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Krzysztof Nawotka - Alexander The Great (Retail)
Krzysztof Nawotka - Alexander The Great (Retail)
Krzysztof Nawotka - Alexander The Great (Retail)
By
Krzysztof Nawotka
Alexander the Great, by Krzysztof Nawotka
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Bibliography............................................................................................ 387
Index........................................................................................................ 419
PREFACE
and other regions of the ancient world (e.g. Holt, 1988; Eggermont, 1993;
Karttunen, 1997; Habicht, 1999; Debord, 1999; Sartre, 2001, 2003; Speck,
2002); specific aspects of 4th-century history such as the attitude of
mainland Greece towards Macedonia (Jehne, 1994; Blackwell, 1999); the
way the elites functioned in Greece (Herman, 1987; Mitchell, 2002) and
Macedonia (Heckel, 1992); the position of women in Macedonia (Carney,
2000) and Persia (Brosius, 1996); Macedonian colonization (Fraser, 1996);
finances and numismatics (Le Rider, 2003; Holt, 2003); history of art and
ideology (Stewart, 1993; Cohen, 1997) as well as the first monographs on
Darius III (Briant, 2003), Olympias (Carney, 2006), and new biographies
of Philip II (Hammond, 2002; Corvisier, 2002; Worthington, 2008). To
that there is a plethora of new books on military history, although without
much real progress except for the critical assessment of study of
Macedonian army logistics pioneered by Engels in 1978 (Roth, 1999). All
this new knowledge and all these new interpretations clearly require the
actions and personality of Alexander to be once again reviewed.
Second, for a long time it has been a common knowledge that the
most serious obstacle faced in Alexander research is the number and
quality of historical sources available. A few authors were already writing
about Alexander in his lifetime and over a dozen more wrote about him
not long after his death when they still had access to eyewitness accounts.
Unfortunately all these works have disappeared almost without a trace.
The earliest extant historical work to mention Alexander at least in passing
is that of Polybius, who wrote in the mid 2nd century BC, whereas the most
important ancient accounts date from the 1st and 2nd centuries AD. The
quality of these accounts depends not only on the considerable time that
had elapsed between the time of writing and the epoch of Alexander, but
also on the methods the authors used, frequently relying on a single
source. Ancient Alexander historians are customarily classified into two
groups depending on the sources they use. One is the works of Flavius
Arrianus (Arrian) and the anonymous Itinerarium Alexandri, which are
based on the writings of Alexander’s companions – the King of Egypt
Ptolemy I and Aristobulos. Their accounts are of greater value for events
prior to 327 BC, for they made use of the now missing books of the
famous historian Callisthenes of Olynthus, who also accompanied
Alexander. The second category, commonly called the Vulgate, includes
Diodorus, Curtius Rufus and Justin, who above all based their writings on
the Alexandrian historian Cleitarchus, Ptolemy’s contemporary. Plutarch
cannot be included in either of these groups, for this outstandingly erudite
scholar made use of the works of as many as 24 different authors, mainly
Alexander’s contemporaries, in an extraordinarily modern way. To the
x Preface
modern reader Arrian’s rhetoric is more palpable than that of the Vulgate
authors and for this reason he was for many years considered to be the
most trustworthy source. However, his methodology in fact simply relied
on rejecting information that might in any way cast Alexander in a
negative light and thus his stance primarily reflects the Macedonian
propaganda version of events. W.W. Tarn and N.G.L. Hammond both
largely rely on Arrian and to give him greater credibility they maintain the
theory regarding the existence of the Royal Journal (ephemerides), which
was allegedly kept at Alexander’s court throughout his reign and later
taken to Alexandria in Egypt, where it served as a source for Ptolemy and
thus also indirectly as a source for Arrian.
Source research in recent decades has uncovered so much new
information regarding Alexander’s history that writing a new biography
has become both possible and necessary. Commentary on Arrian and
other studies by A.B. Bosworth (1980, 1988a and 1995) have shed new
light on Arrian’s methods, his reliance on earlier sources and generally
allowed us to wonder whether the significance of this ancient author
regarding the life and times of Alexander may have been somewhat
overrated. At the same time the value of the so-called Vulgate authors
have undergone a positive reappraisal, particularly thanks to new
commentaries (Atkinson, 1980, 1994 and 2009) and other studies
(Baynham, 1998a) on Curtius Rufus, who for all his extravagant rhetoric
and moralising is a very valuable author especially in that he was well
informed about events within the Persian camp. Although today hardly
anyone believes in the existence of the so-called mercenary source, i.e. an
account written by a Greek mercenary in the Persian camp that Curtius
Rufus and Diodorus had seen, evidence corroborating what these authors
write about the Persian camp has been found. Therefore we can assume
that the Vulgate authors had indirect access to this information from
earlier historians who had actually heard the oral accounts of Greek
mercenaries on Persian pay. Interest in Plutarch is currently undergoing a
genuine revival, whereas the commentary to his Alexander (Hamilton,
1999; 1st edition in 1969) is rightly considered to be classics of the genre.
Historical and philological commentaries have also appeared to his other
work: On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander the Great (D’Angelo,
1998; Cammarota, 1998; Nawotka, 2003). Finally scholars have now more
boldly made use of smaller anonymous works such as the Metz Epitome
(which is associated with the Vulgate group though it makes no references
to the others and is based on the works of historians a generation after
Alexander) or extant fragments of the writings of Alexander’s
contemporaries Ephippus and Chares. The author of this book agrees with
Alexander the Great xi
those (Plezia, Bielawski, 1970) who argue that the document found in an
Arab manuscript is the translation of a genuine letter from Aristotle to
Alexander regarding the treatment of Greeks and barbarians. With newly
discovered 4th-century Greek inscriptions as well as already well known
but newly researched ones we have an increasingly better understanding of
Alexander’s policies towards the Greeks and how they were received –
differently on the east coast of the Aegean and differently on the west
coast. Of particular value is the steadily increasing amount of eastern
sources, which not only allow us to more accurately establish the dates of
key events but also move away from the Eurocentric view held in some
earlier studies. That is also the value of later, even mediaeval Zoroastrian
sources maintaining the Persian tradition, which unlike the western
sources was consistently hostile towards Alexander.
Third, one should note how historical interpretations have changed
over recent decades. In the period immediately after World War II the
immense influence of W.W. Tarn’s book (1948) gave Alexander the image
of a benign propagator of the Western civilization and the brotherhood of
the various peoples within one empire. The work of another great scholar
from that period, F. Schachermeyr (1973), gave us the heroic image of this
great Macedonian and it is not surprising that the first edition of his
monumental biography (1947) is entitled Ingenium und Macht. However,
scholars subscribing to this traditional view of Alexander (e.g. Hammond
or Lane Fox) are now very much a minority among historians. The tragic
consequences of 20th-century militarism and totalitarianism, a gradual
departure from European colonialism and the mission of taking up ‘the
white man’s burden’ as well as from the traditional world outlook in the
postmodern era inevitably led to a revision or even deconstruction of
Alexander the Great’s character. The process of diminishing Alexander’s
greatness has been continuing since the 1950s. A decisive blow to the
predominance of Tarn’s image of Alexander was delivered by E. Badian
(1960, 1964), for whom the Macedonian prefigured the 20th-century
dictators Stalin and Hitler, being preoccupied with organising large-scale
purges and surrounded by the ‘loneliness of power’. The next step in the
new trend was to reject the notion that Alexander was motivated by any
grand ideas or non-military objectives. Today’s chief proponents of this
minimalist view, represented above all by P. Green, A.B. Bosworth and I.
Worthington, have reduced Alexander’s life to purely a matter of military
history. Excluding his talents as a commander (although sometimes
questioned too), Alexander has now all too frequently been depicted as a
megalomaniac, alcoholic (most vividly: O’Brien 1992; more balanced:
Kets de Vries, 2004), tyrant and hothead who for no profound reason laid
xii Preface
waste to the local cultures of Europe, Asia and Africa and thus, as it is
sometimes asserted, is to be blamed for radical Islam’s hatred of the West
(Prevas, 2004). Such extreme views may only be expressed if one treats
sources very selectively, and that surely indicates that the pendulum of
reaction against the over idealisation of the great Macedonian has swung
too far in the opposite direction (Holt, 1999a; Briant, 2002). Nonetheless, I
believe, that without either idealizing or deconstructing Alexander, his
times may be reassessed from a non-military perspective. For instance in
the light of recent research of 4th-century Greek society it is worthwhile to
consider the reasons why Macedonian policies succeeded or failed on
either side of the Aegean Sea. The last quarter century’s breakthroughs in
research into Achaemenid Persia in fact demand that the effectiveness of
Alexander’s policies in the various countries of the Persian Empire be
reviewed in terms of his attitude towards Achaemenid tradition and
cultural conflicts during his campaign in the East. Although for a long
time yet to come no doubt no one will dare formulate any grand theories
the way Tarn did, there is now enough room to make careful
generalisations and sum up the historical discussions of the last few
decades.
This book presents the story of Alexander strictly on the basis of
ancient sources. In the footnotes I have endeavoured to refer to all primary
and most secondary ancient sources. On the other hand, for all effort to
synthesise modern scholarship in this book, no attempt has been made to
cite all modern literature concerning Alexander and his epoch. The sheer
volume of such works would make the task quite unfeasible and, from the
point of view of most readers, both tedious and unnecessary. Those
specifically interested in historiography concerning Alexander the Great
can refer to specialist literature dealing with this subject (e.g. Seibert,
1972). Footnotes in this book may serve to inform the reader of the most
important historical discussions of recent decades. The names of ancient
authors and the titles of their works are quoted using the abbreviations also
applied in the Oxford Latin Dictionary and Liddell, Scott, Jones’ Greek-
English Lexicon. The titles of periodicals are abbreviated according to
L’Année Philologique. When ancient times are discussed in this book,
unless otherwise stated, all given dates are BC/ BCE.
Finally, I have the pleasant task of thanking all the people and
institutions without whose help this book would never have been
published. The several years of research and especially the enquiries made
in the libraries of Vienna and Oxford were possible thanks to generous
grants from the Polish State Committee for Scientific Research and the
LanckoroĔski Foundation as well as the hospitality of St John’s College
Alexander the Great xiii
1. Birth of Alexander
In Antiquity people believed that the birth of someone destined to be great
was accompanied by signs, portents and strange happenings. Alexander’s
biographer, Plutarch, states that his mother, Olympias, dreamt of a fiery
thunderbolt that had entered her body, whereas his father, Philip II,
envisioned in his dream a seal on his wife’s body in the shape of a lion,
which allegedly foretold the extraordinary ‘lion-like’ nature of his son.
Another persistently repeated tale has Philip seeing in a dream on the night
of consumption Olympias having sexual intercourse with a giant serpent,
presumably an incarnation of the god Ammon from the Siwah Oasis in the
Libyan Desert. According to a much later legend, emerging no doubt after
Alexander’s visit to Siwa, Philip was then told by the Apollo Oracle at
Delphi to henceforth offer sacrifices to Ammon and was also told a
prophecy that he would lose the eye with which he had seen the deity lying
next to Olympias.1 Such tales could emerge from the traditional view that
Olympias had in her native Epirus engaged in mysterious Orphic rituals,
which were much feared by the Greeks, and an important element of this
practice was the breeding of serpents in her home.2 The belief that
Alexander was conceived by the god Ammon did not mean in the opinions
of contemporaries that he was not the son of Philip. After all, they knew
the myth of Alexander’s forebear Heracles, who was the son of Alcmene
but also of the god Zeus. At various stages in his career, Alexander
himself sometimes boasted that he was the son of Philip and at other times
allowed people to believe that he was conceived by the god Ammon.3
1
Ephor., FGrH, 70 F217; Plu., Alex., 2-3; Paus., 4.14.7; Luc., Alex., 7; Just.,
11.11.3, 12.16; It. Alex., 12; see Baynham, 1998, p. 149; Hamilton, 1999, pp. 4-6.
For an alternative version of the legend, but one still maintaining the notion of
divine conception and lion shaped seal, see: Ps.-Callisth., 1.4-8.
2
Cic. Div., 2.135: Plu., Alex., 2.9; see Lane Fox, 1973, pp. 44-45.
3
Ogden, 1999, pp. 27-28.
2 Chapter I
2. Macedonia
Alexander’s fatherland was situated to the north of Thessaly with borders
that have not been precisely defined but most certainly did not resemble
the borders of today’s Macedonian state (FYROM)6 and were much closer
4
Hegesias, ap. Plu., Alex., 35-36 (FGrH, 142 F3); Timae., ap. Cic., N.D., 2.69;
Cic., Div., 1.47; Plu., Alex., 2.7. Burning of Artemisium by Herostratus: Str.,
14.22.1; Solinus, 183.23. Magi in Ephesus: Str., 14.1.23. See Briant 1996, p. 875;
Shabazi 2003, pp. 7-14. Asia as the Persian empire: Nawotka 2004.
5
Plu., Alex., 3.5-8; Plu., mor., 105a; Just., 12.16.6. Brown 1977, pp. 76-77; Badian
1982, p. 38; Bosworth 1988, p. 19; Hammond 1992, pp. 356-357; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 7-9. Alexander I at the Olympic Games: Hdt., 5.23; but see Borza 1982, pp. 8-
13; Thompson 1982, p. 113.
6
On fluidity of the name Macedonia see: CzamaĔska, Szulc 2002.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 3
7
Errington 1990, chapter i; Billows 1994, p. 3.
4 Chapter I
8
Geography of Macedonia principally after: Borza 1990, pp. 23-57, 287-299; also
Corvisier 2002, pp. 37-41; Thomas 2007, pp. 23-32.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 5
9
Hammond 1994, p. 40, n. 38.
10
Billows 1994, pp. 198-206. Population of Attica: Hansen 1991, pp. 90-94. Low
estimates for Attica (ca. 200,000) and Macedonia (660,000) are after Corvisier
2000, pp. 32-44. Thomas 2007, p. 49 lists 700,000 for Macedonia under Philip II.
6 Chapter I
11
Presentation of Greek position: Kalléris 1954-1976; similar: Lane Fox 1973, p.
30; Cawkwell 1978, pp. 22-23; Hammond 1979, pp. 39-54; Hammond 1999, pp.
31-33; O’Brien 1992, p. 26; Corvisier 2002, pp. 49-50; Worthington 2004, pp. 7-8;
Panayotou 2007. See: Borza 1990, pp. 3-12, 90-97.
12
Mikoáajczak, Stamatoski 2002; Moroz-Grzelak 2002; Danforth 2003.
13
Borza 1990, pp. 90-94; Borza 1994; Borza 1999, pp. 41-43. See now Panayotou
2007 for Macedonian as a Greek dialect.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 7
14
Hammond 1995; now also Worthington 2008, p. 8.
15
Weber 1968, p. 389; Badian 1982; Haarmann 1986, pp. 260-262; Borza 1990,
pp. 90-97, 305-306; Borza 1992; Borza 1996; Hall 2000, pp. 19-26, 170-172, 177;
Nawotka 2003, p. 27; Thomas 2007, pp. 32-37.
8 Chapter I
16
Barr-Sharrar 1982.
17
Diod., 18.66. Montgomery 1985; Montgomery 1997; Hammond 1994, p. 56;
Thomas 2007, pp. 81-83.
18
Greenwalt 1999; Corvisier 2002, pp. 53-57.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 9
19
Arist., Pol., 1286b20. See Gauthier 1984, p. 86; Quass 1979.
20
Errington 1990, pp. 222-234.
21
Archibald 2000.
22
FGrH, 115 F225b.
10 Chapter I
The most sumptuous sepulchres are the royal graves at Vergina, which
shall be discussed in detail in Chapter III. The number of hetairoi during
Philip II’s reign rose to approximately 1,800. This would have been so not
only because of a natural rise in the number of Macedonian aristocrats
resulting from the country’s prosperity, but also from a large influx of
foreigners, especially Greeks. The closeness between the king of
Macedonia and his aristocrats is apparent in their name, hetairoi, which
simply means companions – the king’s companions. The hetairoi
accompanied the king in battle as well as in hunting and feasting, yet in
the monarch’s regular presence they were bound by none of the
submissiveness and strict adherence to court ceremony that was so typical
of ancient states of the East. The lack of an administrative or court
hierarchy meant that both Philip II and Alexander ruled with the aid of
their closest entourage, especially a group of seven to eight
Somatophylakes (‘personal bodyguards’). Despite their name, the latter
were not only to physically protect their king but also serve as officers
carefully selected from the king’s most trusted men to carry out special
missions. The king, who wore no unique garments or head covering
distinguishing him from his wellborn subjects, was probably addressed by
name. Indeed, the ancient authors draw our attention to the fact that there
was generally little social distance between Macedonian kings and their
subjects, who in the Classical and Hellenistic periods still had easy access
to their monarch and relative freedom to speak out (parrhesia) in his
presence. The abilities of riding a horse, using weapons and hunting were
an essential part of every young Macedonian aristocrat’s education. The
hunting down of the first wild boar and the killing of the first enemy in
battle were elements of the Macedonian ‘rites of passage’. It was only then
that a young aristocrat was entitled to wear a belt and feast, as was the
fashion in the ancient world, in a half reclined position. The Greeks were
shocked by a peculiar form of pederasty practiced by Philip II’s hetairoi in
which the adult could be the passive partner in a homosexual
relationship.23 Macedonian aristocrats loved breeding horses which
originated from the famous Median Nesaian breed brought over to
Macedonia during the Persian rule.24
Little is known about Macedonia’s lower social orders before the
Hellenistic period as they were not an object of interest to ancient authors.
The usual custom in the Balkan states was for the aristocracy to rule over a
serf majority, who in Thessaly were called the penestai. And such was no
23
Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F225. Flower 1994, pp. 109-119.
24
Errington 1990, pp. 152-154, 219-220; Billows 1990, pp. 19-22; Borza 1990, pp.
85-88; Badian 1996, pp. 11-12; Heckel 2003, pp. 206-208.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 11
25
Billows 1994, pp. 9-10.
26
Figures after Hanson 1999, especially pp. 104-105, 226-227.
12 Chapter I
27
Hanson 1999, pp. 84-141; van Wees 2000, pp. 87-88; Lendon 2005, pp. 102-
105.
28
Diod., 16.3.1-3.
29
Greenwalt 1999, p. 171; Archibald 2000, p. 230.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 13
30
Hdt., 8.136-138; Th., 2.99. Borza 1990, pp. 84-85.
31
Hdt., 8.137-139. Hammond 1979, pp. 3-14, 152.
32
Badian 1982, pp. 34-36; Borza 1982, pp. 7-13; Huttner 1997, pp. 65-85; Hall
2000, p. 64.
14 Chapter I
and Macedonia but also their subsequent defeats at Salamis (480) and
Plataea (479) by the league of Greek states. During the time of Persian
dominance Alexander I was a loyal vassal of Darius I and Xerxes I. He
gave away his sister Gygaia to the Persian aristocrat Bubares and adopted
the Persian system of administration as well as elements of Persian culture.
Thanks to his ties with Persia, Alexander I consolidated his control over
Lower Macedonia and subjugated the mini states of Upper Macedonia.33
But at the same time he also maintained contact with Athens, selling her
Macedonian timber to build a fleet. Although tales of the Macedonian king
helping the Greeks during the 480-479 wars with Persia, particularly just
before the Battle of Plataea, are most probably apocryphal, Alexander’s
loyalty to the Persian suzerain certainly did not survive Xerxes’ European
defeat. Alexander I’s adroitness in liaising with both the Persian invader
and the ultimately victorious Greeks, particularly Athens, enabled a
peripheral and backward Macedonia to become for a short while a regional
power in its part of the Balkans.34
The next attempt to build a strong Macedonian state was undertaken by
Archelaus (413-399). He was an ally of Athens in the final phase of the
Peloponnesian War and tried to reform his weak and peripheral state by
building roads and fortresses. It was presumably his decision make Pella
Macedonia’s capital because, according to Xenophon, in 382 it was the
most important city in the land and it is hard to imagine that the shifting of
the capital would have occurred in the years of chaos that followed
Archelaus’s death.35
Besides, the reasons for the move could only have been economic as in
military terms Pella was in a more vulnerable position than the old capital
at Aegae. Indeed, thanks to the river Ludias, Pella had access to the sea,
which allowed the king of Macedon to make additional profits from the
export of timber and other forest products (pitch and resin) as well as other
natural resources. Political stability as well as the external security
provided by Archelaus’ reign allowed Macedonia to become prosperous,
as is testified by the high quality of its silver in two-drachm coins that
were issued in that period. Thucydides also attributes Archelaus with
arming his soldiers with the ‘hoplon’, which for a long time was
interpreted as evidence that he had created a heavy (hoplite) infantry.
Currently a more sceptical opinion prevails which notes the lack of any
33
Fol, Hammond 1988, p. 249; Borza 1990, pp.100-105; Brosius 2003a, pp. 230-
231.
34
Borza 1990, pp. 113-115, 123-131.
35
X., HG, 5.2.13. Hammond 1979, pp. 139-140; Borza 1990, pp. 166-171;
Greenwalt 1999, pp. 163-164.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 15
trace in the sources that such weapons were used by Macedonians at the
time as well as the fact that the ancient authors suggest Macedonia’s
military weakness at the start of the 4th century. However, we know that
Archelaus conducted an aggressive foreign policy and towards the end of
his reign he ordered military intervention in Thessaly on the side of the
Aleuad aristocratic family. It was thanks to this intervention that
Macedonia gained the borderland region of Perrhaebia, which provided it
with an important link to Greece. Moreover, a Macedonian garrison was
briefly installed in Thessaly’s chief city – Larissa. However, Archelaus’
successes were short-lived as Macedonian troops had to withdraw from
Thessaly as Spartan forces, then imposing hegemony over the whole of
Greece after the Peloponnesian War, moved in. Nonetheless the
Thessalian expedition is noteworthy in that it showed the direction of
Macedonian expansion which became so important in the times of Philip
II and Alexander. Even if Archelaus had actually formed some hoplite
units, they would have in all certainty been disbanded in the years of chaos
that followed his death.36 This monarch had promoted the Hellenisation of
the Macedonian elites by organising theatre festivals in Dion and inviting
to his court numerous Greek artists, including Zeuxis, Agathon, Timotheos
and Euripides, who reportedly was torn apart by a pack of dogs in Pella.37
It was this policy of Hellenisation that would prove to be his lasting
legacy.38
Archelaus’ other achievements, administrative ones, came to nothing in
the anarchic early decades of the 4th century, when the Argead dynasty
was blighted by assassinations and political coups. Mini states broke away
from Argead control in Upper Macedonia and the whole country was
subjected to repeated invasions and looting by neighbouring nations,
particularly the Illyrians. At the time of the Theban hegemony over Greece
Macedonia became de facto a Boeotian fief. As a guarantee of his loyalty,
King Alexander II had to give to the Thebans hostages, including his own
brother Philip, who spent three years in Thebes and returned to Macedonia
in 364. Shortly afterwards war broke out between Macedonia and the
Illyria, which was then rising in power and whose king, Bardylis, defeated
in battle Philip’s brother, King Perdiccas III, killing him and some 4000 of
36
Th., 2.100.2; Polyaen., 2.1.17; X., HG, 5.2.40. Milns 1976, pp. 92-93; Markle
1978, p. 485; Cawkwell 1978, p. 31; Borza 1990, pp. 165-166; Snodgrass 1999, p.
116.
37
Satyr., Vit. Eur., fr. 39.21; St.Byz., s.v. Bormfskoj. Schorn 2004, pp. 310-311,
340.
38
Borza 1990, pp. 161-177.
16 Chapter I
his troops.39 Most history books state that the battle took place in 359,
though some historians believe that it happened somewhat earlier in 360.40
39
Diod., 16.2.4-5; Polyaen., 4.10.1. Pająkowski 2000, pp. 148-155.
40
Borza 1990, p. 200.
