USA

The third-largest country in the world by land and total area, [c] the U.S. consists of 50 states, a federal district,
five major unincorporated territories, nine Minor Outlying Islands[i] and includes 326 Indian reservations.

With a population of over 334 million,[k] it is the most populous country in the Americas and the third-most
populous in the world.

By 1900, the United States had established itself as a great power, becoming the world's largest economy.
After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S. entered World War II on the side of the
Allies.

The United States national government is a federal presidential constitutional republic and liberal democracy
with three separate branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial; this governmental structure
is designed to maintain a system of checks and balances among the branches. It has a bicameral national
legislature composed of the House of Representatives, a lower house based on population; and the Senate,
an upper house based on equal representation for each state. Many policy issues are decentralized at a state
or local level, and these can vary by jurisdiction. However, they must conform with, and are subordinate to,
the Constitution. Americans generally value liberty, equality under the law, individualism, and limited
government.

The American economy accounts for over a quarter of global GDP and is the largest nominally. It ranks among
the highest in the world in international measures of human development, income, wealth, economic
competitiveness, productivity, innovation, human rights, and education. The United States is a founding
member of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of
American States, NATO and WHO and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. It
wields considerable global influence as the world's foremost political, cultural, economic, military, and
scientific power.

Revolution and expansion (1776–1861)

After winning the French and Indian War, Britain began to assert greater control over local colonial affairs,
creating colonial political resistance; one of the primary colonial grievances was a denial of their rights as
Englishmen, particularly the right to representation in the British government that taxed them. In 1774, the
First Continental Congress met in Philadelphia, and passed a colonial boycott of British goods that proved
effective. The British attempt to then disarm the colonists resulted in the 1775 Battles of Lexington and
Concord, igniting the American Revolutionary War. At the Second Continental Congress, the colonies
appointed George Washington commander-in-chief of the Continental Army and created a committee led by
Thomas Jefferson to write the Declaration of Independence, adopted on July 4, 1776.[65] The political values of
the American Revolution included liberty, inalienable individual rights; and the sovereignty of the people;[66]
supporting republicanism and rejecting monarchy, aristocracy, and hereditary political power; virtue and
faithfulness in the performance of civic duties; and vilification of corruption.[67] The Founding Fathers of the
United States, which included George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas
Jefferson, John Jay, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and John Adams, took inspiration from Ancient Greco-
Roman, Renaissance, and Age of Enlightenment philosophies and ideas.[68][69]
After the British surrender at the siege of Yorktown in 1781, American sovereignty was internationally
recognized by the Treaty of Paris (1783), through which the U.S. gained territory stretching west to the
Mississippi River, north to present-day Canada, and south to Spanish Florida.[70] Ratified in 1781, the Articles
of Confederation established a decentralized government that operated until 1789. [65] The Northwest
Ordinance (1787) established the precedent by which the country's territory would expand with the
admission of new states, rather than the expansion of existing states.[71] The U.S. Constitution was drafted at
the 1787 Constitutional Convention to overcome the limitations of the Articles; it went into effect in 1789,
creating a federation administered by three branches on the principle of checks and balances.[72] Washington
was elected the country's first president under the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 to
allay concerns by skeptics of the more centralized government;[73][74] his resignations first as commander-in-
chief after the Revolution and later President set a precedent followed by John Adams, establishing the
peaceful transfer of power between rival parties.[75][76]

Animation showing the free/slave status of U.S. states and territories expansion,
1789–1861

In the late 18th century, American settlers began to expand westward, with a sense of manifest destiny.[77]
The Louisiana Purchase (1803) from France nearly doubled the territory of the United States. [78] Lingering
issues with Britain remained, leading to the War of 1812, which was fought to a draw.[79] Spain ceded Florida
and their Gulf Coast territory in 1819. [80] The Missouri Compromise attempted to balance desires of northern
states to prevent expansion of slavery in the country with those of southern states to expand it, admitting
Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state and declared a policy of prohibiting slavery in the
remaining Louisiana Purchase lands north of the 36°30′ parallel.[81]

As Americans expanded further into land inhabited by Native Americans, the federal government often
applied policies of Indian removal or assimilation.[82][83] The displacement prompted a long series of American
Indian Wars west of the Mississippi River.[84][85] The Republic of Texas was annexed in 1845,[86] and the 1846
Oregon Treaty led to U.S. control of the present-day American Northwest.[87] Victory in the Mexican–American
War resulted in the 1848 Mexican Cession of California and much of the present-day American Southwest,
resulting in the U.S. stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans.

Civil War (1861–1865)

Main articles: History of the United States (1849–1865) and American Civil War
show
Division of the states during the American Civil War

During the colonial period, slavery was legal in the American colonies, though the practice began to be
significantly questioned during the American Revolution. [89] States in The North enacted abolition laws,[90]
though support for slavery strengthened in Southern states, as inventions such as the cotton gin made the
institution increasingly profitable for Southern elites.[91][92][93] This sectional conflict regarding slavery
culminated in the American Civil War (1861–1865).[94][95] Eleven slave states seceded and formed the
Confederate States of America, while the other states remained in the Union.[96] War broke out in April 1861
after the Confederacy bombarded Fort Sumter.[97] After the January 1863 Emancipation Proclamation, many
freed slaves joined the Union Army.[98] The war began to turn in the Union's favor following the 1863 Siege of
Vicksburg and Battle of Gettysburg, and the Confederacy surrendered in 1865 after the Union's victory in the
Battle of Appomattox Court House.[99]

The Reconstruction era followed the war. After the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln,
Reconstruction Amendments were passed to protect the rights of African Americans. National infrastructure,
including transcontinental telegraph and railroads, spurred growth in the American frontier.

Post-Civil War era (1865–1898)

Main article: History of the United States (1865–1917)
Duration: 2 minutes and 43 seconds.2:43An Edison Studios film showing immigrants arriving at Ellis Island in New York
Harbor, a major point of entry for European immigrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries[101][102]

From 1865 through 1917 an unprecedented stream of immigrants arrived in the United States, including 24.4
million from Europe.[103] Most came through the port of New York City, and New York City and other large
cities on the East Coast became home to large Jewish, Irish, and Italian populations, while many Germans and
Central Europeans moved to the Midwest. At the same time, about one million French Canadians migrated
from Quebec to New England.[104] During the Great Migration, millions of African Americans left the rural
South for urban areas in the North.[105] Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867.[106]

The Compromise of 1877 effectively ended Reconstruction and white supremacists took local control of
Southern politics.[107][108] African Americans endured a period of heightened, overt racism following
Reconstruction, a time often called the nadir of American race relations.[109][110] A series of Supreme Court
decisions, including Plessy v. Ferguson, emptied the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of their force,
allowing Jim Crow laws in the South to remain unchecked, sundown towns in the Midwest, and segregation
in cities across the country, which would be reinforced by the policy of redlining later adopted by the federal
Home Owners' Loan Corporation.[111]
An explosion of technological advancement accompanied by the huge influx of cheap immigrant labor that
could be exploited[112] led to rapid economic development during the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
allowing the United States to economically outpace England, France, and Germany combined. [113][114] This
fostered the amassing of power by a few prominent industrialists, largely by their formation of trusts and
monopolies to prevent competition.[115] Tycoons led the nation's expansion in the railroad, petroleum, and
steel industries. The United States emerged as a pioneer of the automotive industry.[116] These changes were
accompanied by significant increases in economic inequality, slum conditions, and social unrest, creating the
environment for labor unions to begin to flourish.[117][118][119] This period eventually ended with the advent of the
Progressive Era, which was characterized by significant reforms.

Rise as a superpower (1898–1945)

Main article: History of the United States (1917–1945)

The Trinity nuclear test in 1945, part of the Manhattan Project and the first
detonation of a nuclear weapon. The World Wars permanently ended the country's policy of isolationism and left it as a world
superpower.

Pro-American elements in Hawaii overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy; the islands were annexed in 1898.
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines were ceded by Spain following the Spanish–American War.[122]
American Samoa was acquired by the United States in 1900 after the Second Samoan Civil War.[123] The U.S.
Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark in 1917.[124] The United States entered World War I alongside the
Allies of World War I, helping to turn the tide against the Central Powers.[125] In 1920, a constitutional
amendment granted nationwide women's suffrage.[126] During the 1920s and 30s, radio for mass
communication and the invention of early television transformed communications nationwide. [127] The Wall
Street Crash of 1929 triggered the Great Depression, which President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to
with New Deal social and economic policies.[128][129]

At first neutral during World War II, the U.S. began supplying war materiel to the Allies of World War II in
March 1941 and entered the war in December after the Empire of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.[130][131] The
U.S. developed the first nuclear weapons and used them against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in August 1945, ending the war.[132][133] The United States was one of the "Four Policemen" who met
to plan the postwar world, alongside the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China.[134][135] The U.S. emerged
relatively unscathed from the war, with even greater economic and military influence.
Cold War (1945–1991)
Main articles: History of the United States (1945–1964), History of the United States (1964–1980), and History
of the United States (1980–1991)

Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear

Forces Treaty at the White House, 1987.

After World War II, the United States entered the Cold War, where geopolitical tensions between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union led the two countries to dominate world affairs. [137] The U.S. engaged in regime change
against governments perceived to be aligned with the Soviet Union, and competed in the Space Race,
culminating in the first crewed Moon landing in 1969.[138][139][140][141]

Domestically, the U.S. experienced economic growth, urbanization, and population growth following World
War II.[142] The civil rights movement emerged, with Martin Luther King Jr. becoming a prominent leader in the
early 1960s.[143] The Great Society plan of President Lyndon Johnson's administration resulted in significant
and broad reaching laws, policies and a constitutional amendment to counteract some of the worst effects of
lingering institutional racism.[144] The counterculture movement in the U.S. brought significant social changes,
including the liberalization of attitudes towards recreational drug use and sexuality as well as open defiance
of the military draft and opposition to intervention in Vietnam.[145][146][147] The societal shift in the roles of
women partly resulted in large increases in female labor participation around the 1970s, and by 1985 the
majority of women aged 16 and over were employed. [148] The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the collapse of
the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of the Cold War and
solidified the U.S. as the world's sole superpower.

Contemporary (1991–present)
Main articles: History of the United States (1991–2008) and History of the United States (2008–present)

The Twin Towers in New York City during the September 11 attacks of 2001

The 1990s saw the longest recorded economic expansion in American history, a dramatic decline in crime,
and advances in technology, with the World Wide Web, the evolution of the Pentium microprocessor in
accordance with Moore's law, rechargeable lithium-ion batteries, the first gene therapy trial, and cloning all
emerging and being improved upon throughout the decade. The Human Genome Project was formally
launched in 1990, building of the Large Hadron Collider commenced in 1998, and Nasdaq became the first
stock market in the United States to trade online. [153] In 1991, an American-led international coalition of states
expelled an Iraqi invasion force from Kuwait in the Gulf War.[154]

The September 11, 2001 attacks by the pan-Islamist militant organization Al-Qaeda led to the war on terror
and subsequent military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.[155][156] The cultural impact of the attacks was
profound and long-lasting.

The U.S. housing bubble culminated in 2006 with the Great Recession, the largest economic contraction since
the Great Depression.[157] Coming to a head in the 2010s, political polarization increased as sociopolitical
debates on cultural issues dominated politics. [158] This polarization was capitalized upon in the January 2021
Capitol attack,[159] attempting to prevent the peaceful transfer of power. [

Government and politics

National government
Comprised of three branches, all headquartered in Washington, D.C., the federal government is the national
government of the United States. It is regulated by a strong system of checks and balances.[202]

•
The U.S. Congress, a bicameral legislature, made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
makes federal law, declares war, approves treaties, has the power of the purse,[203] and has the power
of impeachment.[204] The Senate has 100 members (2 from each state), elected for a six-year term.
The House of Representatives has 435 members from single member congressional districts
allocated to each state on the basis of population, elected for a two-year term.[205]
•
The U.S. president is the commander-in-chief of the military, can veto legislative bills before they
become law (subject to congressional override), and appoints the members of the Cabinet (subject
to Senate approval) and other officials, who administer and enforce federal laws and policies through
their respective agencies.[206] The president and the vice president run and are elected together in a
presidential election. Unlike any others in American politics, it is an indirect election, with the winner
being determined by votes cast by electors of the Electoral College. The President and Vice President
serve a four-year term and may be elected to the office no more than twice.[207]
• The U.S. federal judiciary, whose judges are all appointed for life by the President with Senate
approval, consists primarily of the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. courts of appeals, and the U.S.
district courts. The U.S. Supreme Court interprets laws and overturn those they find
unconstitutional.[208] The Supreme Court is led by the chief justice of the United States. It has nine
members who serve for life. The members are appointed by the sitting president when a vacancy
becomes available.

Political subdivisions
Main articles: State governments of the United States, Local government in the United States, and U.S. state
Further information: List of states and territories of the United States, Indian reservation, Territories of the
United States, and Territorial evolution of the United States
In the American federal system, sovereign powers are shared between two levels of elected government:
national and state. People in the states are also represented by local elected governments, which are
administrative divisions of the states.[210] States are subdivided into counties or county equivalents, and
further divided into municipalities. The District of Columbia is a federal district that contains the capital of the
United States, the city of Washington.[211] The territories and the District of Columbia are administrative
divisions of the federal government.[212]

Political parties
Main article: Political parties in the United States
The Constitution is silent on political parties. However, they developed independently in the 18th century
with the Federalist and Anti-Federalist parties.[213] Since then, the United States has operated as a de facto
two-party system, though the parties in that system have been different at different times.

Today the two main national parties are the Democratic and the Republican. The former is perceived as
relatively liberal in its political platform while the latter is perceived as relatively conservative.[214] Each has a
primary system to nominate a presidential ticket, and each runs candidates for other offices in every state in
the Union. Other smaller and less influential parties exist but do not have the national scope and breadth of
the two main parties.

Foreign relations
Main articles: Foreign relations of the United States and Foreign policy of the United States
 The United Nations headquarters has been situated along the East River in
Midtown Manhattan since 1952; in 1945, the United States was a founding member of the UN.

The United States has an established structure of foreign relations, and it had the world's second-largest
diplomatic corps in 2021.[215] It is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council,[216] and home to
the United Nations headquarters.[217] The United States is a member of the G7,[218] G20,[219] and OECD
intergovernmental organizations.[220] Almost all countries have embassies and many have consulates (official
representatives) in the country. Likewise, nearly all countries host formal diplomatic missions with the United
States, except Iran,[221] North Korea,[222] and Bhutan.[223] Though Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic
relations with the U.S., it maintains close unofficial relations. [224] The United States regularly supplies Taiwan
with military equipment to deter potential Chinese aggression.[225]

The United States has a "Special Relationship" with the United Kingdom[226] and strong ties with Canada,[227]
Australia,[228] New Zealand,[229] the Philippines,[230] Japan,[231] South Korea,[232] Israel,[233] and several European
Union countries (France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Poland).[234] The U.S. works closely with its NATO allies on
military and national security issues, and with countries in the Americas through the Organization of
American States and the United States–Mexico–Canada Free Trade Agreement. In South America, Colombia
is traditionally considered to be the closest ally of the United States. [235] The U.S. exercises full international
defense authority and responsibility for Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau through the Compact of
Free Association.[236] It has increasingly conducted strategic cooperation with India,[237] and its ties with China
have steadily deteriorated.[238][239] Since 2014, the U.S. has become a key ally of Ukraine;[240] it has also provided
considerable military equipment and other support to the country since Russia's 2022 invasion.

Military
Main articles: United States Armed Forces and Military history of the United States

The Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense

The President is the commander-in-chief of the United States Armed Forces and appoints its leaders, the
secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense, which is headquartered at the
Pentagon near Washington, D.C., administers five of the six service branches, which are made up of the
Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Space Force. The Coast Guard is administered by the Department of
Homeland Security in peacetime and can be transferred to the Department of the Navy in wartime.[242]
The United States spent $877 billion on its military in 2022, which is by far the largest amount of any country,
making up 39% of global military spending and accounting for 3.5% of the country's GDP. [243][244] The U.S. has
45% of the world's nuclear weapons, the second-largest amount after Russia.[245]

The United States has the third-largest combined armed forces in the world, behind the Chinese People's
Liberation Army and Indian Armed Forces.[246] The military operates about 800 bases and facilities abroad, [247]
and maintains deployments greater than 100 active duty personnel in 25 foreign countries.

Law enforcement and crime

Main articles: Law of the United States, Law enforcement in the United States, Crime in the United States, and
Censorship in the United States

J. Edgar Hoover Building, the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI)

There are about 18,000 U.S. police agencies from local to national level in the United States. [249] Law in the
United States is mainly enforced by local police departments and sheriff departments in their municipal or
county jurisdictions. The state police departments have authority in their respective state, and federal
agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Marshals Service have national
jurisdiction and specialized duties, such as protecting civil rights, national security and enforcing U.S. federal
courts' rulings and federal laws.[250] State courts conduct most civil and criminal trials, [251] and federal courts
handle designated crimes and appeals of state court decisions.[252]

As of January 2023, the United States has the sixth highest per-capita incarceration rate in the world, at 531
people per 100,000; and the largest prison and jail population in the world with almost 2 million people
incarcerated.[253][254][255] An analysis of the World Health Organization Mortality Database from 2010 showed
U.S. homicide rates "were 7 times higher than in other high-income countries, driven by a gun homicide rate
that was 25 times higher."[

Peacebuilding Commission

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is a United Nations intergovernmental advisory body
of both the General Assembly and the Security Council that supports peace efforts in conflict affected
countries. A key addition to the capacity of the international community in the broad peace agenda, it was
established in 2005 with the passage of both A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645[1][2] Mr. Ivan Šimonović (Croatia) is
the incumbent chair of PBC.[3][4]

The Peacebuilding Commission, which has a unique role to play in advancing intergovernmental coherence
through its cross-pillar mandate, has already diversified its working methods to enhance its flexibility as a
dedicated intergovernmental platform.[5]

Recent good practices of the Peacebuilding Commission include attention to cross-border and regional issues
in the Great Lakes region and the Sahel, support to the transition from a peace operation in Liberia and the
adoption of a gender strategy that is the first of its kind for an intergovernmental body of the United Nations.
Member States have also used the platform of the commission for constructive discussions on Burkina Faso,
Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Somalia and Sri Lanka, at the initiative of the
countries concerned. [1]

Members of the Peacebuilding Commission[edit]

The commission is composed of 31 member states, which gather in two main fora: an Organizational
Committee, and country specific Configurations, one for each country that currently is part of the PBC's
agenda.

PBC Members [edit]

The current composition of the Peacebuilding Commission's Organizational Committee is as follows: [6]

Additi
Selected by Selected by Selected by the Selected due to Selected due to
onal
the Security the General Economic and contributions to contributions to
partne
Council Assembly Social Council UN missions the UN budget
rs
Bolivia,
(Plurinationa Colombia Belgium Bangladesh Brazil
EU
l State of)
Czech
China Ecuador Ethiopia Canada OIC
Republic
Côte-
Egypt Italy India Germany IMF
d'Ivoire
El
France Nigeria Pakistan Japan WBG
Salvador
Russian Republic of
Kenya Rwanda Norway
Federation Korea
United
Romania
Kingdom Indonesia
United
Mexico South Africa
States
Leadership[edit]
The [2] of the PBC is currently as follows:[6]

• Chair: Egypt
• Vice-Chairs: Canada and Slovakia

Origins of the Peacebuilding Commission[edit]

The PBC is one of the new entities created by the reform process initiated during the 60th session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, as part of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. The debate over the
reform of the United Nations systems is not a recent one. Since the creation of the organization (June 1945),
most of delegates and commentators believed that the structure they had given birth to was a merely
temporary one as a first step towards the establishment of the new multilateral system. Indeed, the third
paragraph of article 109 is a clear clue of this initial orientation, as it states that a General Conference aimed
at reviewing the UN Charter should be called from the tenth annual session of the General Assembly onward.
But, the first attempt to reform the UN structure failed at the very 10th session, when the General Assembly,
even though aware of the need of a reform, decided to postpone any decision. Various attempts to reform
the UN took place during the decades but the core issues (Security Council reform, veto power, UN
enforcement) failed to be properly addressed. The PBC was inaugurated in June 2006, with the inclusion of
Burundi and Sierra Leona as first cases of the commission, as previously requested by the Security Council, in
order to develop a country-specific model aiming to contribute to the implementation of the post-conflict
tasks in each of both countries.

The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change [edit]

The new environment and challenges brought by the post–September 11 system of international relations
spurred the Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seek new proposals and solutions in order to reform a certain
sensitive area of the UN system. This approximately was the mandate of the High Level Threat Panel.

(The United Nations' High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was created in 2003 to analyze threats and challenges to
international peace and security, and to recommend action based on this analysis.[1] It was chaired by former Prime Minister of Thailand, Anand
Panyarachun, and its members included former United States National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, as well as several former heads of
government and foreign ministers as members.[2]

In December 2004, it produced a report on threats to peace and security.[2]

Ten threats[edit]
In its 2004 report, the Panel identified ten threats: [2]

1. Poverty
2. Infectious disease
3. Environmental degradation
4. Inter-state war
5. Civil war
6. Genocide
7. Other atrocities (e.g., trade in women and children for sexual slavery, or kidnapping for body parts)
8. Weapons of mass destruction (nuclear proliferation, chemical weapon proliferation, biological weapon proliferation)
9. Terrorism
10. Transnational organized crime
Annan announced the membership of the 16-member Panel in a letter, dated November 3, 2003, addressed
to the President of the General Assembly, Julian Robert Hunte (Saint Lucia). Mr Anand Panyarachun, former
Prime Minister of Thailand, was appointed to chair the high-level panel on global security threats and reform
of the international system.

