Cons%tu%onal Law 1

February 11, 2024

John Carlo Villaseñor
Exercise of Governmental Powers: Separa7on, Blending, Delega7on of Powers

The Exercise of Government Power

There are three branches of the government — legisla%ve, execu%ve and judicial. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of the maJers within its jurisdic%on, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and dis%nct that the
Cons%tu%on intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Cons%tu%on
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordina%on in the workings of the
various departments of the government.

Separa7on of Powers

Ar$cle VI, Sec$on 1: The legisla%ve power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representa%ves, except to the extent reserved in the people by provision on
ini%a%ve and referendum.

Ar$cle VII, Sec$on 1: The execu%ve power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Ar$cle VII, Sec$on 1: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Ra$onale: It aims to prevent a concentra%on of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to
an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican ins%tu%ons. It is intended to
secure ac%on, forestall overac%on, to prevent despo%sm and to obtain efficiency.

Interdependence: Even as a department may not control, interfere with or encroach upon the acts done
within the cons%tu%onal competence of the other, the departments have to interact with one another to
achieve unity of purpose.

Blending of Powers: In the performance of a cons%tu%onal task, one department acts in a manner
complimentary or supplementary to the other. For example, bills are passed by Congress and sent to the
President for his approval. The Execu%ve Department prepares the budget and submits it to Congress that uses
it as basis for enac%ng the general appropria%ons act.

Checks and balances: The Cons%tu%on gives each department certain powers by which it may definitely
restrain the others from improvident ac%on, thereby maintaining the balance among them and preserving the
will of the sovereign expressed in the Cons%tu%on. The President’s veto power, the power of Congress to over-
ride the veto, the power of impeachment, and the court’s power to declare legisla%ve and execu%ve acts
uncons%tu%onal are examples of checks and balances under the cons%tu%on.

Poli$cal Ques$on Doctrine: A poli%cal ques%on is a ques%on of policy, one that involves the wisdom of the
acts of the execu%ve and legisla%ve branches of government, or one that is leY for the people to decide in
their sovereign capacity. Poli%cal ques%ons are beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry in deference to the
separa%on of powers doctrine.
 Delega7on of Powers

Cons$tu$onal doctrine: It is a well-entrenched principle of cons%tu%onal law that generally, legisla%ve power
may only be exercised by the legisla%ve branch, and may not be delegated to the other branches of
government. No department of government, be it legisla%ve, execu%ve, or judicial except when authorized by
the cons%tu%on, can abdicate authority of escape responsibility by delega%ng any of its powers to another
body. Any aJempt at such delega%ons of power is void under the maxim, “potesta delegata non po test
delegari.”

Ethical basis of the rule: It is based on the principle that a delegated power cons%tutes not only a right but
also a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. The power to whose judgment, wisdom and patrio%sm this high preroga%ve has
been entrusted cannot relieve itself off the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power
shall be delegated nor can it subs%tute the judgment, wisdom and patrio%sm of any other body for those to
which alone the people have seen fit to confide the sovereign trust.

When allowed: It is well-established in this jurisdic%on that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
ac%vity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the laJer may cons%tu%onally delegate
authority to promulgate rules and regula%ons and implement a given legisla%on and effectuate its policies, for
the reason that the legislature oYen finds it imprac%cable (if not impossible) to an%cipate and provide for the
mul%farious and complex situa%ons that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that
the regula%on should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regula%on be not in
contradic%on with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

Valid delega$on: Delega%on of legisla%ve power is authorized in the following cases:

A. By direct cons3tu3onal grant
1. Tarriff powers to the President
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limita%on and restric%ons as it may impose, tarrif rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other du%es or imposts within the framework of the
na%onal development program of the Government. (Ar3cle VI, Sec3on 28 (2))
Ra$onale: There is the necessity of giving to the Chief Execu%ve the authority to act
immediately on certain maJers affec%ng the na%onal economy lest delay may result in
hardship to the people. The President must be able to respond quickly to changes
happening in tariff structures and rates as these may cause possible adverse consequences
to the economy. The legisla%ve process is much too cumbersome for the speedy solu%on of
some economic problems, especially rela%ng to foreign trade.