41
Diod., 16.2.2; Plu., Pel., 26.4-8; Plu., mor., 334c-d ; Just., 7.5.1-2; Scholia in
Aeschin., 3.112; Suda, s.v. K£ranoj. Ogden 1999, pp. 12-13; Carney 2000, p. 41;
Hammond 1994, pp. 8-10; Corvisier 2002, pp. 69-73.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 17
42
Just., 7.5.9-7.6.2; Satyr., F25 ap. Ath., 13.5; Diod., 16.1.3, 16.2.1. Cawkwell
1978, pp. 27-28; Griffith 1979, pp. 208-209, 702-704; Borza 1990, p. 200; Anson
2009.
43
Philip’s inscription: Hatzopoulos 1995; Amyntas’ inscription: IG, vii.3055;
Satyr., F25 ap. Ath., 13.5. Goukowsky 1991; Tronson 1984, p. 126 ; Hammond
1994, pp. 23-24; Corvisier 2002, pp. 74-76; Schorn 2004, pp. 423-424.
18 Chapter I
ceased serving its purpose and he was also skilled in using bribery to
achieve his political goals. First Philip had to deal with all the pretenders
to the Macedonian throne: Argaios (who was supported by Athens),
Pausanias (who was backed by Cotys the king of the Odrysians),
Archelaus, Arrhidaeus and Menelaus. By withdrawing Macedonian troops
from Amphipolis, Philip avoided a conflict with Athens, which had always
wanted control of this city. It was with money that Philip managed to stave
off the danger of another Paionian invasion and persuade the son of Cotys,
who had in the meantime been murdered, to get rid of Pausanias. The
invasion force of 3,000 Athenian mercenaries in support of Argaios came
later than had been planned and though initially they managed to capture
Aegae, ultimately they were defeated. The Athenians were forced to hand
over their pretender to Philip, but they were allowed to keep Amphipolis.
The Macedonian army was reorganized in the first year of Philip’s reign,
and in 358 he was already deploying it in serious military operations
beyond Lower Macedonia’s borders. At the start of that year, he made use
of the Paionian king’s death and subjugated their state. Next, having
rejected peace proposals, he launched an offensive against Bardylis. In a
pitched battle at Lyncestis the Illyrians lost 7,000 soldiers and had to cede
all the territories in Upper Macedonia they had previously captured from
the Kingdom of Macedonia. Peace was secured through the marriage of
Philip to the Illyrian princess Audata.44 The hold over Upper Macedonia
was, on the other hand, made safer thanks to his marriage to Phila, who
was most probably a member of the royal family of Elimeia. These were
the first of a series of matrimonial unions which, in the short-term rather
than the long-term, worked to Philip’s political advantage. They are
presented as such in more or less chronological order by his biographer
Satyrus: ‘Philip always married a new wife with each new war he
undertook. In the twenty-two years of his reign at any rate he married
Audata of Illyria, and had by her a daughter, Cynane; he also married
Phila, a sister of Derdas and Machatas. Wishing to put in a claim to the
Thessalian nation as his own besides others, he begot children by two
women of Thessaly, one of whom was Nicesipolis of Pherae, who bore to
him a daughter called Thessalonice, while the other was Philinna of
Larissa, by whom he became the father of Arrhidaeus. He acquired also
the kingdom of the Molossians by marrying Olympias, by whom he had
Alexander and Cleopatra. And when he subjugated Thrace, Cothelas the
Thracian king came over to his side, bringing with him his daughter
44
This paragraph mostly after: Hammond 1994, pp. 23-28.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 19
Medea and a large dowry. By marrying her he thus brought home a second
wife after Olympias.’45
Having successfully protected Macedonia against all the dangers that
immediately followed Perdiccas’ death, Philip started Macedonia’s
gradual expansion to become a powerful Balkan empire. His pretext to
intervene in Thessaly in 358 was the disputes between successive tyrants
of the city of Pherae near the Gulf of Pagasae. The city’s tyrants were
trying to unite the country, which was traditionally ruled by an inland
aristocracy, by force. Philip sided with the aristocrats and married a
woman called Philina, who was most probably a member of the Aleuads,
the largest aristocratic family in Thessaly. He returned to Thessaly in the
years 354-352 when the Pheraean tyrants, in alliance with the brilliant
Phocian leader Onomarchus, tried once again to take over the country.
This was when Philip faced his most critical test as a military and political
leader. The Macedonians were defeated twice in battle, but Philip gained
the support of the Thessalian League, which appointed him lifelong archon
and thus also gave him command of its troops. The office of archon
(president) had in fact been created by the Thessalian League quite
recently, in 369, to reorganise and consolidate its military forces against a
contemporary tyrant of Pherae. Philip now had at his disposal the united
forces of Macedonia and Thessaly including some 20,000 infantry and
3,000 cavalry with which at the Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 he finally
defeated Onomarchus’ army, including approximately the same number of
infantry but only 500 cavalrymen. With this victory Philip was able to
force the tyrants out of Pherae and become the unquestioned ruler of
Thessaly. Perhaps he also received the title of tagos, which had been held
by an earlier ruler of Thessaly, Jason of Pherae, whose relative Nicesipolis
Philip married. The reaching of an understanding between Philip and the
Thessalian aristocracy was facilitated by the fact that both Macedonia and
Thessaly were still relatively primitive civilizations with value systems
more reminiscent of the Homeric era than the Greek polis of the second
half of the 4th century. A characteristic feature of their culture was the
binding of ritualised friendship (xenia) between the elites of different
states by exchanging gifts and appropriate favours to the aristocracies. The
most famous example of this tradition is related in Book 6 of The Iliad
where Diomedes and Glaucus, from opposing sides, meet on the battlefield
outside Troy but do not fight when they realise they are bound by the ties
of xenia between their families. In the Archaic period, when the state was
45
Satyr., F25 ap. Ath., 13.5, perhaps after Theopompus. Schorn 2004, pp. 421-430.
Carney 2000, pp. 51-81 relates the long scholarly discussion on this passage.
20 Chapter I
still a relatively new and weak entity, aristocrats from various Greek poleis
and even from beyond Greece world were bound together by xenia, which
meant there was greater solidarity within their social group than political
loyalty towards their particular countries. Such was the world of the
charismatic leader of the Athenian aristocrats Alcibiades at the time of the
Peloponnesian War, but by the 4th century identification with one’s polis
became a stronger force dictating the political actions of the social elites
rather than their ritualised friendships, which were now strictly relegated
to their private lives. Yet this was not the case with Thessaly, which was
still ruled by great aristocratic families, whose representatives now
showered Philip with gifts and with whom he was now bonded by two of
his seven marriages. On account of the country’s strategic location, the
subjugation of Thessaly and its subsequent loyalty throughout Philip and
Alexander’s reigns was the foundation stone of the empires of both of
these two great Argeads. By controlling Thessaly they not only had control
of the road between central Greece and Macedonia, but also the ability to
raise a very large army, especially an unmatched cavalry of 3,000-6,000
riders, whose contributions to the victories at Issus and Gaugamela cannot
be overrated.46
The threat from the Illyrians brought Macedonia closer to the
Molossian kingdom in Epirus. This tribal state was, like Macedonia itself,
situated on the borderlands of the Greek world. It was ruled by the Aiacid
dynasty, which traced its origins to Neoptolemus the son of Achilles. After
Neoptolemus’ death the Molossian throne was taken over by his brother
Arybbas. In 357 Arybbas sealed his alliance with Philip II of Macedonia
by giving him as wife his niece Olympias, who in her childhood may have
also been called Myrtale or Polyxena. Plutarch cites from an unknown
source a story in which Philip becomes enamoured of her during their first
encounter while she was performing initiations in the Cabiric mysteries at
Samothrace. Regardless of the historical veracity of this romantic tale, this
is widely regarded to have been a political marriage. Soon afterwards the
weak Molossian kingdom became a de facto vassal state of Macedonia.
Most probably in 342 Philip II installed Olympias’ brother Alexander on
that kingdom’s throne. Alexander had spent several years at the
Macedonian court, where he gained the trust of his powerful brother-in-
law. According to some sources, he had also become an object of Philip’s
46
Cawkwell 1978, pp. 58-62; Griffith 1979, pp. 220-223; Buckler 1989, pp. 48,
58-84; Rhodes 1994, pp. 585-586; Sprawski 2000; Sprawski 2004; Hammond
1994, pp. 45-49; Corvisier 2002, pp. 205-222. On xenia see: Herman 1987 and
Mitchell 2002. Thessalian cavalry: Lendon 2005, pp. 98-102.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 21
homosexual desires. The hapless Arybbas and his sons had to seek refuge
in Athens.47
Of equal importance was Macedonia’s expansion to the northeast. Here
the first city Philip conquered was Amphipolis, an important colony
founded by the Athenians in 437/436 on the river Strymon not far from its
estuary into the Aegean. After 424 it broke away from Athens but
continued to be much desired territory and was repeatedly but each time
unsuccessfully besieged by the Athenians. Unlike the Athenians, who in
preceding years had in vain tried to make Amphipolis surrender by
imposing a blockade, Philip captured the city in 357 after an aggressive
siege during which the walls were demolished with battering rams.
Amphipolis was permanently incorporated into the Macedonian kingdom.
That same year Philip II also took Pydna. This city was allied to Athens,
but at the time the Athenians were engaged in war with rebellious
members of the Second Maritime League. The next city he took over in
357 was Crenides in Thrace together with its adjacent gold mines. This
was done in response to a request made by the Greek inhabitants
themselves, who preferred the Macedonian ruler to the Odrysian king
Cersobleptes. Under Philip II’s rule Crenides maintained its Greek
character and system of government, like Amphipolis, but it did change its
name to Philippi, which was the first instance in the Greek world of a city
being named after its founder. Exploitation of the mineral resources of
Thrace gave Philip the incredibly vast by ancient Greek standards annual
revenue of 1,000 talents and went a long way to cover the costs of his
constant wars. By 355 Philip gained full control of the Thermaic Gulf.
Methone was the last city Philip captured on this seaboard, during the
siege of which he lost his right eye, struck by an arrow fired from the
beleaguered city. The struggle to subjugate Thrace lasted intermittently
almost throughout Philip’s reign as a result of which a large part of that
country was indirectly ruled by the Macedonian king perhaps on the
principles of the Persian satrapy system. However, the most important
stage in the conquest of territories to the east of Macedonia was the
conflict with the Chalcidian League. In the 4th century Greek cities on the
Chalcidice Peninsula formed a federal state with common citizenship, law,
coinage and a powerful army. When he was still weak Philip II won the
league’s favour by ceding it Potidaea. But in 349 he waged war, the
47
Diod., 16.72.1, 19.51; Plu., Alex., 2; Plu., Pyrrh., 1; Satyr., ap. Ath., 13.5; Paus.,
1.11.1; Just., 7.6.10, 8.6, 9.7, 17.3.14; Tod, GHI, 173. Griffith 1979, pp. 305-308,
504-506; Borza 1990, pp. 207-208; Hammond 1994, pp. 30, 120-122; Carney
1987, p. 41; Carney 2000, pp. 62-64; Carney 2006, pp. 12-16; Corvisier 2002, pp.
91-93.
22 Chapter I
48
Momigliano 1975, p. 132; Kienast 1994, pp. 24-27; Borza 1990, pp. 212-216;
Hammond 1994, pp. 31-40; Spawforth 2007, p. 92. Inscriptions: Syll.3 332, SEG
36.626, 40.542; see Errington 1998.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 23
49
Buckler 1989, pp. 5, 9-29.
50
Cawkwell 1978, pp. 62-68, 77-113; Montgomery 1985, pp. 42-44; Buckler
1989, pp. 30-142; Hammond 1994, pp. 45-49, 90-108; Corvisier 2002, pp. 222-
236.
24 Chapter I
51
Diod., 16.4.3.
52
Diod., 16.3.1-2 after Philip’s contemporary Ephorus; see Hammond 1994, p. 25.
53
Griffith 1979, pp. 420-421.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 25
panoplia.54 The fact that the king was able to provide armour for each
infantryman meant that the creation of an army was limited only by the
availability of men in the recruiting age, which in populous Macedonia
could be tens of thousands of recruits. By contrast, in a typical polis the
figure would not even be in thousands but more often than not in
hundreds, for the number of adult males usually ranged between 230 and
1250.55
The most basic and famous element of the Macedonian phalangite’s
weaponry, one which distinguished them from the soldiers of other
contemporary formations, was a spear or pike called the sarissa.56 Though
no complete sarissa has survived to this day, accounts from ancient
sources, iconographic images and quite numerous metal remnants of
various types of sarissai have provided considerable information about
this spear. We know that the shaft was made of very hard and elastic
cornel-wood (cornus mas), which grew in abundance in Macedonia. The
philosopher Theophrastus, who was a contemporary of Philip II and
Alexander and knew Macedonia well, states that the longest sarissai of
that period measured 12 cubits. Unfortunately it is difficult to determine its
precise length in modern measurements as a cubit (the length of a forearm)
could vary between 44 and 52.5 cm. Most historians estimate that the
sarissa in Philip II and Alexander’s day measured between 4.5 and 5.5 m.
According to Polybius, the spear’s length was extended in the Hellenistic
period to approximately 16 cubits (over 6 m), which increased its range
but diminished the Macedonian phalanx’s manoeuvrability.57 The infantry
used three quite different types of sarissa. The lightest version weighed
approximately 3 kg. It was also one of the two shorter versions, measuring
4.5 m, and had a relatively light iron spearhead. The other shorter version
was of the same length, but as well as having a longer spearhead and
ferrule (together measuring c. 0.5 m) it also had a metal spike at the base.
Thus it weighed approximately 5.35 kg. The longer version of sarissa
measured 5.5 m and its wooden shaft was considerably thicker than in the
shorter types so as to reduce its vibrations when in use. The spearhead was
with a ferrule and – as in the other shorter version – the butt end also had a
metal spike. On account of its additional length and thickness it weighed c.
6.2 kg. These measurements have been arrived at on the basis of excavated
metal parts of the sarissa and reconstructions of the spear made by
54
Errington 1990, pp. 238-239; Billows 1994, pp. 13-14.
55
Ruschenbusch 1985.
56
On sarissa mostly after Markle 1982.
57
Thphr., HP, 3.12.2; Plb., 18.29.2. Griffith 1979, p. 421; Mixter 1992; Noguera
Borel 1999.
26 Chapter I
archaeologists. There were several reasons why the sarissa was weighted
down by a metal spike at the base. Firstly, it counterweighted the
spearhead and ferrule, thanks to which the phalangite could grasp the spear
further back with 2/3 or even 4/5 of the spear in front of him. Thus the
range of phalangite sarissai was considerably greater than that of the
spears of their opponents. The metal spikes could also be fixed in the
ground when the sarissai were used against cavalry attacks. Finally, if a
sarissa was broken in battle, a phalangite could continue fighting with the
rest of the shaft by using the spear’s pointed butt as a replacement
spearhead.
The phalangite’s weaponry was supplemented with a sword or dagger.
Macedonian swords excavated at Vergine are about 55 cm long and their
shape indicates that they were used for both cutting and thrusting. In battle
the sword was a reserve weapon to be resorted to once the sarissai were
broken and of no further use. The sword was also used when the phalanx
formation was broken as the sarissa, unlike hoplite spears, was not
suitable for man-to-man fighting. Swords were also naturally used when
storming city walls in situations where sarissai were totally ineffective.58
Archaeologists examining an ancient cemetery at Vergine have
uncovered the graves of ordinary Macedonian soldiers who had most
probably served in the phalanx and were buried with elements of their
fighting gear. One of the reasons why these finds are so significant is the
fact that they date from immediately after the reign of Alexander the Great
and therefore provide us with an insight into how soldiers of that time
were equipped, many of whom would have served under Alexander’s
command. The graves contain the spearheads of both sarissai and hoplite
spears, though the latter actually outnumber the former by approximately
three to one. No doubt to a certain extent this reflects proportions in which
both types of weapon were used in Alexander’s army. The phalangites
would have been trained to use both the sarissa and the hoplite type of
spear, just as they would have been taught to use the sword and no doubt
also the javelin. All sorts of weapon were used depending on the situation
and the sarissa was in all probability reserved for pitched battles. The lack
of spearheads of an indisputable sarissa type to be found during the
excavation of Olynthus has even led some scholars to believe that
originally Philip’s phalanx was armed with ordinary hoplite spears and
that the sarissa was introduced only towards the end of his reign.59
58
Markle 1982, pp. 101-102.
59
Markle 1978; Markle 1982, pp. 98-99.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 27
60
Feyel 1935; Polyaen., 4.2.10 in Krentz’ translation. Griffith 1979, pp. 422-423;
Lush 2007.
61
Markle 1982, p. 94; Borza 1990, pp. 288-289; Hammond 1994, p. 18-19. On
deflecting arrows by the dense forest of sarissai: Plb., 18.30.3-4.
28 Chapter I
not invulnerable. Above all the argument that armour was superfluous is
countered by the fact that phalangite officers wore it. In accordance with
the universal custom of that period, officers were recruited from higher
social groups than ordinary soldiers and therefore they would have been
able to afford to buy armour if it offered them significant protection during
battle. This suggests that there may have been non-military reasons for not
equipping Macedonian phalangites with abdominal armour, which, apart
from the shield, was the most expensive item of a phalangite’s gear. It is
therefore plausible that Philip took into account the fact that most
phalangites could not afford abdominal armour and, what is more, on
account of the cost of constant wars, nor could his treasury. In other words
he realised he would have to economise on this particular expenditure.
Having to decide between a small, at most a couple of thousand-strong,
hoplite army and a much larger though less well armoured army of
phalangites, Philip chose the latter. As it turned out, he made the right
decision.62
Thus a phalangite’s protective armour was generally limited to the
helmet and shield. The phalangite’s helmet did not offer as much
protection as that of the hoplites (among whom the most popular sort was
of the Corinthian type), but it was lighter to wear and did not limit the field
of vision so much. Both these factors would have been significant for the
Macedonian phalanx, which had to be very mobile and flexible. The
phalangite suspended his shield on a strap around his neck and shoulder as
he needed to hold his long sarissa with both hands. Moreover, his shield,
called the telamon, was much smaller than the hoplite aspis shield; the
former measuring on average 60 cm in diameter as opposed to ca. 90 cm
in diameter of the aspis. This reduced size meant that the shield would not
hinder movement when marching in battle formation. Although the
telamon offered less protection, it allowed the Macedonian phalanx to
fight in a tighter formation than its Greek equivalent.63
Even the shortest sarissa was more than twice as long as the hoplite
spear, which in the 4th century measured approximately 2.1-2.2 m and
weighed slightly over 1 kg. These two different types of weapon were
used differently. The hoplite would grip his spear with his right hand more
or less in the middle and when attacking the enemy he would raise it above
his head so as to thrust it on the opponent from above. The phalangite, on
the other hand, need both hands to hold his long sarissa. The best
description of a phalanx attacking with sarissai is provided by Polybius:
62
Griffith 1979, pp. 423-424; Billows 1990, p. 31; Billows 1994, pp. 12-13.
63
Markle 1982, pp. 92-93; Markle 1999; Lendon 2005, pp. 123-124, 417-418.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 29
‘That when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength, nothing
can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge can be easily
understood for many reasons. For since, when it has closed up for action,
each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth, and the
length of the pikes is according to the original design sixteen cubits, but
has now been adapted to the actual need of fourteen cubits, from which we
must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length
of the weighted portion of the pike behind, which serves to keep it
couched – four cubits in all – it is evident that it must extend ten cubits
beyond the body of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it
with both hands. The consequence is that while the pikes of the second,
third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, but even
those of the fifth rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in
the first rank. Of course this is only possible when the phalanx has its
characteristic close order as regards to both depth and breadth… This
description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first
rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each at a
distance of two cubits from the next. From this we can easily conceive
what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is
sixteen deep. In this case those further back than the fifth rank cannot use
their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. Therefore they do not
severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the
shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation
from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which,
passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those in front of and
behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in
the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to
face about.’64
Written virtually as an addendum to his account of the 197 battle of
Cynoscephalae, Polybius’ description of a contemporary Macedonian
phalanx includes many significant characteristics in common with the
phalanx formation of the last of the great Argeads. The most significant
feature mentioned is the extension of the sarissai held by five ranks of
phalangites in front of the first rank. Of course one should not imagine that
these pikes were held in a stationary position – in all probability each
phalangite would be manoeuvring and thrusting his weapon in an attempt
to get at the enemy. With five ranks taking part in the fighting that was
two ranks more than in the Greek phalanx, and that of course gave the
Macedonian phalanx a natural advantage. The Macedonian phalanx in
64
Plb., 18.29-30.
30 Chapter I
Philip II’s time and for most of his son’s reign was most probably eight
ranks deep. According to the account of Callisthenes, that was, indeed,
how many ranks there were in Alexander’s phalanx at the Battle of Issus
in 333.65 The three ranks that did not directly engage in battle formed a
tactical reserve which could, for instance, turn about if the enemy tried to
attack the phalanx from behind. Ancient sources testify that various
manoeuvres were carried out by the phalanxes of Philip II and Alexander:
the last ranks turning round to face the opposite direction; moving aside to
let through charging chariots or feigning a retreat from the battlefield. We
also know that the Macedonian phalanx was able to fight in both loose and
tight formations, depending on what the situation required. If we add to
this the ability of phalangites to expertly use diverse weapons, it becomes
very apparent that these skills were acquired through persistently long and
rigorous training. The above-mentioned sources (Diodorus and Polyaenus)
recount intensive exercises with weapons and 30-stadion marches fully
armed, with provisions and other necessary equipment. Such training not
only developed physical strength and endurance, but also made the
phalanx act as a single unit automatically and reliably able to follow the
commander’s orders even in the thick of battle. In fact Philip required such
toughness and staying power not just form the phalangites but from all his
soldiers. Polyaenus recounts an anecdote about Philip dismissing a
mercenary officer, Dokimos of Tarentum, for taking a warm bath, which
apparently even Macedonian women would not do after giving birth to a
child.66
Philip’s phalanx comprised large units called taxeis (taxis in the
singular), each including approximately 1,500 soldiers. At the start of his
Asian campaign Alexander had eight such units. During his reign
particular taxeis were recruited from particular regions. We know of taxeis
being recruited from the Upper Macedonia regions of Tymphaea, Orestis
and Lyncestis as well as Elimeia. We do not know if the whole
Macedonian army was recruited on a territorial basis, but it is certain that
at the time of his expedition to Asia Alexander respected this rule,
allocating troops sent on by Antipater to army units recruited from the
same region. Respecting soldiers’ territorial loyalty was a way of building
a sense of unity, solidarity and pride in the Macedonian army. Smaller
military units called lochos comprised 240-256 soldiers. The smallest
65
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35. Griffith 1979, p. 420.
66
Cawkwell 1978, p. 34; Manti 1992, pp. 37-38; Lloyd 1996, pp. 171-174; Hanson
1999, p. 150; Corvisier 2002, pp. 102-105. Polyaen., 4.2.1.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 31
military unit, called the dekas, in Philip II’s time comprised ten soldiers,
whereas under Alexander the number was increased to 16.67
On account of the significant reduction in armour Macedonian
phalangites could not be categorized like the hoplites of the Greek phalanx
as a classical heavy infantry. Yet despite this formal dissimilarity, the
Macedonian phalanx performed exactly the same role in the battlefield as
the Greek phalanx, only the Macedonian phalangites generally performed
their task better. One of the significant organisational differences between
Greek hoplite phalanxes and those of Philip II was the elimination of
supply trains and a reduction in the number of army servants. In the
Macedonian army there was a servant to every cavalryman and one
servant to every ten phalangites, whereas in the Greek army every hoplite
was usually accompanied by his own servant who actually took no part in
the fighting. The limited number of servants greatly enhanced the
Macedonian army’s mobility and logistical capabilities. Unable to rely on
supply trains and servants to be employed as porters, the phalangites were
forced to greatly limit the amount of camp equipment they took on
expeditions. Moreover, given that similar numbers of soldiers were
involved, the Macedonian army required more or less half as much food as
a Greek army – regardless of whether they were fighting on behalf of their
own polis or as mercenaries serving the Persians. Without the supply trains
the Macedonian army was able to move surprisingly quickly and stay in
occupied territories for much longer, living, as was the military custom of
those times, off the enemy’s land, i.e. plundering or commandeering food
and other property.68
The Greek armies of the 4th century included elite groups of heavy
infantry of which the most famous was the so-called Theban Sacred Band,
founded in 378. This fairly small unit of just 300 hoplites, according to
ancient sources, comprised specially selected pairs of homosexual lovers.