The Panel was asked to analyse and assess future threats to peace and security and to evaluate existing
approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the organs of the UN system. In this view, the Panel was
specifically asked to:

• Examine today's global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to international peace
and security;
• Identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges;
• Recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including but not limited to
a review of the principal organs of the United Nations.
The list above makes clear that the panel was not asked to formulate policies on specific issues. Rather it was
asked to make an assessment of current challenges and to recommend proper changes in order to meet
them effectively. The final report of the High-level Panel, named "A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility," set out a number of recommendations to address problems and issues in six main areas of
concern on which the multilateral system should concentrate its action now and in the decades ahead:

11. war between States;

12. violence within States (civil wars, gross violations of human rights and genocide);
13. poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation;
14. nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
15. terrorism; and
16. transnational organized crime.[7]
Considering the second point, the analysis of the panel identified "a key institutional gap: there is no place in
the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist
countries in their transition from war to peace" (reference: report, paragraph 261). Since the United Nations
should be able to act coherently and effectively from preventive action through post-conflict peace-building,
the panel recommended to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as a subsidiary body of the Security Council
itself. As it is stated in the report, "the core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify
countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the
national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in
the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and
sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may
be necessary".[8] For what concern more practical and in-depth aspects of this new body, the panel just
recommends that the commission should be reasonably small, meet in different configurations in order to
consider both general policy issues and country-by-country situations and strategies, involve the main
relevant actors in different fields (UN organs such as ECOSOC and representative from UN agencies,
International Financial and Economic Institutions, representatives of regional and subregional organizations)
and it should be assisted by Peacebuilding Support Office established in the Secretariat.

High-Level Threat Panel members [edit]

The High-Level Panel was integrated by 16 prominent politicians, diplomats and development experts:
 • Anand Panyarachun (Thailand), former Prime Minister of Thailand (chair)
• Robert Badinter (France), French Senator and former Minister of Justice
• João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), former Secretary-General of the Organization of American
States;
• Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), former Prime Minister of Norway and former Director-General of
the World Health Organization;
• Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana), Vice-chairman, National Development Planning Commission of Ghana
and former Deputy Director-General, International Labour Organization;
• Gareth Evans (Australia), President of the International Crisis Group and former Australian Minister
for Foreign Affairs;
• David Hannay (United Kingdom), former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the
United Nations and United Kingdom Special Envoy for Cyprus;
• Enrique V. Iglesias (Uruguay), President of the Inter-American Development Bank;
• Amr Moussa (Egypt), Secretary-General of the Arab League;
• Satish Nambiar (India), former Indian Army lieutenant general and United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) commander;
• Sadako Ogata (Japan), former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;
• Yevgeny Primakov (Russia), former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation;
• Qian Qichen (China), former Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China;
• Nafis Sadik (Pakistan), former executive director of the United Nations Population Fund;
• Salim Ahmed Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), former Secretary-General of the Organization of
African Unity; and
• Brent Scowcroft (United States), former United States Air Force lieutenant general and National
Security Advisor.

Structure and mandate of the Peacebuilding

Commission[edit]
Institutional Framework [edit]
The Peacebuilding Commission is a subsidiary organ of both the General Assembly and the Security Council,
thus the legal basis for its institution is to be found in articles. 22 and 29 of the UN Charter, devoted
respectively to GA and SC subsidiary bodies.

In this regard, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1645 on December 20, 2005, in concurrence with an
analogue act approved by the General Assembly, the 60/180 resolution of December 30, 2005. In both texts
the Peacebuilding Commission is described as an intergovernmental advisory body, and among its tasks there
is the duty to submit an annual report to the General Assembly which is supposed to hold an annual session
to discuss it.

The main task of the new Peacebuilding Commission is that of taking care of post-conflict actions to be
adopted and enforced in countries emerging from conflicts, whose Governments choose to ask for relief from
the International Community. It is up to the PBC to collect all available resources and funds directed to
support recovery projects in those countries, and to draft long-term strategies in order to guarantee
reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development.
As said, this new body represents an innovation to the UN traditional approach to conflicts situations: for the
first time there is a single organ charged with a mission that relies on a complex of capacities and expertise
which used to be of many UN subjects' concern, without any substantial coordination set out. For this reason
the commission can benefit by all the UN experience on such matters as conflict prevention, mediation,
peacekeeping, respect for human rights, the rule of law, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and long-
term development.

Obviously, as it is an advisory body, its natural role is that of proposing action patterns to be followed from
the countries involved in the peace-building operations, and it is not entitled to take effective action. Another
important task the PBC is supposed to fulfill is the one of ensuring actual funding both for early
reconstruction activities and for longer-term strategies. This last mission is aimed at fixing the previous
general praxis, according to which Countries were often more disposable to engage themselves to offer
resources for short-term interventions (mainly devoted to peace-keeping operations) than to keep their
promises of supporting peace-building operations once the conflict had been soothed and the hype on it had
ceased to affect international public opinion.

The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) [edit]

This Peacebuilding Support Office was envisaged as part of the founding resolutions from the Security Council
and General Assembly that established the Peacebuilding Commission in order “to establish, within the
Secretariat and from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified
experts to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission and drawing from the best expertise available.”

The PBSO also administers the Peacebuilding Fund and provides support to the Secretary General's efforts
regarding the coordination of peacebuilding activities. In September 2014, the Secretary General appointed
Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, from Argentina, as Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support.

The PBSO comprises three branches: the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, the Policy, Planning and
Application Branch and the Financing for Peacebuilding Branch.

The Peacebuilding Commission takes its first steps[edit]

In its first year of operations, the Commission focused its attention on Burundi and Sierra Leone.[9]

In Burundi, the PBC and the Government of Burundi agreed on four critical peacebuilding areas to form the
basis of a strategic framework: promoting good governance, strengthening the rule of law, reform of the
security sector, and ensuring community recovery with a special focus on youth.

In Sierra Leone, the PBC and national partners identified reform of the justice and security sectors, youth
employment and empowerment, and capacity-building in governance institutions as key priorities. Effective
partnership between national and international actors helped ensure that recent elections in Sierra Leone
were conducted in a peaceful, orderly and genuinely contested manner.

The 2010 elections in Burundi were more problematic. Allegations of fraud in an earlier local poll marred the
June 2010 presidential election, in which incumbent Pierre Nkurunziza was the only candidate, after the
country's opposition parties pulled out of the campaign. [10]
According to the constituting resolutions of the PBC, the further inclusion of a situation in the PBC agenda,
that is as well part of the Security Council's agenda, would need formal action of the members of the council.
In this regard, the council has adopted the practice of issuing a letter to the president of the PBSO to request
the consideration of other countries as part of the PBC agenda. Once a country-situation has been put under
the consideration of the PBC, it should remain as part of the agenda for several years, or until the
peacebuilding phase is considered to be completed. Currently the agenda of the PBC includes the situation in
Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic. The six cases in the
agenda of the PBC and the overall progress achieved since the establishment of the Commission reveal the
complexity in relying on peacebuilding efforts, as well as the coexistence of several factors within this
process, including the ability of the PBC and its different Configurations to engage with the host government,
as well as civil society and important stakeholders on the ground, in the conduction and implementation of
coordinated actions. Besides, there are several factors largely dependent on the Security Council's
substantive engagement on each situation, including the need of regular interactions with the PBC and its
Configurations.

The Peacebuilding Commission's expanding role in the UN

system[edit]
PGA High-level dialogue on sustainable development and sustaining peace in
2017[edit]
In January 2017, the President of the General Assembly convened a high-level dialogue on sustainable
development and sustaining peace, in which brought together the President of the General Assembly, the
President of the Security Council, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Chair of the
Peacebuilding Commission for the first time to promote coordination and coherence across peace and
development efforts. The Human Rights Council also considered the links between peacebuilding and human
rights at its thirty-fourth session. Such initiatives have built upon the regular exchanges held by the
Peacebuilding Commission with the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council. [11]

PGA high-level meeting on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in 2018 [edit]

The President of the General Assembly will convene the High-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining
Peace on 24 and 25 April 2018.[12]

Briefing on the high-level event to the Peacebuilding Commission, the President of the General Assembly
stressed that "Again and again, we have reaffirmed the role for the PBC as one of the UN’s most valuable
tools for Sustaining Peace. This was clear, during the review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, in 2015. It was
clear, through the adoption of the twin resolutions on Sustaining Peace, a year later. And, it is clear, again,
from the recent report of the Secretary-General."[13]

An Independent Look at the Peacebuilding Commission [edit]

In 2010, the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting and the Stanley Foundation sent an independent journalist to
visit the PBC's four agenda countries. The journalistic investigation suggested that the PBC's greatest strength
was in its creation and execution of a political mandate for its work.[14] Among its weaknesses were in its
open-ended funding mechanism.
 Russo-Ukrainian War
The Russo-Ukrainian War[c] is an ongoing international conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began in
February 2014.[d] Following Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and
supported pro-Russian separatists fighting the Ukrainian military in the Donbas war. The first eight years of
conflict also included naval incidents, cyberwarfare, and heightened political tensions. In February 2022,
Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and began occupying more of the country.

In early 2014, the Euromaidan protests led to the Revolution of Dignity and the ousting of Ukraine's pro-
Russian president Viktor Yanukovych. Shortly after, pro-Russian unrest erupted in eastern and southern
Ukraine. Simultaneously, unmarked Russian troops moved into Ukraine's Crimea and took over government
buildings, strategic sites and infrastructure. Russia soon annexed Crimea after a highly disputed referendum.
In April 2014, Russian-backed separatist forces seized government buildings in Ukraine's eastern Donbas
region and proclaimed the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) as
independent states, starting the Donbas war. The separatists received considerable but covert support from
Russia, and Ukrainian attempts to fully retake separatist-held areas failed. Although Russia denied
involvement, Russian troops took part in the fighting. In February 2015, Russia and Ukraine signed the Minsk
II agreements to end the conflict, but they were never fully implemented in the years that followed. The
Donbas war settled into a violent but static conflict between Ukraine and the Russian and separatist forces,
with many brief ceasefires but no lasting peace and few changes in territorial control.

Beginning in 2021, Russia built up a large military presence near its border with Ukraine, including within
neighbouring Belarus. Russian officials repeatedly denied plans to attack Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir
Putin criticized the enlargement of NATO and demanded that Ukraine be barred from ever joining the
military alliance. He also expressed irredentist views and questioned Ukraine's right to exist. Russia
recognized the DPR and LPR as independent states in February 2022. Putin announced a "special military
operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine, claiming Russia had no plans to occupy the country.
Russian forces invaded Ukraine. The invasion was internationally condemned; many countries imposed
sanctions against Russia and increased existing sanctions. In the face of fierce resistance, Russia abandoned
an attempt to take Kyiv in early April 2022. From August, Ukrainian forces began recapturing territories in the
north-east and south. In late September, Russia declared the annexation of four partially-occupied regions of
Ukraine, which was internationally condemned. Russia spent the winter conducting inconclusive offensives in
the Donbas. In spring 2023, Russia dug into positions ahead of another Ukrainian counteroffensive, which
failed to gain significant ground. The war has resulted in a refugee crisis and tens of thousands of deaths.

Background
Main article: Russia–Ukraine relations
See also: Historical background of the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine

Independent Ukraine and the Orange Revolution

Further information: Orange Revolution
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine and Russia maintained close ties. In 1994,
Ukraine agreed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-
weapon state.[4] Former Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine were removed and dismantled.[5] In return, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to uphold the territorial integrity and political
independence of Ukraine through the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.[6][7] In 1999, Russia was
one of the signatories of the Charter for European Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and
every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of
alliance, as they evolve."[8] In the years after the dissolution of the USSR, several former Eastern Bloc
countries joined NATO, partly in response to regional security threats involving Russia such as the 1993
Russian constitutional crisis, the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Putin
claimed Western powers broke promises not to let any Eastern European countries join. [9][10]

Protesters in Independence Square in Kyiv during the Orange Revolution,

November 2004

The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was controversial. During the election campaign, opposition
candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned by TCDD dioxin;[11][12] he later accused Russia of involvement. [13] In
November, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner, despite allegations of vote-rigging by
election observers.[14] During a two-month period which became known as the Orange Revolution, large
peaceful protests successfully challenged the outcome. After the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the
initial result due to widespread electoral fraud, a second round re-run was held, bringing to power
Yushchenko as president and Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister, and leaving Yanukovych in opposition. [15]
The Orange Revolution is often grouped together with other early-21st century protest movements,
particularly within the former USSR, known as colour revolutions. According to Anthony Cordesman, Russian
military officers viewed such colour revolutions as attempts by the US and European states to destabilise
neighbouring countries and undermine Russia's national security. [16] Russian President Vladimir Putin accused
organisers of the 2011–2013 Russian protests of being former advisors to Yushchenko, and described the
protests as an attempt to transfer the Orange Revolution to Russia. [17] Rallies in favour of Putin during this
period were called "anti-Orange protests".[18]

At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. The response among NATO
members was divided; Western European countries opposed offering Membership Action Plans (MAP) in
order to avoid antagonising Russia, while US President George W. Bush pushed for their admission.[19] NATO
ultimately refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but also issued a statement agreeing that "these
countries will become members of NATO" at some point. Putin voiced strong opposition to Georgia and
Ukraine's NATO membership bids.[20] By January 2022, the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remained
remote.[21]

In 2009, Yanukovych announced his intent to again run for president in the 2010 Ukrainian presidential
election,[22] which he subsequently won.[23] In November 2013, a wave of large, pro-European Union (EU)
protests erupted in response to Yanukovych's sudden decision not to sign the EU–Ukraine Association
Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. On 22 February 2013 the
Ukrainian parliament had overwhelmingly approved of finalizing the agreement with the EU, [24] subsequent to
which Russia had put pressure on Ukraine to reject it using the threat of sanctions, with Kremlin adviser
Sergei Glazyev pronouncing that if the agreement was signed Russia could not guarantee Ukraine's status as
a state.[25][26]

Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and pro-Russian unrest

Main articles: Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine
Following months of protests as part of the Euromaidan movement, on 21 February 2014 Yanukovych and
the leaders of the parliamentary opposition signed a settlement agreement that called for early elections.
The following day, Yanukovych fled from the capital ahead of an impeachment vote that stripped him of his
powers as president.[27][28][29][30] On 23 February, the Rada adopted a bill to repeal the 2012 law which gave the
Russian language an official status.[31] The bill was not enacted;[32] however, the proposal provoked negative
reactions in the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine,[33] intensified by Russian media saying that the ethnic
Russian population was in imminent danger.[34]

On 27 February, an interim government was established and early presidential elections were scheduled. The
following day, Yanukovych resurfaced in Russia and in a press conference declared that he remained the
acting president of Ukraine, just as Russia was beginning its overt military campaign in Crimea. Leaders of
Russian-speaking eastern regions of Ukraine declared continuing loyalty to Yanukovych, [28][35] causing the 2014
pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine.

Russian military bases in Crimea

Main article: Political status of Crimea
At the onset of the conflict, Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel in the Black Sea Fleet,[34] in several
locations in the Crimean peninsula like Sevastopol, Kacha, Hvardiiske, Simferopol Raion, Sarych, and others.
In 2005 a dispute broke out over control of the Sarych cape lighthouse near Yalta, and a number of other
beacons.[36][37] Russian presence was allowed by the basing and transit agreement with Ukraine. Under the
agreements the Russian military in Crimea was constrained to a maximum of 25,000 troops; they were
required to: respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, honor its legislation, not interfere in the internal affairs of
the country, and show their "military identification cards" when crossing the international border. [38] Early in
the conflict, the agreement's sizeable troop limit allowed Russia to significantly reinforce its military presence
under the plausible guise of security concerns, deploy special forces and other required capabilities to
conduct the operation in Crimea.[34]

According to the original treaty on the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet signed in 1997, Russia was
allowed to have its military bases in Crimea until 2017, after which it would evacuate all military units
including its portion of the Black Sea Fleet out of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. On 21
April 2010, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych signed a new deal known as the Kharkiv Pact, to
resolve the 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute; it extended the stay to 2042 with an option to renew. [39]

Legality and declaration of war

Further information: On conducting a special military operation
No formal declaration of war has been issued in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. When Putin announced
the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, he claimed to commence a "special military operation", side-stepping a
formal declaration of war.[40] The statement was, however, regarded as a declaration of war by the Ukrainian
government[41] and reported as such by many international news sources. [42][43] While the Ukrainian parliament
refers to Russia as a "terrorist state" in regard to its military actions in Ukraine, [44] it has not issued a formal
declaration of war on its behalf.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine violated international law (including the Charter of the United
Nations).[52][53][54][55] The invasion has also been called a crime of aggression under international criminal law[56]
and under some countries' domestic criminal codes – including those of Ukraine and Russia – although
procedural obstacles exist to prosecutions under these laws. [57][58]

History
Russian annexation of Crimea (2014)
For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

The Russian military buildup along Ukraine's eastern border in February–March

2014 The blockade of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the

capture of Crimea by Russia in February–March 2014 Russian troops blocking the

Ukrainian military base in Perevalne

On 20 February 2014, Russia began an annexation of Crimea.[59][60][61][62] On 22 and 23 February, in the relative
power vacuum immediately after the ousting of Yanukovych, [63] Russian troops and special forces began
moving into Crimea through Novorossiysk.[61] On 27 February, Russian forces without insignias began their
advance into the Crimean Peninsula.[64] They took strategic positions and captured the Crimean Parliament,
raising a Russian flag. Security checkpoints isolated the Crimean Peninsula from the rest of Ukraine and
restricted movement within the territory. [65][66][67][68]

In the following days, Russian soldiers secured key airports and a communications center. [69] Russian
cyberattacks shut down websites associated with the Ukrainian government, news media, and social media.
Cyberattacks also enabled Russian access to the mobile phones of Ukrainian officials and members of
parliament, further disrupting communications. [70]

On 1 March, the Russian legislature approved the use of armed forces, leading to an influx of Russian troops
and military hardware into the peninsula.[69] In the following days, all remaining Ukrainian military bases and
installations were surrounded and besieged, including the Southern Naval Base. After Russia formally
annexed the peninsula on 18 March, Ukrainian military bases and ships were stormed by Russian forces. On
24 March, Ukraine ordered troops to withdraw; by 30 March, all Ukrainian forces had left the peninsula.

On 15 April, the Ukrainian parliament declared Crimea a territory temporarily occupied by Russia.[71] After the
annexation, the Russian government increased its military presence in the region and made nuclear
threats.[72] Putin said that a Russian military task force would be established in Crimea. [73] In November, NATO
stated that it believed Russia was deploying nuclear-capable weapons to Crimea.[74] Since the annexation of
Crimea, certain NATO members have been providing training for the Ukrainian army. [75]

War in the Donbas (2014–2015)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the war in Donbas (2014).
See also: Combatants of the war in Donbas (2014–2022) and List of equipment used by Russian people's
militias in Ukraine

Ukrainian troops deploy in response to Russian maneuvers. Early March 2014.

Pro-Russia unrest
Main article: 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine
From late February 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups took place in major
cities across the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.[76] The first protests across southern and eastern
Ukraine were largely native expressions of discontent with the new Ukrainian government. [76][77] Russian
involvement at this stage was limited to voicing support for the demonstrations. [77][78] Russia exploited this,
however, launching a coordinated political and military campaign against Ukraine. [77][79] Putin gave legitimacy
to the separatists when he described the Donbas as part of "New Russia" (Novorossiya), and expressed
bewilderment as to how the region had ever become part of Ukraine. [80]
Russia continued to marshal forces near Ukraine's eastern border in late March, reaching 30–40,000 troops
by April.[81][34] The deployment was used to threaten escalation and disrupt Ukraine's response. [34] This threat
forced Ukraine to divert forces to its borders instead of the conflict zone. [34]

Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local separatist leaders in early
March. Those leaders were replaced by people with ties to the Russian security services and interests in
Russian businesses.[82] By April 2014, Russian citizens had taken control of the separatist movement,
supported by volunteers and materiel from Russia, including Chechen and Cossack fighters.[83][84][85][86] According
to Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) commander Igor Girkin, without this support in April, the movement
would have dissipated, as it had in Kharkiv and Odesa.[87] The separatist groups held disputed referendums in
May,[88][89][90] which were not recognised by Ukraine or any other UN member state. [88]

Armed conflict

Ukrainian response to Russian activities in Donbas after seizure of Sloviansk on 12

April. April–May 2014.

In April, armed conflict began in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatist forces and Ukraine. The
separatists declared the People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. From 6 April, militants occupied
government buildings in many cities and took control of border crossings to Russia, transport hubs, a
broadcasting center, and other strategic infrastructure. On 12 April several armed groups took cities of
Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and then Horlivka, Druzhkivka in subsequent days. They were led by people like retired
Russian colonel Igor Girkin and lieutenant colonel Igor Bezler. Faced with continued expansion of separatist
territorial control, on 15 April the interim Ukrainian government launched an "Anti-Terrorist Operation"
(ATO); however, Ukrainian forces were poorly prepared and ill-positioned and the operation quickly stalled. [91]

By the end of April, Ukraine announced it had lost control of the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. It
claimed to be on "full combat alert" against a possible Russian invasion and reinstated conscription to its
armed forces.[92] Through May, the Ukrainian campaign focused on containing the separatists by securing key
positions around the ATO zone to position the military for a decisive offensive once Ukraine's national
mobilization had completed.

