WEEK 1 Child penalty affect

women's earnings
a

child
lot .
more

d they
↳ especiallyaffectedafterFo
.

OVERTIME :

than husa.see
i earn more
who never married
· the % of couples get
married couples &
the % of OVERTIME
· :

% divorced couples children per .

woman
· the of i in the
#
of
cohabitating family
·
huge
of opposite
sex
% cultures
different
-
The have
·
↳ countries
· the%
of
married comple family + have kids a lot later in their lines
.

parent family i (because they don't mary) .

·
people rate
fertility
love
· the % of
divorce rate
4
started to . There in still differences in
among
60's
early
·
from the
countries
developing
-
·

education, the love

the

higher
↳ + in 70s
huge the the

↳ 80s plateaued
·
usually
fertility
in the
-

started .
↳ at the end
of 90's they
time) 4
% husband and
wife working
FT
(full
of
·
the
either
traditional comple (husband FT +
Wife
· the % of a t least doesn't work FT) ↓
doesn't work or

I but those over 40

·
gender pay gap
is
slightly wage
still quite high
.

is
gap

WEEK 2 = Gains from marriage

Frontier (PPF)
main sources of potentialgains Possibility

I
· I oint Production

↳ Activities Consumption Couple equally productive

:

of , is
labour
Investment,
:

Division of

it
Production % ↳ with
equally productive couples
material
(productivity is
Labour > specialisation identical) there is no
gain from
Division of
,
-
sector over the other
.

specializing in
one

-
labour to
moto

ofbecomes
a

↳ : division
TM Th
T =
+
personal
to each sponce
T-total time available Household
goods
mar ketjobe
e
↳
split between
Coup Le is
Unequally productive market wais
2) onedoesmarket
de Both 1) do

hathproducedinhone
market goo

E-
work work
a -

L
marker

Specialisation
marker
M good M good
e

Th= time allocated

to household activities -
O M, .
--

-
Mz

i
- - -
- -

I consumption

mingearisa i household household

↳purchasedithemarket
Ne

Thousehold goods
sector more productive
market
.

4) neither does market work

1) the sponce who is
3) Both do household
work in labour market works only
the
in that market whereas
- m a r ke r marker sectors
M good good other works
in both

gains from marriage

:
Other 2) they both
fully specialise
in

are more productive

what
they
problem ↓
My
i household
. . -
-
---

Principal-Agent
ener -
· doing
.

goods
and c a re household 3) born do household work , but

marriage partners provide

,
↳ in ,

transactions .
↳
who i s more productive
non-market the sponce works i n the
to eachother
as
only

of asymetric information The division labour "Tothe a the

household to
other wor

share comma gains from of

is no issue the
↳ There .

marriage usually
both sectors
in
different productivities
Partners in a
when have
and ↓ likliho
f a partners household work
proate
interests
>
in
do
4) only
-

both
principal-agent within couple can >
-

the
↳ since partnersboth are stakeholders in the ↳ specialisation
relationship , there
in a natural
alignment absolute or comparative advantages in
cooperation and mutual +
sectors overall 4 in material
of
interests
.
,
postering specific
support
standard of living
.
scale
. Economies
1
of scale
that arise when the

Credit and Investment

Y cost advantages Coordination :
of production
a.
. Extending
3 credit or loars
due to
factors like
reduction
4 task
:
couples can collaborate and
↳ individuals may face challenges
in
obtaining
or other financial
.
constraints

responsibility - certain tasks

becoming credit income volatility
share
history ,
investment decisions and returns
.

efficient investment activities > better

.
more -

specialisation
in

↳↑ returns to scale
: as the scale
of both ↳
and market work i , the
efficiency ↳ Pensions
and inheritence - provide financial security
household
4
and overall benefits also .
of public
Good
↳ .

