important for the Western powers to leave to humanitarian NGOs to han-
dle. During the era, domestic conditions, such as poverty and despotism
in fragile states in the global south possibly fostering future terrorism,
came to define the orientation of the international actions of Western
states. The regime of interference led to interventionist humanitarian mili-
tary operations and military operations legitimized by humanitarian rheto-
ric, such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2011 international
military intervention in Libya.30 Intervention in order to advance the lib-
eral order, rationalized and legitimized as a fight against human suffering
caused by undemocratic leaders and illiberal forces mostly in “non-
Western” areas, became a core feature of US foreign policy and the
world order.
In particular, during the post-Cold War era of liberal humanitarianism,
as Roberto Belloni states, humanitarianism became “a part of the control
strategy designed to prevent the transmission of disorder and chaos from
the global war zones, and poor peripheral countries to the Western
Barnett (2011), 30–31; See also Duffield (2007).

29
Barnett (2011), Belloni (2007), Douzinas (2007), Aaltola (2009), Chandler (2006),
30
Duffield (2007), Bentley (2017).

world.”31 Scholars critical of the political utilization of the humanitarian

and human security frame within the US (Western) foreign policy have
claimed that especially after the Cold War era, the so-called liberal states
started to use humanitarian reasons and rhetoric to justify their strategy to
expand influence and control over allegedly illiberal regimes at the global
“borderlands.” International political acts, including military intervention
justified by resorting to a humanitarian legitimizing narrative, functioned
as a core liberal strategy of global governance.32 Mika Aaltola argues that
during this era, which was seen as emblematically liberal, humanitarianism
became a world political key frame through which multifarious world
actors started to evaluate each other’s legitimacy and determine their roles
in the world.33 The success of this orientation has also been sustained by
the dominant position of humanitarian discourse—a general popular belief
in human rights and the virtues of liberal humanitarianism—vibrant
among the citizens of Western liberal societies in recent decades.34
Consequently, interventionist humanitarianism has been a pivotal mode of
operation and a central source of moral legitimacy within the liberal inter-
national system but also a convenient and effective rhetorical strategy and
narrative practice used to gain support, also for interest-oriented polit-
ical acts.35
The humanitarian narrative practice in legitimizing foreign policy has
been constitutive in and at the heart of the LIO. This order has now been
widely presented as facing a severe crisis due to the rise of a political trajec-
tory that is seen to be illiberal and is represented by, for example, President
Trump. For example, John Ikenberry sees that the populist authoritarian
statements and alignments of President Trump, on trade, alliances, inter-
national law and human rights, if acted upon, would “bring to an end
America’s role as leader of the liberal world.”36 Robert Kegan sees that, in
particular, Trump’s withdrawal from its global responsibilities—especially
the inward-looking, isolationist and protectionist “America First” and
“Make America great again” policies—mark a break from the liberal inter-
nationalist tradition and therefore jeopardize whole LIO.37
31
Belloni (2007).
32
Duffield (2007), Reid and Dillon (2009), Chandler (2006).
33
Aaltola (2009), 1.
34
Chouliaraki (2013). See also Kotilainen (2016).
35
Duffield (2007), Kotilainen (2016). See also Parmar (2018).
36
37
Kagan (2018).
242 N. KOTILAINEN
The crux of this chapter is that the discourse on the so-called crisis of
the liberal, humanitarian West actually reveals an acceptance of the fact
that the US-led global governance system has really been all that is claimed
to be by liberal internationalists: a liberal, humanitarian, international
order.38 The point of my departure, therefore, is that lamenting the crisis
of the liberal order discloses a West-centric perspective on the world order
of the past 70 years. The crisis narrative is based on a naïve and romantic
confidence in the moral excellence of the US-led global order.39 Therefore,
following Inderjeet Parmar, this chapter argues that the humanitarianly
framed LIO of recent decades has primarily been a legitimizing ideology.
Parmar suggests that the concept, theory and thinking of liberal interna-
tionalism provides a convenient rationalizing rhetoric and narrative justifi-
cation for interest-oriented and interventionist acts, rather than a
theoretical explanation or a description of an actually existing system, as
suggested by many IR researchers and commentators, in particular Liberal
Internationalists.40 Therefore, the widely reiterated idea that the recent
international political trajectory—represented in particular by President
Trump—is in crisis, appears ideological in nature.41 Consequently, in this
chapter, I approach the practice of legitimizing contemporary politics by
humanitarian virtuosity as convenient legitimizing tools, as a rhetorical
strategies and narrative frames that have been central within the LIO.42
Within liberal international foreign policy, the humanitarian narrative,
themes and rhetoric are used to create a specific, preferred view—a human-
itarian frame—of decisions and actions to convince a specific audience to
support their views and gain legitimacy.43 As Kuypers defines it, “framing
is a process whereby communicators act—consciously of not—to con-
struct a particular view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be
viewed in a particular manner, with some facts made more noticeable than
others.”44 I perceive resorting to the narrative practice of liberal humani-
38
Garfinkle (2017).
39
Parmar (2018), Garfinkle (2017). See also Duffield (2007), Belloni (2007), Douzinas
(2007).
40
Parmar (2018), Staniland (2018).
41
Ideology is here understood as “a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that
explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and
provides a program for social and political action.” See Weber (2010), 4.
42
See also: Belloni (2007), Tictin (2011), Bentley (2017).
43
See Bentley (2017), 558.
44
Kuypers (2010), 300.
tarian order to be an indicator of the vibrancy of the humanitarian frame

within current US foreign politics. Therefore, I set out to examine
empirically how the narrative frame of humanitarianism is referred to and
used in US foreign policy rhetoric during the Trump era. I analyze how
the framings of President Trump and his administration adhere to the nar-
rative of the Liberal International Oder, traditionally promoted by liberal
internationalists. This is done in order to assess the alleged crisis, in the
LIO represented by President Trump on a narrative level.
According to Kuypers, a rhetoric frame is constructed of themes, sub-
jects of discussion, which are then framed in certain ways by communica-
tors in order to encourage a particular interpretation of those themes.45 I
look for humanitarian themes that reside in the analyzed speeches and
texts and analyze how those themes are framed. As central humanitarian
liberal themes within the US international political contexts, I have identi-
fied, for example: the role of the US in the liberal international system, the
promotion of human rights, the rule of law and human welfare (abroad),
international alliances, economic openness, protection of humans (and
humanity) against forces seen as illiberal, undemocratic or threatening to
peace and security, the alleviation of human suffering, the use of force to
combat forces that induce human suffering and insecurity, the allocation
of humanitarian assistance to the needy, the prevention of atrocities and
punishing the regimes and leaders that threaten peace, security or human
lives and assistance/support for organizations/actors that promote “the
Liberal Order.” I monitor how (and if) these themes are referred to,
framed and possibly reframed by Trump and his administration and com-
pare the framing of these themes with that of Trump’s predecessors,
mainly President Obama and his administration, habitually seen to repre-
sent the ideals of the LIO.
The Trump and Obama National Security Strategies:

A Break with or Reframing of the Humanitarian
Narrative?
The NSS is a periodically prepared document, which in a general manner
outlines the topical concerns, challenges and alignments of the administra-
tion, and drafts plans to deal with the current challenges. The document
45
Ibid.
244 N. KOTILAINEN
communicates strategic visions of the administration and aims at achieving

an internal accord on foreign and defense policy.46 The release of the first
NSS by the Trump administration in December 2017 has been widely
seen to signify the United States turning away from a liberal international
toward an illiberal, protectionist and isolationist “America First” doctrine.47
The ceremonial narrative style of the NSS makes the document inter-
esting to examine the narrative construction and framing of the US posi-
tion in relation to international cooperation, foreign policy, and the
international humanitarian approach of the United States. In essence, the
NSS is a document that represents how things are framed and narrated by
the administration in question rather than how things are actually done.
As argued above, in the context of liberal internationalism and especially
humanitarianly framed interventionism, how things are named, framed
and narratively represented in order to gain political legitimization is cru-
cial. As Parmar phrases it, liberal internationalism is primarily a legitimiz-
ing ideology.48 In this sense, the mode of narrative depiction of liberal
global humanitarian politics and the text of National Security Strategies is
similar. In both cases, it is primarily about how the objectives of the United
States are presented and legitimized on the level of lofty aspirations, noble
ideals, ceremonial ethos and value-based legitimization, and how, for
instance, the often reiterated “American values” are referred to in cus-
tomary ways.
I analyze the rhetoric, narrative choices and framings of President
Trump administration’s 2017 strategy49 and compare it to the NSS of the
Obama administration released in 2015.50 This is done in order to investi-
gate whether the narrative practice of framing US politics as humanitarian
is contested in the Trump administrations’ NSS and to trace possible dif-
ferences and alterations in narrative positioning of the two presidents
toward US foreign policy and the humanitarian imperative of helping dis-
tant others in need or those who are at risk from violence or abuse. First,
I compare and assess the opening words of the president in the two strate-
gies from the perspective of international political orientation and sec-
46
National Security Reports overview (2018).
47
See, for example: Stokes (2018), Duncombe and Dunne (2018a, b), Garcia Encina
(2018), “The Trouble with Trump’s New National Security Strategy” (2017), “Trump’s
National Security Strategy isn’t much of a strategy at all” (2017).
48
Parmar (2018).
49
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017).
50
National Security Strategy (February 2015).
ondly concentrate on the narrative framing of humanitarian issues,

narratives of protecting humanity and international intervention.
Many commentators on Trump’s Security Strategy have pointed out
that it makes a clear break from the US post-Cold War liberal orientation,
especially in its “America First” policy.51 The 2017 document builds a nar-
rative of Trump serving the interests of his voters, and from the first sen-
tences, the document makes clear that the impetus is to emphasize the
safety, interest and well-being of US citizens and the US state. The pre-
amble states: “I promised that my Administration would put the safety,
interest and well-being of our citizens first,” “We are prioritizing the inter-
ests of our citizens and protecting our sovereign rights as a nation,” and
“We will serve the American people and uphold their right to government
that prioritizes their security, their prosperity and their interests.”52 What
is interesting in the rhetoric of putting American interests first is that on a
narrative level, the text makes the supposition that the United States as a
state would have prior to the Trump’s administration prioritized the inter-
ests of “others.” However, when we compare Trump’s and Obama’s
NSSs, it is apparent that both statements highlight the truism of prioritiz-
ing the United States, though Obama NSS does this more implicitly.
Likewise, the preamble of Obama’s 2015 NSS states in many places that
the safety of the American people and the interests of the United States are
priorities.53
Moreover, the LIO and the US foreign policy in its entirety has histori-
cally primarily benefitted the United States, its citizens and its close allies,
though states and populations at the margins of the “empire” have often
payed heavily for the policy.54 In the light of the history of liberal interna-
tionalism, when looked at from an actual or even a rhetorical perspective,
putting America first does not mark a break but a continuation. The secu-
rity politics of the United States (or any nation-state for that matter) has
always been the first about the security of the state and its citizens. In this
respect, to some extent Trump’s strategy can actually be seen as more
honest in its positioning. Consequently, as Staniland and Parmar argue,
those who proclaim the end of the liberal world order are romanticizing
51
See, for example: Stokes (2018), Duncombe and Dunne (2018a, b), Garcia Encina
(2018).
52
National Security Strategy (February 2017), Preamble.
53
National Security Strategy (February 2015), Preamble.
54
See, for example: Garfinkle (2017), Parmar (2018), Barnett (2011).
246 N. KOTILAINEN
their position and are failing to recognize the flaws, ambiguities and hier-
archical hypocrisy embedded in the system.55 Therefore, commentators
who in the light of the 2017 NSS lament the crisis of the liberal order
ignore the strategic use of military power, violence and coercion in the
interests of America during the past 70 years of US foreign policy.
Another point in the 2017 NSS that is habitually presented as a rupture
from the liberal internationalist tradition is Trump’s “America First” para-
digm, which is seen to point toward illiberal isolationism and protection-
ism. Nevertheless, although the strategy highlights the “America First”
policy and the priority of US interests, and talks about “making America
great again,” it also refers—in a liberal international spirit—to the promo-
tion of “American influence in the world,” the importance of partners and
allies, as well as the rigor of American global leadership.56 The anticipated
break away from the liberal internationalist ethos of previous NSSs does
not seem to be in evidence, as the core of the 2017 strategy is firmly
grounded in the ideology that promoting American values is the key to
spreading peace and prosperity around the globe. Moreover, contrary to
the critique of isolationism, the Strategy outrightly states the US commit-
ment to a humanitarianly motivated international role and the willingness
to take action, even taking up the option of military interventionism at
points.57 The “America First” rhetoric, therefore, seems primarily to be a
domestic political narrative turn, directed toward the American public,
rather seeming to mark a clear retreat from the liberal international narra-
tive trend.
Then, as to US commitment to humanitarian issues, international
intervention, international intervention concerning human rights viola-
tions and the taming of oppressive regimes, what do the two Security
Strategies say? At first glance, the difference between the two seems sig-
nificant. The Obama 2015 NSS mentions human rights 13 times, while
Trump’s 2017 Strategy only mentions human rights once (page 42 of the
document). However, in this single mention, Trump’s narrative of the
United States as a global guardian of human rights is couched in a human-
itarian wording that is customarily found in liberal internationalism and
humanitarian world politics. Under the title “Champion American Values”
the document states: “We support, with our words and actions, those who
55
Parmar (2018); Staniland (2018); Allison (2018).
56
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017).
57
See also, for example: Cordesman (2017).
live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom, individual dignity,
and the rule of law,” and “We will not remain silent in the face of evil. We
will hold perpetrators of genocide and mass atrocities accountable.”58
Trump’s NSS also takes up the US goal of globally reducing human suf-
fering and asserts that the United States “will continue to lead the world
in humanitarian assistance.”59 The Strategy also states that the United
States will partner with regional (in this case African) partners, to end
violent conflict, to encourage reform, improve the rule of law and con-
tinue to respond to humanitarian needs and work to address the root
causes of human suffering.60
In this respect the Trump NSS does not mark a clear break away from
the 2015 NSS, or the habitual humanitarian rhetoric that has been central
in the liberal international narrative in recent decades. Also in the rhetoric
of Trump’s NSS the United States appears as the global guardian of human
welfare rights and as the protector of the people against repressive leaders,
regimes and all sorts of grievances and atrocities, either man-made or nat-
ural. President Trump’s humanitarian rhetoric and Obama’s Strategy are
surprisingly similar in tone, though Obama’s NSS more clearly and more
frequently states the US interest in leading the international fight against
human suffering and atrocity. The Obama Strategy, for example, strongly
supports the US commitment to the UN Responsibility to Protect para-
digm and openly and repeatedly states that the United States (and the
international community) is ready to intervene in situations where gov-
ernments fail to protect their populations from mass atrocity. Trump’s
NSS likewise not only mentions a commitment to R2P but also demands
that US partners “shoulder a fair share of the burden.”61 This unfair
burden-sharing discourse marks a moderation in Trump’s humanitarian
grand narrative, which is also manifested in more limited references to
human rights, the protection of humanity and humanitarianism.
The 2017 NSS repeatedly states that the United States “expects others
to share responsibility” in humanitarian assistance.62 Trump has also high-
58
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017), 42.
59
Ibid.
60
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), 52. (“Strategy in
African regional context”).
61
National Security Strategy (February 2015), 22. Also the Trump NSS not only mentions
(on page 4) commitment to R2P but also demands the U.S. partners to “shoulder a fair share
of the burden.”
62
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017), 42.
248 N. KOTILAINEN
lighted the unequal burden-sharing narrative in the context of military

expenditure and NATO. However, whereas this has been seen as pointing
to Trump thinning out of US global, humanitarian responsibilities, it
could also be seen as constructing a narrative of a virtuous United States,
the sole actor responsibly carrying its fair share of the global humanitarian
burden. The alteration in attitude toward international openness and a
humanitarian ethos during the Trump era is most clearly manifested in
refugee and migration issues. The Obama NSS refers to refugees and
migration in the context of terrorism and violent conflict as well as climate
change. It frames migration over the US southern border as a consequence
of weak institutions and violence and stresses the need of support,
American leadership, economic growth and democratic governance in
partnership with the neighboring countries in resolving the issue.63
Trump’s NSS, on the other hand, highlights the need to reinforce borders
and prop up security standards to keep “dangerous people” out. Hence,
the rhetoric of Trump’s NSS frames migrants and refugees primarily as a
security risk, and when referring to support for displaced people, mentions
that the United States helps “people close to their homes and meets their
need until they can safely and voluntarily return home.”64 This sort of
phrasing is emblematic of the rhetoric of contemporary anti-immigration
populism. Trump’s positioning on migration indicates a clear change in
humanitarian wording and framing compared with the Obama
administration.
The unfair burden-sharing narrative and a stricter attitude toward
migration in the 2017 NSS mark a clear and interesting reframing of the
humanitarian narrative by Trump. A similar reframing and reversal of the
humanitarian narrative is manifested perhaps most strikingly in the word-
ing of President Trump’s January 2019 Address to the Nation on the
border wall issue. Trump calls the situation on the US southern border a
humanitarian crisis, not on account of the inequality and hardship the
people south of the border might endure but because of the suffering and
bloodshed migration and migrants cause to the American people. But
although this rhetoric marks a break from the customary rhetoric of recent
years in some respects, it also indicates the resilience and flexibility of
humanitarian rhetoric, coming from the same humanitarian narrative root
63
National Security Strategy (February 2015), 1, 12, 28.
64
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017), 10, 49, 48,
42.
as Trump used in his “America First” narrative. In Trump’s rhetoric, the

objects of humanitarian compassion are redefined as the American people
(“us”) and therefore the humanitarian emotions of the audience are redi-
rected from the people aiming to cross the US border, to US citizens suf-
fering because of migration and migrants.65 By this rhetorical move and
redefinition of the humanitarian frame, US citizens become humanitarian
victims, and it is their lives that are presented as being in need of protec-
tion and saving. Trump’s reframing of the humanitarian narrative repre-
sents a turn away from universal concern toward the suffering of others,
into the direction of exclusive solidarity. This sort of reframing of humani-
tarian responsibilities for exclusionary ends, as concern only toward cer-
tain in-groups, nationalities, ethnicities and identities, that should be
protected from “outsiders” is emblematic for right-wing populism.66
Trump’s resorting to such reframing designates the buoyancy of the
humanitarian narrative and demonstrates its strategic value and continued
usefulness in legitimizing Trump’s migration policy and border wall project.
In conclusion, the comparison of the rhetorical framing of the 2017
and the 2015 NSS unveils that the special role of the United States in lead-
ing the world order and humanitarianly governing the global world is
emphasized in both Strategies. The Trump administration’s document
emphasizes the interests of the United States and has a more self-centered
and competitive perspective, yet no clear narrative indication of stepping
down from the role of the liberal global leader can be found. Trump’s NSS
mentions all of the key attributes (and humanitarian themes) of the LIO:
commitment to international cooperation, the leadership role of the
United States in the world, fighting dictatorship and violations of the
international law and conventions, common defense and international alli-
ances, economic openness, the role of the United States as a provider of
security and prosperity and global promoter of “American values,” and the
aim of a common humanity living peacefully side by side. Although
Trump’s alignment with the US humanitarian global role is milder than
Obama’s, the US commitment to being a humanitarian global force is still
present, and the rhetoric of moral duty and the leading role of the United
States in helping those in need is clearly stated. Most explicitly, the roll-
back from the customary humanitarian frame is expressed in the question
of unfair burden-sharing and especially the more rigorous and exclusion-
65
“President Donald J. Trump’s Address to the Nation on the Crisis at Border” (2019).
66
Nikunen (2019), 24–25.
250 N. KOTILAINEN
ary stance on migration issues. Reframing of the humanitarian narrative

into the direction of (nationalistic) exclusive solidarity is most explicitly
present in the context of migration and the US southern border.
Nevertheless, also these issues are framed by referring to humanitarian
rhetoric tradition, but Trump’s wording indicates an interesting shift on
how protectable and vulnerable life is framed, and whose rights to protec-
tion are talked about and presented to be at stake. The reframing of this
matter also expresses the contemporary persistence and usefulness of the
humanitarian narrative, as well as the strategic ability to shift the frame
when politically useful.
The Humanitarian Narrative Frames of the 2017

Shayrat Strike and the Response to the 2013 Ghouta
Attack
This subsection looks at how actual US (humanitarian) military interven-
tions (planned or actualized) are legitimized and framed in the speeches
and proclamations of Presidents Trump and Obama. This is done by ana-
lyzing President Trump’s narrative framing and legitimization of the mis-
sile attack he ordered against the al-Assad regime in April 2017 in response
to a chemical attack in Syria. Trump’s speeches are compared with the
wording of President Obama in 2013 when he rationalized and strived to
legitimize the military intervention in Syria in order to punish the Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad for the Ghouta chemical attack. The aim of this
section is to trace the possible alterations in narrative construction con-
cerning the legitimization and reasoning of the two military operations
and to identify a possible illiberal turn in how the 2017 attack is framed,
in comparison to the 2013 speech. The two particular cases are selected
for scrutiny because in both cases the target of the United States (and its
allies in 2013) was al-Assad’s regime, and both times the reason was the
same, namely the use of illegal chemical weapons on a civilian population.
On April 4, 2017, yet another chemical weapons attack took place in
Syria.67 The attack in the town of Khan Shaykhun—apparently committed
by the Syrian government forces—was the deadliest since the infamous
2013 August Ghouta attacks. The Ghouta gas attack, killing hundreds if
67
There have been continuous chemical weapons attacks in Syria during the long dragged
out war. See: “Timeline of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012–2018” (2018);
Almukhtar (2018).
not thousands, mostly sleeping civilians, shocked the spectating world.

Soon after the attack, a Western coalition, led by the United States, started
planning a targeted humanitarian military strike on Syria to punish al-
Assad, who was seen as responsible for the brutal act. The Ghouta atrocity
was prominently visible in media during the weeks after the attack, and
horrific images of the attacks were widely circulated in the international
media. Active lobbying for military intervention in the coalition states of
the United States, France and Britain increased worldwide attention to the
attack. However, in 2013 the Western military solution did not escalate as
the British Parliament voted against the strike, and a diplomatic solution—
the UN Security Council’s resolution 2118 on the disarmament and
destruction of Syrian chemical weapons—later replaced Western plans of
military intervention.68 By contrast, on April 7, 2017, US President Trump
ordered a cruise missile attack on the Syrian Shayrat air base, which was
actually carried out.
President Trump rationalized the 2017 attack as a necessary rectifica-
tion of the unsuccessful politics of his predecessors, saying that “years of
previous attempts at changing Assad’s behavior have all failed and failed
very dramatically.” This is a clear reference to the inability of the former
administration to respond adequately to al-Assad’s illegal acts and frames
the 2017 attack in terms of a liberal interventionist and humanitarian nar-
rative. Moreover, in his speeches regarding retaliation for the chemical
weapons assault, Trump also strongly referred to the suffering of “inno-
cent” civilians, and “beautiful babies” who “were cruelly murdered in this
very barbaric act.” Trump represented the attack as being against all
humanity and pleaded for “all civilized nations” to end the slaughter and
bloodshed in Syria. The banning of chemical weapons by international
conventions and the disregard for UN regulations were also mentioned in
the speech as a reason for the attack. Trump also rationalized the military
68
It remains a matter of debate why the US did not carry out the planned military response
in 2013. One major reason was that the unanimity of the Western coalition was split when
the British Parliament voted against the operation. US domestic politics—war weariness due
to the lengthy operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—may also have had something to do with
the decision. Moreover, foreign political pressure, especially from Russia, also played a cen-
tral role in the decision to go along with the disarmament plan. In many ways the decision
not to intervene can be seen as a blow to the authority and credibility of President Obama,
since prior to Ghouta he had repeatedly stated that the use of chemical weapons was “a red
line” after which the US would intervene. See, also: Kotilainen (2016), 364–471.
252 N. KOTILAINEN
strike by stating that “no child of god should ever suffer such horror,”69
while Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that the missile attack clearly
indicated Trumps willingness to take decisive action in the face of atrocity
when needed. Tillerson said that after seeing the horrific results of the
chemical weapons, the President made the decision that the United States
could no longer “turn a blind eye.”70
The rhetoric of Trump and his administration in 2017 very much
resembles the choice of words and argumentation of his predecessor
President Obama in 2013, when Obama strove to make a case of “limited
military humanitarian intervention” in Syria. In an attempt to get Congress
to back the military strike in 2013, Obama— similar to Trump’s wording
in 2017—referred to the illegal status of chemical weapons, the threat of
the weapons to all civilized nations and to global security, and most impor-
tantly—from the humanitarian narrative point of view—the horrors suf-
fered by the civilians themselves. Obama legitimized the planned military
operation by making reference to children “writhing in pain and going
still on a cold hospital floor.”71 The suffering of innocent children was
used in both presidents’ rhetoric as a strong plea to humanitarian values
and was intended to arouse the humanitarian sentiments of their audi-
ences. Both presidents also referred to the deterrent effect of a military
strike, arguing that a military solution would show the response taken
should chemical weapons be used in the future. This framing also pointed
to the protection of civilians and humanity, and the interventionist duty of
the United States (and its Western allies) to protect humanity from weap-
ons of mass destruction banned by international conventions.72
The narrative and rhetorical framing of both of the presidents clearly
resonate with the core ideas of liberal internationalism and military
humanitarianism. Trump’s wording about the international community
69
Gordon et al. (2017); “Transcript and Video: Trump Speaks About Strikes in Syria”
(2017).
70
Gordon et al. (2017).
71
“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria” (2013).
72
“Transcript and Video: Trump Speaks About Strikes in Syria” (2017); “Remarks by the
President to the White House Press Corps” (2013); “Remarks by the President in Address
to the Nation on Syria” (2013); “Obama’s shocking case for attacking Syria: Gruesome series
of videos taken in aftermath of gas attacks that White House is using in closed-door briefings
to persuade lawmakers to back US strikes” (2013); “Statement by the President on Syria”
(2013); “Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate” (2013); “Syria Crisis: Obama wins backing for military
strike” (2013); “Obama lines up key support in Congress for Syria attack” (2013).
and “civilized nations” points directly toward liberal international ideals of

a rule- and institution-based world politics. Trump’s references to
international institutions, such as the UN upholding shared rules and reg-
ulations that were targeted to keep the peace and ensure security, adhere
to the core narrative of the LIO.73 Trump, who has been accused of aban-
doning of the liberal international system, emphasized, however, the legit-
imacy of the UN and international regulations prohibiting the use of
chemical weapons when condemning the Khan Shaykhun attack. This
indicates that the narrative framing tradition of liberal international poli-
tics and the US-led global order do not seem to be obsolete—at least on
a rhetorical level when it is politically and strategically convenient.
Having said this, there are differences in the framing of the chemical
assaults in Syria by the two presidents, as well as in their rhetorical choices.
Trump’s rhetoric is less abstract and more pragmatic, centering more on
the national security aspects of the Syrian crisis for the United States. In
his speech, Trump also mentions destabilization of the area due to the
chemical attack and mentions that such acts will lead to the deterioration
of the “refugee crisis,” which he frames as a subsequent threat to the
United States and its allies. Trump’s reference to “no child of god” may
be read as a Christian reference, but it is also a reference to “mankind,” a
singular entity of suffering humans who should be safeguarded from such
brutality, and therefore a statement that affirms a key element of cosmo-
politan humanitarian thinking.74
However, references to the “slaughter” and bloodshed that claimed
innocent lives in a distant area were in the forefront of both presidents’
narrative frames when justifying and rationalizing military acts, enhancing
security, upholding the liberal order and saving lives overseas. Despite the
very different political leanings and ethoses associated with the two presi-
dents and their administrations, the rhetoric used to legitimize military
attacks was fairly analogous. In both Obama’s and Trump’s rhetoric, the
notion that “we”—implying humankind and a US-led international com-
munity—cannot just stand by and do nothing is recurrent. Referring to
humankind and the responsibility of global “onlookers” to respond to the
suffering of distant others is at the heart of their argumentation, which
clearly adheres to a humanitarian rhetorical framing.
73
See, for example: Ikenberry (2018) and Jahn (2018).
74
“Transcript and Video: Trump Speaks About Strikes in Syria” (2017).
254 N. KOTILAINEN
In 2013 Obama made his case relying strongly on an appeal to universal

humanity and the responsibility to act in reducing the suffering of others.
Trump also takes up the responsibility of the United States to act in
response to foreign atrocities, but perhaps more in line with the realist US
tradition; his choice of words marks a rather subtle shift from underlining
the universal humanitarian duties of the United States, to emphasizing the
national interest and the domestic consequences of the crisis. Nevertheless,
the liberal international duty of the United States as the liberal hegemon,
obligated to intervene in instances of human suffering and where interna-
tional norms are violated, is at the forefront of the rhetorical framing of
both presidents. The fact that President Trump actually intervened in the
situation in Syria by military means, and rationalized the operation primar-
ily on humanitarian grounds (protection of the local civilian population,
violation of international humanitarian laws and prevention of a humani-
tarian catastrophe in the area), indicates that his administration, in this
case, seems to resume the narrative as well as the actual trajectory of liberal
internationalism, rather than breaking with it. The case of Trump’s rheto-
ric in regard to the attack on the Shayrat air base indicates a humanitarian
rationalization that is in line with liberal internationalist ideals.
Will the Liberal Humanitarian Frame in US Foreign