In the opinion of Greek military theorists, this guaranteed that each soldier
would rather get himself killed in battle than show himself up in front of
his lover as a coward. Apart from the sexual orientation, purely physical
attributes were also taken into consideration and each such soldier
underwent thorough infantry and cavalry training so as to make the Sacred
Band a fully professional unit whose military value could at least be
compared to that of today’s commando units. They were commanded by
67
Anaximenes, FGrH, 72 F4; Diod., 17.57.2; Curt., 4.13.28; Arr., An., 3.16.11.
Milns 1976, pp. 89, 103-105; Errington 1990, pp. 242-243; Lloyd 1996, pp. 171-
172; Sekunda 2007, pp. 330-331.
68
Fron., Str., 4.1.6. Garlan 1994, p. 689; Hanson 1999, pp. 149, 174-176; van
Wees 2000, p. 109; Carney 2006, pp. 67-68.
32 Chapter I
69
DeVoto 1992.
70
Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F348; D., ap. Phot., s.v. pez{tairoi; EM, s.v.
pez{tairoj; Hsch., pezetafroij; Anaximenes, FGrH, 72 F4. Milns 1976, pp. 89-96;
Griffith 1979, pp. 414-418; Errington 1990, pp. 244-245; Billows 1990, p. 32;
Ashley 1998, p. 40; Lendon 2005, p. 125; Thomas 2007, pp. 78-79.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 33
and helmets, and in terms of protective as well as offensive gear they were
better equipped than most of the opposing cavalries they encountered in
Philip II and Alexander’s time. The prodromoi, on the other hand, were a
typical light cavalry. They also had good horses and a high military value
equivalent to that of the Thessalian cavalry. Thessalian horsemen wore
less armour than the hetairoi and instead of the sarissa, each rider had two
javelins and a curved sword. The light cavalry also included contingents
from Thrace and Paionia.71
The fact that another verified name for these mounted scouts is
sarissophoroi allows us to assume that their chief weapon was the sarissa.
This was also a weapon of the hetairoi. Iconographic sources show that
unlike the Sarmatian cavalry or Macedonian infantry the Macedonian
cavalry held the sarissa with just one hand, not both. This was possible
because the sarissa used by the cavalry, alternatively called the xyston,
was shorter (4.5 m, and some historians even believe it to have been no
longer than 3 m) and lighter than its equivalent used in the infantry.
Another difference in the cavalry version was an iron sleeve in the centre
of the shaft. Its purpose is not entirely clear and one cannot be certain that
historians who claim that it was used to bind two separate parts of the shaft
are right: the sleeve’s length (16 cm) was just not long enough. Perhaps
the sleeve was put on a single dogwood shaft to give the rider a better grip
on the spear. Like the heavy infantry sarissa, the cavalry equivalent had an
iron tipped stub serving as a reserve spearhead if the front part of the spear
was broken, which happened quite frequently in battle. Moreover it
provided a counterbalance so that the cavalryman was able to hold 60% of
the spear (counting from the tip of the spearhead) in front of him, which
meant that he had a better chance of spearing an opponent before being
struck himself. We do not know when Philip II equipped his cavalry with
sarissai. Some historians presume that they were first used at the Battle of
Chaeronea. Apart from the sarissa, riders also had slightly curved swords
used for cutting and javelins. The hetairoi, fitted in armour and holding
long spears, should not be compared to a European cavalry in the Middle
Ages, for in antiquity two basic pieces of equipment later considered to be
indispensable were quite unknown: the saddle and the stirrups. Without
these not only controlling a horse was much more difficult than in later
times but also the rider’s stability on the horse left a lot to be desired. This
of course made the training of riders a very long and difficult process, but
it also affected the method of fighting. The Macedonians were the first in
71
Garlan 1994, p. 687; Hammond 1996, pp. 31-32; Hanson 1999, p. 150; Lush
2007, pp. 16-17.
34 Chapter I
the west to successfully master cavalry charges with lances where the
momentum of the charging horse greatly increased the weapon’s impact.
However, the hetairoi could not use their sarissai like a medieval lance
which was aimed at the easiest target, i.e. the opponent’s chest and
stomach, for without a saddle the recoil from the impact could easily
knock the charging rider off his horse. To avoid this, Macedonian riders
aimed their sarissa at the opponent’s head. Though this was a much more
difficult target to hit, if correctly executed, it greatly reduced the risk of
being thrown off one’s horse.72
The 4th century brought to Greece a cavalry renaissance, for in
preceding centuries it had been a completely marginalised part of the
armed forces. Poleis, at least the larger ones, now expanded their old
cavalry units or founded quite new ones. In Athens the number of riders
was increased to 1,000. However, the Greek cavalry still by and large
played secondary roles: carrying out reconnaissance, protecting the
phalanx flanks during battle and chasing the defeated enemy. The great
reformers of the Boeotian army Pelopidas and Epaminondas had
experimented with using the cavalry to attack the flanks of enemy
phalanxes and that could not have escaped Philip’s notice. But it was only
when Philip became king that the cavalry started being used to attack and
break up enemy infantry formations on a large scale, and later this method
of warfare was further developed with great success by Alexander. The
Macedonian cavalry attacked in a wedge formation, which was an idea
adopted from the Scythians either directly or via the Thracians. The
hetairoi’s basic tactical unit, called the ile, comprised 136 cavalrymen who
when attacking formed a wedge of sixteen ranks in which the number of
riders in each rank was follows: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15 and 16. Such a configuration enabled the cavalry unit to effectively
search for weak points in the enemy’s infantry formations. It also made a
difference in the midst of the battle’s chaos and noise when normally the
commanding officer’s verbal orders or signals could go unnoticed by the
riders. With the commanding officer at the front of a wedge shaped
formation the hetairoi could always see him and therefore even in the
thick of battle they were able to tactically retreat and carry out other
manoeuvres.73
72
Markle 1982, pp. 89-91; Manti 1983; Manti 1994; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 74-75;
Borza 1990, pp. 203-205; Mixter 1992, pp. 25-27; Hammond 1996, pp. 30-31.
73
Arr., Tact., 16.6. Markle 1978, p. 486; Lane Fox 1973, p. 75; Daniel 1992;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 107-108; Worthington 2004, p. 12; Carney 2006, pp. 65-66;
Sekunda 2007, pp. 331-332.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 35
74
Diod., 12.28.2-3, 13.54.7, 14.49-53.
75
Aen. Tact., 32.8; Diod., 16.8.2. Marsden 1977; Snodgrass 1999, pp. 116-117.
36 Chapter I
76
Diod., 16.72-76; Ath. Mech., 10.5-10 and Vitr., 10.13.3 (both after
Agesistratos). Marsden 1977; Ferrill 1997, pp. 170-175; Hanson 1999, pp. 155-
160; van Wees 2000, p. 403; Worthington 2008, pp. 31-32.
77
Plu., Alex., 1.2. Unz 1985, p. 171; Hamilton 1999, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.
78
Satyr., ap. Ath., 13.5. Carney 2000, pp. 75-76.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 37
79
Curt., 8.2.8-9; Plu., Alex., 5.7-8; Arr., An., 4.9.3-4; Just., 12.6; Ps.-Callisth.,
1.13.4. Berve 1926, no. 462; Wilcken 1967, pp. 53-54; Hamilton 1965, p. 117;
Hamilton 1974, pp. 29-32; Hamilton 1999, p. 16; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 45-46;
Carney 1987, p. 42; Carney 2000, pp. 64-65; Fredricksmeyer 1990, p. 301; Heckel
1992, pp. 34-37.
80
Plu., Alex., 25.6-8; Plu., mor., 179e; Plin., Nat., 12.62.
81
Plu., Alex., 5.8, 8.2; Plu., mor., 327f ; Hom., Il., 9.168-169. Berve 1926, no. 481;
Dascalakis 1965, p. 170 ; Hamilton 1999, p. 14; Carney 2006, p. 6; Thomas 2007,
p. 97.
38 Chapter I
during his school years rather than in adult life when he was so preoccupied
with politics and military affairs.82
Although they are far from coherent with one another, all the stories of
the young prince’s upbringing indicate that from the earliest years his
parents devoted a lot of attention to it. In the case of Philip, who made all
the most important decisions in the palace and state, this would suggest
that from the start he envisioned Alexander to be his successor instead of
his other son Arrhidaeus, who was born almost at the same time as
Alexander. This could be associated with the fact that the mental
retardation of Arrhidaeus was noticed early in his childhood and this made
the Philip’s other son quite unsuitable as a candidate to the throne.83
Ancient sources include anecdotes showing Alexander to have been a
boy of great physical dexterity, emotionally mature well above his age,
interested in the outside world, ambitious and aware of his own
importance. He excelled in running but, despite the insistence of his father
and colleagues, refused to compete in the Olympic Games on account of
the fact that unlike him the other competitors would not be monarchs.
Indeed a later legend has him competing in a chariot race at Olympia
against the sons of other kings and satraps. Such tales served to foretell
Alexander’s negative attitude to sport or rather his disregard for
sportsmen. When later looking at statues of Olympic and Pythian victors
displayed at Miletus Alexander asked: ‘and where those men of such
magnificent bodies were when the barbarians besieged your town?’ His
biographer Plutarch interprets Alexander’s reservations regarding sport as
an element of the perceived image of a philosopher king who valued the
fine arts, literature and philosophy more than athletic challenges.
Alexander’s intellectual maturity and early plans (or perhaps just dreams)
of conquering Asia are illustrated in an anecdote about how at the
Macedonian court, at a time when Philip was absent, emissaries of the
Great King were received by Alexander. He was said to have amazed the
ambassadors by not asking questions – as most people his age would have
done – about the legendary wealth, the hanging gardens and other wonders
of the Achaemenid court, but about the network of roads, the distances to
places and the position held by the Great King in battle formations.
Finally, Alexander’s ambitions and urge to act are expressed in the
concern he is said to have shown on receiving news of his father’s
victories that as a consequence there would be nothing of significance left
for him to later conquer. The most famous incident related by biographers
82
Plu., Alex., 8.3 ; Nikobule, FGrH, 127 F2.
83
Carney 1987, p. 42.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 39
from Alexander’s childhood, one illustrating his ability to control men and
beasts as well as to succeed where others failed, is his taming of a horse
called Bucephalus. This magnificent black Thessalian stallion had been
offered for sale to Philip by a man called Philoneicus, but the horse would
not allow itself to be mounted. Later legend even has it devouring human
flesh. However, Alexander, who had cleverly noticed that the horse’s wild
behaviour resulted from the fact that it was afraid of its own shadow, was
able to calm the animal down, mount it and then ride it. The onlooking
Macedonians, who after all had expert knowledge of horses, were amazed
and his proud father, Philip, was said to exclaim: ‘My son, seek thee out a
kingdom equal to thyself; Macedonia has no room for thee!’ Bucephalus
was then given to Alexander as a gift by his father’s Greek companion
Demaratus of Corinth, having bought it for the record sum 13 talents at a
time when the average mount cost just one fifth of a talent. Bucephalus
was Alexander’s favourite charger throughout his mission east, right up to
India, where it died at an exceptionally old age for a horse. The association
of famous personalities with exceptional horses is a popular topos in
ancient biographies. Nonetheless, with the exception of the amazing claim
that the horse ate human flesh (alluding to the myth of Heracles and the
man-eating mares of Diomedes), the authenticity of the taming of
Bucephalus cannot really be doubted. It was probably first related by
Chares, Alexander’s court-marshal.84
In 343/342 Philip employed a new preceptor for Alexander: Aristotle.
He educated Alexander for two years, until 340. The place selected for
their studies was near Mieza, to the south of Macedonia at the foot of
Mount Vermion. This academy also served as a garden shrine to the
Nymphs, with benches and cloisters, and it had already become a tourist
attraction by Plutarch’s times. The encounter of the most famous of the
Greek philosophers with a pupil who would become the greatest military
leader of antiquity is the ideal stuff of legends, and, indeed, very much was
made of this episode in the medieval perception of Alexander’s life
history. However, in 343/342 Aristotle had not yet written the great works
that would ensure him unrivalled renown over the centuries and so at that
stage he was merely one of many intellectuals active in Greece at the time.
Therefore it would not have been because of his academic status, or rather
not only for this reason, that he was selected to be Alexander’s tutor from
84
Diod., 17.76.6; Plu., Alex., 4.8-6.8; Plu., mor., 179d, 331b, 342b-c; Chares, ap.
Gel., 5.2.1-3; Plin., Nat., 8.154; Ps.-Callisth., 1.13, 15, 17, 19; EGen., b208; EM,
s.v. bouk{faloj. Brown 1977, pp. 77-78; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 47-48; Baynham
1995, pp. 5-9; Stoneman 1997, p. 15; Hamilton 1999, pp. 13-16; Nawotka 2003,
pp. 26-31, 132-133.
40 Chapter I
85
Plu., Alex., 7; Ps.-Callisth., 1.13.4; Diod., 16.52.5-8; D., 10.31-34; Did., In D.,
col. 4.59-6.66. Jaeger 1948, pp. 120-122; Hamilton 1965, p. 118; Brocker 1966;
Wilcken 1967, pp, 54-55; Chroust 1967; Plezia 1968; Green 1974; pp. 52-54;
Badian 1982, p. 38; O’Brien 1992, p. 19; Rubinsohn 1993, pp. 1308-1309; Debord
1999, pp. 417-419; Corvisier 2002, p. 263; Green 2003.
86
Griffith 1979, pp. 518-522; Errington 1990, pp. 77-79.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia 41
education started the conventional Greek way with literature and Homer in
particular. It is difficult not to presume that the heroic ideology and cult of
manly virtue (areté) so very apparent in Alexander’s adult life had some
connection with the education he had received from Aristotle – the author
of a dithyrambic poem praising Hermias’ areté and heroic death cruelly
inflicted upon him by the Persians. Other authors Aristotle instructed
Alexander to read may have also included Pindar; for when in 335 having
Thebes destroyed Alexander ordered Pindar’s house to be spared. In all
probability Alexander also received elementary instruction in dialectics
and eristics (the art of disputation). A major issue that remains unknown is
the impact Aristotle as a political thinker had on Alexander. There is no
evidence that as a monarch Alexander adopted his mentor’s views
regarding the ideal state, which was inspired by the Greek model: a polis
counting approximately 5,000 citizens. Alexander also did not heed advice
to treat barbarians as enemies or even animals, though, in accordance with
his teacher’s views, he did treat the Greeks living in Asia Minor as allies.
Extant Arabic translations of Aristotle’s letters to Alexander as well as
references to their correspondence by other authors show that the two must
have for a long time exchanged views on political matters. There can be no
doubt that Aristotle’s school inspired or at least consolidated in Alexander
the conviction that Greek culture was supreme in the entire world.
However, the Hellenisation of the East and cultural homogeneity
stretching from the Adriatic to the Hindu Kush following Alexander’s
conquests were no doubt an unforeseen consequence of this education.
Perhaps of greater importance than the formal knowledge passed on during
lectures at Mieza was the personal contact Alexander had in his formative
years with the greatest mind of the ancient world. The intellectual curiosity
that was aroused at the time indubitably accounts for the fact that
Alexander took learned men with him on his expedition east, gave
instructions to pass back to Aristotle information about the plants and
animals found there and gave financial support for Aristotle to conduct his
research.87
Scholars assume that Alexander’s education at Mieza was not in the
form of private lessons but provided in the company of other young
Macedonian aristocrats including those who would later become his
87
Plu., Alex., 7.5-8.3. Ehrenberg 1938, p. 92; Merlan 1954; Wilcken 1967, pp. 55-
58; Plezia 1968; Stern 1968; Bielawski, Plezia 1970; Seibert 1972, pp. 72-73;
Green 1974, pp. 57-62; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 53-56; Bosworth 1988, pp. 20-21;
Rubinsohn 1993, pp. 1310-1312; Thomas 2007, pp. 196-197. Plutarch devoted his
De fortuna seu virtute Alexandri to the topic of Alexander’s arête and his cultural
mission in the East.
42 Chapter I
88
Wilcken 1967, p. 55; Green 1974, pp. 55-57; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 51-54; Heckel
1986, p. 302; Heckel 1992, pp. 205-208; Thomas 2007, pp. 126-127; Heckel
2009a, p. 71.
CHAPTER II:
1
Plu., Alex., 4.1; Plu., mor., 335a-b; Arr., An., 1.16.4; Cic., Fam., 5.12.7; Hor., Ep.,
2.1.237-241; V.Max., 8.11, ext. 2; Plin., Nat., 7.125
2
Plu., Alex., 74.6. Bosworth 1988, p. 20; Hamilton 1999, pp. 206-207.
44 Chapter II
of the Amazons, who had also expected the greatness of the famous leader
to be matched by an appropriately great physique. 3 Some historians in
good faith assume that Alexander was of average height and therefore – on
the basis of measurements of skeletons found in contemporary
Macedonian graves – estimate that he was approximately 1.7 tall. But this
must be an exaggeration for the sources leave us with no doubt: Alexander
was short, to the extent that when he sat on the captured throne of (the tall)
Darius III, a table had to be provided for him to rest his feet on. On the
other hand, thanks to physical exercise Alexander developed a strong and
muscular body.4
A feature of Alexander’s posture that has frequently been noticed and
imitated is his raised head with the neck slightly skewed to the left. That is
indeed how Lysippus presents him, but the very fragmentary references in
historical sources do not allow us to establish whether this was a symptom
of some illness or simply a manner adopted over time by Alexander. It is
thanks to Plutarch and the polychromy on the so-called ‘Alexander
Sarcophagus’ that we know he had a fair complexion with ruddy cheeks,
neck and chest. Citing Aristoxenus, the 4th-century peripatetic philosopher,
Plutarch states that Alexander’s body and breath had a pleasant smell. This,
historians interpret as being a reflection of the tradition that Alexander was
of divine or heroic status, for the ancient Greeks believed that pleasant
scents were a characteristic attribute of both gods and heroes. The images
on the Alexander Mosaic, on coins and in the form of sculptures all show
Alexander to have a straight nose, a slightly protruding jaw, full lips and
eyes deep set beneath a strongly pronounced forehead. Alexander’s hair,
which according to Aelian was fair but in the Alexander Mosaic appears to
be brown, was combed back above the forehead with a centre parting so
that it fell to the sides like a lion’s mane. According to the unverified and
late tradition of the Alexander Romance, Alexander had heterochromic
eyes, one being light in colour and the other dark. This same source
maintains that he had sharp teeth, like those of a snake. Such features
served to stress the legend of Alexander’s superhuman nature.5
Contemporaries were struck by the fact that the young ruler had a
smoothly shaven face, in sharp contrast to the Greek tradition of adult men
3
Quotation is: Curt., 7.8.9. Curt., 3.12.16, 6.5.29; Diod., 17.37.5.
4
Stewart 1993, pp. 72-73. Diod., 17.66.3; Curt., 5.2.13-15; It. Alex., 14.
5
Plu., Alex., 4.1-4; Plu., mor., 55d, 335a-b; Plu., Pomp., 2.1 ; Plu., Pyrrh., 8.1 ;
Ael., VH, 12.14 ; Ps.-Callisth., 1.13.3; Iulius Valerius, Res gestae Alexandri
Macedonis, 1.7; S. Aurelius Victor, Epitome de Caesaribus, 21.4; Johannes
Tzetzes, Ep., 76; idem, Chiliades, 11.368. Bieber 1964, pp. 50-55; Bosworth 1988,
pp. 19-20; Killerich 1993; Stewart 1993, pp. 72-78; Hamilton 1999, pp. 11-12.
The Heir to the Throne 45
having beards. In the 4th century the lack of a beard had the unequivocally
negative connotation of a shamefully passive homosexual lover. Such an
image was particularly ill-suited to the image of leader and conqueror;
therefore it is unsurprising that in c. 330 a Greek vase painter from Apulia,
unaware of how the Macedonian king really looked, depicted him as a
bearded warrior. Yet, although indubitably aware of the negative
associations, Alexander consciously decided to look the way he did, to
demonstrate – as he did more than once in his life – that the social canons,
customs and general outlooks held by ordinary mortals did not apply to
him. His role model and point of reference was an ancestor on his
mother’s side: Achilles. In the 4th century Achilles was presented in Greek
art as a young and beardless hero. The rhetorician Polyaenus (perhaps in
an attempt to rationalise this aesthetic decision) even claims that
Alexander ordered his soldiers to shave their beards so that the enemy
would not be able to catch hold of them. 6 Like with other aspects of
Alexander’s appearance the fact that he shaved was subsequently imitated
by many others – that was how rulers of major Hellenistic monarchies had
their likenesses presented in countless portrayals, especially on coins.
With this effective promotion of self-image, Alexander became the first
ever person in Western culture known by name to have started a fashion
trend.
The impression Alexander made on contemporaries comprised a
mixture of contradictory stimuli. The energetic gait, muscular and athletic
physique, and hoarse voice all contributed to the image of a tough,
masculine warrior and leader of men. This contrasted with his smooth face;
the hair combed back, the impression of moist slightly bulging eyes and
fair complexion, all of which were in the 4th-century cultures of
Macedonia and Greece associated with gentleness and effeminacy. When
to this he added the upward gaze and characteristic turn of the neck,
Alexander’s appearance and posture must have given him an electrifying,
charismatic aura.7 However strong the impression Alexander made on his
contemporaries, he was not considered outstandingly handsome in his
lifetime. It was in a later tradition started in the 2nd century AD that he
became a model of male beauty, reflecting a general idealisation of the
Macedonian ruler that was far greater than the reality of his times.8
6
Chrysippos, ap. Ath., 13.18; Polyaen., 4.3.2. Dover 1978, pp. 71, 87, 144; Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 40-41; Stewart 1993, pp. 74-75, 78-86, 150-157.
7
Plu., Alex., 4.1-2; Plu., mor., 53c, 335b; Plu., Pyrrh., 8.1-2 ; It. Alex., 15.
Bosworth 1988, pp. 19-20; Stewart 1993, pp. 73-74.
8
App., BC, 2.151; Arr., An., 7.28.1; Apul., Fl., 7. Stewart 1993, p. 73.
46 Chapter II
It must have been sometime between the finishing of his education and
338 (a year of intensive war and politics) that an anecdote passed on by
Athenaeus from Alexander’s contemporary Theophrastus and regarding
the Macedonian royal couple’s problem with Alexander’s upbringing took
place. It was then that a worried Olympias ascertained that her teenage son
lacked interest in the opposite sex. Theophrastus explained this lack of
interest as a consequence of Alexander’s excessive drinking. Alcoholic
abuse was indeed characteristic of Macedonian aristocrats, including his
father Philip. A lack of libido, however, was most certainly not a typical
Macedonian trait. With Philip’s approval, Olympias recruited a ravishing
Thessalian hetaira called Callixeina (perhaps referred to elsewhere as
Pancaste) to seduce the heir to the throne. We cannot be sure, however,
whether she, or his mother’s requests were able to change Alexander’s
lifestyle.9
While Alexander pursued his studies under Aristotle’s instruction at
Mieza, Philip made use of Athens’s military standstill following the Peace
of Philocrates and continued Macedonia’s expansion north. In 342 he
completed the subjugation of Epirus by installing Olympias’s brother
Alexander on the throne. In a sense as if making use of this situation, he
also conquered and annexed to Epirus the Greek cities of Cassopia,
situated between the Ambracian Gulf and the Adriatic.10 That same year,
342, Philip started another campaign in Thrace against Cersobleptes, from
whom he had already taken the town of Crenides and the gold yielding
mountains of Pangaion. In fighting lasting until 340 Philip’s annexations
of Thracian territory reached Mount Haemus (Stara Planina) and the Black
Sea coast. Philip’s sway over Thrace was augmented with garrisons and
newly formed cities, the most important of which was Philippopolis, and
through the installation of a Macedonian strategos (general) as the new
ruler of this land that was conquered by Macedonia but not incorporated
into it.11
The Peace of Philocrates was resented by many in Athens. In 342 this
resentment led to an undeclared war with Macedonia simultaneously
waged on several fronts. Swift Athenian intervention prevented Ambracia,
an important city in western Greece, from falling into Philip’s hands. In
the Thracian Chersonese a unit of mercenaries supporting a newly formed
party of Athenian cleruchs and commanded by the general Diopeithes
9
Ath., 10.45 after Theophrastus (F578); Ael., VH., 12.34. Odgen 2009, p. 209.