Sharing and services that are considered public in nature

.

joint consumption
or use
of goods
2 RISK Pooling responsibilities
↳
children
sharing financial housing fridge
>
. ↳
. -

ex
resources and
↳combining
,
Car and TV
.
private characteristics
:
or
income sources
+ ↓risk with public
diversification of
. ↳
↳
individual
goods
↳ ...
Mitigate
the impact
of
income fluctuations ④ - cost efficiency
collaborative consumption
or unforseen financial challenges
.
+
tenhanced resource utilisation
 Housemates
Benefits
also in
relationships
Benefits on in
long
term =
scale duties
↳ Economies of ex
sharing cleaning
↳ Division labour
of goods
↳
Sharing of public
↳ principal agent
↳ risk sharing coordination
credit and investment
↳ extending
MARBINGE US cohabitation
Benefits in
-

driven by desireyo
alsoprovide
lega
specific a see
Legal marriage
a

Both can be ↳
↳ companionship shared experiences
.
and
benefits
financial inheritance
rights
and
whether legally
or
married pensions ,
and risks, automatic rights
to

Couples together for

emoti

enjoyment of lifetogether benefits

come . .
cohabiting , often
shared activities and
telx
institutions in
support ,
this depends on the role of
which ↳ note that Scandinavian countries
↳ formal recognition of
the
partnership ,
For example in

in household each economy

. extensive and support various
specialisation public services
may encouragerolee and France are
one partner
socially accepted
,

This could involve structures , cohabitation

has become a
and economic family
.

whilst the other the

on career development and viable long-term replacement for legal marriage
. ;
So on

focusing domestic responsibilities

.
in countries
where there i s no robust public
other hand, social
manage e comprehensive
skiefocuses
limited
partner we
or less
forthe meaning
Thisalso ingood
net" and
↳ e pouce "saftey ,
individuals
may find
that specialisation
one capital support systems
he
are crucial for financial
stability
,

dre to
not
theirhuman
building case
of splitting term commitments
.
be
-
see
risking finan long environments legal marriage may and
oradie,
marriageinthe case
such
C

Hence in formal regal

with
- ,
due to the

upHowever and incomes assets

as a more
secure option
it provides
of joint
·

equal financial protections

division

many employment-based
date
divorcing
the

financial equality
man
measure of for US
providing
a
in the
.

↳ for ex
·

to sponses
sponces plans extend coverage
.

health insurance health insurance

marriage for
the sake
of
inceritizing legal
gains .

unmarried
WEEK 3-marriage market SE
#of
S
EQ M

F
M

·
Zi single person output D
if SF =
SFM situation
of
excess supply of women

marital output that

I
gett men

o wanting
more women than
S := share o so there are
·

Zij
=
Si +
Sj and
to
get
married and so will have to

from marriage
. SFn
- - - - - - - - -

to their EF .

si, zi
marry if S > stable
demand of more
-
·

meaning Here
i
- -

egrn men
-

- . .

Stn excess
.

St
=

· can look a t zias reservation

utility if women wanting
to
get
.
married
men than
SFL - - -
- - - -

have to
give of up more their marriage
higher less
zi :
-

The
-

·
They
and offer higher
sf to make marriage

i
to (as there share
↳ the likely you marry are
more attractive women to .

discardS
will be more marriages you
~
e

↳ the better of you are as married => guemarie

women
market # of iden ,

marriage
:

Demand in
and
In model of supply N*

↳ of wome ↳ # of marriages
Supply
=
mer
in
equ
↳ Demand -# of
If
but in the "price" men
pay
to mome
.
↳ no
monetary price supply side)
↑ in (affects
of the
The
higher # women
is marital output that
to women higher St so the
goes
=>
more women
to marry
willing
even those with
the
of
there will be more
more
the better
deal
get momer higher Zi
SF1 Si Sa ·
now for every price ,

of marial output
SF

themarkets
Sm ZMF
-

available
: =
in
↳ share men
get ever Di No a re the
↳ the Im the more men
willing
to
marry ,
> At new eq ,
so there

higher
-
·

zi
.
married
those with
higher people getting
·
morse deal for women and
SFI now a
↳ marriage in
relatively scarce
- - - -

t are now

-
individuals their reservation
utilities
.
SF men are better
off (they -

defer in
_

· more competitive
↳ so because it becomes
population although a husband ,
they
then
· Note that ZMF does not
vary
i n the
for a woman to find
prefere a
accept e
in

beingwillingto
We assume there no
and zf do
Em vary star
.

mer , .
for one person over another as .
sponce #ofwomen
NY
women" selective abortion

> sex ratio imbalances : ↓ in the

# women + "missing
Phenomena that -

S2 there will be
less more
men) Si
·
now for every price ,

· wars (typically #of Se e

available inthe market .