Policy Maintain Its Resilience?
If Francis Fukuyama’s statements on the end of history and the universal-
ization of the “Western liberal democracy as the final form of human gov-
ernment” today sound somewhat naïve, the same can perhaps be said of
the currently popular argument on the crisis of liberal international poli-
tics. Both standpoints, in their distinct ways, reveal the same underlying
assumption, namely an acceptance of the liberal international global sys-
tem as being the universal humanitarian high point of human governance.
This chapter took as its point of departure that, rather than being an
explanation or description of an actual existing system of governance, the
LIO may be approached as a legitimizing ideology and a central narrative
frame through which the US-led international, often interventionist order
has been rationalized. This tendency has been especially vibrant in recent
decades, but the use of a humanitarian narrative frame goes back further
in time, and may be considered a leading legitimizing narrative of Western
intervention already in the colonial era. I have argued that the humanitar-
ian ethos and interventionist acts rationalized by a rhetoric of human
rights have been at the core of the post-Second World War LIO. This
chapter discussed how the practice of framing international political,
interventionist acts as humane and motivated by humanitarian aspirations
have, especially in recent decades, occupied a central position in the narra-
tive construction of US foreign policy.
I set out to scrutinize whether the liberal humanitarian ethos and a
rhetoric of legitimation in Western foreign political settings still prevails in
the current age, an age that has frequently been described as marking the
crisis of the liberal international orientation. As the facets promulgating
the end of the LIO habitually locate the inner threat to the liberal order in
the political trajectory headed by US President Donald Trump, I set out
to find out whether and how the humanitarian narrative frame is repre-
sented and employed by Trump and his administration in their interna-
tional political wording. This was done by scrutinizing two exemplary
cases within which the humanitarian legitimizing frame has been vibrant
and essential within the liberal internationalist trajectory, namely in the
discourse of National Security Strategies and the legitimization of inter-
ventionist military acts.
Using contemporary, empirically orientated cases, it would appear that
humanitarian rhetoric and legitimization in international political contexts
is still widely employed today. President Trump’s NSS does not denote a
clear break with the liberal humanitarian ideals and the US global leader-
ship role promoted by former presidents. All of the themes central to the
humanitarian legitimizing frame were apparent in the Trump administra-
tion’s NSS: US-led humanitarian assistance, resistance to undemocratic
tyranny that causes suffering, defense of the global community from
offenses against human integrity and welfare and punishing evildoers who
threaten the liberal order. The humanitarian rhetorical tradition is also still
alive in cases of international humanitarian military intervention and their
rhetorical legitimization. In the speeches of both President Trump and
President Obama in relation to the use of chemical weapons by the al-
Assad regime in Syria, the United States is presented as a global power that
does not just stand by and watch as illegal weapons are used to inflict a
humanitarian disaster and threaten global security. The suffering of inno-
cent victims is mentioned in the rhetoric of both presidents and is the
primary legitimization for the use of military force. Therefore, in the light
of the two cases under scrutiny here, it seems that a rhetoric of humanitar-
ian internationalist liberalism is still used during an era that has often been
represented as undergoing a liberal world order crisis.
256 N. KOTILAINEN
The two cases scrutinized in this chapter do not, of course, suffice to

conclude whether this narrative frame will continue in the future within
the foreign political trajectory represented by President Trump. However,
the examples indicate that the humanitarian rhetorical framing has not
been abandoned but is instead recurrently referred to and employed by
President Trump in ceremonious strategy texts and in legitimizing actual
military intervention. The purpose of this chapter has not, however, been
to prove that the trajectory represented by Trump would be humanitarian
or liberal in essence. Rather, an analysis of the two cases exhibits the resil-
ience, flexibility and persistent political convenience of liberal internation-
alist humanitarian narrative framing. This examination indicates that
within the existing institutional international surroundings, the current
foreign political settings and the present high popular acceptance of
humanitarian aspirations within international (interventionist) politics
make resorting to this narrative practice beneficial and functional. The
long tradition of presenting liberal politics as steered by altruistic, moral
and ethical considerations—notably the protection of humanity from suf-
fering and rights abuses—rather than presenting politics as advancing self-
interest power political motivations—makes it rational to resort to a
familiar, widely shared, popular narrative. The humanitarian frame is resil-
ient because it works: it addresses people on a deep, emotional level. Who
would not want to believe in a narrative that reassures you that there is a
strong global force for good, prepared and able to defend humanity
around the world?
Moreover, institutions central for international relations and law, and
multilateral conventions that determine the international political setting,
are a feature of the post-Second World War era. The vocabulary, rhetoric
and terminology of the existing international system is liberal internation-
alist in tone and is built upon a humanitarian frame, introduced and pro-
liferated by those who built the liberal world order. Abandoning the
reasoning based on the humanitarian rhetorical frame is simply not feasible
within the existing system. Therefore, the use of a humanitarian rhetorical
frame also by political actors who are seen as illiberal in essence—even
actors who are seen to threaten the very global order—can also be seen to
indicate the convenience, even the instrumental nature of the rhetorical
tradition. Therefore, Trump largely adhering to the liberal humanitarian
narrative practice in the cases, at hand, demonstrates the institutional
strength of the liberal international system, as well as the flexibility and
potential for political instrumentalization of the humanitarian narrative
practice within international politics, rather than is telling of actual politi-

cal objectives.
However, as the cases indicate, within the trajectory seen as represent-
ing an illiberal course, there were some shifts and alterations in how the
humanitarian frame was referred to and defined, and whose rights, distress
and saving were in question. In relation to the military strike on the
Shayrat air base, Trump’s choice of words marks a rather subtle shift from
underlining the universal humanitarian duties of the United States to
emphasizing the national interest and domestic consequences of the crisis,
in line with a more realist US tradition. This also adheres to the Trump’s
America First-policy and indicates a domestic political motivation in the
reframing. Moreover, the rhetoric of putting US citizens’ interests first, as
well as the references to the unjust sharing of expenditure among the
United States and its allies and the emphasis on the United States as the
sole bearer of global responsibility, points to redefining whose rights and
distress are being talked about within the humanitarian frame. It seems
that in the narrative framing of US foreign policy, US citizens (and the
state) have subtly come to occupy the role of the humanitarian victim, an
object of pity and compassion. This indicates a shift in what is meant by a
protectable life, a shift in how life worthy of protection and rights are
understood and outlined, and therefore it also represents a hardening of
the borders between the global categories of “us” and “them” and a shift
toward solidarity based on exclusions. This also indicates the fluidity and
potential for alteration of the familiar and popular humanitarian rhetoric
frame. Nevertheless, the current era, seen to mark a crisis in the liberal
tradition, is not the first, and probably not the last alteration in the history
of the liberal order. Rather than marking the end of the narrative practice
of legitimizing political acts on the grounds of global humanitarianism, we
are more likely to be witnessing yet another alteration in the long tradition
of liberal internationalism and the use of humanitarian framing in interna-
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CHAPTER 10
Confrontational Civilizational Identity

in the Making? The New Turkey
and the West
Toni Alaranta
The Republic of Turkey was for decades ruled by a Kemalist moderniza-

tion ideology that promised to attach Turkey to the Western world.
Although the liberal philosophy of history was implied, the Kemalist proj-
ect never fulfilled its initial promise of political liberalism but instead con-
centrated on securing the state and building a homogenous secular-national
identity.1 The recipe for overcoming this ‘tutelary democracy’2 was seen in
an independent Anatolian middle class that would crush the restrictive
state tradition and generate the necessary social pressure for the establish-
ment of a pluralist, liberal democratic regime.
The incumbent Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development
Party, AKP) was for a long time seen as the fulfilment of this process,
1
See, for instance, Alaranta (2014).
2
In Turkish scholarship, the ‘tutelary democracy’ is known as vesayet rejimi. It refers to the
military-bureaucratic establishment that has allegedly set the limits within which democrati-
cally elected governments have been allowed to rule. See, for instance, İnsel (2010).
T. Alaranta (*)
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: toni.alaranta@fiia.fi

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_10
264 T. ALARANTA
riginally started in the 1980s.3 The academic literature on political inclu-

o
sion, in this case arguing for the beneficial steps in democratic consolida-
tion once the system absorbed political Islamists,4 and the EU/US practice
of pushing ‘democratization-through-market liberalization’ in the non-
Western context,5 hugely increased these expectations.
However, instead of a pluralist liberal democracy, the AKP experiment
has during the last five years ended in a crude authoritarian regime that has
completely questioned Turkey’s affinity with the West—and political liber-
alism. This chapter analyses how the AKP leadership, intellectuals close to
the party, leading columnists in the pro-government media, and pro-
government think tanks have recently defined the AKP’s Islamic-
conservative state transformation project, and to what extent they have
simultaneously constructed a confrontational civilizational identity within
which the West is increasingly conceptualized as the ‘other’ to the alleg-
edly authentic Turkish-Islamic ‘self’. The article detects key features of the
ruling AKP’s political narrative, demonstrating how both the domestic
Islamic-conservative state transformation project and Turkey’s new for-
eign policy discourse use civilizational identity narrative as a central tool
in order to build a collective political actor.
Both civilization and identity are notoriously vague terms. However,
they are also some of the key concepts used by the AKP leadership in their
own political narrative. From an analytical point of view, Jacinta O’Hagan
provides a useful definition of a civilizational identity. According to her, a
civilizational identity is a form of identity that locates an ethnic or national
community within a context of a broader, cultural community, often
extensive in geographical and temporal scope. Further, it can be perceived
as encompassing many languages, ethnicities, and religious denominations
but united by shared histories, traditions, values, and beliefs. These shared
ideas on their part influence the way people believe the world should be,
the goals that should be striven for, and even the things that are at stake.
In this way, a civilizational identity is important in helping to form values,
goals, and norms. Taken together, civilizational identity provides the
opportunity for membership in a normative community, of the kind that
is not necessarily fixed but capable of change, evolution, diversity, and
3
Dağı (2009), 59.
4
For the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and debates, see Schwedler (2013).
5
For a good overview of EU and US attempts to promote democratization through eco-
nomic liberalization, see Hassan (2015).
10 CONFRONTATIONAL CIVILIZATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE MAKING… 265
even inconsistency. Finally, civilizational identities may be an aspect of

national or state identity, but they locate the state or nation in a much
broader imagined community.6
This chapter will first discuss a prominent theoretical stand within
which to analyse the ambiguous relationship between liberalism and
nationalism in Western historical experience during the era of popular sov-
ereignty, and how this can be used to contextualize main manifestations of
nationalism in Turkey. This is followed by a short account of competing
modernization paradigms and their inherent interpretations of the West
during the republican era in Turkey. The third part analyses in detail the
incumbent AKP’s Islamic-conservative state transformation project cur-
rently implemented in Turkey, in particular regarding the construction of
a confrontational civilizational identity. The fourth part looks at this same
issue in terms of Turkey’s new more active and even aggressive foreign
policy. Finally, the concluding section discusses the article’s main findings
in relation to the more general debate on the current state of the so-called
Detecting the Affinity Between Liberalism

and Nationalism
If one aims to analyse the limits of political liberalism in the Turkish con-
text, one first needs to detect the more general mechanism through which
liberalism so often is at the same time secured and threatened by national-
ism. Liberal-democratic form of government is an outcome of centuries-
long political struggles. This is relatively well known, although often
forgotten in those debates that tend to see current democratic and plural-
ist societies in the West as self-evident. The blind spot of the debate on the
historical formation process of political liberalism as a regime type has
always been the relationship between liberalism and nationalism.
Regarding this blind spot, it is useful to follow Bernard Yack, who
makes a very particular and important distinction between the two con-
cepts of nation and people. According to him, both the nation and the
people are ‘imagined communities’ in the sense once coined by Benedict
Anderson. However, they are also distinct in terms of time and space.
National community is an image of community over time. What binds us
into national communities is our images of a shared heritage that is passed
6
O’Hagan (2002), 11–12.
266 T. ALARANTA
(and altered) from one generation to another. As a result of this, national

communities are imagined as starting from some specific point of origin in
the past and extending forward into an indefinite future. The people, in
contrast, present an image of community over space. It portrays all indi-
viduals within the given boundaries of a state as members of a community
from which the state derives its legitimate authority.7
Thus, while national community bridges one generation to another,
the people offer a bridge over the chasm that separates individuals from
each other in their efforts to shape and control authority of the state. The
concept of the nation allows us to imagine the evolving community that
precedes our existence and survives our death. The concept of the people
allows us to imagine the community that we share at any particular
moment in dealing with the state’s coercive authority. The idea of the
people as the sovereign implies the idea that it precedes and survives the
dissolution of political authority. This, on the other hand, requires that the
people share something crucial beyond the relationship based on being
participants of the same political authority.8
Further according to Yack, the defenders of the modern concept of
popular sovereignty—the liberals and the liberal political theory in the
front row—have no consistent answer to the question of what, exactly, is
this common prepolitical characteristic. This has opened the door for the
close identification of political with national community, of the people
with the nation. For the nation provides precisely what is lacking in the
concept of the people: a sense of where to look for the prepolitical basis of
political community. Thus, by encouraging us to think of political com-
munity as distinct from and prior to the establishment of political author-
ity, the liberal conception of popular sovereignty brings our image of
political community much closer to national community than it has been
in the past.9
These observations provide the key insight on why nationalism, as an
enduring political ideology in the modern world, and national sovereignty,
as the essential principle of the state system, have remained—and are likely
to remain—the main components in the formation of state identities and
the overall international system. It also explains why the struggle between
different constituencies over the ability to define the national past (of the
7
Yack (2002), 35.
8
Ibid., 36.
9
Ibid., 40.
individual nation-states) constitutes the general framework within which

ultimately all national politics coalesce. Yack’s argument also provides a
valuable perspective to the Turkish experiment with liberalism, which has
always been limited by the parameters defined by competing versions of
Turkish nationalism.
As such, it is an example of a more general mechanism that allows reli-
giously defined political ideologies to be hosted by nationalism. Thus,
nationalism has the ability to provide a platform also to those political
ideologies that at first sight seem to reject nationalism’s secular presup-
positions. As recently observed by Cesari, political Islam can also be seen
as a particular manifestation of nationalism, that is, religious nationalism,
especially in those cases where the central state has aimed to create strong,
monist national ideologies with Islam at their centre.10 Turkey’s current
Muslim-nationalist reformulation of national identity represents precisely
this kind of religious nationalism produced in order to consolidate
the state.
Whether one looks at the previously dominant Kemalist secular-
nationalism or current Islamic-conservative form of Turkish nationalism,
one can find the attempt to preserve state sovereignty at its core, accom-
panied by an enduring debate regarding on what terms modern Turkey
can or should align its political principles with the Western experience. In
Turkey’s struggles to determine the meaning and contents of the ‘national’,
that allegedly encapsulates the meaning of the people as the sovereign,
political liberalism has always been a minor stream, crushed under the
overriding attempt to produce a monist political community through a
nationalist project.
Outlining the Competing Meanings of the West

and the National in Turkey
If nationalism has been an inseparable part of political liberalism in the

West in the sense argued by Bernard Yack, and I am convinced it has, then
one of course needs to ask why this combination has nevertheless allowed
the emergence of liberal democratic regimes in the West but crucially lim-
its it in Turkey. At least a partial answer seems to have something to do
with the rival, highly antagonistic conceptualizations of the national in the
Turkish modernization process. This, on the other hand, is crucially linked
10
Cesari (2016).
268 T. ALARANTA
to the struggle over the meaning of modernization and westernization

of Turkey.
The West as a synonym to the universal civilization of modernity was at
the heart of the Kemalist ideology that animated the republican project in
Turkey from the 1920s to the 1980s. The struggle over the meaning of
modernity and modernization in the Turkish case has always been one of
the key dimensions of Turkey’s politics. From today’s perspective, when
an authoritarian Islamic-conservative presidential system with few checks
and balances is being built in Turkey, it is crucial to understand the long-
term mechanisms that establish the necessary preconditions to this power
concentration. When the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 after
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, secularism and nationalism became
prominent features of the new state. Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), the
leader of Turkish independence war (1919–1922) and the key political
figure in the events that led to the establishment of the Republic, radical-
ized the Westernization (batılılaşmak) project originally started in the
Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. The republican nation-
building project was based on a holistic understanding of modernity,
requiring Turkey to absorb what was then seen as the universal aspects of
modernity, namely rational-scientific worldview and secularism.11
In direct confrontation with this holistic interpretation, a counter-
narrative had emerged already in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. This can be called Islamic mod-
ernism, but it also provided the basis for the first known example of politi-
cal Islam, in the sense that Islam was now for the first time used as a
political legitimation tool and a discourse to create a collective political
actor in the context of modernization processes.12 Instead of a total
absorption of Western civilization, the Islamic-conservative tradition
called for a material-scientific progress along the lines of W
estern-originated
11
See, for instance, Gülalp (2002), 29.
12
In a way, Islam has been a particularly political religion from its inception. According to
Ayubi, Islam is mainly a shariʽa (a nomos or ‘religious law’), containing principles that regu-
late man’s relationship to other men (muʽamalat). Islam, thus, has essential instructions
regarding not only the faith but also the social relations among the Muslim community.
According to Ayubi, this fusion of matters of belief with matters of conduct in Islam makes
it difficult to separate religion from politics. Ayubi (1991), pp. 50–51. However, one can
argue that as the traditional social order underwent drastic changes due to modernization
processes, Islam increasingly became used as a modern political ideology in order to create a
collective political actor.
development but rejected Western values and culture, especially secular

humanism, trying to preserve the allegedly authentic Ottoman Islamic,
and subsequently also Turkish-Islamic, civilization. This was the answer
provided also by the founder of Turkish sociology, Ziya Gökalp, who
made a distinction between universal civilization (medeniyet) consisted of
material-scientific development, and culture (hars), which referred to the
unique national culture of each nation. In Gökalp’s view, the Turks should
take the first one (civilization) from the West but jealously preserve their
authentic culture.13 Mustafa Kemal, on the other hand, perceived this as
an artificial and impossible distinction, supporting a holistic view on mod-
ernization. Thus, two alternative modernization paradigms—holistic/
republican versus selective/Islamic-conservative—have competed in
Turkey during the twentieth century.
Thus, the struggle over the meaning of the West and modernization
has always been at the heart of the Turkish nation-building project.14
Whereas the first-generation Kemalist cadres wanted to implement in
Turkey a Western-type secular and national project through a state-led
revolution, they were also anxious about Western great power intentions
in the Middle East. As the Western countries aimed to annex the Anatolian
heartlands of the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, the
Kemalist strategic culture always saw the West as a possible threat to
Turkish national sovereignty. This ambivalence towards the West was then
subsequently radicalized by the so-called left-wing Kemalist tradition that
became the dominant version of Kemalism during the 1960s. From that
period onwards, there has been a strong anti-Western element in the
Kemalist tradition.15
The selective, Islamic-conservative interpretation of Turkish modern-
ization, on the other hand, is best understood as a line or continuum with
moderate, rather pro-Western conservative centre-right parties in the one
end, and strongly anti-Western political Islamist parties in the other end.
The most prominent examples of the first group of parties have been the
Democratic Party (Demokrat Partisi [DP]) of the 1950s and the
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi [ANAP]) of the 1980s. Regarding
13
Gökalp (1976) [1923], 25–37.
14
These debates have an intellectual history reaching back to the first modernization
attempts in the Ottoman Empire in the beginning of the eighteenth century, see Karpat
(2010), 93–110.
15
For the competing traditions of strategic culture in Turkey, see Mufti (2009); for the
neo-nationalist, anti-Western variant of Kemalism, see Uslu (2008).
270 T. ALARANTA
the latter constituency, the so-called Milli Görüş movement—for many

decades led by late Necmettin Erbakan—has been the dominant political
Islamist movement during the republican era. The incumbent AKP, on its
part, emerged from and combined elements from both of these Islamic-
conservative traditions.16
To a significant degree, preserving the original Kemalist moderniza-
tion project, with its conviction of one universal civilization of modernity,
has obstructed the development of a more pluralist and liberal political
regime in Turkey. This is because the Kemalist regime saw the Islamic-
conservative constituencies as a threat to the cherished modernization
project and their own power.17 On the other hand—and as will be dem-
onstrated in what follows—the most ardent champions of the selective,
Islamic-conservative modernization have interpreted the Kemalist west-
ernization project as repressive, being eager to crush it once they have
been able to conquer the state.18 Within the mechanism where two rival
national modernization projects understand the struggle over the mean-
ing of the national community and modernization as a zero-sum game,
the individual liberties cherished by political liberalism have been repeat-
edly compromised by both traditions in their attempt to build a unitary,
state-centric national identity.
The AKP and Turkey’s Domestic Restoration Project

as a Civilizational Identity Narrative
Even though most analysts evaluate that under Erdoğan’s rule Turkey has
more or less completely turned its back to liberal democracy, the AKP
leadership and many Turkey’s citizens supporting the party strongly argue
that Turkey has only now become a genuine democracy. In order to
understand this argument in its intellectual and social context, one must
notice that the AKP representatives understand Turkey as a country fight-
ing against Western imperialism and domestic authoritarian regime alleg-
edly supported by the West. According to this interpretation, the AKP era
and Erdoğan’s leadership is a long-waited emancipation process that ends
the tutelary regime imposed by the Kemalist, culturally western-oriented,
elite in Turkey. Further, the general socio-political situation is understood
16
Çakır (2006), 544–549.
17
Keyder (1997), 46–49.
18
Somer (2016).
to be similar in other Middle Eastern Muslim-majority societies, and the

AKP constituency’s political narrative is full of arguments according to
which Turkey, as the most powerful regional actor, will take the leadership
role in the whole region.19 Increasingly, the common bond allegedly
attaching other Middle Eastern countries and Turkey together is defined
as shared Islamic civilization.
These views have become the most prevalent way to frame Turkey’s
socio-political reality among the AKP constituency in recent years. The
interpretation of Turkey being forced to abandon its own culture under
the rule of the westernized elite is explicit in the following excerpt by
Ahmet Hamdi Çamlı, an AKP parliamentarian and columnist in the pro-
government Star newspaper:
In order to rescue ourselves from the imperialist occupation, we abandoned

our culture, traditions, language, religion and even our spiritual values that
make us who we are. Yes, we abandoned all these, but the imperialists were
still not satisfied, and we remained dependent on them. In our schools, our
children were taught with the mentality of the occupiers … the explicit
physical occupation in 1919–1923 was repelled with our National
Independence War, but a more subtle, covered occupation continued for
decades, until it was finally overcome with the rise of Erbakan hoca and the
Milli Görüş movement.20 (transl. T.A.)
Ending this national alienation process is defined as a domestic restora-

tion project and it functions as the cornerstone in the AKP’s political nar-
rative. The idea of a domestic restoration inherent in the current
Islamic-conservative state transformation project has an intellectual pedi-
gree in several locations. The most prominent one is the shared literature
produced by specifically Islamic intellectuals that already spans three gen-
erations. During the early republican decades, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek
(1904–1983) and Nurettin Topçu (1909–1975) formulated the view
according to which Islam constitutes a unique and clearly distinct civiliza-
tion that had experienced its times of grandeur during the Ottomans. In
Kısakürek and Topçu’s texts, it is precisely this kind of Turkish-Islamic
civilization that is offered as the only legitimate basis upon which to build
a new modern Turkey. In sharp contrast with the westernizing project
implemented by the Kemalist elite of the time, the first-generation Muslim
19
Aslan (2018).
20
Çamlı (2014).
272 T. ALARANTA
intellectuals strongly argued that Turkey’s national identity needed to be

established on the foundations offered by an allegedly authentic civiliza-
tional tradition provided by Islam.21
Since the 1980s, these views were further elaborated and consolidated
by a new generation of Islamic intellectuals, with writers such as Ali Bulaç,
Rasim Özdenören, and İsmet Özel in the front row. These writers empha-
sized that Turkey should not seek a new social contract based on Western
political concepts and secularism but should instead develop a whole new
epistemology and conceptual map based on Islam and the tradition pro-
vided by the Prophet Muhammed and his sunna. Unlike Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek, who formulated a complete authoritarian Islamic form of gov-
ernment with a führer-type great leader (Başyüce) guiding the allegedly
unified Turkish Sunni nation to salvation,22 Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören,
and İsmet Özel base their ideas on individual emancipation through the
strict following of the Prophet and his righteous path. The Islamic intel-
lectuals explicitly attack the rationalist and secular worldview cherished by
the Kemalists, making it as the threatening ‘other’ of an authentic
Islamic ‘self’.23
A noteworthy aspect of the Islamic-conservative narrative that has now
replaced the Kemalist one in Turkey is that it does not challenge the exis-
tence of the ‘West’ but rather utilizes this as a counter-image for an alleg-
edly authentic and historically distinct (Turkish) Islamic civilization. In
this respect, few things are more revealing than dominant conceptions
regarding key national and international events and personalities. The dis-
cursive practices normalizing the constructed distinction between civiliza-
tional entities, such as the ‘West’ and the ‘Islamic world’, become concrete
in these historical narratives.
In our case, one such key historical figure is Sultan Abdülhamid II, who
ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1876 to 1909. The meaning of his reign
has become a major site in the Turkish struggles over the meaning of his-
tory and the national. In the AKP’s discourse, the distinction between
Western and Islamic civilization is constructed through the glorification of
Abdülhamid II. According to President Erdoğan, the Kemalist western-
izers demonized Abdülhamid II and turned him into the ‘other’ of the
republican ‘self’. According to this account, the demonizing of Abdülhamid
21
Yavuz (2003), 114–117.
22
Kısakürek (1968).
23
Yavuz (2003), 117–121.
II was the product of westernized elite that saw Turkish history from the
distorted perspective caused by a Western mentality.24 Redefining
Abdülhamid II as the hero of the Turkish nation in the AKP’s political
narrative thus serves as a way to repossess Turkish history after it was dis-
torted through the westernized categories implemented by the Kemalists.
In terms of both economic ties and political institutions, Turkey is rela-
tively firmly connected to the West. Further, a political narrative that
repeatedly emphasizes an essential civilizational distinction between the
West and Turkish-Islamic civilization does not necessarily imply that these
two distinct civilizations need to see each other in a confrontational way.
However, the political narrative reproduced by the AKP leadership also
includes elements that often point to that direction. In Erdoğan’s speeches,
the West (Batı) often becomes a hostile, monolithic category that wants
to attack and humiliate the Islamic world. This alleged behaviour often
leads Erdoğan to describe westerners as despicable, unworthy people.25
To a great extent, the debate on Western liberalism is based on the idea
of an individual and his/her inalienable rights. Safeguarding these rights is
seen as the function of the liberal state, although more communitarian
variants of liberalism also emphasize the individuals’ responsibility towards
the community.26 When the AKP came to power in Turkey in 2002, it
often based its critique of Kemalist modernization to this kind of liberal
tradition, emphasizing individuals’ rights against the repressive state. In
this discourse, the Kemalist state was seen as representing political elite
that dismissed the people’s will. During these early years, the AKP’s own
political narrative rarely emphasized Turkey’s character as an exclusively
Sunni Islamic nation, although the party’s so-called conservative democ-
racy (muhafazakar demokrat) programme included, from the very begin-
ning, an attempt to safeguard the ‘national and religious characteristics of
our people’ (halkımızım milli ve dini karakterini), often understood in
essential, unchanging manner.27 Right from the start the party leadership
formulated its mission as the ‘normalization’ of Turkish politics, strongly
24
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı (2018a).
25
See, for example, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı (2018b).
26
Eccleshall (2003), 23.
27
See, for instance, the statement by AKP deputy Nureddin Nebati. In his view, the claim
that Turkey is becoming more conservative is inadequate. According to Nebati, ‘Turkey is
just becoming itself’. In other words, the AKP has created a situation where Turkey can real-
ize its authentic identity. Nebati concludes that Turkey ‘just is this kind of society, our people
are religious (dindar) and conservative (muhafazakâr)’. Milliyet (2014).
274 T. ALARANTA
suggesting that the Kemalist top-down, state-led modernization project

founded on the attempts to control religious institutions and behaviour
had produced a social trauma.28 At that time, the Turkish liberals hailed
these ideas, as the AKP agenda seemed to lay the foundations for a new
social contract, one that could crush the restrictive Kemalist state
tradition.29
Reading through the documents published during the early phase of
the party formation, when it was crucial for the AKP leaders—who were
nearly all well-known Islamists from Erbakan’s Milli Görüş movement—
to win public legitimacy in the eyes of both liberals and Kemalists, one can
notice that the ‘conservative democrat’ self-description aimed to create an
eclectic, flexible agenda. Most important was to convince all outsiders that
the new party had abandoned political Islam and was situated in the politi-
cal centre, continuing the tradition of previous conservative centre-right
parties, in particular the Democrat Party (DP) of the 1950s and the
Motherland Party (ANAP) of the 1980s. However, in the longer run, the
party carried on the legacy of both Milli Görüş tradition and the centre-
right DP/ANAP tradition. During its 17 years of existence, the party has
always been a kind of battleground between these two traditions.
The AKP’s experiment with its alleged ‘conservative-democrat’ agenda
can be roughly divided into two periods. During the first period
(2002–2011), the AKP had to fight against the Kemalist bureaucracy and
the old guard in general, in order to take over all state institutions. In
doing this, it formed an alliance with the Gülen community, a reformist
Islamic brotherhood headed by Fethullah Gülen. After 2010 constitu-
tional amendments and 2011 parliamentary election, which further con-
solidated AKP’s ‘electoral hegemony’,30 the party was able to take over all
state institutions, and soon its alliance with the Gülen community ended.
However, one can argue that the central ideas inherent in the AKP leader-
ship’s worldview have been essentially the same during these years.
Regarding the domestic restoration project, the AKP political elite
shares an understanding of the world in which civilizations (medeniyetler)
play a crucial role. This is most noteworthy in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s think-
ing, but the same civilizational approach is clearly observable among the
28
Akdoğan (2004), 18–19.
29
For Turkish Liberals’ critical stance on Kemalism, see Karaveli (2009).
30
For this term and AKP’s enduring ability to form a winning coalition in elections, see
Keyman (2010).
whole AKP elite. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s (Minister of Foreign Affairs

2009–2014) key work Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) builds a
civilizational-religious framework for international relations and Turkey’s
major role in global politics. Within the overall hierarchy established in the
book, Turkey is conceptualized as one of the few specific ‘core countries’
expressing a unique religious-cultural/civilizational actorness in world
history.31 Especially when read in conjunction with his other writings,
Davutoğlu’s cherished idea of ‘restoration’ develops a civilizational
approach where Turkey and other Middle Eastern Muslim-majority soci-
eties are seen to have suffered from an alienation process due to previous
state-led westernization attempts. According to this stance, the western-
ization projects have been a key cause for the loss of self-esteem and lack
of authenticity in Turkey.32 Thus, Davutoğlu and his disciples now work-
ing in various Turkish think tanks clearly base their main political views on
the tradition espoused by Turkish Islamic intellectuals.33
Perhaps even more important is the fact that President Erdoğan explic-
itly argues that Turkey represents a unique Islamic civilization and that,
unlike Western civilization that is much too individualistic, the Islamic
civilization encompasses all dimensions in the community’s experience.34
From these statements, one can detect a critique of liberalism and its indi-
vidualistic approach, together with an attempt to discover alternative ways
to conceptualize modernity and modernization processes. Taken together,
these views also tend to challenge the legitimacy of Western-originated
modernization process and its contemporary international manifestation,
the so-called liberal world order. From time to time, President Erdoğan
explicitly uses the concept of the West (Batı) in order to name the civiliza-
tional category represented as non-Islamic in the AKP’s political discourse:
The increasing Islamophobia in the West leads to an all-out attack against

our book, the Prophet and all that we consider sacred. We observe with sad-
ness how the Western societies are experiencing a severe crisis of faith. Sadly,
they try to alleviate this crisis by targeting Islam and Muslims. From Osman
Gazi to Mehmed the Conqueror, many of our state leaders expressed toler-
ance that is indeed rarely seen in today’s world. Within the contemporary
31
Davutoğlu (2001).
32
See, for instance, Ardıç (2014), 49.
33
For the enduring debate in Turkey, Russia, and Japan of not being accepted as good as
the West in the eyes of the West, see Zarakol (2010).
34
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı (2017).
276 T. ALARANTA
Western system based on the culture of conflict, our civilizational under-

standing based on dialogue, tolerance, and respect for differences is mark-
edly different.35 (transl. T.A.)
Thus, president Erdoğan here reproduces the very well-known Islamist

leitmotif according to which the West is in perpetual moral crisis because
it has abandoned faith.36 However, in order to fully comprehend the
reproduction of the concept of the West—and the widespread reluctance
to associate one’s own political vision with this term in Turkey—it is note-
worthy in this context that also many contemporary secular-nationalist
(Kemalist) writers do not see their own stance as representing the West in
Turkey. Erol Manisalı, for example, explicitly argues that the Turkish revo-
lution (or alternatively Atatürk revolution) that created a modern secular
nation-state represents Europeanness (Avrupalılık) in the sense that the
Kemalists wanted to implement in Turkey the kind of modern institutions
and practices—such as secularism, rule of law, and democracy—that had
originally emerged in countries like France and Great Britain. This,
Manisalı argues, however has ‘nothing to do with westernizing Turkey’.37
The AKP representatives, however, ignore these views by domestic
opponents. To them, the Kemalist secular-nationalists are despicable west-
ernizers who have caused a collective alienation with heir modernist, top-
down secularizing project. Regarding the AKP’s domestic narrative on
normalization and restoration, one can detect a mechanism where the
construction of collective political actor by the AKP first utilizes liberal
concepts, especially individual rights, in its critique of Kemalism.
Subsequently, however, the same narrative engages in the critique of liber-
alism from an allegedly superior Islamic (civilizational) approach, arguing
that liberalism’s excessive individualism threatens the healthy organization
of the political community. This way the AKP political narrative construct-
ing an Islamic civilizational identity both utilizes—and in this sense super-
ficially affirms—some of the central tenets of Western liberalism but also
rejects them in order to establish a more communitarian and an allegedly
superior Islamic civilizational identity for Turkey. As will be demonstrated
in the next section, in AKP’s political narrative, this successful domestic
restoration also provides Turkey with a unique ability to transform other
Muslim-majority societies, especially in the Middle East.
35
36
For this kind of argumentation, see Bonnet (2004).
37
Manisalı (2018).
The AKP and Turkey’s New Foreign Policy:

Emotional Revisionism and Civilizational Identity
While analysing changes and continuity in US grand strategy, Colin Dueck
described its long-term characteristics as being practised by ‘reluctant cru-
saders’. With this, Dueck referred to a long-term cultural tradition of US
foreign policy that desired to spread American freedoms to the rest of the
world with almost religious fervour, while the more practical consider-
ations restrained these reflexes, so that the grand designs for social trans-
formations in far-away lands was never given the vast resources these
would have required. In other words, the US freedom-exporting foreign
policy was always a bit reluctant as many actors saw this much too costly
and resource consuming.38
The attempt to export liberal freedoms to non-Western world is at the
core of liberal international order. However, as liberalism itself has been
transformed, becoming a bit uncertain about its universalism, especially
regarding secularism and scientific rationalism in the era of ‘postmodern’
theories emphasizing cultural particularisms, the modernization paradigm
framing the liberal ascendancy is also challenged. This is problematic, as
there are many, not easily debunked, arguments according to which secu-
larization is a sine qua non of liberal emancipation project. John Rawls, in
his major work Political Liberalism, argued along these lines,39 while oth-
ers have quite credibly asserted that, in the final analysis, liberalism has
historically presupposed secularization and scientific rationalism.40
In domestic politics, the Kemalist tutelary democracy could never
redeem its promise of liberal emancipation. Nevertheless, in the interna-
tional field, Kemalist foreign policy was based on the idea of sovereign
nation-states embarked on a Western-inspired modernization process, a
system of states upon which the liberal international order is ultimately
established. Things have in this respect changed rather dramatically with
the coming to power of the Islamic-conservative AKP. Turkey’s foreign
policy under the AKP governments has certain characteristics that allow
one to describe it as ‘emotional revisionism’. The AKP foreign policy dis-
course has cherished concepts and slogans such as merkez ülke Türkiye
(central state Turkey), düzen kurucu aktör (order producing country), and
38
Dueck (2006).
39
Freedman (2000).
40
See, for instance, Susser (1988), pp. 214–215.
278 T. ALARANTA
dünya beşten büyüktür (world is bigger than five), referring to the UN

Security Council’s five permanent members. President Erdoğan and the
rest of the AKP leadership have endlessly repeated all these concepts. As
the analysts in the pro-government think tanks also explicitly argue, the
most enduring change in Turkey’s foreign policy during the last 15 years
is the abolishment of Western-centred foreign policy doctrine and the firm
believe in the emergence of multipolar world where Turkey is able to
acquire a powerful status.41
There indeed seems to be a widespread consensus among the AKP-
supporting think tanks that multipolarity is the key characteristics of an
emerging world order and that Turkey should actively push things to that
direction with interest-based approach that gives no priority whatsoever to
the West. As one enthusiast supporter of this view, Bülent Erandaç,
recently argued:
The land route of the new Silk Road goes through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to Europe. One of the sea routes goes
through Mersin-Iskenderun. From our point of view, the key question
regarding the future is the following: how is Turkey going to position itself
in the new world order? Independent Turkey – global leader Erdoğan is now
making geopolitical decisions as the leader of the third axis. With multi-
dimensional policies towards USA, EU, China, Russia, Africa and the
Islamic world, he is consolidating Turkey as the central state defining the
world.42 (transl. T.A.)
This kind of interest-based approach does not necessarily imply the

straining of relations between Turkey and the West nor that Turkey would
radically redefine its traditional foreign-policy doctrines, such as NATO
membership. However, one can observe that within this new foreign pol-
icy discourse, the space has also been opened for a critical evaluation of
some of the taken-for-granted and highly institutionalized commitments,
such as the NATO Membership.43 At least some Turkish think tankers
close to AKP have already argued that both NATO and EU are a ‘ conceptual
captivity’ that unnecessarily restrict Turkey’s choices.44 Further, a signifi-
41
Yeşiltaş (2018).
42
Erandaç (2018).
43
Kibaroğlu (2017), 8–9.
44
Tavukçu (2018).
cant characteristic of the ruling AKP leaders’ foreign policy thinking seems
to be emotional revisionism. In President Erdoğan’s words:
We are heirs to an uninterrupted historical civilization lasting for 1400 years.

Our first Anatolian state was established in Iznik in 1075, subsequently this
became the Selçuk Turkish state with Konya as its Capital. The Ottoman
state comprised 600 years and three continents, 7 different climates. The
Republic of Turkey, on its part, is our most recent state formation, estab-
lished on those territories we were able to keep after enormous sacrifices.
Let us not cheat ourselves—the Republic of Turkey is not the first state (of
ours). We are heirs to a state that ruled over 22 million square kilometers.
Even at the eve of establishing the Republic, we still possessed nearly 3 mil-
lion square kilometers of land, then falling to 780 thousand square kilome-
ters. When I have spoken about the Lausanne Treaty, this has made some
people anxious. Why? Unfortunately, in Lausanne our territories were
reduced from 3 million square kilometers to 780,000 square kilometers.
Lands that were very dear to us were taken. While these lands were taken,
some people are still glorifying this treaty. They are saying, ‘We achieved
magnificent things with the treaty.’ How is that? You gave away what was in
your hands, and claim this was a ‘success’.45 (transl. T.A.)
Erdoğan here explicitly attacks Kemalist foreign policy doctrine—and

traditional Turkish national historiography—that cherished the Lausanne
Treaty as the highly appreciated moment of international recognition of
the new Turkish nation-state. The search for a new international role for
Turkey started already during the 1980s with Turgut Özal. This search
was then made almost inevitable by the collapse of the Soviet Union and
end of the Cold War. The period from 2002 to 2011 is perceived as a
reformulated, yet in many parts continuing, attempt to redefine Turkey’s
relations with its Middle East neighbours, initially launched already in the
1980s. The idea is often summed up with the slogan ‘zero problems with
neighbours’, indicating the idea that Turkey should develop more produc-
tive and even fraternal socio-economic and political relations, especially
with the Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East. This has been
described as a transformation in the whole mentality regarding the national
security, which was for a long time based on the idea that Turkey was sur-
rounded by hostile states.46
45
46
Yeşiltaş and Balcı (2011), 17–18.
280 T. ALARANTA
With these kinds of characteristics, one could still argue that the AKP’s
new, more active foreign policy was becoming more, not less, compatible
with the Western countries’ eagerness to promote economic liberalization
and regional integration policies in the Middle East. However, in recent
years the AKP leadership has conceptualized the whole Middle East as the
foreign policy extension of its domestic state transformation project, both
allegedly consolidating each other. The so-called value-based approach in
Turkey’s foreign policy, called for by both Ahmet Davutoğlu and Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, explicitly maintains that the alleged ‘democratic consoli-
dation’ secured by the AKP governments in Turkey is directly linked to
the AKP’s foreign policy narrative, according to which Turkey under the
AKP functions as the saviour of Muslim peoples all over the Middle East.47
The AKP’s domestic narrative puts great emphasis on the ideas of ‘res-
toration’ and ‘normalization’, arguing that the state–society relationship
has been dysfunctional and lacking a solid basis. The Middle East as a
whole is seen from a similar perspective. In this sense, this narrative clearly
implies the idea that the international order established in the Middle East
after the First World War not only fragmented the historically structured
Ottoman sociocultural and political regional system, turning it into
(domestically often highly challenged) territorial nation-states, but also
contributed to the situation in which these new political entities were
ruled by ‘alienated’ elites.48 It is in Syria that this approach has produced
its most controversial and destabilizing results. The ‘order’ Turkey has
been after—one where the AKP’s ideological equivalents, the Muslim
Brotherhood, take on government responsibilities—required ousting not
only the existing Syrian government but also its existing state institutions
built around the al-Asads. To this end, Turkey started to arm various
Sunni Islamist factions fighting against the Syrian government, especially
the al-Qaeda cooperative Ahrar al-Sham, a salafi-jihad organization.49
Further, Turkey allowed international jihadi organizations, such as the
Islamic State (Daesh), to use Turkish territory as a logistics and supply
centre, a policy that allowed the emergence of the infamous ‘jihadi high-
way’ on the Turkish–Syrian border.50
47
For a strong statement expressing this view, see Erdoğan’s speech in Tokat on July 9,
2014 during his presidential campaign tour. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (2014a).
48
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (2014b).
49
Steinberg (2016), 5.
50
Uslu (2016).
In addition to this, Turkey started to use its Sunni Islamist proxies in its
attempt to wipe out the PKK-affiliated Kurdish militias, The People’s
Protection Units, from the regions close to its border. These Kurdish
groups, on the other hand, have been a major force in the US-backed
Syrian Democratic forces. The United States has been arming these groups
in its war against the Islamic State (Daesh) terrorist group—the Kurds were
chosen as Turkey for a long time refused to fight the Daesh. It is safe to say
that any Turkish government—whether Kemalist or Islamic-conservative—
would have reacted, sooner or later, to PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane,
Kurdistan Workers’ Party)-affiliated Kurdish groups building initial struc-
tures of autonomy right next to Turkey’s borders. However, there is a
considerable novelty in how this issue is now placed within the much
larger—and transformed—conception of international relations and
Turkey’s role in it. Unlike previously, the quarrel with the United States
about the Kurdish militias is not a separate issue, but part of the AKP’s new
grand strategy based on the domestic agenda, which is now Islamist.
The AKP leadership also increasingly sees all these troubles in Turkey’s
neighbourhood as being caused by the West. The repressive regimes, like
the one in Syria, is seen as the result of Western imperialism and post–
World War I decisions by the British and French to draw lines in the sand
while partitioning the Ottoman territories in the Middle East. The AKP
leadership sees countries like Syria as artificial, originally resulting from
Western imperialism. According to President Erdoğan, Turkey is the only
country in the world that can reestablish legitimate order in the Middle
East.51 On the other hand, the Islamic State terror organization is seen by
the AKP leadership as a result of United States aggressive Iraqi interven-
tion in 2003—an assertion being hard to deny, of course, as it is indeed
the case that Islamic State would not exist had not the Americans destroyed
the very state structures in Iraq.
With these kinds of foreign policy decisions, accompanied by an increas-
ingly authoritarian and Islamic-conservative domestic agenda, Turkey can
be defined as a revolutionary state that at least to some extent is imple-
menting revisionist foreign policy. It has become increasingly difficult to
see Turkey within the Western camp—and it is indeed hard to see why
anyone should even try to see it that way during a time when influential
AKP actors themselves explicitly argue that the era of Turkey’s Western-
centred foreign policy doctrine is over.
51
282 T. ALARANTA
Turkey’s New Civilizational Identity and the Fate

of the Liberal West
John Ikenberry has characterized the emergence of the post-1945 ‘liberal

international order’ by tracing its prehistory in the ascendancy of liberal-
ism in Britain and subsequently in the United States during the nineteenth
century. When Ikenberry originally published this account, the debate was
still on whether the new rising powers (China, India, Russia, Turkey, and
Brazil) desired to crush the liberal order, or only—as Ikenberry sug-
gested—wanted a new bargain regarding its implementation.52 Since then,
however, the debate has changed quite a bit, as the liberal order is under-
stood by many to be under attack by the Trump administration. However,
another noteworthy debate revolves around the question whether the lib-
eral order as presented in many popularized narratives really ever existed.
Paul Staniland, for example, has recently argued that the narrative of post-
1945 liberal world order made up by international rules and institutions,
free trade and democracy, ignores the violence, coercion, and instability
that was part of post-war international relations. The key aspect of this
critique asserts, quite persuasively, that coercion and disregard for both
allies and political liberalism have been entirely compatible with the ‘lib-
eral’ order.53
Turkey is one of those cases that at least challenges the idea of post-war
international order made up of liberal democracies. It was indeed absorbed
in the neoliberal free trade regime since the 1980s and has participated,
among others, in various Western-originated institutions. However,
Turkey’s experiment with liberal democratic practices was short and pre-
carious and is by now replaced by an authoritarian state transformation
project. The traditional Kemalist civilizational identity narrative, which
imagined the Turkish nation as part of the universal civilization of moder-
nity, has been replaced by the AKP’s new civilizational narrative that imag-
ines Turkey as the leading country within the Islamic civilization. The fact
that both these narratives have been strongly nationalist and inclined to
authoritarian practices easily obstructs recognizing that the changed state
identity in Turkey is in many ways a transformation of a major scale. What
has been considered in Washington as a ‘pivotal state’54 has now radically
52
Ikenberry (2012), 6–7.
53
Staniland (2018).
54
Fuller (2007).
switched its self-proclaimed role position in world politics, abandoning its

Western-oriented civilizational identity.
Obviously, one must be cautious in concluding what this changed iden-
tity entails. Unlike the proponents of essentially distinct civilizational enti-
ties claim, these civilizations, such as the West and the Islamic world, do
not exist independently but instead only as far as human actors reproduce
them in social interaction. As was observed in the early section of this
chapter, the dividing line between competing interpretations of modern-
ization in Turkey does not run between nationalists and cosmopolitans.
The competing modernization projects are both strongly nationalist but
differ in their interpretations of Turkey’s civilizational identity and main
characteristics of national identity. The analytical definition of a civiliza-
tional identity adhered to in this study understands it as a form of collec-
tive identity that locates the immediate ethnic or national community
within a context of a broader cultural community, often extensive in geo-
graphical and temporal scope.
The construction of national identity, and in particular the civilizational
identity within which this is placed in different eras and historical contexts,
is a highly political act, serving the purpose of building an emotionally and
intellectually credible basis for a collective political actor, in the context of
popular sovereignty. As was observed above by following Bernard Yack,
the principle of popular sovereignty that understands the sovereign com-
munity having an existence prior to the political authority, almost imme-
diately requires the concept of the nation. The idea of the nation provides
the necessary component by demonstrating the existence of the political
community before the establishment of the state. To a large extent, then,
the reproduction of a particular civilizational identity narrative is used as a
tool for political mobilization. The consequences stemming from these
narratives are dependent on how these collective identities are framed, and
what kind of national projects they serve to legitimize.
The Kemalist project that attached Turkey to the universal civilization
of modernity simultaneously understood the international order as being
dominated by imperialist Western countries that did not necessarily allow
to others, especially to non-Western countries, the kind of national sover-
eignty they themselves possessed. In this sense, the Kemalist project and
the civilizational identity narrative requiring Turkey’s participation in the
universal scientific civilization of modernity did not need to conceptualize
the Western nations as Turkey’s friends. As a matter of fact, and as was
demonstrated above, a significant part of the Kemalist discourse interprets
284 T. ALARANTA
the Western countries as at least potentially unfriendly, and even as poten-

tial threats to Turkey. Further, in its usage of Western civilizational identity
narrative, the Kemalists always emphasized secularism more than liberal-
ism. Even though there are good reasons to see these as two sides of the
same coin, in the Kemalist political practice the concentration on secular-
ism, and the consolidation of the regime as its guardian, often led the
Kemalists to restrict, rather than endorse, individual rights cherished by
liberalism.
Thus, at least in theory, the AKP’s ‘New Turkey’ discourse that narrates
the Turkish nation within the civilizational identity defined as the Islamic
world, could even allow for a friendlier relationship with the Western
world. This, however, would require seeing these different civilizational
entities as converging, helping each other to find each other’s best charac-
teristics. However, as was demonstrated above by analysing the AKP lead-
ership’s political narrative, these distinct civilizational narratives are at least
now understood to be rather antagonistic, the Western civilization alleg-
edly threatening the Islamic one. To some extent—and this may turn out
to be crucial in the long run—the Kemalist version of Turkish national
identity and its civilizational orientation anchored Turkey to the same his-
torical experience with the West. That is, even though the West was often
seen as unfriendly, there was nevertheless a deep philosophical ‘expecta-
tion’ that Turkey and the Western nations were part of a same historical
process of universal modernization. This is not the case with the AKP’s
desire to locate the Turkish national identity within the Islamic civiliza-
tion, not as long as these two are in many quarters and discourses seen as
rivals and adversaries.
Ultimately, most if not all the talk about civilizational identity can be
reduced to domestic power struggles within Turkey. As Ted Hopf has
suggested, states often understand themselves through domestic others,
and in this way, the crucial question often concerns how state identities
are constructed at home. Hopf quotes Deniz Kandiyoti, who has observed
that, ‘The question of what and who constitutes the West, or any other
Other, often has less to do with the outside world than with the class,
religious, or ethnic cleavages within the nation itself.’55 In short, regard-
ing the AKP’s civilizational identity narrative, its function is to fight
against the domestic other, that is, the domestic representatives of
Westernization in Turkey, the Kemalists. The Kemalist westernizing elite
55
Quoted in Hopf (2002), p. 10.
is the domestic other of the Islamic-conservative ‘new Turkey’. However,

even though the main adversary is the domestic one, rather than the
Western countries, the fight against the domestic westernizers is inconsis-
tent without simultaneous animosity towards the external other—the
West. With this mechanism, where the AKP is building a collective
Islamic-conservative political actor by degrading the Kemalists, the party
also builds a conceptual frame within which the West is almost inevitably
understood as a threat.
All these observations raise further questions regarding the kind of
interrelationship and intersubjective mechanism that describes the process
within which Turkey has changed its civilizational identity narrative at the
same time as the so-called liberal international order has come under
attack by illiberal and nationalist forces, both within and outside the ‘lib-
eral world’. In other words, how these two help to explain each other, and
how does the fate of the liberal international order look like when it is
evaluated in terms of what is taking place in Turkey?
These, however, are vast questions that cannot be answered in this
chapter. What can be said on the basis of the materials analysed here is that
the emerging liberal discourse that to some extent spread all over the
globe from the 1950s to the early 2000s provided an influential vocabu-
lary that allowed the Islamic-conservative AKP to challenge and delegiti-
mize, both home and abroad, the Kemalist authoritarian modernization
practices in Turkey. However, the same liberal discourse has subsequently
been seen as an alien and overtly individualistic creed, originating in the
Western civilization that is allegedly threatening the Islamic civilization,
within which the AKP political narrative now increasingly places the
Turkish national community.
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CHAPTER 11
A Russian Radical Conservative Challenge

to the Liberal Global Order: Aleksandr
Dugin
Jussi Backman
In recent years, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has increasingly profiled itself in

international politics as an “illiberal” and conservative alternative to the
Western model of liberal democracy and social pluralism and as a beacon
for certain anti-liberal political movements in the West. In the context of
international relations, as Anne L. Clunan and Tatiana Romanova point
out, Russia has not so much opposed the liberal international order per se
but rather highlighted the perceived contradictions inherent in its current
I owe particular thanks to Dr. Timo Pankakoski, with whom I recently

coauthored another article on radical conservative thought, learning a great deal
from him in the process. I also thank Professor Mika Ojakangas for the
opportunity to participate in his Academy of Finland research project The
Intellectual Heritage of Radical Cultural Conservatism (2013–2017). Financial
support for writing this article came from my Academy of Finland Research
Fellow’s project Creativity, Genius, Innovation: Towards a Conceptual Genealogy
of Western Creativity (2018–2023).
J. Backman (*)
e-mail: jussi.m.backman@jyu.fi

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_11
290 J. BACKMAN
form—above all, those between principles of national sovereignty and

national or cultural pluralism, on the one hand, and neoliberal globalism,
interventionism, and unilateral (American) hegemony, on the other—and
sought recognition for Russia’s sovereign status as a regional Eurasian
great power with a distinct cultural and political identity.1
Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin (b. 1962) is, in many ways, an intellectual
personification of these tendencies. Dugin has been one of the most
prominent actors on the Russian right-wing political scene since the
breakup of the Soviet Union, first and foremost as the key figure of the
international neo-Eurasianist movement. Despite his diverse and some-
times frenzied political activities, Dugin is first and foremost a political
theorist whose ideas have gradually gained international prominence and
notoriety. In recent years, Dugin’s main theoretical construction has been
his “fourth political theory,” distinguished by its attempt to sketch out a
vision of a postliberal, genuinely multilateral world order. Dugin situates
his thought within the legacy of the German “conservative revolution” of
the Weimar period, drawing particular inspiration from the geopolitical
and legal theories of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) and the philosophy of
Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). This attempt at formulating a novel type
of conservative ideology makes him an actual and potential key influence
for the international New Right. Rather than a purely Russian phenome-
non, Dugin can thus be characterized as a novel intersection of Western
and Russian political thought.
This chapter first takes a brief look at Dugin’s ambiguous status in the
context of contemporary Russian politics and his international ideologi-
cal significance. It then turns to the twofold background of Dugin’s
political thought: the Russian tradition of Eurasianism and the German
tradition of “revolutionary” conservatism. In the latter context,
Heideggerian philosophy of history and Schmittian geopolitics are par-
ticularly important for Dugin. Heidegger’s notion of an end of moder-
nity and “another beginning” of Western thought, together with the
pluralist geopolitical models of Schmitt and Samuel Huntington
(1927–2008), provide the foundations for Dugin’s vision of an ongoing
late modern turn from an increasingly globalized and unipolar world of
hegemonic Western liberalism toward a multipolar world of profoundly
different “civilizations”—a vision that is most accurately characterized as
radical conservatism.
1
Clunan (2018), Romanova (2018).
11 A RUSSIAN RADICAL CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE TO THE LIBERAL… 291
Dugin on the Russian Post-Soviet Political Scene

Dugin’s career in politics and political theory started in an unconventional
manner, from the Bohemian and esoteric political and intellectual fringe of
the final years of the Soviet era.2 Born in Moscow as the son of an officer
working in the Soviet military intelligence and a physician, he studied for
a time at the Moscow Aviation Institute but was expelled without a degree,
either because of poor academic performance, suspected dissident activi-
ties, or both, and had to take up employment as a street sweeper.3 Around
1980, Dugin became involved with an esoteric Moscow circle of dissidents
known as the Yuzhinskiy circle after the street (Yuzhinskiy pereulok) where
it originally met, founded by the eccentric mysticist and novelist Yuri
Mamleev (1931–2015) and, after Mamleev’s exile in 1974, centered
around the equally eccentric poet Yevgeniy Golovin (1938–2010). The
Yuzhinskiy circle, whose experimentations went so far as to flirt with Nazi
imagery, took a special interest in traditionalist authors such as the French
spiritualist René Guénon (1886–1951) and the Italian right-wing esoteric
thinker Julius Evola (1898–1974), some of whose works the members
were able to obtain from Moscow’s Lenin Library. Apparently, it was
Golovin’s influence that motivated the young Dugin to study foreign lan-
guages—he even translated Evola into Russian at a very early stage—and
initially introduced him to Eurasianism, radical conservatism, and herme-
neutic philosophy.
Open political involvement became easier during the perestroika of the
late 1980s. Around 1987–1989, Dugin was involved with the ultranation-
alist and anti-Semitic Pamyat (“Memory”) organization led by Dmitriy
Vasilyev (1945–2003). In 1993, he became the cofounder, with the for-
merly exiled underground writer Eduard Limonov (b. 1943), of the
National Bolshevik Party, whose nationalistic interpretation of Bolshevism
was modeled on the ideas of Ernst Niekisch (1889–1967), a German poli-
tician associated with the conservative revolution. Dugin left the party in
1998 following disputes with Limonov; it was subsequently banned as an
extremist group in 2007. In 2000, Dugin became head of the newly
founded All-Russian Eurasia Movement, which was registered as a politi-
cal party in 2002, reorganized into the International Eurasia Movement in
2
The biographical information presented here is based first and foremost on Sedgwick
(2004), 221–40, Laruelle (2006 and (2015b), and Umland (2007), 97–141 and (2010).
3
Umland (2007), 138.
292 J. BACKMAN
2003, and complemented with a Eurasian Youth Union in 2005. The

Eurasia Movement remains Dugin’s principal organizational vehicle.
The Gorbachev reforms also allowed Dugin to travel abroad since the
late 1980s and establish contacts with like-minded groups in Western
Europe, the most important of which was the French “ethnopluralist”
Nouvelle Droite led by Alain de Benoist (b. 1943), who became Dugin’s
most important collaborator outside Russia. In the early 1990s, Dugin
also initiated extensive activities as a publicist, establishing in Moscow his
own publishing house and cultural association Arktogeya through which
he was able to distribute his Eurasianist journal Elementy (1992–98),
modelled on de Benoist’s review Éléments. Arktogeya also published his
first books and pamphlets, the most prominent of which was Osnovy geo-
politiki (Foundations of Geopolitics, 1997), which lays out a proposal for
the construction, through strategic territorial annexations and pacts, of a
new Russian-led Eurasian Empire to counter the global hegemony of lib-
eral Anglo-American “Atlanticism.” This book, which was subsequently
used as a geopolitical textbook by the Academy of the General Staff of the
Russian military, brought Dugin considerable prominence with the
Russian military and political elites and cemented his position as an ideo-
logical mentor to those in power. In 1998, he became advisor to the
Chairman of the Russian State Duma, the Communist Gennadiy Seleznyov
(1947–2015), and in 1999, the chairman of the geopolitical section of the
Duma’s Advisory Council on National Security, exerting a certain influ-
ence on figures such as the ultranationalist “liberal democrat” Vladimir
Zhirinovskiy (b. 1946) and the head of the Russian Communist Party,
Gennadiy Zyuganov (b. 1944).
In 2000, Dugin completed a lower postgraduate degree (kandidatskaya)4
in philosophy, and in 2004, he defended his second doctoral dissertation
(doktorskaya, in many ways equivalent to the German Habilitation)5 in
political science, which gave him the necessary credentials for an academic
position. As an academic platform for the dissemination of his ideas, he
established in 2008 at the prestigious Moscow State University a Center
for Conservative Studies, focused on the adaptation and application of
Counter-Enlightenment and conservative ideas of Western thinkers such
as Guénon, Evola, Schmitt, and Heidegger to Russian politics and
4
How Dugin completed his basic higher education degree is a matter of some dispute; see
Umland (2007), 133–41.
5
Dugin (2004).
international relations.6 However, after an aggressive comment by Dugin

on the 2014 Ukraine crisis attracted unwelcome attention, his position as
the head of the Center was discontinued, after which Dugin has returned
to the status of an extra-academic independent intellectual.7
His status as a one-man Eurasianist and conservative think tank with
connections to those in power brought Dugin within the orbit of Vladimir
Putin’s administration, which, especially during Putin’s second presiden-
tial term (2004–2008) and his premiership (2008–2012), began to veer
more and more explicitly toward conservative nationalism as a new state
ideology. Dugin himself was initially ambivalent about Putin, noting criti-
cally in his writings the new president’s pragmatism and inherent lack of
ideology.8 In a 2014 interview for Der Spiegel, he distinguishes between a
“solar” Putin—Putin the conservative, Putin the Eurasianist—and a
“lunar” Putin—Putin the pragmatist and Realpolitiker.9 The apparent
proximity between Dugin’s and Putin’s political visions was strengthened
by Putin’s 2011 public announcement10 of the intent to build a Eurasian
Economic Union together with the Central Asian republics and Belarus,
and particularly by the 2014 annexation of the Crimea; this encouraged
Western media to cite Dugin as a “grey eminence” of “Putinism,” or as
“Putin’s Rasputin,” and his book on geopolitics was suspected of being a
“blueprint” for Putin’s foreign policy.11 Some went so far as to label Dugin
“the most dangerous philosopher in the world.”12 However, as Marlène
Laruelle notes, this impression, which Dugin himself welcomed, is largely
based on Dugin’s disproportionately great international visibility13; there
6
Rossman (2015), 65–66.
7
In a May 6, 2014 interview for the pro-Kremlin Abkhazian Network News Agency
(ANNA News), Dugin voiced his shock at the death of several pro-Russian activists in a fire
at the Trade Unions House of Odessa on May 2, 2014, declaring that “what we have seen
on May 2 is already beyond all limits. And I think: kill, kill, and kill. There should be no more
discussion. This is my opinion as a professor.” A video extract from the interview is available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-3khItD8s0. This comment led to an anti-Dugin
petition in June 2014 by Moscow students: a translation of the text of the petition is available
at https://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/2014/06/15/moscow-students-demand-to-fire-
dugin-from-the-moscow-state-university-for-sparking-hatred-towards-ukrainians/. This, in
turn, apparently resulted in the somewhat ambiguously framed termination of Dugin’s con-
tract; see Fitzpatrick (2014).
8
Dugin (2014c).
9
Neef (2014).
10
Putin (2011).
11
MacCormac (2015).
12
Ratner (2016).
13
Laruelle (2015a), 15.
294 J. BACKMAN
is no evidence of any immediate links or personal contact between Dugin

and the president, and in the 2014 Spiegel interview, Dugin himself admits
that he does not “know” Putin and has no influence upon him.14 The loss
of his position at Moscow State University shows that his status in Russia
is not sufficient to make him immune to disciplinary measures. While
Dugin’s ideology clearly resonates with many of the aspirations of Russia’s
current political elite, from the point of view of Russian political power he
is at most an unofficial ideological attaché among others, hampered to
some extent by his rather marginal background and by the complexity and
inaccessibility of his theoretical contributions.
Dugin and the International New Right