10
Diod., 16.72.1; D., 7.32. Hammond 1994, pp. 120-122; Corvisier 2002, pp. 167-
170.
11
Diod., 16.71.1-2; D., 82, 35; Arr., An., 1.25.2. Cawkwell 1978, pp. 116-117;
Hammond 1994, pp. 122-125; Corvisier 2002, pp. 184-186.
The Heir to the Throne 47
12
Cawkwell 1978, pp. 118-135; Griffith 1979, pp. 510-516; Hammond 1994, pp.
125-132; Corvisier 2002, pp. 236-247.
13
Diod., 16.74.2-76.4 (our principal source here; Diodorus probably follows
Ephorus); Plu., Alex., 70.5; Plu., mor., 339b; D., 11.5; Arr., An., 2.14.5; Paus.,
1.29.10; Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F222; Did., In D., col. 10.34-62. Cawkwell 1978,
pp. 135-136; Griffith 1979, pp. 567-573.
48 Chapter II
14
Diod., 16.76.3-772; D., 11.6; 12.53; 18.76, 244, 302; 50.6, 19; Aeschin., 3.256;
Plu., Phoc., 14; Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F292; Philoch., FGrH, 328 F54, 55; Just.,
9.1. Cawkwell 1978, pp. 136-140; Griffith 1979, pp. 573-591; Ashley 1998, pp.
142-144; Corvisier 2002, pp. 247-248.
15
Plu., Alex., 9.1; Isoc., Ep., 4 and 5; Aeschin., 1.167-169; St. Byz., s.v.
Alex£ndreiai. Wilcken 1967, p. 58; Griffith 1979, p. 558; Hatzopoulos 1986, p.
288; Bosworth 1988, pp. 21, 245-246; Greenwalt 1989, p. 40; Hamilton 1999, pp.
22-23; Heckel 1992, pp. 38-49; Fraser 1996, pp. 26, 29-30 (for identification of the
third Alexandreia of Stephanus of Byzantium with Alexandropolis).
The Heir to the Throne 49
2. Chaeronea
The Scythian campaign only for a while drew Philip’s attention away from
the situation in central Greece, where in 339 local disputes over the city of
Amphissa in Locris led to the outbreak of the Fourth Sacred War. The
Thessalians mobilised their forces very gradually. This was perhaps for
fear of Athens and Boeotia reacting. But another reason may have been an
understanding reached with Philip for the Thessalians had requested the
Macedonian king to enter the war. In the autumn of 339 the Macedonian
army seized the city of Elatea, which was situated in Phocis close to the
Boeotian border. This sent a shockwave through the Greek world and
inclined Thebes, which had until then been an ally of Macedonia, to accept
Demosthenes’s offer of making an alliance with Athens in a war against
Philip. From that moment on the new allies swiftly mobilised a citizen
army as well as 10,000 mercenaries – who took up strategic positions
blocking all the mountain passes into Boeotia. Partisan warfare and minor
skirmishes lasted from the end of 339 to mid 338. Then in the summer of
338 Philip managed to dislodge the mercenaries from the mountain passes,
which enabled him to take Amphissa and end the Fourth Sacred War. The
16
Just., 9.1-3, 12.2.6; Luc., Macr., 10.10; Arr., An., 5.26.6; Curt., 10.1.44; Did., In
D., col. 13.3-7. Nawotka 1997, pp. 30-31; Hammond 1994, pp. 135-137; Musielak
2003, pp. 54-56. See Bloedow 2002 on Philip’s goals in this war.
50 Chapter II
17
Cawkwell 1978, pp. 140-144; Griffith 1979, pp. 585-596; Londey 1990; Borza
1999, pp.58-64; Hammond 1994, pp. 143-148; Ashley 1998, pp. 149-152;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 249-254.
The Heir to the Throne 51
18
Diod., 16.85.5-86; Plu., Alex., 9.2-3; Plu., Cam., 19.9; Polyaen., 4.2.2, 4.2.7;
Fron., Str., 2.19; Paus., 7.6.5, 9.40.10 ; Str., 9.2.37 ; Just., 9.3. Cawkwell 1978, pp.
144-149; Griffith 1979, pp. 596-603; Hammond 1994, pp. 148-154; Carlier 1996, p.
111; Ashley 1998, pp. 154-157; Hamilton 1999, p. 23.
19
Plu., Alex., 9.4; Plu., Pel., 18.5. Borza 1990, p. 225; DeVoto 1992, pp. 17-19;
Sabin 2007, pp. 127-128.
52 Chapter II
20
Cawkwell 1978, pp. 167-168; Corvisier 2002, p. 255; Zahrnt 2009, pp. 19-20.
The Heir to the Throne 53
and was now ceded to Athens no doubt in order to enflame anew an almost
forgotten disagreement between Athens and her Chaeronean allies.21
Philip’s conditions for ending the war with Athens were milder than
had been expected. The Athenians expressed their gratitude by granting,
probably on motion of Demades, the Macedonian dignitaries appropriate
awards. Athenian citizenship was bestowed on Alcimachus, Antipater,
Philip and therefore in a way also automatically on his son and heir
Alexander. Moreover, a statue of Philip was erected in the Agora, whereas
Alcimachus and Antipater were also awarded the honorary title of
proxenos. The Macedonian king’s very moderate treatment of Athens after
the Battle of Chaeronea is usually put down to political motives. Philip
was planning war against Persia and therefore could not afford to prolong
the conflict in Greece; besides, the Athenian fleet of an estimated 350
warships could be of considerable use to him. Besides, plundering of
Attica, once occupied by Xerxes, would weaken Philip’ Panhellenic cause
in the planned war with Persia. There are also opinions that the
determination and energy the Athenians had shown in preparing for the
continuation of war inclined the Macedonians to conversely seek a
peaceful solution. However, we may also assume that for the parvenu
Macedonian laying siege to and eventually destroying Athens – in the
words of Thucydides, the school of Hellas – was contrary to what
throughout his life he had striven for, full acceptance in the Greek world.22
21
Griffith 1979, pp. 604-609; Hammond 1994, pp. 155-157; Habicht 1999, pp. 11-
12; Brun 2000, p. 65; Corvisier 2002, p. 256. On the date of transfer of Oropus to
Athenian control (338 or 335) see Faraguna 2003, p. 100.
22
Hyp., Philippides, fr. 8; Hyp., ap. Harp., s.v. Alkfmacoj; IG ii2 239; Plu., Dem.,
22; Paus., 1.9.4; Scholia in Aristid., Panathenaikos, 178.16; Just., 9.4.5. Cawkwell
1978; p. 167; Cawkwell 1996, pp. 98-99; Osborne 1983, pp. 69-70 (T69); Griffith
1979, pp. 619-620; O’Brien 1992, p. 26; Whitehead 2000, p. 41; Badian 2000, pp.
54-55; Brun 2000, pp. 64-65; Hammond 1994, p. 157; Carlier 1996, p. 116;
Corvisier 2002, p. 256 ; Worthington 2008, pp. 155-156.
54 Chapter II
23
Ryder 1965, pp. 150-162 ; Hammond 1994, pp. 157-158; Ashley 1998, pp. 159-
160; Corvisier 2002, pp. 258-259; Faraguna 2003, p. 101; Zahrnt 2009, p. 20.
24
Lane Fox 1973, p. 93; Flower 2000, p. 98.
25
Curt., 8.1.25. Heckel 1979, p. 390.
The Heir to the Throne 55
26
[D.] (=Hypereides?), 17; Diod., 16.98.3; Just., 9.5.1; IG ii2 236 = Syll.3 260;
Moretti, ISE 44. Heisserer 1980, pp. xxiii-xxvi; Bosworth 1988, pp. 189-193;
Blackwell 1999, pp. 38-40; Faraguna 2003, p. 101; Poddighe 2009, pp. 103-106.
27
Opposing views: Cawkwell 1969, p. 167 and Hammond 1994, pp. 158-164;
1996, pp. 22-23. Ryder 1965, p. 106; Adams 1999.
56 Chapter II
Macedonian control over Greece at the end of Philip II’s reign and under
Alexander.28
In the autumn session of 337 the decision was also made to wage war
against the Great King under the pretext that Persia had broken the
universal peace.29 This decision officially set in motion a chain of events
leading to war with Persia, Alexander’s conquest of the Achaemenid
Empire and the start of what 2,200 years later was referred to as the
Hellenistic Epoch. This was a genuine turning point marking the start of
one of the most profound revolutions in Mediterranean civilization, though
we may assume that for those participating, the importance of these events
was not as apparent as it would be for observers in later centuries. The
resolution was passed by the synedrion of the League of Corinth at a time
when Alexander was still the heir to the throne and so the decision to wage
war on Persia actually belonged to his father. The momentous consequences
of this decision have made it the subject of great controversy among
modern historians, particularly with regard to the moment when Philip
decided to attack the powerful Persian Empire and also as to what his
objectives in this war were.
In the 4th century the Greek attitude towards Persia was quite
ambivalent. The most powerful empire that had ever existed both terrified
and fascinated the Greeks. Its sheer size, the fact that it encompassed
virtually all known lands to the east of Greece, meant that it was
frequently simply referred to as Asia as if in a sense the empire and the
continent were one and the same – a continent of whose boundaries before
Alexander’s expedition the Greeks had no idea. Its population, at the start
of the expedition an estimated 30 to 35 million people, greatly exceeded
the demographic potential of not only individual poleis or Macedonia but
even the entire Greek world. The Greeks called the ruler of Persia the
Great King or simply the King. Unlike the kings of Sparta, Macedonia or
of the Molossians in Epirus, who were all referred to by name, the Persian
monarch was a king par excellence. The way Greeks referred to the
Persian monarch indeed reflected the way Persian monarchs wished to be
referred to in writing. For instance Darius I’s inscription at Behistun states:
‘I am Darius, the great king, king of kings, the king of Persia, the king of
countries.’ The ‘king of kings’ title, adopted from Urartu no doubt via the
Medes, demonstrated the Persian ruler’s superiority over local princes and
kings as well as the universal character of his monarchy. The Great King
28
Tod, GHI 179. Bosworth 1988, pp. 191-192; Billows 1990, pp. 190-194; Jehne
1994, pp. 7-28; Blackwell 1999, pp. 39-48; Adams 1999; Corvisier 2002, pp. 257-
262; Zahrnt 2009, pp. 23-25; Poddighe 2009, pp. 103-106.
29
Billows 1990, p. 193; Faraguna 2003, p. 102; Poddighe 2009, pp. 105-106.
The Heir to the Throne 57
30
Eddy 1961, pp. 44-47; Frye 1964, pp. 36-37; Cook 1985, pp. 225-231; Briant
1996, pp. 202-216, 236-237, 274-326; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 29-30, 39-41;
Aperghis 2001, p. 77; Llewellyn-Jones 2002 (astoundingly conservative approach
to eunuchs issue); Nawotka 2004; Brosius 2007, pp. 26-27.
58 Chapter II
economy thus deprived of ores and state care was supposed to have
experienced crisis that terminally weakened the empire, which was then
easily defeated by Alexander. Today we know that such theories based on
Greek sources overly sticking to certain stereotypes are untenable.
Actually only a small proportion of collected taxes were thesaurized,
whereas most of the revenue was spent on the army, the administration,
the royal and satraps’ courts. 4th century documents attest uninterrupted
continuation of the royal economy with taxes, storage, redistribution
throughout the Persian empire from Bactria to Idumea. Moreover, the state
was investing in major irrigation projects to stimulate agriculture and
economic growth. Not only is there no proof of a shortage of ores but
numismatic evidence shows a steady rise in the use of coins in trade,
especially in Egypt and Asia Minor. The long period of peace could not
but have benefited traditional trading nations such as the Phoenicians and
Greeks of Asia Minor. Evidence of this is not only an increased circulation
of money in 4th-century Ionia but also the number of monumental building
projects in that part of the Greek world, which was noticeably larger than
in the preceding century.31
Among the major achievements of the Achaemenid Empire to be
particularly noticed and admired by the Greeks were the excellent roads
linking its major centres. Their total length has been estimated to be
13,000 km. Archaeologically uncovered sections of ancient Persian
highways reveal a very carefully levelled, 5-7 metre wide gravel road.
Where necessary such roads cut through rock. Thanks to these highways
more or less kept safe by the state authorities and with postal stations
approximately every 30 km a royal messenger could cover 2,400 km from
the Aegean coast to Susa within one or two weeks, while a normal journey
on this road would not exceed three months. The royal court was nearly
always on the move. Every year it travelled hundreds of kilometres along
these highways, known as the Royal Road, between the four capitals of
Babylon, Susa, Persepolis and Ecbatana, spending a few months in each.
As custom dictated, on his journeys the monarch would always be greeted
by the local people with gifts.32
Although he was never deified by his Persian subjects, the Great King
ruled by the grace of the Iranian Lord of Wisdom – Ahura Mazda.
According to the doctrine formulated by the prophet Zarathustra – and
least the later Achaemenids if not all of them were its adherents – Ahura
31
Olmstead 1948; contra: Kuhrt 1990; Stolper 1994, p. 259; Carlier 1995, p. 145;
Dandamayev 1999, pp. 296-298; Debord 1999, pp. 22-23; Briant 2009.
32
Hdt., 5.50.3. Mellink 1988, p. 216; Cuyler Young 1988, pp. 79-81; Graf 1994;
Debord 1999, pp. 34-36.
The Heir to the Throne 59
Mazda fought a cosmic battle against the essence of evil Angra Mainyu
(Ahriman). It was the king’s mission to lead the state along the road of
justice, enlightenment and truth. This did not imply suppressing the
religious practices of his pagan and non-Iranian subjects but naturally
those who opposed the Great King as the guardian of the Truth were
amoral followers of lies and indeed are described as such in royal
Achaemenid inscriptions. Awareness of the Zoroastrian doctrine in Greek
literature is famously expressed in The Histories of Herodotus, where he
states that young Persians were taught three things: horse riding, archery
and telling the truth. The empire was bound by numerous cultural and
religious taboos. According to Ahura Mazda’s law the king of Iran could
only be a Persian Aryan from the Achaemenid dynasty who happened to
be endowed with a special charisma of kingship, in ancient Persian called
khvarenah. Connected with fire and light, it was an internal force (mana)
which predestined someone to hold power. However, it could not be
acquired by force but only inherited down the male line of the ruling
dynasty. A monarch possessing khvarenah stood at the head of a
hierarchical society personifying perfect unity in a multi-ethnic monarchy.
Numerous works of Persian art, particularly friezes at Persepolis, present
the image of a just, sovereign and unlimited royal rule over many nations
and symbolically over the entire world.33
The Greeks were shocked by the behaviour of Persian women, which
was far more open than that of women in their own country. This was
especially true of the Persian court, where aristocratic women were
granted a higher status and were therefore more visible. Persian women
did not hide within the walls of palaces or houses but played an active role
in social and economic life; they owned property and managed it
themselves. Worse still, Persepolis tablets show that even women who
were commoners could have active professional lives. Generally
misogynistic Greek authors saw in all this yet another symptom of Persian
decadence. Notice was taken of the fact that apart from official wives, the
Great King also had 360 concubines and a similar number of female
musicians who played and sang for his pleasure. From among the King’s
numerous children only the sons of official wives had the right to
succession, whereas the children of his concubines, a vast array of royal
relatives well documented in the sources, accompanied the monarch at
banquets, during hunting and in military expeditions. According to Curtius
Rufus, Darius III would be accompanied by 200 propinqui and 15,000
cognati. But the number of those children entitled to the throne was also
33
Frye 1964, pp. 45-46; Schwartz 1985, p. 677; Cuyler Young 1988, pp. 99-105;
Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 30-33; Briant 1996, pp. 183-195, 222-229.
60 Chapter II
34
Curt., 3.3.9-25; Just., 10.3.3; Diod., 16.52.3. 17.5.3-6; SEG 27.942; Babylonian
tablet BM 71537. Badian 1985, p. 422; Cook 1985, pp. 226-228; Guyot 1990, pp.
189-190 (no. 17); Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 82-85; Brosius 1996, pp. 83-97, 123-180;
Brosius 2003a, p. 235; Briant 1996, pp. 292-296, 789-790, 799; Briant 2003, pp.
64-65; Hammond 1994, p. 129-130; Heckel 1997, p. 197; Walker 1997, p. 22.
The Heir to the Throne 61
35
Cook 1985, p. 241.
36
Curt., 5.5; Diod., 17.69.3-4; Just., 11.14. Briant 1996, pp. 755-756; Tuplin 1996,
pp. 137-140.
37
Under the name Parsa/Persai: Arist., Mir., 838a; Ctes., FGrH, 688 F36. Ctesias,
however, could have in mind Fars (Persis) or even Pasargadae and not Persepolis,
Gáombiowski 1981, pp. 19-21.
62 Chapter II
so strong, it seems, is the power of honour – you may well be assured that
I shall wage war upon you to the best of my ability.’ This expression of
feudal mentality is a good illustration of how the Persian Empire was
administered. There once someone was made a satrap he held that position
for life and any attempts to remove him from his post frequently led to
rebellion. A satrap, like every high-ranking Persian official, was a vassal.
The Persian word for vassal was bandaka, which the Greeks, not
understanding Persian social structures, translated as doulos, i.e. slave. To
modern historians studying Persian history mainly from Greek sources the
Achaemenid Empire for a long time gave the impression of being a
despotic state where the monarch’s subjects were basically his slaves.
Today we know that the Great King was not a tyrant standing above the
law. His government also served the interests of the aristocracy and magi.
Moreover, together they were all bound by tradition and established
ideology to serve as the guardians of what was for Iranians the one and
only true religion.38
Another factor to consider was the great war of Xerxes I in the years
480-479, his occupation of mainland Greece and the destruction of
Athenian temples, which for centuries was considered to be the
quintessential act of eastern barbarity. Although defeated in the great 5th-
century wars, Persia had not ceased being a threat to Greek states in the
century that followed, though there were no more epic battles where Greek
hoplites had to defend the freedom of their poleis against many thousands
of barbarians driven on with whips as recorded by Herodotus. Aware of
the ineffectiveness of earlier military efforts, the Persians now changed
their policy. Intricate diplomacy and financial support distributed to
various Greek states in the last part of the Peloponnesian and during the
Corinthian War in the beginning of the 4th century let Persia to eventually
recover all its lost territories in Asia Minor. The empire also gained
control of numerous Greek islands in the Aegean, whereas the chaos of the
4th century allowed successive Persian rulers to continue influencing
events in mainland Greece through the skilful use of subsidies, diplomacy
and the threat of military intervention. No wonder that to Greek public
opinion Persia was the enemy par excellence. Even in 341 Demosthenes,
who was after all looking for Persian help against Philip II, had to assure
38
X., HG, 4.1.37 in Brownson’s translation (Loeb). Frye 1964, pp. 36-37; Barceló
1993, pp. 217-218; Hornblower 1994, pp. 54-56; Billows 1994, pp. 60-70; Carlier
1995, pp. 143-144; Briant 1996, pp. 350-351; Klinkott 2000.
The Heir to the Throne 63
the Athenians that the Macedonian monarch was an even greater threat
than the Great King.39
Many Greek physicians, artists and architects were employed in the
courts of the Great King and his satraps, whereas for good pay Greek
mercenaries served in Persian armies in their thousands. The best Greek
commanders fought in the many wars that took place in the western
regions of the vast Achaemenid empire in the 4th century including: King
Agesilaus of Sparta, Pammenes of Thebes, the Athenians Conon,
Iphicrates, Timotheos, Chabrias, Chares, Charidemus as well as the
brothers Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes. Yet Greek authors, particularly
Diodorus, who is our major source for this era, overstate the importance of
Greek generals and mercenaries in wars fought by Persia in the 4th century.
They concentrate exclusively on the role played by Greek soldiers on the
Persian pay. That is why many modern historians have succumbed to the
illusion of Persia’s military weakness against Alexander’s imminent
invasion and have willingly portrayed it as a colossus with feet of clay.
Looking at Alexander’s defeat of Persia with the benefit of hindsight it is
easy to forget that for most of the 4th-century before the Macedonian
conquest, despite internal problems, the Achaemenid state had generally
experienced political successes. Artaxerxes II recovered the Greek cities of
Asia Minor that had been lost in the 5th century. At the start of his reign
Artaxerxes III quelled the rebellion of the western satraps, next in 345 he
crushed the resistance of Phoenician cities before finally in 343 re-
conquering Egypt, which for 61 years had been independent of Persia. In
Asia Minor, which was much closer to Greece, tyrants attempting to gain
quasi-independence, such as Hermias of Atarneus, were removed. The
Great King’s authority over the satraps was once again restored and, after
ending his military actions, Artaxerxes III ordered them to disband their
mercenary armies, so as they would no longer be able to act too
independently. The reign of Artaxerxes IV (338-336) was too short-lived
to allow us to assess it. On the other hand, his successor, Darius III, will
probably always be associated with the odium of defeat and incompetence,
because he had the misfortune of facing in battle the greatest military
leader of ancient times – Alexander the Great. However, when Darius
ascended the throne he was already a known figure. Under Artaxerxes III
he had acquired fame as a warrior. Moreover, the fact that he had managed
to take over the throne and dispose of Bagoas without causing political
unrest indicates that he must have acquired the trust of the Iranian
aristocracy and magi. We also know that at the start of his reign he briskly
39
D., 10.33.4. Badian 1985, p. 427; Hammond 1994, p. 165; Tuplin 1996, pp. 153-
154; Flower 2000, p. 104.
64 Chapter II
40
Parke 1933, pp. 105-112, 122-132, 165-169; Starr 1976, pp. 63-66; Ruzicka
1993, pp. 85-91; Hornblower 1994, pp. 45-48; Burstein 2000; Brosius 2003, pp.
170-171. One new book (Briant 2003) is largely devoted to the image of Darius III
in historiographic tradition.
41
H., HG, 3.4.19 in Brownson’s translation (Loeb). Momigliano 1975, pp. 129-
137; Starr 1976, pp. 50-60; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 80-85; Tuplin 1996, pp. 153-162.
The Heir to the Throne 65
Persian Empire was weak and the only forces of value were the Greek
mercenaries. Xenophon relates what Antiochus of Arcadia, a envoy to the
Persian court, said: ‘the King had bakers, and cooks, and wine-pourers,
and door-keepers in vast numbers, but as for men who could fight with
Greeks, he said that though he sought diligently he could not see any.’
Nonetheless such views cannot be regarded as reflecting the true state of
affairs but merely the Hellenocentric outlook of the authors, who regarded
the polis to be the universal model for a proper state and a state’s military
power to be measured by its ability to deploy a citizens’ army of hoplites.
Yet the basic Persian military formation was the Iranian cavalry, whereas
Greek mercenaries were only hired in the western part of the empire.
Despite the large numbers of mercenaries employed, as many as 20,000
soldiers in the 340s, they never formed independent armies realising Greek
political aims. Instead they were merely a part of the Persian army,
following the orders of the Great King and his satraps. These mercenaries
were commanded by Persian or Greek officers, in return for whose loyal
service the king would frequently grant them land and gradually
incorporate them into the ruling aristocracy. Naturally the lack of a native
infantry was a potential source of danger to the state, but only in the
eventuality of the Great King no longer being able to recruit Greek
mercenaries. As long as the market for mercenaries remained open, the
recruitment of Greeks was not a sign of any weakness or decline but of
Persian appreciation of the difference between Greek and Asian infantry.
