IPE and International Regimes

Economía Política Internacional y Regímenes Internacionales
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Clive ARCHER, 2001. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Review by Prof. Dr. H. G. Schermers, Leiden. That “International Organizations" is not a legal book
becomes clear right from the first page. Used to terminology which has been confirmed by
practice and case law, lawyers will have little difficulty with either the word „international" or the
word „organization". Archer on the other hand defines and criticizes both terms. „International"
should in fact be „intergovernmental" and „organization" could better be „institution". In both
cases good reasons are presented.
After the definitions Archer offers an historical survey of intergovernmental cooperation in Europe
which gradually grew into international organizations. After the unions of the 19th century the
League of Nations is distinguished somewhat more extensively. Subsequently, a survey is given of
the creation of the United Nations and other international organizations after the Second World
War. The first chapter then ends with an enumeration of several working definitions of the notion
„international organization".
In the second chapter Archer discusses different classifications of international organizations. Next
to the traditional intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations he
distinguishes hybrid international non-governmental organizations which draw their membership
partly from non-governmental and partly from governmental institutions. As another category he
mentions transgovernmental organizations which are governmental organizations not controlled
by the central foreign policy organs of their government. As example he mentions the
International Union of Local Authorities, Interpol and the International Parliamentary Union. As a
fourth category he distinguishes „business international non-governmental organizations
(BINGOs)" which are the multinational enterprises.
After this classification the classification between regional and universal organizations is made.
Loyal to the tendency of putting figures in tables a classification is made on the homogeneity of
different international organizations. As the most homogeneous organization the Benelux is found
with a maximum number of fifteen points. Second comes the European Communities with twelve
points. Last is the U. N. with only one point. However interesting such classifications may be, I do
not find them very convincing. Since the antagonism between the Flemish and the Walloon
regions of Belgium Benelux does not function that well. The Community, although less
homogeneous, seems more effective.
A next classification is made as to aims and activities. Again we find a table on which seventeen
different activities are mentioned and crosses are placed behind each organization which performs
them. The table is practical for a journalist who wants a quick survey but is necessarily defective if
one wants to go into detail. I find it difficult to understand why after the United Nations a cross is
placed under labour, education, culture and health but not under food and agriculture, trade and
commodities, fisheries or transport. The EFTA gets a cross under agriculture and fisheries, but not
under transport. A similar table is made for non-governmental organizations in which the
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International Olympic Committee gets a cross for education, culture and health and the Liberal
International for „broad political", education and human rights. Several more tables are offered in
which the aims and activities of international organizations are systematically presented. Finally a
classification is made as to the structure of international organizations.
The third chapter of the book is on writings on international organizations. The works of many
authors are discussed (of course, it is impossible to be complete). The literature is divided in:
traditional views, revisionist views, structuralist views and globalist views. The traditional views
are subdivided in those of international lawyers, the world law school (Clark and Sohn),
international government, realists and neo-realists. The other views are similarly subdivided. On
the whole the chapter gives an interesting survey of the different approaches in literature.
Chapter four on the role and function of international organizations examines their place in the
contemporary world. Are they mere instruments for performing the policy of their member states
or are they separate actors on the international scenery? Archer concludes that they have a role of
their own. One cannot imagine the contemporary world without international organizations. Their
number has grown because they have a function which cannot be fulfilled by national states. They
perform functions that help to keep the international political system working.
The fifth chapter concerns the future. Archer predicts that the growth in the number of
intergovernmental organizations is likely to decline and that their number will remain at
approximately 300, but he expects that the number of NGO's will have tripled by the end of the
century. The United Nations is unlikely to contribute much to disarmament which will remain a
bilateral affair. The trend in economic, social and environmental organizations seems to point to
larger bureaucracies, more politicized and less effective organizations. „As the Titanic sinks, the
orchestra is quarrelling over which music should be played".
Clive Archer ends his book with the quest for a better alternative. Under this heading he refers to
the Palme Report, the Brandt Report and the Brundtland Report. Especially the first one has
exerted some influence on the developments. The role of the U. N. Security Council must be
strengthened. Both the U. N. and regional agencies should move more purposefully into dealing
with states' internal conflicts as these form the bulk of threats to international peace today. In the
Third World political and administrative reforms are necessary in order to achieve a change in the
international economic system. Finally, Archer expects an important growth of international
nongovernmental organizations and of their influence on governmental activities. It is especially
with reference to the NGO's that he writes his final sentence: „the history of international
organizations, with its modest beginnings in the 19th century, might then enter a golden age".
..
Malgorzata Lange PUC.
Intergovernmental, transnational, transgovernmental = international organizations
- International organizations up to the First World War: Congreso de Viena 1814-15-

codificó las reglas de la diplomacia; Conferencias de la Haya 1905-1907 – International
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Court of Justice; 1919 Versailles Peace Conference 1919 – la Liga de las Naciones y la ILO
en Genova…..;
El rol de las organizaciones internacionales:

- Instrumento para los fines específicos,
- Arena – foro del debate, cooperación, discusión entre los estados, actores soberanos – el
rol de segunda imagen de las OI
- OI como actor independiente
Funciones:
- Articulación y agregación
- Normas, actividades normativas, creación y propagación de normas, aplicación de las
normas, adjudicación de las normas,
- Reclutamiento
- Socialización,
- Información,
- Operacionalización funcional
- Gobernanza global
Enfoques: realista tradicional; neo-realista, legal internacionalista, de gobernanza internacional
(Escuela Inglesa), funcionalistas (Mitrany – A Working Peace System 1943- integración política,
realización de políticas sectoriales por organizaciones internacionales, abandono de la visión
estado-céntrica); neo-funcionalismo (Haas – análisis de la unificación europea); transaccionalitas –
intensificación de relaciones y consolidación de la confianza y predictabilidad (Deutsch);
interdependencia (Keohane y Nye 1977).
…..
David BALDWIN, 1985.ECONOMIC STATESCRAFT
Baldwin's motivation is his belief that "the utility of economic techniques of statecraft has been
systematically underestimated by most analysts since 1945" (13). His primary goal is to challenge
the conventional wisdom that the use of economic embargoes as an instrument of statecraft does
not work and to rehabilitate the reputation of economic statecraft. Baldwin's concern with
reevaluating the utility of economic statecraft as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy stems from
his belief that "in a nuclear age, it is especially important, nay imperative, to understand the
capabilities and limitations of alternatives to military force. He uses the social power literature to
demonstrate that the use of sanctions is almost always effective.
Baldwin uses indicators other than a change in the policy of the target, he seems primarily to
support the importance of the symbolic uses of sanctions. But when sanctions are used primarily
as a symbolic response to a foreign policy crisis, the symbolic meaning of the sanctions takes
precedence over any impact that the sanctions may have on the target. His emphasis on foreign
policy as purposive behavior leads him to borrow a conceptual framework from the social power
literature as a means with which to evaluate the utility of economic statecraft. The social power
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literature focuses on one actor's ability to get another actor to do something that the second actor
would otherwise not choose to do.
This analytical framework provides a method for identifying multiple means, multiple goals, and
relational concepts (that is, concepts, such as influence, that indicate something about the relative
ability of one actor to influence another with the use of economic sanctions. His concern with the
linkages between policy and power leads him to emphasize the means by which policies (in this
case, foreign policies) are carried out-for example, through the use of economic sanctions or
military force.
Baldwin identifies four instruments of foreign policy, derived from Lasswell's taxonomy of
techniques of statecraft, that are available to policy-makers in their efforts to obtain foreign policy
goals: information, diplomacy, economics, and force. In the context of statecraft, these categories
translate into the following means of conducting foreign policy: 1. Propaganda refers to influence
attempts that rely primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols. 2. Diplomacy refers
to influence attempts that rely primarily on negotiation. 3. Economic statecraft refers to influence
attempts that rely primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in
terms of money. 4. Military statecraft refers to influence attempts that rely primarily on violence,
weapons, or force.
To evaluate the advantages of economic statecraft, Baldwin distinguishes between "influence

attempts" and "influence”. The distinction between targets and objectives allows him to point out
that in assessing the utility of alternative policy instruments, especially economic statecraft, one
must recognize the multiple goals and targets involved in an influence attempt. Baldwin introduces
a further distinction, derived from the social power literature, to help assess the utility of
alternative instruments of foreign policy: the difference between property concepts and relational
concepts.
Property concepts are attributes of states "that can be defined and measured without reference to
other countries. Property concepts include attributes of states such as population, geographic
area, and wealth, in addition to instruments of statecraft. In contrast, relational concepts such as
influence, capabilities, outcomes, and results can only be understood in terms of the relationship
between two or more actor. Baldwin makes the argument that "the study of techniques of
statecraft is complicated and confused by the tendency to treat the capabilities (power resources,
power assets, or power bases) of states as if they were property rather than relational concepts."
Baldwin uses this distinction to argue that policymakers use economic policy instruments (a
property concept) "to exercise noneconomic forms of power" through other relational bases of
influence.28 For example, relational concepts would reveal whether the target state interpreted
an embargo as "a veiled threat to use military force if compliance is not forthcoming.
Through distinguishing between the bases of influence (economic, military, and so forth) and the
means by which the influence attempt is accomplished (embargoes) he points out that: Embargoes
may trigger a sense of shame, impose a sense of isolation from the world community, signal a
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willingness to use more radical measures, or simply provoke a reexamination of policy stances in
the target country. Economic sanctions may have diplomatic, psychological, political, military, or
other effects even when their economic effect is nil. Ignoring this fact severely impairs one's ability
to evaluate the costs and effectiveness of economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy.
Thus, economic statecraft (property concepts) may succeed because of their connection with
noneconomic causal conditions (relational concepts). To the extent that sanctions impose costs on
the source state, Baldwin suggests that they lend credibility to the source state's intentions. He
argues, "Costs are widely regarded as a standard indicator of the intensity of one's resolve.
Baldwin argues that, if we are to evaluate whether sanctions are excessively costly, we must
compare their costs with the expected costs of alternative courses of action, which typically
involve the use of military force.
Baldwin's concern with the advantages of economic statecraft leads him to stress the importance
of the symbolic uses of sanctions. He argues that sanctions can be effective even though they are
not severe enough to exact the compliance of the target state. Baldwin ofrece una perspectiva de
la medición de eficiencia de las sanciones no solamente desde punto de vista del objetivo político,
que es el cambio de las políticas del estado contra el cual las sanciones están puestas. Se trata de
comparar el resultado obtenido con los escenarios posibles y también discernir bien los objetivos
de las sanciones (no según la lógica de “todo o nada”) dado su contexto multidimensional de
configuración política (contingencias políticas). A veces se logra evitar el conflicto mayor (militar)
o subir los costos de “desobediencia” del estado.
Base values: a power base refers to the causal condition that makes a successful influence
attempt possible (that can serve as bases of power (power, rectitude, respect, affection, well-
being, wealth, skill, enlightment). The three cases suggest that states can have various options that
determine the economic impact of sanctions on the target state. These cases suggest that the
options are in part a function of the stability of the international political system (Gilpin
characterizes the stability of the international political system as "largely determined by its
capacity to adjust to the demands of actors affected by changing political and environmental
conditions."
There is no consensus in the literature about whether a specific structure contributes to the
stability of the system. Instead, Gilpin argues that "the most destabilizing factor is the tendency in
an international system for the power of member states to change at different rates because of
political, economic, and technological developments. The importance of stability to the argument
here is that when the international political system is unstable, the imposition of stringent
economic sanctions by a major actor may be enough to throw it out of equilibrium and trigger a
war. To avoid military conflict, states may choose to implement sanctions that will not undermine
the stability of the international system and that, as a result, are not effective in terms of
influencing the behavior of the target state. In contrast, in a stable political system, economic
considerations may dictate the intensity of economic sanctions.
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Baldwin concludes that targets and goals are usually multiple, success is usually a matter of
degree, alternative policy options matter, and imposing costs on the target can be useful. He
demonstrates the symbolic utility of sanctions by taking into account multiple objectives and
targets. In addition, by presenting a perspective that emphasizes the political dimension of
international economic transactions, Baldwin has convincingly argued that international economic
transactions cannot be insulated from foreign policy objectives.
Yet, in arguing that the social power framework allows us to see this benign aspect of embargoes,
Baldwin ignores the potential connection between embargoes and war. His concern with
economic transactions as a means of exercising power also leads him to discount the problems
posed within and between states, both stemming from the economic costs source states inflict on
themselves when they impose embargoes.
Review by Robert 0. Freedman. The central argument in Baldwin's study is that critics of the use
of economic statecraft have not studied their case histories thoroughly and have looked at
specific uses of economic statecraft, such as sanctions, through a very narrow analytic prism. To
prove his point, Baldwin reexamines a number of key cases, such as the ill-fated League of Nations
sanctions against Italy, the U.S. embargo of oil and scrap iron to Japan prior to World War II, the
U.S. embargo against Cuba, the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, the post-World War II East-West
trade embargo, the U.S. economic sanctions against Iran following the seizure of the U.S. embassy
in 1979, the partial grain embargo against the USSR following the invasion of Afghanistan, and the
Reagan administration's use of economic sanctions against the USSR following the imposition of
martial law in Poland in 1981. He also deals, in a more limited way, with Soviet uses of economic
sanctions against Yugoslavia, Albania, and China.
In calling for a reevaluation of the utility of economic sanctions and other forms of economic
statecraft, Baldwin contends that there are no fewer than nine factors that must be understood in
evaluating the success or failure of these undertakings. The most important of these are the
realization that targets and goals of economic statecraft are usually multiple; that the use of a tool
of economic statecraft should be evaluated-both as to costs and desired outcomes-against
alternative tools of statecraft such as military action; that success is usually a matter of degree and
that neither perfect success nor perfect failure is likely; that imposing economic costs on a target
nation for noncompliance is itself a measure of success; and that economic statecraft, when used,
has important symbolic aspects that can affect a nation's image in the international arena. On this
last point, Baldwin, citing Robert Jervis, asserts that the symbolic aspects of economic statecraft
will influence the "psychological environments and policies" of foreign decision-makers (p. 100).
Baldwin, in answering the critics of the utility of economic sanctions, goes beyond merely
rebutting their arguments, however. While noting that economic sanctions lie somewhere
between war and appeasement in terms of a continuum of "toughness"-and hence are open to
attack from both "hardliners" and "soft liners"-he notes prescriptively that "techniques that enable
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policy makers to demonstrate firmness while reassuring others of their sense of proportion and
restraint can be highly useful, especially to nuclear powers"' (p. 105). In addition, in citing the
desirability of using economic statecraft as a means of registering approval or disapproval, Baldwin
notes that "economic techniques usually cost more than propaganda or diplomacy and thus tend
to have more inherent credibility. Military techniques, of course, usually entail higher costs and
even more credibility, but their costs may be too high" (p. 107)
Baldwin concludes that "compared to other techniques of statecraft, economic measures are likely
to exert more pressure than either diplomacy or propaganda and are less likely to evoke a violent
response than military instruments." Hence, "they are not merely inferior substitutes for force but
first-best policy alternatives" (p. 110). Given Baldwin's perspective, it is not surprising that the
often-criticized American use of economic sanctions against Iran and the Soviet Union during the
Carter administration receives very high evaluations. In both cases, the U.S. demonstrated that
there could not be "business as usual" while the target state undertook policies that angered the
United States; that the U.S. was itself willing to undergo economic costs to demonstrate its
firmness (Baldwin notes that in the case of the grain embargo the cost to American farmers was
far less than alleged, and the cost to Moscow far greater); and that the U.S. was able to
demonstrate its anger prudently, that is, without either driving Iran into the arms of the Soviet
Union-something that might have happened if the U.S. employed major military force against Iran-
or escalating the Afghanistan crisis with the USSR to the brink of nuclear war.
In looking to a general evaluation of Baldwin's study, it is clear that his discussion of the utility of
Western uses of economic sanctions is by far the most useful section of his book, and political
scientists will read it to their benefit. His discussion of Soviet uses of economic sanctions, however,
is somewhat weaker. In the case of Yugoslavia, I would disagree with Baldwin's view that Stalin
wanted to send signals to other communist countries about the danger of noncompliance with
Soviet wishes via economic sanctions (p. 230). Soviet soldiers occupied all the other East European
communist states except Albania, which was allied with the USSR against Yugoslavia, so there was
little need to send signals to them. Indeed, this was a case where Stalin appears to have thought
(incorrectly) that propaganda, diplomacy, and economic sanctions alone might topple Tito.
Other than this small weakness, David Baldwin's book, Economic Statecraft can be highly
recommended, both to scholars in the field of international relations, and to statesmen grappling
with the problem of exert- ing influence in a very dangerous world. In- deed, those who have
criticized President Reagan for his January 1986 economic sanctions against Libya might consider
changing their views after reading this book.
Michael BARNETT Y Martha FINNEMORE, 2004. RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Enfoque constructivista!
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Scholars adopting a principal-agent approach wont to treat IOs as the mere servants of their
principals—the nation-states. At the extreme, neorealist theory sees a subset of states—the major
powers—as the masters. These approaches accord little if any autonomy to IOs and take no
account of how the IOs might change over time. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore Challenge
traditional theory by attempting to provide a Framework for analyzing IOs as semi-independent
actors. In particular, they argue that IOs have significant autonomy and derive their power from a
Lumber of sources beyond the limited leeway and resources delegated to them by member-states.
Barnett and Finnemore begin their argument with the fundamental assumption that IOs act as
bureaucracies.
Furthermore, Studies of the American federal bureaucracy have established a Sorong body of
theory to understand the autonomy, inertia, andother properties of government organizations.
Barnett and Finnemore have a much Broader purpose - clearly deªning the different sources of
authority, change, and pathologies for IOs. The result is more theoretical framework than theory.
Chapters 3–5 present case studies of the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations
(UN)High Commissioner for Refugees, and UN peacekeeping (with Special attention to Rwanda),
respectively. Barnett and Finnemore trace the history of The organizations or efforts for each.
Generally, they provide thick description that is Supposed to offer illustrations of the claims made
in the theoretical chapter.
Review by John Ikenberry. International organizations are a growing presence in the global system
but remain a neglected subject of study. This book by two prominent political scientists provides a
groundbreaking look at their impact, making clear that international organizations may be created
by powerful states but, once established, are neither straightforward tools of states nor unalloyed
servants of a global common good.
In order to account for what international organizations do, it is first necessary to understand what
they are: sprawling bureaucracies with their own distinct interests, rules, culture, and logics of
action. Detailed case studies of the International Monetary Fund, the office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, and the UN Secretariat illustrate the various ways that international
organizations exercise authority. Barnett and Finnemore conclude that the impact of these
organizations lies less in the expert knowledge they wield than in the ways they define problems,
set agendas, and deploy "intellectual technologies." The most intriguing insights of the book,
however, emerge as the authors grapple with what the grow ing "global bureaucratization" means
for democratic accountability.
Review By Yale H. Ferguson. In Rules for the World, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore have
written a forthright and path-breaking constructivist book that not only challenges the familiar
realist and neorealist argument that international organizations (IOs) are entirely subservient to
their member states but also the neoliberal assumption that international institutions are
generally beneficent in character. In a sense, Barnett and Finnemore are addressing a great debate
in international relations theory about the autonomy, authority, and power of IOs that never fully
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happened. They stake out a controversial and nuanced theoretical position, illustrate it with three
case studies of actual bureaucratic practice, and consider the normative implications of the
perspective they advance.
Barnett and Finnnemore observe that at least 238 IOs operate in the world today. These
organizations are actively involved in all sorts of global issues and even deal routinely with matters
that formerly were the exclusive province of states (p. 1). Yet, oddly, IOs have been rather
neglected both in terms of theory and empirical research. Why? The reason has been the state-
centric nature of international relations theory, which has tended to persist even as new theories
evolved. Realism and neorealism initially dominated the field, and both approaches assumed that
IOs and their behavior merely reflected the preferences of member states. Even the emergent
interest in interdependence during the 1970s had the effect of slighting IOs because it focused
mainly on international regimes, interpreted as the "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures' that governed state action" (pp. vii-viii). As Barnett and Finnemore argue,
[I]nternational organizations ... were not actors in their own right and had no independent
ontological status. For these scholars, the interesting theoretical question was why states would
cooperate to set up an international organization in the first place. What these organizations did
after creation, and whether their behavior conformed to what states wanted, apparently provoked
very little curiosity (p. viii).
Functional accounts and especially neoliberal theorists accepted the idea that IOs existed because
states created them for useful tasks. But, Barnett and Finnemore maintain, analysts erred by
assuming that international cooperation and the attendant organizations were necessarily "a good
thing" (p. viii).
Barnett and Finnemore draw from sociology "the fact that IOs are bureaucracies" (pp. viii-ix, Ch.
2), and consequently they reach radically different conclusions about their status and behavior.
Traditional international relations theory held that sovereignty is the only basis for authority, and
this peculiarly legalistic view allowed statist scholars to regard the actions of other actors as
relatively insignificant. By contrast, Barnett and Finnemore argue that "the state is an authority,
but academics, professionals and experts, heads of nongovernmental organizations, and religious
and business leaders can also be conferred authority. So, too, in international life authority is
conferred in differing degrees and kinds on actors other than states. Prominent among these are
IOs" (p. 5). For Barnett and Finnemore, the essence of authority is effectiveness: "the ability of one
actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference from others." Moreover,
"bureaucracies are ... authorities in their own right, and that authority gives them autonomy vis-a-
vis states, individuals, and other international actors" (p. 5).
Barnett and Finnemore regard IO bureaucracies as "rational-legal authorities in their domain of