Nb so there a re less
·
migration/immigration South Korea preferable
Di E
·
At new equilibrium .SF2
married
,

(ex China , India, getting

selective abortions to have
boys) people

I
·

↳ women"
"missing
with
technological progress
is what led to
SF
↑ - - - - -

e
marriage now worsedealfora
a
me
combining prejudice
-------

↳
missingwomen.E technologicalprocess-ultrase
scans
↳ so because it becomes
more competitive
Meissueof
-

wife
they
then
for a man to find a

aahige
.
threshold offer
used
to
willing
being
as
girls
is a

star
to
↳ upper limit of
107
boys
# sons Born mer ,
#Tuomen
+
of
"large
in
↳ 2 effects
:

(selective abortions)
shortage of females
NON
-

·
Population sub-groups
·
University campuses, workplaces
 dem and side
affect
men = men
↳ in the #
o ↑ in the #
of will be
m en
o
, there
foreveryprice
now
I

less Si
there will be
men

every price
SF
I
now for , -

Si Dz St , so there a re more
available in the market At new equilibrium
.
SF1 ·

less , .
married
SF2*, Not so there a re
people getting
·
At new equilibrium are less men

e
Di married there

now morsedealfora
as me
people getting a
.
around
i SF ↳marriage
now morsedealfor
wome =

I
a

St
↳
marriage a
*
S ↳ so because it becomes
more competitive
they
I
↓ wife then
find
- - -
W
competitive

i
a
more man to
SF- ↳ so because it becomes for a

eig zin e
----

in we
en
it
inte
staramanagedhusband Being
Garet
S

e # of
S have
7

7 N

Missing women
born (demand i) eqin depends
which

3 effect
on on
sons overall
1) large of
+ in #
42 effects :

(selective abortion)
is
stronger
2) females
shortage of 4)
(supply
I usually effect 2 (supply of women t is

S25 , stronger) .

S#
M
·

For every price are

there we
nowfewer married.

·
*
SF2 NG so there are less
Dz ·
At new equilibrium . ,

D married
,
t
-ing
people yell
und
morse deal for men
in now a
↳ marriage
women are better
off (they
are now relatively scarce
↳ so because it becomes
more competitive
SFP
they asset
then
for a man to find a un

higher a

willingo wellbigent
o

star
being SF M

more men remain unmarried

&
Q now
many
Ne NY than before
.

men,
-
women

Market

I
Effect of
Sexual Revolution on
Marriage
WEEK 4 So in the past ,
the cost
than
of sex outside
marriage was much

upward shift of supply

men-
curse . for
higher for
women

↑ womens wages > (betters for women by $

-
In But then when social environment changes
the cost
of sex outside marriageC meaning
that women feel less need to
vertical part
quantity change
so
stays married Supply 4. However these changes also
make
marriage

·
:
not a
get
.
·

demand band demand

the same less
appealing
to men and : .

borne
may even
· Better outside opportunities for women such as
shift more since the cost
of unwanted
pregnancies mainly
and ↑ Ef
(well-being of

·i
+ .
women
↑ female
education wages

SE o
single
women it

share
· Both demand and supply
higher
-------

require a
but demand t
..

↑ *
↳ supply curve shifts up as women
.
married .
more
marital output SF i n order to
get
SF
-----
of unwanted
excessdemo,
o ↳ cost
of having
·

al egnthereelnow have
old children
higherfor
is
(SFA) to 4
Price will .
married S2
willing get to
morer .

mechanism you gain

in a partnership Better deal
equilibrium
:

men ,
New :

↳ if well-being improves off

outsid
for
↓
men .