In antiquity infantry soldiers were drafted from the peasantry and those in
the Asian part of the Persian Empire were too poor to be able to afford
hoplite armour, they lacked the social models of how to behave like
phalangites and, besides, serfs never made good recruitment material for
such military formations. Therefore, on account of Persia’s social structure,
the Great King could not use his Asian subjects to form large efficient
infantry units and thus the drafting of Greek mercenaries was the simplest
alternative. The only Persian infantry formation of military value, though
also inferior to the Greek hoplites, was what the ancient authors call the
‘immortal’ guard. The name itself is actually yet another example of how
little the ancient Greeks understood Persia. The Persian name for the guard
was anušiya meaning servants or companions, whereas the Greeks
confused the name with another Persian word anuša, which indeed means
immortals. Thanks to the skilful use of Greek mercenaries, Iranian cavalry
and a fleet provided by Greek and Phoenician cities, the rulers of Persia
were for a long time able to successfully realise their foreign policy.42
42
X., HG, 7.1.38, after Brownson (Loeb). See also Plb., 3.6.9-12 for the importance
of Xenophon’s picture of Persia’s weakness. Hornblower 1994, pp. 80-83, 92;
66 Chapter II
This fact, even though it was painfully felt by the Greeks, especially
those living in Asia Minor, had no effect on the popularly held myth of
contemptible Persian military ineptitude and low morale. The 4th-century
Persian victories over the Greeks were explained simply by the lack of
unity among Greek states. It is worth noting that in the 4th century,
especially after 386 when the Persians regained full and, as it seemed,
permanent control of Greek cities in Asia Minor, Greek political authors
began treating compatriots living in that region as one political entity and
it was then that calls for their liberation first appeared. Some scholars
assume that many of the contemptuous opinions about Persians were
inspired by Greeks living in Asia Minor, who were hoping for a new
Greco-Persian war that would free them from the Great King. By
emphasising the structural weakness of the Achaemenid Empire they
wished to facilitate the decision of mainland Greeks to invade. Plutarch
even names an associate of Plato, Delios of Ephesus, who was apparently
sent as an envoy from Asia Minor to Alexander to persuade him to invade
Persia and liberate the Greeks there. 43 Unfortunately we do not know
Plutarch’s source.
The main theme in Greek political literature after the Peloponnesian
War concerned a lack of political stability and constant conflicts, which no
doubt reflected the mood among the Greek public. The remedy advocated
by writers and orators was to unite the conflicting poleis with a common
cause. It was at the start of the 4th century that the idea of Panhellenism
first appeared in speeches given by the famous sophist Gorgias of Leontini
and the Athenian rhetorician Lysias. This concept stressed that, despite
their various differences, the Greeks had much more in common with each
other than with barbarians. The most influential 4th-century propagator of
Panhellenism was Isocrates. After years of unsuccessfully searching for a
polis capable of uniting the Greeks, in 346 Isocrates decided that Philip II
was the best suited ruler to become hegemon and tried to persuade Greek
public opinion that this was the case. According to a plan that Isocrates
had formulated most fully in several works (Panegyricus, Philippus and
letters he wrote to Philip II), the union of Greek states was to be built on a
common cause to fight their arch enemy Persia. One of the things the
Athenian author could not bear was the fact that, unlike his Greek
compatriots, the barbarians in Asia were living in prosperity and their
Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 90-92, Briant 1996, pp. 803-809. About mercenaries in
general see now: Trundle 2004.
43
Seager, Tuplin 1980; Flower 1994, p. 89; Hornblower 1994, p. 211. The
embassy of Delios: Plu., mor., 1126d; see Brunt 1993, p. 291; Flower 1994, p.107;
Ruzicka 1997, pp. 124-125.
The Heir to the Throne 67
economy was thriving. One could say that this conflicted with his sense of
justice. Isocrates was not alone among the Greeks in thinking that they
were created by nature to rule over barbarians like the Persians.
Experiences of the great Persian wars in the 5th century served as evidence
that by diverting its energies away from internal conflicts to overseas
expansion a united Greece would ultimately defeat Persia. For Isocrates
the key issue was to remedy Greek demographic and social problems
without starting a revolution involving the redistribution of land and other
actions that could harm the rich. Through the large-scale colonisation of
conquered land in Asia, war with Persia was to be a painless way of
alleviating Greece’s social tensions. Philip would be rewarded with wealth
and fame as well as esteem among the Greek peoples. In keeping with the
Greek literary tradition, Isocrates enhanced his arguments with references
to mythology, which in J. Burchkhardt’s words, was the ideal basis of
Greek existence. Isocrates argued that as the descendent of Heracles Philip
was bound to conquer Asia and there found new cities. Finally it should be
stressed that in Antiquity there was nothing unethical in conquering other
countries for, quite unlike today, war was seen as a natural state of affairs,
though of course prolonged conflicts were not considered a good thing.44
Although Isocrates’s views are well known, the extent to which he and
other Panhellenists influenced the decisions made by Philip II and later by
Alexander remains highly controversial. Indeed, Isocrates does not overtly
claim that Philip’s decision to invade Persia was made on his persuasion.
The only fairly certain thing is that both the Greek elites and the general
Greek public feared and disliked Persia. The Greek elites were people the
Argead kings were very much in touch with and whose acceptance they on
more than one occasion were eager to gain. Moreover, among the
proponents of war with Persia were Aristotle and Callisthenes, who were
very close to Philip and Alexander. The fact that Persia was indeed
perceived as the arch enemy of Greece should lead us to rejecting the
opinion that the Panhellenic idea of invading Persia was just a propaganda
ploy or a mere marketing tool used by Isocrates to draw the attention of
potential clients, especially Philip II, to his school. Sanctioned by the
League of Corinth, Philip’s declaration of war against Persia had two
official goals: to liberate the Greeks in Asia Minor and to avenge crimes
committed by the Persians 150 years earlier, particularly the destruction of
Greek temples by Xerxes. Regardless of how sincere these declared
reasons for war were, they corresponded well with the public mood and
44
Wilcken 1967, pp. 34-38; Dobesch 1968, pp. 137-149; Markle 1976; Perlman
1976; Jehne 1994, pp. 7-19; Hammond 1994, p. 164-165; Huttner 1997, pp. 81-85;
Flower 2000, pp. 98-104.
68 Chapter II
45
Diod., 16.89; Arr., An., 2.14.5-8; Just., 11.5.6; revenge as a pretext for Philip:
Plb., 3.6.12-14. Varying interpretations of modern scholarship: Markle 1976;
Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 24-28; contra Flower 2000. See Lane Fox 1973, pp. 92-93;
Badian 1982, p. 38; Errington 1981, p. 83; Errington 1990, p. 103; Gehrke 1996, p.
26; Brosius 2003a; Bloedow 2003; Poddighe 2009, pp. 99-107.
46
For a review of modern scholarship see Errington 1981. Badian 1983, pp. 67-68;
Bosworth 1988, p. 18; Errington 1990, pp. 88-89; Hornblower 1994, p. 95;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 262-263, 271-276.
The Heir to the Throne 69
47
Billows 1990, pp. 3-4; Ellis 1994, pp. 788-789; Hatzopoulos 1997, p. 43.
70 Chapter II
49
Starr 1977; Mellink 1988, pp. 213-231; Boyce, Grenet 1989, pp. 197-209;
Hornblower 1994, pp. 230-232; Briant 1996, pp. 718-719; Debord 1999, pp. 20-21,
183-188; Kaptan 2003; Shabazi 2003, pp. 11-12; Raimond 2007; Briant 2009, pp.
156-160.
50
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 171-175; Hornblower 1982, pp.107-137; Hornblower
1994, pp. 227-229; Nawotka 1999, pp. 33-34; Nawotka 2003a, pp. 21-26; Debord
1999, pp. 328, 404.
72 Chapter II
51
Diod., 16.89.2, 16.91.2, 17.2.4, 17.7.7; [D.], 17.7; Arr., An., 1.17.11; Just., 9.5;
IG xii.2.526. Cawkwell 1978, p. 170; Ruzicka 1993, pp. 84-85; Hammond 1994,
pp. 167-168; Lott 1996; Briant 1996, p. 837; Debord 1999, pp. 421-425; Nawotka
2003a, pp. 23-24. Heckel 1997, pp. 194-195 formulates an unfounded hypothesis
of universal resistance to Macedonian army.
The Heir to the Throne 73
53
Plu., Alex., 10.1-4; Str., 14.2.17. Debord 1999, p. 59. On Alexander’s friends see
Heckel 1992, pp. 205-208.
54
Bosworth 1988, pp. 21-22; Develin 1981, p. 95; Ruzicka 1992, p. 101. The story
is put in doubt by: Hatzopoulos 1982; Hammond 1996, p. 27; Debord 1999, pp.
59-62; Corvisier 2002, pp. 267-268.
The Heir to the Throne 75
5. Cleopatra’s wedding
In 337, shortly after his return from Corinth, Philip married for a seventh
time. On this occasion the bride was a Macedonian by the name of
Cleopatra – though Arrian called her Eurydice – the niece of Attalus, the
one who later on together with his father-in-law, Parmenion, headed the
first Macedonian expeditionary force into Asia Minor. The sources relate
this marriage in the context of growing tensions between Alexander and
Philip, exacerbated by Olympias, who is usually portrayed as an ill-willed
and quarrelsome woman. During the wedding feast there occurred an
incident that created serious rift within Argead dynasty and the
consequences almost led to an important international conflict. The
Alexander Romance includes an anecdote that on entering the banqueting
hall Alexander promised his father to invite him to his mother’s wedding
when he, Alexander, would give her away to another king. From then on it
only got worse. An essential part of all Macedonian feasts was the
drinking of vast quantities of undiluted wine, which inevitably led to
inebriation. It was in such a state that Attalus raised a toast wishing the
newly weds to produce future kings that were pure blooded and legitimate
heirs. Alexander was never so drunk as not to notice even an imagined
insult let alone one that was real. No doubt expressing the secret opinions
of much of the Macedonian aristocracy, Attalus was referring to
Alexander’s mother’s foreign origins and, what was less obvious, to the
presumed fact that she was an adulteress. A livid Alexander shouted out
55
Badian 1963; Bosworth 1988, p. 22; Carney 2001, pp. 65-80.
56
Weber 2009, p. 86.
76 Chapter II
‘But what of me, base wretch? Dost thou take me for a bastard?’ and next
hurled his goblet at Attalus, who responded by throwing his cup at
Alexander. Apart from the markedly unreliable Alexander Romance, none
of the other sources claim that any of the missiles hit their intended targets.
We may assume that Attalus at least missed for Philip abruptly rose with
drawn sword in defence of the former’s honour. The king fortunately did
no one any harm for according to Plutarch and the Alexander Romance
anger and the surfeit of alcohol had denied him control of his legs: the
manoeuvre just ended with him falling flat on his face. Alexander is
reported to have then mockingly remarked: ‘Look now, men! here is one
who was preparing to cross from Europe to Asia; and he is upset in trying
to cross from couch to couch.’ Justin presents a less spectacular version of
this incident in which the king was physically restrained from killing his
son and heir by friends. Whichever way it happened, the consequence was
that Alexander and Olympias immediately left Pella and headed for Epirus
to the court of Olympias’s brother Alexander. The heir to the throne next
travelled to an Illyrian kingdom that the sources fail to name.57
Modern historians have for a long time been trying to politically
interpret these events. For a while credence was given to Justin’s statement
that Philip’s marriage took place after he had divorced Olympias. Such a
version of events suited both Roman and later European views on
marriage in civilised societies, i.e. that it ought to be monogamous.
However, save for the unreliable Alexander Romance, this version is
contradicted by all the other sources. The authors of these two later works
did not realise that Argead views on marriage were quite different from
those associated with civilised behaviour in their day and age. Meanwhile
if only the aforementioned passage from Satyrus suggests that Philip had
throughout his adult life more than one wife and that perhaps polygamy
was traditional in Macedonia’s ruling dynasty. Olympias was not Philip’s
first wife and she had had younger women vying for the king’s attention
before, but such rivalries had not previously led to conflicts, at least not
ones to be mentioned in the sources. Therefore neither sexual jealousy nor
the fact that Philip had married yet another woman while he was at least
still formally the husband of Olympias could have been the reason for the
rift in the royal family.58
As far as is known, the Macedonian court differed from polygamous
courts in the East in that there was no formal hierarchy among the
57
Plu., Alex., 9.5-11; Arr., An., 3.6.5; Paus., 8.7.7; Just., 9.7.2-6; Satyr., F25 ap.
Ath., 13.5; Ps.-Callisth., 1.20-21. Excessive wine drinking: Ephippus, ap. Ath.,
3.91. On the name of Philip’s new wife see Badian 1982a.
58
Carney 1987; Greenwalt 1989; Ogden 1999, pp. xiv-xvi; Carney 2006, pp. 22-26.
The Heir to the Throne 77
59
Badian 1963, p. 246; Hatzopoulos 1986; Carney 1987, pp. 37-48; Greenwalt
1989; Ogden 1999, pp. 3-4, 18-19, 24; Mirón 2000, pp. 39-44; Carney 2006, pp.
32-36. The case of Caranus: Just., 11.2.3, 9.3.7; Satyr., ap. Ath., 13.5; Heckel 1979;
Unz 1985; Carney 2000, p. 77.
78 Chapter II
intended to strengthen his ties with the Macedonian elite. This thesis,
though popular in modern historiography, lacks substantiation in ancient
sources. We know nothing about the origins of Attalus and Cleopatra. It is
only from our general knowledge of Macedonian society that we can
assume they were aristocrats. However, this does not entitle us to
speculate as to their exact position within Macedonian society. Events
following Philip’s death and the ease with which Attalus was removed
from any position of authority indicate that this aristocrat was far less
powerful than has been commonly assumed. Moreover, Satyrus’
biography of Philip cited by Athenaeus and Plutarch clearly state that the
king married Cleopatra out of love. The moralist Plutarch adds that Philip
fell in love with her despite his senior age. It is hard not get the impression
that such unequivocal information from the sources is simply being
ignored by supporters of the theory that Philip’s marriage to Cleopatra had
an essentially political objective,60 and that this stems from the opinion
that Philip (as perhaps all outstanding political figures) was always
rational, weighing up every single decision in terms of profit or loss. Yet
with the lack of any powerful arguments to dismiss the information
provided by Plutarch and Satyrus it is more sensible to accept it. It would
not have been the first or the last time a middle-aged man lost all common
sense and fell in love with a woman young enough to be his daughter.61
Accepting hypothetically that the motive was love, not political calculation,
most certainly does not imply the situation was any less worrying to
Olympias and Alexander. After all, if the king was able to take such an
extraordinary step as allowing his emotions to decide on yet another
marriage, one could expect anything of such a man.
The falling out between Philip and Alexander did not last long.
Ultimately Alexander was still the only heir to the Macedonian throne and
a very competent one at that. Philip was certainly aware of the fact that the
outburst of rage he had provoked and his son’s departure for Illyria did not
serve the Macedonian state. Experiences from the earlier history of the
Argead dynasty showed that quarrels between a monarch and family
members often led to the emergence of pretenders to his throne. That is
why Philip willingly accepted the excuses provided by the trusted hetairos
Demaratus of Corinth and through his mediation got Alexander to return
to Macedonia. A similar reconciliation with Olympias was out of the
question. Besides, she was at the time actually trying to persuade her
60
E.g. Hamilton 1965, pp. 120-121; Hamilton 1999, p. 24; Green 1974, pp. 88-91;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 265-267; Carney 2006, pp. 33-34. On Attalus: Heckel 2009, p.
27.
61
Heckel 1986, pp. 295-298; Borza 1990, pp. 206-208.
The Heir to the Throne 79
6. Death of Philip
The wedding ceremony was to take place at the original capital of
Macedonian, Aegae. Once peace in the Balkans was secured with the
marriage of Alexander of Epirus to his daughter, Philip intended to set off
with his Macedonian and allied forces on the planned invasion of Asia
Minor. In accordance with custom the king first consulted the Delphic
Oracle to learn whether he would defeat the Persians. The answer he
received was as follows: ‘Wreathed is the bull. All is done. There is also
the one who will smite him.’ As on many other occasions, Pythia’s words
were subjected to conflicting interpretations. For Philip it implied the
slaughter of Persians like the slaughter of sacrificial beasts. Diodorus,
however, sees in these words a clear prophesy of Philip’s own death. It
used to be believed that the wedding between Alexander of Epirus and
Philip’s daughter Cleopatra was held in the summer of 336, but according
to more recent research into the chronology of events concerning
Alexander the Great’s reign it seems more likely that the wedding took
place in the autumn of that year, perhaps in October, though some scholars
very precisely date Philip’s death to have occurred on 25th September. The
wedding took place the day before the Macedonian king’s death. At dawn
the following day games were to be held at the city’s theatre, which was
then filled to capacity with guests from Macedonia and Greece. Philip
approached the theatre accompanied by his son and heir as well as by his
son-in-law; having instructed his bodyguards to keep some distance away,
so that he could show the Greeks friends and allies gathered there how
much he trusted them. If archaeological assumptions regarding the
location of Philip’s palace at Aegae are correct, it was just some 60 metres
from the theatre. On the way the Macedonian king had fallen a short
distance behind his companions. That was when a young man from among
his bodyguards called Pausanias ran up and thrust his sword through Philip
thus killing him. The assassin next started to flee, but before he could get
62
Plu., Alex., 9.12-14; Just., 9.7. Bosworth 1988, pp. 22-23.
80 Chapter II
to his horse, he stumbled on a vine and fell. This allowed the royal guards
to catch up and instantly spear Pausanias to death. Among the guards
Diodorus mentions Alexander’s later companions: Leonnatus, Perdiccas
and Attalus.63
In a letter written to Darius III four years later Alexander accused the
Persian king of dispatching the assassins who killed his father.
Alexander’s most famous modern biographer, W.W. Tarn, calls this
accusation – which today would be termed indirect perpetration of murder
– the official Macedonian court’s version. 64 Unfortunately we do not
know when this version emerged. Certainly none of the ancient sources
relating what happened at Aegae in 336 mentions it. Therefore it could
have merely been invented for propaganda purposes in the war against
Darius III in 332. In describing the events of the autumn of 336 the ancient
authors devote a lot of attention to Philip’s assassin, Pausanias. Fairly
typically for the Macedonian court, it was apparently a sordid homosexual
affair that drove this bodyguard to commit the crime. For Pausanias,
originally from the Upper Macedonian land of Orestis, had in his early
youth been Philip’s lover. When Philip found another homosexual lover,
also by the name of Pausanias, the future assassin offended his rival in
such a way as to make him commit suicide. But before committing suicide
the other Pausanias related everything to Attalus, the uncle of Cleopatra.
Later at a banquet Attalus let Pausanias the future assassin get drunk and,
according to Justin, together with other guests proceeded to rape him.
Diodorus, on the other hand, claims Attalus had his muleteers gang rape
him. This most probably happened in 337 or at the start of 336, not long
before the departure of the first Macedonian expeditionary corps to Asia
Minor. The rape victim complained to Philip, but the king did not punish
Attalus, who was then very much a court favourite as the uncle and
guardian of the king’s newly wed wife Cleopatra. Instead Philip tried to
appease Pausanias with gifts and promotion to the rank of a somatophylax
(personal bodyguard). Now Pausanias’s anger turned against the king and,
what is worse, he recalled from the teachings of the philosopher
Hermocrates the thought that one can acquire the highest fame by killing
someone who had achieved the greatest things. Thus personal revenge and
63
Diod., 16.91-94; Just., 9.6; Plu., Alex., 10.5. Date in October: Bosworth 1980, pp.
45-46; Hatzopoulos 1982a. Date on 25 September: Grzybek 1990, pp. 21-28;
Hauben 1992, p. 146. Careers of Leonnatus, Perdiccas and Attalus: Heckel 1992,
pp. 91-106, 134-163, 180-183. Archaeology of Aegae: Andronicus 1984, pp. 38-47.
64
Arr., An., 2.14.5; Curt., 4.1.12. Tarn 1948, I, p. 3.
The Heir to the Throne 81
a desire for fame are the most frequently mentioned motives behind the
murder.65
The ancient authors also mention a story originating from other sources
now difficult to unequivocally identify which claims that Olympias
persuaded Pausanias to commit the murder and that Alexander at least
knew if not actually actively encouraged the assassin too. Olympias
allegedly even paid homage to the dead assassin’s body by placing a gold
wreath on it, arranging a funeral with sacrificial offerings and offering the
assassin’s sword to Apollo. The fact that Pausanias had had a prepared
escape – the horses were also allegedly left for him by Olympias – would
imply the existence of a conspiracy against Philip. Thus modern historians
have suggested that Pausanias was not arrested and put on trial but
instantly killed for fear that he would reveal the names of other
conspirators. 66 However, it is difficult not to get the impression that
attempts to establish who would have been party to this real or presumed
conspiracy are more to do with whether or not one believes in the
culpability or innocence of Philip’s successor than with scrupulous
analysis of very equivocal sources. Olympias’s involvement would seem
plausible if we consider her very bad relationship with Philip and the very
real sense of danger following Philip’s marriage to Cleopatra. After
Philip’s death the successor’s mother, Olympias, gained a position of
unquestioned authority, and the many times she showed ruthlessness
clearly demonstrate that she was capable of any crime. The same
arguments may be used to also implicate her son. Furthermore neither any
of the Lyncestis princes nor anyone else from beyond Philip’s dynasty had
enough authority to wrest control of the state from the Argeads, who had
ruled it for centuries. 67 Opponents of this theory point to the fact that
Olympias has had an extremely bad press, presumably ever since her
mortal enemy Cassander started inciting against her. Thus ancient authors
found it easy to suspect her of any crime. This was especially so as
Olympias clearly breached the conventions regarding women of her time,
and all the ancient authors relating the death of Philip were males with
fairly conservative outlooks. However, neither she nor her son is
65
Arist., Pol., 1311b1-3; Diod., 16.93-94; Plu., Alex., 10.5-6; Just., 9.6. Date: Fears
1975, p. 120; Mortensen 2007, p. 374, n. 15; Miller 2007, p. 138.
66
Diod., 16.94.3; Plu., Alex., 10.5-6; Just., 9.7. C.B. Welles, n. 2 to p. 101 in
Diodorus in Loeb Series; Green 1974, p. 107. The strongest case for a conspiracy
involving Olympias and Alexander: Worthington 2008, pp. 184-186.
67
Köhler 1892, pp. 497-514; Hamilton 1965, pp. 120-122; Develin 1981; Carney
1987, pp. 46-48; Badian 1963; Badian 2000, pp. 54-58; Corvisier 2002, pp. 268-
269.
82 Chapter II
68
Fears 1975; Ellis 1981; Burstein 1982, pp. 69-70; Borza 1990, p. 227; O’Brien
1992, pp. 36-40; Hammond 1994, pp. 175-176; Briant 2002, p. 9; Mortensen 2007.
69
Lane Fox 1973, pp. 21-25; Carney 2006, p. 39.
CHAPTER III:
1
Arr., An., 1.25.2, 7.9.6; Ps.-Callisth., 1.26; Diod., 17.2.2; POxy. 1798 = FGrH
148 F1 with emendation as in Parson 1979. Wilcken 1967, pp. 61-62; Badian 1963;
84 Chapter III
Thompson 1982, p. 116; Bosworth 1988, pp. 25-26; Baynham 1994, p. 337; Le
Rider 2003, pp. 48-63. Debts: Plu., mor., 327d (after Onesicritus).
2
Grainier 1931; Aymard 1950; Wilcken 1967, pp. 24, 61; Schachermeyr 1973, pp.
34-36, 304-305, 492-497; Briant 1973, pp. 318-320; Ellis 1976, pp. 24-25;
Hammond 1979, pp. 153, 160-162; Griffith 1979, pp. 389-392; Bosworth 1988, p.
26; Hammond 1989, pp. 60-70; O’Brien 1992, p. 40; Hatzopoulos 1996, i, pp. 261-
322; Hammond 1994, pp. 6-7, 37-38, 185-188; Worthington 2003, pp. 72-73;
Rzepka 2006.