action" that also "draw authority from other sources" (p. 20). Specifically, IOs receive "delegated
authority" (pp. 21-22) from member states, which might appear to support the traditional
interpretation of IO subservience. Indeed, IOs must seem to be faithful to their mandates, and
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they must avoid clashes with member states, especially powerful member states. However,
"unintended consequences," a concept pioneered by Ernst Hass (1964), almost always occur. IO
constitutions and mandates often require extensive interpretation, and in fact states often want
an organization "to take charge of a problem and sort it out" (p. 22).
Likewise, IOs have "moral authority" because they are normally created to serve useful and even
noble purposes-and they are usually perceived as doing so, whatever their faults. As Barnett and
Finnemore put it, "IOs carry out their mission by means that are mostly rational, technocratic,
impartial, and nonviolent. This often makes IOs appear more legitimate to more actors than self-
serving states" (p. 5). Lastly, IOs have "expert authority" that derives from their bureaucrats'
reputations for possessing specialized knowledge and experience. Barnett and Finnemore
distinguish between being "an authority" and being "in authority," and they note that IOs are
sometimes given tasks because of the latter even though they actually lack the requisite
knowledge (pp. 24-27).
Because IOs have authority, they also have a strong measure of autonomy from their member
states, resulting in a degree of power as well. States hope that IOs will exercise whatever
discretion they have "within a zone that is demarcated by state interests" (p. 27), but outcomes
may be unpredictable. IOs may act on their own initiative if states are indifferent to a situation, or
they may fail to act despite state demands. IOs may act, at least obliquely, against the perceived
interests of member states, even against the interests of important states. And sometimes IOs go
so far as to "change the broader normative environment and states' perceptions of their own
preferences so that they are consistent with IO preferences" (p. 28). Barnett and Finnemore
accept Weber's argument that the foundation for bureaucratic power is the control of knowledge.
In their words, "IOs are able to use their authority, knowledge, and rules to regulate and
constitute the world that subsequently requires regulation" (p. 29). Three mechanisms are
involved: (1) the capacity of bureaucracies "to classify and organize information" and to "define
problems and pursuits," (2) the ability to "fix meanings [of concepts like 'development'] that orient
action and establish boundaries for acceptable action," and (3) the mission "to spread, inculcate,
and enforce global values and norms" (pp. 31-34).
Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the result of IOs' exercise of authority, autonomy, and
power is not always global sweetness and light. Indeed, Barnett and Finnemore identify certain IO
"pathologies" that derive from their bureaucratic nature (pp. 31-34): the "irrationality of
rationalization" (inflexible rules and procedures), "bureaucratic universalism" (insensitivity to
particularistic situations), "normalization of deviance" (the opposite of inflexibility--too much
bending of established rules and procedures), "insulation" (because of professionalism, lack of
competition, and no external evaluation), and "cultural contestation" (internal divisions). The
three case studies (Chs. 3-6) tell stories of mixed successes and failures attributable to these
pathologies. For example, the International Monetary Fund found that "conditionality" policies did
not solve payments problems, and as a result it undertook even more controversial structural
interventions in target economies and societies. Similarly, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees made valiant efforts to protect refugees, but the repatriation policies that evolved
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violated human rights. Finally, UN peacekeeping bureaucrats became alarmed, especially after
Somalia, about the erosion of rules about consent and neutrality and therefore stayed aloof from
the genocide in Rwanda.
Barnett and Finnemore's concluding chapter addresses the normative questions that arise once we
accept that IOs both are and are not beholden to their member states. On the one hand, the fact
that states create and fashion a mandate for IOs does lessen "the democratic deficit." Moreover,
IOs' general reputation for serving liberal causes with professional expertise also increases their
legitimacy. On the other hand, the inevitable influence of powerful states and the bureaucratic
pathologies that Barnett and Finnemore identify would appear to justify the suspicions of anti-
globalization protestors and developing countries that everything is not well. IOs have been trying
to develop more formal and informal relationships with civil society activists, but it is often
impossible to be truly accountable to the obviously diverse constituencies that such organizations
must address. In sum, Rules for the World breaks new theoretical ground, and it pulls no punches
in explaining the extraordinary status and capabilities-as well as the limitations-of IOs. Clearly
written, this book belongs to the bookshelves of scholars and interested nonspecialists alike, and it
should be widely used in courses on IOs and global governance.
Peter EVANS, Harold JACOBSEN y Robert PUTNAM, 1993. DOUBLE EDGED DIPLOMACY
Moravcsik; Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International

Bargaining
El enfoque del juego de dos niveles (two-level-game) es una teoría de regateo/negociación
internacional. Los patrones complejos de interdependencia no solamente implican
constreñimientos para los políticos sino que también oportunidades de negociación; segundo, el
político negociador aparece como una figura central y tercero, el enfoque de doble filo reconoce
que la política doméstica puede ser usada para afectar los resultados de negociación internacional,
y que las acciones internacionales pueden ser usados para exclusivamente obtener resultados
domésticos. Se requiere tomar en cuenta tres elementos: 1) los win-set de grupos domésticos; 2)
características del ambiente de negociación; 3) preferencias del negociador (tres imágenes
waltzianos).
Manipulación de limitaciones domésticas: vinculación de issue areas (sinergistic issue linkages –

Snyder describe la estrategia de Gorbachev de vincular la reforma doméstica con el retiro de
tropas de la Europa del este y la ayuda occidental); mantención del ambiente de incertidumbre;.
Política Doméstica y la Negociación Internacional: Según Putnam, el resultado de negociación

refleja el tamaño de win-sets domésticos. Estrategias en este etapa de negociación: amenaza de la
no-ratificación; amenazas creíbles (como las amenazas de Reagan contra los sandinistas fueron
socavadas por la oposición en el Congreso; también el análisis de Odell sobre la amenaza de
sanciones US-Brasil y US-UE); estrategia de reverberación – demostrar que las acciones en el país
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afectarán expectativas respecto el acuerdo en otro país. Existe el riesgo de la defección voluntaria
e involuntaria (estados con poca autonomía). Estrategia de manos atadas – “tying hands”-
disminuir el tamaño de win-set a propósito.
Preferencias del político negociador (dovish or hawkish): la ambición del político de reforzar su
posición doméstica; esfuerzo de movilizar la respuesta óptima para los imperativos
internacionales; preferencias políticas individuales.
Estrategias de grupos domésticos:
Peter Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics

Negociación internacional vista como proceso de doble filo: cada actor trata de tomar en cuenta
las reacciones esperadas del nivel tanto doméstico, como internacional. El negociador es Janus-
faced – tiene que balancear lo doméstico con lo internacional – enfoque integrativo.
Agenda – setting usualmente pertenece al negociador, hay poca evidencia sobre el impacto de
grupos domésticos.
Ignorancia sobre la política doméstica de otra parte – el riesgo de miscálculo y el resultante
incertidumbre.
Review by Miguel Angel Centeno. Anyone watching the NAFTA ratification or the politics of the
GATT Uruguay Round will not dispute the central tenet of this book: "Diplomatic strategies and
tactics are constrained both by what other states will accept and by what domestic constituencies
will ratify" (p. 15), or, to follow Tip O'Neill's famous aphorism, even international politics can be
local. Originating in a study group held at the Center for Advanced Study at Palo Alto, the book
features contributions by some of the best analysts of state policy. Their point of departure is an
article by Robert Putnam (included as an appendix) that seeks to go beyond the simple
observation that domestic and international politics interact by proposing the image of a "two-
level game" in which national political leaders must constantly and simultaneously play at two
boards. Moves that are rational for one game may be disastrous for the other; Putnam seeks to
define the strategies that this dilemma generates.
Because it recognizes the double-edged, or Janus-like, nature of international relations, the two-
level game model is offered as a significant improvement on perspectives that privilege purely
international or domestic interests. Yet the collection has little new to offer as a theoretical
breakthrough. A cursory scan of any good political history of nineteenth-century Europe (A.J.P.
Taylor comes to mind) would give the reader much the same impression. Despite their claims to
the contrary, many of the articles often come down to the not very surprising discovery that
conflicts exist and pervade all levels of politics and that few negotiations are simple.
But the authors wish to do much more; they wish to move the two-level game from "metaphor to
theory." Unfortunately, the attempt to formalize the analysis by using terms such as "win sets"
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and "indifference curves" fails. As in much of rational choice, the model either confirms the
obvious or requires such loose application as to render it meaningless. With so many possible
variables and so many different versions of rationality, any theory attempting to predict outcomes
of negotiations will risk becoming either overdetermined or simplistic. The two-level game is a
wonderful heuristic device, but that is all it can be.
The two-level game metaphor is perhaps flawed by artificially limiting the complexities involved in
these interactions. Within each "actor" a variety of games is also being played, and within these,
even more games. An awareness of this complexity, to which this volume certainly contributes,
will help guide empirical work. It cannot, however, begin the creation of a universal model.
Nevertheless, several of the chapters make valuable contributions. Andrew Moravcsik's
introduction, if not completely convincing, gives an excellent overview of the major issues in the
analysis of international relations as well as cogent summary of the argument.
Janice Gross Stein's discussion of Camp David includes an interesting point on the use of symbolic
signals. According to her, the criticism from the Arab world, rather than hurting the negotiations,
helped convince the Israelis of Sadat's sincerity. Jack Snyder makes an excellent argument for the
importance of Soviet internal politics in defining the USSR's international relations. Despite his use
of Putnam's language, however, he seems to contradict the spirit of the original article by
emphasizing separate analyses of each level of the game.
Many of the chapters make it difficult to believe in the possibility of a coherent model of
international negotiation. Eichengreen and Uzan's chapter on the 1933 World Economic
Conference, for example, privileges an issue largely neglected in the other pieces: Negotiations
failed because the conceptual frameworks of the various negotiations were so radically different.
If we cannot assume agreement on the rules, how can we predict the outcomes of games? Articles
by Martin and Sikkink and by Miles Kahler highlight the role played by politics inside each of the
major actors in any negotiating process, and Robert Pastor emphasizes that is often not enough to
change actors' preferences, but one must "provide them with the sufficient political space to vote
the right way" (p. 310). Whether it be the politics of the Argentinian junta or those of the IMF, we
cannot assume a limited number of players. Chapters by Moravcsik, Helen Milner, John Odell, and
Ellis Krauss detail how complex the interests of various subactors may be and to what extent their
preferred strategies may be counterintuitive.
The one generalizable conclusion that may be drawn from these studies is the absence of a link
between authoritarianism and freedom to bargain. In the words of Peter Evans in his concluding
chapter, "There is no relationship between the extent of enfranchisement and the propensity to
conclude agreements" (p. 400). This finding may be of particular help to the analysis of economic
restructuring and democratization, where too often the ability of authoritarian regimes to impose
economic and social costs on populations has been assumed. Conversely, various chapters seem to
indicate that the domestic pressures of a democracy may actually contribute to successful
negotiation.
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Despite its limitations, Double-Edged Diplomacy should stimulate future work. I would certainly
welcome a companion volume treating domestic negotiations as the dependent variable and
demonstrating that these also involved multilevel games. Another volume on international cases,
with less concentration on security issues and more on post-Cold War concerns such as
international debt would be equally useful. The book may also serve as a warning of the limitation
to the type of theoretical formalism to which other social science disciplines have fallen prey.
Memo 11 – Economía Política Internacional – Enrico Padoan

The Logic od Two-level Games (Putnam, 1988), Double edged diplomacy (Evans et al, 1993) y
Institutions, Interests and Information (Milner, 1997)
Los textos de esta semana nos proponen distintos marcos teóricos para comprender lo que Waltz
(1959) describe como la segunda “imágen” del sistema político internacional, es decir la política
doméstica. Es decir, los textos estudian como la política doméstica afecta el funcionamiento del
sistema internacional, yendo todos los autores por ende más allá de explicaciones estructurales
derivantes de la distribución de poder militar y económico (Waltz 1979) para dar cuenta del
comportamiento de los Estados y de sus políticas exteriores.
Decir que la política doméstica, y los actores principales en esta esfera, son fundamentales para
poder entender de manera exhaustiva la política internacional, es uno de los supuestos principales
que contribuyen a describir el “paradigma” liberal en las IR (Legro y Moravcsik 1999); no es una
casualidad que los “clásicos” textos propuestos pertenezcan a esta corriente, tan en su visión
“tradicional” (Moravcsik 1993) que en su interpretación “neoliberal institucionalista” (Milner
1997), que añade una relevante importancia asignada a la influencia de actores internacionales
como las IGOs. Sobre todo, los autores considerados, si bien comprenden en sus estudios varios
actores domésticos, así superando la narrowness de la visión realista con su énfasis en el Estado
como actor unitario, no rechazan ni el asunto racional, ni el hecho de que el Estado sigue siendo la
unidad de análisis de su variable dependiente: es decir, los outcomes por analizar son las
actuaciones del Estado, y las implementaciones de políticas (públicas domésticas o exteriores) de
este actor. Si!
Esto es cierto en la propuesta teórica de Putnam (1988), el primero que plantea la existencia de un
“juego a dos niveles” (two-level game) jugado por el Estado. El autor analiza los constreñimientos
de los diplomáticos en los bargainings internacionales, constreñimientos causados por fuerzas
internas (actores de la sociedad civil, partidos políticos y, sobre todo, poder parlamentario) que
achican las estrategias y los resultados viables para los actores del poder ejecutivo que
desempeñan en el ámbito internacional. Uno de los planteamientos teóricos de Putnam, y
precisamente la “fuerza negocial” que deriva de constreñimientos fuertes por parte de lo
doméstico, es de alguna manera recuperado por Milner (1997), quién a través de modelos de
rational-choice afirma que dichos constreñimientos (propios de situaciones de divided
government) impiden o dificultan la cooperación internacional: esto, a mi juicio, es un corolario de
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lo planteado por Putnam, es decir, en estas situaciones el gobierno nacional está menos dispuesto
a compromisos, lo que genera o un resultado favorable, o, más probablemente, una ausencia de
cooperación.
Más en general, Milner estudia las consecuencias de este two-level game para la cooperación
internacional, siguiendo así en el debate académico provocado por, entre otros, Keohane (1984).
La incorporación en sus modelos de tres variables (intereses/preferencias de los actores
domésticos – agrupados en “poder ejecutivo”, “poder legislativo” y “grupos de interés”;
instituciones – principalmente, sistema presidencial o parlamentario y distintas reglas para la
ratificación; distribución de información – asumida como “escasa e asimétrica”, con una grande
atención para los endorsers de la sociedad civil que pueden influir de manera muy relevante en las
decisiones estatales) provoca una cierta complejización del debate y un menor “optimismo” para
la posibilidad de haber cooperación internacional.
Si bien es necesario una cierta simplificación para proceder a la modelización de las hipótesis y de
los supuestos, no cabe duda de que agrupar en un único actor los “grupos de interés” representa
algo muy problemático, sobre todo a la luz del interesante discusión sobre el rol de los endorsers
(que, a su vez, me parecen contribuyan menos a la esfera de la “información” y mucho más a la
esfera de los “intereses/preferencias”, ya que su papel es el de reforzar el apoyo a – o la lucha
contra – un determinado issue). En general, me parece que la modelización padezca de un sesgo
hacia los regímenes presidenciales, ya que en los regímenes parlamentarios la división entre
legislativo y ejecutivo es menos fuerte, y el papel desempeñado por los distintos partidos políticos
asume una relevancia mayor, a mi juicio. A su vez, ¿como considerar a los partidos? ¿grupos de
intereses o actores del poder parlamentario?
En todo caso, los insights de los autores son importantes, sobre todo porque, como bien lo explica
Moravcsik (1993), ya es tiempo de no considerar a los comportamientos de los Estados no
predecidos por explicaciones estructurales como simples “desviaciones” o “anomalías”, siendo
éste un camino poco ventajoso desde un punto de vista analítico, ya que, precisamente, una de las
debilidades más evidentes de la teoria realista es la de no saber (y no poder, como el mismo Waltz
admite) explicar eventos “micros”, los que, “lamentablemente”, muchas veces son lo que se
requiere explicar más frecuentemente.
Los estudios de casos propuestos, de hecho, se refieren a situaciones bastantes específicas, y en

todos se pueden averiguar la importancia de los avances teóricos cumplidos y derivar otros
insights analíticos útiles para comprender mejor ciertos sucesos. Odell (1993) compara las
consecuencias de comportamientos coercitivos de Estados Unidos en la esfera de las relaciones
comerciales hacia Brasil y Comunidad Europea (CE) en el final de la década de los Ochenta.
Además de una crítica a los planteamientos realistas, su trabajo nos evidencia la importancia de
como una amenaza viene percibida por los Estados amenazados por represalias, y como es
relevante la voluntad política de perseguir consecuentemente una política de big stick. Esta visión
más “constructivista” no es compartida, lamentablemente (a mi juicio), por Pastor (1993) en su
trabajo sobre las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y, respectivamente, Panamá y Nicaragua a lo
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largo de las administraciones Carter y Reagan. Si bien el autor toma en cuenta variables
“ideológicas” como el nacionalismo (aunque considerado como variable dependiente, influenciado
por la estrategia política estadounidense), lo que más emerge (como en el trabajo de Odell) es la
imprecisión del supuesto teórico del Estado como actor unitario, dada la enorme divergencia de
visiones entre poder legislativo y ejecutivo y, más aún, entre las distintas oficinas del ejecutivo. Sin
embargo, yo habría señalado también la importancia de las distintas interpretaciones, por parte
de Carter y Reagan, de los gobiernos panameño y nicaragüense. No necesariamente los
Sandinistas podían ser percibidos como “más comunistas” del gobierno de Torrijos; sin embargo,
las lentes “de guerra fría” utilizadas por Reagan provocaron una distinta evaluación de la situación,
una distinta estrategia, y una distinta reacción del gobierno involucrado.
Muy interesante, desde un punto de vista analítico, es la propuesta de Kahler (1993) de interpretar
el Fundo Monetario Internacional (FMI) como actor estatal sui generis, con su división entre
ejecutivo y legislativo y su peculiar proceso de ratificación de los agreements con los Estados
clientes. Aquí se evidencia aún más la perspectiva neoliberal institucionalista que considera las
IGOs como actores relevantes, y no como simple transmission belts de las preferencias de los
Estados. Muy aguda, también, es la discusión sobre las posibles tácticas viables por parte de los
Estados clientes para atrasar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones, o, simplemente, para evitar de
tener que ratificar los agreements, en la espera de situaciones económicas menos dramáticas. Es
interesante, además, ver como un Estado chico y dependiente de la ayuda externa reacciona de
distintas formas, y como el Estado más reaccionario no necesita tomar en cuenta grupos de
interés (por ser estos escasamente organizados) en sus decisiones políticas, ya que los actores
relevantes y las posibles oposiciones pertenecen a la misma esfera, la ejecutiva. Otra importante
sugerencia es que, para entender cuales son las “preferencias” de los actores no estatales, no es
suficiente una check-list de las ventajas y desventajas de cada grupo, sino averiguar la capacidad
de organización colectiva de los actores, en una discusión que nos lleva a otros autores que han
estudiado estas importantes (y políticas en el sentido más completo de la palabra) áreas de
investigación (Alt y Gilligan 1994; Frieden 1991; Broz y Frieden 2001; Bien! √+
Jeffry FRIEDEN, 1988. SECTORAL CONFLICT AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1914-1940
El rol de los grupos socio-económicos y políticos en la formulación y realización de política

económica internacional de los EEUU. La posición internacional del país no da cuenta de las
causas.
El crecimiento del poder EEUU después de la I GM. El país tenía la capacidad, pero no la voluntad
(argumento de Kindleberger). La posición del lider mundial fue rechazada. Esto se debe a la
polarización de los intereses de la sociedad Americana.
Despúes de la IGM, los bancos e inversionistas EEUU empezaron a conquistar los mercados
mundiales. Especialmente se trata de los préstamos a Europa (foreign lending) que se estaba
recuperando. Pero las inversiones fueron representativas para un sector relativamente pequeño
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(industria maquinaria, química, eléctrica). En la escena domestica surgieron dos bloques – de los
internacionalistas (FED y el Departamento del Estado, Dawes Plan para Europa programado para
1924) y de los isolacionalistas – nacionalistas económicos (Congreso y el Departamento del
Comercio). El resultado fue una política de estado contradictoria y volátil. A partir del 1921 el
control sobre los préstamos de los bancos crece (Hoover), se imponen tarifas sobre los bienes
extranjeros, para proteger industria domestica. La crisis de los años treinta.
Robert GILPIN, 1987. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Tres temas fundamentals de la IPE:

- Causas y efectos económicos/políticos del auge de la economía del mercado: Sobre el
impacto del fenómeno del mercado; Relación entre el cambio económico y político
- importancia y significancia del mercado económico global para las economías domésticas.
Importancia del mercado: Polanyi; Keohane y Nye (1977) han observado de la interdependencia
económica puede resultar en las relaciones del poder; Hirschman (1945) ya habló de la
interdependencia vulnerable: se puede tratar también de la interdependencia sensible.
Interdependencia es una dependencia mutua pero desigual. Consecuencias económicas del
mercado: 1) rol crítico de precios relativos para el intercambio de bienes y servicios; 2) centralidad
de competencia e instrumentalismo; 3) importancia de la eficiencia para la supervivencia
económica. Aunque supuestamente todos se benefician del mercado en términos absolutos, el
beneficio es altamente desigual. Efectos del mercado y respuestas políticas: David Ricardo y la ley
de ventajas comparativas; división mundial del trabajo basada en especialización; el surgimiento
del mercado global tiene profundas consecuencias políticas y sociales; efectos disruptivos para la
sociedad, disolución de comunidades y modos de vida tradicionales; muy desigual distribución de
riqueza; relaciones del poder subyacentes; muy desigual distribución de costos.
Las tres ideologías de economía política:

LIBERAL: libre mercado, estado mínimo, racionalidad de actores, los gobiernos no intervienen
salvo para proveer bienes colectivos, el mercado siempre tiende hacia el equilibrio y estabilidad, fe
en progreso, estables patrones de crecimiento sostenido, crea relaciones pacíficas entre las
naciones (Kant, Smith, Keynes)
NACIONALISTA: primacía del estado, proteccionismo, imperialismo, factores económicos como
factores del poder; el objetivo es la industrialización que luego se puede traducir en autonomía y
la base del poder militar; todos quieren ser monopolistas, entonces el orden liberal solo será
posible cuando los poderes dominantes constaten que su interés es consistente con este modelo.
MARXISMO: revolucionario – Marx, social-democracia – Kautsky; enfoque dialéctico y materialista;
compromiso normativo; los capitalistas – sobreproducción de ciertos bienes lleva a imperialismo;
el capital tiende a acumularse – monopolios, la tasa de crecimiento tiende a bajar, el sistema
capitalista es en si irracional, socava su propia existencia – planta gérmenes de su destrucción, el
desarrollo del mundo es extremadamente desigual, la competencia entre capitalistas lleva a la
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guerra, ningún modo de producción deja de existir antes de cumplir su rol histórico del desarrollo
dialéctico.
Las tres ideologías son las profesiones de fe “intelectual commitments of faith”.
TRES DESAFÍOS PARA LA ECONOMÍA DEL MERCADO:

1) el proceso del crecimiento desigual; la guerra es para testear si el crecimiento haya
cambiado la distribución del poder.
2) Economía del mercado y la política exterior: según montesquieu la paz es efecto natural
del comercio; lo que afecta las consecuencias políticas del comercio es la presencia o
ausencia del hegemón; segundo, el crecimiento lleva a la interdependencia; tercero, grado
de homogeneidad o heterogeneidad que dcida sobre la estructura de importación y
exportación.
3) La significancia del capitalismo del bienestar que desafía los supuestos marxistas- la
regulación del mercado por las políticas del estado.
LAS TEORIAS CONTEMPORÁNEAS DEL IPE

Economía dual/dualismo: cada economía tiene que ser analizada en términos de dos sectores:
moderno, progresivo, eficiente, creciente, rico y otro atrasado, postergado y decaído. La
expansión de la economía y mercado global a la larga desplaza los sectores tradicionales, antiguos
y atrasados. El centro y la periferia existen en separación.
Sistema Mundo Moderno/ Modern World System MWS: el MWS es la unidad de análisis de la
división de trabajo, el mundo es un todo estructural donde el centro necesita estructuralmente de
la periferia (Andre Gunder Frank). El sistema mundo es dividido en tres anillos (tiers) – centro,
periferia y semiperiferia – Wallerstein
Teoría de la estabilidad hegemónica – Kindleberger– la economía liberal y abierta requiere del
poder dominante que vigile este orden que quiera y pueda hacerlo; este poder tiene que ser
comprometido con la causa (embedded liberalism – SOCIAL PURPOSE del liberalismo), proveer los
bienes colectivos (Olson, 1965), protección contra el free rider, función del estabilizador,
imposición de reglas, normas, principios, coordinación, dispuesto a asumir los costos de la
manutención del orden, el prestamista del último recurso, capacidad de transformación-
adaptarse a los cambios; Gramsci – sobre el hegemón ideológico – el poder y consenso. Es
necesario o no el hegemón, es el orden liberal y la apertura económica el bien público? Según
“After Hegemony” de Keohane , y en contra de lo que sostiene Gilpin, la manutención de la
cooperación y del régimen es posible aun sin el hegemón; los regímenes son más facíl para
mantener que crear.
CAMBIO ESTRUCTURAL: cada estructura crea las oportunidades y constreñimientos. Cambio

estructural indica al cambio de la institucionalidad y alteración de relaciones.
DINERO: cada régimen monetario descansa en un orden específico. l. Choque entre la autonomía
del estado y el orden monetario internacional. Gold standard clásico: 1870-1914; Interregnum
(1914-1944); Bretton Woods 1944-1976 – siempre en este tipo de orden monetario de tasas de
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cambio fijas – existe el problema de consistencia N-1; eso significa que N-1 países pueden
modificar su tasa de cambio salvo uno, cuya moneda es establecida como estándar. Las tasas
flexibles facilitan a los países acomodarse a los cambios económicos internacionales. En actualidad
las economías nacionales están vinculadas: si un país restringe la su oferta interna del dinero para
combatir inflación, suben sus tasas de intereses y el dinero extranjero entra el mercado
entropezando el objetivo de las políticas. El problema fundamental es (según Cooper) la existencia
de los altos grados de la interdependencia económica sin que exista un control político central
sobre el sistema.
COMERCIO: teoría Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson – país va a exportar estos productos que utilizan

los factores de producción abundantes; proteccionismo; GATT 1948; paradójicamente la
importancia de política doméstica crece conforme crece la interdependencia internacional.
LAS MULTINACIONALES – inversiones extranjeras directas y la propiedad en distintos países; el

ciclo del producto en tres fases (Vernon 1966); las multinacionales y el país de proveniencia
(complementariedad de intereses, herramientas de la diplomacia); las multinacionales y los países
anfitriones – choque entre intereses, supuestamente favorece regímenes autoritarios,
imperialismo cultural, relación ambigua.
DESARROLLO Y SUBDESARROLLO
Review Henry Teune University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. The main theme of Gilpin's book is
that the world system is at a threshold of transformation. The concluding sentences are as follows:
Nevertheless, at this juncture in the transition from one economic order to another, the only
certainty is that a new international political economy is emerging. It is not clear who will gain,
who will lose, or what the consequences will be for global prosperity and world peace (p. 408).
Some reasons given for the world's being on the brink are the relative decline of the United States
as a hegemonic leader, the ascendance of the Pacific region, and the uncertain future of Japanese-
American relations. Although the title of the book includes the term "political economy," as do the
titles of three of the ten chapters, the analysis is long on economics and short on politics. One
factor, for example, for the strategic importance of Japan is Soviet initiatives to contest the United
States militarily in Asia rather than Europe. Navies, and now the geopolitics of inner space, are
central to a new world order.
Topics covered are trade, money, finance, debt, economic inequality, multinational corporations,
and ideology; noneconomic transnational movements and institutions, including religion, and the
rise of world cities are not. Messages are sent to a "discourse group" of scholars but in a context
general enough to inform interested readers. Heavy in description about economic relations
between nations since 1945, several sections contain modern historical developments during
several centuries, such as money.
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Gilpin is open about his ideology: "My position is that a hegemon is necessary to the existence of a
liberal international economy." He contrasts as "contending" theories liberalism, Marxism, and
nationalism rather than treating them as conflicting forces of change. The relative decline of the
United States is well documented, and he urges it to deal with its foreign debt, reindustrialize, and
resist the New Protectionism. Speculation about the new world order focuses on the United States
and Japan, whether Japan can become a financial hegemon, and whether the need for a hierarchy
for world stability can come from pluralist leadership.
Too much is made of Japan as it begins to face competition, an aging population, and a new
generation. Much praise is to be given for emphasizing the role of technology in growth and trade.
The prediction that it is "highly doubtful that they [technologies] will cause a replication of the
unprecedented postwar global rate of economic growth" can be challenged by recent
developments in superconductivity, resins, synthetic materials that could end the century of steel,
and the uncertain future of Japanese-American relations.
Although the title of the book includes the term "political economy," as do the titles of three of
the ten chapters, the analysis is long on economics and short on politics. One factor, for example,
for the strategic importance of Japan is Soviet initiatives to contest the United States militarily in
Asia rather than Europe. Navies, and now the geopolitics of inner space, are central to a new world
order. Topics covered are trade, money, finance, debt, economic inequality, multinational
corporations, and ideology; noneconomic transnational movements and institutions, including
religion, and the rise of world cities are not. Messages are sent to a "discourse group" of scholars
but in a context general enough to inform interested readers. Heavy in description about
economic relations between nations since 1945, several sections contain modern historical
developments during several centuries, such as money.
Gilpin is open about his ideology: "My position is that a hegemon is necessary to the existence of a
liberal international economy." He contrasts as "contending" theories liberalism, Marxism, and
nationalism rather than treating them as conflicting forces of change. The relative decline of the
United States is well documented, and he urges it to deal with its foreign debt, reindustrialize, and
resist the New Protectionism. Speculation about the new world order focuses on the United States
and Japan, whether Japan can become a financial hegemon, and whether the need for a hierarchy
for world stability can come from pluralist leadership.
Too much is made of Japan as it begins to face competition, an aging population, and a new
generation. Much praise is to be given for emphasizing the role of technology in growth and trade.
The prediction that it is "highly doubtful that they [technologies] will cause a replication of the
unprecedented postwar global rate of economic growth" can be challenged by recent
developments in superconductivity, resins, synthetic materials that could end the century of steel,
and the undeveloped know-how of plant production in water and air. One can argue here and
there, but this is a very fair presentation of the economic, and hence political, issues confronting
those who will shape the near future of a new world order.
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Memo 2 – Economia Política Internacional - Enrico Padoan

Gilpin (1987), Krasner (1976) y Keohane y Nye (1977)
Los textos estudiados en esta semana presentaban tres perspectivas distintas de la Economia
Política Internacional; los tres analizaron un periodo extremadamente largo de la historia
contemporánea (desde el 1870 hasta la – entonces – actualidad); y los tres tienen como
preocupación principal el comportamiento de los Estados en el sistema internacional. Sin
embargo, los tres textos (Nye y Keohane, 1977; Krasner, 1976; Gilpin, 1987) se diferencian según
el enfoque adoptado, y, más precisamente, según la teoria escogida para explicar distintos
regímenes internacionales existentes y los cambios de los mismos.
Nye y Keohane desafian al tradicional enfoque realista para el estudio de las relaciones
económicas internacionales. Ellos contestan sobre todo tres supuestos de la teoria realista: la
visión del Estado como actor unitario y predominante, la fungibilidad (para utilizar el término de
Morgenthau) del poder militar en cualquier asunto internacional, y la preeminencia de
preocupaciones de seguridad en la política extranjera de los mismos Estados. Los autores
introducen un nuevo modelo, el asillamado “de interdependencia compleja”, que postula la
existencia de canales múltiples que conectan la sociedad (a nivel transnacional, además que entre
élites gubernamentales y no – así negando la racionalidad unitaria del actor-Estado); la no
existencia de jerarquías entre temas sensibles; la escasa (o, en todo caso, limitada) fuerza del
poder militar para influir en las elecciones de otros países. De estas premisas, además, los autores
deducen una nueva intepretación y previsión de algunos procesos políticos y estrategias por seguir
por parte de los Estados (sus objetivos, sus instrumentos, la formación del agenda, el linkage entre
distintas cuestiones, el rol de las organizaciones internacionales).
El análisis de dos bien distintas ésferas de la política internacional (la marítima y la monetaria)
evidencian, según los autores, que la teoria realista tradicional está gradualmente perdiendo su
poder esplicativo, precisamente por la modificación del panorama global y, por ende, por la
progresiva pérdida – por parte de los supuestos teóricos realistas – de adherencia a la realidad. Ya
no es posible ver a los regímenes internacionales como simples “sobreestructuras” que reflejan sic
et simpliciter una estructura internacional (entendida como distribución de poder entre los
actores predominantes); aunque Nye y Keohane reconozcan que una consistente incongruencia
entre estructura e instituciones (entendidas en el sentido más amplio de la palabra) conlleva
necesariamente a una modificación de los regímenes, subrayan el papel “conservador” de estos
mismos, que de esa manera seguirían vigentes hasta que los nuevos actores dominantes (que
siguen siendo, en todo caso, los Estados) soporten el costo de la creación de nuevos regímenes. Lo
que buscan los autores, en fin, es la integración de las teorías estructurales – de las cuales
comparten la parsimonia, pero no la simplificación – con la perspectiva de la “interdependencia
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compleja”, que tiene una probabilidad de acierto mucho mejor en situaciones que no superan un
cierto nivel de conflicto.
Gilpin, por su parte, dedica su libro al estudio de las influencias de la economia de mercado en las
relaciones internacionales. A partir del análisis de tres distintas ideologias de la economía política
(liberalismo, nacionalismo, marxismo), el autor deduce tres perspectivas, declarando
abiertamente su apoyo para la realista (que deriva del nacionalismo). El Estado, en la visión de
Gilpin, tiene interés para direccionar e influenciar el rumbo de la economia mundial, para
conseguir ventajas relativas; sin embargo, esta lucha provoca inestabilidad a nivel global, que es
uno de los supuestos necesarios de una economia liberal. Por eso, el autor comparte la teoria de la
estabilidad hegemónica, notando que los momentos de máxima apertura del mercado han
coincidido con un fuerte liderazgo internacional por parte de la superpotencia vigente, que trocó
algunos beneficios de corto plazo con la ventaja de poder establecer las reglas del juego,
soportando los costos conexos. A la misma intuición llega Krasner; sin embargo, Gilpin reconoce y
subraya el incrementado papel jugado por otros actores no estatales (las multinacionales in primis,
pero también los grupos de interés a nivel nacional y transnacional), aunque no le reconozca un
poder similar a lo detenido por el Estado, mientras que Krasner niega el mismo concepto de
interdependencia, añadiendo que, en fin y al cabo, las multinacionales han sido creaciones del
Estado, gracias al periodo de apertura de los mercados ocurrida entre el 1958 (año de
implementación, por parte de Europa Occidental, del sistema de Bretton Woods) y el 1971 (año
del colapso del mismo sistema).
Los tres enfoques, analizados en conjunto, muestran muchas más afinidades que diferencias; se
pueden entender como complementarios (lo que era, en fin, el objetivo de Nye y Keohane), y a
veces llegan a las mismas conclusiones: tan Krasner como Nye y Keohane comparten que la teoria
de la estabilidad hegemónica se vuelve cada vez más imprecisa; Gilpin y Krasner dedican la mayor
parte de sus energias en explicar los cambios a través de modificaciones en la estructura; Nye y
Keohane, por su lado, añaden la relevancia de normas e instituciones internacionales para explicar
algunos outcomes que parecen no derivar sic et simpliciter de la distribución de poder. Gilpin y
Nye and Keohane, además, subrayan la importancia de la esfera política, separada de la
económica, aunque de sus argumentos se pueda deducir las crecientes y enormes dificultades que
esperan al Estado-nación. Gilpin evidencia un trade-off entre autonomia del Estado y orden
económico liberal, sobre todo si falta un actor hegemónico que asegure estabilidad e imponga una
cierta limitación a la libertad de perseguir política macroeconómicas autónomas y políticas
comerciales nacionalistas; además, la libertad macroeconómica nuevamente adquirida tras la
Segunda Guerra Mundial coincide con un nivel de interdependencia global nunca experimentado
antes, lo que limita esta misma libertad. Nye y Keohane, por su parte, subrayan los vínculos
estructurales e institucionales que atan los Estados, que tienen que tener en cuenta, además, la
emersión de nuevos actores y de problemas de harmonización entre las exigencias de distintas
ramas del aparato ejecutivo. I like the discussion in this paragraph. You explicitly make
connections, comparisons among the readings.
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El texto de Krasner, en mi opinión, falla en no considerar un proceso básico de path-dependent: si

se argumenta que el sistema económico internacional de los Setentas era producto de la
estructura global y de algunos frutos de una política de openness empujada por los mismos
Estados, eso no basta para negar a algunos de estos frutos (in primis, las multinacionales) el papel
de actor relevante, solo por haber sido “creados” por el Estado. Una vez ingresados en el mundo
de la interdependencia, ya no es simple volver atrás. A veces Gilpin cae en el mismo error, a pesar
de que este autor, correctamente en mi opinión, combate la ideologia liberal por su separación
entre economia y política, ya que esta última sigue teniendo el poder de direccionar o por lo
menos corregir los cambios que se darían en un mundo regido solamente por “leyes” económicas;
no está claro, sin embargo, si Gilpin, en fin y al cabo, ve la economia mundial de mercado como un
patrón fijo – que puede ser sujeto a modificaciones – o si sus previsiones de una economia global
dividida entre tres bloques distintos (y una periferia marginalizada) conlleve un quiebre del mismo
concepto de mercado mundial.
Nye y Keohane, y en cierta medida Gilpin, tienen el mérito de introducir en los modelos el tema de
las preferencias estatales, que no son fijas, sino influenciadas (entre otras) por la políticas internas.
Gilpin, en una visión extremadamente normativa, ve en el Estado de bienestar occidental tal vez el
mayor peligro para el orden económico liberal, tan directa (a través de los pedidos para una
política proteccionista) como indirectamente (ya que, para defender el Welfare State, hay que
tener una cierta autonomia macroeconómica, lo que puede afectar la estabilidad internacional):
todo eso, sin tener en cuenta posibles spill-over culturales y las demandas de redistribución que la
casi totalidad de los Países de Reciente Industrialización han tenido que enfrentar y, en parte,
cumplir. Nye y Keohane, por su parte, subrayan los factores institucionales, aunque fallen en no
subrayar dos aspectos: primero, unas componentes importantes para la explicación de la
sobrevivencia de un regimen – aún en presencia de variaciones estructurales – son la costumbre
de los actores (sobre todo no estatales) de actuar bajo determinadas reglas, y los procesos de
adaptación burocrática y cultural a los que son sometidos los actores en su cumplimiento de las
reglas establecidas; segundo, las preferencias de los actores, aunque no sean consideradas fijas,
son interpretadas como racionales, y los fines son exclusivamente económicos, sin considerar
otros posibles objetivos que no necesariamente son los del homo oeconomicus. Creo sea
excelente, en el análisis de Nye y Keohane, la separación de los conceptos de sensibilidad y
vulnerabilidad, algo que me parece derivado muy estrechamente de las teorias económicas sobre
los bienes sustituibles.
Para concluir, una reflexión. Gilpin utiliza la palabra hegemónica, de clara deriviación gramsciana;
Gramsci supo integrar en una visión tan materialista como la marxista una interpretación de la
cultura como algo más de una simple sobreestructura; lamentablemente, en el análisis de Gilpin
falta completamente alguna consideración sobre instrumentos de soft power. El mismo Gilpin vio
en la esfera de la finanza internacional el mayor peligro para la estabilidad del orden internacional
liberal, a causa de los enormes flujos descontrolados de capitales que ya en los años Ochenta
afectaban las autonomias presupuestarias y monetarias nacionales. Los recientes sucesos de la
zona Euro parecen darle razón. Sin embargo, me parece que, a nivel regional europeo, lo que falte
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no es sólo la estabilidad, sino la presencia de un hegemón, es decir de alguien que, además de ser
el más poderoso, sepa utilizar también recursos de soft power para coordinar y implementar
políticas. Y eso, a lo largo, puede provocar una ausencia de legitimidad política, necesaria para
cualquier proyecto de integración (o, por lo menos, coordinación).
Ernst HAAS, 1964. BEYOND THE NATION STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Funcionalismo – funciones desempeñadas por las organizaciones. Los grupos están en el centro
del análisis.
El poder es conceptualmente separado del bienestar y riqueza (welfare). “Funcionally specific

international programs, if organizationally separated from diffuse orientations, maximize both
welfare and intergration. Funcionalmente específicos programa hacen surgir las organizaciones
internacionales cuyas tareas y alcance crece conforme crecen las tareas y funciones. Estas
organizaciones desarrollan sus propias normas y procedimientos para lidiar con los conflcitos que
puedan surgir alrededor de dichas normas.
A través del proceso de aprendizaje, la ininial orientación hacia el poder transita hacia la
orientación al bienestar (welfare). Aprendizaje se basa en las percepciones de autointerés de los
actores que al reconocer que éstos serán mejor representados por la organización, modifian su
comportamiento en apoyo de la intergración. Aunque los actores no van a concordar en cuanto el
contenido del bienestar (sus objetivos subjetivos), pueden manifestar el consenso procedural. La
armonía de intereses sociales no existe. Lo que se puede esperar es tal vez un patron convergente
dnde es posible satisfacer una serie de intereses económicos. Las necesidades de ciertos grupos
pueden dar lugar a la ley funcionalmente específica.
La organización internacional surge más rápido cuando su función es orientada al bienestar ,

atendida por los expertos conscientes de las implicancias políticas de sus acciones y
representativos de los intereses homogéneos sociales, públicos y privados.
Con el tiempo los actores pueden desarrollar lealtad hacia la organización.
El sistema útil funcionalmente (sistema orientado a actores); teoría sistémica funcional-

sociológica
Los actores son los gobiernos y asociaciones voluntarias; el ambiente consiste de creencias,
instituciones, metas, capacidades de los actores; la políticas gubernamentales son los inputs al
sistema; decisiones colectivas son los outputs- que pueden a su vez transformar el ambiente
sistémico. Las relaciones predominantes del sistema son entre los inputs y los outputs.
Provisionalmente, las instituciones consideradas como estructuras son consideradas resultados de
los outputs, pero con el tiempo adquieren identidades propias. Las funciones del sistema son
tareas impuestas a la estructura por los actores.
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El sistema comprende una serie de relaciones dadas en un ambiente institucional y legal.