The most significant aspect of Dugin’s immediate ideological impact is
thus clearly the way it is disseminated through the extensive international
networks that he has been building for three decades. Laruelle distin-
guishes two main phases in Dugin’s European networking activities: his
trips to France, Italy, and Spain in the early 1990s and the establishment
of contacts in Turkey, Hungary, and Greece during the late 2000s.15
France—where, as Klaus von Beyme points out, the ideas of the Weimar
conservative revolution have “much more open and sophisticated advo-
cates” than in Germany16—has clearly been Dugin’s most important
European arena. In the first phase of his travels, his main contact was de
Benoist and people associated with GRECE (Groupement de Recherche et
d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne, Research and Study Group for
European Civilization), an ethnonationalist think tank founded by de
Benoist in 1968 as the main platform for his Nouvelle Droite, distinguished
from other French right-wing factions by its cultural focus, its search for
intellectual respectability, and its manner of incorporating anti-liberal ideas
from the New Left of the 1960s.17 Through GRECE, Dugin became
acquainted with figures such as the French “national revolutionary” writer
and activist Christian Bouchet (b. 1955), currently a member of the Front
national, and the Belgian geopolitical theorist Robert Steuckers (b. 1956).
14
Neef (2014).
15
Laruelle (2015a).
16
von Beyme (2017), 152.
17
Bar-On (2010) presents the Nouvelle Droite as a synthesis of the ideas of the New Left
and the conservative revolution.
Another Belgian right-wing politician who became acquainted with Dugin

late in his life was the “Pan-European National Bolshevik” Jean Thiriart
(1922–1992).
In Italy, Dugin befriended the far-right writer Cladio Mutti (b. 1946),
who later converted to Islam and is, since 2011, the editor-in-chief of the
Italian geopolitical review Eurasia.18 In Turkey, an initially favorable inter-
est in Dugin’s work among anti-Western circles was damaged after the
2003 publication of a Turkish translation of Osnovy geopolitiki, which
describes Kemalist Turkey in harsh words as a secularized and antitradi-
tionalist outpost of American Atlanticism.19 However, the conservative
and authoritarian presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since 2014 has
apparently changed matters, as Turkish sources reported Dugin acting as
an unofficial go-between in brokering a rapprochement between Putin
and Erdoğan in 2015.20 In Greece, Dugin has had some contacts with
some of the older, pro-Russian cadres of the left-wing Syriza party, such as
the former Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias (b. 1950), as well as the
extreme-right Golden Dawn.21
In Poland, Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism has been picked up by Mateusz
Piskorski (b. 1977), one of the cofounders in 2007 of the Eurasianist
think tank European Center for Geopolitical Analysis and head of the pro-
Russian Zmiana (Change) party. In 2016, Piskorski was detained by
Polish security officials under suspicion of cooperating with Russian intel-
ligence services.22 In the United Kingdom, Dugin’s influence is centered
around the main publisher of English translations of his works, Arktos
Media, a New Right and alt-right publishing house formally based in
London but operating mainly in Budapest, launched in 2010 by the
Swedish businessman Daniel Friberg (b. 1978) and the American John
B. Morgan (b. 1973).23 In Germany and the Nordic countries, Dugin’s
networks are limited to a few individuals, such as the extreme-right publi-
cist Dietmar Munier (b. 1954) and the journalist and editor-in-chief of the
Zuerst! magazine Manuel Ochsenreiter (b. 1976) in Germany and the
pro-Russian “human rights activist” Johan Bäckman (b. 1971) in Finland.
18
Shekhovtsov (2015b), Camus (2015), Savino (2015).
19
İmanbeyli (2015).
20
Meyer and Ant (2017).
21
Laruelle (2015a), Shekhovtsov (2015a), Tipaldou (2015).
22
Shekhovtsov (2018), 113–17, 255n17.
23
Schaeffer (2017).
296 J. BACKMAN
Although Dugin has been a vocal supporter of Donald Trump’s elec-

tion to the US presidency, his ties to the American alt-right seem, for now,
to be rather indirect. While Dugin and Trump’s former chief strategist and
former Breitbart News executive Steve Bannon (b. 1953) have favorably
acknowledged each other, they do not appear to have met or to have any
direct links.24 Dugin’s connection to the American “white nationalist”
leader Richard Spencer (b. 1978) seems more substantial: Spencer’s for-
mer spouse, Nina Kouprianova (b. 1988, pen name Nina Byzantina), is
the English translator of Dugin’s Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of
Another Beginning, published in 2014 by Spencer’s Washington Summit
Publishers, and of shorter texts by Dugin. Spencer’s webzine Alternative
Right (since 2018 Affirmative Right) has also published several interviews
with Dugin and reviews of his books.25
On the whole, looking at Dugin’s international connections, we note
that he is affiliated mainly with theoretically and intellectually oriented
conservative groups and individuals, many of whom are influenced by
either Russian Eurasianism or the German conservative revolution, rather
than the extreme right in the sense of neo-Nazis or right-wing populists.
Moreover, he tends to be connected to think tanks, publications, and pub-
lishing houses rather than political power or major established political
parties. This further underlines the fact that Dugin is first and foremost a
conservative political thinker whose main contribution is theoretical. In
sum, he is best seen as a facet of the wider European New Right that
Roger Griffin describes as “[b]y far the most sophisticated disguise
assumed by the fascist radical right since the war,” characterized by a
“right-wing Gramscianism” which recognizes that cultural hegemony must

precede political hegemony; the extensive use of intellectuals associated with
the “Conservative Revolution,” notably Nietzsche, Ernst Jünger, Martin
Heidegger, and Carl Schmitt … the belief that that the dichotomy of left
and right can be transcended in a new alliance of intellectual energies
opposed to the dominant system of liberal egalitarianism, capitalist material-
ism, and American consumerist individualism … and the celebration of eth-
nic diversity and difference (“differentialism”) to be defended against
cultural imperialism and “totalitarian” one-worldism.26
24
Nemtsova (2017).
25
Bertrand (2016), Shekhovtsov (2018), 254.
26
Griffin (2017), 20–21.
Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism
Russian Eurasianism, the main domestic element in Dugin’s political
thought, came into existence after the 1917 revolution among the Russian
emigrant community of Western Europe. The most prominent intellectu-
als associated with the movement were the linguist and historian Prince
Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890–1938) and the linguist and literary theorist
Roman Jakobson (1896–1982), who were also key members of the influ-
ential structuralist Prague Linguistic Circle. Flourishing in the 1920s,
Eurasianism was not a coherent unified ideology but rather a broad intel-
lectual platform seeking to redefine postrevolutionary Russia’s cultural,
spiritual, and geopolitical status. In contrast to the nineteenth-century
Pan-Slavists, for whom the key to Russian identity was the community of
Slavic-speaking peoples in Eastern Europe, the Eurasianists distinguished
sharply between Europe and Russia. For them, the decisive element in
Russian history was the Mongol overlordship over the East Slavic princes
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; the enormous Mongol
empire and its successor khanates unified the vast Eurasian landmass and
irrevocably connected the fate and mentality of the Russian people with
the alleged wider “Turanian” community consisting of the Uralic, Turkic,
and Mongol peoples of Inner and Central Asia. Since the retreat of the
Mongols, it had become the historical task of the rising Russian Empire to
uphold Eurasian unity, and in the eyes of many of the Eurasianists, this
task now befell the emerging Soviet Union, which should understand
itself not in terms of Marxist internationalism but as a distinct modern
Eurasian realm. However, the question concerning the appropriate stance
toward Soviet power split the early Eurasianists, and the movement gradu-
ally waned in the 1930s with the rise of Stalinism and Nazism.27
The Eurasian idea was revived in the Soviet Union in the wake of de-
Stalinization by the historian and ethnologist Lev Gumilyov (1912–1992).
Son of the poets Nikolay Gumilyov (1886–1921) and Anna Akhmatova
(1889–1966)—his father was executed by the Cheka on apparently fabri-
cated charges of conspiracy and his mother spent most of her life under
Stalin’s close surveillance—Gumilyov was regarded as politically suspect
during Stalinism and spent altogether fourteen years in prison camps.
After his release in 1956, Gumilyov was able to complete his education in
history, teach at Leningrad State University, and publish some of his
27
Laruelle (2008), 16–49.
298 J. BACKMAN
istorical and theoretical studies, but his idiosyncratic naturalistic theories

h
of ethnogenesis were regarded as unorthodox by his Soviet colleagues,
and he remained in a rather marginal and isolated position until the
Gorbachev reforms. Gumilyov’s theories about the development of Soviet
ethnicities, like those of the early Eurasianists, emphasize the key role of
the Mongol domination in the Russian ethnogenesis, the Russians’ natural
affinity with Mongolic and Turkic peoples as well as their natural enmity
toward the West, represent ethnonationalism in insisting on the necessity
of keeping ethnicities from intermingling, and promote traditional social
norms as a means of ethnic self-preservation.28 In the post-Soviet era,
Gumilyov’s ideas have gained immense popularity in Russia and other for-
mer Soviet republics; in 1996, Kazakhstan’s new national university,
founded by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in Astana, was named the
L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University to celebrate the idea of a
Eurasian Union, and during Putin’s 2000 visit, the walls of the university
were reportedly decorated with slogans taken from Dugin’s works.29
This post-Soviet resurgence of the Eurasian idea is normally referred to
as neo-Eurasianism; its chief theorists are Dugin and the internationally
somewhat less famous philosopher Aleksandr Panarin (1940–2003).30
Dugin and Panarin developed Eurasianism into a conservative and tradi-
tionalist direction. Dugin, in particular, was able to fuse the cultural rela-
tivism and ethnic particularism inherent in the Eurasianist tradition with
the cultural relativism and ethnic particularism characterizing the German
Counter-Enlightenment tradition of conservative thought. In general,
Dugin differs from the earlier Eurasianists in his strong reliance on Western
intellectual traditions—a somewhat paradoxical fact, given Eurasianism’s
insistence on the fundamentally non-European character of Eurasian men-
tality. Dugin’s achievement was also to combine Eurasianism with ideas
borrowed from the European tradition of geopolitical thought repre-
sented by Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Karl Haushofer (1869–1946),
Friedrich Naumann (1860–1919), Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922), and
Halford Mackinder (1861–1947). Dugin specifically picks up Mackinder’s
idea of the area stretching from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the
28
Laruelle (2008), 50–82.
29
Kullberg (2001). For Dugin’s own theory of “ethnosociology” and the ethnos (Russian
narod) as well as his comments on Gumilyov’s theory of ethnogenesis and passionarity, see
for example Dugin (2018).
30
Laruelle (2008), 83–106.
Himalayas to the Arctic as the “Heartland” that forms the geographical

center of the “World Island” comprising the Eurasian and African land
masses.31 According to Mackinder’s dictum, whoever rules the Heartland—
traditionally, Russia—rules the World Island and, thus, the entire world.32
This, of course, gives a vital geopolitical importance to the Eurasian zone
and to Russia, which, using Haushofer’s distinction, is essentially a land
power (in Dugin’s terminology, “tellulocracy”) in contrast to the Anglo-
American “Atlantic” sea powers (Dugin: “thalassocracies”). Dugin super-
poses this distinction upon other binary oppositions (Orthodoxy/Western
Christianity, ideocracy/democracy, collectivism/individualism, tradition-
alism/dynamism) that he uses to characterize the fundamental differences
between the Eurasian and the Atlantic civilizations.33
Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory: Radical

Conservatism
In Dugin’s eyes, after the end of the Cold War and with Soviet commu-
nism gone, Eurasia is in need of a new ideology, suited to its particular
traditions, to counter and rival the dominant Atlantic ideology, political
and economic liberalism. Liberalism, the oldest of the great modern ide-
ologies, emerged victorious from the twentieth century after having mili-
tarily and economically defeated its chief rivals, fascism and communism,
in the Second World War and the Cold War. Having thus gained hege-
mony, liberalism ceases to be a consciously embraced ideological option.
Its distinctive key tenets—for Dugin, the self-interested individual as the
fundamental subject of politics, the sacrosanct character of private prop-
erty, the equality of opportunity as the moral law of society, the contractual
basis of sociopolitical institutions, and the priority of civil society and the
market economy over political institutions and collective (ethnic, cultural,
or religious) ties—develop into the dominant framework of the Western
mindset as such, ushering in the kind of post-, late, or “liquid” modernity
described by Zygmunt Bauman as a condition of extreme social fluidity
and nomadic individualism in which the individual is no longer an autono-
mous, rational, and self-identical subject but rather constantly redefining
31
Mackinder (1904, 1919).
32
Mackinder (1919), 194.
33
See for example Dugin (2015).
300 J. BACKMAN
and reinventing herself.34 However, hegemonic liberalism has still not

become the universal “end of history” proposed by Francis Fukuyama in
198935—it remains a “Western” phenomenon that has never properly
taken root in non-Western spheres such as Eurasian Russia.36
Articulating a viable ideological alternative to liberalism as well as its
now-defunct twentieth-century competitors is Dugin’s key pursuit in his
most important mature work, The Fourth Political Theory (Chetvertaya
politicheskaya teoriya, 2009, English translation in two volumes 2012 and
2017). Dugin’s “fourth” ideology claims to incorporate the most viable
elements of the three previous ideologies—freedom in liberalism, the cri-
tique of capitalism in Marxism, and ethnic particularism in fascism—while
rejecting their respective individualism, materialism, and racism, in short,
their universal teleological narratives of history as a process of individual
emancipation, class struggle, or racial conflict.37 The result is a combina-
tion of spiritualist, communitarian, and particularist approaches emphasiz-
ing the significance of cultural and linguistic traditions—particularly their
different religious, spiritual, and intellectual ways of relating to dimen-
sions of ultimate meaningfulness—and the importance of preserving inter-
cultural differences.
Dugin’s fourth ideology rejects the modernistic grand narratives com-
mon to the great twentieth-century ideologies and the secular-teleological,
progressive, and utopian conception of time underlying them.38 In this
sense, it draws its “dark inspiration” from the “postmodern” critiques of
Enlightenment modernity and of the autonomous, rational, and individ-
ual Enlightenment subject. At the same time, however, Dugin also calls
for a “crusade” against postmodern culture, seen as the nihilistic culmina-
tion of liberal modernity.39 The strategy of the fourth ideology vis-à-vis
postmodernity is characterized by Dugin with an expression borrowed
from Evola: “riding the tiger,”40 that is, exploiting the strength of the
beast and at the same time discovering its weak points and hacking them,
rather than attempting to avoid or ignore it or confronting its fangs and
claws directly.
34
Bauman (2000).
35
Fukuyama (1989).
36
Dugin (2012), 139–55.
37
Dugin (2012), 43–54; (2014a), 101–14.
38
Dugin (2012), 83–94; (2014c), 145–53.
39
Dugin (2012), 12, 23.
40
Evola (2003).
It is not possible to just walk past postmodernity…. Hence why the Fourth
Political Theory must turn to the precursors to modernity and to what
modernity actively fought, but what became almost entirely irrelevant to
postmodernity. We must turn to tradition, to pre-modernity, archaism, the-
ology, the sacred sciences, and ancient philosophy.41
Exploiting postmodernity’s indifference to premodernity by retrieving the

latter in a transformed sense—this strategy makes the fourth ideology a
postliberal conservatism. Dugin carefully distinguishes it from the “funda-
mental” conservatism or traditionalism of thinkers such as Guénon and
Evola, which advocates a reactionary return to premodern values and
social institutions such as religion, spirituality, hierarchy, and patriarchy, as
well as from the liberal or “status quo” conservatism that he attributes to
Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929), which endorses Enlightenment modernity
but opposes its unfolding into extreme, postmodern manifestations.42 The
particular strand of conservatism within which Dugin situates his own
work and which he seeks to develop theoretically is the German “conser-
vative revolutionary” movement of the Weimar period, which broadly
encompasses thinkers and activists such as Ludwig Klages (1872–1956),
Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876–1925), Othmar Spann (1878–1950),
Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), Niekisch, Hans Freyer (1887–1969),
Edgar Julius Jung (1894–1934), Ernst Jünger (1895–1998), and Ernst
von Salomon (1902–1972)—and, most importantly for Dugin, Schmitt
and Heidegger.43 Like Russian Eurasianism, the German conservative rev-
olution was not a monolithic ideological program but rather a shared
mentality and an intellectual platform for the purpose of reconsidering
and redefining Germany and European society in general after the destruc-
tion and social upheaval brought by the First World War. The conservative
revolutionaries were first and foremost united by their antagonism toward
the liberal democracy represented by the Weimar constitution, perceived
by them as a weak, fragmented, and atomized political entity that reduced
its citizens to faceless masses without shared identity or purpose and
exposed them to civil strife and extreme movements such as Bolshevism.
This basic attitude brought the conservative revolutionaries into a certain
proximity with Nazism. Some of them, notably Schmitt and Heidegger,
41
Dugin (2014c), 286.
42
Dugin (2012), 83–94; (2014c), 145–53.
43
Dugin (2012), 94–98; (2014c), 153–59.
302 J. BACKMAN
later became party members and did their best to nudge the Hitler move-
ment into a conservative direction during the early years of the Third
Reich, soon becoming disillusioned by their patent lack of success; others,
like Niekisch and Jung, did not conceal their distaste for the racist and
totalitarian mass movement and often ended up killed or imprisoned.
In spite of the fundamental hostility to central manifestations of
Enlightenment modernity—individualism, rationalism, utilitarianism, lib-
eralism, and materialism—that connected them to the older tradition of
German conservatism, Dugin emphasizes that the conservative revolu-
tionaries were not nostalgic reactionaries: they did not see modernization
as an unfortunate mistake but rather as an inevitable development that
cannot be cancelled in order to return to a traditional type of society, but
should not be conceived in terms of universal teleological progress either.
In the spirit of the Nietzschean “eternal recurrence of the same,” the revo-
lutionary conservatives believed in the necessity of historical change and
renewal without the assumption of a final aim or end of history. The con-
servative notion of “revolution” is thus to be understood in terms of a
cyclic, rather than linear, conception of time, in the literal sense of a rolling
back (Latin revolvere) to a point of departure or origin that is recaptured,
albeit in a new temporal sense.44 As Moeller van den Bruck puts it in his
Das dritte Reich (1923):
The conservative … seeks to discover where a new beginning may be made.

He is necessarily at once conserver and rebel…. Conservative thought per-
ceives in all human relations something eternal and recurrent that, now in
the foreground, now in the background, but never absent, ever reasserts
itself, and does not simply recur as the same…. But even this eternal prin-
ciple must be recreated from the temporal, ever anew.45
However, since not all revolutionary conservatives were actual revolution-

aries and not all of them used the concept of revolution, the most accurate
and comprehensive term for describing this new, radicalized version of
conservatism is “radical conservatism.”46 This term is also the most appro-
priate for describing Dugin’s approach and is occasionally employed by
Dugin himself.47
44
See Mohler (1989), 78–129.
45
Moeller van den Bruck (1931), 189, 206; (1934), 203, 219–20. Translation modified.
46
Dahl (1999), 2–3.
47
Dugin (2014c), 157.
Dugin’s Heideggerian Model of the Conservative

Revolution
In his book Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning
(Martin Heidegger: filosofiya drugogo Nachala, 2010, trans. 2014)—the
first of altogether four volumes on Heidegger’s philosophy48—Dugin
presents Heidegger as the quintessential thinker of radical conservatism.
He argues that in terms of systemic connections and contacts, intellectual
influences, and political sympathies, Heidegger must be regarded as an
“integral part” of the German conservative revolution.49 Heidegger, as
read by Dugin, is concerned precisely with an intellectual and spiritual
“revolution” in the radical conservative sense: an impending culmination
and end of Western modernity and the possibility of a new beginning that
would not be simply a return to the past but rather a retrieval or reappro-
priation of the foundations of the Western tradition in a new, transformed
framework, no longer situated within the confines of modernity. Heidegger
was a, if not the, philosopher of the conservative revolution as the thinker
of “another beginning” of the West.50 As the title of Dugin’s book on
Heidegger indicates, it is the notion of the “other beginning” (der andere
Anfang) of Western thought, introduced by Heidegger in the later period
of his thought since the mid-1930s, that makes him, in Dugin’s eyes, the
founding figure of the philosophical twenty-first century, which “will start
when we truly begin to grasp Heidegger’s philosophy.”51
In his later thought, Heidegger develops a historical narrative of
Western philosophy and metaphysics that includes an account of the emer-
gence of Western modernity since the seventeenth century as well as its
culmination and end in the contemporary era of global technicity.52 For
Heidegger, the modern, post-Cartesian metaphysics of subjectivity—and
Western metaphysics as a whole—attains its completion in Nietzsche, an
“ultramodern” thinker. Nietzsche articulates the metaphysical framework
48
Dugin’s other books on Heidegger—Martin Heidegger: vozmozhnost’ russkoy filosofii
(Martin Heidegger: the possibility of a Russian philosophy, 2011), Martin Heidegger: posled-
niy bog (Martin Heidegger: the last god, 2014), and Martin Heidegger: metapolitika, eskha-
tologiya bytiya (Martin Heidegger: metapolitics, the eschatology of being, 2016)—remain
untranslated. On Dugin and Heidegger, see also Love and Meng (2016).
49
Dugin (2014b), 23–26, 171–73.
50
Dugin (2014b), 172.
51
Dugin (2014b), 277–78.
52
For a more detailed account of this narrative, see Backman (2015), 19–68.
304 J. BACKMAN
for the subjective domination and extreme instrumentalization that deci-

sively determines the late modern human being’s technical and techno-
logical relationship to reality. In this reality, empirical sciences and social
ideologies function as means of controlling and configuring nature, soci-
ety, and the human being herself as a “human resource.”53 In the contem-
porary situation, philosophy faces the necessity of a profound
reconsideration of the most fundamental premises of Western thought—a
retrieval and reappropriation of the Greek “first beginning” of Western
thinking. This reappropriation would result in its transformation into
another beginning, an entirely new point of departure and principle for a
new, postmetaphysical form of thinking.54 While the classical metaphysical
tradition sought maximal universality and permanence—an absolute, non-
relative point of reference for reality as a whole—the Heideggerian post-
metaphysical approach accepts the radical historicity, context dependence,
and relativity of all meaningful configurations. In the other beginning of
Western thought, the ultramodern, nihilistic technical domination of an
inherently meaningless reality gives way to an insight into the way in which
all meaningfulness and sense of purpose is constituted and experienced in
unique and communally shared historical and cultural situations and ulti-
mately eludes active control.
Dugin’s “Right Heideggerian” theoretical project is to “develop the
implicit political philosophy of Heidegger into an explicit one.”55 For
Dugin, this means interpreting the Heideggerian “other beginning” as a
conservative revolution, a turning back to the roots of the Western histori-
cal tradition in which the late modern world of subjective liberal individu-
alism is left behind. The fourth political theory is no longer focused on the
autonomous and self-sufficient liberal individual, the value-producing
working class of Marxism, or the total state or master race of fascism. All
of these political agents belong to the culmination of modernity. Rather,
the political subject of the fourth political theory is the Heideggerian
Dasein, the genuinely “post-modern,” finite, situated, and singular human
53
See for example Heidegger (1991a), 3–6; (1991b), 3–9, 150–251; (1991c), 147–96;
(1992), 198–208; (1998c), 1–4, 415–23, 425–32, 585–94; (1998d), 1–22, 177–229,
231–361; (2000c), 61–65; (2002), 55–59.
54
Heidegger (1989), 171, 185; (1991b), 182; (1998d), 21; (2012b), 135, 145–46.
55
Dugin (2014a), 114.
being thoroughly determined and defined by her relations, by a particular

historical context, and by a particular cultural community.56
Dugin, Schmitt, and Huntington: From Liberal

Global Hegemony to the Multipolarity
of Civilizations
Dugin’s Eurasianist geopolitics of multipolarity also finds novel theoretical

support in the work of Heidegger and Schmitt. For the German radical
conservatives, a shared central concern was precisely the perceived homog-
enization of the human world in modernity, the levelling out of cultural,
historical, and geographical differences in favor of a global world order. In
1933, Heidegger enthusiastically greeted Hitler’s decision to withdraw
Germany from the League of Nations, maintaining that a true community
of peoples cannot be founded upon the “baseless and non-committal
world fraternization” of the League any more than on “blind domination
by force” but requires each nation to take responsibility for its own par-
ticular historical “determination.”57 In 1935, Heidegger describes
Europe—Germany, in particular—as being caught in “great pincers”
between the Soviet Union and the United States, two global and suprana-
tional powers that, “seen metaphysically, are both the same: the same
hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organization
of the average man.” The only way out of this intense pressure is a radical
reappropriation of historical tradition; Germany can “gain a fate from its
vocation only when it … grasps its tradition creatively.”58
56
Dugin (2012), 32–54. In his “thought diaries,” the so-called Black Notebooks (Schwarze
Hefte), Heidegger views contemporary phenomena such as Nazism, fascism, communism,
and liberalism as different symptoms of one and the same historical juncture, the completion
of modernity; Heidegger (2014a), 408, 412–13; (2014b), 109, 262; (2015a), 130; (2017a),
318, 321–22; (2017b), 85–86, 208. They are first and foremost late modern modes of
manipulating and mobilizing the resources of a fully homogenized and biologized humanity;
Heidegger (1998b), 179–214, 223–24; (2015b), 151–80, 188. In the 2015 interview,
Dugin notes: “National Socialism is one of three political ideologies rooted in Modernity. Its
totalitarianism is absolutely modern (Hannah Arendt has shown that). Heidegger was the
most radical critic of Modernity as the oblivion of Being. He denounces the modern aspects
of National Socialism, including racism. That is quite logical. And I share these criticisms.”
Dugin (2017), 211.
57
Heidegger (1993), 50–52; (2000a), 188–89.
58
Heidegger (1998a), 28–29; (2000b), 40–41.
306 J. BACKMAN
The theoretically most important articulation of this concern for pre-

serving local differences and plurality was Schmitt’s vision, introduced in
his 1939 lecture “The Großraum Order of International Law,” of the
geopolitical articulation of the world into a number “large spaces”
(Großräume), each with their particular political, geographical, and cul-
tural identities, as an alternative to a universalistic and unipolar global
world order.59 This model elaborates the logical consequences of Schmitt’s
famous definition of politics as based on a determinate and exclusive polit-
ical identity that differs from other identities and from which a fundamen-
tal “existential” distinction between political friend and political enemy
inevitably follows to such an extent that the possibility of war always
remains.60 The existential risk presented by liberal cosmopolitanism is a
completely depoliticized world in which no one is committed to fighting
unto death for a political cause. For both Schmitt and Heidegger, the
great initial promise of National Socialism was to create a European “great
space,” led by Germany, to counter Europe’s incorporation into the uni-
versalistic ideologies of the two emerging superpowers and the loss of its
particular political or spiritual identity. For Schmitt, the European-German
Großraum was to be distinguished by a particularistic and nationalistic
political idea, based on the “respect of every nation as a reality of life
determined through species and origin, blood and soil.”61 For Heidegger,
who despised racialism and biologism, European identity was to be deter-
mined rather by its particular cultural and intellectual tradition crystalliz-
ing in European philosophy, whose last great modern representatives,
Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche, had all been Germans.
Both visions of a territorially limited or nationally or culturally particu-
laristic German power were definitively shattered at the latest by the
German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 and the concomitant
announcement by Hitler of a coming, supranational “New Order”
(Neuordnung) of Europe, organized on racial principles and thus reveal-
ing the global scope and the homogenizing and biologistic nature of the
Nazi ambitions.62 In 1941 or 1942, Heidegger describes Hitler’s New
Order as “a provision for planetary domination” that seeks to obliterate
59
Schmitt (1995), 269–371; (2011), 75–124.
60
Schmitt (2007, 2015).
61
Schmitt (1995), 306; (2011), 111.
62
The New Order of Europe was initially announced by Hitler in his speech at the Berlin
Sports Palace on January 30, 1941.
the difference between West and East and thereby to “complete the
essence of modernity, an essence which … dominates the Western hemi-
sphere (America) in the same unequivocal manner as the East of Russian
Bolshevism.”63 Rather than an alternative or counterforce to the moder-
nity represented by American liberalism and Russian communism, the
Nazi vision of Europe is now seen as an extreme consummation of this
modernity. Accordingly, the Cold War, described by Heidegger already in
1949 as the “battle for the domination of the earth” by the “two contem-
porary ‘world’ powers,” is for him a mere continuation of the Second
World War.64 Such global struggles, whether hot or cold, are fundamen-
tally conflicts between ideologically opposed but “metaphysically” identi-
cal powers competing for the control of the earth’s material resources and
populations—in the words of Schmitt, “global civil wars” rather than
genuine political conflicts between communities with truly distinct
identities.65
Dugin argues that the end of the Cold War has given new relevance to
Schmitt’s contrast between a unipolar global system and a multipolarity of
great spaces.66 This had now become a contrast between the liberal and
democratic “new world order” envisioned by President George Bush Sr.
in 1990 and corresponding to Fukuyama’s thesis on the liberal “end of
history,” on the one hand, and Huntington’s prediction of the replace-
ment of the Cold War by a postideological “clash of civilizations,”67 on the
other. Huntington’s vision, Dugin argues, has in hindsight proved closer
to the truth, and his articulation of the world map into seven or eight
major “civilizations” or religious and cultural regions has the merit of
providing a way of rehabilitating Schmitt’s “large spaces.” However,
Dugin sees Huntington’s idea of inevitable intercivilizational clashes as
overly pessimistic; the decisive contemporary conflict does not, for Dugin,
take place between the individual civilizations but between the multipolar-
ity of civilizations and Fukuyaman liberal-democratic unipolarity as such,
that is, between a particularistic or regional continuation of history and a
universalistic end of history.
63
Heidegger (2009), 95; (2013), 80.
64
Heidegger (1994), 51; (2012a), 48.
65
Schmitt (1974), 271; (2006), 296.
66
Dugin (2012), 101–20; (2017), 72–87.
67
Huntington (1996).
308 J. BACKMAN
[A] multi-polar world … will create the real preconditions for the continua-
tion of the political history of mankind…. Surely, both dialogue and colli-
sions will emerge. But something else is more important: history will
continue, and we will return from that fundamental historical dead-end to
which uncritical faith in progress, rationality and the gradual development
of humanity drove us…. There will be no universal standard, neither in the
material nor in the spiritual aspect. Each civilization will at last receive the
right to freely proclaim that which is, according to its wishes, the measure
of things.68
In Dugin’s multipolar world, history will thus continue—no longer as the

universal History of the Enlightenment narratives, but rather in the form
of the regional narratives of civilizational great spaces that are capable of
living and acting in concert, provided that they adopt a hermeneutic
respect for otherness and for the plurality of historical traditions. We see
that this vision is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Heideggerian and
Schmittian radical conservative geopolitics, with the obvious difference
that it is not the possibility and future of the European large space that first
and foremost concerns Dugin, but that of the Eurasian-Russian space.69
Conclusion
This overview of Dugin’s thought shows that the substance of his chal-
lenge to the unipolar aspirations of the liberal global order is first and
foremost theoretical and intellectual in nature. Even though his project
grows out of Russian Eurasianism and is largely harmonious with Russia’s
prevalent policies and aspirations for recognized sovereignty as a regional
great power with a conservative cultural identity, in the light of Dugin’s
considerable international visibility and networks, it is most fruitful to
68
Dugin (2012), 116, 120.
69
Interestingly from Dugin’s point of view, the Eurasian idea itself finds certain resonance
in Heidegger. In remarks inspired by the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Heidegger
notes that Russia and Japan belong to Eurasia—they are in between the European and Asian
spaces; Heidegger (2009), 95; (2013), 80. Hitler’s planetary war campaign, which amounts
to a “limitless exploitation of raw materials,” risks depriving both Germanness and
Russianness—the metaphysical West and its transmetaphysical Eurasian other—of their his-
torical particularity and of an opportunity for a mutually fruitful encounter and exchange;
Heidegger (1998b), 119–20; (2015b), 100–101. Remarks such as this give Dugin all the
more reason to regard Heidegger as “the greatest stimulus for our rethinking the West and
ourselves [the Russians] faced vis-à-vis the West.” Dugin (2014b), 186.
consider his work in the wider context of the international New Right,
with its emphasis on cultural and national pluralism and particularism,
inspired by the anti-liberal ideas of the conservative revolution.
In its substance, Dugin’s fourth political theory cannot be character-
ized as particularly original; it consists almost entirely in a circulation and
eclectic recombination of philosophical and political ideas that have been
around for almost a century. Its merit is rather the extraordinarily wide
scope of Dugin’s erudition and his ability to bring very different intellec-
tual traditions into concert. The theory remains a draft with much impor-
tant detail and articulation missing, hopelessly vague on key issues such as
the precise nature, dynamic, and internal diversity of a cultural tradition,
the different types of interaction between civilizations, and different pos-
sible modes of political organization. Its current formulation remains so
conspicuously nonpragmatic, even esoteric, that it is manifestly unfit to
function as the kind of policy blueprint that it has sometimes been sus-
pected of being. Moreover, it is not at all clear that Dugin’s strict distinc-
tion between his fourth ideology and all forms of fascism, racism,
xenophobia, and other, more traditional far-right phenomena, are ulti-
mately very tenable on the level of actual political practice.
However, Dugin has undeniably been able to breathe new life into an
old idea, Eurasianism, that clearly has an important influence on Russian
geopolitical thinking even among the political and military leadership, and
to complement it creatively with Western philosophy and political theory.
In a broader and more international framework, Dugin’s perhaps most
interesting achievement has been to rediscover and reassert a form of dis-
tinctly anti-modern conservatism that has most often been overlooked as
an available ideological option: the “revolutionary” conservatism of the
Weimar era that was irreparably eclipsed by fascism and National Socialism,
even though it did not completely perish with them. From a purely theo-
retical viewpoint, Dugin’s discovery of a coherent ontological, anthropo-
logical, and jurisprudential foundation for this ideology in Heidegger and
Schmitt is innovative, even unique, in the contemporary context of politi-
cal theory in its attempt to produce a postliberal model of geopolitics.
Dugin’s radical conservative geopolitical vision of cultural pluralism and
multipolarity as a challenge to an alleged “Atlantic” liberal hegemony will
undoubtedly have a role to play in the theoretical and ideological dis-
courses of twenty-first-century New Right politics, even though it remains
to be seen whether this role can ever fully extend to the concrete level of
political movements or international policymaking.
310 J. BACKMAN
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CHAPTER 12
A Non-world: Chinese Perceptions

of the Western International Order
Matti Puranen
The ‘liberal international order’ and its core ideas, such as democracy,
human rights, or free trade, have been encountering an increasing amount
of challenges during the last decade. However, serious challenging models
for the order have been lacking. During the Cold War—especially during
the first decades after the Second World War—the rapid growth of the
communist economies and their leading edge in space technology seemed
to prove that Marxist-Leninist doctrine indeed provided a considerable
alternative ideology and development model for the whole mankind. After
its collapse, challenging powers have not been able to propose any viable
alternatives for the current political order, that is, nation-states with mar-
ket economies and more or less democratic governments.
China, however, seems to be attempting to construct an alternative
vision. Within China, the decline of the international order led by the
Western countries and China’s rise to its traditional position as the lead-
ing, ‘central country’ are seen as almost inevitable historical currents.1
1
See, for example: Renmin ribao 7.2.2017. For an academic perspective, see Cheng and
Wang (2015).
M. Puranen (*)
e-mail: matti.i.puranen@student.jyu.fi