As conflict between the separatists and the Ukrainian government escalated in May, Russia began to employ
a "hybrid approach", combining disinformation tactics, irregular fighters, regular Russian troops, and
conventional military support.[93][94][95] The First Battle of Donetsk Airport followed the Ukrainian presidential
elections. It marked a turning point in conflict; it was the first battle between the separatists and the
Ukrainian government that involved large numbers of Russian "volunteers". [96][97]: 15 According to Ukraine, at
the height of the conflict in the summer of 2014, Russian paramilitaries made up between 15% and 80% of
the combatants.[85] From June Russia trickled in arms, armor, and munitions.
On 17 July 2014, Russian-controlled forces shot down a passenger aircraft, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, as it
was flying over eastern Ukraine. [98] Investigations and the recovery of bodies began in the conflict zone as
fighting continued.[99][100][101]

By the end of July, Ukrainian forces were pushing into cities, to cut off supply routes between the two,
isolating Donetsk and attempting to restore control of the Russo-Ukrainian border. By 28 July, the strategic
heights of Savur-Mohyla were under Ukrainian control, along with the town of Debaltseve, an important
railroad hub.[102] These operational successes of Ukrainian forces threatened the existence of the DPR and LPR
statelets, prompting Russian cross-border shelling targeted at Ukrainian troops on their own soil, from mid-
July onwards.[103]

August 2014 Russian invasion

See also: Battle of Ilovaisk

June–August 2014 progression map

After a series of military defeats and setbacks for the separatists, who united under the banner of
"Novorossiya",[104][105] Russia dispatched what it called a "humanitarian convoy" of trucks across the border in
mid-August 2014. Ukraine called the move a "direct invasion". [106] Ukraine's National Security and Defence
Council reported that convoys were arriving almost daily in November (up to 9 convoys on 30 November) and
that their contents were mainly arms and ammunition. Strelkov claimed that in early August, Russian
servicemen, supposedly on "vacation" from the army, began to arrive in Donbas. [107]

By August 2014, the Ukrainian "Anti-Terrorist Operation" shrank the territory under pro-Russian control, and
approached the border.[108] Igor Girkin urged Russian military intervention, and said that the combat
inexperience of his irregular forces, along with recruitment difficulties amongst the local population, had
caused the setbacks. He stated, "Losing this war on the territory that President Vladimir Putin personally
named New Russia would threaten the Kremlin's power and, personally, the power of the president". [109]

In response to the deteriorating situation, Russia abandoned its hybrid approach, and began a conventional
invasion on 25 August 2014.[108][110] On the following day, the Russian Defence Ministry said these soldiers had
crossed the border "by accident".[111][112][113] According to Nikolai Mitrokhin's estimates, by mid-August 2014
during the Battle of Ilovaisk, between 20,000 and 25,000 troops were fighting in the Donbas on the separatist
side, and only 40–45% were "locals".[114]

On 24 August 2014, Amvrosiivka was occupied by Russian paratroopers,[115] supported by 250 armoured
vehicles and artillery pieces.[116] The same day, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko referred to the
operation as Ukraine's "Patriotic War of 2014" and a war against external aggression. [117][118] On 25 August, a
column of Russian military vehicles was reported to have crossed into Ukraine near Novoazovsk on the Azov
sea coast. It appeared headed towards Ukrainian-held Mariupol,[119][120][121][122][123] in an area that had not seen
pro-Russian presence for weeks.[124] Russian forces captured Novoazovsk.[125] and Russian soldiers began
deporting Ukrainians who did not have an address registered within the town. [126] Pro-Ukrainian anti-war
protests took place in Mariupol.[126][127] The UN Security Council called an emergency meeting.[128]

Residents of Kyiv with Sich Battalion volunteers on 26 August 2014

The Pskov-based 76th Guards Air Assault Division allegedly entered Ukrainian territory in August and engaged
in a skirmish near Luhansk, suffering 80 dead. The Ukrainian Defence Ministry said that they had seized two
of the unit's armoured vehicles near Luhansk, and reported destroying another three tanks and two
armoured vehicles in other regions.[129][130] The Russian government denied the skirmish took place, [130] but on
18 August, the 76th was awarded the Order of Suvorov, one of Russia's highest awards, by Russian minister
of defence Sergey Shoigu for the "successful completion of military missions" and "courage and heroism". [130]

The speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament and Russian state television channels acknowledged that
Russian soldiers entered Ukraine, but referred to them as "volunteers". [131] A reporter for Novaya Gazeta, an
opposition newspaper in Russia, stated that the Russian military leadership paid soldiers to resign their
commissions and fight in Ukraine in the early summer of 2014, and then began ordering soldiers into
Ukraine.[132] Russian opposition MP Lev Shlosberg made similar statements, although he said combatants from
his country are "regular Russian troops", disguised as units of the DPR and LPR. [133]

In early September 2014, Russian state-owned television channels reported on the funerals of Russian
soldiers who had died in Ukraine, but described them as "volunteers" fighting for the "Russian world".
Valentina Matviyenko, a top United Russia politician, also praised "volunteers" fighting in "our fraternal
nation".[131] Russian state television for the first time showed the funeral of a soldier killed fighting in
Ukraine.[134]

Mariupol offensive and first Minsk ceasefire

Main articles: Offensive on Mariupol (September 2014) and Minsk agreements
 A map of the line of control and buffer zone established by the Minsk Protocol on
5 September 2014

On 3 September, Poroshenko said he and Putin had reached a "permanent ceasefire" agreement. [135] Russia
denied this, denying that it was a party to the conflict, adding that "they only discussed how to settle the
conflict".[136][137] Poroshenko then recanted.[138][139] On 5 September Russia's Permanent OSCE Representative
Andrey Kelin, said that it was natural that pro-Russian separatists "are going to liberate" Mariupol. Ukrainian
forces stated that Russian intelligence groups had been spotted in the area. Kelin said 'there might be
volunteers over there.'[140] On 4 September 2014, a NATO officer said that several thousand regular Russian
forces were operating in Ukraine. [141]

On 5 September 2014, the Minsk Protocol ceasefire agreement drew a line of demarcation between Ukraine
and separatist-controlled portions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

End of 2014 and Minsk II agreement

See also: 2014 Russian cross-border shelling of Ukraine
On 7 and 12 November, NATO officials reconfirmed the Russian presence, citing 32 tanks, 16 howitzer
cannons and 30 trucks of troops entering the country. [142] US general Philip M. Breedlove said "Russian tanks,
Russian artillery, Russian air defence systems and Russian combat troops" had been sighted. [74][143] NATO said it
had seen an increase in Russian tanks, artillery pieces and other heavy military equipment in Ukraine and
renewed its call for Moscow to withdraw its forces. [144] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs stated that
Russian separatists enjoyed technical advantages over the Ukrainian army since the large inflow of advanced
military systems in mid-2014: effective anti-aircraft weapons ("Buk", MANPADS) suppressed Ukrainian air
strikes, Russian drones provided intelligence, and Russian secure communications system disrupted
Ukrainian communications intelligence. The Russian side employed electronic warfare systems that Ukraine
lacked. Similar conclusions about the technical advantage of the Russian separatists were voiced by the
Conflict Studies Research Centre. [145] In the 12 November United Nations Security Council meeting, the United
Kingdom's representative accused Russia of intentionally constraining OSCE observation missions'
capabilities, pointing out that the observers were allowed to monitor only two kilometers of border, and
drones deployed to extend their capabilities were jammed or shot down. [146][non-primary source needed]
 Pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk in May 2015. Ukraine declared the Russian-backed
separatist republics from eastern Ukraine to be terrorist organizations.[147]

In January 2015, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Mariupol represented the three battle fronts.[148] Poroshenko
described a dangerous escalation on 21 January amid reports of more than 2,000 additional Russian troops,
200 tanks and armed personnel carriers crossing the border. He abbreviated his visit to the World Economic
Forum because of his concerns.[149]

A new package of measures to end the conflict, known as Minsk II, was agreed on 15 February 2015.[150] On 18
February, Ukrainian forces withdrew from Debatlseve, in the last high-intensity battle of the Donbas war until
2022. In September 2015 the United Nations Human Rights Office estimated that 8000 casualties had
resulted from the conflict.[151]

Line of conflict stabilizes (2015–2021)

Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2015), Timeline of the war in Donbas (2016), and Timeline
of the war in Donbas (2017)
After the Minsk agreements, the war settled into static trench warfare around the agreed line of contact,
with few changes in territorial control. The conflict was marked by artillery duels, special forces operations,
and trench warfare. Hostilities never ceased for a substantial period of time, but continued at a low level
despite repeated attempts at ceasefire. In the months after the fall of Debaltseve, minor skirmishes
continued along the line of contact, but no territorial changes occurred. Both sides began fortifying their
position by building networks of trenches, bunkers and tunnels, turning the conflict into static trench
warfare.[152][153] The relatively static conflict was labelled a "frozen" by some,[154] but Russia never achieved this
as the fighting never stopped.[155][156] Between 2014 and 2022 there were 29 ceasefires, each agreed to remain
in force indefinitely. However, none of them lasted more than two weeks. [157]

US and international officials continued to report the active presence of Russian military in eastern Ukraine,
including in the Debaltseve area. [158] In 2015, Russian separatist forces were estimated to number around
36,000 troops (compared to 34,000 Ukrainian), of whom 8,500–10,000 were Russian soldiers. Additionally,
around 1,000 GRU troops were operating in the area.[159] Another 2015 estimate held that Ukrainian forces
outnumbered Russian forces 40,000 to 20,000. [160] In 2017, on average one Ukrainian soldier died in combat
every three days,[161] with an estimated 6,000 Russian and 40,000 separatist troops in the region. [162][163]
 Casualties of the war in Donbas

Cases of killed and wounded Russian soldiers were discussed in local Russian media. [164] Recruiting for Donbas
was performed openly via veteran and paramilitary organisations. Vladimir Yefimov, leader of one such
organisation, explained how the process worked in the Ural area. The organisation recruited mostly army
veterans, but also policemen, firefighters etc. with military experience. The cost of equipping one volunteer
was estimated at 350,000 rubles (around $6500) plus salary of 60,000 to 240,000 rubles per month. [165] The
recruits received weapons only after arriving in the conflict zone. Often, Russian troops traveled disguised as
Red Cross personnel.[166][167][168][169] Igor Trunov, head of the Russian Red Cross in Moscow, condemned these
convoys, saying they complicated humanitarian aid delivery. [170] Russia refused to allow OSCE to expand its
mission beyond two border crossings.[171]

The volunteers were issued a document claiming that their participation was limited to "offering
humanitarian help" to avoid Russian mercenary laws. Russia's anti-mercenary legislation defined a mercenary
as someone who "takes part [in fighting] with aims counter to the interests of the Russian Federation". [165]

In August 2016, the Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU, published telephone intercepts from 2014 of
Sergey Glazyev (Russian presidential adviser), Konstantin Zatulin, and other people in which they discussed
covert funding of pro-Russian activists in Eastern Ukraine, the occupation of administration buildings and
other actions that triggered the conflict.[172] As early as February 2014, Glazyev gave direct instructions to
various pro-Russian parties on how to take over local administration offices, what to do afterwards, how to
formulate demands, and promised support from Russia, including "sending our guys". [173][174][175]

Russian-backed separatists in May 2016

2018 Kerch Strait incident

Main article: Kerch Strait incident
See also: List of Black Sea incidents involving Russia and Ukraine and Timeline of the war in Donbas (2018)
 The Kerch Strait incident over the passage between the Black and Azov seas

Russia gained de facto control of the Kerch Strait in 2014. In 2017, Ukraine appealed to a court of arbitration
over the use of the strait. By 2018 Russia had built a bridge over the strait, limiting the size of ships that could
pass through, imposed new regulations, and repeatedly detained Ukrainian vessels.[176] On 25 November
2018, three Ukrainian boats traveling from Odesa to Mariupol were seized by Russian warships; 24 Ukrainian
sailors were detained.[177][178] A day later on 26 November 2018, the Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly
backed the imposition of martial law along Ukraine's coastal regions and those bordering Russia. [179]

2019–2020
Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2019) and Timeline of the war in Donbas (2020)

From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron,
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, France, December 2019

More than 110 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the conflict in 2019. [180] In May 2019, newly elected Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took office promising to end the war in Donbas. [180] In December 2019,
Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists began swapping prisoners of war. Around 200 prisoners were exchanged
on 29 December 2019.[181][182][183][184] According to Ukrainian authorities, 50 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in
2020.[185] Since 2019, Russia has issued over 650,000 internal Russian passports to Ukrainians.[186][187]

Russian military buildup around Ukraine (2021–2022)

Main article: Prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2021) and Timeline of the war in Donbas (2022)
From March to April 2021, Russia commenced a major military build-up near the border, followed by a
second build-up between October 2021 to February 2022 in Russia and Belarus. [188] Throughout, the Russian
government repeatedly denied it had plans to attack Ukraine. [189][190]

In early December 2021, following Russian denials, the US released intelligence of Russian invasion plans,
including satellite photographs showing Russian troops and equipment near the border. [191] The intelligence
reported a Russian list of key sites and individuals to be killed or neutralized. [192] The US released multiple
reports that accurately predicted the invasion plans. [192]
Russian accusations and demands
Further information: Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian irredentism

Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna with NATO secretary-general

Jens Stoltenberg at a conference on 10 January 2022 regarding a potential Russian invasion

In the months preceding the invasion, Russian officials accused Ukraine of inciting tensions, Russophobia, and
repressing Russian speakers. They made multiple security demands of Ukraine, NATO, and other EU
countries. On 9 December 2021 Putin said that "Russophobia is a first step towards genocide".[193][194] Putin's
claims were dismissed by the international community, [195] and Russian claims of genocide were rejected as
baseless.[196][197][198] In a 21 February speech,[199] Putin questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, repeating
an inaccurate claim that "Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood". [200] He incorrectly stated that
Vladimir Lenin had created Ukraine, by carving a separate Soviet Republic out of what Putin said was Russian
land, and that Nikita Khrushchev "took Crimea away from Russia for some reason and gave it to Ukraine" in
1954.[201]

Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian society and government were dominated by neo-Nazism, invoking the
history of collaboration in German-occupied Ukraine during World War II,[202][203] and echoing an antisemitic
conspiracy theory that cast Russian Christians, rather than Jews, as the true victims of Nazi Germany.[204][195]
Ukraine does have a far-right fringe, including the neo-Nazi linked Azov Battalion and Right Sector.[205][203]
Analysts described Putin's rhetoric as greatly exaggerated. [206][202] Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, stated that his
grandfather served in the Soviet army fighting against the Nazis;[207] three of his family members were killed in
the Holocaust.[206]

A U.S. intelligence assessment map and imagery on Russian military movement

nearby the Ukrainian border, as on 3 December 2021. It assessed that Russia had deployed about 70,000 military personnel
mostly about 100–200 kilometres (62–124 mi) from the Ukrainian border, with an assessment this could be increased to
175,000 personnel. Published by The Washington Post.[208]

During the second build-up, Russia demanded a treaty that would forbid Ukraine from ever joining NATO,
and end all NATO activity in its Eastern European member states. [209] These demands were rejected.[210] A
treaty to prevent Ukraine joining NATO would go against the alliance's "open door" policy and the principle of
self-determination, although NATO made no efforts to comply with Ukraine's requests to join. [211] NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg replied that "Russia has no say" on whether Ukraine joins, and that
"Russia has no right to establish a sphere of influence to try to control their neighbors".[212] NATO offered to
improve communications with Russia and discuss missile placements and military exercises, as long as Russia
withdrew troops from Ukraine's borders, [213] but Russia did not withdraw.

Prelude to full invasion

Fighting in Donbas escalated significantly from 17 February 2022 onwards. [214] The Ukrainians and the pro-
Russian separatists each accused the other of attacks. [215][216] There was a sharp increase in artillery shelling by
the Russian-led militants in Donbas, which was considered by Ukraine and its supporters to be an attempt to
provoke the Ukrainian army or create a pretext for invasion. [217][218][219] On 18 February, the Donetsk and
Luhansk people's republics ordered mandatory emergency evacuations of civilians from their respective
capital cities,[220][221][222] although observers noted that full evacuations would take months. [223] The Russian
government intensified its disinformation campaign, with Russian state media promoting fabricated videos
(false flags) on a nearly hourly basis purporting to show Ukrainian forces attacking Russia. [224] Many of the
disinformation videos were amateurish, and evidence showed that the claimed attacks, explosions, and
evacuations in Donbas were staged by Russia.[224][225][226]

Putin's address to the nation on 21 February (English subtitles available)

On 21 February at 22:35 (UTC+3),[227] Putin announced that the Russian government would diplomatically
recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. [228] The same evening, Putin directed that Russian
troops deploy into Donbas, in what Russia referred to as a "peacekeeping mission".[229][230] On 22 February, the
Federation Council unanimously authorised Putin to use military force outside Russia. [231] In response,
Zelenskyy ordered the conscription of army reservists;[232] The following day, Ukraine's parliament proclaimed
a 30-day nationwide state of emergency and ordered the mobilisation of all reservists. [233][234][235] Russia began
to evacuate its embassy in Kyiv.[236]

On the night of 23 February,[237] Zelenskyy gave a speech in Russian in which he appealed to the citizens of
Russia to prevent war.[238][239] He rejected Russia's claims about neo-Nazis and stated that he had no intention
of attacking the Donbas.[240] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 23 February that the separatist leaders
in Donetsk and Luhansk had sent a letter to Putin stating that Ukrainian shelling had caused civilian deaths
and appealing for military support.[241]

Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022–present)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Animated map of Russia's invasion of Ukraine through 5 December 2022 (click to

play animation)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine began on the morning of 24 February 2022, [242] when Putin announced a
"special military operation" to "demilitarise and denazify" Ukraine.[243][244] Minutes later, missiles and airstrikes
hit across Ukraine, including Kyiv, shortly followed by a large ground invasion along multiple fronts. [245][246]
Zelenskyy declared martial law and a general mobilisation of all male Ukrainian citizens between 18 and 60,
who were banned from leaving the country.[247][248]

Russian attacks were initially launched on a northern front from Belarus towards Kyiv, a southern front from
Crimea, and a south-eastern front from Luhansk and Donetsk and towards Kharkiv.[249][250] In the northern
front, amidst heavy losses and strong Ukrainian resistance surrounding Kyiv, Russia's advance stalled in
March, and by April its troops retreated. On 8 April, Russia placed its forces in southern and eastern Ukraine
under the command of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, and some units withdrawn from the north were
redeployed to the Donbas.[251] On 19 April, Russia launched a renewed attack across a 500 kilometres (300 mi)
long front extending from Kharkiv to Donetsk and Luhansk. [252] By 13 May, a Ukraine counter-offensive had
driven back Russian forces near Kharkiv. By 20 May, Mariupol fell to Russian troops following a prolonged
siege of the Azovstal steel works.[253][254] Russian forces continued to bomb both military and civilian targets far
from the frontline.[255][256] The war caused the largest refugee and humanitarian crisis within Europe since the
Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s;[257][258] the UN described it as the fastest-growing such crisis since World War II. [259]
In the first week of the invasion, the UN reported over a million refugees had fled Ukraine; this subsequently
rose to over 7,405,590 by 24 September, a reduction from over eight million due to some refugees'
return.[260][261]

Ukrainian soldiers killed in the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022

Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensives in the south in August, and in the northeast in September. On
30 September, Russia annexed four oblasts of Ukraine which it had partially conquered during the
invasion.[262] This annexation was generally unrecognized and condemned by the countries of the world. [263]
After Putin announced that he would begin conscription drawn from the 300,000 citizens with military
training and potentially the pool of about 25 million Russians who could be eligible for conscription, one-way
tickets out of the country nearly or completely sold out.[264][265] The Ukrainian offensive in the northeast
successfully recaptured the majority of Kharkiv Oblast in September. In the course of the southern
counteroffensive, Ukraine retook the city of Kherson in November and Russian forces withdrew to the east
bank of the Dnieper River.[citation needed]

The invasion was internationally condemned as a war of aggression.[266][267] A United Nations General Assembly
resolution demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces, the International Court of Justice ordered Russia to
suspend military operations and the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed new
sanctions, which affected the economies of Russia and the world,[268] and provided humanitarian and military
aid to Ukraine.[269] In September 2022, Putin signed a law that would punish anyone who resists conscription
with a 10-year prison sentence[270] resulting in an international push to allow asylum for Russians fleeing
conscription.[271]

As of August 2023, the total number of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers killed or wounded during the Russian
invasion of Ukraine was nearly 500,000. [272] More than 10,000 civilians were killed during the Russian invasion
of Ukraine.[273] According to a declassified US intelligence assessment, as of December 2023, Russia had lost
315,000 of the 360,000 troops that made up Russia's pre-invasion ground force, and 2,200 of the 3,500
tanks.[274]

Human rights violations

See also: Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Humanitarian situation during the war in Donbas, and
Russian war crimes § Ukraine
Violations of human rights and atrocity crimes have both occurred during the war. From 2014 to 2021, there
were more than 3,000 civilian casualties, with most occurring in 2014 and 2015. [275] The right of movement
was impeded for the inhabitants of the conflict zone. [276] Arbitrary detention was practiced by both sides in
the first years of the conflict. It decreased after 2016 in government-held areas, while in the separatist-held
ones it continued.[277] Investigations into the abuses committed by both sides made little progress. [278][279]

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian authorities and armed forces have
committed multiple war crimes in the form of deliberate attacks against civilian targets, [280][281] massacres of
civilians, torture and rape of women and children, [282][283] and indiscriminate attacks in densely populated
areas. After the Russian withdrawal from areas north of Kyiv, overwhelming evidence of war crimes by
Russian forces was discovered. In particular, in the town of Bucha, evidence emerged of a massacre of
civilians perpetrated by Russian troops, including torture, mutilation, rape, looting and deliberate killings of
civilians.[284][285][286] the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR) has documented the murder
of at least 73 civilians – mostly men, but also women and children – in Bucha.[287] More than 1,200 bodies of
civilians were found in the Kyiv region after Russian forces withdrew, some of them summarily executed.
There were reports of forced deportations of thousands of civilians, including children, to Russia, mainly from
Russian-occupied Mariupol,[288][289] as well as sexual violence, including cases of rape, sexual assault and gang
rape,[290] and deliberate killing of Ukrainian civilians by Russian forces. [291]

Ukrainian forces have also been accused of committing various war crimes, including mistreatment of
detainees, though on a much smaller scale than Russian forces. [292][293]

Related issues
Spillover
Further information: 2014 Vrbětice ammunition warehouse explosions, 2022 missile explosion in Poland, War
in Sudan (2023), and Nuclear threats during the Russian invasion of Ukraine
This section needs expansion. You can
help by adding to it. (November 2023)

On 19 September, CNN reported that it was "likely" that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces were behind a
series of drone strikes and a ground operation directed against the Wagner-backed RSF near Khartoum on 8
September.[294] Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of
Ukraine, stated in an interview on 22 September that he could neither deny nor confirm the involvement of
Ukraine in the conflict in Sudan,[295] but said that Ukraine would punish Russian war criminals anywhere in the
world.[296]