Las organizaciones poseen funciones manifiestas y latentes: Funciones manifiestas son de las que
los actores son conscientes y sirven para adaptar al sistema, son intencionales, resultados de una
acción intencional de los actores, mientras que las funciones latentes no son intencionales e
incluso pueden ser no reconocibles. Las funciones son reproducidas y en cada sistema llegan a ser
nuevos objetivos (también las funciones no intencionales).
One of the most important assumptions of the Functionalist school is based on the concept of what
is called “spillover” effect. The concept of spillover is similar to that of “demonstration” effect as
used in the discipline of economics. The underlying belief of the spillover concept is that
cooperation in one area would open new avenues for similar cooperation in other areas.”
“For Haas “political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over
the pre-existing national states”
Mitrany (1948): The truth is that by its very nature the constitutional approach emphasizes the
individual index of power; the functional approach emphasizes the common index of need.
There are many such needs which cut across national boundaries, and an effective beginning
could be made by providing joint government for them (interdependence). These characteristics
of the functional approach therefore help to mitigate the obstinate problem of equal sovereignty.
In this approach it is not a matter of surrendering sovereignty, but merely of pooling so much of it
as may be needed for the joint performance of the particular task.
Attention to human needs outside the realm of the political – technical, non controversial
conduct.
Review INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. The University of Michigan. Professor Haas, who has earned and
enjoys a wide reputation as an exceptionally imaginative and sophisticated analyst of the
processes operative within and around international organizations, has set out in this study to
develop the concept of international integration, to examine the means by which such integration
may be brought about, and, in particular, to assess the contribution of the International Labor
Organization to that end. From the author's own viewpoint, he has written a book less about the
ILO as such than about the process of international integration. Nevertheless, it is open to the
reader to exploit the book for his own profit-if not to the reviewer to treat it for purposes of
assessment-as a case study of the development and functioning of the ILO. However, if the reader
makes this choice, he must be prepared to find the meaty ILO material sandwiched between a
thick slice of theoretical bread and a thinner, but still substantial, one.
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His reaction may well be that the sandwich includes an unnecessarily large amount of bread for his
purposes. The reviewer must emphasize that the author's purposes are clearly not those of our
hypothetical reader who is intent upon chewing into a study of the ILO. Haas' Part I, on
"Functionalism and the Theory of Integration," is not conceived as an introduction to his treatment
of the ILO, nor is his final section, "The Utility of Functionalism," designed merely to provide a
conclusion for that treatment.
Reverting to the metaphor of the sandwich, one might suggest that Haas regards the outer layers
of the volume as the real meat of the dish-and, considering their toughness, one would be inclined
to agree. Those parts demand strenuous intellectual molar activity. Haas' central concept of
international integration does not lend itself easily to clear definition. In his most elaborate
attempt at definition, the author puts it this way: "If the present international scene is conceived
of as a series of interacting and mingling national environments, and in terms of their participation
in international organizations, then integration would describe the process of increasing the
interaction and the mingling so as to obscure the boundaries between the system of international
organizations and the environment provided by their nation-state members." (p. 29)
At other points, Haas refers to the "process of growing mutual deference and institutional
mingling," (p. vii), to "social transformation leading to system-dominance," (p. 83), or simply to
"transformation of the international system." (p. 126) Whatever may be the inade- quacies of
these definitional statements, the book as a whole indicates that Haas conceives integration as
involving the progressive diminution of the separateness of states, the linking of interest groups
across political boundaries, and the growth of effective international institutions, capable of
harmonizing and coordinating national policies. This introduces the notion of functionalism, which
figures as importantly in the study as does the concept of integration. Essentially, Haas is asking
whether the theory of functionalism points to the means by which the end of integration can be
achieved.
He selects the ILO, a notable institutional expression of functionalism, as a test case. Hitherto, the
functional theory of international organization, most closely associated with David Mitrany, has
occupied a prominent niche in the gallery inhabited by international organization specialists, but
has been kept there in a state of theoretical isolation. What Haas has undertaken to do is to bring
this theory out and set it into the broader context of social science theory, examining its
relationship with, and exposing it to refinement in the light of, systems theory, organization
theory, the functional theory of law, functional sociology, conflict resolution theory, etc. This
accounts for the heavily abstract character of major sections of the book. Among international
organization specialists, Haas was perhaps uniquely qualified for the task, and he has performed it
with admirable industry and intelligence. From the viewpoint of this reviewer, it was a task that
very much needed doing, if only to find out whether it was worth doing. From the same viewpoint,
the result is not significantly rewarding. Haas would presumably disagree. At the beginning of Part
III, he notes that the middle section represented a sharp descent from "the lofty level of general
inquiry" with which the book began, and announces a new takeoff "to recapture that initial
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loftiness" (p. 429); he apparently enjoys the higher altitudes of theorizing. So be it; I can only reply
that I prefer Haas Debased to Haas Exalted.
Going into orbit produces exhilaration-but also weightlessness. Haas is a weighty man when he has
his feet on the ground. During the period of the author's grounding, in Part II, he develops a
sophisticated analysis and appraisal of the functioning of the ILO, valuable not only as a case study
but as a contribution to the general undertanding of the possibilities and limitations of
international institutions. Here, his concept of integration becomes more meaningful as he makes
it clear that he is concerned with such issues as the growth of institutional autonomy, the
expansion of the tasks of the ILO, the acceptance by members of unintended consequences of
policies and decisions, and the evolution of the ILO's effectiveness in influencing the behavior of its
members. Haas distinguishes between the "authority" of the organization-its capacity to persuade
states to perform their obligations unwillingly-and its "legitimacy"- the capacity to convince states
that they should perform their obligations. He employs a set of statistical devices for measuring
the development of those capacities, which, despite the inevitable imperfections of such gadgets,
serve as useful indicators. He develops important insights into the means available to international
organizations for influencing the policies and behavior of states, the factors affecting the
sensitivity of states to pressures emanating from international bodies, the positive as well as the
negative impacts of political conflict upon the evolution of the powers and the programs of such
agencies as the ILO, and the possibilities of bureaucratic leadership in international organizations.
In short, one finds here an impressive contribution to the theory of international integration-a
contribution that appears to derive from the author's thorough investigation and imaginative
utilization and interpretation of his data, without substantial indebtedness to the body of
theoretical material that occupies a prominent place in the volume.
Stephen HAGGARD y Beth SIMMONS, 1987. THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
El estudio no tan amplio como la estructura internacional, pero de mucho más que la la
organización formal. Estudio de NORMAS, del comportamiento regido por las normas –
consistente con la persecución de los intereses nacionales. Heggard y Simmons lo ven como
reconciliación entre idealismo y realismo. El artículo responde a la falta de la dimension domestica
en el trado del tema de los regímenes. Postulan el método de process tracing. Evocan al trabajo de
Putnam somber el juego de dos niveles.
La definición de Krasner: “principios implícitos o explícitos, normas, reglas, procedimientos de

toma de decisiones alrededor de los cuales convergen las expectativas de actores en un area
dada.” Es difícil distinguir entre normas y reglas. Ruggie en este contexto habla de enraizamiento
de liberalismo (embedded liberalism) que cumple función social.
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Una definición más restrictiva habla de los acuerdos formales multilaterales dentro de un área
política. Pero hay que distinguir los regímenes de otros tipos de cooperación. No cada cooperación
es un regimen. Regímenes pueden contribuir al orden y estabilidad.
Los indices del regimen:
- Fuerza: el grado de cumplimiento (compliance) en vista de intereses a corto plazo;
- Forma de la organización: el grado de centralización y tareas, forma de la toma de
decisiones;
- Alcance (scope) de los temas que el regimen cubre;
- Modo de la alocación de recursos (tipo Mercado o autoritario –que predetermina, de
issue-area)
Hay cuatro grupos de teorías sobre la formación de regimen:
- Estructuralismo: Teoría de estabilidad hegemónica – Gilpin, Kindleberger (will and
capacity). La estructura solo no es un buen predicador de las características del regimen ni
del vínculo con la política domestica. Los autores creen que política domestica es crucial
para entender la cooperación. La teoría hegemónica se vincula con la concepción de los
bienes públicos inernacionales.
- Enfoque estratégico y de la teoría de juegos: PD sirve para explicar porque hay
cooperación, pero no es útil para explicar la evolución (remediar los resultados sub-
óptimos).
- Teoría funcional: explicación en función de las instituciones. No es una teoría causal, más
bien explica cuando se va a requerir de un regimen.
- Teorías Cognitivas: Conocimiento e ideología (valores, creencias, información, aprendizaje,
etc. – los intereses surgen siempre en contexto normative y epistémico dado).
Peter KATZENSTEIN, 1998. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AT FIFTY
1960-1970 – variante sistémico de IPE, enfoque sobre la interdependencia , transnacionalismo,

alternativa a estado-centrismo, desafío para la teoría de estabilidad hegemónica. Fue una apertura
hacia el campo de IPE. Antes las instituciones aparecían en análisis formales de su funcionamiento,
el foco fue centrado en los temas de alta política. El impacto de política comparada fue
fundamental (Tilly, Skockpol, Gerschenkron, Moore).
La importancia del trabajo de Haas inspirado con los escritos de Mitrany – Neofuncionalismo sobre
la posibilidad de cooperación voluntaria entre distintos actores; el tema de intergracionismo
(Europa). Neofuncionalismo fue complementado por Deutsch y su investigación sobre las
comunidades epistémicas. Neofuncionalismo sostuvo una visión optimista de que la sociedad civil
va a apoyar los avances de la integración. La década de los 1970 trajo eventos de naturaleza
económica que devlvieron el interes por el impacto a lo político. De apoco se fortalece el tema de
la interdependencia – Keohane, Nye y el debate con Gilpin (neo-realista) sobre el rol del estado.
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Los trabajos de Susan Strange – énfasis sobre el mercado y como los estados interactúan con él. El
enfoque estadocéntrico de Gilpin y Krasner fue dominado por el extremo de internacionalización
(el estado casi desaparece).
1970 – realismo y sus críticos. Desafío liberal de la teoría de regímenes. Realistas tratan de
adoptarla co la teoría de estabilidad hegemónica.
1980 – institucionalismo neoliberal y neorealismo; también constructivismo vs. Racionalismo. El
libro de Gilpin es fundamental.
1982 Krasner publica su definición del régimen. Keohane lo apoya con argumentos racionalistas.
Axelrod con la teoría de juegos. Institucionlismo Neoliberal – debate con neorealismo sobre las
ganancias relativas y absolutas (grieco).
Por otro lado apareción el interés por el vínculo entre la política internacional y doméstica, vínculo
con política comparada y relaciones internacionales, vínculos entre los temas, las líneas de
investigación se complegizaron.
- Marxismo estructural – Cox, Prebisch, Walerstein, Caporaso, Cardoso, Neo-Gramscism
- Estadismo (nacionalismo) – estado que guiá la economía, burocracia, estc.
- Estructuras domésticas y el sistema internacional – industrialización, modernización
(Gourevitsh, Putnam, Moravcsik, Rogowski, Frieden)
- Globalización – altos niveles de flujos fronterizos
Tiempos post-guerra-fría y el debate entre racionalismo y reflectivismo (constructivismo)…cambios

políticos internacionales, complegización. Revivamiento de las perspectivas sociológicas, también
de la Escuela Inglesa; constructivimso (convencional y post-moderno/crítico). KKK constatan que
constructivismo convencional y racionalismo son compatibles, pero ambos representan distintas
racionalidades. Los autores ponen mucha énfasis sobre estas dos escuelas de racionalismo (thin –
información) y constructivismo (thick – normas e identidades). Ninguno puede ser completo sin el
otro.
Memo 1 – Economia Política Internacional – Enrico Padoan

Polany (1944), Lake (1976) y Katzenstein et al. (1998)
En esta clase introductoria hemos tenido la posibilidad de confrontar dos descripciones bien
diferentes de la sub-disciplina de la Economia Política Internacional (IPE), la propuesta por
Keohane, Krasner y Katzenstein (aquí resumidos por K) y la de Lake. Además, la lectura de un
clásico como The Great Transformation de Polanyi nos ha permitido averiguar los importantes
insights que nos ofrece esta obra (ante litteram) “constructivista”.
Ambas descripciones de la disciplina ponen el decisivo desarrollo de la disciplina entre la década

de los Sesenta y de los Setenta, cuando sucesos tales como el proceso de integración europea y los
exitosos round de negociación en el GATT pusieron otra vez en relevancia los asuntos económicos
internacionales en un mundo por entonces dominado por los temas de seguridad internacional (K:
654). Fue pero precisamente el colapso del sistema de Bretton Woods, la aparición de la OPEC
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como actor económico de primera importancia y las demandas de un Nuevo Orden Económico
Internacional (NOEI) lo que permitió ir más allá del funcionalismo y de integrar la disciplina en las
IR, causando el nacimiento de General Theoretical Orientations (GTO) especulares e integradas a
las de la disciplina “madre” (el realismo con su teoria de la estabilidad hegémonica y
sucesivamente con el asillamado “estadismo”, el liberalismo y su teoria de la interdependencia
compleja primero y la de los regímenes internacionales después; sin olvidar las teorias de la
dependencia y las marxistas), animando un debate que habría dominado la década de los
Ochenta.
Ambas visiones, además, comparten la predilección para una metodología empírica y falseable
(Lake: 772), y el corolario de un cierto rechazo de enfoques posmodernistas (K: 677-678). Lo que
separa estas dos descripciones, sin embargo, se puede ya encontrar en la definición propuesta; K
distinguen (con una terminologia algo infeliz) entre la economia política internacional como las
conexiones internacionales entre política y economía, y la IPE (el objeto del artículo) como la
subdisciplina que a partir del estudio de la economía política internacional analiza aspectos de la
política mundial (K: 645). Lake, en contra, ve en la IPE una disciplina… interdisciplinaria que traza
un puente entre ciencia política y economia (Lake: 757-758). De aquí, la posibilidad para K de
insertar la IPE en una tradición de pensamientos más amplia; la disciplina dibujada por Lake, a lo
contrario, es una propuesta metodológica, en la cual, en realidad, se pone evidente el predominio
de un abordaje econométrico mitigado por el mérito de insertar en los modelos propuestos
variables políticas.
En este marco, los GTO que pueden ser eficazmente utilizados parecen reducirse casi
completamente al neoliberalismo institucional y a la teoria de la interdependencia compleja, y a
los debates sobre la relación entre positive y absolute gains; mucha de la literatura nombrada por
Lake se especializa en como operacionalizar factores como instituciones, clases sociales, grupos de
interés, variables macroeconómicas, proteccionismo, etc. El uso de rational-theory y teoria de
juegos también resulta preponderante, y ha contribuido a encontrar interesantes findings acerca
de las interacciones entre nivel doméstico e internacional. La perspectiva de Lake, sin embargo, se
caracteriza por la estrechez de sus intereses académicos y su escasa atención hacia la teoria
internacionalista; si a key divide within this approach is between the Ricardo-Viner or specific
factors theory of international trade […] and the Heckscher-Ohlin […] which assumes that all
factors are mobile across occupations (Lake: 763), ¿qué decir entonces de los conflictos – que
dominó la década de los Noventa - entre las perspectivas neo-neo (nombrada racionalistas por K,
en una evidente admisión de sus raíces metodológicas y ontólogicas comunes) y el
constructivismo, acerca de la importancia y de la interpretación de las instituciones y de las
normas?
Contra una excesiva “economización” de las IR, bien se puede insertar el texto de Polanyi.
Primero, una aclaración: no es que entender la IPE como subdisciplina de las IR responda
simplemente a una reacción de la “Ciencia Política” qua “academia” contra la “Economía”;
simplemente, yo creo que en los textos presentados los autores hablen de dos cosas diferentes
(siendo la de Lake una sub-sub-disciplina de la IPE). No se trata, tampoco, de una categorización
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tal vez ociosa y esteril; hay que defender, por supuesto, los estudios multidipliscinarios de los
temas que son estudiados, a partir de diferentes perspectivas y miradas, por las dos disciplinas
resumidas en estos textos. Pero un enfoque interdisciplinario es muy complicado para alcanzar, y
solo puede ser logrado a través de un estrechamiento de las opciones metodológicas posibles y de
los temas tratables (tal como lo hizo la OEP resumida por Lake)
Polanyi, por su parte, en una obra de increible profundidad teórica, nos ofrece una fuerte
problematización de algunos supuestos comunmente asociados a la Economía. El punto central de
su obra es la crítica al concepto clásico de mercado autorregulado, a través de un análisis histórico
de las distintas formas de organización económica y de los fundamentos socio-culturales que las
fundaban, y de un análisis político-institucional que permitió desvelar los mecanismos de
autodefensa creados por los Estados para limitar y relativizar (y a veces para acelerar) el impacto
de variaciones epocales en la organización económica debidas a la Revolución Industrial. La
dialéctica entre mainstream teórico y mecanismos de actuación y de resistencia al cambio
implementados por Estados y grupos de interés nos aclaran el impacto de la construcción social de
la realidad; el proceso de formación de preferencias previo a la toma de decisiones se ve
poderosamente afectado no solamente por los distintos intereses económicos en juego, sino por
lo que la doctrina académica hegemónica proponia en una particular época histórica y por las
preocupaciones de realpolitik de los Estados soberanos.
La era del Imperialismo siguiente a la guerra Franco-Prusiana, por ejemplo, representó el cierre de
una (breve) época de dominio de las teorias académicas clásicas en el comportamiento de algunos
Estados, y volvió a hacer de la economía un instrumento de la política internacional; al revés, la
defensa ideológica del patron oro en los años Veinte y Treinta (hasta su completo colapso) fue
provocada por la preponderancia de la teoría clásica con respecto a los intereses económicos de
las clases sociales afectada por estas políticas. En este último caso, es evidente la importancia de
tomar en cuenta factores ideológicos y discursivos para poder describir adecuadamente la
realidad.
En fin, las relaciones entre intereses económicos de los grupos dominantes, teoria económica
dominante, policies implementadas por los Estados, feedbacks hacia el nivel doméstico y el nivel
internacional - nos dice Polanyi - son mucho más complejas de lo que podria parecer si
utilizaramos una perspectiva basada exclusivamente en los intereses de las clases o en una visión
linear y teleológica de la historia económica. Ni se trata de un enfoque menos racionalista, sino de
un approach más problematizante y atento a distintos niveles de análisis: sociológico, político,
económico y cultural.
Robert KEOHANE y Joseph NYE, 1989. POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE
Interdependencia: altos niveles de transacción transfronteriza y los efectos y consecuencias

