TORTS TOPIC: DAMAGES (Chapter 1)

JURISPRUDENCE/ BRIEF FACTS ISSUE RATIO RECIDENDI

1. BPI Express Card vs CA (120639, Sept 25,
1998)
Marasigan, a lawyer, is a BPI credit card holder. His
contractual relations with BPI went on smoothly until
October 1989, when his statement of account amounting
to P8,987.84 was not paid in due time. BPI demanded
immediate payment, and required him to issue a check
in favor of BPI, otherwise his card will be suspended.
Marasigan issued a post-dated check (PDC) in favor of
BPI.
BPI, having been informed of the PDC only a week after
receipt, already sent a letter to Marasigan, informing
him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his
card. He was also told to refrain from using his card to
avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless
he settles his outstanding account within 5 days from
receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently
cancelled.
On the other hand, confident that he had settled his
account with the issuance of the postdated check,
Marasigan invited some guests at Café Adriatico
(there is also no showing that he received the letter
from BPI before he went to Café Adriatico). When
he presented his credit card to paythe bill, the it
was dishonored and one of his guests paid the bill
by using her own credit card.
Marasigan asked BPI to withhold the deposit of his
postdated check and to return the said check to him
because according to him, BPI violated their
agreement that once Marasigan issues the check
to the to cover his unpaid account, BPI will not
suspend the effectivity of the card.
Marasigan filed a complaint for damages against BPI
before the trial court, and the trial court ruled in favor of
him. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
W/N BPI had the right to suspend the credit card of the
Marasigan
Yes. Under the terms and conditions of the credit card,
signed by Marasigan, any card with outstanding
balances after 30 days from original billing shall
automatically be suspended. Marasigan admitted that he
did not pay within 30 days for his original billing. BPI
could automatically suspend his credit card.
Even though there was an arrangement between the
parties (that upon issuance of a check, the card
wouldn’t be suspended) the court found that
Marasigan was not able to comply with his
obligation.
The purpose of the arrangement between the parties was
for the immediate payment of Marasigan’s outstanding
account, in order that his credit card would not be
suspended. As agreed upon by the parties, on the
following day, private respondent did issue a
check. However, the check was postdated 15
December 1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check
is only a substitute for money and not money, the
delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself
operate as payment. This is especially true in the case
of a postdated check.
Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the
postdated check was not effective payment. It did
not comply with his obligation under the
arrangement with BPI. BPI corporation was therefore
justified in suspending his credit card.
While Marasigan suffered damages as a result of the
cancellation of his credit card, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt,
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In order that