Gas disputes
See also: Russia–Ukraine gas disputes, Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2, and Russia in the European energy sector
 Major Russian natural gas pipelines to Europe

Europe TTF natural gas

Until 2014 Ukraine was the main transit route for Russian natural gas sold to Europe, which earned Ukraine
about US$3 billion a year in transit fees, making it the country's most lucrative export service. [297] Following
Russia's launch of the Nord Stream pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine, gas transit volumes steadily
decreased.[297] Following the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2014, severe tensions extended to
the gas sector.[298][299] The subsequent outbreak of war in the Donbas region forced the suspension of a project
to develop Ukraine's own shale gas reserves at the Yuzivska gas field, which had been planned as a way to
reduce Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas imports. [300] Eventually, the EU commissioner for energy
Günther Oettinger was called in to broker a deal securing supplies to Ukraine and transit to the EU. [301]

An explosion damaged a Ukrainian portion of the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhhorod pipeline in Ivano-Frankivsk

Oblast in May 2014. Ukrainian officials blamed Russian terrorists. [302] Another section of the pipeline exploded
in the Poltava Oblast on 17 June 2014, one day after Russia limited the supply of gas to Ukrainian customers
due to non-payment. Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said the following day that the explosion had
been caused by a bomb.[303]

In 2015, Russian state media reported that Russia planned to completely abandon gas supplies to Europe
through Ukraine after 2018.[304][305] Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom had already substantially
reduced the volumes of gas transited across Ukraine, and expressed its intention to reduce the level further
by means of transit-diversification pipelines (Turkish Stream, Nord Stream, etc.). [306] Gazprom and Ukraine
agreed to a five-year deal on Russian gas transit to Europe at the end of 2019. [307][308]

In 2020, the TurkStream natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey changed the regional gas flows in
South-East Europe by diverting the transit through Ukraine and the Trans Balkan Pipeline system.[309][310]

In May 2021, the Biden administration waived Trump's CAATSA sanctions on the company behind Russia's
Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany.[311][312] Ukrainian President Zelenskyy said he was "surprised" and
"disappointed" by Joe Biden's decision.[313] In July 2021, the U.S. urged Ukraine not to criticise a forthcoming
agreement with Germany over the pipeline. [314][315]

In July 2021, Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel concluded a deal that the U.S. might trigger
sanctions if Russia used Nord Stream as a "political weapon". The deal aimed to prevent Poland and Ukraine
from being cut off from Russian gas supplies. Ukraine will get a $50 million loan for green technology until
2024 and Germany will set up a billion dollar fund to promote Ukraine's transition to green energy to
compensate for the loss of the gas-transit fees. The contract for transiting Russian gas through Ukraine will
be prolonged until 2034, if the Russian government agrees. [316][317][318]

In August 2021, Zelenskyy warned that the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany
was "a dangerous weapon, not only for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe." [319][320] In September 2021,
Ukraine's Naftogaz CEO Yuriy Vitrenko accused Russia of using natural gas as a "geopolitical weapon". [321]
Vitrenko stated that "A joint statement from the United States and Germany said that if the Kremlin used gas
as a weapon, there would be an appropriate response. We are now waiting for the imposition of sanctions on
a 100% subsidiary of Gazprom, the operator of Nord Stream 2."[322]

Hybrid warfare
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has also included elements of hybrid warfare using non-traditional means.
Cyberwarfare has been used by Russia in operations including successful attacks on the Ukrainian power grid
in December 2015 and in December 2016, which was the first successful cyber attack on a power grid, [323] and
the Mass hacker supply-chain attack in June 2017, which the US claimed was the largest known cyber
attack.[324] In retaliation, Ukrainian operations have included the Surkov Leaks in October 2016 which released
2,337 e-mails in relation to Russian plans for seizing Crimea from Ukraine and fomenting separatist unrest in
Donbas.[325] The Russian information war against Ukraine has been another front of hybrid warfare waged by
Russia.

A Russian fifth column in Ukraine has also been claimed to exist among the Party of Regions, the Communist
Party, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Russian Orthodox Church.[326][327][328]

Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns

Main articles: Russian information war against Ukraine and Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Pro-Kremlin TV and radio host Vladimir Solovyov voiced support for his country's
invasion of Ukraine.[329]

False stories have been used to provoke public outrage during the war. In April 2014, Russian news channels
Russia-1 and NTV showed a man saying he was attacked by a fascist Ukrainian gang on one channel and on
the other channel saying he was funding the training of right-wing anti-Russia radicals.[330][331] A third segment
portrayed the man as a neo-Nazi surgeon.[332] In May 2014, Russia-1 aired a story about Ukrainian atrocities
using footage of a 2012 Russian operation in North Caucasus.[333] In the same month, the Russian news
network Life presented a 2013 photograph of a wounded child in Syria as a victim of Ukrainian troops who
had just retaken Donetsk International Airport.[334]

In June 2014, several Russian state news outlets reported that Ukraine was using white phosphorus using
2004 footage of white phosphorus being used by the United States in Iraq. [333] In July 2014, Channel One
Russia broadcast an interview with a woman who said that a 3-year-old boy who spoke Russian was crucified
by Ukrainian nationalists in a fictitious square in Sloviansk that turned out to be false.[335][336][331][333]

In 2022, Russian state media told stories of genocide and mass graves full of ethnic Russians in eastern
Ukraine. One set of graves outside Luhansk was dug when intense fighting in 2014 cut off the electricity in
the local morgue. Amnesty International investigated 2014 Russian claims of mass graves filled with hundreds
of bodies and instead found isolated incidents of extrajudicial executions by both sides.[337][338][339] The Russian
censorship apparatus Roskomnadzor ordered the country's media to employ information only from Russian
state sources or face fines and blocks, [340] and ordered media and schools to describe the war as a "special
military operation".[341] On 4 March 2022, Putin signed into law a bill introducing prison sentences of up to 15
years for those who publish "fake news" about the Russian military and its operations, [342] leading to some
media outlets to stop reporting on Ukraine. [343] Russia's opposition politician Alexei Navalny said the
"monstrosity of lies" in the Russian state media "is unimaginable. And, unfortunately, so is its persuasiveness
for those who have no access to alternative information." [344] He tweeted that "warmongers" among Russian
state media personalities "should be treated as war criminals. From the editors-in-chief to the talk show
hosts to the news editors, [they] should be sanctioned now and tried someday." [345]

Putin and Russian media have described the government of Ukraine as being led by neo-Nazis persecuting
ethnic Russians who are in need of protection by Russia, despite Ukraine's President Zelenskyy being
Jewish.[346][347][338] According to journalist Natalia Antonova, "Russia's present-day war of aggression is
refashioned by propaganda into a direct continuation of the legacy of the millions of Russian soldiers who
died to stop" Nazi Germany in World War II.[348] Ukraine's rejection of the adoption of Russia-initiated General
Assembly resolutions on combating the glorification of Nazism, the latest iteration of which is General
Assembly Resolution A/C.3/76/L.57/Rev.1 on Combating Glorification of Nazism, Neo-Nazism and other
Practices that Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance, serve to present Ukraine as a pro-Nazi state, and indeed likely forms the basis for
Russia's claims, with the only other state rejecting the adoption of the resolution being the US.[349][350] The
Deputy US Representative for ECOSOC describes such resolutions as "thinly veiled attempts to legitimize
Russian disinformation campaigns denigrating neighboring nations and promoting the distorted Soviet
narrative of much of contemporary European history, using the cynical guise of halting Nazi glorification".[351]

NAFO (North Atlantic Fella Organization), a loose cadre of online shitposters vowing to fight Russian
disinformation generally identified by cartoon Shiba Inu dogs in social media, gained notoriety after June
2022, in the wake of a Twitter quarrel with Russian diplomat Mikhail Ulyanov.[352]

Russia–NATO relations
Main article: Russia–NATO relations
In his speech justifying the invasion of Ukraine, Putin falsely claimed that NATO military infrastructure was
being built up inside Ukraine and was a threat to Russia. [353] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
characterized the conflict as a proxy war started by NATO.[354] He said: "We don't think we're at war with
NATO ... Unfortunately, NATO believes it is at war with Russia". [355] NATO says it is not at war with Russia; its
official policy is that it does not seek confrontation, but rather its members support Ukraine in "its right to
self-defense, as enshrined in the UN Charter".[356] NATO and Russia had co-operated until Russia annexed
Crimea.[356] Former CIA director Leon Panetta told the ABC that the U.S. is 'without question' involved in a
proxy war with Russia.[357]

Russian military aircraft flying over the Baltic and Black Seas often do not indicate their position or
communicate with air traffic controllers, thus posing a potential risk to civilian airliners. NATO aircraft
scrambled many times to track and intercept these aircraft near alliance airspace. The Russian aircraft
intercepted never entered NATO airspace, and the interceptions were conducted in a safe and routine
manner.[358]

Reactions
Further information: International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War and List of military aid to
Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War
See also: Second Cold War

Reactions to the Russian annexation of Crimea

Main article: International reactions to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
Ukrainian response

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, Ukraine blocked the North Crimean

Canal, which provided 85% of Crimea's drinking and irrigation water.[359]

Interim Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov accused Russia of "provoking a conflict" by backing the
seizure of the Crimean parliament building and other government offices on the Crimean peninsula. He
compared Russia's military actions to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, when Russian troops occupied parts of
the Republic of Georgia and the breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were established under
the control of Russian-backed administrations. He called on Putin to withdraw Russian troops from Crimea
and stated that Ukraine will "preserve its territory" and "defend its independence". [360] On 1 March, he
warned, "Military intervention would be the beginning of war and the end of any relations between Ukraine
and Russia."[361] On 1 March, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov placed the Armed Forces of Ukraine on full
alert and combat readiness.[362]

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs was established by Ukrainian government on 20
April 2016 to manage occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea regions affected by Russian military
intervention of 2014.[363]

NATO and United States military response

Further information: Operation Atlantic Resolve, European Deterrence Initiative, NATO Enhanced Forward
Presence, and Russia–NATO relations
 A U.S. Army convoy in Vilseck, Germany during Operation Atlantic Resolve, NATO's
efforts to reassert its military presence in central and eastern Europe that began in April 2014.

On 4 March 2014, the United States pledged $1 billion in aid to Ukraine. [364] Russia's actions increased tensions
in nearby countries historically within its sphere of influence, particularly the Baltic and Moldova. All have
large Russian-speaking populations, and Russian troops are stationed in the breakaway Moldovan territory of
Transnistria.[365] Some devoted resources to increasing defensive capabilities, [366] and many requested
increased support from the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which they had joined in recent
years.[365][366] The conflict "reinvigorated" NATO, which had been created to face the Soviet Union, but had
devoted more resources to "expeditionary missions" in recent years. [367]

In addition to diplomatic support in its conflict with Russia, the U.S. provided Ukraine with US$1.5 billion in
military aid during the 2010s.[368] In 2018 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a provision blocking any
training of Azov Battalion of the Ukrainian National Guard by American forces. In previous years, between
2014 and 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed amendments banning support of Azov, but due to
pressure from the Pentagon, the amendments were quietly lifted. [369][370][371]

Financial markets

Euro/RUB exchange rate USD/Russian

Ruble Exchange Rate

Russian bonds
Inverted yield curves to tame inflation during their wars (Russo-Georgian War, Russo-Ukrainian War, 2022 Russian invasion of
Ukraine)

20 year bond
10 year bond
1 year bond
3 month bond

The initial reaction to the escalation of tensions in Crimea caused the Russian and European stock market to
tumble.[372] The intervention caused the Swiss franc to climb to a 2-year high against the dollar and 1-year high
against the Euro. The Euro and the US dollar both rose, as did the Australian dollar. [373] The Russian stock
market declined by more than 10 percent, while the Russian ruble hit all-time lows against the US dollar and
the Euro.[374][375][376] The Russian central bank hiked interest rates and intervened in the foreign exchange
markets to the tune of $12 billion[clarification needed] to try to stabilize its currency.[373] Prices for wheat and grain rose,
with Ukraine being a major exporter of both crops. [377]
Later in March 2014, the reaction of the financial markets to the Crimea annexation was surprisingly mellow,
with global financial markets rising immediately after the referendum held in Crimea, one explanation being
that the sanctions were already priced in following the earlier Russian incursion. [378] Other observers
considered that the positive reaction of the global financial markets on Monday 17 March 2014, after the
announcement of sanctions against Russia by the EU and the US, revealed that these sanctions were too
weak to hurt Russia.[379] In early August 2014, the German DAX was down by 6 percent for the year, and 11
percent since June, over concerns Russia, Germany's 13th biggest trade partner, would retaliate against
sanctions.[380]

Reactions to the war in Donbas

Further information: International reactions to the war in Donbas
Ukrainian public opinion
See also: Putin khuylo!

Pro-Russian supporters in Donetsk, 20 December 2014

A poll of the Ukrainian public, excluding Russian-annexed Crimea, was taken by the International Republican
Institute from 12 to 25 September 2014.[381] 89% of those polled opposed 2014 Russian military intervention
in Ukraine. As broken down by region, 78% of those polled from Eastern Ukraine (including Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast) opposed said intervention, along with 89% in Southern Ukraine, 93% in Central Ukraine, and 99% in
Western Ukraine.[381] As broken down by native language, 79% of Russian speakers and 95% of Ukrainian
speakers opposed the intervention. 80% of those polled said the country should remain a unitary country.[381]

A poll of the Crimean public in Russian-annexed Crimea was taken by the Ukrainian branch of Germany's
biggest market research organization, GfK, on 16–22 January 2015. According to its results: "Eighty-two
percent of those polled said they fully supported Crimea's inclusion in Russia, and another 11 percent
expressed partial support. Only 4 percent spoke out against it." [382][383][384]

A joint poll conducted by Levada and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology from September to October
2020 found that in the breakaway regions controlled by the DPR/LPR, just over half of the respondents
wanted to join Russia (either with or without some autonomous status) while less than one-tenth wanted
independence and 12% wanted reintegration into Ukraine. It contrasted with respondents in Kyiv-controlled
Donbas, where a vast majority felt the separatist regions should be returned to Ukraine. [385] According to
results from Levada in January 2022, roughly 70% of those in the breakaway regions said their territories
should become part of the Russian Federation. [386]

Russian public opinion

See also: 2014 anti-war protests in Russia
 Peace march in Moscow, 21 September 2014

An August 2014 survey by the Levada Centre reported that only 13% of those Russians polled would support
the Russian government in an open war with Ukraine. [387] Street protests against the war in Ukraine arose in
Russia. Notable protests first occurred in March[388][389] and large protests occurred in September when "tens of
thousands" protested the war in Ukraine with a peace march in downtown Moscow on Sunday, 21
September 2014, "under heavy police supervision". [390]

Reactions to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Main article: Reactions to the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Ukrainian public opinion

Ukrainian refugees in Kraków protest against the war, 6 March 2022

In March 2022, a week after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 98% of Ukrainians – including 82% of ethnic
Russians living in Ukraine – said they did not believe that any part of Ukraine was rightfully part of Russia,
according to Lord Ashcroft's polls which did not include Crimea and the separatist-controlled part of Donbas.
97% of Ukrainians said they had an unfavourable view of Russian President Vladimir Putin, with a further 94%
saying they had an unfavourable view of the Russian Armed Forces.[391]

At the end of 2021, 75% of Ukrainians said they had a positive attitude toward ordinary Russians, while in
May 2022, 82% of Ukrainians said they had a negative attitude toward ordinary Russians. [392]

Russian public opinion

Russia
Countries on Russia's "Unfriendly Countries List". The list includes countries that have imposed sanctions against Russia for its
invasion of Ukraine.[393]
An April 2022 survey by the Levada Centre reported that approximately 74% of the Russians polled supported
the "special military operation" in Ukraine, suggesting that Russian public opinion has shifted considerably
since 2014.[394] According to some sources, a reason many Russians supported the "special military operation"
has to do with the propaganda and disinformation.[395][396] In addition, it has been suggested that some
respondents did not want to answer pollsters' questions for fear of negative consequences. [397][398] At the end
of March, a poll conducted in Russia by the Levada Center concluded the following: When asked why they
think the military operation is taking place, respondents said it was to protect and defend civilians, ethnic
Russians or Russian speakers in Ukraine (43%), to prevent an attack on Russia (25%), to get rid of nationalists
and "denazify" Ukraine (21%), and to incorporate Ukraine or the Donbas region into Russia (3%)." [399]
According to polls, the Russian President's rating rose from 71% on the eve of the invasion to 82% in March
2023.[400]

The Kremlin's analysis concluded that public support for the war was broad but not deep, and that most
Russians would accept anything Putin would call a victory. In September 2023, the head of the VTsIOM state
pollster Valery Fyodorov said in an interview that only 10-15% of Russians actively supported the war, and
that "most Russians are not demanding the conquest of Kyiv or Odesa." [401]

United States
On 28 April 2022, US President Joe Biden asked Congress for an additional $33 billion to assist Ukraine,
including $20 billion to provide weapons to Ukraine. [402] On 5 May, Ukraine's Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal
announced that Ukraine had received more than $12 billion worth of weapons and financial aid from
Western countries since the start of Russia's invasion on 24 February. [403] On 21 May 2022, the United States
passed legislation providing $40 billion in new military and humanitarian foreign aid to Ukraine, marking a
historically large commitment of funds. [404][405] In August 2022, U.S. defense spending to counter the Russian
war effort exceeded the first 5 years of war costs in Afghanistan. The Washington Post reported that new U.S.
weapons delivered to the Ukrainian war front suggest a closer combat scenario with more casualties. [406] The
United States looks to build "enduring strength in Ukraine" with increased arms shipments and a record-
breaking $3 billion military aid package. [406]

Russian military suppliers

After expending large amounts of heavy weapons and munitions over months, the Russian Federation
received combat drones, loitering munitions, and large amounts of artillery from Iran, deliveries of tanks and
other armoured vehicles from Belarus, and reportedly planned to trade for artillery ammunition from North
Korea and ballistic missiles from Iran.[407][408][409][410][411]

The U.S. has accused China of providing Russia with technology it needs for high-tech weapons, allegations
which China has denied. The U.S. sanctioned a Chinese firm for providing satellite imagery to Russian
mercenary forces fighting in Ukraine. [412]

In March 2023, Western nations had pressed the United Arab Emirates to halt re-exports of goods to Russia
which had military uses, amidst allegations that the Gulf country exported 158 drones to Russia in 2022. [413] In
May 2023, the U.S. accused South Africa of supplying arms to Russia in a covert naval operation, [414]
allegations which have been denied by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa.[415]

Sudan Civil War

 The First Sudanese Civil War (also known as the Anyanya Rebellion or Anyanya I, after the name of the
rebels, a term in the Madi language which means 'snake venom')[23] was a conflict from 1955 to 1972 between
the northern part of Sudan and the southern Sudan region that demanded representation and more regional
autonomy. The war was divided into four major stages: initial guerrilla warfare, the creation of the Anyanya
insurgency, political strife within the government and establishment of the South Sudan Liberation
Movement. Around a million people died over the course of the nearly 17-year long war.

Although the Addis Ababa Agreement ended the First Sudanese Civil War 1972, it failed to completely dispel
the tensions and addressed only some of the issues stated by southern Sudan. The breakdown of the initial
appeasement later led to a reigniting of the north–south conflict during the Second Sudanese Civil War,
which lasted from 1983 to 2005.

Background[edit]
Colonial era[edit]
Until 1956, the British government, in cooperation with the Egyptian government (under a condominium
governing arrangement) administered northern and southern Sudan as separate colonies despite both
making up Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.[24] At the time, the two areas were merged into a single administrative
region after political pressure from the northern elite. [citation needed]

This act was taken without the consultation of minority southern leaders, who feared being subsumed by the
political power of the northern elite in the colonial political structure. [24] Additionally, the British colonial
administration favored the northern elite during the process of decolonization, granting them a majority of
political power during the transition to independence. [24]

After becoming independent from colonial rule in 1956, the ethnic and domestic tensions against the
southern Sudanese further escalated during the post colonial reconstruction. [25] There were national concerns
of political inequalities, economic development and insufficient institutions that remained hidden to the
international community but ravaged Sudan internally. Also, the northern government superseded the
jurisdiction of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) by committing discriminatory violence
against the southern minorities under the guise of internal turmoil of democratic growth. [

The Second Sudanese Civil War was a conflict from 1983 to 2005 between the central Sudanese government
and the Sudan People's Liberation Army. It was largely a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil War of 1955
to 1972. Although it originated in southern Sudan, the civil war spread to the Nuba mountains and the Blue
Nile. It lasted for almost 22 years and is one of the longest civil wars on record. The war resulted in the
independence of South Sudan 6 years after the war ended.

Roughly two million people died as a result of war, famine and disease caused by the conflict. Four million
people in southern Sudan were displaced at least once, normally repeatedly during the war. The civilian
death toll is one of the highest of any war since World War II[26] and was marked by numerous human rights
violations, including slavery and mass killings.

Background and causes[edit]

Further information: History of Sudan (1956–1969) and History of Sudan (1969–1985)
See also: First Sudanese Civil War
Wars in Sudan are often characterized as fights between the central government expanding and dominating
peoples of the periphery, raising allegations of marginalization. Kingdoms and great powers based along the
Nile River have fought against the people of inland Sudan for centuries. Since at least the 18th century,
central governments have attempted to regulate and exploit the undeveloped southern and inland regions of
Sudan.[27]

Some sources describe the conflict as an ethnoreligious one where the Arab-Muslim central government's
pursuits to impose Sharia law on non-Muslim southerners led to violence, and eventually to the civil
war.[28][29][30][31] Douglas Johnson has pointed to exploitative governance as the root cause. [32]

When the British governed Sudan as a colony they administered the northern and southern provinces
separately. The south was held to be more similar to the other east-African colonies – Kenya, Tanganyika, and
Uganda – while northern Sudan was more similar to Arabic-speaking Egypt. Northern Arabs were prevented
from holding positions of power in the south with its African traditions, and trade was discouraged between
the two areas. However, in 1946, the British gave in to northern pressure to integrate the two areas. Arabic
was made the language of administration in the south, and northerners began to hold positions there. The
southern elite, trained in English, resented the change as they were kept out of government. [33] After
decolonization most power was given to the northern elites based in Khartoum, causing unrest in the south.
The British moved towards granting Sudan independence, but did not invite southern Sudanese leaders to
participate in negotiations during the transitional period in the 1950s. In the post-colonial government of
1953, the Sudanization Committee had only six southerners in its 800 senior administrative positions.[32]

The second war was partially about natural resources. Between the north and the south lie significant oil
fields and thus significant foreign interests[34] (the oil revenue is privatized to Western interests as in Nigeria).
The northerners wanted to control these resources because they live on the edge of the Sahara desert, which
is unsuitable for agricultural development. Oil revenues make up about 70% of Sudan's export earnings. Due
to the numerous tributaries of the Nile river and heavier precipitation in the south of Sudan, it has superior
water access and more fertile land.