compartidas de estas transacciones (aparecen problemas comunes que un estado por si solo no
puede resolver eficientemente)
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El poder es la habilidad de un actor de hacer que otro haga algo que no habría hecho de otro
modo.
Para entender conuntamente el poder y la interdependencia es importante distinguir entre la
sensibilidad y vulnerabilidad:
Sensibilidad dentro de un área política es el grado de efecto que generan cambios dentro de un
país sobre el otro y lo costosos que son estos cambios.
Vulnerabilidad – la habilidad de un país de mitigar estos efectos introduciendo cambios y
modificaciones políticas.
En resultado la interdependencia asimétrica entre los actores determina en grado del poder.
Los régimenes – la red de reglas, normas y procedimientos – marco en el cual la relación de
interdependencia ocurre – el régimen es el paso intermedio entre la estructura del poder del
sistema y el proceso de regateo entre actores.
Interdependencia compleja:
- canales múltiples de conexiones; conexiones informales transfronterizas
- el poder desagregado en las áreas políticas si jerarquía clara entre ellas
- menor énfasis sobre la dimensión militar del poder
- porque no hay una clara jerarquía entre temas, los intereses de los países van a varian
dependiendo del área, y de esto también dependerá el balanceo del poder; por ejemplo el
poder militar no siempre va a ser útil.
- La capacidad de agenda setting de distintos actores también no estatales.
- La frontera entre la política estatal y doméstica menos nítida dados los CANALES
MULTIPLES DE INTERACCIÓN.
- Relevancia creciente de organizaciones internacionales – unen temas, reúnen
representantes de distintas posiciones políticas, dotan países menores de poder.
- Cambios dentro y del régimen y del régimen. Declive del hegemón que no puede seguir
asumiendo los costos.
Malgorzata Lange
Interdependence and Globalization/ memo 12
-
The book by Keohane and Nye on power and interdependence published for the first time in the
seventies has not devaluated its premises in spite of epochal changes, power and economical
shifts. The authors with certain initial realist credentials, challenge realist slightly short-sighted and
“ideal type” paradigm, proposing a more dynamic power relations panorama (where power is
understood by traditional realist terms) of complex interdependence, where states, along with
other actors, depend mutually one from the other in non-symmetrical degree, sharing benefits as
well as costs of such interdependence.
Interdependence comprises, as it was indicated above, social, political and economic realms and
thus operates throughout rules, norms and patterns of behavior within the structures of
international regimes. There authors distinguish three characteristics of complex
interdependence: 1) “multiple channels” indicate to multiple channels of contact and transmission
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belts of actors¨ interests; 2) lack of hierarchy among issues (much more topics are subject to
international policy) and multiple agenda; 3) minor role of military power – the recourse to force
seems less likely, as a means of not an appropriate means of achieving goals. This characteristics of
complex interdependence generate distinctive political processes, where the concept of power is
in a way disintegrated (there are many means of power, which make also “small” states powerful
because of a “sensible” product they have) into issue areas which leads to more horizontal
hierarchy, complex agenda setting, where states coexist with non-state actors and independent
international organizations. The effects of power bargain in such environment oscillate between
sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity implies the degree in which changes in one country
generate costly social political or economical effects for the other before any political measures
have been taken, while vulnerability implies costly policy adjustments to change environment over
a period of time. Vulnerability is crucial for the understanding of the interdependence relations in
international system, because it reveals the capacity of a state to adjust its policies, deal with a
change and finally, set the rules of the game. Vulnerability is a fundamental political tool of
manipulation the assets of power in interdependent world that lead to power asymmetries and
even a dominance.
Keohane and Nye present their interdependence model, without rejecting a realist approach. They
rather suggest that it is insufficient to explain the complexity of today’s international relations,
maintaining academic modesty, stating that there is no single model able to explain change in
world politics. They make an overview of four competitive realist-rooted models of regime change,
indicating their strengths and shortcomings. From “economic process explanation” these are
economical variables, technological change and interdependence that determine regime surge
and decline and to a much lesser degree political factors, political responses and structural
adjustments. Among of what can be classified as structural explanations” the authors distinguish a
“power structure” and “issue structure”. The apparent “elegance” of power structure explanation
emphasize international power structure and power capabilities, without distinguishing between
separate issue areas. The state with the overall highest power capabilities is a hegemon who takes
a leadership and assumes the burden of regime creation and maintenance.
According to this approach, international system changes, because of a violent change (a war) or a
hegemonic equilibrium breakdown when common trade-offs of the regime “public good” may
help boost an emergent power and debilitate a hegemon. There are basically three, material as
well as non-material, factors that lead to hegemonic decline in post war era, such as changes of
perception of hegemon “malignity”, changes in relative economic strength and changes in
hierarchical patterns. However, as we already know from Keohane regime theory, the demise of a
hegemon is not a sufficient explanation for a regime decline. Issue structural model, in contrast to
power structure model, “disaggregates” power resources along issue areas. It means that one
state can be powerful in one, but less efficient in other area. Issue structure theory generates
better predictions and is more demanding, however the latter may cause it to be “less powerful”
because it is information and data demanding. Both structural approaches lack, however, second
image variables which makes them at least simplistic as well as the same state-centric view
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perceive a bargaining structural process as having no autonomy. Considering this panorama,

structural views are all too narrow and too static, “provide only a partial explanation”. The last
model, an “international organization model” is based on another kind of structure, where states
and non-state actors regulate their behavior through norms, multilevel linkages and institutions.
Keohane and Nye see just another kind of international structure in form of international
organizations. Independent states can no longer play it on their own, they are constrained by
patterns of behavior, norms and networks. International organizations become regime operational
centers and guardians. According to the complex interdependence approach, the regime change
will be influenced and modeled by international organization structure. However, the weakness of
this model depends on the assumption that the states have a will to maintain.
One of the “Pax Britannica” issue areas (defined subjectively as a problem about which policy
makers are concerned and consider the relevant to public policy) analyzed along with monetary
regime with the optics interdependence approach is the ocean issue area. The particularity of this
area has traditionally been the category of “global public good” (rules by customary law) it
enjoyed almost until the second half of the 20 th century, when the technology opened new
possibilities of sea bed exploitation which together with the growing demand for sea products
created state interests and competition for resources. Then, a strong regulative impulse came with
strictly defined norms and limits ratified by international sea conventions which gave rise to strong
regime type. However, partially owing to North-South cleavages and outside area issue linkages
(scientific research, arm control, oil transport, etc) the strong regime fainted in the late sixties into
a weak form and even a demand for an alternative order.
The explanation of regime change and fluctuations in the conditions of complex interdependence
leads to a broadening of the concept of force. If it comes to ocean area, water space keeps
important for the naval and thus security purposes mainly for deterrence (in this realist elements
prevails), however there are strongly embedded norms of no-use of force and the rise in issue
linkages of technology, natural resources and environmental protection downplayed the force as a
means of regime maintenance. Another interdependent element – the absence of hierarchy
among issues is true about sea regime. The growing multiplicity of issues has not been
accompanied by a fixed hierarchy among them. The third element to analyze according to
interdependence matrix - the multiplicity of channels of contact is now-a-days already all
pervasive. The analysis of this international issue area demonstrates that complex
interdependence paradigm accomplishes its premises.
Robert KEOHANE y Helen MILNER, 1996. INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
Anita Perricone PUC. The central question has to do with the impact of internationalization of the
world economy on domestic politics. Such a process makes it impossible to understand domestic
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politics without investigating the linkages between the two levels. The key to internationalization
is a shift in transaction costs, which allows an increase in the flow of goods, services and capital.
Internationalization is de independent variable while the dependent variables are two: national
preferences and national policies and institutions. A second argument is that the existing
institutional context mediates the impact of internationalization, thus producing different effects
depending on the country. The theoretical perspective used is the “second image reversed”, which
juxtaposes theories of preferences and theories on institutions. The assumption on which such
theories build is one of rational choice: politicians respond to incentives coming both from the
world economy and from domestic society.
These studies build upon “interdependence theory” (Keohane and Nye, 1972, among others),
which anticipated the impact of internationalization on the domestic realm but didn’t explain it.
Further works in a “second image reversed” tradition go deeper into the mechanisms through
which internationalization affects domestic politics: Rogowski (1989) explains that
internationalization changes the returns to factors of production and thus produce a shift in
domestic coalitions and cleavages. Gourevitch (1986) explains that internationalization reshapes
national preferences and thus national politics. Milner (1988) has argued that the pressure
exercised by influential multinational enterprises changes domestic politics.
But the effect of internationalization on domestic politics is far from automatic: it depends on a
number of factors, such as the partisan composition of the government; the strength of labor
organization and financial organizations such as central banks does matter a lot. Institutions
matter: if their strength or weakness has an impact on their mediation effect.
The authors present evidence to the existence of the process of internationalization since the 70s.
This process is recognizable in the increase of international trade flows and in the expansion of
international capital markets, both allowed by deregulation and technological innovation.
The effects of internationalization are thought to be a shift in coalitions: the group that is closest
to the abundant factor will be in favor of internationalization, while the group closest to the
scarcest factor will be against internationalization. This implies that a country’s interest will be
increasingly defined by international economic forces (here is the central puzzle). The authors
speculate that internationalization will expose national economies to external shocks, and
undermine the autonomy of governments’ policies. Being increasingly exposed to international
price trends, the pressure will be greater on left-wing governments than on right-wing ones, since
the former favor welfare and the second price stability. The consequences of internationalization
affect also countries with closed economies, while international capital will gain power relative to
labor and politicians, since it has the “exit” option.
But the effects of internationalization on domestic politics are not automatic: political leaders,
parties, unions and other actors have a margin to resist such changes. For example, they may block
international price signals (as in the communist countries), freeze coalitions and policies (as in
Scandinavia) or invent strategies to counter international tendencies.
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The tension between international trends and domestic politics is a constant one: but what is
happening in the majority of countries? Which tendency has been stronger, internationalization or
resistance? The focus of the book is on the interplay between international economy and domestic
politics, with a glance also to collective action (GATT, EU)..
Memo 10 – Economía Política Internacional – Enrico Padoan

Keohane y Milner (1996), Gourevitch (1978), Mosley (2000)
Los autores que hemos visto en esta semana abarcan uno de los temas más importantes de la
disciplina, es decir las relaciones entre política doméstica y política internacional. Más
precisamente, hay una atención hacia como la evolución del escenario internacional afecte las
opciones disponibles para los actores domésticos, in primis los Estados.
Gourevitch (1978) recupera el segundo de los tres niveles de análisis utilizados por Waltz (1959)
para explicar como está compuesta la estructura de la política internacional, es decir el Estado
(siendo los otros dos el individuo – con su visión hobbesiana, de la cual deriva su peculiar
interpretación de la realidad – y la estructura internacional, es decir la distribución de poder y
capabilities entre los distintos Estados). Gourevitch, sin embargo, está interesado en explicar como
la política doméstica se ve afectada por las relaciones internacionales (entendidas en términos de
distribución de poder militar) y la economia política internacional, aunque no descarte el peso de
las ideologias y de las ideas. El autor nos ofrece una excelente review de las principales teorías de
las relaciones internacionales, indicándonos una interesante división según el rol que en estas
teorias juegan el Estado; hay teorías Estadocéntricas, como las que derivan del estudio clásico de
Genschenkron, ciertos marxistas y los neomercantilistas, y hay otras que o dejan el Estado al
margen, enfocándose en una unidad de análisis mucho más amplia (teoría de las dependencias,
teoría del sistema-mundo) o planteando una inevitable convergencia de todos los Estados hacia
políticas similares, siendo solo uno el camino posible hacia el desarrollo económico (teorías
liberales del desarrollo).
Su preferencia para teorías á la Genschenkron empuja el autor hacia teorías más complejas para
explicar las reacciones del Estado en contra de los inputs que derivan del sistema internacional,
aunque, en fin y al cabo, el autor quiere subrayar, sobre todo, la necesariedad de analizar ambos
niveles de análisis y la difícil separación analítica entre los dos niveles. En general, el autor rechaza
argumentos reduccionistas que simplifiquen demasiado una realidad mucho más compleja, y
subraya la complejidad causal, muchas veces circular, entre estructura de poder interna y externa
y política interna y externa de un país. Finalmente, Gourevitch avanza una crítica al concepto de
interdependencia, ya que, según su visión, este fenómeno no es ni nuevo ni particularmente
poderoso, con respecto a las épocas pasadas; el autor relativiza así esta supuesta “revolución” en
las relaciones internacionales (subrayada por Keohane y Milner, 1996), rescatando posibles
explicaciones más clásicas pero igualmente aún valiosas.
Los demás autores o proponen teorías para explicar los efectos de la economía internacional para
las opciones viables para los actores domésticos (Frieden y Rogowski, 1996; Keohane y Milner,
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1996), o nos proponen interesantes estudios empíricos para comprobar sus hipótesis (Garrett
1996; Haggard y Maxfield, 1996; Mosley, 2000). Keohane y Milner proponen un aumento del peso
de los sectores tradable cuanto más se avance en la internacionalización de la economía,
fenómeno que, como también nos explican Frieden y Rogowski, afecta hasta los Estados
economicamente más cerrados. Sin embargo, Keohane y Milner subrayan también como ciertos
actores pueden tratar de resistir a esta tendencia, a través de, entre otras maneras, el uso de las
instituciones domésticas existentes, creadas para objetivos muchos distintos de lo de la
integración económica, y por eso fuente de un posible freezing de las distribuciones de poder
entre sectores tradable y non-tradable.
Frieden y Rogowski, por su lado, nos ofrecen un resumen de las distintas teorias que explican las
reacciones de los actores domésticos hacia el proceso de internacionalización. Cada uno, en sus
trabajos anteriores (Frieden 1991; Rogowski 1988), ha monstrado preferir distintos modelos para
explicar las posibles coaliciones entre “factores” (según el modelo Hecksher-Olin compartido por
Rogowski) o “sectores” (según el modelo Ricardo-Viner compartido por Frieden) con respecto al
grado favorito de apertura de la economía nacional. Ambos comparten la existencia de un
exogenous easing (es decir, una disminución de los costos de transporte de los bienes) que
favorece el intercambio comercial y financiero internacional y que modifica los cálculos de costo-
beneficio que hacen los Estados y los actores domésticos para abrirse (o cerrarse) frente a la
internacionalización; una debilidad de su argumentación es que ellos estiman “análogos” los
exogenous easing en la esfera comercial y financiera, algo que habría que explicar y no que
suponer y dar por sentado, ya que los mecanismos en esta dos esferas son lejos de ser parecidos y
de tener las mismas consecuencias.
Frieden y Rogowski son interesados en explicar los outcomes a nivel de preferencias (de los
actores domésticos, también no-estatales, como factores y/o sectores) y de policies, en reacción a
este proceso de internacionalización. Los autores subrayan como los efectos de este proceso
afecten hasta (y, tal vez, sobre todo) los Estados más cerrados afectando sus terminos de
intercambio, ya que aislarse significa una renuncia a los beneficios del intercambio cada vez más
dañina, sobre todo en términos de desarrollo tecnológico (piénsese en los países del Pacto de
Varsovia). Los autores, según una perspectiva más “friedeniana”, destacan también la importancia
de variaciones en los precios relativos para explicar modificaciones de ciertas políticas nacionales,
como en el caso del fenómeno llamado Dutch disease, en que hubo una peligrosa
deindustrialización a causa de un movimiento de capitales hacia un sector en un cierto momento, y
temporaneamente favorecido por los términos de intercambio (el petrolero).
Los trabajos más empíricos apuntan a comprobar distintas hipótesis sobre las posibles reacciones
de los Estados hacia la internacionalización. Es útil comparar los trabajos de Mosley (2000) y
Garrett (1996), ya que ambos se enfocan sobre los países de la OECD, y más precisamente sobre
los constreñimientos que enfrentan los Estados con respecto a la libertad de maniobra en sus
políticas macroeconómicas. Los resultados son interesantes, aunque un poco contradictorios.
Garrett no logra darnos una respuesta unívoca sobre la posible sobrevivencia de Estados de
bienestar y big governments en las economías avanzadas; los liberales plantean un progresivo
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“achicamiento” del Estado, per se ineficiente y culpable de desviar desde una optimal distribución
de recursos, mientras que los teóricos de la new growth afirman que, siendo el capital humano un
factor cada vez más importante en la lucha para los mercados internacionales, es necesario que el
Estado se “agrandezca” para proveer a aquellos bienes públicos (como la educación) que los
privados no tienen los incentivos para crear y distribuir. Los resultados de su investigación tal vez
favorecen los argumentos liberales; en contra, Mosley nota que, por lo que concierne la movilidad
de los capitales, las teorias que apuntan a una progresiva convergencia (hacia un Estado “chico”)
de las políticas macroeconómicas nacionales están parcialmente equivocadas, ya que en realidad
el Estado sigue teniendo un espacio de maniobra bastante grande, gracias a una extrema bounded
rationality de los inversionistas internacionales de capitales, que están interesados a unas pocas
variables macroeconómicas, sin entrar en consideraciones demasiado específicas sobre la
distribución de los gastos estatales (que podrían así, a través de políticas de spending review, ser
destinados a gastos sociales para compensar los loosers de la integración económica mundial).
Otra perspectiva, muy interesante, es la de Haggard y Maxfield (1996), que, mirando a los países
en via de desarrollo, notan como el grado de apertura es, casi siempre, una función del estado de
salud de la balanza de pagos; esto se pone evidente en su análisis sobre el caso chileno (aunque
sucesivamente al primer shock de 1974 la fuerza de argumentos ideológicos habrían sido más
relevantes). Aún más interesante, a mi juicio, es el case-study de surcoreano, ya que, en ese unico
ejemplo, constreñimientos políticos (precisamente, las presiones de Estados Unidos para una
apertura del mercado nacional para permitir, particularmente, una revaluación del won)
provocaron una (parcial) apertura que no habría sido estrictamente necesaria.
Review by J. SAMUEL BARKIN, University Of Victoria. This volume represents the state of the art
in the study of the effects of internationalization on domestic politics. Specifically, it examines the
extent to which economic internationalization, operationalized as the consistent increase in the
last several decades of international trade and investment flows, affects domestic policy choices. It
approaches the subject from a rationalist perspective and addresses both the expected impacts of
internationalization on policy preferences and the mediating effects of existing political institutions
on actual policy outputs.
Following an introductory chapter by Helen V. Milner and Robert 0. Keohane, Jeffrey Frieden and
Ronald Rogowski provide an analytic overview of the impact of the international economy on
domestic policy preferences, and Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange model the mediating effect of
institutions on the political change caused by economic internationalization. The case studies are
individually very good, but leave fairly substantial gaps in their coverage. For example, there are
no cases that examine Western Europe specifically, and only one chapter on the entirety of the
developing world. On the whole, though, this volume is the most comprehensive attempt, both
theoretically and geographically, to address the question of the effects of economic
internationalization on domestic politics. It also works well as an edited volume; the theoretical
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chapters lay out a set of clear propositions, and the following chapters address these propositions
fairly directly.
The concluding chapter, also by Milner and Keohane, identifies and sums up these effects. The
surprising thing is not that these effects exist; rather, it is that these effects are not stronger. The
editors are able to find significant empirical support for most of their hypotheses. The effects of
internationalization, however, were neither universal, nor nearly as overwhelming as some of the
globalization literature would have us believe. The case studies suggest that strong states,
particularly the communist systems of the Soviet Union and China, can block these effects over a
long term. Even in the studies of liberal democracies the effects are often mitigated by strong
institutions.
This book is important, though, for what it says implicitly about the current state of the study of
international political economy as well as what it says explicitly about internationalization and
domestic politics. In particular, it is a reflection both on how the field has developed since the
1970s, and on where it might be headed from here. Keohane and Milner began the project with
the question, "what happened to interdependence theory?" (p. vii). The rest of the volume
implicitly answers that question. Interdependence theory was the predominant theoretical
statement of liberal international theory in the 1970s, and described a complex and contingent
world, a world too complicated to be captured by formal models. Since then the trend has been
toward increased use of rational-actor models and increasing formality, which has tended to leave
interdependence theory behind. Whether one thinks of this as a positive trend or not, this volume
is an effective statement of the current methodological predominance of deductive, rational
theorizing amongst liberal approaches to the study of international political economy.
It is interesting to note that as the topical ambitiousness of formal models increases to encompass
the sort of broader and more general questions tackled by interdependence theory, the
ambitiousness of claims to prediction seem to be retreating to the point where we still need
qualitative, even narrative, research to predict in any specific situation. In attempting to apply
formal logic simultaneously to the effects of internationalization on domestic policy preferences
and to the mitigating effects of political institutions, this volume has shown that formal theorizing
in the end faces many of the same limitations as the methodologies it replaces.
Stephen KRASNER, 1993. GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS AND NATIONAL POWER: LIFE ON THE
PARETO FRONTIER
By Anita Perricone. There is no single international regime for global communications. There is
considerable variation in principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures according to the
interests and relative power of actors. Global communications have not been characterized by
Nash equilibrium and by disagreement on which point on the Pareto frontier should be chosen
(distributional conflict or market failure). Emphasis is posed on information and monitoring rather
than on power (given the Pareto suboptimal situation and concern for absolute gains also).
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Where there were disagreements and unequal power distribution, states have done what they
pleased. But when coordination problems and the distribution of power has been symmetrical
regimes have been established. In presence of coordination problems, the purpose of the regime
has been avoiding mutually undesirable outcomes. In presence of distributional consequences,
states disagreed on the desirable outcomes. Conflicts over the allocation of the radio spectrum
and international communications are determined by the relative power of states. The nature of
institutional arrangements is better explained by power than by attempts to solve market failure.
Relation between configuration of interests and creation and maintenance of regimes: under zero-
sum conditions (pure harmony or conflict) there is no basis for regimes, one actor’s goal is the
other’s loss. Purely self-regarding behavior produces both a Nash and a Pareto optimal
equilibrium. In contrast, dilemmas of common aversion/interest are distributions of preferences
that create incentives to establish international regimes. Dilemmas of aversion refer to situations
in which strategic interaction is needed to coordinate actors’ policie sin order to avoid mutually
undesirable outcomes. Actors agree on some rules. If there is no agreement, then Nash
equilibrium which is Pareto optimal.
Dilemmas of such kind can involve questions of coordination or distribution. Actors recognize the
need for agreement, but do not necessarily agree on the solution: there are many points on the
Pareto frontier. Battle of the sexes: a couple prefers to go on holiday together, but they disagree
on the place to go (mountain/sea). In IR theory the equilibrium reached depends on states’
commitment (cleverness) or outright through the exercise of state power. Three manifestations of
state power: determines of who can play the game; dictates rules of the game; changes the payoff
matrix.
Dilemmas that involve collaboration, not distributional issues, are concerned with market failure;
have Pareto suboptimal outcomes (one can win without the other losing); are like Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In IR: question of how can actors move toward the Pareto-optimal outcome of mutual
cooperation? Cooperation is more likely when there is iteration, no defined number of plays, low
discount rates ad small difference between payoffs of cooperation and defection. How can
institutions facilitate cooperation? Increasing information (reduces incentive to lie and cheat),
raising the cost of illegitimate behavior, promoting convergent expectations and fostering cross-
issue-area linkages.
Market-failure analyses pay no attention to power: all actors are treated symmetrically.
Information and monitoring capabilities count mode than power, defined as the capacity to set the
rules, decide who plays and change the payoffs of the game. Issue-linkage or limiting the number
of players is mode effective than power in fostering cooperation. But market-failure problems are
irrelevant for global communications: monitoring and information were never central
considerations. Power – and interests – did matter.
Author considers four issue-areas: radio and television, remote sensing, allocation of
electromagnetic spectrum, telecommunications. The first two areas are not international regimes:
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there is no agreement, powerful states have acted unilaterally. Weak states, on the other hand,
could not regulate access to their territory. The other two areas have witnessed coordination
problems and have been international regimes. Then there have been distributional issues as well.
CONCLUSIONS: literature on international regimes has focused on market-failures, emphasizing