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_12
316 M. PURANEN
China’s increasingly self-confident leadership centered around president

Xi Jinping is arguing that there is, indeed, a unique ‘Chinese path’ which
offers traditional Chinese values and institutions as solutions for our glob-
ally shared problems, and which is presented exactly as an alternative for
‘Western ideas’, such as liberal democracy or market economy.2 Yan
Xuetong, perhaps the most well-known Chinese scholar of international
politics, has similarly argued that because China is the most relevant of the
rising great powers, it will also stand as the most likely source for a new
global ideology which will, in the long run, replace liberalism.3
The search for a ‘Chinese path’ can be found also within Chinese aca-
demic circles of international politics. Chinese scholars are increasingly
arguing that international politics should not be studied relying only on
Western theories of international relations, such as realism or liberalism,
since they are based on Western historical experience and thus only on a
narrow ‘Western’ conception of what international politics is and, more
importantly, what it can be in the future.4
Instead, ancient Chinese political concepts and philosophies, such as
Confucianism or Legalism, are being studied again. They are seen as offer-
ing ageless yet temporarily forgotten pieces of political wisdom which
should be tapped into now that both China and the world are entering a
challenging era of multipolar competition and emerging global threats.
These new ideas and theories are not of mere philosophical interest. In the
strictly controlled academic environment of China, they can be seen as an
enlargement of the official political discourse, dominated by the
Communist Party of China. The party controls the broad direction of the
academia, yet dominating ideas flow back to influence the political leader-
ship in a dualistic, two-way relationship. China’s intellectuals are thus, as
articulated by Zhang Feng of the Australian National University, “more
influential than their counterparts in many Western countries paradoxi-
cally because China’s repressive political system makes intellectual debates
a surrogate form of politics.”5
One of the most influential fruits of this renaissance of Chinese tradi-
tional thought is the ‘tianxia theory’. Tianxia theory attempts to utilize an
ancient Chinese political/philosophical concept of tianxia (天下, Engl. all
2
Shi-Kupfer et al. (2017).
3
Yan (2018).
4
See, for example, Schneider (2014), 683–703.
5
Zhang (2013).
12 A NON-WORLD: CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE WESTERN… 317
under heaven) in order to create a cosmopolitan vision for the whole

world. At the same time, tianxia theory is used for criticizing the prevailing
international order and its institutional framework as well as the ‘Western
political thought’ behind it, which are both seen as unable to answer the
problems of the globalizing world.
From the discussions and debates around the tianxia theory thus
emerges an interesting narrative of the ‘West’, both as a historical civiliza-
tion and as an actor in world politics. Instead of being on the leading edge
of modernity, the Chinese narrative depicts the West as offensive, self-
centered, and unable to understand international politics from a ‘worldly
perspective’. This chapter focuses on these Chinese narratives of the West
in world politics as developed by Chinese scholars of international politics.
The research data consists of monographs as well as articles in leading
Chinese journals, such as ‘World Economy and Politics’ (世界经济与政治,
Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi), which discuss and develop the tianxia theory and
its core concepts.
In Search of a Chinese Worldview

After the ‘Great Helmsman’ Mao Zedong died in 1976, China embarked
on a project of ‘reform and opening up’, in which the Maoist society was
dismantled piece by piece. The socialist economy was privatized and the
social order which was based on class background and class warfare was
dissolved. Foreign companies were allowed and even invited to invest in
China again.6
A similar readjustment has been going on within China’s ideological
sphere. As the economic reforms commenced, China began also reform-
ing its ideology of Maoist communism. The rhetoric of ‘class struggle’ was
played down in the new state constitution of 1982, and the socialist ele-
ments have been further weakened in later amendments. During the
1990s, communism as a guiding ideology of China had become almost
like an empty shell. Concepts such as ‘socialist market economy’ or ‘social-
ism with Chinese characteristics’ were and still are being thrown around,
but their meaning is getting increasingly obscure in the new China of
6
On this process of reform and opening up, see a detailed description in Chaps 4–6 in
MacFarquhar (2012).
318 M. PURANEN
littering skyscrapers and busy business people, running around with

g
Starbucks coffee cups in their hands.7
During the years 1949–1978, Maoism was the sacred doctrine which
held answers for almost every question one could ask. It offered a clear
identity of who the Chinese were (a vanguard of the world communist
revolution), who were they against (capitalists, revisionists, class enemies),
and where their country was heading (toward a communist utopia).
Importantly, ‘scientific Maoism’ also offered strong legitimation for the
governing party and its radical policies.8
During the reform era, the communist ideology has not been able to
answer questions of identity, nor can it offer the party much legitimacy.
The legitimation has stemmed from the fact that the Chinese economy has
developed staggeringly, but it is not hard to see that this development is
more due to the pragmatic, market economy-based reforms rather than
any guiding socialist principles.9
From the point of view of the world at large, the situation is similar.
During the high tide of socialism in China, Chinese brand of communism
inspired radical leftists everywhere.10 After the reforms, China has not
been able to offer a credible alternative vision for the world, although it is
fair to say that it has not been trying to either. In the modern Chinese ‘low
profile’ foreign policy, nonintervention and respect for state sovereignty
have been very strong principles.
All this has been changing. Little by little, the communist ideology has
been substituted by a sort of cultural nationalism, in which traditional
Chinese ideas, ideologies, and philosophies have been promoted.11 Since
the 1980s, the central government has sponsored studies of Confucianism
by establishing research institutes and by guiding finances for research
projects focusing on Confucianism and other traditional philosophies.12
Furthermore, during the eras of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, even the
national leadership itself has increasingly used traditional concepts such as
‘harmony’ or ‘humanity’, to such a degree that Valerie Niquet has invented
7
Ibid.
8
For an excellent introduction to Maoism and its historical development, see the essays in
Cheek (2010).
9
Kallio (2015), 87–114.
10
Cook (2010), 288–312.
11
Guo Yingjie has proposed that there exists alongside the official party-state sponsored
nationalism, a cultural nationalism which is more attached to Chinese culture or Chinese
nation than to the current government. See Guo (2004).
12
Brady (2012), 57–76.
a label for this new brand of party rhetoric: ‘confu-talk’.13 Xi Jinping has
also often emphasized the concept of ‘cultural self-confidence’ (文化自信,
wenhua zixin), which declares that instead of relying on ‘Western think-
ing’ or ‘Western values’, China possesses a long and illustrious intellectual
and cultural tradition it can rely on.14
This growing interest in traditional culture has often been called ‘tradi-
tional learning fever’ (国学热, guoxue re). It hopes to discover a new iden-
tity, a new worldview, and a new legitimacy for the postcommunist China
from its imperial past.15 Within the academic circles of international politics,
scholars are studying the classics in order to create a ‘Chinese theory of
international relations’, which would utilize Chinese history and philosophy
as its raw material in an attempt to develop an alternative theoretical and
normative framework for interpreting and guiding international politics.
Theoretical understanding of international politics in China has been
heavily influenced by U.S. academic thought. As China opened up, and as
its diplomatic networks began to spread out into the world in the 1980s,
the country faced a rapidly growing demand of knowledge and expertise
on foreign relations and international politics in general. China’s own field
of international relations, if there even was such a thing, had languished
during the Maoist years, but with the help of Ford, Rockefeller, and
Fulbright foundations among others, first generations of Chinese interna-
tional scholars studied mainly in the United States. China thus basically
adopted the American discipline of international relations, with its theo-
retical mainstreams (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) and even its
name (国际关系, guoji guanxi).16
The interest in creating a Chinese theory of international politics stems
from this background. According to Qin Yaqing, president of the presti-
gious China Foreign Affairs University, China cannot rely on American or
European traditions of international politics, as their core problems arise
from different geographical, historical, and social backgrounds. For Qin,
the creation of a Chinese theory of international politics is thereby not
only possible but also inevitable.17 In the same vein, Zhao Tingyang, one
of the most notable developers of the tianxia theory, has called out for a
‘re-thinking of China’ (重思中国, chongsi Zhongguo) which means
13
Niquet (2012), 76–90.
14
See Xinhua (2017).
15
See Kallio (2011).
16
Nielsen and Kristensen (2014), 97–118.
17
Qin (2016).
320 M. PURANEN
recreating a completely Chinese philosophical system that would use

Chinese concepts and ideas instead of ‘Western’ ones.18
The development of this theorization has focused around three streams
or schools of thought: first, Yan Xuetong’s ‘Qinghua school’ of interna-
tional relations and its doctrine of ‘moral realism’; second, Qin Yaqing and
his ‘relational theory of international politics’; and third, tianxia theory.19
All the three streams apply traditional concepts as their raw matter for
theory construction, and accordingly, there are many overlapping ideas
between them. For example, all the schools generally emphasize morality
and ‘humane leadership’ as guiding principles in international politics and
are interested in relational statuses of political units within larger systems.
All the schools also see as their core objective to offer some normative
guidelines on how to stabilize the international order and on how to
incorporate China peacefully in it. This dual function bears the legacy of
Marxist thought, in which theory (理论, lilun) was seen principally as
‘guiding political action’, instead of simply analyzing or explaining events.
Chinese theory of international theory should thus, similarly, also serve as
a guide for Chinese foreign policy.20
The core claim of the currently developing tianxia theory is that for
most of its history, China was the center of a unique, East Asian interna-
tional order, the tianxia system. Tianxia was strictly hierarchic and cen-
trally organized, but it was also a ‘harmonious’ and loose system, allowing
cultural diversity within its domain. It was an alternative method for orga-
nizing international relations before the Western great powers forced their
Westphalian order upon the world. According to tianxia theorists, study-
ing the principles and institutions of this ancient order might offer a lot of
insight for reforming the current, troubled liberal international order.21
Whether such a harmonious system ever truly existed is under debate,
but most historians agree that the Chinese rulers held a rather coherent
and unchanging tianxia worldview.22 From the earliest dynasties on (Zhou
dynasty, 1046–256 b.c.e.) the Chinese political elite considered it was rul-
ing the whole world, ‘all under the Heaven’, according to Confucian prin-
ciples of hierarchical yet benevolent rule. Within this cosmology, the
18
Zhao (2011), 1–7.
19
On Qinghua school, see Yan (2011). On relational theory, see Qin (2018).
20
Noessellt (2015).
21
Ren (2014).
22
See Kang (2010). For a more critical assessment, see Perdue (2015), 1002–1014.
emperor was thought to be the ‘Son of Heaven’ (天子, tianzi), and

Heaven itself was believed to be a superior god or a cosmic force. Heaven
had given his son, the emperor, a mandate for ruling the terrestrial issues—
but only as long as he followed the Heaven’s will.23 Within this cosmology,
there were no ‘sovereign states’, as everyone under the Heaven was under
the authority of the emperor. Smaller kingdoms or other political units
would need to demonstrate their submission by sending tributary emissar-
ies to the Chinese capital every now and then. The Son of Heaven, how-
ever, could not act dictatorially, since “All under Heaven” would be in
peace and prosper only when he followed the rules of propriety (礼, li) and
acted righteously.24
This kind of ethnocentric universal kingdom is of course not unique to
China. As other examples, one could mention the well-known distinction
between the Greeks and the ‘barbarians’, and the idea of the United States
as a shining ‘city upon the hill’ among other nations. Benjamin Schwartz
has argued that what was unique in the case of the Chinese civilization was
that for most of its history China was almost completely isolated from the
rest of the world by natural barriers. Unlike universal kingdoms elsewhere,
Chinese empire never encountered any culturally advanced rivals that
could deny its sinocentric cosmology. On the contrary, the fact that
China’s major neighbors—Japan, Korea, and Vietnam—adopted China’s
Confucian ideological system, as well as many other cultural elements,
seemed to prove it. Northwestern nomad tribes, although being able to
raid China’s border regions and wreak some serious havoc, were still con-
sidered to be mere barbarians. They too would be eventually civilized by
the moral and cultural supremacy of the central kingdom.25
This tianxia cosmology dominated the worldview and philosophy of the
Chinese empire up until the nineteenth century, when the Western great
powers arrived with technologically advanced gunboats and forced its
downfall. Western political cosmology differed from the tianxia consider-
ably. It was based on an idea of equal and sovereign nation-states that
would interact within the international order according to certain universal
laws and institutions. Competition, diplomacy, trade, and war were all
integral parts of this international order, which is usually thought to have
been formalized in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
23
Fairbank (1968). See also Ban (2017).
24
Ibid.
25
Schwartz (1968), 276–288.
322 M. PURANEN
During the nineteenth century, China slowly learned that its worldview
of being the center of ‘all under heaven’ had been a delusion. The last
dynasty, Qing (1644–1911), was wavering as it tried to orient itself in the
quickly changing political conditions. It attempted to adopt some ele-
ments of Western power (such as military technology) in order to fight
back the intruders, but at the same time it tried to hold on to its Confucian
ideas and cosmology. It could not have both. The Chinese empire and
tianxia system around it finally collapsed in the Xinhai revolution of 1911,
after which the Republic of China was established.26
During these painful years, China acknowledged that instead of being
everything under the Heaven, it was simply another state (国, guo) within
a larger system of states (万国, wanguo). The concept of tianxia was then
replaced with the Western concept of ‘the world’ (世界, shijie). At the
same time, many other new concepts, such as nation (民族, minzu),
Chinese (中国人, Zhongguoren), or the people (人民, renmin), had to be
imported into the Chinese language, as in the all-embracing world con-
ception of tianxia, there had been no place or need for such ideas.27
The Return of Tianxia

During the twentieth century, China became a nation-state and, at the end
of the century, finally stabilized politically and economically. Now, as the
search for China’s postcommunist identity is intensifying, the forgotten
concept of tianxia has been revitalized. Historians, political philosophers,
and scholars of international politics are studying the concept and its
potential for China’s international thinking.28
Tianxia theory in its modern form was first proposed by a liberal econo-
mist Sheng Hong in a short but influential article ‘From nationalism to
tianxiaism’ in 1996. The idea was brought into the mainstream by Zhao
Tingyang, a philosopher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
with his 2005 book: Tianxia System. After the publication of Zhao’s book,
a vibrant discussion on the potential of the concept emerged and is still
ongoing. Although never becoming a leading theoretical model, Zhao
26
For a rich and detailed description of these events, see Spence (1999).
27
See Zheng (2011), 293–321.
28
Various Chinese terms for the tianxia theory are used, such as ‘tianxiaism’ (天下主义,
tianxiazhuyi), ‘tianxia theory’ (天下论, tianxia lun) sometimes ‘new tianxiaism’ (新天下主义,
xin tianxiazhuyi), and ‘tianxia order’ (天下秩序, tianxia zhixu).
and Sheng brought the idea of a unique tianxia worldview ‘on the agenda’
and the Chinese scholarship has since explained and analyzed Chinese for-
eign policy thinking by applying their ideas.29 Furthermore, even the
Chinese government has increasingly included concepts from the tianxia
theory into its foreign policy rhetoric: Xi Jinping, for example, declared in
his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015
that China’s foreign policy aims to create ‘a world truly shared by all’ (天
下为公, tianxia wei gong).30
What unifies the tianxia theorists is the belief that the hierarchic Chinese
tianxia order was more stable and peaceful than the anarchic Western order.
It also included many valuable ethical ideals that the globalizing world could
perhaps find useful. One of the main claims about tianxia is that it had ‘no
outside’ (无外, wuwai). Because it covered all under Heaven, there could
not exist any outer borders, and thereby every culture, tribe, or kingdom
was accepted within it. Even if there were strange and barbarous cultures
living far away from the center, they were not seen as being outside of
tianxia, but merely too far away from its civilizing influence. Tianxia, the
argument goes, was harmonious and open to difference, as many different
religions and thought systems (e.g. Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and
Islam) coexisted peacefully within it. There were no ‘others’ in the tianxia,
and also no need to forcibly transform others into one’s own culture.31
Another common metaphor the theorists propose is that tianxia was
like a large family (天下一家, tianxia yijia). Instead of fiercely competing
nation-states like in the ‘West’, the tianxia was imagined as a large family,
with the Chinese emperor as the respected but righteous father, and the
smaller states, kingdoms, and tribes as its filial sons and daughters.32 A
child state would need to respect the father state, but it would get security,
recognition, and economic benefits in return. Hierarchy in the tianxia was
thus not comparable to ‘hegemony’ as understood in the Western tradi-
tion of international thought. Instead of mere military supremacy, the
theorists argue, a true tianxia system can only be based on morally exem-
plary leadership in which the hierarchy of the system is accepted and even
embraced by all its members. According to Zhao: “seizing political power
or territory alone is not equal to ‘obtaining tianxia.’ […] ‘Obtaining
29
Schneider (2014), 689.
30
See Mokry (2018) and Kallio (2018).
31
Zhao (2011), 34–40.
32
Ren (2014).
324 M. PURANEN
tianxia’ means having the approval of the society, and representing the
choice of the public.”33
Tianxia theorists see the current liberal international order of equal and
sovereign states as chaotic and unstable. Even if the order functioned sat-
isfactorily for a short period of history, it is now getting obsolete as the
ever more deeply globalizing and interlinking world faces increasing prob-
lems, such as global inequality and climate change, that no nation-state or
even a group of states can handle on their own. The theorists claim that
the concept of tianxia is like a philosophical seed which, when cultivated,
could develop into a framework for an alternative cosmopolitan world
society.34 Instead of an emperor, the new tianxia could have some kind of
‘world institution’ which would oversee the good of the whole planet and
act as a mediator in political conflicts.
Tianxia theory has met heavy criticism both within and outside China.
Especially historians, such as Ge Zhaoguang, have argued that the histori-
cal tianxia order was only a utopian fantasy in the scriptures of Confucian
scholars, and ordinary logic of great power politics dominated in China
just as in anywhere else.35 In the West, well-known sinologists such as
William Callahan and June Teufel Dreyer have also offered critical remarks
on the historical accuracy of the theory’s basic arguments.36
What is distinctive to the discussion around tianxia theory is that what
the ancient Chinese tianxia order was like, and how the new global tianxia
should be organized, are matters of heavy dispute. Some, such as Zhao
Tingyang, claim that the truest form of tianxia can be found only in the
feudal and loose system of the early Zhou dynasty. But for others, such as
Sheng Hong, tianxia means the unified Chinese empire after the establish-
ment of the Han dynasty. Many tianxia theorists point to the ‘tributary
system’ of Ming and Qing dynasties, and there is even a liberal wing of
tianxia theorists (Liu Qing, Xu Jilin, Bai Tongdong) who claim that the
new tianxia order should not have a dominating central institution.37
33
Zhao (2011), 38.

34
Ren (2014).
35
Ge (2016).
36
Callahan (2008), 749–761. Dreyer (2015), 1015–1031.
37
Xu and Liu (2015).
But even though the concept of tianxia itself is rather muddy and
vaguely described, all the theorists agree that tianxia had to be something
different from the ‘West’. It could not have been simply another empire
like the other historical empires, but it had to be a unique Chinese system
of international politics.38 Creating an identity for oneself always needs the
‘other’, a mirror from which to reflect one’s own uniqueness. In the dis-
cussion around tianxia theory, tianxia, no matter what it is, is always placed
against an imagined Western civilization and a Western thought system.
Most of the theorists seem to agree on what the West is like, and the
West as a concept (西方, xifang) is not truly problematized or questioned
within the tianxia discourse. Geographically it seems to point to Europe
and (or) the United States, but the definition is never made very clear.
Similar kind of essentialism is applied to the Chinese civilization, and it
and its elements are taken for granted. With this dualism, the tianxia theo-
rists are constructing an Occidentalist grand narrative of the Western civi-
lization. In this narrative, the current, chaotic international order is the
result and legacy of Western philosophy and Western value system, which
are lacking a ‘worldly’ outlook.
Occidentalism is here understood as a more or less distorted image and
narrative of the ‘West’as a coherent sociocultural entity and as an actor in
world politics. Occidentalist rhetoric attempts to compress and essential-
ize the multitude of cultures, languages, and philosophies under a simple
label of the ‘West’, very similar to what Orientalist rhetoric has been
attempting with the vast and diverse regions of Asia or the ‘East’.39
Occidentalism can be utilized for drawing an inhumane and brutal image
of the West by its enemies, yet it can be also applied for positive and inclu-
sive purposes: Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, for example, has argued how an
idealized Western civilization was rhetorically invented after the Second
World War for incorporating Germany into the transatlantic alliance
against the growing menace of the Soviet Union.40
Occidentalist imagery is not a new phenomenon in Chinese thinking.
Ever since the Chinese Qing dynasty and the Western great powers
collided during the nineteenth century, Chinese intellectuals were forced
to rethink China’s position in the larger world. The image of the West had
38
Li (2016), 1–10.
39
Jouhki and Pennanen (2016), 1–10.
40
See Buruma and Margalit (2004); Jackson (2006).
326 M. PURANEN
to be similarly updated: instead of red-haired beasts driven by animal-like

instincts, the West was later imagined to represent another civilization,
perhaps even of an equal standing with China, and possessing, in the
words of a contemporary scholar Wei Yuan (1794–1857), “knowledge of
astronomy and geography and [being] well versed in things material and
events of past and present.”41
In the process of China’s opening to the world, the West as a collective
entity became the extreme ‘other’ and a benchmark into which the Chinese
intellectuals reflected China’s own achievements. Chinese Occidentalism
thus included both the idealization and the enemization aspects of
Occidentalism, and the West was seen as either a model to follow or as a
menace to fight against. The liberals of the early twentieth-century China
saw the Chinese tradition in a negative light, and the modernization and
westernization of China was urged as inevitable for China’s very survival.
Others, representing more traditionalist viewpoints, argued that even though
the West was indeed powerful, it was lacking in spiritual quality. China should
therefore apply chosen Western technologies and governmental innovations
as needed, but it should leave the Chinese cultural and intellectual substance
intact (中学为体西学为用, Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong).42
For many, especially traditionally oriented intellectuals, the West served
as a device from which China could reflect its own uniqueness. For exam-
ple, one of the most important Confucian philosophers of the twentieth
century, Liang Shuming (1893–1988), dedicated his notable work,
Substance of Chinese Culture (中国文化要义, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi), for
the comparison of Chinese and Western civilizations and their cultural
origins. In his words:
Chinese people will never gain a clear understanding if they only remain
within the structures of Chinese society; if only they first look to others
and then at themselves, then they will immediately understand.43
During the early decades of the People’s Republic, Occidentalism was
temporarily pushed under the all-encompassing rhetoric of a global class
struggle. The demonic caricature of an imperialist ‘West’ did exist, but it
was used mainly for domestic purposes, for maintaining the legitimacy and
the dominant position of the Communist Party.44 Cultural Occidentalism
41
The change in Chinese perceptions of the West during this transformative period is well
presented in Ch’en (1979), 59–91.
42
Wang (2013), 103–124.
43
Lu and Zhao (2009), 52–66.
44
See Chen (1995).
reemerged in China after the end of the Cold War when Maoist ideologi-
cal orthodoxy was relaxed and as the cultural and civilizational models
returned to the focus of international politics scholarship on a global scale.45
Especially the publication of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of the
Civilizations in 1996 animated traditionalist Chinese intellectuals. The
book’s core argument was interpreted to be that the West was simply
another civilization among many others and its ideological values and
political institutions, even though currently triumphant, were not to be
taken as universal. The ominous clash of civilizations argument then, iron-
ically, offered hope and confidence for the Chinese scholars as they once
again continued their search for China’s position in the global order.46
Tianxia theory is building its own civilizational argument on this legacy
of Chinese Occidentalism. In this narrative, different thought systems of
the West and China are presented as opposites facing each other. The
Western thought system and its derivative, the liberal international order,
are now ruling supreme, but they are not universal solutions and they do
not constitute any ‘end of history’. The main argument of Zhao Tingyang
and Sheng Hong is that they could—and should—indeed be replaced by
their Chinese variants: a modernized tianxia world order and the Confucian
value system behind it.47
According to Quentin Skinner, there can be no ahistorical, ‘ageless wis-
dom’ in political theories, and every theory is simply an attempt to address
the political problematics of its day.48 Robert Cox states the same in rela-
tion to theories of international politics, which, for Cox, are “always for
someone and for some purpose. Perspectives derive from a position in
time and space, specially social and political time and space. […] There is,
accordingly, no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from standpoint in
time and space.”49
Accordingly, in this chapter, Tianxia theory is understood as a rhetori-
cal device, deriving from the context of China’s rise and the West’s relative
decline. Tianxia theory is criticizing and questioning the legitimacy of the
current Western-led international order and the universality of the Western
values and concepts behind it, and with this, it is providing rhetorical sup-
port for the Chinese government, which is similarly constructing its own
45
See Katzenstein (2010).
46
Jun and Smith (2018), 294–314.
47
Sheng (1996).
48
See Skinner (2002).
49
Cox (1986), 207.
328 M. PURANEN
grand narrative of a uniquely peaceful and harmonious great power China

that can challenge Western unilateralism.50
As China grows more powerful, its leadership yearns for more say on
how international politics is being framed and understood. A well-known
Chinese scholar of world politics, Zhang Weiwei, has claimed that the
West currently holds a ‘discoursive hegemony’ (话语霸权, huayu baquan)
on how international politics is being interpreted, and on what is thought
to be the best for the world. Zhang has urged the Chinese leadership to
reinforce its ‘discoursive power,’ so that China will be able to define the
dominating values, ideals, and master narratives of the world.51 This is
exactly what the tianxia theory is attempting to do, and we will now take
a closer look at the arguments on the failures of the Western international
order found within it.
Tianxia and the Western International Order