There has also been a significant amount of death from warring tribes in the south. Most of the conflict has
been between Nuer and Dinka but other ethnic groups have also been involved. These tribal conflicts
continued after independence.

The first civil war ended in 1972, with the Addis Ababa Agreement. Part of this agreement gave religious and
cultural autonomy to the south.[35] Despite this a number of mutinies by former Anyanya took place in 1974,
1975, and February 1976 with the March 1975 mutiny at Akobo seeing 200 killed, 150 soldiers executed, and
48 more sentenced to imprisonment for up to 15 years.

From 2023
A war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid
Support Forces (RSF) under Hemedti, rival factions of the military government of Sudan, began on 15 April
2023 during Ramadan. Fighting has been concentrated around the capital city of Khartoum and the Darfur
region.[35] As of 21 January 2024, at least 13,000[32]–15,000 people had been killed and 33,000 others were
injured.[33] As of 29 December 2023, over 5.8 million were internally displaced and more than 1.5 million
others had fled the country as refugees, [34] and many civilians in Darfur have been reported dead as part of
the 2023 Masalit massacres.[36]

The war began with attacks by the RSF on government sites as airstrikes, artillery, and gunfire were reported
across Sudan. The cities of Khartoum and Omdurman were divided between the two warring factions, with
al-Burhan relocating his government to Port Sudan as RSF forces captured most of Khartoum's government
buildings. Attempts by international powers to negotiate a ceasefire culminated in the Treaty of Jeddah,
which did not stop the fighting and was abandoned as ineffective.

Over the next few months a stalemate eventuated, during which the two sides were then joined by rebel
groups who had previously fought against Sudan's government. By mid-November the Minni Minnawi and
Mustafa Tambour factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement had officially joined the war in support of the
SAF, alongside the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).[3][37] In contrast the Tamazuj movement joined forces
with the RSF, while the Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North attacked
SAF positions in the south of the country.[21][38][39]

Starting in October, momentum began to swing towards the RSF once more, as the paramilitary defeated
army forces in Darfur and made gains in Khartoum State, Kordofan, and Gezira State. Further negotiations
between the warring sides have so far produced no significant results, while many countries have provided
military or political support for either al-Burhan or Hemedti.[40][41]

Background[edit]
Main article: History of Sudan
The history of conflicts in Sudan has consisted of foreign invasions and resistance, ethnic tensions, religious
disputes, and disputes over resources.[42][43] Two civil wars between the central government and the southern
regions killed 1.5 million people, and a conflict in the western region of Darfur displaced two million people
and killed more than 200,000 others.[44] Since independence in 1956, Sudan has experienced more than 15
military coups[45] and it has been ruled by the military for the majority of that time, interspersed with periods
of democratic parliamentary rule. [46][47]

War in Darfur and the formation of the RSF[edit]

By the turn of the 21st century, Sudan's western Darfur region had endured prolonged instability and social
strife due to a combination of racial and ethnic tensions and disputes over land and water. In 2003, this
situation erupted into a full-scale rebellion against government rule, against which president and military
strongman Omar al-Bashir vowed to use forceful action. The resulting War in Darfur was marked by
widespread state-sponsored acts of violence, leading to charges of war crimes and genocide against al-
Bashir.[48] The initial phase of the conflict left approximately 300,000 dead and 2.7 million were forcibly
displaced; even though the intensity of the violence later declined, the situation in the region remained far
from peaceful.[49]

To crush uprisings by non-Arab tribes in the Nuba Mountains, al-Bashir relied upon the Janjaweed, a
collection of Arab militias which was drawn from camel-trading tribes which were active in Darfur and
portions of Chad. In 2013, al-Bashir announced that the Janjaweed would be reorganized as the Rapid
Support Forces (RSF) and he also announced that the RSF would be placed under the command of the
Janjaweed's commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more commonly known as Hemedti.[50][51][52][53] The RSF
perpetrated mass killings, mass rapes, pillage, torture, and destruction of villages and were accused of
committing ethnic cleansing against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.[52] Leaders of the RSF have been indicted
for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC),[54] but
Hemedti was not personally implicated in the 2003–2004 atrocities.[49] In 2017, a new law gave the RSF the
status of an "independent security force".[52] Hemedti received several gold mines in Darfur as patronage from
al-Bashir, and his personal wealth grew substantially. [53][54] Bashir sent RSF forces to quash a 2013 uprising in
South Darfur and deployed RSF units to fight in Yemen and Libya.[51] During this time, the RSF developed a
working relationship with the Russian private military outfit Wagner Group.[55] These developments ensured
that RSF forces grew into the tens of thousands and came to possess thousands of armed pickup trucks which
regularly patrolled the streets of Khartoum. [55] The Bashir regime allowed the RSF and other armed groups to
proliferate to prevent threats to its security from within the armed forces, a practice known as "coup-
proofing".[56]

Political transition[edit]
Main article: Sudanese transition to democracy

Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.

In December 2018, protests against al-Bashir's regime began, starting the first phase of the Sudanese
Revolution. Eight months of sustained civil disobedience were met with violent repression. [57] In April 2019,
the military (including the RSF) ousted al-Bashir in a coup d'état, ending his three decades of rule; the army
established the Transitional Military Council, a junta.[53][54][57] Bashir was imprisoned in Khartoum; he was not
turned over to the ICC, which had issued warrants for his arrest on charges of war crimes.[58] Protests calling
for civilian rule continued; in June 2019, the RSF perpetrated the Khartoum massacre, in which more than a
hundred demonstrators were killed[51][53][57] and dozens were raped.[51] Hemedti denied orchestrating the
attack.[53]

In August 2019, in response to international pressure and mediation by the African Union and Ethiopia, the
military agreed to share power in an interim joint civilian-military unity government (the Transitional
Sovereignty Council), headed by a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, with elections to be held in
2023.[48][57] In October 2021, the military seized power in a coup led by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemedti. The Transitional Sovereignty Council was reconstituted as a new
military junta led by al-Burhan, monopolizing power and halting Sudan's transition to democracy. [58][59]

Origins of the SPLM-N and the SLM[edit]

The Sudan Liberation Movement (or Army; SLM, SLA, or SLM/A) is a rebel group active in Darfur, primarily
composed of members of non-Arab ethnic groups[60] and established in response to their marginalization by
the Bashir regime.[61][62] Since 2006, the movement has split into several factions due to disagreements over
the Darfur Peace Agreement, with some factions joining the government in Khartoum. [63][64][65] By 2023 the
three most prominent factions were the SLM-Minnawi under Minni Minnawi, the SLM-al-Nur under Abdul
Wahid al-Nur, and the SLM-Tambour under Mustafa Tambour. The SLM-Minnawi and SLM-Tambour signed
the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, ceasing hostilities and receiving political appointments, but the SLM-al-Nur
had refused to sign and kept fighting. [66][67]

The SPLM-N was founded by units of the predominantly South Sudanese Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army stationed in areas that remained in Sudan following the South Sudanese vote for
independence in 2011. These forces then led a rebellion in the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue
Nile a few months later.[68] In 2017, the SPLM-N split between a faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu and one led by
Malik Agar, with al-Hilu demanding secularism as a condition for peace while Agar did not agree with this. [69]
During the Sudanese Revolution, al-Hilu's faction declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire. [70] In 2020, a
peace agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and Agar's faction, [71] with Agar later joining
the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Khartoum. Al-Hilu held out until he agreed to sign a separate peace
agreement with the Sudanese government a few months after. [72] Further steps to consolidate the agreement
stalled following the 2021 coup, and the al-Hilu faction instead signed an agreement with the SLM-al-Nur and
the Sudanese Communist Party, agreeing to co-operate in order to draft a 'revolutionary charter' and remove
the military from power.[73]

Prelude[edit]
In the months after the 2021 coup the already weak Sudanese economy steeply declined, fuelling wide
protests demanding that the junta relinquish power back to civilian authorities. [74] Tensions soon arose
between the two junta leaders over al-Burhan's restoration to office of old-guard Islamist officials who had
dominated the Omar al-Bashir government. Hemedti saw the appointment of these officials as a signal that
al-Burhan was attempting to maintain the dominance of Khartoum's traditional elite over Sudanese politics.
This was a danger to the RSF's political position, as said elites were hostile to Hemedti due to his ethnic
background as a Darfuri Arab.[75] As a sign of the growing rift between him and al-Burhan, Hemedti expressed
regret over the October 2021 coup.[59]

Tensions between the RSF and the SAF began to escalate in February 2023, as the RSF began to recruit
members from across Sudan.[74] Throughout February and early March there was a military build up in the
Sudanese capital of Khartoum, however a deal was brokered on 11 March, with the RSF withdrawing its
forces from the capital.[74][76] As part of this deal negotiations were conducted between the SAF, RSF and
civilian leaders, but these were delayed and halted by political disagreements. [77] Chief among the disputes
was the integration of the RSF into the military: The RSF insisted on a 10-year timetable for its integration
into the regular army, while the army demanded integration within two years. [78][79] Other contested issues
included the status given to RSF officers in the future hierarchy, and whether RSF forces should be under the
command of the army chief rather than Sudan's commander-in-chief, who is al-Burhan.[80]

On 11 April 2023, RSF forces were deployed near the city of Merowe as well as in Khartoum.[81] Government
forces ordered them to leave, and they refused. This led to clashes when RSF forces took control of the Soba
military base south of Khartoum.[81] On 13 April, RSF forces began their mobilization, raising fears of a
potential rebellion against the junta. The SAF declared the mobilization illegal. [82]

Course of the war[edit]

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the War in Sudan (2023–present).
See also: List of engagements during the war in Sudan (2023)

Initial engagements (April–May)[edit]

Battle of Khartoum begins[edit]
Main article: Battle of Khartoum (2023-present)
On 15 April 2023, the RSF attacked SAF bases across Sudan, including Khartoum and its airport.[78][83] There
were clashes at the headquarters of the state broadcaster, Sudan TV, which was later captured by RSF
forces.[84] Bridges and roads in Khartoum were closed, and the RSF claimed that all roads heading south of
Khartoum were closed.[85] The next day saw a SAF counteroffensive, with the army retaking Merowe Airport
alongside the headquarters of Sudan TV and the state radio. [86][87]

The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority closed the country's airspace as fighting began. [88] Telecommunications
provider MTN shut down Internet services, and by 23 April there was a near-total Internet outage across
Sudan. This was attributed to electricity shortages caused by attacks on the electric grid. [89][90] Sudanese
international trade began to break down, with Maersk, one of the largest shipping companies in the world,
announcing a pause on new shipments to the country. [91]
 With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, his deputy Malik Agar became de facto
leader of the Sudanese government.[66]

Hemedti directed his forces to capture or kill al-Burhan, and RSF units engaged in pitched and bloody combat
with the Republican Guard. Ultimately al-Burhan managed to evade capture or assassination, but his base at
the Sudanese Armed Forces Headquarters was eventually placed under RSF siege, rendering him unable to
leave Khartoum.[66][92] In an interview with Al Jazeera, Hemedti accused al-Burhan and his commanders of
forcing the RSF to start the war by scheming to bring deposed leader Omar al-Bashir back to power.[93] He
called for the international community to intervene against al-Burhan, claiming that the RSF was fighting
against radical Islamic militants.[94]

Following the first few days of war the SAF brought in reinforcements from the Ethiopian border. [95] Although
a ceasefire was announced for Eid al-Fitr, fighting continued across the country.[96][97] Combat was described as
particularly intense along the highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan and in the industrial zone of al-Bagair.[98]
Intercommunal clashes were reported in Blue Nile State and in Geneina.[99][100]

By the beginning of May the SAF claimed to have weakened the RSF's combat capabilities and repelled their
advances in multiple regions.[101] The Sudanese police deployed its Central Reserve Forces in the streets of
Khartoum in support of the SAF, claiming to have arrested several hundred RSF fighters. [102] The SAF
announced it was launching an all-out attack on RSF in Khartoum using air strikes and artillery. [103] Air strikes
and ground offensives against the RSF over the next few days caused significant damage to infrastructure,
but failed to dislodge RSF forces from their positions. [104][105]

Following further threats to his life from Hemedti, al-Burhan gave a public video address from his besieged
base at the Army Headquarters, vowing to continue fighting. [106][107] On 19 May, al-Burhan officially removed
Hemedti as his deputy in the Transitional Sovereignty Council and replaced him with former rebel leader and
council member Malik Agar.[108] With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, Agar became de facto leader of the
Sudanese government, assuming responsibility for peace negotiations, international visits and the day-to-day
running of the country.[66]

Treaty of Jeddah[edit]
Main article: Treaty of Jeddah (2023)
International attention to the conflict resulted in the United Nations Human Rights Council calling a special
session to address the violence, voting to increase monitoring of human rights abuses. [109] On 6 May,
delegates from the SAF and the RSF met directly for the first time in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia for what was
described by Saudi Arabia and the United States as "pre-negotiation talks".[110] After diplomatic lobbying from
the Saudis and Americans the warring sides signed the Treaty of Jeddah on 20 May, vowing to ensure the
safe passage of civilians, protect relief workers, and prohibit the use of civilians as human shields.[111] The
agreement did not include a ceasefire, and clashes resumed in Geneina, causing more casualties.[111] The
United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths expressed frustration at
the lack of commitment from both sides to end the fighting.[112]

The situation remained volatile, with both sides trading blame for attacks on churches, [113] hospitals,[114] and
embassies.[115] Casualties mounted, particularly in Geneina, where Arab militias loyal to the RSF were accused
of atrocities against non-Arab residents.[116] A temporary ceasefire was signed and faced challenges as fighting
persisted in Khartoum, and the agreed-upon ceasefire time saw further violence. [117] Between 28 and 97
people were reportedly killed by the RSF and Arab militias when they attacked the predominantly Masalit
town of Misterei in West Darfur on 28 May.[118]

Summer stalemate (June–September)[edit]

The RSF took control of the National Museum of Sudan in June.

Continued fighting in Khartoum [edit]

As June began, Khartoum witnessed tank battles resulting in casualties and injuries. [119][120] The RSF took control
of several important cultural and government buildings, including the National Museum of Sudan and the
Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex.[121][122] Acute food insecurity affected a significant portion of Sudan's
population.[123]

Come July al-Burhan was still trapped at the Army Headquarters and unable to leave, and in order to break
him out the SAF elected to send a column of troops to lift the siege of the base. This force was ambushed by
the RSF and defeated, with the paramilitary claiming it had killed hundreds of soldiers and captured 90
vehicles, along with the column's commander. [124]

In response to the escalating violence in Khartoum the SAF increased the intensity of their airstrikes and
artillery bombardment, leading to heightened civilian casualties often numbering in the dozens per
strike.[125][126][127] Shelling by the RSF also increased in intensity, leading to many civilian casualties in turn. [128][129]

Heavy fighting continued in Khartoum throughout August, with clashes breaking out across the city. The RSF
laid siege to the SAF's Armoured Corps base, breaching its defences and taking control of surrounding
neighbourhoods.[130][131] The SAF also made offensives, with the RSF-controlled Republican Palace and Yarmouk
Complex coming under SAF air bombardment. An offensive was launched against Yarmouk, but this was
beaten back after the RSF shipped in reinforcements. [132] One of the few remaining bridges between Khartoum
and Khartoum North was also destroyed by the SAF, in an attempt to deny the RSF freedom of movement. [133]
On 24 August a SAF military operation successfully rescued al-Burhan from his besieged base at the Army
Headquarters, allowing him to head to Port Sudan and hold a cabinet meeting there.[134][135]

Diplomatic efforts[edit]
Ceasefires between the warring parties were announced but often violated, leading to further clashes. The
SAF and RSF engaged in mutual blame for incidents, while the Sudanese government took actions against
international envoys.[136] The Saudi embassy in Khartoum was attacked, and evacuations from an orphanage
were carried out amid the chaos.[137] Amidst the turmoil, Sudan faced diplomatic strains with Egypt, leading to
challenges for Sudanese refugees seeking entry. [138][139]

With al-Burhan out of Khartoum for the first time since the start of the war, he was able to fly to Egypt and
hold a meeting with the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.[140] Following this visit al-Burhan went on a
tour of numerous countries, heading to South Sudan, Qatar, Eritrea, Turkey, and Uganda. [141] He then
proceeded to New York City as head of the Sudanese delegation to the 78th United Nations General
Assembly, where he urged the international community to declare the RSF a terrorist organization. [142][143]

SPLM-N (Al-Hilu) enters the war[edit]

The Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) broke a long-
standing ceasefire agreement in June, attacking SAF units in Kadugli, Kurmuk and Dalang, the latter coinciding
with an attack by the RSF. The SAF claimed to have repelled the attacks, [38][144] while the rebels claimed to have
attacked in retaliation for the death of one of their soldiers at the hands of the SAF and vowed to free the
region from "military occupation". [70] More than 35,000 were displaced by the fighting. [70] Speculation arose as
to whether the attacks were part of an unofficial alliance between al-Hilu and the RSF or an attempt by al-
Hilu to strengthen his position in future negotiations concerning his group. [145] Civil society organizations
supporting the SPLM-N claimed its operations sought to protect civilians from possible attacks by the RSF. [146]

Al-Hilu's faction launched further offensives in July, moving into South Kordofan and gaining control of
several SAF bases.[147][148] In response the SAF brought in artillery and heavily bombarded SPLM-N positions.[147]
Further attacks by the group largely petered out after this, with an assault on Kadugli in September being
pushed back by the SAF.[149]

The Darfur Front[edit]

In Darfur fighting and bloodshed was particularly fierce around the city of Geneina, where hundreds died and
extensive destruction occurred.[150] RSF forces engaged in frequent acts of violence against the Masalit
population of Geneina, leading to accusations of ethnic cleansing.[151] On 4 August the RSF claimed that it had
taken full control over all of Central Darfur.[152]

A United Nations investigation discovered numerous mass graves in Darfur that contained Masalit civilians. [153]
The RSF and Arab militias were additionally accused of having killed lawyers, human rights monitors, doctors
and non-Arab tribal leaders.[154] The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was abducted and killed by
armed men in June, hours after accusing the RSF of genocide and calling for international intervention in a TV
interview.[155] The SAF, for their part, conducted indiscriminate airstrikes against Darfur that killed many
civilians, especially in Nyala.[156]

Tribal and rebel groups in Darfur began to declare allegiance to one or the other of the warring parties. A
faction of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mustafa Tambour (SLM-T) joined the conflict
in support of the SAF.[3] In contrast the controversial Tamazuj rebel group formally declared its alliance with
the RSF, joined by the leaders of seven Arab tribes, including that of Hemedti's. [39][157]

As September arrived both sides made offensives in Darfur. The RSF took control of several towns in West
Darfur and also attacked the market of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur.[158] SAF offensives saw success in
Central Darfur, with the army retaking parts of Zalingei from the RSF.[159] Fighting in Darfur also began to
increasingly spill over into North Kordofan, with the SAF attacking RSF positions in the state capital of El-
Obeid and clashes over the town of Um Rawaba.[160] Both sides made withdrawals to end the month, with the
RSF retreating from Um Rawaba while the SAF withdrew from Tawila.[161][162]

RSF gains momentum (October–December)[edit]

SAF collapse in Darfur[edit]

By the end of November, Al-Fashir was the last of the five state capitals in Darfur
under SAF control.

By October, the SAF in Darfur was experiencing acute shortages in supplies due to RSF-imposed sieges, and
had failed to utilize its air superiority to stem RSF advances. [163] On 26 October, the RSF captured Nyala,
Sudan's second largest city, after seizing control of the SAF's 16th Infantry Division headquarters. [164] The fall
of Nyala, a strategic city with an international airport and border connections to Central Africa, allowed the
RSF to receive international supplies more easily and concentrate its forces on other Sudanese cities. [165] After
Nyala's fall, RSF fighters turned their focus to Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur. The SAF's 21st Infantry
Division, stationed in Zalingei, fled the city without a fight and allowed the RSF to take it over. [166]

In Geneina, reports emerged that tribal elders were attempting to broker the surrender of the SAF garrison in
the city to prevent bloodshed.[167] However the army rejected the proposal, raising fears of an imminent RSF
assault on the city and compelled civilians to flee across the border into Chad. [168] The RSF besieged the
headquarters of the SAF's 15th Infantry Division in Geneina, giving the garrison a six-hour ultimatum to
surrender.[169] The base was captured two days later when the 15th withdrew from the area before fleeing to
Chad in haste.[170] Those left behind, numbering in the hundreds, were taken prisoner and paraded in RSF
media with signs of abuse.[170] Witnesses later reported of mass atrocities perpetrated by the RSF in the city
shortly after its seizure, with a local rebel group claiming up to 2,000 people were massacred in Geneina's
satellite town of Ardamata.[171] With Geneina's fall, Ed Daein and Al-Fashir were the last remaining capitals in
Darfur under government control, with both cities under heavy RSF pressure. [167][170]

The RSF stormed and plundered the town of Umm Keddada, east of Al-Fashir, after the SAF garrison
withdrew.[171] SAF troops in Al-Fashir itself were reported to be running low on food, water, and medicine due
to the city being under siege, and external forces noted the SAF seemed incapable of stopping the RSF
advance.[172][173] Ed Daein fell in the early hours of 21 November, with RSF forces taking control of the city after
seizing the headquarters of the SAF's 20th Infantry Division.[174] SAF garrisons in East Darfur subsequently
abandoned their positions and withdrew, allowing the RSF to occupy the area. [175] In response to RSF gains in
Darfur and subsequent abuses, the Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
(Minnawi), and other smaller rebel factions renounced their neutrality and declared war on the RSF.