the possibility of mutual gains (appropriate institutions can enhance mutual well-being). Power is
not necessarily inconsistent: the contractual approach is not a substitute for power-oriented or
interdependence positions (Keohane). The most important issue of the research program based on
market-failure is how to reach the Pareto frontier. Investigation of institutional arrangements to
overcome the problem of payoff structures that are not Nash equilibriums.
Keohane, in After Hegemony, analyzes the ways in which institutions can overcome problems of
market failure by increasing the symmetry and amount of information, making it easier to
establish reputation across several issue-areas, promoting convergent expectations. Power is
ignored in market-failure analyses, because it is not considered important to solve such kind of
problems. The cognitive ability to construct efficacious institutional arrangements (cleverness) is
more important than national power capabilities. But a power-oriented research program is not
inconsistent with such an analysis.
Instead, a power oriented approach, compatible with market-failure analysis, pushes issues of
pareto-suboptimality, cheating and monitoring into the background. There is always struggle for
control of an institution, because of the benefits it implies. Power is exercised not to improve
cooperation but to secure benefits. The most important issue is the distribution of capabilities and
benefits.
The communication regimes have been established to solve coordination problems that have
distributional consequences (not market-failure). The absence of rules would have left everybody
worse off. The regimes reflect the power capabilities of states, and have changed as the
distribution of power has changed. The choice of certain rules has left everybody better off, but
has benefited some more than others. Power is determined by: technology and market size;
membership in universal organizations; control over territorial access.
Three aspects suggest that a power-based approach is more appropriate than analyses based on
market failure when dealing with the international system: there are some aspects in this realm
that are zero-sum, one actor’s gain is another’s loss; it is possible to eliminate some players
through the use of force or to compel him; the initial allocation of property rights will have
distributional consequences. Indeed, in the realm of international politics, power must be given a
central place: neoliberal speculations about the positive effects of greater information are
fascinating, but they obscure considerations of relative power capabilities, which draw attention to
how the power structure was structured in the first place, constraints on choices and winners and
loosers.
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David LAKE, 1988. POWER, PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE
Review by Stephan Haggard, Harvard University. Systemic or structural approaches seek to

explain both international outcomes, such as cooperation or regimes, and foreign policies in terms
of characteristics of the international system as a whole, with minimal reference to the internal
characteristics of states. In Power, Protection, and Free Trade (as well as a series of important
articles), David Lake has built on earlier work by Charles Kindleberger, Stephen Krasner, and
Robert Gilpin to advance a more refined and complex structural theory of trade policy. Lake
follows previous theorists of hegemonic stability in noting the importance of power-
operationalized as share of world trade-in providing the "infrastructure" required to sustain a
liberal order, though why relative size should be important in this regard remains unclear.
According to Lake, relative size also increases the likelihood that countries will be able to alter
their terms of trade through an optimal tariff unilaterally. Finally, size is presumed to affect the
ability to exploit the open economy multiplier by running current account surpluses, though the
most important instruments for achieving this objective are the exchange rate and, ultimately,
macroeconomic policy, rather than trade policy.
One of Lake's central contributions is to include a measure of relative productivity in his

conception of the international trade structure. The importance of relative labor productivity in
deducing trade interests is somewhat ambiguous, however. Differences in unit labor costs across
countries are one basis for international specialization and justify free trade policies regardless of
relative productivity. Lake argues, however, that medium-sized and small countries with relatively
high labor productivity are better positioned to benefit from protection of industries with
increasing returns than are other states. Though the empirical evidence on the efficacy of strategic
trade policy and trade surpluses remains tenuous, the arguments about increasing returns and the
open economy multiplier are crucial to Lake's story. They constitute the systemic source of the
mercantilist policy preferences he attributes to the most important nonhegemonic actors in the
system, the "opportunist" (high- productivity) and "spoiler" (low-productivity) middle powers.
The next step in the argument is to generate an international structural matrix from power (large,
medium, and small powers) and relative productivity (high or low). This yields six basic structural
positions, though the lines between categories are necessarily somewhat arbitrary. International
structures vary depending on the distribution of countries occupying these positions. Though
refinements have been added by Lake's careful specification of structure, the most important
distinction empirically is still between hegemonic systems (the United Kingdom until 1912 and the
United States from 1945 to 1965) and the systems in which rising or declining hegemons have
contended with one, two, or more middle powers.
Lake's dependent variable is trade "strategy," including the general trend of tariff levels but also
whether tariffs are negotiated and the degree of discrimination in national trade policies. The final
step in the theoretical argument is to show how different structures affect both national choices
and bargaining processes. This is done by the application of simple game theory to the interactions
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of different actors in the structure. The expectations derived from structure alone are
indeterminant, however, and can therefore only be treated as broad constraints or as a heuristic.
Hegemonic systems may or may not lead to a liberal international trade structure; it depends on
other factors, including the resources available and the net cost to the hegemon of providing the
international infrastructure, sanctions and side payments required to make such a system work.
Conversely, Lake follows Robert Keohane in arguing that the absence of a hegemon need not
result in restrictive trade policies if the overall economic environment is stable and institutions and
strategies exist to overcome collective action problems. These qualifications to a structural
approach already seem quite significant, but Lake is honest in adding yet another: the influence of
domestic structures on policy. It is crucial to the descriptive utility and theoretical integrity of a
structural theory that nation-states can reasonably be treated as relatively unified rational actors.
Lake adopts a stylized view of the state as consisting of two parts: an executive that responds
primarily to external incentives and acts to maximize an aggregate national welfare function
dictated by those incentives; and a representative part that is responsive to societal demands.
This conceptualization raises a new theoretical problem, however. Why should we expect that the
executive determines policy? As Lake admits, "despite the efforts of the foreign policy executive,
the nation-state may choose not to follow its national trade interests" (p. 87). This is tantamount
to saying that structure may or may not matter. But even if trade policy outcomes correspond with
Lake's structural predictions, they may usually be given an equally plausible and parsimonious
domestic explanation: protectionist policies result from emergent or declining industries; strategic
policies from those with increasing returns and an interest in foreign markets; and the call for
free trade from internationally competitive industries and those with extensive international
commercial and investment ties. Moreover, a domestic explanation has the advantage of
reminding us that national trade interests are not homogeneous, that contradictory interests
coexist, and that these interests are likely to be reflected in the compromises that are struck.
This is particularly plausible since the United States generally has a "weak" state, meaning that
policy is likely to be responsive to business pressures. Lake counters that executives have ways of
influencing policy outcomes. This is unquestionably true, though executive initiative does not
necessarily constitute evidence for the influence of international constraints, since executives are
also responsive to domestic political constraints. The emphasis on the executive does put us on
the terrain of a somewhat different range of domestic political variables than interest group
theorists have focused on, however, including tactics, agenda setting, executive coalition building,
and the nature of the institutions through which interests are represented. Like interest group
pressures, these forces may all offset or reinforce structural constraints.
This is what we find to be the case in the careful reconstruction of U.S. trade policy that Lake
provides in the second half of his book. The evidence suggests that presidents are cognizant of
international constraints and respond to them, often in advance of the societal pressures filtered
through Congress. But we know that firms are cognizant of international constraints and
opportunities as well and that trade policy is not simply the result of executive initiative but of a
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changing domestic economic structure. An alternative formulation might draw the line less sharply
between the "international" and "domestic" and focus less on the state and more on how the
international structural position of domestic industries and sectors affects trade policy
preferences. Such a theory would not necessarily yield sharp, determinate predictions about
turning points; but neither does an international structural theory.
There are a few points where Lake's theoretical framework steers him away from contending
explanations or leads to odd characterizations. For example, in the chapter on 1887-97, we read
virtually nothing about the role of the depression in shaping trade policy. His definition of
structure leads him to focus on U.S.-European relations in the post-1975 era, though it is clear that
U.S. relations with East Asia have been equally if not more con- straining. Overall, however, Lake
has written an excellent book. He is meticulous in showing when and how his predictions are
confirmed or disconfirmed by the evidence. His version of structuralism in the trade area is by far
the most sophisticated and nuanced we have. By focusing sharply on structure, he alerts us to
external constraints and opportunities, and suggests interesting reinterpretations of particular
historical events. Lake has probably reached the limits of what such a structural approach can
accomplish, however. As Lake argues in closing, the future theoretical task is to build on structural
insights, while incorporating more centrally the interaction between the structure given by the
interaction of states and the economic structure given by firms, markets, and changing
comparative advantage.
David LAKE, 2007. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: A MATURING INTERDISCIPLINE
By Enrico Padoan. Lake ve en la IPE una disciplina… interdisciplinaria que traza un puente entre
ciencia política y economia (Lake: 757-758); la disciplina dibujada por Lake, es una propuesta
metodológica en la cual, en realidad, se pone evidente el predominio de un abordaje
econométrico mitigado por el mérito de insertar en los modelos propuestos variables políticas. En
este marco, las orientaciones teóricas generales que pueden ser eficazmente utilizadas parecen
reducirse casi completamente al neoliberalismo institucional y a la teoria de la interdependencia
compleja, y a los debates sobre la relación entre positive y absolute gains; mucha de la literatura
nombrada por Lake se especializa en como operacionalizar factores como instituciones, clases
sociales, grupos de interés, variables macroeconómicas, proteccionismo, etc. El uso de rational-
theory y teoria de juegos también resulta preponderante, y ha contribuido a encontrar
interesantes findings acerca de las interacciones entre nivel doméstico e internacional. La
perspectiva de Lake, sin embargo, se caracteriza por la estrechez de sus intereses académicos y su
escasa atención hacia la teoria internacionalista; si a key divide within this approach is between the
Ricardo-Viner or specific factors theory of international trade […] and the Heckscher-Ohlin […]
which assumes that all factors are mobile across occupations (Lake: 763), ¿qué decir entonces de
los conflictos – que dominó la década de los Noventa - entre las perspectivas neo-neo (nombrada
racionalistas por K, en una evidente admisión de sus raíces metodológicas y ontólogicas comunes)
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y el constructivismo, acerca de la importancia y de la interpretación de las instituciones y de las

normas?
By Anita Perricone. La política económica internacional es una disciplina que nació anticipando los
grandes cambios traídos por la globalización. Trata de unir la perspectiva de la ciencia política y de
la economía en la forma de una verdadera inter-disciplina. Aquellos que estudian OEP (Open
EconomyPolitics) prefieren ser llamados international política economists. Aun siendo una inter-
disciplina joven, está madurando rápidamente. Las causas de su éxito (en menos de tres décadas
se ha transformado en un enfoque hegemónico) residen en que se basa en fundaciones empíricas
fuertes, en el desarrollo indicadores apropiados, y el desarrollo de bases de datos y herramientas
econométricas potentes; también residen en su rigor deductivo, basado en las teorías fuertes de la
economía y el estudio de las instituciones de la ciencia política; finalmente, también residen en su
integración en otras disciplinas (comercio internacional, acción colectiva, instituciones políticas), lo
que ha hecho de OEP una disciplina muy fértil.
Es un tópico de investigación más que una metodología. Las preguntas que aborda son: porque los
estados deciden abrirse a flujos de bienes, servicios, capitales y personas (globalización)? Cuáles
son los efectos de la integración en la economía internacional para los intereses de los individuos,
sectores y factores productivos y estados? IPE emergió a fines de los 60s/comienzos de los 70s tras
el éxito del sistema económico internacional instaurado después de la segunda guerra mundial.
Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo que la interdependencia empezó a despegar, las fundaciones
políticas de ésta comenzaron a desmoronarse. En el 71 Nixon puso fin al sistema de BW, mientras
en el 73 los países de la OPEC empezaron a funcionar como un cartel y a subir los precios del
petróleo. La economía internacional se politizó, y quedó claro que ya no era una disciplina
autónoma.
El primer enfoque de IPE fue la teoría de la dependencia, nacida en AL en los 60s, y se hizo popular
en Europa y EEUU la década siguiente. Esta teoría pasó de moda por dos razones: sus adeptos no
lograron formular una teoría única y solida, y porque fue contradicha por el éxito económico de
los países de nueva industrialización en base al éxito de estrategias basadas en la exportación. Un
segundo enfoque fue la teoría de la estabilidad hegemónica que, basada en las experiencias de UK
y EEUU sostuvo que la presencia de una potencia hegemónica es necesaria y suficiente para
determinar una apertura económica internacional. Hay dos variantes de esta teoría: la teoría de la
leadership y la teoría hegemónica. La primera postula que es necesario un estabilizador para
garantizar el funcionamiento de la economía internacional; la segunda postula que las grandes
potencias tienen una preferencia por un mercado internacional libre y abierto. Con el declive de la
economía EEUU, se esperaba el colapso de la economía internacional. Sin embargo, ésta persistió.
Entonces, nació el interés por los regímenes e instituciones internacionales. Otro enfoque más es
aquél sobre los intereses domésticos, los grupos de interés en las economías desarrolladas.
De este último enfoque se desprende el OEP, que construye un puente entre la economía y la
ciencia política. Parte por actores como empresas, sectores y factores de producción; devisa sus
intereses; concibe las instituciones como agregadoras de intereses; incluye las negociaciones a
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nivel internacional. El núcleo del OEP es el interés, o la manera en que los individuos o grupos son
afectados por la política económica. Las teorías difieren sobre cuál es la unidad de análisis elegida
(individuos, grupos, empresas, factores de producción o sectores productivos). Una vez
identificada la unidad de análisis, OEP procede a derivar el interés de los efectos de la política
económica. En otras palabras, los intereses son derivados de una teoría empírica, previa,
falsificable y robusta (enfoque deductivo).
Las instituciones son vistas como agregadoras de intereses. Algunas de las conclusiones del IPE
son: constituencies grandes tienden a tirar las políticas públicas hacia el estado de bienestar,
mientras constituencies chicos empujan las políticas hacia el proteccionismo; cuantos más actores
con poder de veto en un sistema político, tanto más prevalecerá el estatus quo; los sistemas de
representación proporcional producen estabilidad e inflexibilidad, y por ende menos credibilidad,
mientras que sistemas mayoritarios favorecen la flexibilidad e inestabilidad, y por ende más
credibilidad y efectividad. Al mismo tiempo, las instituciones pueden tener un efecto autónomo
sobre las políticas económicas.
Una vez que los intereses nacionales han sido agregados, una nación negocia al nivel internacional,
sobre todo si las políticas de un estado tienen externalidades para otro. Las líneas de investigación
han abordado: los efectos de las instituciones sobre la estructuración de las negociaciones y sus
efectos; las negociaciones sobre las ganancias extraídas de la cooperación. Pero el nivel
internacional no está separado de los niveles del interés y de las instituciones domésticas; este
también puede afectar a los niveles domésticos, no solamente al revés (este es uno de los
principales límites de la agenda de investigación de IPE). Algunas líneas nuevas de investigación
conciernen: la formación endógena de los estados; la gobernancia global; la política económica del
conflicto.
Lisa MARTIN y Beth SIMMONS. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS
International institutions have increased in importance in the latter decades, and so did the
literature on them. This article has the objective of systematizing this literature. The authors
define international institutions in terms of formal organizations (such as the UN), which are worth
to study because they have agency and agenda-setting power. Starting in the 70s, however,
interest shifted to international regimes, defined as sets of norms, rules, principles and procedures
for determined issue-areas, around which actors expectations and behavior converge. Despite the
absence of a consensus on the definition of regimes, its study allowed a more unified framework
for the study of international institutions, formal and informal.
The word institution has replaced the term regime in ir literature. Ironically, it was Mearsheimer
that gave the most useful definition of institution, defined as set of rules that establish the ways
states are going to cooperate or compete with one another. This definition has several
advantages: it does not imply the presence of an organization, while an organization may host
several different institutions; it separates institutions from its effects, and allows us to ask
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whether they have an effect on behavior; and lastly, the definition is free of any theoretical
perspective, and allows to evaluate a broad range of theoretical claims using a single definition.
For realists, institutions are an epiphenomenon to state power and interest, and thus are created
only when they favor state interest or they respond to patterns of power distribution. A sub-group
of realists (hegemonic stability) have explained that the creation of institutions is only possible in
times of hegemony, but have subsequently studied the survival of institutions in time as well.
Neorrealists as Grieco and Mearsheimer are critic of international institutions, arguing that
cooperation is not possible under anarchy given to states’ preoccupation about the distribution of
relative gains. In sum, institutions, according to realists, reflect power and interest. But why do
states, then, lose that much time negotiating them?
Rational functionalism developed in the 80s in response to this puzzle. The research agenda
inaugurated by Keohane’s After Hegemony has produced a number of theoretical insights. The
focus is on state actors and other unified actors. It’s strength is in explaining the creation and
survival of institutions, while it is weaker in explaining effects on state behavior. According to
Keohane and Krasner, international institutions and regimes could help in solving collective action
problems, lowering transaction costs and increasing transparency. That institutions allow
cooperation is a solution to the realist puzzle.
Rational functionalists then went on trying to discover the strategic motives behind cooperation
(prisoner’s dilemma, Pareto equilibrium, bounded rationality, problem-structural approach –
consensual or dissensual – situation-structural approach…). They also investigated the form taken
by institutions. Form would be determined by distributional and enforcement problems, and by
uncertainty about state behavior. Another stream of authors argues that institutional forms are
influenced by domestic politics (need to avoid opportunism hierarchical international
institutions). Other insights have been on the question of the level of analysis, and one finding is
that a decrease in heterogeneity of preferences about public goods distribution favor more
centralized governance structures.
Constructivists have criticized the absolute character of anarchy and proposed a study of the
intersubjective social context in which states act. The English School offers a much broader
definition of international institutions, one not linked to issue-specific regimes. The “international
society” is much broader, and includes institutions such as the balance of power and international
law or diplomatic practice. In general, scholars in the US are on the rational functionalist side,
while Europeans on the English school and constructivist side. Ruggie and Kratochwil have tried to
bring both sides closer. They criticize the regimes literature for its positivist methodology.
Attention to rules and norms, how international institutions reflect intersubjectively created
meanings.
International institutions are thus a socializing actor, which can influence domestic politics; on the
other hand, domestic politics can also influence international institutions. Emphasis on feedback
effects and complex social interactions makes positivist research design impossible (mainly case
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studies and counterfactual analysis). Notion that institutions and interests (domestic) are mutually
constitutive. Interested in the question of order, ask how can order be maintained in an anarchical
society?
Effects of ii on state behavior: positive impact of international rules on cooperation; ii prevent the
formation of new institutions and promote learning. Studies on cooperation and compliance suffer
heavily from methodological flaws. So, evidence on causal explanations in these issue-areas
remains open to challenge. Authors investigate to what extent ii derive from concepts and
methods that can be found at domestic level, institutional mechanisms by which ii influence
domestic politics, and approach the methodological problem of the measurement of international
institutions’ effects.
Literatures on regimes and ii have come closer together, which was positive. Focus is not only on
state actors but more open to informal organizations as well.
Helen MILNER, 1997. INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION
Attempts to derive a fully developed model of the interaction between domestic and international
politics to explain patterns of international cooperation. This apparently offers an alternative to
neorealist and neoliberal accounts of cooperation that have maintained the states as unitary
actors assumption.
A standard bargaining model between two countries, one of which is broken up into an executive,
a legislature and a societal interest group.
The executive bargains with the foreign state over an agreement on a uni-dimensional policy
space, and makes a take it or leave it offer to the legislature. The legislature ratifies or rejects
agreements made at the international level (Putnam style). Interest groups have two effects:
indirectly, by influencing the preferences of actors (pressure) and directly, by providing
information to legislators who may be uncertain about the desirability of the deal.
Thus, the prospect and terms of international cooperation is a function of (