- ⑳

partnership
.

a reg
Mesokegalestinatingnaue
·

e
wages > downwardshift of supply
curse
In
↑
.

womens -
to
marriage
en
see relative

so vertical part
stays N
changesoutside
-opportunities
E
quantity change

·
· not a

the same - women

worse outside opportunities for women such as Also t h e number

of marriages t
particularly for younger
married later.
·

and
wage
+ b zf(well-being a people (people star t to
get
education
↓female
lower share
e
St
noteThatThis
a
requiresBot techni
↳ supply curve shifts down as women require a
· However
.
married
marital output SF in order to
get
of

momeldegnthermalinowsSupere
SF · at
b)
pro
gren
b change
mechanisin You
: loose in a partnership
#
men ,

mover
if well-being worsens
outside
of
partnership
.
-

Availability of effective birth control :

sexual revolution + Birth control availability

avoid
something
which
supply
curve pill"
shiftbeinlarger
I

of the
now the
contraception women can
GOLDINE power

·
· ·

lunwanted
pregnancyI than the
than to men
costly to them
much more 52
is
D2 may i n the demand curve
4 woman delay marriage
if single women's shift
X

↳
supply may shift
more
wellbeing *
er the
hig

improves
more than
single
mex's .
----

women car invest

more in
especially
capital (get
·

their human
married later)
is more
and
attractive
being ↳ifyouknow canavoda
you a

single T investment in
plan better and
to them (because they . Before this
wa s
human capital to invest
#of man,
can avoid unwanted pregnancies) having
not possible
inchuman capital
as it was risky
due to possibility of
to withdraw due to the high
women costs
unwanted pregnancies
.
of
 reproductive tech
Biological Clock constraint Impact of effective assisted in their 30's
·

ifaverage
on
of
married
one the
is
goals
to have children
,
as to
why on the
marriage
market of women :

people get
would naturally prefer to have. demand a treatments that help
then mes
fertility
as
·

more
fertile partners (on average younger T
women in their mid thirties have
"dejects" fecundity
with
·
If could wome will i the
age
then this as
With respect to other
women ,

interested in If of
· these
less
-
negative
-

make men less .

potentially becomes
factor
women
marrying
them instead of younger -

↳ additionally
wait
long have
Ihumanif they
so now
they it more
However the reason
may
to
get
married is because women

their human capital

also want
(time taking invested
Also
-
.
capital
in their

to invest in -

trade-off SFT
.
more marriages and
-

and hence face a

- could see
↓
· Zot with
age
because
yean dity
with womens
age (although
EF may 4if
.

have invested in human .

capital)
you

Imbalances with ethnic groups

.
WHY ?

white women most women

1) ↓ in
marriage prospects for African
among
·
the
children i
grew i (their Siare i
aremarriedandmost
↑ American women

· black women -
the
opposite
among
E 2) 44 The ↑
in EF in EF is
Female
married t both white wages
.

·
proportion of women
for black word than white
is much greater for
.

and black but this

t
proportionally more for
is smallerfor
disadvantage by
race
black women
.
earnings well-educated women ;
among
don't
Also more
that
mary
↳ Black women %
of
,
women o women .

men
from 1960 -> 2006 + by 32% low educated, women better off than -

white 17 %
to
by
↳ for
3) Welfare system
women
↑ - ↑ in EF : allowed momen

Immigrants and women in market

to not bother
getting married but still
having
with children,
children

of poor single women

↳ shifte men

It supply/demand Benefits to
at low income
↳ this view only works when looking
Additional Effects : women .

immigration
Laws
1( tougher
① MAIN DRIVER ↓ in the number
C

between natives and

of
~

· ↑ in the #of marrages :

immigrants Ext
.