The New King 85
words in the Greek language have more different meanings than nomos,
the term used by Arrian. It can mean ‘custom’, ‘constitution’ or even
‘melody’. One of the meanings is obvious: ‘law’ and ‘constitutional norm’,
but to assume that Arrian had this meaning in mind without knowing the
strict legal context is dangerous. One hardly needs to mention that the
encomium Callisthenes delivered in honour of Macedonians to officers of
Alexander’s army did not concern matters of jurisprudence, which
naturally require very precise legal language. If, on the other hand, we
reject the notion that the word was intended to mean ‘law’ and
‘constitutional norm’, we demolish the methodological basis on which
modern historians of ancient Macedonia have founded their constitutionalist
theory. One also needs to remember that this speech, like generally all
speeches in the works of ancient authors attributed to historical figures,
does not relate the actual words uttered by the philosopher but words used
by Arrian over half a millennium after the lives of Callisthenes and
Alexander. Therefore it could be argued that we are referring to the views
of an ancient author rather than the actual views of the historical figure he
is writing about. Epideictic orations, which combined all the known
resources, images, concepts and formulations used by orators, were very
popular in Arrian’s day and so here we are probably dealing with a topos
frequently appearing in Greek literature, one that contrasts force with law
and custom. If that is the case, Alexander probably had Philotas tried by
his soldiers not for legal reasons but for political ones (more on this in
Chapter V.5). The decisions imposed on Alexander by his own army on
the river Hyphasis and at Opis should be all together excluded from the
debate over the Macedonian constitution as both were the rebellions of
soldiers against their leader, but ones in which they did not so much want
to dispose of him as to make him change decisions that happened to be
unfavourable to them. Therefore these rallies of Macedonian soldiers were
not a consequence of constitutional rights but a show of force, rebellions
in which the soldiers temporarily got the upper hand.3
Once the constitutional theory started being questioned as based more
on a priori imaginings of how an ancient society evolved rather than on
sources regarding the history of Macedonia, a different interpretation
emerged in historiography. According to some historians, Macedonian
monarchs had absolutist aspirations, which they tried to realise insofar as
they were able to overcome opposition from powerful Macedonian barons.
The barons were to make up a royal council which, if there were
controversies within the royal family, would resolve the matter of royal
3
Arr., An., 4.11.6. Lock 1977; Errington 1978; Anson 1991; Virgilio 2003, pp. 35-
37. On the word nomos see Ostwald 1969, pp. 20-54.
86 Chapter III
4
Errington 1978; Greenwalt 1989, pp. 19-20, 31, 34-36. The alleged royal council:
Hammond 1979, pp. 158-160.
5
Borza 1990, pp. 231-242.
6
Borza 1990, pp. 234, 243-245; Ogden 1999, pp. 3-4.
7
Just., 9.7; POxy 1798 = FGrH 148 F1. Perhaps Diod., 17.2.1 and Plu., Alex., 10.7
allude to this event too.
The New King 87
8
Plu., mor., 327c; Arr., An., 1.17.9; Arr., Succ., fr. 1.22; Curt., 3.11.8, 6.9.17,
6.10.24; Paus., 8.7.7; Plu., Alex., 10.7, 20.1; Diod., 17.2.3, 17.3.2, 17.48.2;
Polyaen., 8.60.1; Just., 9.7, 12.6. Wilcken 1967, pp. 62-63; Badian 1963; Bosworth
1971, pp. 102-103; Bosworth 1988, pp. 25-26; Errington 1978, pp. 94-95; Burstein
1982, pp. 159-161; Ellis 1982; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 38-39; Prandi 1998; Baynham
1998, p. 147. Apology of Olympias: Carney 1993; Carney 2006, pp. 43-48.
88 Chapter III
Alexander did not allow his real or perceived political rivals live long,
though there is no reason to assume as E. Badian does that immediately
after his ascension a great purge was started in which all potential enemies
were eliminated. This certainly did not happen straight away as is best
testified by the case of Attalus, who if only for his quarrel with Alexander
at Cleopatra’s wedding should have been the new king’s first victim. And
yet Attalus was still alive at the start of 335 during Memnon’s counter-
offensive against the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor. The
first to be killed were the two princes from Lyncestis, Arrhabaeus and
Heromenes, charged with being involved in the conspiracy to murder
Philip. Their brother Alexander of Lyncestis saved his life by prudently
declaring his support to king Alexander immediately after Philip’s death.
Besides, he was the son-in-law of Antipater, the most powerful member of
Alexander’s circle, which may have been another reason why Alexander
refrained from the Macedonian custom of sentencing to death all the
members of a family accused of conspiracy against the monarch. It was for
such a conspiracy that Alexander’s rival to throne Amyntas IV was killed.
This must have happened before the summer of 335, for then Alexander
could offer the hand of Amyntas’ now widowed wife, Cynane, to his ally
Langarus, king of the Agrianians. In face of such vigorous measures taken
by Alexander to secure his position, Attalus tried to save his own skin by
showing himself to be totally loyal to the new monarch and submitting to
him the letters he had received from Demosthenes. But all this was to no
avail for Alexander had decide to eliminate the man who had dared insult
him verbally and then raise his hand in anger at him during Cleopatra’s
wedding. The king sent a unit of soldiers to Asia Minor headed by his
trusted officer Hecataeus. This unit joined the army commanded by
Attalus and Parmenion and then killed the first of these two commanders.
There can be no doubt that the murder of a popular general in the middle
of his camp could not have been carried out without the active cooperation
of the other Macedonian commander, Parmenion, who put his allegiance
to the increasingly more powerful monarch above loyalty to his son-in-law.
We do not know when exactly Attalus was killed, but it most probably
happened in the second half of 335. In any case Alexander saw to it that
before his expedition to the East no member of Cleopatra and Attalus’s
family remained alive. Scholars believe that Parmenion made a secret deal
with Alexander by which in return for Attalus’s head Parmenion was
guaranteed a position of power and influence under the new king. This
may largely explain why by the start of the Asian expedition so many
The New King 89
9
Diod., 17.2; Curt., 6.9.17; Arr., An., 1.5.4; Arr., Succ., fr. 1.22; Just., 11.2, 11.5,
12.6.14. Badian 1964, p. 193; Burstein 1982, pp. 159-161; Ellis 1982; Will 1986,
pp. 31-32; Heckel 1986, pp. 299-300; Bosworth 1988, pp. 26-28; O’Brien 1992, p.
44; Prandi 1998.
10
Diod., 17.2.2; Just., 11.2.1; POxy 1798 = FGrH 148 F1.
11
Andronicos 1984, pp. 17-62.
90 Chapter III
place of his father. The less problematic of the two tombs is No. III, where
a teenage king was buried. This was in all probability Alexander IV, the
son of Alexander the Great and his Iranian wife, Rhoxane, who was born
in 323 and murdered in 310/09. The matter looks quite different with
Tomb II. It comprises two chambers: thee main chamber contains the
remains of a man who had died at approximately the age of forty+ and
then there is also an antechamber containing the remains of a woman at a
younger age. Only two Argeads could possibly be associated with the
man’s body: Philip II or his son Arrhidaeus (Philip III), who was murdered
in 317 and formally buried in spring the following year. Already in 1978
M. Andronikos announced that this was Philip II’s resting place and this –
despite reservations expressed by some non-Greek scholars from the start
– was generally accepted as a fact and continues to be the official stance of
Greek academics to this day. If this could be confirmed beyond a
reasonable doubt, Andronikos’s find would be one of the most astounding
archaeological achievements of all time. The Greek archaeologist has
based his claim on several premises: the age of the man being estimated at
around 46 rather than 40 (which was the age of Arrhidaeus when he was
killed); the apparently hasty manner in which the tomb was built; the fact
that one leg of the skeleton is slightly shorter than the other, which could
be explained by the wound Philip had received and the discomfort it later
caused him when wearing standard length grieves as well as the discovery
of five ivory heads which could represent Philip, Olympias and Alexander.
Finally attention is drawn to the style of the mural paintings in the
chambers, which is more appropriate to the years 336-335 than to 316.
Encouraged by Andronikos’s hypotheses pathologists from the universities
of Manchester and Bristol, equally familiar with research into ancient
Egyptian mummies as with modern forensic science, conducted detailed
examinations of the bone fragments and established that buried in grave II
was a man aged from 35 to 55 and a woman who had died at an age
anywhere between 20 and 30. Fragments of the man’s skull allowed for a
simulated reconstruction of his face. And in this reconstruction the experts
even noticed a deformation in one of the eye sockets, which was
interpreted as resulting from damage caused by an arrow. The socket also
includes protrusions which the experts interpreted as a consequence of the
healing process and the specific work of the muscles after the loss of an
eye – perhaps the eye Philip lost at the siege of Methone.12
12
Andronicos 1978; Andronicos 1984, pp. 97-232; Green 1982; Lane Fox 1980,
pp. 77-95; Bernhardt 1992, pp. 72-73; Prag, Musgrave, Neave 1984; Musgrave
1991; Hammond 1994, pp. 179-182; Drougou 1996; Prag, Neave 1997, pp. 53-84;
Worthington 2008, pp. 234-241.
The New King 91
the 4th century. Also some metal artefacts from Tomb II point to a
markedly later date than 336. 13 A renewed examination of the bone
fragments attributed to Philip did not confirm any evidence of damage
caused by an arrow or indeed any other deformities claimed in earlier
studies. Moreover, the changes and cracks in the man’s long bones are
characteristic for a body that had been buried for some time before being
cremated. We know that the body of Philip III Arrhidaeus was buried in
the autumn of 317 only to be exhumed and cremated in the spring of 316.
No sources, however, mention Philips body being burnt after an initial
period of interment.14
In other words, the less attractive theory that Philip III Arrhidaeus and
his wife Adea-Eurydice were buried at Tomb II of the Great Tumulus at
Vergina appears to be closer to the truth. Despite the marginalisation of
this mentally retarded monarch, he was the king of Macedonia at a time
when the great empire created by Alexander was still intact, at least in
theory. The opulence of the tomb is therefore hardly surprising, especially
as Cassander would make every effort to please those Macedonians loyal
to the Argead dynasty by showing his respect to Olympias’s victim Philip
III Arrhidaeus. By organising a lavish funeral for the son of Philip II,
Cassander declared that he was the rightful successor to the Argead
dynasty. This association he soon afterwards formalised by marrying
Philip’s daughter Thessalonice. Apart from the crown, Philip III
Arrhidaeus also inherited from his half-brother other treasures and regalia,
some of which were presumably also deposited in his burial chamber. The
sceptre, shield, armour and helmet had in all probability belonged to
Alexander. The weapons and armour found with the remains of the young
woman in the antechamber may be explained by the historically well
documented military training Adea-Eurydice had received. In light of what
has been said above, it seems most probable that the cist grave known as
Tomb I of the Great Tumulus, which had already been robbed in ancient
times, was the burial place of Philip II. The tomb may not have contained
artefacts as precious as those found in Tombs II and III, but the
archaeologically discovered bones of a middle aged man, young woman
and infant would seem to have belonged to Philip II, his last wife
Cleopatra and their child, which had been born just days before her
father’s death. A full report regarding the archaeological findings in this
13
Boyd 1978; Lehman 1980; Lehman 1982; Green 1982; Burstein 1982, pp. 144-
146; Rotroff 1982; Rotroff 1984; Borza 1990, pp. 260-263, 272-274, 311; Faklaris
1994, p. 616, n. 61; Themelis, Touratsoglou 1997, pp. 183-185, 220-222; Borza
1999, pp. 69-70; Pelagia 2000, p. 191; Gill 2008.
14
Bartsiokas 2000; Schuster 2000; Gill 2008.
The New King 93
grave has not yet been published, but all the indications seem to show that
the man’s body had been inhumed and not cremated. This undermines
conventional views regarding ancient Macedonian burial customs.15
Having taken over control of Macedonia, the young king Alexander
had yet to secure for himself a position in Greece as had been enjoyed by
his father before his death. Numerous delegations had arrived from Greece
to attend the games that were to be held after Cleopatra’s wedding at
Aegae. It was to them that Alexander now turned as the new king of
Macedonia asking them to remain loyal. This appeal was to no avail for
the death of the feared Philip to be replaced by a young and as yet
inexperienced Alexander at a time of crisis was too much not to have
awakened in many a Greek state the hope of breaking free of the existing
political order. Indeed, it immediately became apparent that the many did
not accept the new balance of power. As usual, we know most about how
the situation developed in Athens. Phocion’s sober remark that with
Philip’s death the Macedonian army had lost only one soldier had no affect
of the populace. Instead Demosthenes’ anti-Macedonian rhetoric
triumphed and the Athenians sent out delegations to other states to
encourage them to break their ties with Macedonia and voted honours for
Philip’s assassin. The Thebans voted to expel their Macedonian garrison.
The Aetolians renewed their confederation, which had been disbanded by
Philip, and contrary to the universal peace helped those whom the
Macedonians had earlier banished return to Acarnania. The Macedonian
garrison at Ambracia was expelled. Almost every state in the Peloponnese
broke its ties with Macedonia: the Arcadians refused to recognise
Alexander’s hegemony; there was a general uprising in Elis and Argos,
whereas the Messenians expelled the leader of the local oligarchy that had
been supported by Philip. With Philip’s death unrest also awakened among
the barbarian tribes to the north of Macedonia.16
In light of this situation some of Alexander’s advisors recommended
caution. They felt Macedonia should pull out of Greece and concentrate on
defending her northern borders as this had always been the most
dangerous region. This seemed especially sensible when Alexander
encountered opposition from perhaps the least expected quarter: the
Thessalians blocked the Tempe pass linking their country with Macedonia
15
Borza 1990, pp. 245-246; Borza 1999, pp. 70-71; Carney 1992; Pelagia 2000, p.
191; Gill 2008.
16
Aeschin., 3.77-78, 160; Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F235; [D.] 17.3.3, 4.7; Plb.,
18.14.5-7; Diod., 17.3; Plu., Alex., 11.1-3; Plu., Dem., 22-23.2; Plu., Phoc., 16;
Just., 11.2.4-5. Bosworth 1988, p. 188; Brun 2000, pp. 71-72. A putative Athenian
honorific decree for Pausanias: SEG 19.63, as restored in Miller 2007.
94 Chapter III
and declared full independence. The young king, however, rejected the
cautious approach and set about resolving the first international crisis of
his reign by actually dealing with Thessaly first and thus he immediately
demonstrated a style of leadership that would be characteristic throughout
his reign. Instead of trying to force the pass, Alexander led his army along
the coast and instructed his soldiers to carve steps out of the side of Mount
Ossa. The speed and unconventionality of this manoeuvre caught the
Thessalians quite off guard, who gave up the moment they saw the
Macedonian army appear behind them. At a council meeting of the
Thessalian League Alexander delivered a speech in which he reminded
those gathered of their common ancestor, Heracles, gave them appropriate
pledges so that they could trust him. In return, like Philip before him,
Alexander was elected archon.17
This time it did not come to war in central and southern Greece. The
Amphictyonic Council at Delphi immediately voted for Alexander’s
continued leadership of Greece. He acquired the support of Ambracia by
graciously recognising her independence. The Macedonian army next
appeared post-haste in Boeotia, which was enough to cow the Thebans and
incline them to return to an alliance with Macedonia. In response to news
of these events, the Athenians resorted to their traditional strategy in times
of danger of evacuating the rural population to behind the Long Walls. At
the same time they tried to avert war by sending a delegation to Alexander.
The young king accepted the delegation courteously, all the more so as the
main leader of the war party Demosthenes, who was officially supposed to
be part of this delegation, instead decided to return home. Now all
Alexander had to do was summon the most important council in Greece,
the synedrion of the League of Corinth. Having politely listened to
Alexander’s speech and no doubt reflected on the swiftness of his army’s
actions, the delegates elected the young king the supreme commander of
Greek forces in the war against Persia. Moreover, they declared the
participation of all the poleis in this war, which was to avenge all the
wrongs previously committed by Persia against Greece. As Alexander’s
hegemony in Greece now seemed secure, the Macedonian army marched
north to quell disturbances on the northern border. Now it also seemed
possible to resume preparations for the invasion of Asia Minor, which,
although interrupted by Philip’s death, was due to start in 335.18 As before,
a small Macedonian garrison was left behind in the Peloponnesus. The
17
Diod., 17.4.1; Plu., Alex., 11.3-4; Polyaen., 4.3.23; Just., 11.3.2. Ellis 1981, p.
108; Bosworth 1988, pp. 28, 189; Stoneman 1997, p. 20.
18
Aeschin., 3.161; Arr., An., 1.1.2; Diod., 17.4.2-9; Plu., Alex., 11.4, 14.1; It. Alex.,
16.
The New King 95
19
[D.], 17.10; Paus., 7.27.7; Ath., 11.119. Bosworth 1988, p. 194.
20
E.g. Plu., Alex., 14.2-5; Plu., mor., 331f-332c, 605d-e, 728a-b. Berve 1926, ii, pp.
417; Nawotka 2003, pp. 106-107; Heckel 2006, p. 113, s.v. ‘Diogenes’ [1].
21
Plu., Alex., 14.6-7; Syll.3 251. Stoneman 1997, pp. 21-22; Hamilton 1999, pp.
34-35; Miller 2000, p. 271; Squilace 2005, p. 308; Poddighe 2009, pp. 101-102.
96 Chapter III
their positions and fled into the steppe. Alexander’s army captured their
city, razed it to the ground and returned to the southern bank.23
One cannot accept the late Roman Itinerarium Alexandri claim that
Alexander continued his northern campaign from the Danube along the
Black Sea coast all the way to the Sea of Azov and on the way back also
defeated the Dacians, Getae and Maedi.24 There is no trace of this in other
sources and besides, in the very eventful spring of 335 there would have
been no time for such a long campaign. Instead there followed a short lull
in the fighting whilst Alexander concentrated on diplomacy. After
Alexander’s impressive display of military might in two victorious battles
the Triballian king sent envoys, no doubt to establish conditions for
capitulation. These conditions must have included the supplying of
Alexander with soldiers for Diodorus mentions a Triballian contingent
among detachments of Odrysians and Illyrians in a 7,000-strong North
Balkan corps in his army that invaded the Persian Empire in 334. News of
the Macedonian victories spread far and wide enough for Alexander’s
camp on the Lower Danube to be also visited by envoys from other
peoples that had not yet been conquered, including Celts from the North
Adriatic region. Not knowing the Macedonian king’s future plans but
seeing the speed and effectiveness of his actions, the Celts preferred to
diplomatically demonstrate their peaceful disposition and thus avert a
possible invasion. There is no evidence to suggest that Alexander was
actually planning such a campaign at the time, so there probably was no
need for serious negotiations with the Celtic envoys. Alexander must have
nevertheless been very pleased with himself after such a successful
campaign for he asked the Celts what they feared most; expecting of
course that they would say it was him. However, instead they said they
feared one day the sky would fall on their heads. Despite his obvious
disappointment with this answer, he nonetheless agreed to an alliance and
probably did not impose on them the same obligations as on the defeated
Thracians or Triballi.25
In the early summer of 335 Alexander’s army left the Danube region
and marched south to Macedonia. On the way Alexander stopped in the
land of the Agrianians, ruled by his ally, King Langarus. Return to the
homeland was temporarily made impossible for news had arrived from
territories to the northwest of Macedonia of hostile actions by the Illyrian
ruler Cleitus, the son of Bardylis, whom Philip had defeated in 359.
23
Arr., An., 1.2-4; Plu., Alex., 11.5-6. Iliescu 1990; Hammond 1996, pp. 47-49;
Ashley 1998, pp. 169-170.
24
It. Alex., 16.
25
Arr., An., 1.4.6-8; Str., 7.3.8; Diod., 17.17.4. Alessandri 1997, pp. 131-148.
The New King 99
Cleitus was supported by Glaucias, the king of the Illyrian Taulanti tribe
from the vicinity of Epidamnus, as well as by the Autariatae. This posed a
threat to Upper Macedonia, especially to Lyncestis. Alexander’s decision
to conduct a swift counterattack suggests he wished to show he was
particularly interested in maintaining security in this land, where
dissatisfaction must have been smouldering ever since less than a year
earlier he had two members of the country’s former royal family executed.
Langarus and part of the Agrianian army attacked the Autariatae, the
weakest tribe in the coalition, ransacked their land and made it impossible
for them to join Cleitus or Glaucias. Alexander crossed Paionia and
marched his army along the Erigon (Crna) to reach the Lyncestis fortress
of Pellion, which was held by Cleitus (the exact geographic location of
this fortress is unknown). After offering up human sacrifices the
barbarians went to confront the Macedonians, but soon they were forced to
retreat to within the walls of their town. The following day the conducting
of the siege was hampered by the arrival of large detachments of Taulanti.
Alexander’s relatively small army now found itself between the forces of
Cleitus and Glaucias, who had been constantly trying hard to trap
Alexander in mountainous terrain. But able to rely on the excellent
training of his men the Macedonian king skilfully turned his army around
and marched it through the mountains occupied by the Taulanti. Surprised
by this unexpected military manoeuvre the Taulanti did not dare to attack
the Macedonians. The last element of Alexander’s manoeuvre was to cross
the river Eordaicus with Macedonian archers and catapults keeping the
barbarians at a safe distance. Arrian relates that during their retreat the
Macedonians did not lose a single soldier. In the war, however, Alexander
did allegedly suffer injuries after being hit by a stone and later receiving a
blow with a mace. Once Alexander’s army was on the other side of the
river, the armies of Cleitus and Glaucias were able to unite and form a
single camp. Convinced that the Macedonians happy to have escaped the
trap had headed for their homeland, the Illyrians felt so safe that they did
not bother to fortify their very large camp and even failed to put guards on
watch. This of course did not escape the notice of Macedonian scouts.
Alexander was thus aware of the enemy’s carelessness and on the third
day after his retreat he decided to attack the Illyrians. He personally
commanded the night time river crossing of the first detachments
comprising Agrianians, archers, hypaspists and some of his phalangites,
after whom the rest of the Macedonian army followed. Alexander did not
wait for all of his army to assemble and instead chose to make full use of
the element of surprise: he ordered the Agrianians and archers to attack the
enemy immediately. Suddenly aroused from sleep the Illyrians did not put
100 Chapter III
up much resistance. Many were killed in the camp, whilst others fled for
their lives abandoning their weapons. Many of those who were not taken
as slaves were killed during a chase that lasted all the way to the
mountains where the Taulanti lived. After a short while Cleitus resolved
not to defend Pellion, so he had it torched and fled to the land of the
Taulanti. 26 The victorious Illyrian campaign could not be continued on
account of extremely disturbing news from Greece, but this was not an
empty victory without any political consequences. After their defeat in 335
the Illyrians did not threaten Macedonia’s border for the rest of his reign.
There was an Illyrian contingent in the army that crossed the Hellespont
the following spring, therefore there is also reason to presume that
Alexander was able impose terms for peace on their rulers in a treaty that
has not been recorded in historiography. Finally, in the 335 campaign
Alexander had won a series of victories with very small losses and this
without a doubt earned him the trust of his army, which at the start of this
young ruler’s reign had been far from certain.27
28
Din., 1.10, 1.18; Aeschin., 3.239; Diod., 17.8.6; Plu., mor., 327c-d, 847c; Plu.,
Dem., 20.5, 23.1-2; Arr., An., 1.7; Just., 11.2. Wilcken 1967, pp.70-71; Bosworth
1980, pp. 73-75; Bosworth 1988, pp. 194-195. Rumors in Greece: Lewis 1996, esp.
pp. 75-96.
102 Chapter III
29
Din., 1.18-21; Diod., 17.8.2-9.1; Plu., Dem., 23.1-2; Arr., An., 1.7.4, 1.10.1,
2.15.2; Fron., Str., 2.11.4; Just., 11.3.9. Bosworth 1980, pp. 233-234; Bosworth
1988, pp. 194-195; Heckel 1997, pp. 191-192; Habicht 1999, pp. 14-15; Faraguna
2003, p. 103.
The New King 103
treaty of Corinth. Units of Theban cavalry and light infantry first launched
an attack on the encamped Macedonians which after the initial shock was
repulsed with ease. Alexander chose to delay his attack and give time for
the besieged to think. However, among the gathered Thebans voices to
continue the armed struggle prevailed. Alexander still tried to weaken their
resolve by announcing that any Theban went over to his side would fully
benefit from the Greek universal peace. In response the Thebans declared
that anyone from the enemy camp who wished to fight for Greek freedom
together with the Thebans and the Great King could come over to their
side. Plutarch adds that the Thebans replied to Alexander’s demand for the
handing over of their anti-Macedonian politicians by proposing that in
return for peace the Macedonians should hand over their highest ranking
officers Antipater and Philotas.30
In the war of words the Thebans triumphed. The well aimed ridicule,
their spiteful mockery of the universal peace and the long preparations for
the anti-Persian campaign of united Greek states under the Macedonian
king’s command in defence of Greek freedom touched a raw nerve.
