MEMBERS:

BALDECASA, AILEEN P. (Case 1)

SUSVILLA, IAN (Case 2)
AMBA, QUELTON (Case 3)
MANAGUIT, GRACE (Case 4)
FRANCISCO, PERRY (Case 5 & 6)

1. Knitoy Manufacturing, Inc vs Ferrer-Calleja, GR NO. 81883, September 23, 1992

Labor and Social Legislation; Labor Code; Labor Relations; One Company-One
Union Policy; Exception. — The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one
company-one union policy, anchored on the greater mutual benefits which the parties
could derive, especially in the case of employees whose bargaining strength could
undeniably be enhanced by their unity and solidarity but diminished by their disunity,
division and dissension, is not without exceptions. The present Article 245 of the Labor
Code expressly allows supervisory employees who are not performing managerial
functions to join, assist or form their separate union but bars them from membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. Even Section 2(c), Rule V, Book V of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, which seeks to implement
the policy, also recognizes exceptions. The usual exception, of course, is where the
employer unit has to give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant unit, or a
subdivision thereof, the recognition of these exceptions takes into account the policy to
assure employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Otherwise stated, the
one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions
or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into
collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution guarantees.

Constitutional law; bill of rights; right to from union or associations; scope. —

The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two (2)
broad notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of restraint which
guarantees that the employee may act for himself without being prevented by law, and
(b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from
joining an association. (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54).

Labor and social legislation; labor code; labor relations; one company-one union
policy; not applicable where existing union covered only one class of employees;
case at bar. — in the bargaining history of KNITJOY, the CBA has been consistently
limited to the regular rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis. On the
other hand, the rank-and-file employees paid on a monthly basis were never included
within its scope. Respondent KMEU’s membership is limited to the latter class of
employees, KMEU does not seek to dislodge CFW as the exclusive bargaining
representative for the former. The records further disclose that in the certification
solicited by TUPAS and during the elections which followed thereafter, resulting in the
certification of CFW as the exclusive bargaining representative, the monthly-paid
employees were expressly excluded. Thus, the negotiations between CFW and
KNITJOY following such a certification could only logically refer to the rank-and-file
employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis. Clearly therefore, KNITJOY and CFW
recognize that insofar as the monthly-paid employees are concerned, the latter’s
constituting a separate bargaining unit with the appropriate union as sole bargaining
representative, can neither be prevented nor avoided without infringing on these
employees’ rights to form a union and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations.
Stated differently, KNITJOY and CFW recognize the fact that the existing bargaining
unit in the former is not — and has never been — the employer unit. Given this
historical and factual setting, KMEU had the unquestioned and undisputed right to seek
certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees; both KNITJOY and CFW cannot block the same on the basis of this Court’s
declaration in Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Hon. Sanchez 15 and General Rubber and
Footwear Corp. v. Bureau of Labor Relations (155 SCRA 283 [1987]) regarding the one-
company-one union concept.

Certification election; results thereof confined only to the group it represents; cba
entered does not bar holding of another certification election for the other group;
case at bar. — Considering that (a) the TUPAS solicited certification election was
strictly confined to the rank-and-file employees who are paid on a daily or piece-rate
basis, (b) the results of the election must also necessarily confine the certified union’s
representation to the group it represents and (c) the issue of the plight of the monthly-
paid employees was still pending, KNITJOY and CFW clearly acted with palpable bad
faith and malice in including within the scope of the new CBA these monthly-paid
employees. Thus was effected a conspiracy to defeat and suppress the right of the
KMEU and its members to bargain collectively and negotiate for themselves, to impose
upon the latter a contract the negotiation for which they were not even given notice of,
consulted or allowed to participate in, and to oust from the BLR the pending appeal on
the certification issue. In the latter case, KNITJOY and CFW are guilty of contumacious
conduct. It goes without saying then that the new CBA cannot validly include in its
scope or coverage the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees of KNITJOY. It does not
bar the holding of a certification election to determine their sole bargaining agent, and
the negotiation for and the execution of a subsequent CBA between KNITJOY and the
eventual winner in said election (Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing
the Labor Code).
2. Picop Resources, Incorporated v. Anacleto L. Tañeca, Et. al, G.R. No. 160828
August 9, 2010

Union Security Provision; Requisites to constitute just cause for terminating

employees; The employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union
security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of
the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to
support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. –
However, in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security
clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is
applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security
provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the
union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for
terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA.