Peace negotiations stall [edit]

Attempts by other nations and international organisations to negotiate peace had largely been dormant since
the failure of the Treaty of Jeddah, but in late October the RSF and SAF met once more in Jeddah to attempt
to negotiate peace.[177] This new round of talks was a failure, with neither side willing to commit to a ceasefire.
Instead, the warring factions agreed to open channels for humanitarian aid. [178] On 3 December negotiations
were indefinitely suspended due to the failure of both the SAF and the RSF to open up aid channels. [179]

With the failure of the talks in Jeddah, the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
hosted a peace summit in early December. Earlier attempts by IGAD to open negotiations had floundered
after the SAF had accused Kenyan President William Ruto of supporting the RSF.[180] IGAD's talks appeared to
make more progress than the Jeddah negotiations, with Hemedti and al-Burhan agreeing to meet in person
at some point in the future.[181]

The RSF cross the Nile[edit]

Further information: Battle of Wad Madani
The RSF attacked the town of Wad Ashana in North Kordofan on 1 October, along a key commercial
route.[182][183] In West Kordofan, an uptick in fighting was reported, with the RSF assaulting a "vital" oil field in
Baleela, south of Al-Fulah.[184] Geolocated footage showed RSF fighters celebrating around Baleela Airport
after allegedly capturing it.[185] The Battle of Khartoum continued with the RSF seizing the town of al-Aylafoun,
southeast of the capital, on 6 October. In the process, the paramilitary gained control of key oil
infrastructure.[186][187] By late October the RSF controlled most of Khartoum but had failed to seize key military
bases, while al-Burhan's government had largely relocated to Port Sudan. [188]

The Shambat Bridge in Khartoum was destroyed on 11 November.[189]

The RSF sought to capitalize on its gains by stepping up attacks on SAF positions in Khartoum and Omdurman.
Days of fighting eventually culminated in the destruction of the Shambat Bridge, which connected Khartoum
North to Omdurman over the Nile, severing a critical RSF supply chain. [189] This effectively cut the RSF off from
its forces in Omdurman, giving the SAF a strategic advantage. [190] In an attempt to gain a new crossing over the
Nile and supply its forces in Omdurman, the RSF launched an assault on the Jebel Aulia Dam in the village of
Jabal Awliya.[191] As Jebel Aulia could not be destroyed without flooding Khartoum, its capture would give the
RSF a path over the Nile the SAF could not easily remove. A week-long battle commenced over the dam and
its surrounding village, which ended in an RSF victory. The force captured the dam on 20 November, all SAF
resistance ceasing in the village the following day. [192][193]

On 5 December, local militias along with RSF soldiers attacked SPLM-N (al-Hilu) forces in the village of Tukma,
southeast of Dalang in South Kordofan, resulting in the deaths of 4 people and the destruction of the
village.[22] The RSF leadership, not wanting hostilities with the neutral al-Hilu faction to escalate, issued a
statement condemning this attack and denouncing it as "tribal violence". [194] On 8 December, the RSF entered
Gedaref State for the first time.[194]
Pushing south from their gains around Jebel Aulia and Khartoum, RSF forces began to move into Gezira State
on 15 December, advancing towards its capital Wad Madani.[195][196] Elsewhere in Gezira the RSF made major
gains, taking control of the city of Rufaa in the state's east and entering the Butana region.[197] After several
days of fighting the RSF seized the Hantoob Bridge on Wad Madani's eastern outskirts, crossing the Blue Nile
and entering the city.[197] The army put up little resistance in Wad Madani itself, the 1st Division withdrawing
from the city as the RSF took over. [198]

The fall of Wad Madani was viewed as a major blow to the SAF, as it dramatically widened the frontline and
opened up large parts of the country to potential RSF offensives.[198] The city's fall allowed the RSF to capture
most of Gezira and to make inroads in White Nile State, capturing the town of El Geteina.[199] Within a few
days RSF fighters had advanced to within 25 km of Sennar, the largest city in Sennar State.[199] Over the next
few weeks RSF forces ventured into rural areas of Al Qadarif State and River Nile State, without establishing a
significant presence. In Sennar State the RSF made some further minor advances, but had not attacked
Sennar City by the year's end.[200]

Amid the deteriorating situation, the SAF was reported to be arming civilians while government officials in
the east called on the population to mobilize. [201] Al-Burhan gave a widely promoted public speech to soldiers
in Red Sea State, promising to arm civilian militias to fight the RSF and to fight against 'colonialism', which
was viewed by observers as a reference to the United Arab Emirates' support of the RSF. [202]

The new year (January 2024-present)[edit]

Hemedti travels abroad [edit]
Following the fall of Wad Madani efforts by IGAD to negotiate a ceasefire made progress, as the SAF's
weakened position made them more eager to enter talks. Whereas previously opposition from Islamist
political groups to negotiation had prevented al-Burhan from committing to a specific date, now both he and
Hemedti agreed to meet on 28 December.[198][203] However, a day before the meeting was due, the Sudanese
foreign ministry claimed that they had been contacted by IGAD informing them that the meeting was
postponed citing 'technical issues'.[204]

Instead the RSF leader went on a diplomatic tour, travelling on a chartered Emirati jet and meeting with
several African national leaders. [205] One visit that was particularly promoted was his visit to Rwanda, where
he met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame, visited the Kigali Genocide Memorial and spoke of Rwanda's
recovery from the Rwandan genocide as a model for Sudan to follow.[202] On the tour Hemedti also met with
former Prime Minister Hamdok and his Taqaddum organisation in Addis Ababa, with the RSF agreeing in a
declaration negotiated with the Taqaddum to release political prisoners, open up humanitarian aid corridors
and negotiate further with the SAF. [206] This tour was regarded by observers as an attempt by Hemedti to
portray himself as the leader of Sudan and improve his international image, as his reputation had been
severely damaged since the fall of Wad Madani due to large-scale looting by RSF fighters.[205]

On 5 January, al-Burhan vowed to continue the war against the RSF and rejected the latest peace efforts
saying "No reconciliation", citing the RSF "committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in West Darfur
and the rest of Sudan."[207]

On 14 January, both Hemedti and Burhan received official invitations from IGAD to attend its upcoming
summit on 18 January. Hemedti took to social media to confirm his attendance and show commitment for
peace,[208] while Sudan's military junta issued a statement refusing to attend the summit citing that IGAD did
not give sufficient reason to why the summit on 28 December was delayed. On 16 January Sudan suspended
its contacts with IGAD accusing IGAD of violating Sudan's sovereignty, setting a dangerous precedent and
giving the RSF legitimacy by inviting it to a meeting that will be attended by member heads of state and
government. Burhan also accused African leaders of complicity of atrocities against Sudanese civilians. His
reaction was regarded by observers to isolate Sudan politically and strain the latest peace efforts. [209]

Fighting in Kordofan and Gezira [edit]

As 2024 began the RSF made attacks into South Kordofan, defeating SAF forces in the town of Habila in the
Nuba Mountains and pushing towards Dalang.[210] On 7 January the RSF attacked SAF positions in Dalang,
meeting fierce resistance from the army and civilian militias. [202][211] During the fighting the SPLM-N (al-Hilu)
entered the city, taking control of several neighbourhoods. SPLM-N forces proceeded to attack the RSF, and
the paramilitary retreated from the city. [212] RSF fighters withdrawing from Dalang entered the city of Muglad
in West Kordofan, easily taking control as the city had no organised SAF presence. West Kordofan had been
relatively free of fighting for several months due to a local truce brokered by leaders of the Messiria tribe, but
as tensions began to escalate rumours spread that the RSF was planning an attack on the encircled city of
Babanusa and the SAF 22nd Infantry Division garrisoning it. [212]

In January 2024, the RSF focused on consolidating its gains in Gezira State. Fighting was reported on 17
January east of Al-Managal, the last major town not under RSF control. The SAF delivered weapons to the city
by helicopter, including selectively distributing them among civilians in the town, attempting to bolster its
defenses. Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) selectively recruited and armed civilians
based on perceived loyalty.[213]

On 24 January 2024, the RSF launched an attack on Babanusa after encircling the city for months. By 25
January, the RSF gained control of the city center and entered the headquarters of the 22nd infantry division.

Casualties[edit]
Further information: War crimes during the War in Sudan (2023–present)
As of January 2024, around 13,000[32]–15,000[215] people had been killed and 33,000 others injured, according
to the UN.[33] The Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed on 20 June that more than 5,000 people were killed and
about 8,000 were wounded in fighting in West Darfur alone,[216] while a Masalit tribal leader told the Sudanese
news outlet Ayin Network on 22 July that more than 10,000 people had been killed in the state. [217] On 12
June, the Sudan Doctors Syndicate said at least 959 civilians had been killed and 4,750 others were injured. [218]
On 15 August, the UN said that at least 435 children had been killed in the conflict. [219] Doctors on the ground
warned that stated figures do not include all casualties as people could not reach hospitals due to difficulties
in movement.[220] A spokesperson for the Sudanese Red Crescent was quoted as saying that the number of
casualties "was not small".[93] Sudanese prosecutors recorded over 500 missing persons cases across the
country, some of which were enforced disappearances, and were mostly blamed on the RSF. [221]

Darfur[edit]
In Geneina, West Darfur, ethnic clashes that began in the last week of April had killed at least 1,100
people,[222] while the Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed that more than 5,000 people were killed and about
8,000 were wounded in the city.[216] In July, a Masalit tribal leader claimed that more than 10,000 people had
been killed in West Darfur alone, and that 80% of Geneina's residents had fled. [217]
Massacres were recorded in towns such as Tawila[223] and Misterei,[118] while a mass grave was discovered in
Geneina containing the bodies of 87 people killed in clashes. [153] Several intellectuals, politicians, professionals
and nobility were assassinated. Most of these atrocities were blamed on the RSF and allied Arab militias. The
UK government,[224] witnesses and other observers described the violence in the region as tantamount to
ethnic cleansing or even genocide, with non-Arab groups such as the Masalit being the primary victims.[223]
Mujeebelrahman Yagoub, Assistant Commissioner for Refugees in West Darfur called the violence worse than
the War in Darfur in 2003 and the Rwandan genocide in 1994.[225]

Sexual violence[edit]
Main article: War crimes during the War in Sudan (2023–present) § Sexual violence
In July, authorities reported at least 88 cases of sexual assault on women across the country, most of them
blamed on the RSF.[226] NGOs estimated that the figure could possibly reach 4,400. [227] Activist Hala al-Karib
stated that war rape had become an everyday occurrence with both fighting parties participating. [228]

Casualties among humanitarian workers [edit]

In the Battle of Kabkabiya, three employees of the World Food Programme (WFP) were killed after being
caught in the crossfire at a military base. Two other staff members were injured. [229] On 18 April, the EU's top
humanitarian aid officer in Sudan, Wim Fransen of Belgium, was shot and injured in Khartoum. [230] On 21 April,
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that one of its local employees was killed in a
crossfire while traveling with his family near El-Obeid.[231] On 20 July, an 18-member team of Médecins Sans
Frontières was attacked while transporting supplies to the Turkish Hospital in south Khartoum. By then, the
World Health Organization had verified 51 attacks on medical facilities and personnel since the conflict
began, resulting in 10 deaths and 24 injuries. [232] On 25 July, Humanitarian Coordinator Clementine Nkweta-
Salami said 18 aid workers had been killed and over two dozen others were detained or unaccounted for. [233]
The conflict has led the United Nations to declare Sudan the most dangerous country in the world for
humanitarian workers after South Sudan.[234]

The situation was further compounded by attacks on humanitarian facilities, with more than 50 warehouses
looted, 82 offices ransacked, and over 200 vehicles stolen. One particularly devastating looting incident in El
Obeid in early June resulted in the loss of food "that could have fed 4.4 million people".

Attacks on journalists [edit]

The SAF and RSF are accused of threatening, attacking, and killing journalists during the conflict. The
Sudanese Journalists Syndicate documented over 40 violations in May alone. Several journalists were injured
or killed, and 13 newspapers ceased operations. Humanitarian workers were also targeted, with 18 killed and
many others detained.

Media organizations accused both the SAF and the RSF of threatening, attacking and even killing several
journalists during the conflict, with the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate documenting more than 40 such
violations during the second half of May alone. [235] Aside from the occupation of state media channels, the RSF
raided the offices of the newspapers El Hirak El Siyasi, El Madaniya and the Sudanese Communist Party's El
Midan[236] and shot and injured photojournalists Faiz Abubakr, [237] and Ali Shata,[238] while the SAF was accused
of circulating lists of journalists it accused of supporting the RSF. [239]

BBC journalist Mohamed Othman was reportedly attacked and beaten in Khartoum while a correspondent
and cameramen for the El Sharg news outlet were detained for hours near Merowe airport on the first day of
the fighting on 15 April. On 16 June, Al Jazeera journalists Osama Sayed Ahmed and Ahmed El Buseili were
shot by snipers in Khartoum,[240] while the RSF detained two of the channel's other reporters, Ahmed Fadl and
Rashid Gibril, in Khartoum on 16 May, and subsequently looted Fadl's residence. During a live report on 29
April, al-Arabiya correspondent Salem Mahmoud was interrupted and questioned by the RSF. [241] On 30 June,
Radio Zalingei journalist Samaher Abdelshafee was killed by shelling at Hasaheisa refugee camp near Zalingei,
where she and her family had fled after fighting in the city. [242] Sudan TV photographer Esam Marajan was shot
dead inside his home in the Beit El Mal neighborhood of Omdurman in the first week of August. [243] Sports
photojournalist Esam El Haj was killed during clashes around the Al-Shajara garrison in Khartoum on 20
August.[244] Halima Idris Salim, a reporter for Sudan Bukra was killed on 10 October after she was reportedly
struck by an RSF vehicle while covering the fighting in Omdurman. [245]

The Sudanese Journalists Syndicate (SJS) reported on 10 August that 13 newspapers had ceased operations
due to the conflict, while FM radio stations and channels also halted broadcasts, with journalists grappling
with unpaid wages.[246] It later reported in December that the RSF had turned the premises of the Sudan
Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) into a detention center and was involved in the looting of other media
outlets, including the BBC's Khartoum branch, and the sale of media equipment, including that of the SBC, in
markets in Omdurman.[247]

Foreign casualties [edit]

Foreign casualties in the 2023 war in Sudan

Country Deaths Ref.

Ethiopia 15 [248]

Syria 15 [249]

Democratic Republic of the Congo 10 [250]

Eritrea 9 [251]

Egypt 2 [252]

United States 2 [253]

India 1 [254]

Turkey 1 [255]

Civilians, including 15 Syrians, [249] 15 Ethiopians[248] and 9 Eritreans[251] have been killed across the country. An
Indian national working in Khartoum died after being hit by a stray bullet on 15 April. [254] Two Americans were
killed, including a professor working in the University of Khartoum who was stabbed to death while
evacuating.[253][256] A two-year-old girl from Turkey was killed while her parents were injured after their house
was struck by a rocket on 18 April. [255] Two Egyptian doctors were killed in their home in Khartoum and had
their possessions stolen on 13 June.[252] Ten students from the Democratic Republic of the Congo were killed
in an SAF airstrike on the International University of Africa in Khartoum on 4 June.[250] The SAF claimed that
the Egyptian assistant military attaché was killed by RSF fire while driving his car in Khartoum, which was
refuted by the Egyptian ambassador.[257]

Two Greek nationals trapped in a church on 15 April sustained leg injuries when caught in crossfire while
trying to leave.[258][259] A Filipino migrant worker[260] and an Indonesian student at a school in Khartoum were
injured by stray bullets.[261] On 17 April, the European Union Ambassador to Sudan, Aidan O'Hara of Ireland,
was assaulted by unidentified "armed men wearing military fatigues" in his home, he suffered minor injuries
and was able to resume working on 19 April. [262][263] On 23 April, a French evacuation convoy was shot at,
injuring one person.[264] The French government later confirmed the casualty to be a French soldier. [265] An
employee of the Egyptian embassy was shot and injured during an evacuation mission.

Foreign involvement[edit]
Egypt[edit]
On 16 April, the RSF claimed that its troops in Port Sudan were attacked by foreign aircraft and issued a
warning against any foreign interference. [272] According to former CIA analyst Cameron Hudson, Egyptian
fighter jets were a part of these bombing campaigns against the RSF, and Egyptian special forces units have
been deployed and are providing intelligence and tactical support to the SAF. [273] The Wall Street Journal said
that Egypt had sent fighter jets and pilots to support the Sudanese military. [274] On 17 April, satellite imagery
obtained by The War Zone revealed that one Egyptian Air Force MiG-29M2 fighter jet had been destroyed
and two others had been damaged or destroyed at Merowe Airbase. A Sudanese Air Force Guizhou JL-9 was
among the destroyed aircraft.[275] After initial confusion, the RSF accepted the explanation that Egyptian
combat and support personnel were conducting exercises with the Sudanese military prior to the outbreak of
hostilities.[78]

Egyptian POWs[edit]
On 15 April, RSF forces claimed, via Twitter, to have taken Egyptian troops prisoner near Merowe,[276][277] and a
military plane carrying markings of the Egyptian Air Force.[278] Initially, no official explanation was given for the
Egyptian soldiers' presence, while Egypt and Sudan have had military cooperation due to diplomatic tensions
with Ethiopia.[7] Later on, the Egyptian Armed Forces stated that around 200 of its soldiers were in Sudan to
conduct exercises with the Sudanese military.[78] Around that time, the SAF reportedly encircled RSF forces in
Merowe airbase. As a result, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that it was following the situation as a
precaution for the safety of its personnel. [93][279][better source needed] The RSF later stated that it would cooperate in
repatriating the soldiers to Egypt. [278] On 19 April, the RSF stated that it had moved the soldiers to Khartoum
and would hand them over when the "appropriate opportunity" arose. [280] One hundred and seventy-seven of
the captured Egyptian troops were released and flown back to Egypt aboard three Egyptian military planes
that took off from Khartoum airport later in the day. The remaining 27 soldiers, who were from the Egyptian
Air Force, were sheltered at the Egyptian embassy and later evacuated. [281][282]

United Arab Emirates [edit]

A report published by the Wall Street Journal on 10 August quoted Ugandan officials as saying that an Emirati
plane on a stopover at Entebbe Airport en route to Amdjarass International Airport in eastern Chad turned
out upon inspection to have been carrying dozens of green plastic crates in the plane's cargo hold filled with
ammunition, assault rifles and other small arms", rather than food and other aid officially listed on the
aircraft's manifest supposedly meant for Sudanese refugees. Despite the discovery, the plane was allowed to
take off, and the officials said they received orders from their superiors not to inspect any more planes from
the UAE. Prior to this, the UAE had long been accused of supporting the RSF. The UAE Foreign Ministry
subsequently denied the allegations, saying that the country "does not take sides" in the conflict. [283]

Officials from the US, European and African countries claimed that the UAE was running a covert operation to
back the RSF. Since June, Emirati cargo planes were identified landing in Amdjarass in Chad, where an airfield
and a hospital were being used for the operation. The UAE insisted its operation was purely humanitarian,
but officials stated that it involved supplying powerful weapons and drones to the RSF, treating their injured
fighters and airlifting serious cases to their military hospital.[284] SAF deputy commander Yasir El Atta also
claimed that the UAE was also using N'Djamena International Airport in Chad and another airport in the
Central African Republic to deliver weapons to the RSF. [285] Following these allegations, protests erupted in
Port Sudan on 1 December demanding the expulsion of the UAE's ambassador, while al-Burhan was reported
to have cancelled his participation at the COP28 summit held in Dubai.[286]

On 10 December 2023, Sudan ordered the expulsion from the country of 15 Emirati diplomats. No reason
was provided, but it came amid reports that the UAE had been providing weapons to the RSF. [287] The day
before, three Sudanese diplomats were ordered expelled from the UAE following comments made by SAF
deputy commander Yasser al-Atta during which he accused the UAE of supporting the RSF and called the
country a "mafia state".[288]

Libyan National Army [edit]

On 18 April, an SAF general claimed that two unnamed neighboring countries were trying to provide aid to
the RSF.[289] According to The Wall Street Journal, Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by United Arab
Emirates and the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group, dispatched at least one plane to fly military supplies to
the RSF.[274][when?] The Observer reported that Haftar assisted in preparing the RSF for months before the conflict
broke out.[290] The Libyan National Army, which is commanded by Haftar, denied providing support to any
warring groups in Sudan and said it was ready to play a mediating role. [291]

Wagner Group[edit]
Prior to the conflict, the UAE and the Wagner Group were involved in business deals with the RSF. [292][293][better source
needed] According to CNN, Wagner supplied surface-to-air missiles to the RSF, picking up the items from Syria

and delivering some of them by plane to Haftar-controlled bases in Libya to be then delivered to the RSF,
while dropping other items directly to RSF positions in northwestern Sudan. [294] US officials said that Wagner
was offering to supply additional weapons to the RSF from its existing stocks in the Central African
Republic.[295] On 6 September, Wagner reportedly deployed a convoy of more than 100 vehicles carrying
weapons to the RSF garrison in al-Zurug from Chad.[296] SAF deputy commander Lieutenant General Yasser al-
Atta also accused the Wagner Group of bringing in mercenaries from Chad, Mali, Niger, the Central African
Republic, Burkina Faso, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Libya to fight alongside the RSF. [285]

In response to these allegations, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defended the possible involvement
of the Wagner Group, saying that Sudan had the right to use its services. [297] The head of the Wagner Group,
Yevgeny Prigozhin, denied supporting the RSF, saying that the company has not had a presence in Sudan for
more than two years.[298] The RSF denied allegations that Wagner Group was supporting them, instead stating
that the SAF was seeking such support. [299][300] Sudan has denied the presence of Wagner on its territory. [301][302]

Ukraine

On 19 September, CNN reported that it was "likely" that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces were behind a
series of drone strikes and a ground operation which was directed against the Wagner-backed RSF near
Khartoum on 8 September.[296] Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of
Defense of Ukraine, stated in an interview on 22 September that he could neither deny nor confirm the
involvement of Ukraine in the conflict in Sudan, [314] but said that Ukraine would punish Russian war criminals
anywhere in the world.[315]
On 6 November, the Kyiv Post released drone footage of what it claimed was Ukrainian special forces
attacking Wagner mercenaries in an unidentified urban area in Sudan with an explosive projectile, which was
believed to have been taken about two weeks before its publication.