Sheng Hong’s52 article ‘From nationalism to tianxiaism’ set the basic
parameters of the tianxia theory by suggesting that in its ancient past,
China was in a similar situation as the current Western international
order. During the ‘warring states period’ (战国, Zhanguo, 475–221
b.c.e.), China was split into smaller, independent kingdoms which fought
against each other incessantly. All the states were aware, however, that
this was only a temporary state of affairs. The states shared a dream of
unifying all under Heaven under one ruling center again, and the travel-
ing philosopher-scholars of the era offered their services for the kings for
reaching this goal. The kings had a historical precedent, as before the
warring states era, the Zhou dynasty had been able to unify China under
a loose feudal system, which was thought to be a golden era of stability
and prosperity.53
According to Sheng, it was Han dynasty (206 b.c.e.–220 c.e.) that was
finally successful in uniting all the warring states under the leadership of
the emperor. All under Heaven was then pacified and unified. War and
power struggles between states became a thing of the past, and peace,
stability, and harmony became the leading ideals of Chinese politicians as
50
Shi-Kupfer et al. (2017).
51
Zhang (2012), 125–129.
52
Sheng, Hong is currently working at the Tianze Institute of Economics in Beijing.
Tianze Institute is one of the rare independent think tanks in China.
53
Sheng (1996).
well as scholars. This tianxia system, Sheng argues, became the interna-
tional political order of China and its surroundings, and it remained in
place for thousands of years, with some short breaks, during which it tem-
porarily lapsed back into power struggles. In the West, similar unification
occurred only briefly during the Roman Empire. After the collapse of
Rome, the West degenerated into its own warring states period and it has
not been able to recover from it since. One could claim that with the rise
of the European Union, the warring states era of Europe had finally con-
cluded, but Sheng sees the EU simply as a larger national state, which is
now part of the bigger, global warring states system.54
When the Western warring states system reached China during the
nineteenth century, China was still in its harmonious tianxia mode.
According to Sheng, tianxia was based on moral, not military supremacy,
and the Chinese defenses were helpless against the Western armies.
Chinese tianxia thus collapsed, and with the disappearance of the only
tianxia culture, which was in China, the whole world returned into the
balance of nationalisms. Nationalism was accompanied with the ‘warring
states logic’, that is the logic of ‘military might reigns supreme’, which
spread from the West to all over the world.55 In the process, China had to
suppress its own traditional culture and adopt such harmful Western ideas
as social Darwinism and nationalism in order to survive. But it did survive
and, Sheng claims, is now playing by the Western, ‘warring states ruleset’
of international politics. However, during the age of nuclear weapons, the
global warring states scenario has become all too dangerous.56
Zhao Tingyang agrees with Sheng’s description, but for him, the cur-
rent international order deserves a stronger metaphor than the warring
states. For Zhao it is a ‘chaotic world’ (乱世, luanshi). In Chinese thought,
the concept of luan refers to periods of disunity within Chinese history,
during which the central government had lost its authority and China had
fallen into anarchy. Typically, luan ensued when a dynasty collapsed, and
bandits and rebels roamed the land causing great suffering and destruction.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
330 M. PURANEN
Luan meant that the dynasty had lost the mandate of Heaven, which is a
situation that the Chinese dynasties needed to avoid at all costs. A concep-
tual opposite for luan is zhi (治), ‘well governed’, when the dynasty is
stable and prosperous.57 Whether a ‘chaotic world’ or a stage of ‘warring
states’, both Sheng and Zhao agree that the current Western international
order is in trouble and needs a well-governing, stabilizing central force.
According to Zhao, the differences of these conceptions of politics in
the West and China derive from the very beginnings of both civilizations:
since the political experiences of their early societies were different, both the
West and China developed political thoughts, which greatly differed on
their values, analytical frameworks and question systems.58
In China, the tianxia conception was born during the Zhou dynasty, when
China was united in a loose feudal system called fengjian (封建) under the
leadership of Zhou kings. Zhao, like Sheng, claims that the short period
of the warring states was simply an anomaly, and all political thought in
China evolved from the point of view of a unified world, tianxia.59
Zhao argues that in the West, on the contrary, political activity was
born in the Greek system of city-states. Thus, Western political thinking
evolved around the concept of competing states, and the concept for the
world as a political unit was never invented. The etymology of both the
Western and Chinese concepts of ‘politics’ points to this difference: the
Western concept of ‘politics’ derives from the name of the Greek city-
state, polis, whereas the Chinese concept of politics, zhengzhi (政治),
means more broadly a correct governance.60 It is as if these two concep-
tions of international politics had been determined during the Zhou
dynasty and the Greek golden age, and neither civilization has been able
to change or modify its destiny ever since.
Because of these historical roots, Zhao claims, the Western hierarchy of
political units can be divided into the levels of
57
Zhao (2011), 11–13.
58
, Zhao (2010).
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
1. individual (个体, geti)

2. community (共同体, gongtongti)
3. nation-state (国家, guojia).
In the Western political imagination, above the nation-state there exists

only the level of the international (国际, guoji). ‘The world’ is merely a geo-
graphical concept. It is a playground or a stage in which the nation-states can
compete and fulfill their destructive tendencies. Another concept Zhao uses
for this kind of a divided world is a ‘non-world’ (非世界, feishijie).61
Shang Huipeng, professor of international studies at the Peking
University, agrees on the general description offered by Zhao, but devel-
ops it further. He argues that the Chinese and Western civilizations, in
addition to their differing political systems, have also fundamentally differ-
ent ethical principles when it comes to relations between individuals, and
the way individuals interact is reflected on the macro level: in the other
end it creates a tianxia, and in the other end the logic of the warring states.62
Shang suggests that in China, relations between individuals have always
been based on differing roles in hierarchic relationships: everyone is, first, a
member of a hierarchical unit, for instance a member of a family. Shang calls
this the ‘role principle’ (角色原理, juese yuanli), which means that everyone
can be expected to act toward other people according to his/her current
role in the society. The role principle is similarly found at the international
level: within tianxia, the political units under the Son of Heaven acted as
subordinates, and the Son of Heaven acted according to his role as the
father of nations, being authoritative and demanding, but also by offering
security and economic benefits—the public goods of the time. Smaller king-
doms accepted the emperor’s supremacy and the tribute they paid was
mainly a material symbol of this relationship. Because of this foundation in
individual-to-individual relations, equality or sovereignty between individ-
ual political units could not be even imagined within tianxia.63
But in the West, relations between people are arranged among free
and equal individuals, which Shang calls ‘equal units principle’ (单位平
等原理, danwei pingdeng yuanli). From this perspective, all individuals
are considered to be equal and expected to respect each other’s individu-
ality. A Western human being is, first, a unique, individual person, and
only after that a member of a larger unit. Like in the case of tianxia, this
61
Zhao (2011), 11–17.
62
Shang (2009).
63
Ibid.
332 M. PURANEN
fundamental principle of ‘equal units’ has influenced Western interna-

tional politics, and the principles and values of the current Westphalian
international order stem from it: sovereign nation-states are the core
units of this order, and their interests always come first. The states may
join international organizations, but only if they can gain benefits from
them, and fierce competition between these units is only natural as it is
also on the individual-to-individual level.64
Ren Xiao, professor of international studies at Fudan University, has
created a similar kind of distinction between individual-to-individual level
ethical relations within the Chinese and the Western civilizations.
According to Ren, Western relations between individuals are organized as
a ‘contract system’ (契约秩序, qiyue zhixu), whereas the relations in tianxia
were organized as a ‘status system’ (名分定秩序, mingfending zhixu).
Within tianxia’s ‘status system’, relations between individuals were always
tightly connected to personal statuses of the individuals: they emphasized
rituals (礼, li) instead of strict laws or rules and were always open to inter-
pretation, compromise, and situational awareness.65 There was no interna-
tional law as such in tianxia, because in principle, the political units were
supposed to act only as their statuses within the system allowed.
The Western ‘contract system’, however, places the contracts and rules
above anything else. Within the West, individuals are equal in face of the
law, and there can be no interpretation or situationality when it comes to
law. Ren offers an interesting example of these different systems colliding
in 1793, when George Macartney visited China as an ambassador for King
George III of England. When meeting with the Chinese emperor
Qianlong, Macartney declined from the customary ‘kowtow ritual’66
everybody was supposed to perform when facing the Son of Heaven.
Macartney thought he represented his own sovereign King, who was an
equal with the Chinese emperor. He could not understand the value and
meaning of the kowtow, because from his ‘contract system’ point of view,
there were no hierarchies or any relationality between the heads of states.67
For the Son of Heaven, however, this was of course an outrage.
64
Ibid.
65
Ren (2014).
66
Kowtow (guibai, 跪拜 or ketou 磕头) was a ceremonial bow for expressing deference in
face of the emperor, in which one needed to kneel down and touch the ground with his head
for several times.
67
Ren (2014).
The principles of the Western international order, Ren explains, emerge

from the ‘contract system’ of individual-to-individual relations: states are
equal units and there is no hierarchy in state-to-state relations—at least in
principle. Sovereignty for individual states is achieved, but at the price of
losing the greater good of the planet from sight.68
Because of these fundamental reasons, the theorists claim, the West has
been unable to create a political concept of the world that would tran-
scended the state and the level of the international.69 For Zhao, even such
illustrious philosophers as Immanuel Kant have failed to think in tianxia-
like global terms, since Kant’s cosmopolitan vision, as laid out in the book
For Perpetual Peace (Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf) is
only a world federation of nation-states, remaining at the level of ‘interna-
tionalness’. Even Kant’s conception of politics, Zhao claims, was thus
under the influence of the Western, narrow-minded tradition of world
politics.70
For Zhao, the current international order operates under the
‘Hobbesian law of jungle’ (霍布斯丛林假定, huobusi conglin jiading),
but the West is not interested in changing this logic. It understands the
problems of the order and would like to civilize it so that the fierce,
Hobbesian competition between the states would be transformed into a
more sophisticated economic competition based on rules, but the basic
idea of individual nation-states and state-level interest would remain
intact. Yet even in this pacified form of state competition, powerful states
will emerge and break the rules as they see fit. The West cannot funda-
mentally change this logic, because it is unable to imagine beyond the
level of the ‘international’.71
For both Zhao and Sheng, this kind of mindset is problematic also
because when studying non-Western nations, such as China, the West relies
on its own, warring states-minded thinking. Thus, misinformed ideas, such
as the ‘China threat’ emerge, as the West can only understand world politics
as reflections of its own history, seeing the rise and fall of hegemons as inevi-
table processes.72 Attempting to pacify this luan, the best practical solution
the West has been able to create is the United Nations, but its name reveals
68
Ibid.
69
Zhao gives some credit to Marxisism, however. For him, it is the only Western philoso-
phy which has a truly worldly outlook. He does not study it any further though.
70
Zhao (2011), 11–17.
71
Ibid.
72
Zhao (2011), 11–17. Sheng (1996).
334 M. PURANEN
its true nature. For both Zhao and Sheng, the UN is only a forum for the
nation-states to rush and obtain benefits for themselves, but not for the
world as a whole. It is, in essence, an agora without its polis.73
Finally, the theorists claim, the Western worldview is also limited and
plagued by its obsessive search for opponents and enemies, which owes
its legacy to Christianity. According to Zhao, when Christianity emerged,
the Western worldview ceased to develop toward universal happiness of
all humans on earth, and the utopian society was moved into the after-
life of the Paradise. But on the planet, a constant battle between the
holy and the heathen would continue until everyone would be con-
verted into Christianity.74 Ren Xiao agrees that an important element of
Christianity is its offensive missionary attitude as the Western missionar-
ies would brave even the high seas in order to spread their gospel for the
pagans. Ren contrasts this with the Confucian tianxia, in which a har-
monious multitude of religions and philosophies was allowed, and which
followed the principle of “the rites should not be preached upon others”
(礼不往教, li bu wang jiao). Instead of spreading the Confucian doc-
trine, the Son of Heaven expected his subjects to stand in awe of his
virtue, and all the peoples under the Heaven would travel to the center
to learn its civilized ways. If they did not come, it simply meant that the
center’s virtue was weak, and it did not deserve the admiration of its
subjects.75
According to Zhao, the Western Christendom never allowed such har-
mony or diversity within it. It was dominated by an intolerant and dis-
criminating religion, which divided the world starkly into the world of
Christianity and the world of pagans. Zhao argues that even though
Christianity has lost its influence as a political theory in the West, its legacy
of dualist and confrontational thinking has not. It means that the West is
constantly searching for ‘others’ to suppress or to transform into its
own image:
Since Christianity suppressed the Greek civilization, the Western combative

logic of dividing the world into us and the heretics, took its shape. The West
has since understood the world as a warzone of opposites, and with its
73
Zhao (2009), 6–17.
74
Zhao (2011), 33.
75
Ren (2014).
mission of conquering the world, the West has extinguished the concept of
an ‘a priori whole world’.76
This ‘confrontational’ and ‘dualist’ thinking, originating from Christianity,

has since taken various forms in Western thinking. It can be found in Carl
Schmitt’s concept of ‘enemy consciousness’ and in his metaphor of ‘poli-
tics as warfare’. This same attitude is also influencing Western countries
(especially the United States) as they spread their ‘universal values’ and
Zhao even mentions the Star Wars movies as an example of this Western
tendency to pathologically think of the world in terms of us, the righteous
and the pagan/others. Because of the legacy of Christianity and its dualis-
tic worldview, the West sees its own conception of international politics as
the only and the universal. The current Western international order is
therefore not unlike the Christendom of the old, and every state and cul-
ture must be converted according to its ‘universal’ principles and
doctrines.77
Toward a Community of Common Destiny

for Mankind
Tianxia theorists present a rather coherent narrative of the Western civili-

zation and its essential elements. Because of its historical conditions, the
West has organized its societies following individualist principles, and thus
Western understanding of international politics also reminds this basic set-
ting: it is based on sovereign nation-states which interact like the equal
individuals in Western societies. This atomistic state-centeredness has lim-
ited West’s capability in achieving a holistic, ‘worldly’ vision of politics.
The West is also haunted by its Christian legacy, which remains dominant
in Western philosophy of international politics. The West cannot tolerate
alternatives to its liberal vision of democracy, human rights, and other
‘universal values’ and the Fukuyaman ‘end of history’ argument, from the
point of view of the tianxia theorists, can be understood as a continuation
for the spreading of gospel of the one and only true God.
76
,
Zhao (2016), 21.
77
Ibid.
336 M. PURANEN
Within the narratives of the tianxia theorists, the West is portrayed as

the true opposite of the harmonious tolerance and wuwai of the tianxia.
This can be understood so that these two world systems are not compati-
ble and cannot exist at the same time. The tianxia theorists are, in effect,
reproducing a grand narrative of a clash of civilizations to which Samuel
Huntington would probably nod approvingly. The narrative points out
that the Western-led international order and its elements do not represent
the only and the best possible way for organizing international politics.
They are simply products of particular, historical developments in the
West and they could be replaced by better alternatives.
The narrative can also be seen as a major argument for Chinese excep-
tionalism and as an answer for the aforementioned search for a new
Chinese identity. As the narrative contrasts tianxia to the West, China’s
own uniqueness is brought into the spotlight. According to the tianxia
theorists, China has always had its own, successful methods for organizing
both domestic and international politics, and there is no need for blind
acceptance of Western ideas, whether they concern ‘universal values’ or
theories of international politics. Similarly, the narrative supports the claim
of ‘China’s peaceful rise’: because of the heritage of its unique tianxia
worldview, China will not repeat the fatal mistakes of the rising powers
of the past.
The cosmopolitan world order the tianxia theorists are dreaming of is
of course utopian, and the means for constructing such an order are not at
all accurately described. Even the strongest proponent of the theory, Zhao
Tingyang, claims he is only trying to offer some initial philosophical seeds
so that a new, postliberal international order would have a theoretical
foundation. All through their arguments, tianxia theorists indeed remain
on a highly abstract level. Overall, the theory stands on a rather shaky and
loose empirical basis and on a very selective and ‘cherry picked’ readings
of history. An argument, however, need not to be factually correct or logi-
cally sound to be useful for political purposes, as everyone witnessing the
trumpian era is well aware of.
Many elements and ideas of the tianxia worldview can be found in the
Chinese government’s foreign policy rhetoric. During Hu Jintao’s reign
(2002–2012), the concept of a ‘harmonious world’ (和谐世界, hexie shijie)
was brought forth, proposing a world order in which all the various civiliza-
tions would prosper together in peace and harmony. In the same manner,
the ancient Confucian concept of ‘harmony without sameness’ (和而不同,

he’er butong) was emphasized, pointing out that in international politics, a
harmony of differences is better than a monotonous sameness.78
During the tenure of president Xi Jinping (2012–), the general tone
of Chinese foreign policy rhetoric has become more assertive and con-
fident. At the same time, the rhetoric has gained even more cosmopoli-
tan and, one could say, tianxiaist overtones.79 The main foreign policy
concept of president Xi Jinping, and also the best concept to define
Xi’s vision for the future international order, is the ‘community of
common future for mankind’ (人类命运共同体, renlei mingyun gong-
tongti). According to this idea, the international community will be
more and more tightly tied together during the age of globalization,
and all the states should let go of their grievances and concentrate on
economic and political cooperation. Although the concept is rather
vaguely described, the vision of a harmonious tianxia can be easily rec-
ognized as an inspiration for the concept, and Xi Jiping has himself
described the community using the concept of ‘all under Heaven as a
one family’.80
Tianxia theory then, rather than being a credible scientific theory of
international politics, works better as offering quite sophisticated and
effective rhetorical devices for the Chinese leadership as it is attempting to
challenge Western ‘discourse hegemony’. Underdeveloped as it is, it
already possesses considerable soft power value by framing world politics
with stark dichotomies of the warlike and chaotic Western model of inter-
national politics against the possibility of a stable, harmonious, and peace-
ful Chinese tianxia order. Especially during the troubled era of our day,
when the core elements of the liberal international order seem to be
wavering in uncertainty, the promise of the tianxia can be seductive.
Interestingly, most tianxia theorists argue that even though the tianxia
order was extinguished during the nineteenth century, its worldview and
the political thinking around it have remained in China’s mind as uncon-
scious processes. Perhaps China is indeed dreaming of uniting all under
Heaven once more, once and for all?
78
Keith (2012), 235–252.
79
Kallio (2018).
80
CCTV (2017). See also Puranen (2019).
338 M. PURANEN
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CHAPTER 13
Balancing Between Narratives of the West

and Hindu Nationalism in Emerging India
Jukka Jouhki
In the Indian news media, it is difficult to find recent articles about the
West without having to read about political populism, the alt-right, Brexit,
refugees, military ventures, economic stagnation, and the threat of mili-
tant Islam, to name a few. Especially the flamboyance of President Donald
Trump, the leader of a country most often viewed as the hegemon of the
West, and the center of Western world order has sparked the Indian press
to reflect on what the West is or does, and where Trump is taking it. There
are narratives where the liberal West is in crisis, and they have created a
need for Indians to reflect on the position of their nation in the possible
new world order where the West might not have the global prepotency it
currently does. In this chapter, I am examining these narratives in the
Indian news media. I am focusing particularly on India’s role and pros-
pects in the world system particularly in relation to the ‘liberal West’. To
do this, I am examining the recent contents of major daily E
nglish-language
J. Jouhki (*)
e-mail: jukka.jouhki@jyu.fi

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_13
344 J. JOUHKI
newspapers published in India together with academic literature on

the topic.1
As people identifying as Westerners have looked to India to construct
an idea of an Orient vis-à-vis a ‘Western self’, Indians have generated their
own Occidentalisms to create grand narratives of Westerners and to reflect
on what it means to be an Indian.2 Many Indians believe there are valuable
ideologies, values, policies, and innovations in the West that India has
benefited from and will continue to do so in the future. Contrastingly,
there are nationalist narratives—even by the same people—emphasizing
Indian self-reliance from and even superiority to the West.3 Indians may
have an uneasy relationship with ‘Western modernity’. As Pankaj Mishra,
the author of Age of Anger and one of the most influential analysts of
Indian society in the world system observes, there is a ‘growing awareness
that the Western history of modernization is just one of several possible
courses’.4 Yet, in this millennium, Indian foreign policy narratives have
emphasized democracy, pluralism, and, increasingly, economic liberalism.
The international forums, as Western-dominated as they might be, are
nowadays considered ‘less a threat than an opportunity’.5
In the West, there is a sort of rediscovering of India which applauds a
born-again India with liberal democratic values and celebrates what is
thought to be India’s new generation of pragmatical ‘doers’ who promote
democracy and modern citizenship. Cosmopolitan Indian politicians add
to the narrative claiming that India’s soft power, including yoga and
Bollywood, will make it a global leader and a beacon of democracy in
Asia.6 The ‘New India’ under Narendra Modi has indeed concentrated on
taking a more active role in the world. The exotic, spiritual, and tradi-
tional—if not mythological—dimensions of Indian tradition have been
revitalized for the purposes of international branding as well as domestic
1
To select relevant articles for closer analysis, I have conducted keyword searches using
various combinations of words (the West, Western, crisis, India, future, world order, emerg-
ing India, etc.) in the online versions of the aforementioned newspapers. The selected articles
comprise 120 news reports, editorials, opinion pieces, and essays by mostly the editorial staff
but also by expert guest writers such as politicians, book authors, and scholars. The treat-
ment of the gathered content is nontheory-driven but qualitative and content driven.
2
Said (1978/1995), Spencer (2003).
3
Wojczewski (2016), 100–113.
4
Mishra (2017), 120.
5
Wojczewski (2016), 147–150.
6
Mishra (2013), 86–87; Chandra (2017), 106–107.
13 BALANCING BETWEEN NARRATIVES OF THE WEST AND HINDU… 345
identity construction.7 Hence, one of the aims of this chapter is to analyze

the way this New India manifests itself in relation to the West in the nar-
ratives of Hindutva, Hindu nationalism. It is a worldview supported not
only by Narendra Modi and his followers but also on the left of the politi-
cal spectrum. Hindutva sees Hindu tradition as the essence of Indian soci-
ety, if not a model valuable enough to be followed on the global scale.
These nationalist narratives are also widely reflected on in the Indian news
media. The main newspapers analyzed in this chapter are The Times of
India and The Economic Times, both published by the Times Group,
which is India’s largest media conglomerate; The Hindu published by The
Hindu Group; Hindustan Times published by the HT Media; The
Telegraph published by the ABP Group; and the The Indian Express pub-
lished by Indian Express Limited.8
The West in Crisis, Asia Rising

‘The West’ examined here is a concept often used in a way that connotes
a political, geopolitical, and/or cultural category that is difficult to verify
by empirical observation. It is a solid entity in narrative whereas empirical
study reveals a fuzzy network of heterogenous populations with multiple
agencies, platforms, and levels for interaction. Hence, ‘the West’, like
many other titles for complex social categories, is bound to almost vio-
lently condense and make a monolith out of the sociocultural reality of a
billion people divided into dozens of diverse states, and international and
national organizations and groups. Hence, ‘the West’ is quite often a
product of what I call banal Occidentalism, the reification of complex real-
ity under an overarching concept.9
7
Commuri (2009), 162; Kerrigan et al. (2012).
8
The Times of India is estimated to be most favorable to Prime Minister Modi’s govern-
ment and leaning toward the center-right on the political spectrum, whereas Hindustan
Times is perceived to oscillate between supporting the center-left and Modi’s government.
The other news media analyzed here are more left-center leaning, supporting the Congress
Party. The Hindu and The Telegraph are estimated to be most left-leaning of the six in their
coverage. Maheswari and Sparks (2018); Sonwalkar (2016); The Press Freedom Index
(2019); Media Bias Fact Check (2019); Barclay et al. (2014); Thakur (2013). Circulation-
wise, the printed press in India unlike in the West is thriving albeit India does not do well in
the global press freedom ranking.
9
Jouhki (2016); see also Billig (1995).
346 J. JOUHKI
States, international organizations, and alliances/networks of states

might have agency to the extent that one can talk about them as actors.
For example, it is reasonable to speak of ‘the US’ as deciding something
or ‘the EU’ as passing a law, but it is often more problematic to speak of
‘the West’ as an agent having similarly coherent agency, because it is not a
juridical entity nor does it have a government or sovereignty. Many com-
mentators of and in ‘the West’, and in the newspapers analyzed here, are
aware of the conceptual problematics of ‘the West’, but far more imagine
and/or narrate the West as having agency and being more homogenous
than is warranted.10 Still, in many cases it is sufficiently reasonable—albeit
not very accurate—to do so, particularly when it involves international
organizations or alliances where the decision-making power is dominantly
shared between countries or organizations that can be called ‘Western’.11
In media discourses in India, the West is roughly synonymous to the
US, or at least it means a coalition, organization, or a social sphere of
influence largely dominated by the US and mostly Western European
countries. The word ‘liberal’ is strongly connected—if not synonymous—
to ‘Western’ in India as it is elsewhere. The West is considered liberal in
the sense of promoting free market economy as well as having social and
political views advocating reform and individual freedom. Krishnan
Srinivasan, the former Foreign Secretary of India, described the Western
liberal tradition and its relation to the world order in The Telegraph, and
reflected the general stance of Indian media quite well:
The liberal tradition comprises the platform of ideas that underpinned the
post-World War II international system, meaning democracy, free trade,
international law, multilateralism, environmental protection and human
rights, with the United States of America as the self-styled guarantor of this
liberal world order.12
Gautam Adhikari, the executive editor of The Times of India, wrote about
how earlier it was the Chinese, Indians, Romans, or Persians who ‘played
prime roles in the march of humanity’, but today the world leader is ‘the
10
Anderson (2006); Stephens (2013); see also Zheng (2017); Hall (2011).
11
For example, NATO-, US-, or EU-led ventures are often very roughly, and for the sake
of brevity, summarized as ‘the West’ doing something, although there is a risk that the reader
forgets that most countries that identify as ‘Western’ might be excluded from those
ventures.
12
Srinivasan (2017).
European-American civilization, loosely called the West’. He continued that

a significant proportion of practiced and debated aspects of ‘modern life’
such as nations, nationalism, democracy as well as colonialism and antico-
lonialism ‘emerged from ideas that sprouted from circumstances in the
West’.13 Indeed, in many articles that I analyzed, the West is lauded as the
source of technological innovations as well as the source of democracy, the
inspiration for freedom fighters around the world, and the advocate of
human rights.14
One of the reasons the West is seen to be in crisis in the Indian media
is the internal division between the (leftist) liberals and (right-leaning)
conservatives. According to The Times of India, Donald Trump’s presi-
dency is ‘the flash of a declining civilization’, an epitome of the prob-
lems of Western (neo)liberalism, liberal democracy, and populism—if
not Western civilization altogether. Trump was elected ‘because the
corrupt establishment of liberals and conservatives couldn’t even
acknowledge the existential crisis the US faces’.15 ‘Angry voters in the
US and around the West were seen to rebel against the ‘liberal demo-
cratic system’. Indeed, from the Indian perspective, different forms of
fundamentalism are winning at the expense of the liberal center in the
West. Voters are seeking desperate, extreme, and ‘even gross solutions’
such as Trump and Brexit, and it means that the era of liberal democ-
racy might be over. The West is facing ‘a civilizational crisis’ as ‘the
veneer of civilization’ is peeling off. According to the Indian media,
conspiracy theories blaming immigrants, academics, and minorities
flourish in the West. Western countries are becoming more withdrawn
‘politically and economically’ because globalization is seen as ‘a threat,
not an opportunity’.16 Neelan Deo, the director of the Indian Council
on Global Relations, criticizes Western liberalism for double standards.
On one hand, it is adamant in removing restrictions on how capital
moves globally, but it is also highly restrictive of the movement of labor
into the West, labeling it as immigrant problem. This, according to
Deo, is an essential issue to India who is one of the biggest labor-
exporting countries in the world.17
13
Adhikari (2014). Emphasis added.
14
For example, Breting-Garcia (2017); Malik (2017); Vaidya (2017).
15
Singh, H. (2016b).
16
Aiyar (25.12.2016).
17
Deo (2018).
348 J. JOUHKI
It is a rather common view in the Indian news media that the West has
hastened its own downfall by forcing liberal democracy, not only on
Western nations but also around the globe, and applying double standards
by supporting undemocratic powers at the same time. Even when the
West is defending democracy, it holds the ideology in such value that it
justifies military intervention.18 Professor H. Vasudevan from Calcutta
University and Krishnan Srinivasan wrote in The Telegraph that the West
has made the world unstable by having excess confidence in its political
and moral leadership.19 Other critical observations of the West in the
Indian media accuse it for a ‘missionary dogma on nation-building’,20 and,
as the author Mihaz Merchant purports in The Economic Times, ‘self-
interested, disruptive and intrusive’ foreign policy that has ‘propped up
brutal Arab dictators, bankrolled a terrorist state like Pakistan and destabi-
lized countries ranging from Syria to Ukraine’.21 At the same time, Indian
media might criticize the West for not doing anything about illiberal
terrorist-harboring countries, perhaps because of its deepening crisis of
status.22 Moreover, Western interventions in Muslim countries are seen to
have led to the birth of the uncontrollable ‘hydra-headed monster’ of
Jihadi Islam, which, on its part, has manifested in the form of Islamophobic
attitudes toward immigrants and has stoked ‘primordial ethno-religious
fears’ in the West.23
The rise of Islamism is clearly the most significant moral outcome of
Western military ventures in the narratives of Indian news media. It is also
seen as the reason of anti-Muslim views and acts among Westerners, or
vice versa, compensatory relativist ‘toleration’ of Islamic illiberalism. The
existential dilemma of tolerating the intolerant Islam is seen to cause ten-
sion between Western liberal multiculturalists and conservative national-
ists. As Singh claimed in The Times of India, there will be ‘a profound
rearrangement of the world order’ during Trump’s term as the West’s
social liberalism has ‘succeeded to the point of hubris and corruption’
compromising the West’s ‘economic and social vitality’. That is the major
reason why voters were ready to ‘put America first’.24 Moreover, according
18
For example, the former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal (2016) in The Hindu; see also
Noora Kotilainen in this volume.
19
Srinivasan and Vasudevan (2014).
20
Srinivasan (2017).
21
Merchant (2014).
22
For example, Aiyar (2016a); Singh H. (2016b).
23
Aiyar (2016a).
24
Singh (2016a); see also Narang (2015).
to Singh, globalization has ‘empowered existential enemies of the West

while suppressing the organization and ability of the West to outcompete
these enemies’, and ‘pandering to Islamists and totalitarians at the cost of
democratic, secular, free republics’ has caused Brexit, Donald Trump, and
also Narendra Modi to occur.25 Singh’s view concurs widely with the views
of the Indian media sources analyzed here.
Pankaj Mishra analyzes the development of anti-liberal movement in
the West and describes how it was believed that liberal capitalism would
create a global middle class with ‘bourgeois values’ and ‘democratic vir-
tues’. However, it has resulted in quite the opposite, ‘the creation of a
precariat with no clear long-term prospects, dangerously vulnerable to
demagogues’. Mishra joins numerous other political commentators in
India in that Western liberalism has caused its own demise.26 However,
despite the overwhelmingly pessimistic views of the West’s status quo, the
Indian media examined here do not seem to hold the West to be morally
inferior to India but in many areas quite the opposite. The West is com-
mended and considered a model for and a promoter of a plethora of
important policies and values such as the human rights, gender equality,
effective economy, transparency, globalization, and science. This certainly
reflects the socioeconomic and cosmopolitan backgrounds of journalists
and guest writers in the English-language media in India. Their views do
not reflect the majority of Indians, nor do they reflect the wide nationalis-
tic conservative population more critical of the West.27
Another, and perhaps a more fundamental reason why the West is seen
to be in crisis in India, is the essential quality of liberalism in terms of the
economy, which has given birth to a world order where free trade flour-
ishes and innovations flow freely around the globe. This process has led to
the developing countries emerging economically and is bound to lead to
the rest of the world catching up with the West.28
Plenty of articles in the Indian media envision the opportunities the
weakening of the West provides to Asia—and India in Asia. As the West
faces ‘a civilizational crisis’, it is time for the strongly competitive Asian
economies to rise. China is portrayed as having already ‘destroyed’
American industry and ‘challenging American military supremacy’
25
Singh (2016b).
26
Wade (2018).
27
For example, Pew Research Center (2017).
28
See for example Dadush and Shaw (2011) and Looney (2014).
350 J. JOUHKI
together with ‘the White Man’s dominance’. This, according to the Indian
view, is curiously something ‘deeply pleasing’ to Western liberals.29 Aiyar
repeats the common message in the Indian news media that the West’s
‘unseen bonanza’ of 150 years is over, and although colonialism and
industrial revolution gave the West a head start, Asia is catching up. India
might be economically far behind China—let alone the West—but opti-
mistic views interpret the situation meaning that India has ‘growth poten-
tial’ as India’s age structure predicts its workforce to continue to increase
at least until 2050–2060.30 According to Indian views, the West attempts
to solve the Asian challenge by reverting to protectionism, undemocratic
populism, border walls, and ethnofundamentalism.31
Judging from the Indian media, the global pendulum is swinging East,
but for Indians it seems to be disquieting that the precise direction of the
pendulum is China, not India.32 Although China and India are in decent
relations, China is viewed as India’s biggest strategic challenge, if not a
threat and a ‘natural adversary’.33 Not the least because of the potential of
China’s One Belt One Road project which is something India has been
mostly critical of.34 Some see that together China and India could become
a significant force to make international institutions such as the World
Trade Organization to further liberate trade.35 However, the United States
and Japan are eager to assist India to balance China’s influence in Asia, and
although India and China are cooperating on many levels, there are
cultural and geopolitical differences that make India seek stronger part-
nership with the West.36
To counter China’s military power—which Modi euphemistically refers
to as an ‘absence of an agreed security architecture’ in Asia—and its eco-
nomic dominance, Indian pundits are eager to emphasize that India is the
29
Singh H. (2016b); see also Merchant (2014).
30
Aiyar (2016b).
31
Aiyar (2016a, b).
32
However, e.g. Stuenkel (2016), 195, suggests that predictions about China replacing
the West in economy and military are wrong because power is too dispersed globally to allow
such imperial constructions anymore.
33
Pant (2016), 14; Bayineni (2016), 124; Chandra (2017), 108; Ramani (2016), 31; see
also Babu (2016), 154; Mahalanobis (2016), 1. However, there is a minority of Indian
thinkers who suggest that ‘India and China need to partner to set up a new world order’.
Also, Bayineni (2016), 124, describes how Nehru saw China as ‘a natural friend, close to
India, as both nation states had just fought off imperialism’.
34
For example, Park and Singh (2017); Ministry of External Affairs (2017).
35
Bayineni (2016), 140; see also Itty (2014); Panda (2016); Nayar and Paul (2003), 19.
36
Chandra (2017), 108; Uttam and Kim (2018), 16; Hettiarachchi and Abeyrathne
(2015), 344–345.
largest, liberal, and most powerful non-Western democracy in the world.