3. Employees Union of Bayer vs Bayer Phils. GR No. 162943, December 6, 2010

Gross Violation of Collective Bargaining Unit (CBA); It shall be unlawful for an

employer to violate the collective bargaining agreement under Article 248 (i),
since a valid and binding CBA had been entered into by the workers and the
employer, hence the latter is behooved to observe the terms and conditions
thereof bearing on union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in labor relations
that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization that has been duly certified as
the exclusive bargaining representative and the employer becomes the law between
them. Additionally, in the Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, it is specified
that the registered CBA serves as the covenant between the parties and has the force
and effect of law between them during the period of its duration. Compliance with the
terms and conditions of the CBA is mandated by express policy of the law primarily to
afford protection to labor and to promote industrial peace.

Unfair labor practice; Violation of CBA; Requisites; (1) gross violation of CBA and
(2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. The correlations
of Article 260 (i) and Article 274 of the Labor Code states that for unfair labor practice
pertaining to the violation of the CBA exist it must show prima facie the concurrence of
two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to the
economic provisions of the CBA. Article 274 provides that gross violation of the CBA
shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of
such agreement.
Violations in the Economic Provisions of CBA; Jurisdiction; Unfair labor practice
cases shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
as per Article 224. Unfair labor practice case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter,
and for the NLRC to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereon, the allegations in the
complaint must show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross
violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the
CBA.

4. Republic Of The Philippines V. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, INC., G.R.

No. 160352 July 23, 2008

The Court therein reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union
of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such
inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.

The Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all
the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy
for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such
mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article
239 of the Labor Code

Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to

any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely
investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent
the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have
any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by
filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some
employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial
employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The
employer's onlyright in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

5. Evangeline J. Gabriel, et. Al v. The Honorable Secretary Of Labor And

Employment, G.R. No. 115949 March 16, 2000
(Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code) as prohibiting the payment of attorney's fees only
when it is effected through forced contributions from workers from their own funds as
distinguished from the union funds. The purpose of the provision is to prevent imposition
on the workers of the duty to individually contribute their respective shares in the fee to
be paid the attorney for his services on behalf of the union in its negotiations with
management. The obligation to pay the attorney's fees belongs to the union and cannot
be shunted to the workers as their direct responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union
itself may require the individual worker to assume the obligation to pay attorney's fees
from their own pockets. So categorical is this intent that the law makes it clear that any
agreement to the contrary shall be null and void ab initio. (Emphasis ours.)

From all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public respondent did not act
with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the workers through their union should be
made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly,
the reimbursement should be charged to the union's general fund or account. No
deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees other than those
mandated by law.

6. Tunay Na Pagkakaisa Ng Manggagawa Sa Asia Brewery, v. Asia Brewery, INC.,

G.R. No. 162025 August 3, 2010

Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies
in the field of labor relations. The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if
an employee is to be considered a confidential employee – that is, the confidential
relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor
must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion
from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become
aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought
to be accomplished by the "confidential employee rule." There is no showing in this
case that the secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in a confidential
capacity to managerial employees and obtained confidential information relating to labor
relations policies. And even assuming that they had exposure to internal business
operations of the company, respondent claimed, this is not per se ground for their
exclusion in the bargaining unit of the daily-paid rank-and-file employees.

Not being confidential employees, the secretaries/clerks and checkers are not
disqualified from membership in the Union of respondent’s rank-and-file employees.
Petitioner argues that respondent’s act of unilaterally stopping the deduction of union
dues from these employees constitutes unfair labor practice as it "restrained" the
workers’ exercise of their right to self-organization, as provided in Article 248 (a) of the
Labor Code.

Unfair labor practice refers to "acts that violate the workers’ right to organize." The
prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the
observance of a CBA. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown
that ABI was motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course,
that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety resulted x x x" from ABI’s act
in discontinuing the union dues deduction from those employees it believed were
excluded by the CBA. Considering that the herein dispute arose from a simple
disagreement in the interpretation of the CBA provision on excluded employees from
the bargaining unit, respondent cannot be said to have committed unfair labor practice
that restrained its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, nor have
thereby demonstrated an anti-union stance.