Alexander was livid but that now also meant that the fate of Thebes was
sealed. Three days after the exchange of words the preparations for
storming the city were finished and the fighting began. Basically two
extant sources relate what followed: the rhetorical and pro-Theban account
of Diodorus and Arrian’s very concise description based on the account of
Ptolemy, who was very seriously wounded in the fighting and therefore
unable to witness the entire battle. It is indeed the brevity of
Arrian/Ptolemy’s report that arise suspicion, especially when it is
compared with Arrian’s extensive descriptions of Alexander’s army’s
much less important manoeuvres during the war in the north a few pages
earlier. By being so laconic in his description of the battle, Ptolemy gives
the impression of not wishing to expose all its aspects. For instance, unlike
other sources, it does not mention the heroism of the Thebans defending
their homeland against an enemy numerically many times superior. It is
certain that the most intensive fighting was at the palisade cutting the
Cadmea off from the main Macedonian forces and that the Theban
hoplites confronted their enemy outside those walls. Thanks to their
numerical superiority the Macedonians were able to fight the Thebans in
the field and simultaneously attack the palisade. The first attack on the
palisade by a detachment of Ptolemy’s phalangites, archers and Agrianians
was repulsed, while the numerically inferior but extremely well trained
30
Diod., 17.9.1-5, 17.11.2; Plu., Alex., 11.6-8; Arr., An., 1.7.4-11; Just., 11.3.
Bosworth 1988, p. 32; Hammond 1996, pp. 58-60; Hamilton 1999, p. 30; Poddighe
2009, pp. 107-108.
104 Chapter III
Theban hoplites were for a long time able to hold off the Macedonian
phalanx. Then Alexander ordered a reserve detachment commanded either
by Perdiccas (according to Diodorus) or Antipater (Polyaenus) to launch a
direct assault on a part of the city’s fortifications that were left unmanned.
Bearing in mind the concentration of Theban soldiers around the palisade,
there would have most certainly been more than one unmanned section of
the city’s walls, while numerical superiority made it easy for Alexander to
deploy troops in another section of the front. News of the city’s wall being
breached was immediately spread by the Macedonians, which provoked
panic in Theban ranks at the Cadmea. Making use of this confusion the
trapped Macedonian unit broke out of their garrison and attacked the
Thebans from behind. The Macedonians gave chase to the Theban soldiers
now fleeing in disarray to their city. The battle for the city was over and
instead began the indiscriminate slaughter of defenders and unarmed
civilians. The only Thebans not to be massacred were the cavalry, which
had not taken part in the fighting and now managed to escape from the
captured city.31
Apart from the Macedonians, Phocians and soldiers from smaller
Boeotian cities hostile to Thebes participated in the slaughter. 6,000
Thebans were massacred, but this was a costly victory for the Macedonian
army, which lost 500 men – much more than had been killed during the
entire north Balkan campaign. A large difference in losses between the
defeated and victorious side was typical in ancient warfare for when one
side fell into disarray the other side could and would kill many with
impunity. Therefore the relatively large numbers of Macedonians killed
seems to confirm Diodorus’s version of a lengthy and heroic resistance put
up by the Thebans. Along with the slaughter, there was looting and rapes.
Plutarch relates an anecdote about a woman called Timoclea who was
raped by a captain of the Thracian mercenaries but later managed to kill
her oppressor. Alexander, who had always had a good understanding for
what we would today call public relations, ordered the woman to be set
free, all the more so when it turned out that she was the sister of
Theagenes, the commander of the Sacred Band who had fallen at
Chaeronea. Similar mercy was not shown to other Thebans. Alexander did
not wish to personally pass sentence on this city and left the decision – as
both Arrian and Diodorus claim – to his Greek allies. On account of the
lack of available time it is doubtful that he summoned the synedrion of the
League of Corinth; instead a council was probably held at the Macedonian
31
Diod., 17.11-12; Arr., An., 1.8; Plu., Alex., 11.4-5; Polyaen., 4.3.12. Lane Fox
1973, p. 87; Bosworth 1980, pp. 79-84; Bosworth 1988, pp. 32-33; Flower 2000, p.
96.
The New King 105
32
Clitarch., ap. Ath., 4.148d-f (= FGrH, 137 F1); Plb., 38.2.13; Diod., 17.13.5-
14.4; Plu., Alex., 11.10-12.6; Plu., mor., 259d-260d, 1090c; Arr., An., 1.8-9; D.
Chr., 2.33; Ael., VH, 13.7; Plin., Nat., 7.109; Just., 11.3-4. Wilcken 1967, pp. 73-
74; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 87-88; Bosworth 1980, pp. 84-91; Bosworth 1988, pp.
195-196; Hamilton 1999, pp. 30-32; Le Rider 2003, pp. 41-42.
106 Chapter III
indicate that even there many were of this opinion. Rejoicing at Thebe’s
destruction of the personified Mt. Kithairon in Alexander Romance echoes
the same opinion albeit shrouded in mythological garb. Besides, there
were many hypocrites among the Greeks. For instance, for all his
lamenting over the fate of Thebes, the orator and Alexander’s political
opponent Hypereides was not discouraged from purchasing a Theban
female captive for 20 minas, one who later became his mistress.33
As a political move the destruction of Thebes was a success for
although it certainly did not earn Alexander the love of the Greeks, it did
force them to respect him. Just like Philip’s destruction of Olynthus, so too
Alexander’s destruction of Thebes served as a fierce reminder to the
Greeks, ensuring peace and pro-Macedonian order during his Asian
campaign. Meanwhile a hasty delegation of noted pro-Macedonian
politicians from Athens instantly arrived to congratulate Alexander on his
victories over the Triballi and Illyrians as well as his quelling of the
Theban uprising, even though Athens had actually actively encouraged it.
In response the Macedonian king demanded the handing over of prominent
anti-Macedonian politicians and generals on the charge of being
responsible for Chaeronea, hostility to Philip and himself as well as
inciting Thebes to rise. They were to be judged by the synedrion of the
League of Corinth. The sources give several versions of this list of
Macedonia’s enemies but all of them include the names of Demosthenes,
Lycurgus, Polyeuctus and the general Charidemus. The fate of Thebes
made it obvious that Alexander’s demands had to be treated with the
utmost seriousness and so a heated debate ensued in Athens. Phocion
advised those mentioned on the list to selflessly take their lives for the
sake of their motherland and so that the city of Athens could be spared.
Demosthenes, as could well be expected, was of the opposite opinion and
likened the idea to sheep handing over their sheepdogs to the wolves. But,
like Philip sometime before him, Alexander was not looking for a
showdown with Athens and his heavy demands should be regarded more
as a bargaining tool to pacify Greece as fast as possible at a very small
cost to Macedonia. To that, waging war on Athens would have undercut
the Panhellenic stance of Alexander on the eve of the expedition to Persia.
Thus ultimately the pro-Macedonian orator Demades, allegedly for five
33
Orators: Aeschin., 3.133; Din., 1, passim. Other reference to public opinion:
Diod., 19.54.2; Plin., Nat., 34.14; Arr., An., 1.9; Plu., Alex., 13; Idomeneus, ap.
Ath., 13.58 (= FGrH, 338 F14); Plu., mor., 849d ; Ps.-Callisth., 1.46a. Exiles:
Diod., 17.14.3; Plu., Alex., 13.1; Paus., 9.23.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 196; Heckel
1997, p. 193; Flower 2000, p. 97; Nawotka 2003a, p. 30; Faraguna 2003, pp. 103-
104; Poddighe 2009, p. 108.
The New King 107
34
Aeschin., 3.161; Diod., 17.15; Plu., Dem., 23.3-5; Plu., Phoc., 17; Arr., An., 1.10;
Just., 11.4; Suda, s.v. 'Antfpatroj. Bosworth 1988, pp. 196-197; O’Brien 1992, p.
54; Rubinsohn 1997, pp. 117-118; Habicht 1999, pp. 15-18; Flower 2000, p. 97;
Brun 2000, pp. 74-77; Heckel 2009, p. 29.
35
Arr., An,, 1.10.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 196.
108 Chapter III
over the state’s future. However, there is another aspect to this story in that
both Parmenion and Antipater had unmarried daughters – historians
believe there were five in all. If Alexander were to marry one of these
daughters, the bride’s father would naturally guarantee for himself great
influence in the Macedonian state. We know that Alexander rejected this
advice, no doubt because he did not wish to offend the powerful adviser
whose daughter he would have to consider less worthy of marriage. For
the time being the young king preferred to keep rival parties at his court
parties in balance.36
36
Diod., 17.16; Arr., An., 1.11.1. Baynham 1994, p. 334; Baynham 1998; Weber
2009, p. 87.
CHAPTER IV:
1
Discussion related in Seibert 1998.
110 Chapter IV
2
Ehrenberg 1938, pp. 52-61; Brunt 1965; Goukowsky 1975, pp. 325-326; O’Brien
1992, p. 50; Stewart 1993, pp. 78-88; Austin 2003, pp. 121-123.
3
Tarn 1948, p. 8; Pl., Lg., 625e.
4
Duris and Phylarchus after Chares, Aristobulus and Onesicritus – all quoted in:
Plu., Alex., 15.2; Plu., mor., 327d-e, 342d. Badian 1985, p. 423; Ashley 1998, pp.
187-189; Hamilton 1999, pp. 36-37; Le Rider 2003, pp. 39-40; Nawotka 2003, pp.
36, 91; Austin 2003, pp. 122-124; Thomas 2007, pp. 59-61, 141-142 on
Macedonian monarchy.
From Abydus to Alexandria 111
7
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.19.1); Diod., 17.17.3-5; Arr., An., 1.11,
7.9.6; Plu., Alex., 15.1-6; Plu., mor., 327d-e; Just., 11.6; It. Alex., 17-18; Fron., Str.,
4.2.4. Milns 1966, p. 167; Hamilton 1974, p. 53; Hamilton 1999, pp. 36-37; Green
1974, pp. 155-156; Dąbrowa 1988, p. 33; Bosworth 1988, pp. 259-260; Le Rider
2003, pp. 46-47; Worthington 2004, p. 48. Inscription of Calindoea: SEG 36.626;
see Errington 1998, pp. 79-82.
From Abydus to Alexandria 113
8
Fron., Str., 2.11.3; Just., 9.5, 11.5. Bosworth 1988, pp. 264-266; Heckel 1997, p.
191.
9
Arr., An., 1.11.5; It. Alex., 18. Engels 1978, pp. 26-29; Bosworth 1988, p. 38;
Brosius 2003a, p. 228.
114 Chapter IV
in association with the Trojan War that in 396 the Spartan king Agesilaus
began his expedition into Asia Minor to liberate Greek cities by offering
sacrifices at Aulis as Agamemnon had done before his expedition.
Therefore there was already an established symbolism associated with
political enterprises of the type that was undertaken in the early spring of
334. Before he crossed the Hellespont, Alexander headed for Elaius on the
southern end of Chersonese to offer sacrifices to Protesilaos, the first
Greek warrior of the Trojan expedition to set foot in Asia and be killed.
Arrian relates that the sacrifices were made with an intention that this
expedition would be more providential than that of Protesilaos. The visit to
this Greek warrior’s sanctuary linked the symbolism of the Trojan War
with the need to avenge the crimes committed by Xerxes. In 480 this was
the first Greek religious edifice in Europe to be destroyed by the Persians,
and indeed it was for the sacrilegious destruction of shrines that Alexander
was now intending to punish Persia. The emphasis on Panhellenic
symbolism was particularly important on account of the fact that
Macedonian leadership had so recently been questioned by Thebes. The
visit to Elaius and other religiously symbolic gestures cost the entire
expedition time. It has been estimated that the excursions to sanctuaries
Alexander made at the start of the expedition added 70 km to the route. In
other words, they must have delayed the army’s progress by several days
although speed was such a high priority for the Macedonian king. This
illustrates just how important it was for Alexander to gain the favour of the
gods in what was much more than merely a logistical and strategic
undertaking.10
The crossing of the Hellespont commenced only after Alexander’s
return from Elaius. The passage was between Sestus and Abydos, which
had clearly remained under Macedonian control ever since the expedition
in the spring of 336. The great operation of moving the army across the
Hellespont was entrusted to Parmenion, the most experienced of the
Macedonian commanders, who had at his disposal 160 warships and an
unspecified number of merchant vessels. Even if the strait was no more
than 1.5 km wide, the transporting of 40,000 troops as well as many herds
of horses and wagons must have taken some time. Even before the ships
started sailing Alexander ordered alters to be raised for Zeus, Athena and
Heracles, and exactly the same was next done on the Asian side.
Alexander sailed with part of the fleet (of 60 ships according to Diodorus)
personally steering the flagship. Halfway across the Hellespont he
10
Arr., An., 1.11.5. The story of Protesilaos: Paus., 4.2.7 (after the Kypria).
Instinsky 1949, pp. 9-22; Zahrnt 1996, pp. 130-134; Flower 2000, pp. 108-109;
Faraguna 2003, pp. 108-109.
From Abydus to Alexandria 115
13
Diod., 17.17.2; Just., 11.5; It. Alex., 18; Plu., mor., 330d; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28.
Wilcken 1967, p. 83; Instinsky 1949, pp. 23, 31-38; Schmitthenner 1969, pp. 32-38;
Green 1974, p. 166-167; Briant 1980, p. 40; Briant 1993, p. 13; Mehl 1980;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 38-39; Flower 2000, pp. 119-120. Historicity of this event put
in doubt by Zahrnt 1996; contra Seibert 1998, pp. 56-57.
From Abydus to Alexandria 117
14
Diod., 17.17.2-3, 17.17.6-18.1; Plu., Alex., 15.7-9; Plu., mor., 331d-e; Arr., An.,
1.11.7-8, 1.22.2; Ael., VH, 9.38, 12.7; Just., 11.5; It. Alex., 18. Bosworth 1988, p.
39; Stewart 1993, pp. 83, 249, n. 62; Zahrnt 1996, pp. 144-145; Erskine 2001, pp.
105-106, 226-234.
15
Str., 13.1.26. Debord 1999, pp. 427-429.
16
Arr., An., 1.21.1. Hornblower 1994, p. 220.
17
Erskine 2001, pp. 230-234.
118 Chapter IV
19
Diod., 17.18.2, 17.19.4-5; Arr., An., 1.12.8-10, 1.15.2, 1.16.3; Just., 11.6; Ps.-
Callisth., 1.36. Badian 1977, p. 283; McCoy 1989, pp. 414-417; Briant 1996, pp.
718, 840-841; Debord 1999, p. 430; Heckel 2006, pp. 162, 183; Sabin 2007, pp.
130-131; Heckel 2009, pp. 29-30. Erroneous opinion of Memnon commanding
mercenary soldiers is popular even today: Worthington 2004, p. 54; Matthews
2008, passim.
120 Chapter IV
20
Diod., 17.18.2-3; Arr., An., 1.12.9; Polyaen., 4.3.15. Engels 1978, pp. 18-22;
Briant 1980, pp. 43-45; Briant 1996, pp. 841-842; Seibert 1985, p. 37; McCoy
1989, pp. 428-430; Wirth 1989, p. 16; Heckel 1997, p. 195; Ashley 1998, pp. 187-
190; Debord 1999, pp. 434-435.
From Abydus to Alexandria 121
could be crossed by the cavalry. However, if the infantry tried to cross, the
phalanx line would undoubtedly have been broken and the resulting
confusion would not have rendered its attack effective.21
We have three major accounts of the battle, of: Arrian, Diodorus and
Plutarch. Their rhetoric is somewhat confusing and the accounts also differ
from each other with regard to certain details, such as the time of the day
the battle was fought. All the authors agree that the Macedonian army
reached the Granicus in the afternoon, but there are two versions of what
happened next. According to Diodorus the Macedonians set up camp and
attacked the Persians at dawn the next day. According to Arrian and
Plutarch the Macedonians attacked immediately, and this was possible
because on their way to the river they were already marching in battle
formation. Both Arrian and Plutarch also mention a council held by the
Macedonian commanders. According to Arrian, Parmenion advised
Alexander to postpone the attack until dawn the following day assuming
that the much inferior Persian infantry would not dare spend the night near
the river and that at daybreak it would be easy to cross. In response
Alexander is said to have uttered one of his famous sentences: ‘I should
feel it a disgrace if, after crossing the Hellespont so easily, this small
stream… should bar our way for a moment.’ Ancient authors more than
once relate disputes between Alexander and Parmenion regarding not only
military tactics but also the strategy of the entire war. In these accounts a
careful Parmenion weighing up the pros and cons of each possible move is
contrasted with a young and impatient Alexander eager to achieve great
things. In these confrontations, befitting his literary persona, Alexander
not only always wins the battle of words but is also always successful in
victoriously realising the very plans the old general advised him against.
Such accounts are therefore a literary topos, which makes it virtually
impossible to conduct historical analysis if we cannot even establish
whether such discussions between the Macedonians ever took place. This
topos was probably started in Callisthenes’ book, where Parmenion was
presented as foil to enhance Alexander’s glory. In the case of Granicus,
delaying the battle would have given the weaker Persians an opportunity
to escape; whereas Alexander’s determination to march swiftly shows that
he wanted a confrontation as soon as possible. Moreover the king’s option
of attacking in the second part of the day was logical as it meant that the
Persians would have to fight with the sun in the eyes, whereas in the
morning the Macedonians would have been facing the sun in the east. The
21
Arr., An., 1.13.4; Plu., Alex., 16.2, 16.4. Topography of the battlefield: Janke
1904, pp. 126-135; Nikolaitis 1974; Foss 1973; Harl 1997, p. 304; Sabin 2007, p.
129.
122 Chapter IV
22
Diod., 17.19.3 (similar in It. Alex., 20); Plu., Alex., 16.2-3; Arr., An., 1.13.2-7.
Badian 1977, pp. 271-277; Bosworth 1988, p. 41; Ashley 1998, pp. 191-192.
23
Diod., 17.19; Arr., An., 1.14. Badian 1977, pp. 277-287; Harl 1997, pp. 306-313;
Debord 1999, pp. 430-431.
From Abydus to Alexandria 123
24
Diod., 17.19-21; Arr., An., 1.15-16; Plu., Alex., 16.3-14; Plu., mor., 326f-327a;
P.Hamb. 652; It. Alex., 21-23. Badian 1977, pp. 287-291; Bosworth 1988, pp. 42-
43; Harl 1997, pp. 313-324.
25
Badian 1977, p. 293; Bosworth 1988, pp. 42-43.
From Abydus to Alexandria 125
Barbarians who dwell in Asia’. Thus at the Acropolis, whose temples had
been desecrated by Xerxes 146 years earlier, there was now visible
evidence that Alexander was realising the Panhellenic vendetta. It is also
possible that there was irony in Alexander’s gesture, because among those
captured at Granicus and sent in chains as slaves to Macedonia there could
have been many Athenians – though probably not majority as claimed in
Itinerarium Alexandri. Their release from captivity was for a long time an
object of Athenian diplomatic efforts. 26 The purple gowns, precious
utensils and other valuable items found in the Persian camp now became
the victor’s property. These things Alexander sent as a gift to his mother,
which she most probably next submitted as expensive offerings at
Delphi.27
A direct consequence of the Battle of Granicus was the capture of
Daskyleion, the capital of Hellespontine Phrygia, which surrendered to
Parmenion without putting up resistance. Alexander nominated the
Macedonian Calas his satrap in Phrygia and stipulated that the amount of
tributes collected was to be the same as it had been under Persian rule.
These first administrative decisions to be made on conquered land became
guidelines to be applied – with only a few exceptions, discussed later – in
all lands subsequently acquired by Alexander during his campaign: as an
heir of the Achaemenids Alexander took over their territories without
changing the established administrative and financial systems. Insofar as
we are able to judge on the basis of very imperfect numismatic evidence, it
was indeed as an Achaemenid successor that Alexander was perceived by
the Greeks of Asia Minor for he appears in satrap attire on coins
autonomously issued by some of their cities.28
26
Diod., 16.21.6; Arr., An., 1.16.3-7; Plu., Alex., 16.15-18; Just., 11.6; It. Alex., 23;
Curt., 3.1.9; P.Hamb. 652. Hanson 1999, p. 130.
27
Plu., Alex., 16.19; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.1; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28;
Syll.3 252. Carney 2000, p. 86.
28
Arr., An., 1.17.1. Heckel 1992, pp. 355-357. Coins: Debord 2000.
126 Chapter IV
29
Diod., 17.21.7. Magie 1950, pp. 797-799; Seibert 1985, pp. 35-37; Bosworth
1988, pp. 44-45; Briant 1993, pp. 18-19; Briant 1996, pp. 722-725; Hornblower
1994, pp. 214-217; Debord 1999, pp. 432-433; Sartre 2003, p. 16. Dusinberre 2003
is a monograph of Sardis in Achaemenid period.
From Abydus to Alexandria 127
30
Curt., 3.12.7; Arr., An., 1.17; Diod., 17.21.7; Plu., Alex., 17.1; It. Alex., 24. Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 140-141; Robert 1983, pp. 97-118; Briant 1985; Briant 1993; Heckel
1992, pp. 176-178, 385; Debord 1999, pp. 159-160, 185. On surrendering cities see
below chapter V.4.
31
Paus., 7.5.2. Debord 1999, p. 435.
32
Boyce, Grenet 1989, p. 206; Briant 1996, pp. 721-722; Shabazi 2003, pp. 7-14.
From Abydus to Alexandria 129
commandeered two triremes and escaped from the city, taking with them
Amyntas the son of Antioch, who was a Macedonian aristocrat opposed to
Alexander’s rule. Alexander entered Ephesus accompanied by the
previously expelled supporters of Macedonia and personally ended
oligarchic rule, establishing or rather re-establishing in its place a
democracy. No longer fearful of the oligarchs a crowd dragged their
leaders: Syrphax, his son Pelagon and his nephews, from the temple and
stoned them to death. But once the leaders were killed Alexander forbade
further retributions and, according to Arrian, the wisdom of this decision
earned him great popularity among the populace. A considerable part of
Alexander’s actions in Ephesus focused on the Temple of Artemis – the
goddess who according to legend had failed to save the Artemisium from
fire because she was preoccupied with assisting Olympias in labour.
Alexander now laid offerings to the goddess and arranged a military
parade. He also extended the asylum area around the temple to one stade
(c. 180 m) – we do not know the size of the original asylum area. This was
an important privilege, and Ephesus would have to wait another 300 years
for it to be further extended. Moreover, Alexander decided that the tribute
from the city due to him should be deposited in the temple’s treasury. The
Artemisium lay within the city’s boundaries and, as the division of church
and state was unknown in Antiquity, the temple’s treasury was actually
administered by the city; therefore Ephesus was paying itself tribute.
Strabo records an anecdote about an offer by Alexander to rebuild the
Artemisium from his royal funds which was rejected by the proud
Ephesians, who wanted for themselves the glory of rebuilding the temple.
Yet so as not to offend the monarch they explained that it was not befitting
for deity to build a temple for another deity. Although anecdotal nature of
this account does not necessarily undermine its historical veracity, it is
highly unlikely that something like that could have happened during
Alexander’s first and only visit to Ephesus. Firstly, the current state of his
finances would have prohibited him from making such an offer. Secondly,
the Greeks’ attitude to religion was much too serious for them to have
proclaimed this young Macedonian ruler a god as early as in 334.
Nevertheless this story does illustrate Alexander’s consistent interest in
Artemis of Ephesus, for whom he was willing to give donations even
when royal revenues were at their lowest. 33 Whilst in Ionia Alexander
must have also made a very generous donation for the construction of a
33
Arr., An., 1.17.10-18.2; Str., 14.1.22-23. Bosworth 1980, pp. 132-133; Higgins
1980, pp. 132-134; Badian 1996, pp. 24-25; Nawotka 2003a, pp. 23-24, 29.