India might have its flaws, they say, but its system of governance is still far
better than China’s. Moreover, India through Modi has been eager to
state that its outlook of the world’s major challenges coincides with those
of the West. For example, Modi has repeatedly announced that the top
three concerns of India are terrorism, climate change, and isolationism.
Incidentally, China has announced similar concerns.37
In India, as well as globally, ‘democracy’ often means a democratic sys-
tem favoring economic liberalism. This interpretation is quite evident in
Modi’s vision where India is to take part in the world and to have the
world come to India, mainly by investing in India. In this sense, India
adheres to what can be called the dominant Western liberal economic and
democratic model.38 Democracy-wise India is actually faring relatively well
for a developing country when compared to India’s positions on other
global indices (e.g. freedom of press, GDP per capita, happiness) where
India is in the bottom one-third of the world. But in democracy, India is
among the world’s top one quarter, not quite developed enough to be
included in ‘full democracies’ with the Nordic countries and states like
Canada but categorized in the second level with countries like the US,
Japan, and Latvia.39
Thus, one can detect a proud tone of enlightened geopolitical absti-
nence in the Indian media when its foreign policy writers state that
although India is a ‘liberal democracy’, it refrains from the Westerns-style
military democracy promotion outside of the nation’s borders.40 This pol-
icy can be seen in India having refrained from many recent UN human
rights declarations and sanctions, and not taking part in international mili-
tary interventions.41 This principle is actually one of the rare political
stances quite unanimously respected in India regardless of the political
party. Even Pankaj Mishra, who is often fiercely critical of Indian foreign
37
Mishra (2012), 34–36; Sidhu et al. (2013), 6–7; Inkster (2018); see also Chaturvedi
(2009), 25. Modi has spoken about his visions, for example, in the World Economic Forum
in Davos and to the US Congress in Washington. See for example Government of India
(2016); Modi (2018).
38
Sidhu et al. (2013).
39
Helliwell et al. (2018); World Press Freedom Index (2018); GDP Ranking (2018);
Democracy Index 2017 (2018). India is scoring higher than, for example, European coun-
tries such as Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary.
40
Srinivasan (2017).
41
Wojczewski (2016), 109–111; see also Peetush and Drydyk (2015).
352 J. JOUHKI
policies, agrees with this one. However, he sees the abstinence laudable for
a quite different reason than the Indian media and the foreign policy strat-
egists in India do: Indian ‘democracy’ is in such a bad state that it would
not be morally right to enforce it outside of India.42
The Hindu Nationalist India as a Model

According to Srinivasan and other critical voices in the Indian media, cur-
rent Indian politics has been ‘prone to glorify the Indian past and assert
the superiority of Indian “spiritual” culture over “materialist” Western
civilization’. It has caused Indians to imagine a ‘political unity of the coun-
try and an all-India consciousness from the earliest of times’, mixing
mythology and history.43 These Hindu nationalist visions are a major ideo-
logical battle fought in the political arena, and they reflect strongly in the
news media.44 Quite often, promoting Hindu nationalism gathers momen-
tum by criticizing and protesting against various ‘Western influences’ such
as shopping, gaming, or Valentine’s Day, or liberal attitudes on sexuality
and gender such as public kissing, women entering temples, homosexual-
ity, and so on. Even raping women has been seen as a Western import or
caused by the use of Western attire.45 The Hindu nationalist critique of
Western culture crystallized in the statement by the Chief Minister of
Gujarat. According to him, as Indians have ‘surrendered mentally and
politically to Western values’, values ‘rooted in Indian culture and tradition’
had to be revitalized.46 Mishra views this sort of anti-Western, nationalist
nostalgia as a ‘bizarre lurching between victimhood and chauvinism’. To
him, Hindu nationalism stems from the frustration ambitious Indians feel
when their demands for higher social status are not met by Westerners.47
The relatively liberal English-language Indian media examined here share
some of the viewpoints of Hindu nationalist albeit with a significantly
milder overtone. Moreover, the media are quick to criticize what they
42
Mishra (2012), 49–50.
43
Srinivasan (2006); see also Vijay (2010); Malik (2017).
44
Alyssa Ayres, a South Asia specialist at the US Council on Foreign Relations, describes
the Hindu nationalist project in a positive way, as ‘a quiet but important shift’, signaling that
India is ready to describe its own identity and expects the rest of the world to respect its
determination. See Ayres (2018), 43.
45
For example, Hindustan Times (2018), The Times of India (2015), Lewis (2009).
46
Vaidya (2017); see also Vinod (2016).
47
Mishra (2017), 265.
interpret as strong Hindu nationalist agenda and thus eager to call out
anything they feel are illiberal nationalistic acts.48
Hindu nationalism is similar to many other right-wing nationalist
movements in encouraging economic protectionism, border security, and
one national religion.49 In this context, The Times of India, albeit often
rather supportive of Modi, calls him rather sarcastically ‘the Hindu nation-
alist hero’ fighting for ‘an authentic Bharat’ (India’s Sanskrit name)
against foreign-educated and cosmopolitan Indians.50 Modi himself is
reported claiming that Hindutva is an inclusive ideology which the whole
humankind—not just the nation—can relate to, because it treats it as a
family. Hence, Modi thinks Hindu nationalism is actually a valuable tool
in foreign policy.51 This certainly appeals to Modi’s voter base, but his
domestic challenge is to be the prime minister of all Indians.52 The opposi-
tion is constantly criticizing his Hindu centrism, and as the political Right
is demanding constitutional changes such as the removal of the secularism
clause, the opposition is eager to warn Indians how the government ‘will
tear the constitution’ and make India ‘a Hindu Pakistan’ if Modi is to win
again in the elections of 2019.53
Criticism against Modi’s Hindutva ideology might be exaggerated at
times, but since Modi’s election in 2014, Hindu nationalism has been on
the rise, and there have been more anti-minority (anti-Muslim and
-Christian) sentiment and violence. Critics of Modi have even claimed that
this development is in contradiction of India’s foreign policy aspirations to
be a stabilizing force in the region.54 However, as Modi’s rhetoric aimed
at international audiences takes place in a different realm than the narra-
tives deployed in domestic politics, Modi can apply a more geopolitically
pragmatic and Hindu-inspired but not Hindu nationalist narrative for the
international audience while his domestic policies can have a more Hindu-
48
Hindustan Times (2017a, b), Desai (2015), Viju (2016).
49
Mandalaparthy (2018).
50
Ghose (2017).
51
See for example the interview by Kuber (2014) entitled after Modi’s claim according to
which his ‘Hindutva face will be an asset in foreign affairs’.
52
Adeney (2015), 30.
53
In the words of Congress representative Shashi Tharoor quoted in the interview by The
Economic Times (2018); see also Anand (2007), 259. Changing the constitution was also
discussed in a wide array of newspaper articles such as Singh, P. (2016c), Ashraf (2017),
Puniyani (2018).
54
Mandalaparthy (2018).
354 J. JOUHKI
centric stance.55 In other words, Modi brands himself as a liberal cosmo-

politan with slightly exotic Indian flavor to the foreign press, and as a
conservative reviving Hindu traditions to his domestic followers. In a way,
Modi’s Hindutva is thus banalized and Westernized for foreign policy use
and Hinduism is harmoniously and almost unnoticeably conflated
with India.56
However, Modi’s Hindu nationalism is not merely a rhetorical device.
For example, Modi’s Minister of Culture, Mahesh Sharma, appointed a
14-member academic committee to ‘help the government rewrite certain
aspects of ancient history’. Knowing that Mr. Sharma is a dedicated fol-
lower of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the right-wing Hindu
nationalist organization behind Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and
that the committee is a part of a larger attempt to reinterpret Indian his-
tory to prove its ‘Hindu essence’, the project is most likely more ideologi-
cal than scientific. Sharma was even quoted to say that the new version of
Indian history will eventually prove that ‘Indian culture’ existed already
12,000 years ago. The committee was also said to replace the contempo-
rary theory about central Asian populations migrating to the area of
present-day India and mixing with the local populations 3000–4000 years
ago. To renew a theory might not be so alarming if the result of the
research came after the process, not before it as a given aim.57
Shiv Visvanathan, a professor at Jindal School of Government and
Public Policy, presented a wider progressive stance in the lead article of
The Hindu claiming that the marriage of religion and nationalism in India
‘has led to a decline of the political debate’.58 According to Mishra, India
has never been closer to ‘making India a land of the Hindus’. Modi’s neo-
Hindu devotees and his government move ‘decisively against ostensibly
liberal and Westernized Indians’, who are seen as ‘Trojan horses of the
West’ to be ‘purged from Indian institutions’.59 Even the Constitution is
in danger to be changed to reflect Hindu nationalist Indian values.60 There
55
Diwakar (2017), 24.
56
Jaffrelot (2013), 82–83; Nanda (2011), 139–143; Rao (2018), 171–172.
57
Jain and Lasseter (2018). It should be noted that the majoritarian Hindu nationalism is
not exclusive to BJP voters, but a large proportion of Congress voters support it as well. See
Nanda (2011), 159.
58
Visvanathan (2016).
59
Mishra (2017), 162.
60
The Times of India (2017); Hindustan Times (2017a, b).
is a growing sentiment that the secularist influence of the Congress party

had, for decades, deteriorated the interests of the Hindu majority in India.61
Hindu nationalism is a powerful and lucrative political tool as it draws
on the idea of ‘one religion—one country’ being the solution to unify a
country. Moreover, like nationalism elsewhere, Hindutva is fueled by its
rejection of foreign influence. According to the ideology, India is poten-
tially rich but because of the reverberating effects of colonial history and
national disunity caused by religious, ethnic, and cultural differences,
India has remained a third world country. Hindutva sees India as an essen-
tially Hindu culture, and its proponents assume that materializing
Hindutva as a political reality would make India powerful, wealthy, and
united as well as give it a supreme role in the international arena.62
However, even Hindu nationalists welcome economic growth caused by
India taking part in the global liberal order, and they seem to widely accept
the logic of the market economy behind it, and thus endorse economic
liberalism more or less explicitly.
Indian politicians, and especially Modi’s government, reproduce the
idea of the future world order as a macro-version of the ideal image of
India. The world would be a hotpot of languages and ethnicities, formally
secular but encouraging people’s wide range of religiosity. India’s long
history of being a diverse society is seen to give India the credibility to be
a mediator between the West and the East, and as a model for different
countries—democratic and less democratic—in the developing and devel-
oped world.63 In a way, this vision is the liberal ideal of multiculturalism, a
sort of meta-utopia where a diverse, heterogeneous population can form
different groups with their own values, and the role of the government is
to uphold the legislative structure designed to allow citizens liberty in
economy, ideology, creed, and so on.64 However, this India would have a
Hindu-centric default setting, emphasizing ideas that are seen as histori-
cally based on Hindu tradition. Such hopes for India’s future role in the
world order are tangible in this Denmark-based Indian journalist’s view
where the West is applauded for its technical solutions and India for more
spiritual qualities:
61
Ayres (2018), 20. See Kailash (2017) for an analysis of the BJP and electoral politics in
India.
62
Wojczewski (2016), 181, 202; Chatterjee Miller and Sullivan de Estrada (2017), 36–38.
63
Wojczewski (2016), 146; Tharoor (2007, 2012); Mishra (2012), 40.
64
See for example Nozick (1974).
356 J. JOUHKI
Whilst living away from India we can see the beauty of our heritage and how
it has helped enrich the West with vegetarianism, yoga, Ayurveda, astrology,
to name a few. At the same time, we can also appreciate the western way of
life, the ease of travel and services [… ]. India is now working hard to
improve its living standards, and by using western technology together with
its ancient knowledge, there is no doubt that India will soon become the
best of both worlds.65
In India one does not have to be a fervent nationalist to think that the
ancient Hindu scriptures are applicable in modern times and/or contain
ideas and wisdom that were progressive and tolerant even by contempo-
rary standards already millennia ago. Whether it is the Hindu epic Rig
Veda’s ‘modern progressive ethical message’,66 early ‘Hindu scientists’
solving the ‘mysteries of the cosmos and mathematics’,67 or Buddha’s
‘proto-democratic values’,68 many Indians believe that not only was
ancient India an advanced society but it was even up to par when com-
pared with societies today. It is certainly true that Indians were at some
point ahead of the West in science (astronomy, math, medicine), but the
nationalist narrative often supported by Indian journalists seems to sug-
gest that even though in many measurable aspects, India is lagging
behind the First World, it can use its ‘ancient wisdom’ to ‘revitalize’, and
eventually even surpass the ‘decadent West’.69 For Hindutva propo-
nents, Indian society was democratic and pluralistic a long time before
the West, and now this latent potential is believed to materialize if Hindu
traditions are observed more closely.70 However, there are many, usually
progressive and cosmopolitan Indians who shy away from these national-
ist historical interpretations, not the least for political reasons as it is
Modi’s party and RSS who are the most eager to reproduce them. To
Gautam Adhikari, the executive director of The Times of India, this kind
of thinking is ‘irrational infantilism’, ‘aggrieved nationalism’, and ‘anti-
Western righteousness’.71
65
Mishra (2016); see also Wojczewski (2016), 181; Nayar and Paul (2003), 3.
66
Ghose (2015).
67
Vijay (2018); see also Katju (2014a, b).
68
Khobragade (2016).
69
Mishra (2017), 163–165.
70
For example, Viju (2016); see also Vijay (2012); Wojczewski (2016), 208; Ayres (2018),
38.
71
Adhikari (2014).
In international forums, Modi’s Hindutva ideology has more lenient

manifestations. When he spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos in
2018, he described India as an investment destination for those who want
‘wealth with wellness and peace with prosperity’. He went on to describe
how India is ‘selflessly’ helping other countries and has even fought wars
without strategic interest. India, according to Modi, is also against climate
change, because in Indian culture, Nature is treated as people’s mother.
Hence, India is willing to take lead in mitigating the effects of climate
change.72 One of Modi’s first international achievements was the
International Yoga Day.73 According to him, yoga is ‘India’s gift to the
world’ and ‘one of the most precious gifts given by the ancient Indian
sages to humankind’ as the ‘world could be united through yoga’. To
Modi, yoga represents India’s growing soft power.74 Promoting yoga goes
well with Modi’s Hindu-centric rhetoric of India as the ‘World Guru’ and
India as ‘destined to work for the welfare of the world’.75
In the same vein, Ramgopal Agarwal, the author of India 2050: A
Roadmap to Sustainable Prosperity, estimates rather optimistically that in
10–20 years in a ‘post-western economic world’, there will be a shift from
‘conflict/violence mode to harmony/nonviolence mode’. According to
Agarwala, ‘western civilization has conflict at its core’, and this conflict
happens in many fronts such as between different nations, religion and
science, labor and capital, men and women, humans and nature. In con-
trast, he claims, ‘Asian civilizations have been guided by the principle of
underlying harmony behind apparent conflicts’.76 Apparently, in this ideal
version of democracy there would be no need for interest groups negotiat-
ing—sometimes even fiercely—on common resources. As harmonious and
promising as this may be to many, it is also a vision that does against the
grain of perhaps a more Western idea of democracy where interest groups
debate about social issues whereas harmony connotes something totalitar-
ian like uncritical obedience or forced submission.
In the nationalist narratives promoting India as a model to the world,
‘Western’ technology, statecraft, and science are embraced but somehow
72
Modi (2018).
73
Chatterjee Miller and Sullivan de Estrada (2017), 43.
74
Madan (2018); see also Ayres (2018), 62.
75
Modi’s (2014a) Independence Day speech on 15.8.2014 transcribed by The Indian
Express.
76
Agarwala (2014), 214–215. See also Matti Puranen’s chapter in this book. Puranen
shows how also the Chinese portray the West as a society of conflict.
358 J. JOUHKI
merged with ‘eastern’ culture, morality, and spirituality, resulting in a

superior combination producing ‘a healthier, happier, and more purpose-
ful life than what the western civilization has produced so far’.77 According
to Meera Nanda, India is becoming more Hindu as it globalizes, and
Hindu nationalists celebrate an India that is ‘barely a couple of decades
away from becoming the Number One in everything from IT, science,
[…] technology, higher education, medicine, economy, culture, and of
course spirituality’.78 Perhaps it is too obvious to mention that the narra-
tives about the spiritual and harmonious Indian spirit ignore many shad-
owy sides of India’s history and contemporary social problems in caste,
gender, human rights, and health. Plenty of articles examined here con-
trast the nationalist romanticism with India’s problems. As The Times of
India article noted, nationalists see:
no inconsistency of these aspirations vis-à-vis keeping the country carpeted

with garbage and filth. What is more, we see no irony in our posturing
before the world as a representative of a morally superior culture. We see no
ignominy in accepting the state of our towns and cities, perennially tottering
on the verge of epidemics. Our tolerance towards using the streets as toilets
goes to show that we see little shame in accepting that people can live with-
out basic dignity.79
Indeed, in India, over 20% of the population still lives below the
extreme poverty line. Most people in rural areas do not have toilets, pol-
lution is a serious problem, and there is a lack of safe drinking water.
Urban infrastructure is struggling to adapt to the influx of migrants from
rural areas, and jobs are scarce for young people. The IT industry might
be promising, but its domestic manufacturing is weak. Corruption is sap-
ping growth, there is lack of transparency, the democratic structures are
weak, and although the poor are the biggest voter group in India, they are
ill-informed and vote for short-term benefits, if not for plain cash.80
Nevertheless, Hindu nationalists either fail to acknowledge the dis-
crepancy between their view of model India and the existing social
problems, or trust that they are due to national disunity which should
not obscure the fact that India, in essence, is a tolerant, pluralist, and
77
Agarwala (2014), 215.
78
Nanda (2011), 154–146.
79
Raghunathan (2010); see also Srinivasan (2017).
80
Alam (2017), 287–288; Ayres (2018), 19; Gordon (2014), 207–208; Jouhki (2017).
pacifist nation, with morally advanced agency in global affairs as well.81

Quite accurately, Nanda refers to a study pointing out that Indians rank
number one in the world in thinking they are number one in the world.
She also notes that Hindutva is also supported by ‘Western Indo-
philes’ and scholars who are ‘critical of their own societies and looking
at India to find options’. It is indeed common to observe Westerners
and Hindu nationalist Indians together celebrating India as an essen-
tially nonviolent society because of Gandhi and ahimsa, and a demo-
cratic state as per its ‘ancient Hindu essence’, or applauding India being
so ‘tolerant in nature’ as its population comprises so many religions
and ethnicities.82
In a way, India is struggling with the dualism of its grand narratives,
a pacifist, enlightened India ready to prosper and take lead, and a
nuclear military power in internal social conflict struggling to secure
the basic needs of a major part of its heterogenous population.
Nevertheless, there is no denying that India today is confident to take
part and not simply react to global politics. For example, in climate
negotiations, India has moved up to the group of agenda-setting states
in the global climate change negotiations.83 India is also using its eco-
nomic power to develop militarily, and it has even sent probes to the
moon and Mars—at a very low cost compared to Western space agen-
cies.84 But for India to be a world model, there is a long way to go. It is
evident that India’s sages, yogis, and freedom fighters have inspired
countless of people around the world.85 However, they do not add up
to a very significant global impact, as much as Hindu nationalists would
hope them to do so.86
India Will Not Change the Liberal World Order

Scholars in India see the emerging world order of the twenty-first century
as multipolar, tripolar (India, China, and the US), apolar/nonpolar, or
even bipolar with India and China in charge. Some envision a ‘multiplex’
81
Wojczewski (2016), 167.
82
Nanda (2011), 151–156.
83
Ayres (2017); see also Narlikar (2017), 102–105; Chaturvedi (2009), 15.
84
Ayres (2017).
85
Modi (2011, 2014b); Alam (2017), 287; Mishra (2017), 120.
86
See for example Stuenkel (2016), 66–67; Sullivan (2015).
360 J. JOUHKI
order where power is distributed among many political entity networks on

various levels.87 Many politicians in India are enthusiastically predicting a
post-American or post-Western global order and India in it as a ‘great
power’, even a ‘super power’ or at least a regional hegemon. Some among
the more liberal-minded commentators also lament India’s old ‘mistakes’
of not joining ‘the Democracies’, ‘the Free World’, or ‘the First World’
earlier when the West wanted it to adopt market economy, be a part of
global institutions, fight communism, and promote democracy. In this
narrative, India could have become the first ‘non-Western, liberal demo-
cratic, great power’ but it chose the costly path of nonalignment. The
lesson of this interpretation of history is that if India will play by the norms
of the liberal world order, it will become a ‘great power’ similar to the US
very soon. However, it seems that India becoming a great power has for a
long time been about to happen ‘very soon’ making it a perpetually
impending, almost metaphysical idea.88
On the other hand, there are views according to which the West’s lib-
eralism has created its own crisis, so India should not take example from
the West anyway. ‘Liberal’ is also a concept that allows multiple interpreta-
tions, most of them with negative connotations in India. For example, the
old colonial powers are interpreted as being essentially liberal, and in that
context, liberalism means oppression.89 Liberalism also connotes individu-
alistic values that lead to excessive freedoms such as promiscuity, abandon-
ing of traditions, and anti-collectivist action endangering conservatism.
Interestingly, communism which is viewed as illiberal in the West is viewed
as a liberal ideology in India, because communists criticize all sorts of con-
servative phenomena such as caste ideology and arranged marriage.
Moreover, as liberalism is almost always accompanied with the image of a
morally dubious West, it is a value that the conservative majority of India
is vigorously against. Because of this connotative baggage, it is a concept
often avoided even among its endorsers in India.90
In practice, liberalism in India materializes particularly in international
trade and domestic economic policies rather than in liberalizing the tradi-
tional values of the people. India is poor, and to get wealthier, it needs to
create jobs. The more liberal its financial regulations become, the easier it
87
Buraga (2016), 5813–5814; Stuenkel (2016); Acharya (2017), 1; Acharya (2014).
88
Mishra (2013), 70–71.
89
Ayres (2017).
90
Madan and Friedrich (2017); Mishra (2012), 40. Subrata K. says there is a “bumpy
cohabitation of Hindu nationalism and India’s liberal democracy”. See Mitra (2016), 100;
also Srinivasan (2017); Mishra (2012), 41.
is to do business in India, and the more employment is likely to emerge.

India has indeed increased its position in global trade quite significantly,
and most major corporations in the world have businesses in India. Yet,
many feel India’s economic boom has not resonated enough in its global
status. Like many emerging countries, India also remains wary of ‘Western
dominance’ in international organizations and is prone to counter that
power and the related moral authority through organizations such as
BRICS, and by demanding membership in the G7 or UN Security
Council.91 In BRICS, India is certainly taking part in some diffusion and
decentralization of global power, but the world seems to remain stub-
bornly (neo)liberal, and Western-centric, particularly in terms of finance
and military hegemony.92 As Stuenkel notes, ‘emerging powers agree with
fundamental issues such as international institutions, cooperative security,
democratic community, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty,
and the rule of law’ because ‘it was this rules-based and relatively open
order that significantly contributed to their phenomenal economic rise
over the past sixty years’.93
Hence, India’s counter-hegemonic actions remain mostly on a rather
symbolic level as it has no Asian alternative to the ‘Western-dominated
values-based liberal system’.94 In fact, the Indian government has been
known for wanting to take part in preserving, strengthening, and only
slightly reforming the existing global institutions, and accommodating
itself within them with a higher status it feels it has deserved.95 Both India
and China might talk about ‘changing the rules of the game’, but it cer-
tainly does not mean rejecting the growth-oriented market economy.96
Actually, instead of hoping that India will change the world order, many
Indians fear that their country will be shunned by the new populist and
protectionist Western order parting from global liberal ideals.
In the media, India is often portrayed as convincing the world of its
importance in world politics by referring to its population and area size, its
91
Alam (2017), 287; Wojczewksi (2016), 9, 142–143; Ayres (2018), 7–11; Gordon
(2014), 207; Sinha (2016), 2.
92
Juutinen (2017); Stuenkel (2016), 21–22, 63–65; Mishra (2013); see also Jaffrelot and
Sidhu (2013), 334; Kurečić and Bandov (2011).
93
Stuenkel (2016), 184.
94
Srinivasan (2017).
95
Even President Obama stated that India is ‘taking its rightful place in Asia and on the
global stage’. Mishra (2013), 82 citing an article by Rahi Gaikwad in The Hindu in November
7, 2010; Sidhu et al. (2013), 9; see also Shahi (2014), 18.
96
Käkönen (2013); Stuenkel (2016), 198.
362 J. JOUHKI
material resources, significant geopolitical location, and the strong civili-

zational heritage predating Western achievements. Hindu nationalism
takes these commonly shared ideas further. In its narrative, India is mor-
ally and spiritually superior, and its Hindu values will eventually spread out
to the world. They will compensate for—if not replace—Western values
that are seen overly rational, materialistic, and even destructive. In this
respect, Hindu nationalism does not differ from any other nation’s rhe-
torical self-confidence. It produces a consistent and revered history with a
traceable origin of its ‘people’, and outsiders whose influence needs to be
mitigated if not rejected. It imagines an unbroken chain of national tradi-
tion and reproduces a myth of a unified collective of superior people that
‘conceals that nations are inherently fluid and contentious entities’.97
However, India cannot shake off the West from its self-image however
self-reliant or Hindu nationalist its narratives are. According to Mishra,
India understands itself ‘through the eyes of the West’. There are institu-
tional spaces such as think tanks, learned societies, initiatives, and confer-
ences in the West that guide India to see itself as a potentially great power,
and address its shortcomings, and prospects ‘on its great power trajec-
tory’. Applying what I would call a neo-Saidian critical view, Mishra sees
all the policy papers, books, and popular articles aiming at ‘truly under-
standing India’ to serve the global liberal economy that regards Indian
past ‘as a deficit period’ that should be ‘swiftly compensated by efforts of
its business leaders, young entrepreneurs and new strategists’.98 Hindu-
centric nationalism is certainly worth worrying about among the
non-Hindu minorities in India, but it is of little concern to the world
order because, as The Diplomat observes, ‘[e]ven with the most ardent
Hindu nationalist prime minister in office, Indian foreign policy will be
driven by economic growth and preserving national security’.99
It seems that, at the moment, India is rather happy to be in the com-
pany of Western nations. In that sense, the ‘crisis’ of the West does not
seem that critical from the Indian viewpoint. It looks more like a tempo-
rary recession of hegemony—even a branding glitch—or, at most, a slight
power downgrade not significant enough to cause the West (namely, the
US) to lose its global power position. When looking for solid clues of a
97
Wojczewski (2016), 162, 239; see also Nayar and Paul (2003), 3, 9–11; Anderson
(2006).
98
Mishra (2013), 29, 78–79.
99
Panda (2014).
downturn—let alone a civilizational collapse—in the Indian media, there

are none despite all the dramatic warnings that in the end seem more like
gleeful anecdotes of the embarrassing troubles of the old colonial West
than verification of its actual downfall.
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Index1
NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS AIDS, 159, 168, 170

9/11, see Terror attack Akhmatova, Anna, 297
1800s, 101, 117 Alam, Faisal, 165, 167
Al-Faitha, 165
Algiers, 163
A Allison, Graham T., 42, 112, 219
Aaltola, Mika, 241 All-Russian Eurasia Movement, 291
Abu Ghraib, 167 Al-Qaeda, 155, 280
Acharya, Amitav, 42, 44, 213 Alternative für Deutschland (AfD),
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), 13, 176, 187, 188, 190, 192–194
263–265, 270, 277–282, 284, Alt-Right (also Far-Right, New Right)
285 International New Right, 12,
Address to the Nation, 248 294–296, 309
Adenauer, Konrad, 182 New Right in Germany, 175–195,
Adhikari, Gautam, 346, 356 192n65
Afghanistan, 240, 251n68 Nouvelle Droite, 186, 292, 294
Africa, 177, 278 Amri, Anis, 175, 187
Agarwal, Ramgopal, 357 Anderson, Benedict, 70, 265
Ahimsa, 359 Anton, Michael, 203, 205
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 164 Arabs, 154, 156, 165, 167
Ahrar al-Sham, 280 Arctic, the, 299
AIDES, 160 Arktos Media, 295
1
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4
374 INDEX
Asia, 47, 63, 72, 127 C