Sanctions[edit]
United States

The repeated violations of the ceasefire agreements and other atrocities during the conflict led to U.S.
President Joe Biden issuing an executive order on 4 May 2023 authorizing sanctions for those deemed
responsible for destabilizing Sudan, undermining the democratic transition and committing human rights
abuses.[323] On 1 June, the US government imposed its first sanctions related to the conflict, targeting two
firms associated with the SAF and two others linked to the RSF. It also imposed visa restrictions against
individuals involved in the violence, but did not divulge any names.[324]

On 6 September, the US State Department and the US Treasury imposed sanctions on the RSF's deputy
commander and Hemedti's brother Abdelrahim Dagalo, and Abdel Rahman Jumma, the RSF's top commander
in West Darfur, over "extensive" human rights violations during the conflict, with Jumma in particular being
accused of masterminding the assassination of the state's governor Khamis Abakar in June. [325] On 28
September, it sanctioned former foreign minister and leader of the Sudanese Islamic Movement Ali Karti, the
Sudan-based GSK Advance Company Ltd, and the Russia-based military company Aviatrade LLC, accusing
Karti and other Islamist hardliners of obstructing efforts towards a ceasefire and accusing the firms of
supporting the RSF.[326][327]

On 4 December, the State Department imposed sanctions on three former officials of the Bashir regime,
namely former minister and presidential aide Taha Osman Ahmed al-Hussein and former directors of the
Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services Salah Abdallah Mohamed Salah aka Sala Gosh and
Mohamed Etta Elmoula Abbas, citing Al-Hussein's involvement in coordinating with regional actors to support
the RSF, Gosh's plotting to overthrow the civilian-led transitional government, and Elmoula's attempts to
restore the Bashir regime to power. [328]

United Kingdom

On 12 July, the United Kingdom announced sanctions on firms linked to the SAF and the RSF for providing
funds and weapons in the conflict.

Humanitarian impact[edit]
Main article: Humanitarian impact of the war in Sudan (2023)
The humanitarian crisis following the fighting was further exacerbated by the violence occurring during a
period of high temperatures, drought and it starting during the fasting month of Ramadan. Civilians were
unable to venture outside of their homes to obtain food and supplies for fear of getting caught in the
crossfire. A doctors' group said that hospitals remained understaffed and were running low on supplies as
wounded people streamed in.[330] The World Health Organization recorded around 26 attacks on healthcare
facilities, some of which resulted in casualties among medical workers and civilians. [331] The World Health
Organization said 80% of hospitals in conflict areas were out of service [332] with 32 forcibly evacuated by
soldiers or caught in the crossfire. [333] This included about half of Khartoum's 130 medical facilities and all
hospitals in West Darfur.[334] Outbreaks of diseases such as measles, cholera and diarrhea were reported
across the country.[335]

The United Nations reported that shortages of basic goods, such as food, water, medicines and fuel have
become "extremely acute".[336] The delivery of badly-needed remittances from overseas migrant workers was
also halted after Western Union announced it was closing all operations in Sudan until further notice. [337] The
World Food Programme said that more than $13 million worth of food aid destined for Sudan had been
looted since the fighting broke out.[338] An estimated 25 million people, equivalent to more than half of
Sudan's population, were said to be in need of aid. [339] In particular, the looting of the WFP's warehouses in El-
Obeid on 1 June led to the loss of food aid meant to feed 4.4 million people. [340] On 25 July, Humanitarian
Coordinator Clementine Nkweta-Salami said attacks on humanitarian facilities had led to more than 50
warehouses looted, 82 offices ransacked, and over 200 vehicles stolen. [233]

The UN estimated that economic activity in Sudan fell by more than a third during the first three weeks of the
conflict.[341] In July, Sudanese economists estimated the total amount of damage brought by the conflict at $9
billion, or an average of $100 million per day, while the value of property and goods looted was estimated at
another $40 billion, with the most affected areas being Khartoum and South Darfur.[342] The exchange rate of
the US dollar against the Sudanese pound in the black market rose to SDG730 in September, while it reached
SDG625 at the official rate. The formal economy was described as being in a "near standstill". [341] Gold
production was also reduced to just two tons from the previous year's output of 18 tons. [343]

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that 1,200 children had died from disease
outbreaks in refugee camps in White Nile State since May.[344] In Central Darfur, the head of the Hamidiya
refugee camp said at least 43 children had died in the camp since July. [345] UNICEF also estimated that up the
conflict had led to the number of children being out of school in Sudan to rise from seven million prior to the
fighting to 19 million in October 2023. [346] The war's economic costs have surpassed all prior armed conflicts
since Sudanese independence in 1956 due to extensive destruction of infrastructure, particularly in urban
areas such as the capital city of Khartoum.[347]

Refugees[edit]
Main article: 2023 Sudanese refugee crisis

Sudanese refugee camp in Chad, 16 May 2023.

As of 29 December, at least 7.3 million residents of Sudan have been displaced due to the fighting. The
United Nations said that the conflict had produced more than 5.8 million internally displaced persons, while
more than 1.5 million had fled the country altogether. [34] This has made Sudan the largest host of IDPs
globally.[348] The International Organization for Migration estimated that around 69% of IDPs had come from
the Khartoum region.[349] In November, the UN said the conflict had created the largest child displacement
crisis in the world, affecting three million children. [350]
Of those who fled abroad, more than 160,000 of them were Masalit who fled to Chad to escape ethnically
based attacks by the RSF and allied militias. [351] Fighting between the SAF and the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) had
reportedly displaced more than 35,000 people in Blue Nile State alone, with 3,000 of them fleeing to
Ethiopia,[70] while more than 83,000 were displaced in South Kordofan. [352] As of August, more than 400,000
people had fled to Chad, making it the largest single destination of refugees from the conflict, while others
fled to other neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic, Egypt, and South Sudan. [353]

The UN Refugee Agency and 64 other different humanitarian organizations appealed for $1 billion to protect
and help refugees escape the conflict.[354]

Criticism was levelled at diplomatic missions operating in Sudan for their slow response in helping Sudanese
visa applicants whose passports were left behind in embassies following their closure during evacuation
efforts, preventing them from leaving the country.[355]

War crimes investigations[edit]

This section is an excerpt from War crimes during the War in Sudan (2023–present) § Reaction and
investigation.[edit]
Both the SAF and the RSF are accused of committing war crimes, [356][357][358][359][360] with the RSF being singled out
by the Human Rights Watch,[358] and the United Kingdom[361] and United States[362] governments for committing
crimes against humanity.

On 13 July 2023, the office of the International Criminal Court's Chief Prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan said that
it had launched investigations into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the
course of the 2023 conflict, within the context of its Darfur investigation, which started in 2005 based on
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593.[363][364] The UN Security Council resolution limits the
investigation to Darfur.[365][366] On 5 September, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Alice
Wairimu Nderitu acknowledged that the conflict and related abuses had "strong identity-based
components."[367] In an interview by the BBC, Burhan said that he would cooperate with the ICC to bring those
responsible to justice.[368]

On 3 August, Amnesty International released its report on the conflict. Titled Death Came To Our Home: War
Crimes and Civilian Suffering In Sudan, it documented "mass civilian casualties in both deliberate and
indiscriminate attacks" by both the SAF and the RSF, particularly in Khartoum and West Darfur. It also
detailed sexual violence against women and girls as young as 12, targeted attacks on civilian facilities such as
hospitals and churches, and looting.[369][370][371]

On 6 September, the US State Department and the US Treasury imposed sanctions on the RSF's deputy
commander and Hemedti's brother Abdelrahim Dagalo, and Abdel Rahman Jumma, the RSF's top commander
in West Darfur, over "extensive" human rights violations during the conflict, with Jumma in particular being
accused of masterminding the assassination of the state's governor Khamis Abakar in June.[372] Antony
Blinken, United States Secretary of State, accused the RSF ethnic cleansing in December 2023. [360]

The SAF accused the RSF of perpetrating war crimes. [373] On 4 August, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as chair
of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, established a committee tasked with investigating war crimes, human
rights violations, and other crimes attributed to the RSF. [374] The committee was to be chaired by a
representative of the Attorney General, and also included officials from the Foreign and Justice Ministries,
the SAF, the Police, the General Intelligence Service, and the National Commission for Human Rights. [375][376]
During his speech to the UN General Assembly in New York in September, al-Burhan called for the
international community to designate the RSF as a "terrorist group". [377]

In September, the United States, Britain, Norway, and Germany planned to propose a motion to the UN
Human Rights Council for an investigation into the alleged atrocities in Sudan. The draft motion, which
condemns the human rights violations during the conflict, aimed to establish a three-person Fact Finding
Mission to investigate these allegations. The experts would document the violations and provide updates to
the 47-member Council. The draft has been circulated among member countries but has not yet been
formally submitted to the Council.[378] On 11 October, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted 19–16
with 12 abstentions to adopt a resolution creating a fact-finding committee on crimes and violations in Sudan
since the start of the conflict.[379]

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has called for robust measures to address the ongoing atrocities, urging the
United States to take action at the UN Security Council to protect civilians and hold those responsible for the
violence accountable.[380] The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)
has expressed grave concern over the targeting of civilians and public facilities by the RSF and allied militias,
and the need for urgent action to ensure the safety and protection of civilians in Darfur. [381]

Disinformation[edit]
During the conflict, several instances of disinformation were observed, which aimed to manipulate public
opinion, spread false narratives, and create confusion. Both the SAF and the RSF engaged in disinformation
campaigns on social media platforms.[382] The RSF heavily relied on tweets and inauthentic behavior to spread
its agenda and influence local and international opinions. On the other hand, the Sudanese army used Twitter
to refute RSF claims and boost army morale with false victory claims. [382] The RSF had dedicated teams based
in Khartoum and Dubai to engage in a digital propaganda war. They used social media, including officially
verified Facebook and Twitter accounts, to showcase their activities and spread disinformation. [383]

Various misleading videos were shared on social media platforms, falsely depicting scenes of violence in the
ongoing fighting between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces. Some videos were taken from
other conflicts or events, misattributed to the current crisis in Sudan.[384] Some viral images on social media
were unrelated or misleadingly attributed to the ongoing fighting in Sudan. [385]

Examples[edit]
On 14 April, the official SAF social media page published a video which it said was of operations carried out by
the Sudanese Air Force against the RSF. Al Jazeera's monitoring and verification unit claimed the video had
been fabricated using footage from the video game Arma 3 that was published on TikTok in March 2023. The
unit claimed the video showing Sudanese army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan inspecting the Armoured
Corps, in Al-Shajara, was from before the fighting. A video reportedly of helicopters flying over Khartoum to
participate in operations by the SAF against the RSF, which circulated on social media, turned out to be from
November 2022.[386]

Two photos circulated on social media that depicted a burning bridge reported as Bahri bridge and a bombed
building allegedly in Khartoum, were both revealed to be from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[387][better source needed]
In April, a video supposedly showing the RSF in control of Khartoum International Airport on 15 April
circulated on social media. The fact-checking website Lead Stories found that the video had appeared online
3 months prior to the conflict.[388] A video posted in June and taken by an RSF soldier showing purported
victims of the Bashir regime turned out to have been that of mummies and human remains used as props
from the M. Bolheim Bioarchaeology Laboratory in Khartoum, which were thought to date from 3300 to 3000
BCE.[389]

On 5 May, the British newspaper I reported that the RSF had sent "special bulletins" to UK politicians, which it
claimed were to combat "the disproportionate amount of disinformation" about the conflict. The bulletins
were created with the assistance of Capital Tap Holdings, a Dubai-based investment firm which has mining
interests in Sudan. The I reported that the RSF's Facebook page was being run jointly from UAE and Sudan,
and its Instagram account appeared to be based in Saudi Arabia, with the RSF saying its media team was
based in Khartoum.[390]

In June, a picture of Hemedti hospitalised in Nairobi, Kenya, was circulated in the social media and reported
by the Turkish Anadolu Agency.[391] News websites Fatabyyano and Juhainah checked the images and found it
to be fabricated with the original image which belonged to Elijah McCalin, who was killed in the United States
in 2019.[391][392] Also in June, dominant social media account holders supporting the SAF attacked the Sudanese
Doctors Syndicate, accusing the organization of being partial towards the RSF and collaborating with the so-
called "Janjaweed" militia. These false accusations endangered the reputation and safety of the medical
professionals.[393]

Footage of an SAF warplane reportedly shot down by the RSF in Khartoum on 20 September was found to be
that of an Su-25 fighter jet that crashed in Mali,[394] while a video showing an Egyptian Air Force warplane
reportedly shot down by the RSF while on a mission in northern Sudan was found to be that of a Libyan
aircraft taken outside Sudan in 2020.[395]

Responses[edit]
On 11 August, Facebook shut down the main pages of the RSF due to a violation of its policy, "Dangerous
Organizations and Individuals". In an alternate account, the RSF accused the SAF of lodging complaints based
on false reports that led to the removal of its pages and said it was in contact with Facebook's parent
company Meta Platforms to restore them.[396]

Kyle Walter of Logically, a British disinformation analysis firm, said in May: "What's most concerning from this
latest example of potential foreign interference is that it provides a look into how the nature of these threats
are evolving, particularly in the context of the rapid onset of generative AI being used to create fake images
and text. Although we don't know if this so-called sophisticated 'special bulletin' was created by this
technology, it is symbolic of the wider issue at hand: an inability to trust what you're seeing, reading, and the
undermining of the entire information landscape."

The Situation in Syria

Current political situation 2011 to present
Syrian Civil War
Main article: Syrian Civil War
Hundreds of thousands of Syrian protesters gather in Hama on 22 July 2011 during the outbreak of Syrian Revolution, chanting
the rallying slogan of the Arab Spring: "Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam" (Arabic: ‫الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام‬, lit. '"the people want to
bring down the regime!"'.

The ongoing Syrian Civil War was inspired by the Arab Spring revolutions. It began in 2011 as a chain of
peaceful protests, which was suppressed through a deadly crackdown by the Syrian security apparatus. [116] In
July 2011, Army defectors declared the formation of the Free Syrian Army and began forming fighting units.
The opposition is dominated by Sunni Muslims, whereas the leading government figures are generally
associated with Alawites.[117] The war also involves rebel groups (IS and al-Nusra) and various foreign
countries, leading to claims of a proxy war in Syria.[118]

According to various sources, including the United Nations, up to 100,000 people had been killed by June
2013,[119][120][121] including 11,000 children.[122] To escape the violence, 4.9 million[123] Syrian refugees have fled to
neighboring countries of Jordan,[124] Iraq,[125] Lebanon, and Turkey.[126][127] An estimated 450,000 Syrian Christians
have fled their homes.[128][needs update] By October 2017, an estimated 400,000 people had been killed in the war
according to the UN.[129]

In September 2022, a new UN report stated that the Syrian Civil War was in danger of flaring up again. The
UN also said it had been totally unable to deliver any supplies during the first half of 2022. [130]

Current conflicts
As of 2022, the main external military threat and conflict are firstly, an ongoing conflict with ISIS; and
secondly, ongoing concerns of possible invasion of the northeast regions of Syria by Turkish forces, in order
to strike Kurdish groups in general, and Rojava in particular.[131][132][133] An official report by the Rojava
government noted Turkey-backed militias as the main threat to the region of Rojava and its government. [134]

As of 2023, Turkey was continuing its support for various militias within Syria, which periodically attempted
some operations against Kurdish groups consisting mostly of the YPG/YPJ. [135][136][137] One stated goal was to
create 30-kilometer (18.6-mile) wide "safe zones" along Turkey's border with Syria, according to a statement
by Turkish President Erdoğan.[138] The operations were generally aimed at the Tal Rifaat and Manbij regions
west of the Euphrates and other areas further east. President Erdoğan openly stated his support for the
operations, in talks with Moscow in mid-2022.[139]

In 2022, the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, said that Kurdish forces were
willing to work with Syrian government forces to defend against Turkey, saying “Damascus should use its air
defense systems against Turkish planes." Abdi said that Kurdish groups would be able to cooperate with the
Syrian government, and still retain their autonomy. [140][141][142][143][144] In July 2022, the SDF and the official Syrian
military forged active plans to coordinate actively together to create defense plans to guard against invasion
by Turkey.[145] The SDF said that they felt that the main threat to Kurdish groups was an invasion by Turkey. [146]

As of 2023, active fighting in the conflict between the Syrian government and rebel groups had mostly
subsided, but there were occasional flareups in Northwestern Syria. [147][148] In early 2023, reports indicated that
the forces of ISIS in Syria had mostly been defeated, with only a few cells remaining in various remote
locations.[149][150][151]
Major economic crisis

Military situation in the Syrian Civil War as of January

2024.

Controlled by Syrian Arab Republic

Controlled by Syrian Interim Government (SNA) and Turkish Armed Forces
Controlled by Syrian Salvation Government (HTS)
Controlled by Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (SDF)
Controlled by Revolutionary Commando Army and United States Armed Forces
Controlled by the Islamic State (IS)

(For a more detailed, interactive map, see Template:Syrian Civil War detailed map.)

On 10 June 2020, hundreds of protesters returned to the streets of Sweida for the fourth consecutive day,
rallying against the collapse of the country's economy, as the Syrian pound plummeted to 3,000 to the dollar
within the previous week.[152]

On 11 June, Prime Minister Imad Khamis was dismissed by President Bashar al-Assad, amid anti-government
protests over deteriorating economic conditions. [153] The new lows for the Syrian currency, and the dramatic
increase in sanctions, began to appear to raise new concerns about the survival of the Assad
government.[154][155][156]

Analysts noted that a resolution to the current banking crisis in Lebanon might be crucial to restoring stability
in Syria.[157]

Some analysts began to raise concerns that Assad might be on the verge of losing power; but that any such
collapse in the regime might cause conditions to worsen, as the result might be mass chaos, rather than an
improvement in political or economic conditions.[158][159][160] Russia continued to expand its influence and
military role in the areas of Syria where the main military conflict was occurring. [161]

Analysts noted that the upcoming implementation of new heavy sanctions under the US Caesar Act could
devastate the Syrian economy, ruin any chances of recovery, destroy regional stability, and do nothing but
destabilize the entire region.[162]
The first new sanctions took effect on 17 June. There will be additional sanctions implemented in August, in
three different groups. There are increasing reports that food is becoming difficult to find, the country's
economy is under severe pressure, and the whole regime could collapse due to the sanctions. [163]

As of early 2022, Syria was still facing a major economic crisis due to sanctions and other economic pressures.
there was some doubt of the Syrian government's ability to pay for subsisides for the population and for
basic services and programs.[164][165][166] The UN reported there were massive problems looming for Syria's ability
to feed its population in the near future. [167]

In one possibly positive sign for the well-being of Syria's population, several Arab countries began an effort to
normalize relations with Syria, and to conclude a deal to provide energy supplies to Syria. This effort was led
by Jordan, and included several other Arab countries.[168]

Russia’s War on Ukraine: U.S. Policy

and the Role of Congress
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a new war against Ukraine, a country Russia first invaded in 2014 and
has partially occupied for nearly a decade. The war is estimated to have led to hundreds of thousands of
casualties and the current displacement of more than 10 million people as of January 2024. Ukraine is
continuing to wage defensive and counteroffensive operations bolstered by extensive military assistance,
mainly from the United States and Europe; since mid-2023, warfighting has been largely attritional and has
focused on the seizure of individual towns and settlements or other localized objectives. “The General
Assembly ... reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of
Ukraine [and] declares that the unlawful actions of the Russian Federation ... have no validity under
international law.” U.N. General Assembly Resolution ES-11/4, Oct. 12, 2022 The United States, NATO, the
European Union (EU) and member states, and other partners regard the war against Ukraine as “unprovoked
and unjustified.” The United States, in coordination with the EU and others, has provided substantial
assistance to Ukraine, has imposed a series of increasingly severe sanctions on Russia and its enablers, and
has sought to promote accountability for Russian war crimes. To deter further aggression, the United States
and NATO have increased their military presence in Europe. In the United States, policymakers and observers
are debating the scope and scale of assistance to Ukraine, the impact of sanctions, and the implications of a
protracted conflict. Congress may consider additional actions and oversight with respect to these and related
issues. Assistance to Ukraine Congress enacted four supplemental appropriations laws for FY2022 and
FY2023 providing assistance to Ukraine and countries affected by the war in Ukraine, as well as related
funding. Of a total $113.4 billion in emergency appropriations made available by these laws, Congress
appropriated about $88.7 billion for assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war. Of this
amount, about $48.7 billion was for security assistance, $30.1 billion for economic assistance, and $9.9 billion
for humanitarian assistance. Another $23 billion was appropriated to support U.S. military operations in
Europe and other U.S. agency responses to the war, including for sanctions enforcement and refugee and
entrant assistance. About $1.7 billion was appropriated for other global assistance purposes. Since February
2022, for Ukraine specifically, the Biden Administration has committed $44.2 billion in security assistance,
$22.9 billion in direct financial assistance, and $2.3 billion in humanitarian assistance. The Administration also
has provided assistance for Ukraine’s energy, governance, and agriculture sectors, among others, and to
support the needs of Ukrainian refugees in neighboring countries. On October 20, 2023, the Administration
submitted to Congress a request for $106 billion in FY2024 emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine,
Israel, border security, and other purposes. Of this amount, at least $61 billion is for Ukraine-related
activities, including $18 billion to replenish U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks that are to
be transferred to Ukraine, at least $12 billion in other security assistance to Ukraine, up to $11.8 billion in
direct financial assistance to the Ukrainian government, and additional funds to support DOD’s response to
the war. Congress continues to consider the supplemental request. As of December 2023, EU institutions and
member states collectively had made available an estimated $72 billion in assistance for Ukraine since
February 2022, including about $29 billion in security assistance. The EU has allocated an additional $18
billion to provide for the needs of Ukrainian refugees in Europe; individual EU members also have provided
refugee assistance. Other countries, including the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, and Norway, also have
provided assistance to Ukraine. Sanctions The United States, the EU, and others also have responded to
Russia’s war on Ukraine with sanctions. Since February 2022, the United States has imposed sanctions on
more than 3,500 individuals and entities, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, other Russian political
and economic elites, Russia’s legislature, defense and technology firms, strategic state-owned companies,
and facilitators of sanctions evasion. U.S. sanctions restrict Russia’s central bank from drawing on its dollar-
denominated reserves, prohibit most major Russian banks from conducting transactions in U.S. dollars or
with U.S. persons, and bar new U.S. investment in Russia. The United States has expanded export controls
affecting Russia’s access to sensitive or needed U.S.-origin technologies; banned the import of energy, gold,
diamonds and certain other goods from Russia; banned the export of luxury goods and certain services to
Russia; raised tariffs on many imports from Russia; and prohibited Russian use of U.S. airspace and ports. In
addition to actions taken by the executive branch, the 117th Congress suspended normal trade relations with
Russia and its ally Belarus (P.L. 117-110), prohibited the import of Russian oil and other energy products (P.L.
117- 109), and established sanctions on foreign persons who engage in gold transactions with Russia (P.L.
117-263, §5590).