2. Emergency Powers to the President

In %mes of war or other na%onal emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President
for a limited period and subject to suck restric%ons as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared na%onal policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolu%on of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. (Ar3cle
VI, Sec3on 23 (2))
Scope: The scope off the grant is the exercise of such “powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
na%onal policy.” Thus, subject to restric%ons that Congress may provide, the President is given powers to dela
with the emergency. The condi%ons for the grant of emergency powers are as follows:
1. There must be a war or other na%onal emergency
 2. The delega%on must be for a limited period only
3. The delega%on must be subject to such restric%ons as Congress may provide.
4. The emergency power must be exercised to carry out a declared na%onal policy.

3. Rule Making Power to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Promulgate rules concerning the protec%on and enforcement and cons%tu%onal rights,
pleading, prac%ce, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the prac%ce of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rues shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposi%on of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substan%ve rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effec%ve unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court. (Ar3cle VIII, Sec3on 5 (5))
Scope: On the basis of this power, the Supreme Court has promulgated the Rules of Court, the rules on
admission to the bar, the crea%on and opera%on of the integrated bar, and rules on legal assistance to the
underprivileged. The power to make rules for the above-named subjects is lodged exclusively in the Supreme
Court, and Congress has no power to cause any amendment thereto.

4. Delegated Powers to Local Governments

Each local government sha have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy
taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limita%ons as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to local governments. (Ar3cle X, Sec3on V)
Scope: The above cons%tu%onal grant of power allows local governments to create its own sources of revenue
and levy taxes. The delega%on also encompasses the powers specifically enumerated under the Local
Government Code that is subsumed under the so-called general welfare clause. The power is exercised
principally by the enactment of ordinances by the local legisla%ve councils.

5. Rule Making Powers of Cons3tu3onal Commissions

The Commission on Elec%ons, Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit being
independent bodies have been granted by the Cons%tu%on rule-making p0owers as can be
gleaned from the following provisions.

Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and prac7ce
before it or before any of its offices. Such rues however shall not diminish, increase or modify
substan7ve rights. (Ar3cle IX-A, Sec3on 6)

The Commission on Elec7ons shall promulgate its own rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposi7on of elec7on cases, including pre-proclama7on controversies. (Ar3cle IX-e, Sec3on 3)

The Commission on Audit shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examina7on, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accoun7ng and audi7ng rules and regula7ons, including those for the preven7on and
disallowance for irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures,
or uses of government funds and proper7es. (Ar3cle IX-D, Sec3on 2 (2)) Likewise, Ar%cle XIII,
Sec%on 18 of the 1987 Cons%tu%on empowers the Commission on Human Rights to “adopt its
opera%onal guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for viola%ons thereof in
accordance with the Rules Court.”
B. By legisla$ve grant: Delega$on of powers to administra$ve bodies
- Subordinate legisla$on: This involves the power of administra%ve agencies, granted by an enabling
law, to make implemen%ng ruies and regula%ons. They are tested by their conformity to the
standards set by, and their ability to carry out the legisla%ve intent contained in the primary law.
- Ra$onale for administra$ve regula$on: This has been brought about by the increasing complexity
of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its aJen%on.
- Tests of valid delega$on of powers: There are several tests for determining whether delega%on is
unlawful:
a. Completeness Test: A law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
legislature that nothing is leY to judgment of the delegate. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Cons%tu%on to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delega%on of legisla%ve power, the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness o the measure enacted. The legislature
does not abdicate its func%ons when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in
which the legisla%ve process can go forward. A dis%nc%on has righkully been made between
delega%on of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discre%on as to what it shall
be, which cons%tu%onally may not be done, and delega%on of authority or discre%on as to its
execu%on to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objec%on can be
made.
b. Sufficiency of Standards Test: The statute must not only define a fundamental legisla%ve policy,
mark its limits and boundaries, and specify the public agency to exercise the legisla%ve power. It
must also indicate the circumstances under which the legisla%ve command is to be effected. To
void the taint of unlawful delega%on, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines maJers of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdica%on may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legisla%ve policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legisla%ve command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legisla%ve purpose may be carried out. ThereaYer, the execu%ve and
administra%ve office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regula%ons. The standard may be either express or implied if the
former, the non-delega%on objec%on is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose off the act considered as
a whole.
 Structure and Power of Government
The Cons%tu%on is the fundamental law of the land. The present poli%cal structure of the Philippines was
defined by the 1987 Cons%tu%on, duly ra%fied in a plebiscite held on February 2, 1987 and proclaimed ra%fied
on February 11, 1987.