1) the distribution of preferences,
(2) the nature of domestic political institutions – ratification procedure,
(3) the availability of information within states.
El proceso de negociación es el juego de dos niveles (two-level-game) – la negociación a nivel

internacional y doméstico es interdependiente (influencia recíproca).
Main propositions:
- realism was not even pessimistic enough: Relative to the state-as-unitary-actor approach, the
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introduction of domestic politics never improves the chances of cooperation (more veto points)
- Under divided government, cooperation is less likely and if a deal is made, it reflects legislative
rather than executive preferences ( contratary to Putnam how argues that a stubborn legislator
improves the chances of the executive in international organizations to get a better deal).
- Interest groups, by reducing asymmetric information can act as a check of the exectuitive by
endorsing the content of the agreement to the legislature or not. This may increases the prospects
of coorpeation.
- Any change in the institutional ratification process (such as a referendum will lead decrease the
chances of ratification because the median moves (not clear whay exactly this should make it
harder to ratify).
Evidence: Six case studies from the cold war period that do not support the model. Key highlights:
- Bretton woods was ratified because it was negotiated and decided under a period of unified
government in the US. In constrast, Truman could not get the International Trade Organior charter
ratified in the late 1940s because of the Republican-dominated Congress. In the case of NFTA, the
unified government made the passage possible.
Chapter 4: “Political Institutions and International Cooperation” Milner argues that domestic
political institutions affect the distribution of power between national actors, determining whose
interests will dominate policy making. “Variations or changes in this institutional relationship
influence the probability and terms of international cooperation.” (p. 99)
The five key elements of the legislative process are:
- agenda setting,
- amendment,
- ratification or veto,
- use of referendums,
- and side payments.
While the model in chapter 3 only considered agenda setting and ratification, chapter 4 considers
how changes in the distribution of the five legislative processes affect international cooperation.
Milner finds that:
- when control of legislative processes “is concentrated in the executive, the executive’s
preferences prevail.
- When control is dispersed to the legislature, its preferences will come to the fore.” (p.
127)
In terms of the specific processes, Milner asserts that in foreign affairs, the executive is usually the
agenda setter, but that if that power falls to the legislative branch, then the legislature can set the
terms of the debate. In terms of amendment power, Milner observes, “In most parliamentary
systems, the executive tends to be the agenda setter and the parliament usually has full power of
amendment.” (p. 104) Amendment power decreases the probability of the legislature rejecting
the bill. While veto power constrains the agenda setter, amendment power is more significant
because it can shift the agreement point. The power to call referendums either allows the
executive to bypass or override the legislature (if the executive has the authority to call
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referendums) or (if constitutionally mandated) merely reverts to the bargaining model in Chapter
3, with the median voter (instead of the median legislator) as the pivot. Finally, side-payments
may come in many forms. Milner concludes that the probability of successful cooperative
agreement is highest when decision-making power is concentrated in the most dovish domestic
political actor.
“Prominent theories” fall short to give account of international politics phenomena (Milner: 1997),
as they do not take into account key variables. Gourevitch (1978) reversed the II image and
challenged traditional structural interpretations of the relationship between international
economy and domestic politics “elevating” domestic sphere to the equal status enjoyed by
international economy realm. Putnam, who published his article ten years later, picked up and
developed the idea of strategic interplay between the II and III image into a two-level game
scheme, for there are all together too many episodes that could not be accounted by purely
domestic or international analysis. Evans, Jackobson and Putnam (1993) sustain the same Janus-
face nature of the relation; by giving priority to one of the levels we necessarily create a biased
view. The logic behind this relation is that national governments play a double (and multi-stage)
game in a negotiation process – while they respond to domestic constituencies and interest groups
(characterized by preferences, coalitions and institutions) that press for a certain result on national
level, on international one they seek to maximize their political ability (realize negotiators´
strategies) and win the negotiation situation (or minimize adverse effects). Even though Putnam
considers it a mere metaphor, he lays foundations for a theory that will be worked out by Evans,
Jackobson and Putnam (1993) in a form of double-edge diplomacy, and Milner´ s testable
hypothesis (1997).
Without multi-level, double-edge analytical approach, it would be all too often impossible to
interpret negotiation results correctly, and simply answer why nations cooperate with one
another. Theories that treat states as unitary actors miss an important insight into the problem
(Milner: 1997). The central variable to be taken into consideration while analyzing a negotiating
result (success or a failure), is a particular Level II win-set (acceptable Level I arrangement results),
a mutual want-satisfaction (Milner: 1997). II Level win set size is dynamic rather than static, since
negotiations themselves evolve, subject to divers negotiation strategies, cognitive process
(knowledge and perceptions) and negotiator preferences, new policy options, side payments and
synergistic linkages (new policy option that changes outcomes at II Level) (Evans, Jackobson and
Putnam: 1993). It makes II image gravitating for negotiation results.
Milner (1997) denominates a domestic politics structure a “polyarchy” (not very fortunate term
considering Dahl´ s use of it) that she distinguish by three distinctive elements: preferences of
political and social actors for policy choices (electoral concerns); institutions (legislative process
broadly understood, the structure of government and legislature and political partisan coalitions)
and distribution of information among them (strategic use of information) that all together sum up
into a bargaining structure. Milner dwells upon each of the domestic policy elements in order to
conclude that state as well as non state actors together with institutions that mediate the political
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dialogue and canalize information lead to a particular result. Finally, Milner concludes that
polyarchy makes cooperation less likely. Even though it seems to be supported by the empirical
proof, I feel it is an oversimplification.
It is true that polyarchic states are more complex and negotiation and ratification process is
consequently more arduous, but it does not necessarily mean that these states are less prone to
cooperate than hierarchic one. In the context of democracy we have polyarchic states that do
cooperate even though domestic groups´ interests diverge. If we accept Milner´s conclusion we
will have to assume a controversial thesis that domestic politics actors handicap international
cooperative relations. What´ s more, the emphasis she puts on domestic politics is greater than
the one given to international realm. Milner does not account for international structure that, at
least according to two-level game, is of equal importance. And the role of international
organizations other non-domestic groups can be of great relevance. If one follows her model, one
might conclude that cooperative design results only as a matter of domestic interest will, and the
reality is more complex than that which is precisely made patent by Putnam.
Layna MOSLEY (2000); ROOM TO MOVE: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AND NATIONAL
WELFARE STATES
By Malgorzata Lange. El tema central en el estudio de la política económica comparada es en qué

medida la movilidad internacional del capital (privado) limita a los gobiernos nacionales. Mosley
sostiene que el impacto de la movilidad del capital es FUERTE, PERO ESTRECHO (strong but
narrow). Los gobiernos están presionados para adoptar las políticas que favorecen los mercados ,
pero retienen el espacio del movimiento autónomo.
En la literatura hay dos puntos de vista:

Convergecia: la creciente internacionalización del capital y comercio limita seriamente la
autonomía de los gobiernos.
Divergencia: la internacionalización aumenta las presiones por la intervención gubernamental.
Cuál es la base de la selección de las políticas. Cómo los participantes internacionales financieros
evalúan las políticas del mundo desarrollado? Mosley hace encuestas con los altos ejecutivos.
Según Mosley la influencia de los mercados financieros internacionales sobre los gobiernos es
fuerte pero estrecha – solo algunas de las políticas pueden ser castigadas por los actores
internacionales.
La variable dependiente es la tasa de interés de los bonos del gobierno (deuda soberana).
Tres fuentes de presiones financieras:
- movilidad del capital – la facilidad de mover los capitales e inversiones para castigar o no
el gobierno;
- similitud de los criterios de las decisiones de los participantes del mercado (si son
convergentes, el impacto puede ser profundo);
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- el rango de los indicadores que los tomadores de decisión consideran.

- Los incentivos de recolectr información – temor de la suspención de pagos (default)- el
resultado mostró que este temos en general dentro del grupo OECD no existe, los
inversionistas sólo se fijan en los índices MACROECONOMICOS, tales como la inflación, el
déficit del gobierno y la deuda pública, de menos interés es cómo se gasta el dinero, la
política de impuestos e incluso quien gobierna.
La filiación ideológica del gobierno ha dejado de ser contemplada.
La importancia de los criterios de Maastricht (1998).
La hipótesis central: La influencia de los mercados financieros internacionales sobre el gobierno
del país desarrolldo es fuerte pero estrecha, el castigo por las políticas divergentes.
By Enrico Padoan. Mosley nota que, por lo que concierne la movilidad de los capitales, las teorias
que apuntan a una progresiva convergencia (hacia un Estado “chico”) de las políticas
macroeconómicas nacionales están parcialmente equivocadas, ya que en realidad el Estado sigue
teniendo un espacio de maniobra bastante grande, gracias a una extrema bounded rationality de
los inversionistas internacionales de capitales, que están interesados a unas pocas variables
macroeconómicas, sin entrar en consideraciones demasiado específicas sobre la distribución de
los gastos estatales (que podrían así, a través de políticas de spending review, ser destinados a
gastos sociales para compensar los loosers de la integración económica mundial).
Karl POLANY, 1944. THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
Review By Abbott Payson Usher, Harvard University. The theme of this remarkable book is
compactly stated at the beginning. "Nineteenth century civilization rested on four institutions. The
first was the balance-of-power system which for a century prevented the occurrence of any long
and devastating war between the Great Powers. The second was the international gold standard
which symbolized a unique organization of world economy. The third was the self-regulating
market which produced an unheard-of material welfare. The fourth was the liberal state.... Our
thesis is that the idea of a self adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could
not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society"
(p. 3).
The greater part of the text is given to the analysis of the origin and character of the self-
regulating market and its related monetary system, the automatic gold standard. An unusually
penetrating analysis of the unreformed poor law shows that the consequences of the concept of a
free market for labor were not accepted at that time. Later, when reforms seemed to presage the
full acceptance of liberal principles, a "collectivist" trend began to emerge in various statutes
which obstructed the application of the laissez faire philosophy over an increasingly important
field. The pragmatic attempts to evade the undesirable consequences of unregulated economic
activity developed a substantial body of regulatory and protective legislation, commonly
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stigmatized by liberals as the manifestation of "impatience, greed, and short-sightedness. ... The
counternove against economic liberalism and laissez-faire possessed all the unmistakable
characteristics of a spontaneous reaction" to the perils "inherent in the utopian principle of a
self-regulating market" (pp. 149, 150).
The institutionalist position suggested in some passages is clearly subject to an important

qualification. There were tendencies toward the development of a self-regulating market, but
these tendencies were never allowed to dominate social organization. The society conceived by
the classical economists never really came into existence. The assumption that full freedom of
competition was established was illusory. The market was not self-regulating, nor was the gold
standard automatic, or international. The liberal position was, thus, unsound both as an ultimate
basis of social policy and as a basis for the interpretation of the historical record. Nineteenth-
century societies were in fact moving toward goals that were profoundly different from the
objectives conceived by the naive liberalism of the period.
The development of the welfare state, which was the true aim of the liberal philosophy, required
positive governmental activity and much self-conscious individual action. No magic of market
structure could achieve the errorless objectivity that was presumed to be the outstanding merit of
the free market. The complacency of the Victorian liberals has not been effectively challenged in
the past: least of all, the confident historical interpretation of the period. Dr. Polanyi subjects the
record of the century to a searching critical analysis that destroys every vital position of the older
Victorian interpretation. Some chapters will be difficult reading, some details may require revision,
but the general thesis is decisively and effectively presented. The critical revision of economics and
of political theory is shown to be no less significant for the understanding of history than for the
definition of current political and social aims.
Review by Thomas A. Garrett. To what momentous change does the author affix the epithet. "the
great transformation"? To the change from the subsistence economy of preceding centuries to the
profit-economy which reached its zenith in the nineteenth century. The forces effecting the
change over were those of agricultural capitalism, operating through conversions and enclosures,
and industrial capitalism, operating through the factory-system, urbanization, and the free labor
market. The result, in the author's analysis, was the supplanting of a social system in which
exclusively economic goals were made subservient to more important human and social purposes
by a system in which society and its values were enslaved by the profit-motive working through
the mechanism of a self-regulating market. "The revolution of our time" is viewed by Dr. Polanyi as
an inevitable resurgence of humanity to throw off the shackles of the market economy.
The general problem the author has set himself concerns the interrelations of economic
institutions on the one side and all other social institutions on the other. The treatise tackles a
peculiarly sociological task, and for that reason cannot fail to interest students of sociology. With
the basic assumption of the book few of us would quarrel: economic purposes must be
subordinated, where possible and to the extent necessary, to the purposes of society as a whole.
The volume, moreover, canvasses an almost limitless tract of economic and social history,
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especially that of England. It revives innumerable bits of knowledge bearing upon the evolution of
present-day social institutions, and subjects them to suggestive and often helpful interpretation.
The eleven appendices, in the form of "Notes on Sources." put the reader in possession of highly
valuable information looking to further inquiry into the important topics treated in the text.
But the work as a whole seems to fail of its purpose. It lacks a workable methodology. The
evidence adduced really does not prove anything, because it has not been made part of a
sufficiently systematic building up of the hypothesis the author is trying to verify. This is
substantially the hypothesis that all of the ill statistical method no matter how elaborate nor how
carefully checked against controls.
Social workers will find nothing stimulating in this book. Social statisticians will find a very detailed
outline of a method which may well be adapted to the needs of research committees in this
country.
Dani RODRIK, 1995. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY
No hay otras areas en que la diferencia entre la teoria y la práctica sea mayor que en la política
económica. El libre mercado es muy aclamado, pero el mercado tiene muy poco de libre. El autor
quiere contribuir a la vasta literatura en política económica, haciendo el punto que ésta ha perdido
el verdadero foco de la disciplina, las preguntas verdaderamente importantes que motivaron sus
inicios. El autor propone un marco para estudiar los efectos distributivos de las políticas
económicas; un recorrido por los principales enfoques que abordan la política económica de la
política comercial; se pregunta: porque el libre mercado no es tan libre; porque las políticas
comerciales son sesgadas hacia el comercio; cuales son los determinantes de la variación entre los
niveles de protección entre industrias, países y en el tiempo; las consecuencias de ver la política
comercial como endógena.
This chapter discusses the political economy of trade policy. In principle, a political-economy
model of trade policy must have four elements. Much of the trade theory is devoted to analyzing
the consequences of trade policy for individuals who derive their incomes from different factors of
production or sectors. First, it must contain a description of individual preferences over the
domain of policy choices available to policymakers. Given an underlying economic model of the
Heckscher–Ohlin or Ricardo–Viner type and the presumption that preferences for policy depend
only on self-interest, individuals' policy rankings can be deuced on the basis of their factor
endowments or sector-specific skills. Second, the model must contain a description of the way
these individual preferences are aggregated and channeled, through pressure groups, political
parties, or grass-roots movements, into political demands for a particular policy or another. This
step involves a characterization of the modes of political organization, as well as of the forms that
political influence takes. The chapter also reviews the choice among alternative trade policy
instruments and elaborates the consequences of viewing trade policy from political-economy
lenses.
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Ronald ROGOWSKI, 1989. COMMERCE AND COALITIONS
Opening of trade relations cause political distress domestically. Depending on the land-labor ratio
(level of advancement), there will be conflicts either between rural and urban interests, or
between classes. The author looks at 3 cases: Germany, US and UK. He predicts the effects of an
expansion of trade in the four different cases: class cleavages in an advanced economy, radicalism,
socialism and US populism, defining which class or factor owning group is free-trading and
assertive (because it owns the abundant factor) and which is defensive or protectionist (because is
endowed with the scarce factor). He also predicts the effects of a declining exposure to trade in
four cases: US New Deal, West Europe fascism, Asian and East European fascism, South American
Populism. The author speculates about cleavages, not outcomes: those who gain from trade will
be strengthened and emboldened politically, but they will not necessarily win. Victory may,
instead, depend upon institutional and cultural factors (not considered here). The shifts in the
exposure to trade change internal political cleavages.
Review by Douglas A. Irwin, Federal Reserve System. Ronald Rogowski's slim book is the most
recent in an expanding literature by political scientists on politics and international trade. The
book begins by posing the question of why labor, industry, and agriculture conflict with each other
in different coalitional combinations at various points in history. Rogowski employs the logic of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem along with some notion of a country's relative factor endowments to
explain these domestic political "cleavages." For example, an economy abundant in both capital
and labor but scarce in land (relative to the rest of the world) can expect an "urban-rural" conflict,
pitting industrialists and urban workers against landlords and farmers. An economy abundant in
labor but poorly endowed with capital and land can expect "class" conflict, where workers oppose
capitalists and landlords. As an economy's factor endowment changes over time, through
accumulation of capital or loss of productive agricultural land, the configuration of domestic
political alignments changes.
Rogowski applies this framework in chapters devoted to the nineteenth-century expansion in

world trade, the decline in trade during the interwar period, the post-World War II revival in trade,
and to earlier periods of changing trade (ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and sixteenth-
century Europe). In each case Rogowski categorizes countries according to their relative
endowment of factors. He then uses Stolper- Samuelson reasoning to predict what type of
cleavage will arise and assesses this prediction against evidence gleaned from a wide reading of
secondary sources. In the nineteenth century, for example, expanding world trade meant that in
capital- and labor-rich countries industrialists and workers would unite to support free trade and
landed interests would support protection. Rogowski shows that events in Britain, Belgium,
Switzerland, and part of France support this thesis. Economies abundant only in labor could expect
class conflict, where labor's support for free trade would be opposed by capital and land.
Rogowski again marshalls evidence from Germany (the "iron and rye" protectionist coalition),
Europe, and Asia to suggest that this was indeed the case. Economies abundant only in land, such
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as North America and Oceania, could expect domestic politics to be shaped by conflict between
free-trading farmers and a protectionist alliance of labor and capital. The author demonstrates
that these conflicts also spill over into issues other than trade policy.
The book's chief merit is its repeated use of a simple framework, set out in detail in the first
chapter, to different periods in recent and ancient history. Economists will not be entirely
surprised that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem proves useful in understanding history, but will be
impressed by exactly how easily and generally it lends insight into past events. I found particularly
refreshing Rogowski's application of the analysis to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, thereby going
beyond the well-known examples of Western Europe and North America. Rogowski prudently
states that noneconomic factors may at times determine coalitions and candidly admits when
events cannot be fully reconciled with his framework. But I found Rogowski's own twist-when
world trade expands, abundant factors become politically more assertive than scarce factors; and
when trade declines, scarce factors assert themselves more than abundant factorsless compelling.
Is it not also plausible to posit that because scarce factors have the most to lose from expanding
trade that they have a greater interest in becoming politically assertive to promote measures that
will preserve their economic position?
For such an enthusiastic proponent of an economic theorem to explain political alignments,

Rogowski reveals scant awareness of the work by economic historians on the topics under
consideration (such as general equilibrium modeling of policy changes). So great is his regard for
the original Stolper-Samuelson theorem that Rogowski too quickly rejects alternative models, such
as the specific-factors model, that are simply variations on the two-good two-factor Stolper-
Samuelson framework. Rogowski himself implicitly uses a three-factor (land, labor, capital) model,
known to international trade economists as Anne Krueger's model of trade and development.
Rogowski states that his only concern is about why political alignments arise and change, and not
about the "outcomes" of the conflicts that these alignments create (although he often comes close
to crossing this line). One of the things Rogowski would have discovered from a closer examination
of the literature in economics on the political economy of trade policy is that economists have
gone beyond just identifying the various coalitions that arise depending on factor endowments
and have tried to endogenize policy itself, so that outcomes are determined within the model.
However, the book is aimed at political scientists and historians, not economists. Rogowski
performs a valuable service in doing what economists generally neglect to do-bringing together a
good dose of historical evidence to show how useful a theory can be in interpreting the broad
sweep of events. Rogowski has done this with brevity and clarity, allowing the relevance and
insight of the economic approach to shine through.
Beth SIMMONS, 1998. WHO ADJUSTS?
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Within the field of international political economy, issues of foreign economic policy making,
international cooperation, interstate conflict and preference formation have typically been
explained as the consequences of externally determined circumstances, such as the structure of
the international system and the distribution of capabilities within that system (environmental
factors). More recently, however, a number of scholars have sought to redress the numerous
empirical anomalies and theoretical shortcomings of this approach - known as the systemic
approach - by dipping into the domestic level of analysis. Some scholars have favored combining
the domestic and international levels of analysis by emphasizing the former's impact on the latter
(the so-called "second image" approach), while others have emphasized the role of international
factors on the shape of domestic politics (the so-called "second image reversed" approach).(1)
Others still have sought to address the interdependent nature of the two.(2)
While addressing the interrelated nature of domestic and international politics, Beth A. Simmons's
Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years is ultimately
the story of how domestic politics determine a state's choice of internal or external adjustment
strategy and its overall foreign economic policy. Although Simmons writes that she does not
intend to supplant systemic theories, her book goes far as a critique of systemic accounts of
interwar Europe. In her study of why states chose to adhere to the interwar gold standard,
international factors serve as constraints, but not as the main explanatory variable. Instead,
Simmons directs our attention toward the importance of domestic variables, such as:
- the partisan political composition of governments,