The United States and the EU have closely cooperated in imposing sanctions on Russia. In December 2022,
the United States joined the EU and others in setting a global price cap of $60 per barrel on Russian oil
exports by banning nationals from providing maritime transport services for transactions above that price.
Although the EU has not imposed sanctions on Russian natural gas imports, Russia has reduced natural gas
flows to Europe. The Biden Administration has sought to help the EU reduce its dependence on Russian gas,
including by boosting U.S. liquefied natural gas shipments to Europe. By some metrics, Russia has weathered
new sanctions better than many anticipated. Russia’s economy, the 11th largest in the world in 2021,
contracted by 2.1% in 2022 and grew an estimated 2.3% in 2023. A number of factors have buoyed the
economy: nimble policy responses by Russia’s central bank; increased oil exports to China, India, and Turkey;
imports of sanctioned items through intermediaries; increased military spending; and expropriation of
foreign assets. At the same time, sanctions have created challenges for Russia. Its financial sector has lost
hundreds of billions of dollars, its military has difficulty procuring key components, many Russian factories
have suspended production because they cannot access foreign-origin parts, and hundreds of international
companies have exited Russia. The government also is facing fiscal pressures: government revenues from
energy exports fell in 2023, military expenditures have increased, and Russia cannot borrow from
international capital markets. The draft and emigration have created labor shortages, and nearly half of
Russians report their salaries do not cover basic spending. Seizures and Forfeitures Through the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Task Force KleptoCapture and the international Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs
(REPO) Task Force, the Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury are working “to seize illicit
Russian assets for the benefit of the people of Ukraine, and to prosecute those who facilitate the evasion of
sanctions imposed on Russia.” In April 2023 Senate testimony, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco stated
that the Department of Justice had seized, forfeited, or otherwise restrained over $500 million in assets
belonging to Russia’s oligarchs and others who unlawfully supported the Kremlin’s war machine … We have
indicted more than thirty individuals and two corporate entities accused of sanctions evasion, export control
violations, money laundering, and other crimes. FY2023 appropriations provide authority for the transfer of
proceeds of “covered forfeited property ... to provide assistance to Ukraine to remediate the harms of
Russian aggression towards Ukraine” (P.L. 117-328, §1708). The Justice Department used this authority for
the first time for a $5.4 million forfeiture of funds belonging to a Russian oligarch who has financed pro-
Russian activities in Ukraine and who was indicted by the Department of Justice in April 2022 for sanctions
evasion. Legislation has been introduced in the 118th Congress to broaden the Administration’s ability to
seize frozen and immobilized Russian assets to fund Ukraine reconstruction (including H.R. 4175, which has
been ordered to be reported, as amended in committee). War Crimes Accountability In February 2023, the
Biden Administration determined that “members of Russia’s forces and other Russian officials have
committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine.” Ukrainian authorities and others have accused Russian
forces of perpetrating indiscriminate and mass killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, the
intentional targeting of civilians, and the forced “filtration” (interrogation and separation) of civilians and
noncombatants—including children—from Russia-occupied territories in Ukraine. The U.S. Department of
Justice is working “in partnership with Ukraine and the international community ... to hold Russia
accountable for war crimes committed in its unjust invasion.” This includes cooperation with a Joint
Investigative Team comprising Ukraine, six EU member states, and the International Criminal Court,
supported by EU institutions. In December 2023, the Department of Justice “filed the first ever charges under
the U.S. war crimes statute against four Russia-affiliated military personnel” for crimes against a U.S. citizen
in Ukraine. U.S. and NATO Force Posture in Europe The United States has increased military deployments to
Europe and led a broader NATO effort to deter further Russian aggression and to defend NATO allies,
particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Congress has supported the enhanced U.S. force presence and
U.S. leadership of NATO defense and deterrence measures. In the 117th Congress, the Senate gave its advice
and consent (Treaty Doc. 117-3) to approve Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO (Finland became a
NATO member in April 2023; Sweden’s accession is pending). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine
in February 2022, the United States deployed or extended about 20,000 additional armed forces to Europe,
bringing the total U.S. force posture in Europe, including permanently stationed forces, to approximately
100,000 military personnel. This includes rotational deployment of up to two Brigade Combat Teams in
Central and Eastern Europe; deployment of about 10,000 troops to Poland, including 800 soldiers deployed
to a U.S.-led NATO battlegroup; about 3,000 troops in Romania; and additional naval and air assets in the
region. The increased U.S. military presence is part of an enhanced NATO defense and deterrence posture in
the eastern part of the alliance. Allied troops deployed to the region for the first time in NATO’s history after
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Since February 2022, NATO has expanded its military footprint in the
region. According to NATO, about 10,000 allied soldiers currently serve in multinational battlegroups in eight
countries along NATO’s eastern flank.
 U.S.A on Sudan Civil War
After April 2019[edit]
Al-Bashir was deposed as Sudan's president in a coup d'état in April 2019. In September 2019, Sudan's new
prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, said that he held useful talks with U.S. officials while at the United Nations,
and expressed hope Khartoum could “very soon" be removed from the U.S. state sponsor of terrorism list. [12]
In December 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the U.S. and Sudan are to begin
exchanging ambassadors after 23 years of no diplomatic relations. [13] That same month, Hamdok became the
first Sudanese leader to visit Washington D.C. since 1985. [14]

The last U.S. Ambassador was Tim Carney, who left the post on 30 November 1997. Also in December, it was
reported that the Sudanese transitional government will close the offices of Hamas, Hezbollah, and any other
Islamic group designated as terrorist by the U.S. [15] Sudan remains on the U.S. state sponsor of terrorism list.

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo meets with Sudanese Sovereign Council

Chair General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Khartoum, on 25 August 2020.

As of June 2019, the office of U.S. Ambassador to Sudan was vacant. The Chargé d’Affaires was Steven
Koutsis[16] and the Deputy Chief of Mission was Ellen B. Thorburn. [17]

On 5 May 2020, Sudan appointed Noureldin Sati, a veteran diplomat, as ambassador. [18]

In August 2020, Mike Pompeo became the first US secretary of state to visit Sudan since Condoleezza Rice in
2005.[a] The visit came on the heels of the Israel–United Arab Emirates peace agreement. His visit was meant
to discuss the possibility of opening relations between Sudan and Israel and exhibit assistance and support
for Sudan's shift to democracy.[20]

On 19 October 2020, President Donald Trump announced that he would lift the designation of Sudan as a
state sponsor of terrorism once $335 million in compensation from Sudan to American families victims of
terrorism was deposited into an escrow account. [21] On 23 October 2020, President Donald Trump officially
notified the Congress of his intention to remove Sudan from the State Department's blacklist of state
sponsors of terrorism.[22]

On 14 December 2020, the United States officially removed Sudan from the list after it agreed to establish
relations with Israel.[23]
On 6 January 2021, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin signed a memorandum of understanding with
Sudanese Acting Finance Minister Heba Mohamed Ali, in order to clear Sudan's arrears with the World Bank,
and to allow their access to more than US$1 billion in annual lending. [24]

On 1 March 2021, Sudanese officials welcomed the missile guided destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill at Port
Sudan, the first time in decades that the U.S. naval forces had visited the country. [25] The commander of
Sudan’s naval forces, Alnairi Hassan, described the visit as a momentous occasion and said Sudan was happy
to receive the U.S. warship.[25]

On October 25, 2021, the Sudanese military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan overthrew the
government and detained Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. The United States condemned the coup, called
for Hamdok's release and suspended $700 million in aid to Sudan. [26] Hamdok was reinstated as Prime
Minister on November 21; the move was welcomed by the United States. [27]

In April 2023, after a lot of fighting between the regular military and the RSF, the United States and other
countries have evacuated their diplomats and citizens. [28]

U.S. aid[edit]
See also: United States aid to Sudan
Despite policy disagreements, the U.S. has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to Sudan throughout the
last quarter of the 20th century.[6] The U.S. provided assistance for resettlement of refugees following the
1972 peace settlement that brought the First Sudanese Civil War with the south to an end.[6] The U.S. was also
a significant source of aid in the March 1989 "Operation Lifeline Sudan," which delivered 100,000 metric tons
of food into both government and SPLA-held areas of Sudan, averting widespread starvation. [6] In 1991, the
U.S. made large donations to alleviate food shortages caused by a two-year drought.[6] In October 1997, the
U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against Sudan. [6] However, during
another drought in 2000–01, the U.S. and the broader international community responded to avert mass
starvation in Sudan.[6] In 2001, the Bush Administration named a Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan to
explore what role the U.S. could play in ending Sudan's civil war and enhancing the delivery of humanitarian
aid.[6] For fiscal years 2005–2006, the U.S. committed almost $2.6 billion to Sudan for humanitarian assistance
and peacekeeping in Darfur as well as support for the implementation of the peace accord and
reconstruction and development in southern Sudan. [6]

U.S. sanctions[edit]
Sudan was added to the State Sponsors of Terrorism list on 12 August 1993, alleging that Sudan harbored
members of the Abu Nidal Organization, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad.[29] In 1998, the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical
factory in Khartoum was destroyed by a missile attack launched by the United States government, killing one
employee and wounding eleven.[30][31] The U.S. government claimed that the factory was used for the
processing of VX nerve agent and that the owners of the plant had ties to the terrorist group al-Qaeda. These
justifications for the bombing, however, were disputed by the owners of the plant, the Sudanese
government, and other governments.

In response to Sudan's continued complicity of hunger in unabated violence in Darfur, U.S. President George
W. Bush imposed new economic sanctions on Sudan in May 2007. [6]
President Barack Obama sent Special Envoy Scott Gration to Sudan to improve diplomatic conditions, and
discuss ways to avert the Darfur conflict. On 9 September 2009, the U.S. published a new law to ease
sanctions on parts of Sudan.

On 9 July 2011, the United States officially recognized the independence from Sudan of South Sudan.[32]

On 28 August 2013, Obama named Donald E. Booth Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan.[33][34] Booth
served as the US Envoy until 2017. He led the U.S. government's effort to "normalize relations" with the
genocidal regime in Sudan[35][36] and worked to make it easier for Sudan to comply with U.S. requirements to
lift sanctions.

On 10 June 2019, President Donald Trump re-appointed Booth as Special Envoy for Sudan. [37] In October 2020,
Trump announced that the US would remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list after Sudan had
agreed to pay $335 million in compensation to the families of victims of the 1998 United States embassy
bombings.[38] Sudan was officially removed from the list on 14 December 2020.

Washington’s Responsibility
Some critics of US policy in Sudan, including former officials in the Biden administration, accuse
the United States of bearing part of the responsibility for the conflict because the Trump
administration ignored conditions in Khartoum following the overthrow of former President
Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. This neglect has continued under the Biden administration.2 In
June 2019, the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), committed a massacre—
under the auspices of the transitional military council—while trying to break up a sit-in outside
of SAF headquarters, a bloodbath in which at least 120 people were killed. The Trump
administration’s response at the time was quite timid because of its focus on normalizing
Sudanese-Israeli relations as part of the so-called Abraham Accords.3
Not only did the Trump administration ignore the massacre, but together with its regional and
western allies it also pressed Sudanese civilian forces to participate in a transitional government
with the military, pending general elections in 2022. But the agreement that led to the
establishment of the Transitional Sovereign Council in August 2021—which was composed of
equal numbers of military officers and civilians—ended up under the leadership of SAF
Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, with Hemedti as his deputy; and this despite Washington’s
description of the new arrangement as one of “civilian leadership.” The agreement also
stipulated that the military would lead the council for 21 months, followed by civilian leadership
for the following 18.4 But the military leaders annulled the agreement with an October 2021
coup against the government of then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who was arrested and
detained. While the Biden administration froze $700 million of development aid to Sudan,
worked with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to freeze an additional $6
billion, and annulled plans to defray $50 billion of Sudan’s debts, none of the coup leaders were
personally sanctioned.
Feeling the diplomatic and economic pressure, the coup leaders returned Hamdok to his
premiership in November 2021, but he resigned at the beginning of 2022 because of the
military officers’ noncompliance with their commitments. According to Jeffrey Feltman, who
served as US special envoy for the Horn of Africa from April 2021 to November 2022 and who
resigned in protest at the absence of a clear US strategy for Sudan, Washington should have
had stronger procedures against the coup leaders and should have done what it was preaching
regarding “trying to promote a civilian-led democratic transition.”5 But the Biden administration
remained hesitant to call Burhan’s takeover in 2021 a coup.6 And despite its participation in
December 2022 with the United Nations, the African Union, and the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa in devising a framework agreement for a
civilian transition in Sudan, the civilian forces were not well represented in it. Nor was there a
mechanism to ensure accountability for military leaders if they did not comply with their
commitments. To Feltman, Washington and its allies failed in preventing Sudan from sliding
into war because they had too much confidence in the generals.7 Indeed, there are those who
profess that the framework agreement that Washington helped bring about may have been the
element that led to the current conflict.
However, others saw that the United States could not have done much to prevent the 2021
coup and the ensuing conflict between the SAF and the RSF. David Satterfield, who replaced
Feltman as US special envoy to the Horn of Africa and who has since resigned, said that
Washington did not have anything but bad choices in Sudan, and therefore had to strike deals
with the Sudanese military. According to Satterfield, “If there is ever an opportunity to return to
a path towards restoration of a civilian-led government, you’re going to have to talk to the
military then as well.”8 Many who believe this still argue that the United States does not have
many tools to pressure the military. Hemedti’s financial assets, for instance, are mainly in the
gold he trades with the United Arab Emirates, and it would be difficult for the US to sanction its
ally in the Gulf.
There also is widespread discussion among the civilian forces in Sudan about their own
responsibility for not being united around the goal of a democratic system that would take into
account the role of the army and the need for a transition compromise with it. The dispute
among these forces (between those who support a full rejection of the role of the army in the
transitional period and those ready to unconditionally share power with it) allowed the military
to maneuver among civilian forces to the point that some of them struck deals with Hemedti
against the army during the discussions around the framework agreement.

American Calculations in Sudan

In August 2022, the Biden administration issued its Sub-Saharan Africa strategy, which says
that, “The United States can offer choices to Africans as they determine their own future, limit
openings for negative state and non-state actors, and obviate the need for costly
interventions.”9 When mentioning state actors, the document refers to Russia and China
specifically, while non-state actors are those that Washington accuses of terrorism. Washington
also sees that Sudan holds great geopolitical, economic, and strategic importance that makes it
the subject of regional and international ambitions and greed. Besides, any instability in Sudan
means instability in a very sensitive area that has infrastructural fragility and weakness.
Geopolitically, Sudan is at a vital geographical crossroads, with Egypt and Libya in the north,
Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, and Chad and the Central African Republic at the
heart of the African continent. Sudan comprises 60 percent of the Nile Valley. It also plays an
essential role in managing an ongoing dispute between Egypt, the downstream state that
depends on the Nile for 90 percent of its water needs, and Ethiopia, which controls the
headwaters of the Blue Nile and hopes to increase its electricity generation via the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that Egypt and Sudan oppose because of its impact on their water
supplies. Sudan also has a strategic location on the Red Sea, through which nearly 10 percent of
world trade traverses, and huge mineral wealth—it is the third largest gold producer in Africa
and possesses sizeable deposits of silver, copper, and uranium—and it produces 80 percent of
the world’s gum arabic, which is used in food, paint, and cosmetics.

Conclusion
The principal American goals in Sudan are: arriving at a ceasefire, making the ceasefire
permanent, and returning the country to a civilian government. The United States works to
achieve these goals by cooperating with regional and international partners, while keeping the
mediation role in its hands and those of Saudi Arabia. But it does not distinguish between the
official army and the militia in dealing with the Sudanese crisis. The US State Department issued
a statement on June 15, 2023 accusing the RSF of assassinating the governor of West Darfur
after he accused the group of crimes in El Geneina that led to the death of 1,100 civilians. 21 At
the beginning of June, the United States imposed economic sanctions on four Sudanese
companies, two connected to the army and two affiliated with the RSF, in an attempt to cut off
“key financial flows to both the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces,
depriving them of resources needed to pay soldiers, rearm, resupply, and wage war in Sudan,” 22
But these procedures may not have much influence on the ability of the parties to the conflict
to continue fighting, especially since Russia and the UAE are unlikely to assist in imposing them
on the RSF.23 But Washington will continue trying to deescalate the conflict and to keep its
international adversaries from exploiting the crisis to augment their positions in an area of
strategic significance for American interests.
The Current
Situation in
Syria
A USIP Fact Sheet
Now in its 10th year, the Syrian conflict has led to more than 500,000
deaths and displaced an estimated 13 million—over half of Syria’s pre-war
population. Over 6.2 million Syrians are internally displaced, and 5.6 million
are refugees, predominantly in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.
The war began after the Syrian regime cracked down against peaceful
civilian protestors, quickly evolving into a more complex conflict. Various
factions—the Syrian regime, Syrian rebels, the self-styled Islamic State, al-
Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations, Kurdish-led organizations, and
foreign militias including Hezbollah—have engaged in a costly contest for
control. Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States have also intervened.
Most recently, the emergence of COVID-19 poses great risk both for an
ISIS resurgence and for conflict-affected refugee and displaced
communities, and threatens to exacerbate the country’s existing health,
economic, political, and security crises.
USIP’s Work

The U.S. Institute of Peace has been working in Syria since the war began in
2011. We have supported local leaders, Syrian and international NGOs, and
civil society as they cope with the consequences of conflict. Working with a
local Syrian partner, USIP undertakes local-level, outcome-oriented dialogues
in northeast Syria. These dialogues focus on facilitating the return of internally
displaced persons to their home communities—yielding important
successes—as well as helping to promote peace and shift thinking in local
communities toward nonviolent means and the pursuit of compromise. USIP
also works to increase the knowledge and skills of local leaders who are trying
to resolve conflicts in their communities nonviolently.
Since the Turkish incursion in 2019, and more recently with the COVID-19
global health pandemic, in-person dialogue activities in northeast Syria are not
possible due to security and health risks. However, USIP continues to support
its local partners to conduct conflict analysis, build their capacity for
peacebuilding, and monitor outcomes of dialogues to date.
Resolving Conflicts in Communities

Since 2015, USIP has helped Syrian leaders resolve conflicts in their
communities. In 2015, USIP and our Syrian partner convened 14 leaders—
representing religious, tribal, and civic segments of society—for talks on
tensions in the al-Qahtaniya area of northeast Syria. Although Kurdish-led
forces had cleared al-Qahtaniya of ISIS, more than 100 families—mostly
Kurds not aligned with the dominant political parties—were still unable to
return home. After six months of USIP-supported dialogues, meetings, and
informal discussions, more than 100 families returned home and a key local
road reopened, linking Arab villagers to the al-Qahtaniya town center in al-
Hasakah province.
Building upon our al-Qahtaniya work, USIP and our Syrian partner continued
local-level, outcome-oriented dialogues in other diverse towns and villages in
al-Hasakah. By providing strategic support and targeted trainings, USIP has
strengthened the ability of its partner organization to work with local leaders in
northeast Syria to reduce barriers to the return of displaced people, address
tensions triggered by the conflict, and identify and solve problems shared by
different segments of society. Since 2017, USIP has:
• Helped local leaders adopt agreements to facilitate the return of 684
families to their places of origin in the town of Tal Hamis.
• Coordinated traditional reconciliation on a case-by-case basis between
displaced families and people in their home communities with concerns
about suspected ISIS ties, resulting in the so-far sustainable return of 34
families to their home communities in the towns of Tal Hamis and Tal
Brak.
• Brought 600 people together for a coexistence fair, providing
opportunities to build trust and create momentum for community groups.
Informing Policy through Convenings, Conflict Analysis, and Expert
Engagement

USIP convenes U.S. government and nongovernment stakeholders to

address various aspects of Syria’s complex conflict. In 2018, USIP was
mandated by Congress to facilitate the bipartisan Syria Study Group, which
was established to develop a forward-looking military and diplomatic strategy
for Syria. The Group’s Final Report represented a bipartisan consensus on
U.S. policy on the Syrian conflict. USIP has also brought together government
and nongovernment actors to address the complex challenges embedded in
Syria’s Al Hol displacement camp. We inform policymakers and legislators in
Washington through private briefings, conflict analysis, congressional
testimony, and private roundtables. USIP informs practitioners and the public
through research, media interviews, and public events on Syria and related
issues.
Reducing Tensions Between Refugees and Hosts

Neighboring countries struggle to host Syrian refugees. In Jordan and

Lebanon, USIP has helped local and international organizations train young
Syrians and host communities on how to cultivate cooperative relationships.
USIP has also supported education for journalists in Lebanon on conflict-
sensitive reporting.