The Philippines is a republic with a presiden%al form of government wherein power is equally divided among
its three branches: execu%ve, legisla%ve, and judicial. One basic corollary in a presiden%al system of
government is the principle of separa%on of powers wherein legisla%on belongs to Congress, execu%on to the
Execu%ve, and seJlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. The Legisla%ve branch is authorized to make
laws, alter, and repeal them through the power vested in the Philippine Congress. This ins%tu%on is divided
into the Senate and the House of Representa%ves. The Execu%ve branch is composed of the President and the
Vice President who are elected by direct popular vote and serve a term of six years. The Cons%tu%on grants
the President authority to appoint his Cabinet. These departments form a large por%on of the country’s
bureaucracy. The Judicial branch holds the power to seJle controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable. This branch determines whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discre%on amoun%ng to lack or excess of jurisdic%on on the part and instrumentality of the government. It is
made up of a Supreme Court and lower courts. The Cons%tu%on expressly grants the Supreme Court the
power of Judicial Review as the power to declare a treaty, interna%onal or execu%ve agreement, law,
presiden%al decree, proclama%on, order, instruc%on, ordinance or regula%on uncons%tu%onal.

The Cons7tu7onal Commissions

General Provisions.
1. The independent cons%tu%onal commissions are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elec%ons
and the Commission on Audit [Sec. 1, Art. IX-A].
2. Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions:
- They are cons%tu%onally created; may not be abolished by statute.
- Each is expressly described as “independent”
- Each is conferred certain powers and func%ons which cannot be reduced by statute.
- The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment.
- The Chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of office of seven years.
- The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an ac%ng capacity

Inhibi$ons/Disqualifica$ons
- Shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or employment.
- Shall not engage in the prac%ce of any profession.
- Shall not engage in the ac%ve management or control of any business which in any way may be
affected by the func%ons of his office.
- Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentali%es,
including government-owned or -controlled corpora%ons or their subsidiaries. 4

Rota$onal Scheme of Appointments.

The first appointees shall serve terms of seven, five and three years, respec%vely. AYer the first commissioners
are appointed, the rota%onal scheme is intended to prevent the possibility of one President appoin%ng all the
Commissioners. In Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335. December 13,2000, it was held that in
order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by the Cons%tu%on, the rota%onal plan requires two
condi%ons:
(1) The terms of the first commissioners should start on a common date; and (2) Any vacancy due to death,
resigna%on or disability before the expira%on of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.

Decisions.
1. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or maJer brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolu%on. [Sec. 7, Art. IX-A],
a) The provision of the Cons%tu%on is clear that what is required is the majority vote of all the
members, not only of those who par%cipated in the delibera%ons and voted thereon in order that a
valid decision may be made by the Cons%tu%onal Commissions. Under rules of statutory
construc%on, it is to be assumed that the words in which the cons%tu%onal provisions are couched
express the objec%ve sought to be aJained [Estrella v. Comelec, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004],
This ruling abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua v. Comelec, 156 SCRA 582.
b) In Dumayas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001, because two Commissioners who had
par%cipated in the delibera%ons had re%red prior to the promulga%on of the decision, the Supreme
Court said that the votes of the said Commissioners should merely be considered withdrawn, as if
they had not signed the resolu%on at all, and only the votes of the remaining Commissioners
considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy. Unless the withdrawal of the votes would
materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, there is no reason to
declare the decision a nullity. In this case, with the withdrawal of the votes of Commissioners
Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners, s%ll
cons%tu%ng a quorum at the %me of the promulga%on of the resolu%on, would s%ll be 3 to 1 (and
thus, be a vote of the majority) in favor of the respondent.

2. As to the need to expedite resolu%on of cases and the 60-dayperiod for decision, in Alvarez v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 142527, March 1, 2001, the Supreme Court said that the Comelec has numerous cases before it where
aJen%on to minu%ae is cri%cal. Considering the Commission’s manpower and logis%cal limita%ons, it is
sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realis%cally. Overly strict adherence to deadlines
might induce the Commission to resolve elec%on contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material %me. This is
not what the framers had intended.