- the magnitude of labor unrest,
- the level of trade dependence and the degree of central bank independence from the
executive branch of the government.
Simmons's theory is really one of how domestic variables gave governments incentives to pursue
particular adjustment strategies and how these strategies determined the outcome of
international cooperative ventures such as the interwar gold standard.
There are three primary reasons for including domestic variables in the analysis of foreign
economic policy and international cooperation.
- First, this approach allows us to tell the whole story: By covering the domestic level of
analysis, we are able to trace the process by which particular policies are adopted and
thus reach a more complete account of the processes that lead to national decisions.
- Second, the domestic level of analysis is a means to explain the variation in states' policy
choices. By emphasizing the domestic characteristics of states as independent or, more
commonly, intervening variables, a number of studies have accounted for the sources of
variation in foreign economic policies over time and across countries.(3) In contrast,
systemic approaches (i.e., those relying on the international environment as the crucial
independent variable) tend to emphasize the similarity of policy choices across countries
regardless of their unique political institutions and domestic structures.
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- Third, unlike systemic approaches, which treat state preferences as static and exogenously
determined, domestic-level theories allow a better appreciation of preference formation
within states and better explain the sources of changing policy choices.
The question of who determines economic policy adjustment is important but does not have a
straightforward or obvious answer. In Who Adjusts?, Simmons provides a thorough and persuasive
account of why states choose to adhere to or defect from the norms of the gold standard in the
1920s and 1930s. She maintains that in order to understand why some states abandoned existing
international norms and others did not, we must address not only international but also domestic
incentives for and constraints on cooperation, rather than relying on the traditional explanations
of nationalist policies or the absence of an international hegemon.
Under the interwar gold standard, states were faced with the choice of adjusting their economic
policies internally through reduction of prices and demand, or adjusting externally through
devaluation and changing tariff barriers. Three norms guided the system of the interwar gold
standard.
- States were to give external economic balance of payments precedence over domestic
concerns, as well as give exchange rate stability priority over domestic price stability;
- to honor free trade and liberal policies;
- and, in the event of balance of payment difficulties or currency crises, to be given
international financial support.
Thus, the gold standard was set up to encourage states to adjust their domestic economies
according to the international norms of balance of payments equilibrium, currency support and
minimal trade barriers. Of course, this system also tempted states to defect from international
commitments and trade the costs of domestic adjustment for the short-term political
advantages of external adjustment. This temptation is at the center of Simmons's book, and she
asks what caused some states to indulge in this temptation while other states faithfully sacrificed
domestic political capital in order to honor their international commitments.
Simmons hypothesizes about when states will seek currency devaluations and increased levels of
trade barriers. She suggests that when governments are unstable and do not enjoy strong
domestic political support, they are more likely to devalue their currencies. Similarly, Simmons
hypothesizes that states with high volumes of trade and high levels of trade dependence will be
more likely to keep tariff barriers low. Her research supports these hypotheses, and she shows
that domestic economic and political structures are essential variables in accounting for the
variance in adjustment strategies among states. Simmons maintains that in countries with high
trade dependence, stable governments and quiescent labor forces, governments will choose to
adjust internally. This signifies a cooperative strategy toward other states in which the costs
incurred by a state are primarily domestic in nature. On the other hand, in countries with weak
economic links to other states (measured by levels of trade), weak governments and high levels of
labor disturbance, governments will seek to externalize the costs of adjustment. This implies a
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shifting of the costs of adjustment to other countries and a defection from the norms of the gold
standard.
Simmons also finds that there is a significant difference between governments on the left and the
right of the political spectrum: The left was more likely to reduce tariffs and devalue the national
currency, while the right tended to raise tariffs and protect the value of national currencies.
However, her work supports the claim that small, trade-dependent states with flexible domestic
structures are better equipped to meet external and domestic challenges, and thus will be better
partners in international cooperative enterprises. n this context, however, one thing still remains
to be more thoroughly addressed: Is domestic flexibility the source of adherence to international
norms (we could imagine that domestic flexibility also may lead to sudden shifts in policies, and
thus to fears of defection among other states), or is it simply that smaller states have fewer
choices and thus have to comply with international norms?
The second implication of Simmons's study concerns the prospects for international cooperation.
Her study shows that the absence of a credible international institution to control and manage
international financial cooperation causes states to feel less secure about the intentions of
others. In fact, during the interwar years there was a predominant feeling among states that
emergency financial assistance by other states would not be forthcoming, which made
cooperative strategies less likely. Simmons's study implicitly suggests that international institutions
can provide aid to prevent the type of crises with which we associate the interwar gold standard.
Third, Who Adjusts? brings out the sources and importance of credible commitments to
international cooperation. It is crucial for states to acquire credibility if arrangements lacking
enforcing mechanisms are to persist. Simmons highlights a number of variables that have an
impact on the level of states' credibility. Of the four variables she identifies -- political stability,
level of labor quiescence, political ideology of party in office and the degree of central bank
independence.
Hendrik SPRUYT, 1994. INSTITUTIONAL SELECTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
By Anita Perricone (extractos del texto original). By the beginning of the fourteenth century, a
variety of new institutional forms had emerged for organizing political and economic life. Indeed,
the city-based political organizations initially did very well. In the long run, however, roughly by
the middle of the seventeenth century, city-states and city-leagues had fallen by the wayside. In
this article, I attempt to answer the question of why this was so and chart how sovereign territorial
states displaced their contemporary rivals.
I argue that the sovereign territorial state prevailed because it proved more effective at preventing
defection by its members, reducing internal transaction costs, and making credible commitments
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to other units. It did this in three ways. First, sovereign rulers were better at centralizing
jurisdiction and authority.' Consequently, they were in a better position to prevent free riding and
to gradually rationalize their economies and standardize coinage and weights and measures. This
economic rationalization corresponded with a greater capacity to wage war. The institutional
makeup of sovereign territorial states thus gave them competitive advantages over other
organizational possibilities.
Second, sovereign territoriality, when confirmed to other actors, was a means of structuring
interunit behavior. States, or rather the political and social elites within sovereign states, preferred
similar types of units in their environment because sovereign rulers could more credibly commit
the members of their organization (through their control of free riding and defection) and because
their authority was exactly specified by territorial parameters. Third, and as a consequence of the
first two conditions, actors from other institutional arrangements defected to states or copied
their institutional makeup. Displacement of alternative types thus occurred from the bottom up as
well as the top down-actors "voted with their feet" or copied what they perceived to be the
superior organizational type.
The principle of sovereign territorial authority differed from other systems of rule. The focus of
this essay is on a critical feature of the modern state: the principle of sovereignty-the principle
that authority is limited by precise spatial terms and is subject to no other authority. Stated
another way, authority is territorial and exclusive. The origins of that principle, which came to
dominate Europe, can be traced to the late Middle Ages. We need now to explain its dominance.
Two bodies of literature-new institutional history (NIH) and historical sociology-can be useful in
analyzing the interaction between markets and hierarchies. The NIH approach explains institutions
as contractual agreements between rational individual. Traders will prefer institutions that protect
them physically and economically, while political entrepreneurs will seek to capitalize on gains
from trade and will seek to expand their rule in order to do so. NIH literature also forces us to
focus on the consequences of institutional choice. Two facets of institutional arrangements are
critical: the ability to prevent free riding and the ability to credibly commit. In short, NIH literature
can be useful in explaining the preferences for particular institutions. It furthermore contributes to
explaining domestic and international consequences of institutional outcomes.
In sum, a microlevel focus on the contractual nature of institutions, which empirically takes
account of the role that transaction and information costs play in institutional choice, can be
useful. It illuminates the reasons for political entrepreneurs and merchants to strike particular
bargains. Moreover, it provides for hypotheses on whether or not institutional arrangements will
be competitively successful in the long run. Thus one might expect that institutions will be
competitively successful if they can prevent free riding and defection. This ability will provide the
means to rationalize the domestic economy and reduce transaction and information costs.
Additionally, if particular organizational units can reduce the level of defection and ex post
reneging between themselves, then they can credibly commit to long-term agreements. If an
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organization cannot do so, there is good reason to exclude such an actor from the preferred set of
units.
The problem of hierarchy and markets generally has been solved in two ways. In the imperial logic
of organization, political elites might benefit from expanding their authority over the relevant
sphere of economic transaction. They might do so to gain more revenue or tribute or to expand
their power base. Merchants might acquiesce to such rule as it might create more certitude in
their market environment. Imperial authority, however, might have a negative consequence: it
might exploit traders, who have little opportunity for exit. In a decentralized logic of organization,
merchants have to strike deals with lords on an ad hoc basis. This reduces the ability of long-term
predation by one lord, but it increases protection problems and magnifies the uncertainty and
transaction costs of cross- boundary trade without political protection.
In short, until the late Middle Ages, European political development differed little from that
elsewhere. Decentralized political authority necessitated ad hoc bargains and reliance on self-help
by social actors. Alternatively, both emperor and pope attempted to reestablish imperial
organization. In Europe none of these possibilities-feudal lordships, empire, or theocracy-
eventually carried the day. Instead, the dramatic economic change led to institutional innovation
unique to the European historical experience: city-league, city-states and sovereign territorial
states. A successful institution would have to reduce the number of crosscutting and rival
jurisdictions; reduce defection by its constituents; reduce the number of legal codes, standardize
judicial procedure, and provide for an appeals process. In the economic sphere, it would have to
centralize coinage and the standardizing weights and measures; credibly commit to international
agreements.
The process of rationalizing the economy and centralizing the judicial system was a lengthy one.
England was initially much more successful than France. In short, from the very beginning of
sovereign territorial rule, which was formally claimed by kings in the late thirteenth century and
throughout the preindustrial era, monarchs worked toward eliminating the remnants of feudal
particularism. Of course, kings and queens had reasons of their own to do so. By providing such
goods as a unified coin, standardized weights and measures, a unified legal system and the
personification of representation abroad, they obtained the support of the towns and thereby
capital. Moreover, by enhancing the economic well-being of the realm, they increased their own
ability to raise more revenue.
The city-league had problems with establishing internal hierarchy, and consequently it was less
successful than states in standardizing coinage and centralizing jurisdiction. Externally, it was not
able to credibly commit to international treaties. Moreover, given its lack of clearly defined
territorial jurisdiction, it was less compatible with the territorial units in the international system.
The demise of the Hansa, therefore, had several causes. First, it was due to the competitive nature
of the international system in which it was confronted by rival forms of organization. Parallel with
this "Darwinian" selective process were the choices of individuals to form or join units they
perceived as superior modes of organization.
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Unlike the city-leagues, the city-states died a slow death. While city-leagues were unacceptable to
the other actors in the system, city-states were considered legitimate members of the
international community, given that they were territorially defined and provided clear focal points
for negotiation. Unlike the city-league, the system of rule of the city-state was not inherently at
odds with the principle of territorially circumscribed authority. Competitively, however, the city-
states suffered from some of the same problems as the leagues, in that they lacked internal unity
and consequently were slow in rationalizing their economies. Because sovereign territorial states
were competitively more successful, individuals turned to those institutional models for
inspiration.
In sum, some political and social actors will prefer institutions that can reduce uncertainty in their
internal and external environments. Specifically in commerce, actors will prefer organizations that
reduce transaction and information costs and can prevent expost reneging. Sovereign authority
did just that. Sovereign rulers centralized fragmented political systems and thus reduced legal
uncertainty and domestic transaction costs. As a consequence, by preventing free riding and by
rationalizing their economies, such systems of rule were able gradually to expand the level of
resources they could bring to bear against opponents. Unity and integrated economies were
prerequisites for success in war. But sovereign authorities also reduced the problems facing
transboundary trade by providing for clear focal points through which to negotiate. Consequently,
individuals had reasons to mimic those successful institutions and to shift loyalties. Individuals
emulated what they perceived to be successful arrangements in order to reduce uncertainty and
gain legitimacy.
Why then did sovereign territorial states "win out" over rival institutional forms? The answer
advanced here lies along three dimensions. One causal variable was competitive institutional
efficiency. Sovereign territorial authority proved superior to its contemporary rivals due to its
internal structure. In addition, territorial demarcation of jurisdiction with internal hierarchy proved
to be an effective way of structuring international relations, sovereign rulers provided focal points
monopolizing external relations. Second, sovereign territorial states proved mutually compatible.
Indeed, borders are explicit agreements on respective spheres of jurisdiction. Third, once the
benefits of internal centralization and the ability of sovereign territorial states to engage in longer-
term commitments to one another became clear, actors began to imitate such institutions or
defect to them.
Finally, why do sovereign states continue to be the constitutive units of the international system
despite the fact that the level of economic interaction has increased so much? In game theoretic
terms, sovereign territorial states could play iterative games, at which other units were less adept,
precisely because others' governments could not credibly commit themselves. The previous
argument thus differs from the Grotian, sociological position advanced by Hedley Bull and others.
That is to say, I do not contend that territorial states create a particular international society but
that the particular internal makeup of a unit had external consequences. I also disagree with the
structural realist position that certain patterns of order are imposed only by hierarchy and the
distribution of power: the dominant types of unit have consequences for cooperation and conflict.
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This essay, therefore, provides an empirical and material explanation of a facet that structuration
theory has highlighted but not explained. Neorrealism fails to develop an explicit theory of the
state. This essay contends that there were material reasons for agents to empower only similar
types of units, thus creating a structure that severely limited subsequent possibilities for other
types of units. The notion that every international actor had to have some form of internal
hierarchy and external demarcation also led to a determination of what was "private" and what
"public." We have equated sovereignty with autonomy, which still constitutes a fundamental rule
of the international system.
Susan STRANGE, 1988. STATES AND MARKETS
Un conflicto entre la autonomía del estado y mercado. Los objetivos del estado pueden ser
diversos – Seguridad, Poder, Bienestar / Orden, Justicia, Libertad
(la Academia demasiado dominada por los Americanos; hay un complejo de inferioridad de los
cientistas sociales respecto las ciencias naturales; científico debe simplemente significar racional,
imparcial y sistemáticamente explanatorio).
Strange propone: una síntesis de los político y económico por medio del análisis estructural de los
efectos del estado sobre mercado y viceversa, del mercado sobre el estado.
(What we need is a method of diagnosis of human condition).
La definición de economía política: it concerns the social, political and economic arrangements
affecting the global systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values
reflected therein.
Strange propone un enfoque donde analiza la relación estado-mercado en relación a los cuatro
valores básicos: seguridad, riqueza, libertad, justicia.
El PODER: la autoridad política decide sobre el acceso/rol del mercado (internacional) al

doméstico. Lo más importante es definir cuál es la fuente del poder, no sólo dónde está la
autoridad.
Hay dos tipos del poder en economía política – PODER ESTRUCTURAL – el poder a definir las ramas
y la estructura de las relaciones entre estados. Las fuentes del poder estructural son:
- el control sobre seguridad
- el poder sobre la producción,
- el poder sobre el crédito
- el poder sobre el conocimiento, creencias e ideas.
y PODER RELACIONAL – el poder de hacer que A haga lo que normalmente no habría hecho.
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Haciendo el análisis de política económoca hay que buscar a lo que está en el juego (el objeto de
regateo entre la autoridad y el mercado). Strange habla no sólo de actores estatales, también de
los no-estatales. Las negociaciones entre los gobiernos de los estados, entre los bancos centrales y
comerciales.
La SEGURIDAD: Quién provee la seguridad? Qué está definido como amenaza?Martin Wight
constató en el 1949 de que los conflictos se forman entre los haves and haves-not, los países
satisfechos, conservadores de status quo y los revisionistas, aspirantes a tener más. Los lazos
comerciales y mayor seguridad. El balanceo del poder. Economía y seguridad, armas, conflictos por
los recursos.; percepciones, etc.
La ESTRUCTURA de PRODUCCION: Qué está producido? Por quién? Para quién? Cómo? Sobre
cuáles condiciones?La importancia de patrones culturales, sociales, ideológicos. Los
multinacionales. El ciclo de producto de VERNON. Los Marxistas, legislación. La naturaleza de la
producción global ha sido dominada por los intereses internacionales como resultado de las
políticas del estado, el mercado mismo, estrategias de gerencia, la tecnología. La distribución
mundial de riqueza, la justicia, las normas cambiantes de conducta de las multinacionales, la ética
corporativa. Los cambios en la estructura de la producción. Distintos actores entran en el juego.
La estructura FINANCIERA – sobre el crédito y las tazas del cambio – sistema monetario. Estado,
bancos privados. Inestabilidad, inequidad, inflación, provisión del bienestar, bienes públicos,
comercio, patrón de la alocación del dinero, instituciones financieras estatales y de los bancos –
cooperación (habla de la hegemonía británica, de la voluntad y capacidad de absorber los costos
de la crisis, gold-standard, el colapso de Bretton Woods). El los 1980 – el problema de la deuda
soberana; autonomía vs control sobre los bancos, restauración de la estabilidad y la confianza en
el dólar.
La estructura del CONOCIMIENTO – comunicaciones, tecnología, ideas, creencias, ideología,

monopolio de conocimiento, acceso al conocimiento.
Her scope of enquiry is eclectic – there is no ultimate source of social power (she gives rise to an
alternative theory of power) for power stems from four main foundational elements such as
security, production, finance and knowledge, the mixture of which (each one in a different
proportions and emphasis) leads to a particular power structure. According to the author, it is
structural, more than relational power that prevails in the contemporary political economy. It is a
“multifactorial” overwhelming type of power, where the power-holder “shapes frameworks within
which states relate to each other” together with other actors. Hegemonic power establishes the
rules of the game (topic analyzed on the previous session in relation to the role and character of a
leading power) and determines the bargaining situations of the actors that take part in the play.
Each of the dominant sources of power is relevant for the relative importance of the other sources
of power and for different groups of actors affected by it.
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Strange, without using the term though, describes the reality of the globalized world, as she
recognizes the multiplicity of the sources of power, the array of linkages and the relevance of the
actors (also such as mafia, organized crime, cultural communities, counter-societies etc.) able to
challenge the traditional state authority and the existing security balance of power. The author
shows the dynamics of the changing power structure of principal and secondary elements that
have been making a shift from those state-dominated (like security) towards more “impersonal”
and autonomous forces and tools represented by the international organizations and non-state
actors, market structure, production factors, financial mechanisms (taxation, credits, interest
rates, currency exchange, price policy, etc.), knowledge and exacerbated trade, all of which have
acquired global instead of national scope. On the other hand, the same processes that created
globalization of “legitimate practices” have also facilitated the operation of illegitimate if not
criminal activities that put the system functioning in peril. Strange makes us see that we live now
in a disordered system of failing confidence and the threat of crisis and collapse. She advocates
the terms of trade on the global scale should be under the supervision and constraint just like they
are on a national scale in order to diminish the anarchy. That should be the role of international
trade organizations that fails to perform that role and serve interests of a few dominants powers.
As market and financial forces get global, the states become vulnerable and the problem of
unequal growth and wealth distribution is made patent.
Página 379 de 379

IPE and International Regimes

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Economía Política Internacional y Regímenes Internacionales

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Clive ARCHER, 2001. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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- International organizations up to the First World War: Congreso de Viena 1814-15-

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El rol de las organizaciones internacionales:

David BALDWIN, 1985.ECONOMIC STATESCRAFT

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To evaluate the advantages of economic statecraft, Baldwin distinguishes between "influence

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Barnett and Finnemore regard IO bureaucracies as "rational-legal authorities in their domain of

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Moravcsik; Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International

Manipulación de limitaciones domésticas: vinculación de issue areas (sinergistic issue linkages –

Política Doméstica y la Negociación Internacional: Según Putnam, el resultado de negociación

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Estrategias de grupos domésticos:

Peter Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics

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Memo 11 – Economía Política Internacional – Enrico Padoan

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Los estudios de casos propuestos, de hecho, se refieren a situaciones bastantes específicas, y en

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El rol de los grupos socio-económicos y políticos en la formulación y realización de política

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Robert GILPIN, 1987. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Tres temas fundamentals de la IPE:

Las tres ideologías de economía política:

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TRES DESAFÍOS PARA LA ECONOMÍA DEL MERCADO:

LAS TEORIAS CONTEMPORÁNEAS DEL IPE

CAMBIO ESTRUCTURAL: cada estructura crea las oportunidades y constreñimientos. Cambio

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COMERCIO: teoría Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson – país va a exportar estos productos que utilizan

LAS MULTINACIONALES – inversiones extranjeras directas y la propiedad en distintos países; el

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Memo 2 – Economia Política Internacional - Enrico Padoan

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El texto de Krasner, en mi opinión, falla en no considerar un proceso básico de path-dependent: si

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El poder es conceptualmente separado del bienestar y riqueza (welfare). “Funcionally specific

La organización internacional surge más rápido cuando su función es orientada al bienestar ,

El sistema útil funcionalmente (sistema orientado a actores); teoría sistémica funcional-

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El sistema comprende una serie de relaciones dadas en un ambiente institucional y legal.

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Stephen HAGGARD y Beth SIMMONS, 1987. THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

La definición de Krasner: “principios implícitos o explícitos, normas, reglas, procedimientos de

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Peter KATZENSTEIN, 1998. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AT FIFTY

1960-1970 – variante sistémico de IPE, enfoque sobre la interdependencia , transnacionalismo,

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Tiempos post-guerra-fría y el debate entre racionalismo y reflectivismo (constructivismo)…cambios