Immigrant affected
men :
Eo4
Immigrant
women
men"
e "marriagable .

negatively
be industralisation

re
-
ed ,
employment
↳ American mar ral

:
for African
it
:

education - ↑ mortality and

↓
S2
men,
levels
of
incarceration rates -
,

higher
#ofo
I as mer
married
t
native women get a better
H women
>-
I prefer to
not
get and less attractive
marriagable
·

Fliklihood that
immigrant women deal .

reservation utility of become less

a native man-because
marryoutside SE
·

opportunities tre
the
L male immigrants M si
for a moment (staying single
outsideutilities get morse
met
marrigable
·
their
(ZFN) shift ↓ supply ① t in
-
> in native
value
marrying
- a
↳
they now

immigrant
women's reservational woman more
before
there
DI the vertical part
note that here
.

Utility 7.
·
immigrant men
get a morse
↳
they
now value marrying
a native man deal .

in marital
more than .
before also moves - less men

2) how immigrants affect

the
productivity and job market seminal work of Becker

e
opportunities of natives in incarcerated men
:
.
shows ↑
would want a
- -

② ZF
-

. Women
↓ st
SFy better deal (higher
opportunities
+
↳ outside

#of men,

N - Ni women

at the same time - pushes

To changes happen
down the #
.
of marriages massively
 2) immigrants
how affect the productivity andjob
natives :

opportunities of IMMGRANTS
YOUNG MALE
A LARGE INFLOW OF
CONSIDER

SE
M si
substitutes (compete
, directly
↳
if
native men
and immigrantproductivity perfect
which could I
men
of
are
native men .
This could
negatively
DI marriagable
men
jobs
.

native
same N the #
of
for thethe
- in
native men

marriage prospects of
affect

t
would Si
native women

to
↓

! N - Ni
#of
women
men,
↑

te see directly

Bare Compared on positively

immigranteeing
and
↳ if native men
which could -
same jobs
for thethe marriage o
assect

SD2

L
I So
would
Di

native women
SE -
- -
-
-

↑
- -

- ·

I #O n
NP a
>
-
WEEK 5 model
Matching
Match
quality -> possible pairings yield .
quality
not all the same match

conditions for equ

:

↳ marital depends quality of

to
preges
the .
sponce
output on the
who
married person
Nonsranelanymore 1)There it
- -

Y no
with attributes and
EMF = h j. Sc i
assertive
main
be single =

oputnowmcansemedegree
of

Idemiparmersaffectmarital form
to

· persons who
preger
2C There are no two

a new union
men and women
sides of market eqm :
:

Guarantee unique
↳ two

withoutanyexplicit to see pie because

I

↳ exchange
th men and women
are ranked by a
single trait
thereareindividualattributes of their share
↳
on the
↳ So , individuals
marrige output
want to max

↳ homogenous preferences
: all men
agree
BUT individuals know they can
generate and vice versa

is
-
>
ranking of women
e
depending
on

differentund
h ous
each parther
partnership
:
identity of
a FRAME WORKS
(NTU)
.
matters) 1) non-transferable utility
fixed
rule , no compensation"
allowed E
quality of a match

in the market according to a

is shared
↳ marital output characteristics
determined by the partners'
.

potential partners is solely within the couple

. .

over transfer output

preferences couple
to
↳ not feasible within the
↳ feasible to transfer output
2) transferable utility
eing.
-

infoabo
assumeperfectandcastless
↳ characteristics but home they share the
determinedmatch not
only by the partners'
↳ quality of a

driving force Output

.

are the
↳ preferences
potential partners
.

preferences rankings NTU

of
↳

and demand when there

make
m
(PAM) + associate a
matching supply Positive
assortive matching female a
win

quality of
to a

no explicit prices
and - endowment
highmanite
are -
match mall
ers - wit a true for Negative
assortative
the
- ↳ The opposite is .
(NAM)
matching

if ukyissrictytinbon e
have oppos
a
if andy stable
effects on output
-
unique
is one with
assignment is one with
assignment
perfect PAM perfect NAM

I take FOS

share you
receive is fixed you ,

Since the output

those whose attributes
Want to match with
marital output
.

↑ the
(check Foc
450 when there is NTU , monotonicity
to determine
the .
equ
in attributes is enough
(not the carse with TV)
.