2. Auyong Hian vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
Damnum absque injuria
The purpose of the arrangement between the parties was
for the immediate payment of Marasigan’s outstanding
account, in order that his credit card would not be
suspended. As agreed upon by the parties, on the
following day, private respondent did issue a
check. However, the check was postdated 15
December 1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check
is only a substitute for money and not money, the
delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself
operate as payment. This is especially true in the case
of a postdated check.
Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the
postdated check was not effective payment. It did
not comply with his obligation under the
arrangement with BPI. BPI corporation was therefore
justified in suspending his credit card.
While Marasigan suffered damages as a result of the
cancellation of his credit card, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt,
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In order that
a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
Whether the sale of the tobacco from the public auction
to CTIP was valid
a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff. In the case at bar, it was
Marasigan's failure to settle his obligation which caused
the suspension of his credit card and subsequent
dishonor at Café Adriatico.
Liability for damages of a person for exercising his legal
rights
. — A person has the right to take all legal steps to
enforce his legal and/ or equitable rights. One who
makes use of his legal right does no injury. If damage
results from a person’s exercising his legal rights, it
is damnum absque injuria (damage without injury).
(Auyong Hian vs. Court of Appeals, 59 SCRA 110
[1974].) The plain must establish that the damage to
him resulted from a breach or violation of legal duty
which the defendant owned to him; otherwise, the
consequences must be borne by the plain alone.
One who exercises his rights does no injury.
Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage
results from a person’s exercising his legal rights, it is
damnum absque injuria. The consequent delay in the
delivery of the tobacco is an incident to said exercise of
his rights. The property, subject of litigation is not by
that fact aline, in custodia legis. “When property is
lawfully taken, by virtue of legal process, it is in the
custody of the law, and not otherwise.”
The property subject of litigation is not by that fact
alone, in custodia legis. “When property is lawfully
taken, by virtue of legal process, it is in the custody of
the law, and not otherwise.”It has been shown above,
furthermore, that petitioner herein was not entitled to the
tobacco, consequently he had no right to the proceeds of
the sale, and to have the proceeds thereof deposited
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff. In the case at bar, it was
Marasigan's failure to settle his obligation which caused
the suspension of his credit card and subsequent
dishonor at Café Adriatico.
3. Jimenez vs Reyes , GR 8227, March 9, 1914
This is a civil action for libel. The defendant is editor
and proprietor of the weekly newspaper called "El
Mensajero Católico," published in the city of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur. The plaintiff is also a resident of Vigan,
following the profession of attorney at law; he is also a
druggist and has operated a drug store in Vigan for the
last seventeen years; and he is a councilman of the
municipality. On August 29, 1910, the defendant
published, in the aforesaid newspaper.
Whether claim for damages may prosper
Yes, plaintiff may claim for damages.
General damages are such as the law will presume to be
the natural or probable consequence of the defendant's
conduct. They arise by inference of law, and need not
therefore be proved by evidence. Such damages may be
recovered wherever the immediate tendency of the
words is to impair the plaintiff's reputation, although no
actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted.
Such general damages will only be presumed where the
words are actionable per se. If any special damage has
also been suffered, it should be set out on the pleadings;
but, should the plaintiff fail in proving it at the trial, he
may still recover general damages.
If the publication was false, the plaintiff was entitled, in
the absence of allegation and proof of special damage, to
such general damages as the law would presume to be
the natural or probable consequence of the defamatory
words. These damages arise by inference of law, and
need not be proved by evidence. Such damages may be
recovered wherever the immediate tendency of the
libelous words is to impair the party's reputation,
although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted.
In considering damage to reputation there must be taken
into account the publicity given to the publication, the
extent to which it tends to expose the plaintiff's
reputation to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and
the social and business standing of the parties. In
estimating damages for injured feelings there should be
considered the manner of the publication, that is,
whether the method of publication tends to add
ignominy to the natural effects of the publication. Also,
those factors which enter into the assessment of

4. Bulante vs Liante GR 21583 & 21591, May
20, 1968
On April 19, 1955, a collision occurred between a
Visayan Transit passenger bus and a cargo truck in
Barugo, Leyte. The collision resulted in ten deaths and
seven injuries. Chu Liante, the owner of the cargo truck,
injured passengers, and heirs of deceased bus passengers
filed separate actions against the bus operator and
registered owner, Daniel Bulante. Chu Liante’s
complaint was based on tort (culpa aquiliana), while the
other complaints were for breach of the contract of
carriage (culpa contractual).
Whether or not there is liability for collision
damages for injury to reputation must influence the
injury to plaintiff s feelings. Plaintiff's feelings, in this
sense, are considered to be the mental suffering, shame,
and humiliation experienced by him as a result of the
libel.
Yes. The decision appealed from is also assailed
insofar as the award of damages is concerned. It is
contended that the three injured passengers —
Rufina Boreres, Juanita Marquez and Valentin
Momo — are not entitled to moral damages. The
contention must be upheld, since their cause of
action against the petitioner is based on breach of
contract, and in such a case moral damages may
be recovered only where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220, Civil Code).
The jurisprudence on this point is well settled. The
petitioner here is not sued vicariously but on his
own account as a party to the contract of carriage,
and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged in the
complaint or may be imputed to him merely by
reason of his driver's gross negligence in the
manner he was driving the bus when the accident
took place. The award of moral damages to the
aforesaid injured passengers must be eliminated.
The next item objected to refers to the damages
awarded to the heirs of the deceased passengers
for loss of earning capacity, separately from the
indemnities by reason of death. The ground for the
objection is that loss of earning capacity was not
specifically pleaded or claimed in the complaints.
This item, however, may be considered included in
the prayer for "actual damages" and for other "just
and equitable reliefs," especially if taken in the light
of Article 2206, in connection with Articles 1764, of
the Civil Code, which allows, in addition to an
indemnity of at least P3,000.00 by reason of death,
recovery for loss of earning capacity on the part of
the deceased, the same to be paid to his heirs "in
every case ... unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of
his death."