Asian civilizations, 357 Cairo University, 207
al-Assad, Bashar, 250, 251, 255 Callahan, William, 324
Astrology, 356 Çamlı, Ahmet Hamdi, 271
Atlantic alliance, 108, 109, 211 Canada, 211, 351
Atlanticism, 45, 292, 295 Capitalism, 6, 24, 30, 38, 42, 44, 77,
Ayurveda, 356 101, 300, 349
Catalonia, 181
Categorisations of freedom, 124, 130,
B 131, 145
Bäckman, Johan, 295 Chaudoin, Stephen, 222
Bannon, Steve, 204, 205, 296 Chemical weapons, 237, 250–253,
Barbarians, 36, 68, 155, 161, 321 251n68, 255
Barnett, Michael, 130, 239, 240 Chenu, Sébastien, 161
Bauman, Zygmunt, 299 China
Bawer, Bruce, 157 central kingdom, 321
Beinart, Peter, 206 Communist Party of, 316
Belloni, Roberto, 237, 240 People’s Republic of, 322
Berggruen Institute, 201 Republic of, 322
Berlin, 175–178, 181–183, 185, 186, as a threat, 219
190–193 Chow, Rey, 167
Berlin, Isaiah, 129 Christianity, 166, 192–195, 299, 334,
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 354 335
Bible, the, 193 Church of England, 166
Biden, Joe, 211–213, 217, 223 Civilization
Bollywood, 344 civilizational crisis, 347, 349
Bolshevism, 291, 301 civilizational heritage, 6, 206, 362
Bouchet, Christian, 294 civilizational identity, 69, 70,
Brazil, 74, 282 263–285
Breitscheidplatz, 175, 183 clash of, 64, 76, 85, 106, 109, 152,
Brexit, 9, 75, 113, 343, 347, 349 192, 204, 209, 307, 327, 336
BRICS, 361 Islamic, 271, 272, 275, 282, 284,
Britain, see United Kingdom (UK) 285
British Parliament, 251, 251n68 Class struggle, 186, 300, 317
Brooks, David, 212 Climate change, 48, 72, 248, 324,
Budapest, 295 351, 357, 359
Bulaç, Ali, 272 Clinton, Hilary, 157, 168
Burka, 187 Clunan, Anne L., 289
Burke, Kenneth, 103 Cold War, 6, 21, 25, 31, 64, 65, 67,
Bush, George H. W., 129, 155, 307 72, 101, 102, 106–109, 112,
Bush, George W., 25, 39, 109, 207, 116, 125–127, 141n67, 185,
208, 211, 214, 217, 223 204, 212, 223, 233, 234,
Bush, Laura, 162 239–241, 279, 299, 307, 327
INDEX 375
Collinson, Stephen, 212 114, 125, 127, 131, 136, 139,

Colonialism, 6, 35, 62–63, 67, 101, 155, 159, 169–171, 176, 179,
103, 239, 347, 350 180, 182, 186, 189, 207, 210,
Communism, 64, 111, 126, 129, 299, 212–214, 217–219, 233, 234,
305n56, 307, 317, 318, 360 263, 264, 270, 273, 276, 277,
Communitarianism, 273, 276, 300 282, 289, 299, 301, 315, 316,
Community of values, 124–128, 179, 335, 344, 346–348, 351, 352,
182, 207 357, 360
Confucianism, 316, 318, 323 Democratic Party (Demokrat Partisi,
Congress (USA), 202, 203, 212, 217, Turkey), 269
221, 252 Deo, Neelan, 347
Congress Party, 48, 155, 202, 203, Derrida, Jacques, 107
212, 217, 221, 252, 355 Diplomacy, 115, 321
Consensual, 145 Diversity, 10, 30, 38, 48, 152, 155,
Consensual community of values, 157, 163, 168, 264, 296, 309,
124–128 320, 334
Consensual hegemony, 21–29, 124 Dueck, Colin, 277
Conservative revolution, 190, 290, Duggan, Lisa, 157
291, 294, 296, 303–305, 309 Dugin, Aleksandr, 11, 290–309
Constantinople, 106 Duma, 292
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Advisory Council on National
201, 211, 216 Security, 292
Crimea, 212, 293 Duvall, Barnett, 130
Cultural Marxism, 207 Duyvendak, J. K., 159
Culture, 4, 6, 38, 48, 64, 67, 68, 70,
76, 79, 111, 136, 155, 167, 176,
184, 190–192, 194, 195, 204, E
206–208, 210, 223, 269, 271, East, 12, 34, 64, 151, 153, 154, 170,
276, 300, 319, 323, 325, 329, 171, 179, 307, 325, 350, 355
335, 352, 358 East Asia, 79
East/West, 151
Economic Times, The, 345, 348
D EEC, 129
Dasein, 129, 304 Egypt, 163, 165
Davos, 211–213, 351n37, 357 El-Rouayheb, Khaled, 163
Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 274, 275, 280 Emancipation, 132, 160, 270, 272,
de Benoist, Alain, 292, 294 277, 300
Deash, see Islamism Emperor Qianlong, 332
Declininism, 224 Enlightenment, 6, 8, 36, 62, 67, 71,
Defert, Daniel, 160 101, 176, 218, 238, 239,
Democracy, 2, 4, 6, 7, 13, 24, 30, 300–302, 308
32, 33, 37, 39, 42–44, 47, German Counter-Enlightenment,
73–75, 77–80, 103, 110, 112, 298
376 INDEX
Equality, 7, 31, 37, 44, 131, 140, 152, Far Right, see Alt-Right
169, 170, 189, 208, 210, 234, Fascism, 126, 183, 185, 195, 299,
299, 331, 349 300, 304, 305n56, 309
Erandaç, Bülent, 278 Fassin, Éric, 160
Erbakan, Necmettin, 270, 274 Feddersen, Jan, 185
Erdoğan, Recep, 270, 272, 273, 275, Feng, Zhang, 316
276, 278–281, 295 First Amendment, 128
Erlanger, Steven, 110 Fischer, Joschka, 114
Ethnofundamentalism, 350 Folk devil, 168
Ethnopluralism, 190, 194, 195 Ford Foundation, 319
EU, see European Union Fortuyn, Pim, 160
Eurasianism Foucault, Michel, 160
Eurasian Union, 298 Fourth political theory, the, 290,
neo-Eurasianism, 295, 297–299 299–302, 304, 309
Europe, 1, 3, 4, 6, 12, 30, 31, 34, 44, France, 64, 109, 113, 137, 160, 161,
63, 65, 75–77, 79, 102, 104– 181, 188, 194, 251, 276, 294
108, 110–115, 123, 125, 127, Frankfurt School, 207
129, 133, 134, 138, 142, 145, Freedom
155, 163, 165, 169, 178, 182, of choice, 125
184, 185, 188, 189, 191, 195, negative, 129
207, 210, 278, 297, 305–307, of peaceful assembly, 128
325, 329 positive, 129, 135, 137, 139, 141
mediaeval, 154, 164, 169 of press, 128, 351
European Center for Geopolitical of religion, 1, 128, 155
Analysis (ECAG), 295 Free markets, 1, 24, 44, 217, 346
European Commission, 125 Free world, 112, 191, 360
European Consensus on Development, French, David, 208
The, 132, 139 French values, 181
European Council, 45, 132 Friberg, Daniel, 295
European foreign-policy, 123 Frum, David, 205
European Union (EU), 1, 51, 74, Fukuyama, Francis, 35, 155, 233, 235,
105, 106, 110, 114, 124, 126n9, 254, 300, 307
127–129, 132, 133, 137–140, Fulbright Foundation, 319
138n54, 143–145, 187, 188,
204, 264, 278, 329, 346
EU’s Global Strategy, 137 G
European West, 113, 117 G7, 202, 211, 212, 361
Evola, Julius, 291, 292, 300, 301 G8, 212
Gandhi, Mahatma, 359
Gauck, Joachim, 177–179, 181, 182,
F 185, 191, 194
Facebook, 188, 192 Gauland, Alexander, 193
Faith and Freedom Coalition, 137 Gazi, Osman, 275
INDEX 377
Gender, 19, 70, 140, 158, 164, 237, Hegemony, 8, 10, 11, 63, 72, 100,
349, 352, 358 103, 115–118, 145, 212, 224,
equality, 152, 169, 170, 189, 349 290, 292, 296, 299, 305–308,
Geneva Conventions, 238 323
Germany, 12, 64, 110, 114, 154, 156, Hegemonic Stability Theory, 18,
169, 175, 177–179, 181–183, 22, 29, 49
185–188, 190, 191, 192n65, Heidegger, Martin, 290, 292, 296,
193–195, 219, 294, 295, 301, 301, 303–307, 305n56, 308n69,
305, 306, 325 309
Ghouta attack, 250–254 Himalayas, the, 298–299
Global governance, 68, 123, 136, 144, Hinduism
235, 238, 240–242 Hindu nationalism, 13, 343–363
Global order, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 21, 25, 26, Hindutva, 345, 353–357, 359
31, 34, 79, 84, 85, 91, 92, 143, neo-Hinduism, 354
144, 212, 242, 253, 256, traditions, 13
289–309, 327, 360 Hindu nationalism, 13, 343–363
Global Strategy of 2016, The, 132 Hindustan Times, 345, 345n8
God, 110, 187, 204, 208, 252, 321, Hindutva, see Hindu nationalism
335 Hindu, The, 345, 345n8, 354
Gökalp, Ziya, 269 Hitler, Adolf, 185, 302, 305, 306,
Golden Dawn, 295 308n69
Golovin, Yevgeniy, 291 Hobbesian law of jungle, 333
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 292, 298 hoca, Erbakan, 271
Greece, 6, 101, 294, 295 Höcke, Björn, 192, 193
Greek civilization, 19, 83, 113, 165 Hollande, François, 180, 181
Griffin, Roger, 296 Homosexuality
Groupement de Recherche et d’Études gay marriage; gay pride, 151; gay
pour la Civilisation Européenne rights, 152, 157, 158, 160,
(GRECE, Research and Study 162, 165, 168–170;
Group for European Civilization), homonationalism, 158–162;
294 homonormativity, 157;
Guénon, René, 291, 292, 301 homophobia, 156, 158, 160,
Gülen, Fethullah, 274 165, 169; Islam, 159–162;
Gumilyov, Lev, 297 lesbians, 157, 159; queer, 153,
156, 157, 164; queer
patriarchy, 157
H Hong, Sheng, 322, 324, 327, 328,
Habermas, Jürgen, 82, 86, 107, 301 328n52
Han dynasty, 324, 328 Hopf, Ted, 284
Haushofer, Karl, 298, 299 Houses of Parliament, 208
Heaven, 317, 320–323, 328, 330, Huipeng, Shang, 331
331, 334, 337 Human dignity, 142, 208–210
378 INDEX
Human rights Muslim nationalism, 267

Human Rights Watch, 164 Muslims, 69, 76, 152–154, 156,
universal, 51, 184, 238 158, 159, 163, 164, 166–170,
Humanitarianism 176, 186, 188, 189, 192, 194,
humanitarian world politics, 234, 195, 267, 268n12, 271, 275,
237–243, 246 280
imperial humanitarianism, 239 Muslim Test, 168, 169
Huntington, Samuel, 64, 67, 69, 70, queer Muslims, 165, 168
102, 152, 192, 204, 208, 290, Islamism
305–308, 327, 336 extremism, 180
Islamic State (Daesh), 175, 280,
281
I Jihad, 189
Identity, 2, 5, 8–10, 12, 13, 100, 107, Muslim Brotherhood, 280
114, 115, 124, 127, 128, Italy, 109, 169, 294, 295
131–133, 136, 138, 140, 144,
154, 156, 158–160, 162, 164,
165, 178, 182, 188, 194, 195, J
204, 223, 249, 263–285, 290, Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, 64, 67,
297, 301, 306–308, 318, 319, 103, 104, 109, 110, 209, 223,
322, 325, 336, 344 325
Ikenberry, G. John, 19, 24, 25, 33, Japan, 35, 71, 219, 308n69, 321, 350,
40, 41, 73, 75, 80, 211, 235, 351
241, 282 Jervis, Robert, 221
Imagined community, 70, 71, 265 Jesus, 193
India Jinping, Xi, 316, 318, 319, 323, 337
exotic, 344, 354 Jintao, Hu, 318, 336
foreign policy, 344, 351–353, 362 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Indian culture, 352, 354, 357 (JCPOA), 136, 220
Indian values, 354 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 132, 134
International Yoga Day, 357 Jung, Edgar Julius, 301, 302
Indian Express, The, 345 Jünger, Ernst, 296, 301
Iran, 137, 154, 163–165, 214
Nuclear Deal, 136
Iraq, 39, 74, 104, 127, 167, 240, K
251n68, 281 Kagan, Robert, 17–20, 33, 49, 65, 80,
War, 3, 65, 105, 106, 167 105, 106, 115, 214, 221n89,
Iron Curtain, 179 234n2, 235
ISIS, 161 Kant, Immanuel, 36, 37, 115, 333
Islam Kazakhstan, 278, 298
and homosexuality, 12, 151–171 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 268, 269
Islamophobia, 275 Kemalism, 269, 276
Muslim countries, 189 Keohane, Robert, 9, 22, 75, 224
INDEX 379
Khan Shaykhun, 250, 253 liberal international order, 3, 9–11,

Kindleberger Trap, 217 13, 17–19, 23, 25, 26, 29,
King George III, 332 31–33, 40–42, 44–51, 53, 61,
Kinkel, Klaus, 182 62, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 90,
Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl, 271, 272 128, 141, 141n67, 202,
Kjellén, Rudolf, 298 211–217, 220, 222, 224, 265,
Klages, Ludwig, 301 277, 282, 285, 289, 315, 320,
Korea/Koreas, 214, 321 324, 327, 337
North, 214 liberal society, 30, 184, 241
Kotzias, Nikos, 295 neoliberalism, 22
Krastev, Ivan, 112, 114, 115, 205, 206 political, 100, 263–265, 267, 270,
Kubitschek, Götz, 193 277, 282
Kupchan, Charles A., 77–81, 91, 105, Liberty Medal Award Ceremony, 217
106, 109, 115 Limonov, Eduard, 291
Kurds, 281 Linker, Damon, 207
Locke, John, 132, 152
Löfven, Stefan, 180
L
Larik, Joris, 139
Laruelle, Marlène, 293, 294 M
Latvia, 351 Macartney, George, 332
Lausanne Treaty, 279 Mackinder, Halford, 298, 299
Law and Justice party (PiS), 204 Mahathir Mohamad, 154
Le Pen, Jean Marine, 161 Maier, Charles, S., 124
Le Pen, Marine, 109, 171 Malaysia, 154
Leadership, 11, 18, 19, 21, 24–26, 33, Mamleev, Yuri, 291
45–47, 91, 125, 132, 202, 211, Manisalı, Erol, 276
216–224, 246, 248, 249, 255, Maoism, 318
264, 270, 271, 273, 274, 278, Maréchal-Le Pen, Marion, 188
280, 281, 284, 309, 316, 318, Marriage
320, 323, 328, 330, 337, 348 equality, 152
Left-wing, 185, 191, 195, 269, 295 same-sex, 152
Legalism, 316 Marx, Karl, 185, 306
Legislation, 221 Marxism, 300, 304
Leningrad State University, 297 Marxist-Leninist doctrine, 315
Leonhardt, David, 212 Materialism, 65, 296, 300, 302
Leviathan, 125 Matthew (apostle), 193
LGBT, 156, 159, 160, 170 May, Theresa, 179–181
Liberalism Mayer, Hartmut, 128
of fear, 125, 134, 143, 144 McCain, John, 213, 217, 223
liberal internationalism, 5, 9, 21, 33, McClintock, Anne, 166
34, 37, 40, 48, 50–52, 73, 77, McMaster, H. R., 203, 204, 210
116, 216, 218, 242, 244–246, Mead, Walter Russel, 107
252, 254, 257 Mehmed the Conqueror, 275
380 INDEX
Merchant, Mihaz, 348 Multilateralism, 24, 33, 34, 45, 49,

Merkel, Angela, 110, 111, 113, 132, 109, 133, 134, 220, 222, 236,
134, 134–135n42, 177–179, 346
181, 182, 185, 188, 191, 193, Multipolarity, 25, 278, 305–309
194 Munich Security Conference, 46, 210,
Metaphysics, 303 213
Middle East, 154, 163, 166, 177, 188, Munier, Dietmar, 295
269, 276, 279–281 Mutti, Cladio, 295
Migrants, 74, 76, 160, 189, 248, 249, Myrdal, Gunnar, 128–129
358
Migration, 140, 188, 193, 234,
248–250 N
Military intervention, 44, 234, 237, Nadine Dorries, 151
239–241, 250, 251, 255, 256, Najimabadi, Afsaneh, 164
348, 351 Nanda, Meera, 358, 359
Mill, John Stuart, 132, 152, 155 Nast, Heidi, 157
Miller, Stephen, 204 National Bolshevik Party, 291
Milli Görüş movement, 270, 271 Nationalism
Ming dynasty, 324 Hindu nationalism, 343–363;
Minkmar, Nils, 184 secular nationalism, 77, 267;
Mishra, Pankaj, 344, 349, 351, 352, white nationalists, 206, 296
354, 362 National Rally, 160, 161
Missionaries, 186, 334, 348 National Security Strategy (NSS), 132,
Modernity, 8, 13, 34, 35, 63, 64, 68, 135n44, 141, 142, 203, 214,
69, 71–73, 78–82, 86, 88, 91, 243–250, 255
152, 153, 155–160, 163, 166, National Socialism, 305n56, 306, 309
169, 170, 268, 270, 275, 282, NATO, 6, 102, 107, 115, 116, 204,
283, 290, 299–305, 305n56, 212, 234, 248, 278
307, 317 Article 5, 212
modern West, 6, 8, 63, 64, 100, Naumann, Friedrich, 298
103, 109–111, 155, 169 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 298
Modi, Narendra, 344, 345, 345n8, Nazaryan, Alexander, 205
349–351, 353–357 Nazism, 297, 301, 305n56
Mogherini, Federica, 132, 133, 140 Neoliberalism, see Liberalism,
Moisi, Dominique, 104, 106, 107 neoliberalism
Mongols, 297, 298 Netherlands, 159–161
Moravcsik, Andrew, 104 Neues Deutschland (ND), 186, 195
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, New Left, 294
ANAP), 269, 274 New Right, see Alt-Right
Müller, Michael, 177–179, 182, 185, Niekisch, Ernst, 291
191, 194 Niekisch, Hans Freyer, 301, 302
Multiculturalism, 189, 191, 206, 209, Nietzsche, Friedrich, 296, 303, 306
355 Niquet, Valerie, 318
INDEX 381
Non-domination, 130, 131, 133, 135, Peace, 5, 11, 69, 78, 86, 102, 105,
137, 141, 144 107, 115, 129, 136, 140, 183,
Non-interference, 129, 130, 135–137, 212, 214, 217, 243, 246, 253,
144 321, 328, 336, 357
Nordic countries, 295, 351 PEGIDA, 176
Norrlof, Carla, 23, 90n105, 222 Pence, Mike, 170
Nuclear weapons, 20, 329 Peterson, John, 43, 216
Philpott, Florian, 161
Piskorski, Mateusz, 295
O Poland, 109–112, 115, 203, 204, 207,
Obama, Barack, 108, 109, 132, 133, 295
135–137, 135n44, 141, 141n67, Political West, 100–102, 111, 115,
207, 208, 214, 219, 221n89, 116, 118, 179
223, 236, 237, 243–250, 255 Popper, Karl, 184, 185, 190, 191,
Occidentalism, 325–327, 344, 345 194, 195
Ochsenreiter, Manuel, 295 Populism, 3, 9, 90, 248, 249, 343,
O’Hagan, Jacinta, 7, 202, 264 347, 350
One Belt One Road, 350 Posen, Barry R., 116
Open society, 12, 75, 175–195, 213 Postmetaphysical thinking, 304
Orbán, Viktor, 2, 76, 189 Post-modern, 304
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Post-Soviet era, 298
168 Prague Linguistic Circle, 297
Orient, 151, 153, 154, 156, 163, 167, Pretzell, Marcus, 187–190, 192
170, 322, 344 Prophet Muhammed, 272, 275
Ottoman Empire, 36, 268, 269, Puar, Jasbir, 156, 158, 167
269n14 Putin, Vladimir, 46, 293–295, 298
OutRage, 165
Özal, Turgut, 279
Özdemir, Cem, 182 Q
Özdenören, Rasim, 272 Qing dynasty, 324, 325
Özel, İsmet, 272 Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR),
132
P Quebec, 202
Pagans, 334, 335 Queen Elizabeth II, 166
Panarin, Aleksandr, 298
Pan-Slavists, 297
Paradise, 334 R
Paris Agreement, 136, 137, 220 Racism, 76, 157, 190, 300, 305n56,
Parmar, Inderjeet, 40, 44–46, 75, 84, 309
242, 244, 245 Radical conservatism, 290, 291,
Patrick, Stewart, 201, 211, 212 299–303
382 INDEX
Rajoy, Mariano, 181 Security, 2, 6, 10, 12, 33, 99, 102,

Raping, 164, 352 105, 108, 111, 113, 115, 116,
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 124–129, 132, 133, 136, 139,
354, 356 142, 144, 182, 204, 209, 211,
Rationalism, 124–128, 133, 277, 302 212, 214, 217, 218, 233, 234,
scientific, 277 240, 241, 243, 245, 248, 249,
Ratzel, Friedrich, 298 252, 253, 255, 279, 295, 323,
Rawls, John, 277 331, 350, 353, 361, 362
Reagan, Ronald, 126, 129, 168, 214 Seleznyov, Gennadiy, 292
Realism, 21, 124, 133, 209, 210, 316, Sexuality, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158,
319 162–164, 352
Red Cross, 238 Sharma, Mahesh, 354
Refugees, 74, 76, 85, 179, 187, 188, Shayrat strike, 250–254
248, 343 Shklar, Judith, 125
Religion, 63, 67, 131, 135, 140, 161, Sinocentrism, 11, 321
166, 180, 189, 191, 205, 206, Skinner, Quentin, 327
237, 268n12, 271, 301, 323, Social Darwinism, 329
334, 353–355, 357, 359 Socialism, 1, 317, 318
Resilience, 11, 20, 26, 28, 41–50, 53, Social pluralism, 289
138–143, 233–257 Soft power, 25, 217, 337, 344, 357
Responsibility to Protect principle Sonderweg, 183, 195
(R2P), 234 Son of Heaven, The, 321, 331, 332, 334
Rig Veda, 356 SOS Homophobie, 160
Rockefeller Foundation, 319 Southern, Richard, 169
Röhm, Ernst, 162 Soviet Union, 106, 220, 279, 290,
Romanova, Tatiana, 289 297, 305, 306, 308n69, 325
Rome, 6, 101, 106, 329 Spain, 169, 181, 294
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 129 Spann, Othmar, 301
R Street Institute, 205 Spencer, Richard, 296
Rumsfeld, Donald, 127 Spengler, Oswald, 64, 67, 301
Russia Spiritualism, 65, 271, 297, 300, 303,
intelligence service, 295 306, 308, 326, 344, 352, 355,
military, 292 358
Stalinism, 297
Staniland, Paul, 44, 245, 282
S Star Wars, 335
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 113, 160 State of the Union speech, 134
Saudi Arabia, 39 Stein, Philip, 193
Schäuble, Wolfgang, 182 Steuckers, Robert, 294
Schmitt, Carl, 193, 290, 292, 296, Stock market crash, 114
301, 305–308, 335 Stuckey, Mary, 222
Schwartz, Benjamin, 321 Stuenkel, Oliver, 350n32, 361
Secularism, 268, 272, 276, 277, 284, Suez crisis, 126
353 Sultan Abdülhamid II, 268, 272
INDEX 383
Sustainable Development Goals, 139 Transatlantic rift, 12, 65, 84

Sweden, 180 Transnational community, 179, 181,
Syria, 39, 74, 237, 240, 250–255, 182
280, 281, 348 Trans-Pacific Partnership deal, 220
Traub, James, 108
Treaty
T of Lisbon, 129
Taliban, 162 of Rome, 129
Tatchell, Peter, 165 of Sèvres, 269
Tauqir, Tamsila, 167, 168 Trubetzkoy, Prince Nikolai, 297
Technology, 78, 153, 169, 305, 315, Trudeau, Justin, 211
322, 326, 356, 357 Trump, Donald, 2, 25, 75, 100, 127,
Telegraph, The, 345, 345n8, 346, 348 170, 201, 235, 282, 296, 343
Terror attack Turanian community, 297
9/11, 127, 151, 152, 156, 162, Turkey
184, 234, 240 nationalism, 265, 267
Barcelona, 181 Turkic people, 298
Berlin, 177, 181, 183, 185, 186, Turkmenistan, 278
190, 192, 194 Twin Towers, 155, 156, 159
Borough Market, 179 Two Wests, 4, 12, 99–102, 104–109,
Brussels, 181, 191 112, 113, 115, 117, 127
London Bridge, 179
Madrid, 181
Paris, 180, 181, 191 U
Terrorism, 74, 107, 111, 127, 162, Ukraine crisis, 127, 132, 293
181, 184–186, 191, 234, 235, UN, see United Nations
240, 248, 351 UNESCO, 220
Teufel Dreyer, June, 324 United Kingdom (UK), 156, 166,
Third Reich, 302 180, 295
Thiriart, Jean, 295 United Nations (UN)
Tianxia theory, 316, 317, 319, 320, General Assembly; Human Rights
322–324, 327, 328, 337 Council, 136, 157, 220;
Tianziaism, 11, 320–337 Security Council, 251, 278,
Tillerson, Rex, 132, 209, 210, 252 361
Times of India, the, 345–348, 345n8, The United States of America
353, 356, 358 America First, 11, 136, 137, 143,
Timmermans, Frans, 110 201–224, 236, 241, 244–246,
Tingyang, Zhao, 319, 322, 324, 327, 249
329, 336 American identity, 143, 206
Tolerance, 2, 12, 38, 75, 109, 117, American West, 112, 113, 117
151–157, 159–162, 166, Constitution, 128, 202, 220
168–171, 179, 182, 189, 195, foreign policy, 12, 44, 109, 110,
213, 275, 276, 336, 358 141, 202, 203, 209, 212, 216,
Topçu, Nurettin, 271 217, 221, 233–257, 277
384 INDEX
Universal values, 11, 37, 39, 48, 109, White, Hayden, 102
208, 210, 213, 224, 335, 336 White Man’s Burden, 112, 239
Uralic people, 297 Wiarda, Howard, 203
Wilders, Geert, 188
Wilson, Woodrow, 32, 129
V Wilson Center, 210
van den Bruck, Arthur Moeller, 301, Winkler, Heinrich August, 176, 182,
302 183, 186, 192, 194, 195
Varoufakis, Yanis, 113, 114 World Economic Forum, 211,
Vasilyev, Dmitriy, 291 351n37, 357
Vasudevan, H., 348 World Island, 299
Vegetarianism, 356 World Trade Organization (WTO),
Vietnam, 321 350
war, 107 World War I, 32, 64, 138n54, 280,
Visvanathan, Shiv, 354 301
Volga, 298 World War II, 23, 30, 31, 38, 73, 102,
von Beyme, Klaus, 294 106, 107, 114, 124, 126,
141n67, 183, 213, 217, 219,
221, 239, 299, 307, 315, 325
W
War, 3, 21, 64, 124, 155, 181, 271,
296 X
on terror, 127, 156, 162, 234 Xiao, Ren, 332, 334
Warsaw, 203–210, 223 Xuetong, Yan, 316, 320
Weimar, 290, 294, 301, 309
Welfare state, 114, 126n9, 184
Western Y
coalition, 251, 251n68 Yack, Bernard, 265–267, 283
heritage, 70, 206 Yangtze, 298
imperialism, 151, 239, 270, 281 Yaqing, Qin, 319, 320
international order, 116, 315–337 Yoga, 344, 356, 357
liberal democracy, 233, 254 Yuan, Wei, 326
self, 107, 112, 344 Yuzhinskiy circle, 291
values, 47, 48, 68, 109, 111, 154,
159, 168, 179, 180, 189, 192,
193, 202–210, 213, 269, 319, Z
325, 327, 352, 362 Zakaria, Fareed, 90n105, 201
Westernization, 6, 35, 71, 183, 194, Zedong, Mao, 317
209, 268, 270, 275, 284, 326 Zhaoguang, Ge, 324
Westintegration, 182 Zhou dynasty, 320, 324, 328, 330
Westphalian international order, 332 Zmiana (party), 295

Contestations of Liberal Order: The West in Crisis?

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Contestations

The West in Crisis?

ISBN 978-3-030-22058-7 ISBN 978-3-030-22059-4 (eBook)

Tampere, Turku, and JyväskyläMarko Lehti, Henna-Riikka Pennanen,

8 I magining the West in the Era of America First201

Toni Alaranta The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki,

Table 3.1 Three crisis narratives 89

Marko Lehti, Henna-Riikka Pennanen, and Jukka Jouhki

© The Author(s) 2020 1

dition, tolerance and political pluralism; my generation knows this cata-

We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the doctrine of

We have replaced a shipwrecked liberal democracy with a 21st-century

Crisis of the liberal order abounds everywhere. Indeed, it has in various

Democracy Index 2018 (2019).

cratic (2017); Jiménez (2017); The Global States of Democracy.

By focusing on the idea of the West we are better able to contextualize

zational narrative locates the Western origins in ancient Greece and

ment, human rights, individual freedoms, GDP per capita24—point toward

Western-led Liberal International Order: its ordering principles, underly-

conservative theory as a part of Russian aim to profile itself as a regional,

Liberal identities have become an important site of struggle over identi-

Beyond Liberal Empire and Peace: Declining

Marko Lehti and Henna-Riikka Pennanen

“The American-led liberal world order was never a natural phenomenon,”

© The Author(s) 2020 17

first, because of its preponderant military, economic, and moral power;

example, much excellent theoretical and empirical scholarship on global

nationalism, and tribalism—all of which, historically speaking, manifest

Consensual Hegemony, Consensual Legitimacy

In the classical realist perspective, hegemony is understood as “over-

When it comes to hegemonic behavior, hegemons come in all variet-

no longer c­ onsidered as regional, but as expanding and globalizing.37

process. S. P. Mulligan notes that “legitimacy is virtually indistinguishable

Hegemonic legitimacy is a conceptual frame that turns our analytical

Liberal Principles of International Order

At heart, most liberals were moralists. Their liberalism had nothing to do

Liberal tends to refer to internationalism as the core constitutive order-

The West as a Liberal Empire

hegemonic project called for a distinction between the “civilized” and

Recently, for example in Syria, the humanitarian emphasis has already

Resistance, Contestation, and Resilience

alternatives.99 This contention that there are no serious ideological con-

describe as the “founding myth” of the liberal order.112 Edward Luce

President Trump and his administration have repeatedly talked about

consolidated and united,” are uniquely capable of crafting a new, multipo-

in the battle against climate change.132 However, the Chinese emphasize

The Metamorphoses of Liberal Hegemony and Crisis

The liberal international order remains in place, still largely untouched.

discontentment with the order, and as Kagan asserts, the garden is

crisis. On the contrary, from Gramscian view, contestation or counter-­

that some principles are no longer perceived as flowing from Western

principles of liberal peace, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internation-

When it comes to reacting to change in the world order, it all comes

Cumings, Bruce. 2002. Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian

Ikenberry, G. John. 2011a. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and

http://www.mid.r u/en/press_ser vice/minister_speeches/-/asset_

Trump, Donald. 2017. Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland.

Crises of the West: Liberal Identities

Marko Lehti and Henna-Riikka Pennanen

© The Author(s) 2020 61

Past Crisis Narratives

ism instead. What unites these narratives, according to Jan Ifversen, is

what was understood as liberalism. From an earlier emphasis on duties and

Tampere, Turku, and JyväskyläMarko Lehti, Henna-Riikka Pennanen,

8 I magining the West in the Era of America First201

Table 3.1 Three crisis narratives 89

no longer c onsidered as regional, but as expanding and globalizing.37

crisis. On the contrary, from Gramscian view, contestation or counter-

and self-esteem.99 Jennifer Mitzen, on the other hand, associates self-

Positive- Positive Freedom as the opportunity to make a choice

In Obama’s vision, therefore, the way forward is trading ideas of non-