3. Any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on cer%orari by the
aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
a)In Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251, the Supreme Court held that when it reviews a decision of the
Comelec, the Court exercises extraordinary jurisdic%on; thus, the proceeding is limited to issues
involving grave abuse of discre%on resul%ng in lack or excess of jurisdic%on, and does not ordinarily
empower the Court to review the factual findings of the Commission. In Loong v. Comelec, G.R. No.
133676, April 14, 1999, the Court reiterated that cer%orari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
appropriate remedy to invalidate disputed Comelec resolu%ons, i.e., final orders, rulings and decisions
of the Comelec rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
b) In Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999, the Court said that under Rule 64,
Sec. 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments or final orders of the Commission on Audit may be
brought by an aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on cer%orari under Rule 65. Even before the
effec%vity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the mode of eleva%ng cases decided by the Commission
on Audit to the Supreme Court was only by pe%%on for cer%orari under Rule 65, as provided by the
Cons%tu%on. The judgments and final orders of COA are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or
appeal by cer%orari to the Supreme Court. Only when the COA acts without or in excess of jurisdic%on,
or with grave abuse of discre%on amoun%ng to lack or excess of jurisdic%on, may this Court entertain a
pe%%on for cer%orari under Rule 65.
 c) In the case of decisions of the Civil Service Commission, however, Supreme Court Revised Circular 1-91,
as amended by Revised Administra%ve Circular 1 -95, which took effect on June 1,1995, provides that
final resolu%ons of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable by cer%orari to the Court of
Appeals within fiYeen days from receipt of a copy thereof. From the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the party adversely affected thereby shall file a pe%%on for review on cer%orari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
d) Thus, in Mahinay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152457, April 30, 2008, the Supreme Court held that the
proper mode of appeal from the decision of the Civil Service Commission is a pe%%on for review under
Rule 43 filed with the Court of Appeals.
e)In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004, because the pe%%oner
imputed to the Court of Appeals “grave abuse of discre%on” for ruling that he had no legal standing to
contest the disapproval of his appointment, the Supreme Court said that “grave abuse of discre%on is a
ground for a pe%%on for cer%orari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court”. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court resolved to give due course to the pe%%on and to treat it appropriately as a pe%%on for review
on cer%orari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The grounds alleged shall be deemed “reversible
errors", not “grave abuse of discre%on”.

The CSC
A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born ci%zens of the Philippines and, at the %me of
their appointment, at least 35 years of age, with proven capacity for public administra%on, and must not have
been candidates for any elec%ve posi%on in the elec%on immediately preceding their appointment. They shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven [7]
years without reappointment. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
ac%ng capacity. See Brillantes v. Yorac, supra..

The COMELEC
A Chairman and six [6] Commissioners who shall be natural born Filipino ci%zens, at least 35 years of age,
holders of a college degree, and have not been candidates in the immediately preceding elec%on. Majority,
including the Chairman, must be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the prac%ce of law
for at least ten (10) years. [Sec. 1, Art. IX-C]. They shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven [7] years without reappointment. No member shall be
appointed or designated in a temporary or ac%ng capacity. See Brillantes v. Yorac, supra..

The COA
A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural born Filipino ci%zens, at least 35 years of age, CPAs
with not less than 10 years of audi%ng experience or members of the Philippine Bar with at least 10 years
prac%ce of law, and must not have been candidates in the elec%on immediately preceding the appointment.
At no %me shall all members belong to the same profession [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-D]. They shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment [Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-D].

Sandiganbayan
PD 1606
WHEREAS, the new Cons%tu%on declares that a public office is a public trust and ordains that public officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain at all %mes accountable to the people; WHEREAS, to aJain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, Sec%on 5, Ar%cle XIII of the New Cons%tu%on provides for the
crea%on of a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Cons%tu%on, do hereby order and
decree as follows:
Sec$on 1. Sandiganbayan; composi7on; qualifica7ons; tenure; removal and composi7on. A special court, of
the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of jus%ce, to be
known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding Jus%ce and eight Associate Jus%ces
who shall be appointed by the President. No person shall be appointed Presiding Jus%ce or Associate Jus%ce of
the Sandiganbayan; unless he is a natural-born ci%zen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at
least ten years has been a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the prac%ce of law in the Philippines
or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.
Sec$on 4. Jurisdic7on. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdic%on over:
(a) Viola%ons of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the An%-GraY and Corrupt Prac%ces
Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes commiJed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corpora%ons, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses commiJed by public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corpora%ons, in rela%on to their office.

The jurisdic%on herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a
penalty higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall
be concurrent with the regular courts.
Ombudsman
Office of the Special Prosecutor
National Commissions