130 Chapter IV
34
IPriene, 156. Heisserer 1980, pp. 143-144, 156-158.
35
Arr., An., 1.18.2; Diod., 17.24.1. Detailed discussion of the issue of freedom of
Greeks in Asia Minor with reference to all extant sources: Nawotka 2003a. Now
see also Mileta 2008, pp. 21-40. Here I provide a summary and conclusions.
From Abydus to Alexandria 131
to the average year before his arrival. The trend is most noticeable in large
cities producing a proportionately large number of inscriptions. The most
striking example is Ephesus, where from the entire 4th century up to
Alexander the city’s popular assembly left behind just one extant
inscription, whereas for the last third of the century as many as 44. Both
their large number as well as the evidence of working of the legislative
process at the time show that this was a vibrant and active democracy.
This indeed also confirms the image of Ephesus presented by the ancient
authors, especially Arrian, of a city whose population predominantly
opposed its oligarchic government, which had to basically rely on the
support of the Persian garrison.
There are other examples that can be shown but it is more important to
see the general picture of political changes within the Greek poleis of Asia
Minor in 334 as transpires from extant epigraphic sources. In Ionia, Aeolis
and the Greek cities of the Carian coast the arrival of the Macedonian
army was followed by a legislative explosion, which is a typical sign of
democratic government. Not all the poleis under Persian rule were ruled
by oligarchies, but even those that did manage to preserve their democratic
systems became much more active and radical after Alexander’s arrival.
An example of such democratic revitalisation and a greater opening up of
public initiative is Iasus in Caria, which in 334 was liberated from the
restrictions imposed upon it by its Hecatomnid rulers. In Alexander’s time
we have not only an active assembly but even evidence of assembly pay
(ekklesiastikon) being paid to enable participation of even the poorest
citizens without their having to suffer financial loses. In Greek political
theory assembly pay was an aspect of the most radical type of democracy
and its appearance in Asia Minor at that time is a measure of how deep the
political changes were after Alexander’s arrival. The decision to topple
oligarchies and establish democracies in Ionia, Aeolis and Caria had
fundamental and far-reaching consequences. Whereas up to Alexander’s
reign oligarchies and democracies had been considered equally legitimate
forms of government, the Hellenistic era saw the decided predominance of
democratic systems of government in the Greek world. Though
Alexander’s decisions were not the only reason for this change, they did
contribute to the triumph of democracy.
Fortunately, to this day we have an extensive fragment of inscribed
text from Alexander’s address to the Ionian city of Priene which sheds
light on another two important issues concerning the status of poleis in
Ionia, Aeolis and Caria: the control of rural territories and state finances.
After his victory at Granicus Alexander considered himself the rightful
successor of the Achaemenids and therefore he felt authorised, as is
From Abydus to Alexandria 133
36
Syll.3 283. Heisserer 1980, pp. 79-95.
136 Chapter IV
revolt of 499 and six years later it was captured by the Persians, destroyed
and its people deported to Asia. A repetition of the Theban solution here
could have led the Greek public to draw on very obvious parallels with the
actions of the maligned Xerxes. Alexander therefore had no option but to
forgive Miletus for taking the wrong side in the war. A visible sign of the
grace of the new ruler was his acceptance of the title, though not the
responsibilities, of Stephanephoros, the eponymous official in Miletus,
who gave the name to a year.38
Despite the important role it had played in the siege, Alexander
decided to disband his fleet after the capture of Miletus. This surprising
and controversial decision Alexander justified by the fact that his ships
would be unable to compete out at sea with the much stronger Persians
and that he could defeat the enemy fleet by capturing the seaports of Asia
Minor with his land forces. This was a risky assumption as it is difficult to
imagine how Alexander’s army could have held all the important centres
along the coastline. Indeed, a year later Alexander saw it fit to start
rebuilding his fleet. Nevertheless, capturing the seaports could
significantly hinder the Persian fleet as ancient ships needed to moor next
to the land at night for the oarsmen to rest and were unable to carry large
supplies of food and water. Therefore their effective fighting range did not
exceed 30 nautical miles from their bases. However, the real reason for
disbanding the fleet was no doubt the lack of financial resources, a
problem which is indeed mentioned in the sources. Even the relatively
small number of 160 ships with approximately 32,000 sailors and oarsmen
would have probably cost Alexander 160 talents at month, for it was the
royal treasury that had to cover these costs rather than the cities that
actually provided the ships. Up to that point ancient authors do not record
any really significant amounts of captured booty. It has been estimated that
the keeping of the army and fleet cost Alexander 450 talents a month,
which greatly exceeded the funds he had at his disposal. That is most
probably why Alexander decided to take only enough ships to transport his
men and equipment, whereas the Athenian contingent no doubt served
primarily as guarantee of Athen’s loyalty.39
38
Arr., An., 1.19; Diod., 17.22; Plu., Alex., 17.2; Milet i.3.122.ii.81. Bosworth
1980, p. 141, Bosworth 1988, p. 250; Romane 1994; Graeve 2000.
39
Arr., An., 1.20.1; Diod., 17.22.5. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 134, 143; Bosworth 1980,
pp. 141-143; Bosworth 1988, p. 47; Badian 1985, p. 428; Romane 1994, p. 69;
Briant 1996, p. 845; Ashley 1998, pp. 91-92; Le Rider 2003, pp. 103-108, 115-117.
138 Chapter IV
40
Ar., An., 1.20.2-3; Diod., 17.23.4-6; Vitr., 2.8.10-11. Bean, Cook 1955; Ruzicka
1992, pp. 34, 137-138; Debord 1999, pp. 303, 375-376, 385-386.
From Abydus to Alexandria 139
We may assume that at least Iasus went over to Alexander’s side of its
own accord for Gorgus, a prominent citizen of that city, remained in
Alexander’s circle for years and in the Macedonian command reached the
important post of hoplophylax (warden or arms). 41 Correctly expecting
Halicarnassus to put up a stiff resistance, Alexander had his army pitch
camp 5 stades (900 m) from the city’s walls. Immediately on the first day
the Macedonians attacked the fortifications, to which the defenders
responded with a sally from the Mylasa gate. Both the attacks were
unsuccessful but a certain pattern in the fighting already emerged.
Halicarnassus could not be taken without siege engines and until those
arrived, the only option was to impose a blockade. In the meantime
Alexander tried to capture Myndus situated on the eastern edge of the
Bodrum peninsula. Apparently someone had promised to secretly open the
gate, but the night-time attack failed. The collaborator had either changed
his mind or been discovered. The defenders put up a stiff resistance and
were supported by soldiers shipped over from Halicarnassus 16 km away.
It turned out that without siege engines and ladders, which the
Macedonians had also failed to take, the town could not be taken.
Alexander ordered a retreat to the camp outside Halicarnassus.42
However, even before the siege began in earnest Alexander did have a
significant political success. He was offered the support of Maussolus’
sister Ada (I), who had ruled Caria in the years 344/43 – 341/40. Persians
only recognised as satraps the male members of the Hecatomnid dynasty.
That is why Artaxerxes III did not intervene when control of Caria was
wrested from Ada by her brother Pixodarus, the same one who in 337 had
tried to become Philip II’s ally by offering the hand of his daughter Ada (II)
to Arrhidaeus in marriage. After Pixodarus’ death Darius nominated Ada’s
(II) eventual Iranian husband Orontobates to be the next satrap.
Meanwhile Maussolus’ sister had to make do with just the fortress at
Alinda (later renamed Alexandria ad Latmum). With the arrival of the
Macedonian army in Caria Ada sensed the opportunity. She surrendered
Alinda to Alexander and offered to recognise him as her son. This was in
accordance with a Near Eastern tradition of extending paternal or maternal
terminology to include people beyond the biological family if it served the
legitimisation of rule over conquered territories. Ada’s support could
prove to be of key importance in also gaining the support of the Carian
people whilst their satrap Orontobates was at war with the Macedonians.
Alexander therefore accepted the Carian princess’s kind offer. He left her
41
Ephippus, FGrH, 126 F5. Heisserer 1980, pp. 169-203; Debord 1999, pp. 146-
148.
42
Arr., An., 1.20.4-7.
140 Chapter IV
43
Arr., An., 1.23.6-8; Diod., 17.24.2-3; Plu., Alex., 22.7-8; Plu., mor., 127b, 180a,
1099c. Berve 1926, no. 674; Wilcken 1967, pp. 93-94; Bosworth 1980, pp. 152-
154; Bosworth 1988, pp. 229-230; Hornblower 1982, pp. 45-51; Ruzicka 1992, p.
144; Brosius 1996, pp. 21-22; Debord 1999, pp. 139-140, 160.
44
Diod., 17.24.1; Ath. Mech., 10-15.9; Vitr., 10.3-8. Marsden 1977.
45
Ath. Mech., 14.4; Vitr., 10.3.7.
From Abydus to Alexandria 141
46
Bosworth 1980, p. 147.
47
Diod., 17.24.3-25.5; Arr., An., 1.20.8-10. Bosworth 1988, p. 48.
48
Diod., 17.25.5-6; Arr., An., 1.21.1-4. Lane Fox 1973, p. 138; Bosworth 1980, p.
146; Romane 1994, pp. 72-73; Ober 1996, pp. 56-61; Wheeler 2007, p. 212.
142 Chapter IV
49
Diod., 17.26-27.4 (principal source); Arr., An., 1.22; Curt., 5.2.8, 8.1.36. Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 138-139; Green 1974, pp. 197-199; Bosworth 1980, pp. 147-148;
Bosworth 1988, p. 49; Ashley 1998, pp. 208-209.
From Abydus to Alexandria 143
screen of smoke and flames Memnon evacuated weapons from the military
magazines and some of the soldiers to the island of Kos. The remaining
soldiers occupied the Salmakis fortress and the citadel on the Zephyros
rock. At dawn Alexander saw the smouldering ruins of Halicarnassus and
two strongholds still very much in enemy hands. A long and costly siege
was at most only a partial success. On the one hand, thanks to advanced
Macedonian siege techniques and the immense energy and determination
of Alexander and his soldiers the city of Halicarnassus was taken, which
no doubt gave the Macedonians some satisfaction. On the other hand, the
military situation in Asia Minor did not change significantly for in Caria
Memnon was still holding a military base, although with much reduced
harbour. Alexander decided not to try and capture the two fortresses.
Instead he ordered the city to be razed to the ground, sparing only the
Mausoleum and temples. One can assume that for a time Halicarnassus as
a city was dead, perhaps the synoikism was dissolved and the inhabitants
moved back to their original settlements. Alexander left Ptolemaios in
command of 3,200 soldiers to guard the two Persian fortresses, which
were surrounded by moats and embankments.50
The siege of Halicarnassus had dragged on until at least the middle of
autumn. The onset of winter did not mean a break in the hostilities, but
Alexander did expect the intensity of the fighting to lessen for a while. For
this reason he sent back to Macedonia – under the command of his
bodyguard, Ptolemaios the son of Seleucus – those soldiers who had
recently married, so that they could spend the winter with their wives.
Arrian claims that this act, more than any other, won the Macedonian
troops over to Alexander. The campaign must have cost many more lives
than the ancient authors record for the officers sent back to the homeland
together with the newly-weds were ordered to raise as many infantry and
cavalry reserves as possible. One of the officers, Cleander, was dispatched
to Peloponnesus to levy mercenaries at Cape Tainaron, the main recruiting
centre in Greece.51
The rest of the army was divided in two. Parmenion together with the
baggage train, one ile of hetairoi, the Thessalian cavalry and Corinthian
League detachments headed for Sardis. His next objective was Phrygia.
This region’s satrap, Atizyes, had fought at Granicus but managed to
escape and now took refuge in his satrapy. Phrygia had undergone
intensive Iranian colonisation and therefore Macedonian occupation of this
50
Diod., 17.27.5-6; Arr., An., 1.23. Bosworth 1988, p. 49; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 145-
146; Ashley 1998, p. 209; Heckel 2006, p. 235, s.v. Ptolemy [5].
51
Arr., An., 1.24.1-2; Curt., 3.1.1. Heckel 1992, p. 286.
144 Chapter IV
54
Arr., An., 1.25.3-9; Just., 11.7.1; Diod., 17.32.1, 17.80.2; Curt., 7.1.5-9. Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 143-148 (questions Arrian); Bosworth 1988, pp. 50-51; Heckel 1992,
pp. 357-359; Hammond 1996, pp. 88-89.
55
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F31; Arr., An., 1.26.1-2; Plu., Alex., 17.6-9 (quoting
Menander, fr. 751); J., AJ, 2.16.5; App., BC, 2.149; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28.
146 Chapter IV
Eurymedon. For these reasons Alexander immediately led his army to that
city. At the mere sight of the Macedonians the Aspendians again changed
their mind. This time the terms and conditions of capitulation were much
harsher: the previously agreed war contribution was doubled; now there
was also an obligation to pay tributes; the city was put under the control of
the local satrap and now it was also obliged to submit hostages. Being
situated in Pamphylia, Aspendus was clearly not included in the declared
restoration of freedom that applied to the cities of Ionia, Aeolis and Caria,
and as a polis that had broken a treaty it could not expect much mercy
from its conqueror.56 It was most probably then that Alexander nominated
Nearchus, a trusted companion since his early youth, satrap of Lycia.57
From Aspendus the Macedonian army returned to Perge and thence it
headed for Phrygia. The first and perhaps greatest obstacle was the city of
Termessus (today Gülük). Situated some 40 km to the north-west of Perge
in Pisidia, Termessus guarded a pass into the Maeander valley. On account
of the inaccessible Pisidian Mountains surrounding it, the city had not
been subjugated to the rule of Persian satraps and now its inhabitants also
had no intention of allowing the Macedonians to pass through their land.
The terrain was shaped in such a way that there was only one road leading
through a narrow valley between two mountains at an altitude of 1,000 m.
This road the Termessians easily blocked, but deceived by the sight of the
Macedonians appearing to be calmly bivouacking, they returned to their
city leaving behind only some guards to keep watch. Alexander then
launched a surprise attack with Macedonian archers, light infantry and
some specially selected hoplites. Next he led his army through this
dangerous zone. Despite Strabo’s claim, the Macedonians did not take the
city of Termessus for they lacked the necessary siege equipment. 58
However, the fight with the Termessians inclined the inhabitants of
another Pisidian city called Selge, who were bitter enemies of their
neighbours the Termessians, to offer an alliance with the Macedonian king.
Alexander willingly accepted their offer and next marched his army for
Sagalassus, which was situated 80 km to the north and belonged to a chain
of fortresses stretching all the way to Celaenae. Thanks to the farming of
fertile valleys this was a large and prosperous city. Its Pisidian inhabitants
had the reputation of being good soldiers and their defensive position was
all the more difficult to capture on account of it being located on a 200-
56
Arr., An.,1.25.5-27.4; It. Alex., 26. Debord 1999, p. 451-452; Nawotka 2003a, p.
30.
57
Arr., An., 3.6.6. Bosworth 1980, p. 284; Heckel 1992, p. 228.
58
Arr., An., 1.27.5-8; Str., 14.3.9. Magie 1950, pp. 263-264; Bosworth 1980, pp.
169-170.
From Abydus to Alexandria 147
wishing to control this part of the continent had to use. One has to
remember that so far only a small part of Asia Minor – the Aegean coast
and a few inland regions in the west of this vast peninsula – was in
Macedonian hands. The Persian generals were now raising an army in the
north of Asia Minor. Bearing indirect testimony as to their preparations for
a counteroffensive was the large-scale production of coins at the mint in
Sinope; this money was needed to pay the soldiers. Thanks to these coins
we know the names of the chief Persian commanders: Mithropastes,
Hydarnes and the satrap of Caria Orontobates. No doubt on the Great
King’s instructions, these generals were preparing to cut Alexander’s line
of communication with the Asia Minor coast and thus themselves gain
access to the Persian fleet. Before he left Celaenae or – according to
Arrian – later in Gordium, Alexander received envoys from Athens who
requested him to release their fellow citizens who had been captured at
Granicus. These prisoners were, however, much too valuable as hostages
ensuring Athens’s continued loyalty at what was still a very uncertain time.
Therefore Alexander promised the envoys that he would release the
captives but only once the war was ended.60
From Celaenae Alexander’s army marched across Phrygia to Gordium,
where it was supposed to meet up with Parmenion’s corps. The 290-km
journey must have taken the soldiers about a month, though they were
marching on the well built Royal Road. Taking into account the several
month long campaigns in Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia as well as the trek
across Phrygia, one can assume that Alexander reached Gordium no
earlier than in May 333. The fact that the sources record no incidents
during the march across Phrygia suggests that the area had already been
pacified by Parmenion. Alexander’s complicated itinerary so far as well as
the actions undertaken on his instructions by his commanders suggest that
occupying the entire coastline to deprive the Persian fleet of a base was
not the Macedonian king’s only objective. The aim of this campaign seems
also to have been the conquest of the whole of southern and central
Anatolia, which, despite their defeat at Granicus, was still in Persian
hands.61
Gordium, situated on the river Sangarius, on the border between both
Phrygias (Great Phrygia and Hellespontine Phrygia) and onetime capital of
60
Curt., 3.1.1-10 (principal source); Arr., An., 1.29.1-3, 5-6. Magie 1950, p. 983;
Bosworth 1980, pp. 172-174; Atkinson 1980, pp. 80-84; Seibert 1985, pp. 54-56;
Briant 1996, p. 851. The career of Antigonus Monophthalmus: Briant 1973;
Billows 1990; Heckel 1992, pp. 50-56.
61
Arr., An., 1.29.3; Diod., 17.27.6; Curt., 3.1.11. Bosworth 1980, p. 174; Seibert
1985, p. 56; Debord 1999, p. 455.
From Abydus to Alexandria 149
the Phrygian state, was long past its former glory. First destroyed by the
Cimmerians at the start of the 7th century and then again by Cyrus the
Great in 547/546, it was now rebuilt but its previous political importance
was gone. In Persian times it was not the residence of satraps but of lower
ranking officials. The city itself was quite large, archaeologists have
established that it covered an area of 100 hectares, but now it was chiefly a
centre for local crafts and trade. The district that at the time of the
Phrygian state had been inhabited by powerful political elites, in
Alexander’s day was the site of workshops.62 The most important edifice
in the Gordium acropolis was the temple of the Phrygian deity called
Basileus (King). The Greeks and Macedonians associated him with Zeus,
therefore the father of Heracles, the mythical ancestor of the Argeads. It
was there, or according to certain authors in a palace in that acropolis, that
Gordias’s legendary cart was kept. Gordias was the father of Midas, the
founder of the Phrygian dynasty. According to legend, Gordias was a
simple peasant who once whilst ploughing received a sign from Zeus in
the form of an eagle landing on the yoke of his oxen. The famous cart was
fastened to the yoke by an intricate knot (or knots) of cornel bark with the
ends of the fastening hidden. Legend also had it that whoever managed to
untie this knot would become ruler of Asia. Towards the end of his stay in
Gordium Alexander went to the acropolis to examine the famous cart.
Though according to popular 4th-century legends the Phrygians’ original
homeland was Macedonia, one need not suppose that this was why
Alexander decided to go there. He could have simply wanted to see the
cart out of curiosity, according to Arrian, driven by an insurmountable
urge (pothos). Assuming that the Gordian knot legend originated from the
time of the Phrygian monarchy, i.e. at the start of the first millennium, the
word ‘Asia’ would have had its original Hittite meaning, referring to the
north-western part of Asia Minor, in other words, more or less the area
covered by the Phrygian monarchy. With time the meaning of the word
was extended to encompass the entire continent, and in the political sense
the Achaemenid Empire (see Chapter V.3). Bearing in mind his intention,
officially declared at the Hellespont, to conquer the Persian Empire and
the fact that he always attached great importance to symbols and
prophesies, Alexander could not but rise to the challenge, especially when
he was accompanied by a crowd of Macedonians and local inhabitants.
With the ends concealed, the knot was impossible to untie, so Alexander
was forced to resort to an unconventional solution. The sources provide us
with two versions as to what happened next. A version originating from
62
Arr., An., 1.29.5; Just., 11.7.3. Bosworth 1980, p. 175; Mellink 1988, pp. 228-
231; Voigt, Young 1999, pp. 191-241.
150 Chapter IV
Aristobulus states that Alexander removed a pin that was slotted through
the cart’s shaft and this way also separated the yoke from the shaft. The
other version, belonging to the Vulgate and therefore originating from
Cleitarchus, states that Alexander cut the knot with his sword completely
(Arrian, Curtius) or partially (Plutarch, Justin); in the Plutarch and Justin’s
version Alexander merely wished to find the ends of the binding bark
which enabled him to next untie the knot. Arrian himself was unable to
decide which version of separating the yoke from the cart was more
plausible, therefore today scholars can only conclude that the version
where Alexander cut the knot with his sword, being so much more vivid
and characteristic of the young king’s impetuous nature, was generally
preferred by the ancient authors. Whichever version was true, Alexander
and his companions returned from that site convinced that a prophecy had
been fulfilled, as was confirmed that very night by Zeus with thunder and
lightning. The following day a grateful Alexander offered sacrifices to the
gods.63
It was at Gordium that, after a long trek across Asia Minor, the newly-
married men returned from their winter stay in Macedonia. Accompanying
them were new reserves: 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from Macedonia
and as well as 200 horsemen from Thessaly and 150 from Elis. This was
the first of three batches of reinforcements from Macedonia and Greece
that Alexander would receive in 333. The constant need for new troops
resulted not only because of larger numbers of soldiers left on garrison
duty in newly and not necessarily completely conquered territories but also
because of losses incurred as a result of the war. Apart from those killed in
the actual fighting, which the sources inform us about, there must have
also been losses which the sources ignore, for instance, as a result of
wounds after which soldiers were incapacitated and perhaps eventually
died. Moreover, it should be noted that if in European campaigns in early
modern times twice as many soldiers died from diseases than were killed
in battles, then proportion must have been at least similar in Alexander’s
day. This problem would have been compounded in the Macedonian army
by the state of ancient medicine, which may have been adequate for
treating wounds but virtually helpless against diseases. Finally, the
63
Arr., An., 2.3; Curt., 3.1.14-16; Plu., Alex., 18.2-4; Just., 11.7; Marsyas, FGrH,
135/6 F4. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 262-265; Bosworth 1980, pp. 194-188; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 46-47; Zahrnt 2001; Squilace 2005, pp. 211-213. Alexander’s visit and the
legend of origins of the Phrygians: Fredricksmeyer 1961. Pothos as curiosity:
O’Brien 1992, p. 50. Asia in this context: Schachermeyr 1973, p. 192; Atkinson
1980, p. 87; Oost 1981, pp. 265-266; Nawotka 2004.
From Abydus to Alexandria 151
necessity to recruit more soldiers in 333 was also of course associated with
the impending confrontation with the great army of Darius III.64
The Persian counteroffensive of 333 began with the arrival of spring.
Darius III now appointed Memnon the commander-in-chief of the entire
war and further strengthened his position with additional funds for him to
be able to maintain the great fleet and mercenary army. Memnon almost
certainly realised the futility of trying to confront the superior Macedonian
army in a pitched battle and that is why he reverted to his original plan
once proclaimed in Zeleia to the satraps of Asia Minor and consisting of
shifting the war to Greece. The first step to this end would be an
occupation of the Aegean archipelago, which would provide Memnon with
a base for operations in Greece. This would also make it possible to next
occupy the Hellespont and thus effectively cut Alexander off from
Macedonia. War in Greece and a serious threat to Macedonian security
would force Alexander to return to Europe. A similar manoeuvre had been
successfully conducted by Persia 60 years earlier, when they skilfully
applied diversionary tactics in Greece to effectively stop the Spartan King
Agesilaus’ military operations in Asia Minor. From his base on the Island
of Kos Memnon set sail with 300 ships north towards the largest island
poleis. At least some of these were ruled by oligarchies that towards the
end of Philip II’s reign had switched to his side and joined the League of
Corinth. Now in face of Memnon’s formidable fleet they quickly changed
sides again. Chios switched allegiance without a struggle. Four of the five
states on Lesbos surrendered instantly: Antissa, Methymna, Pyrrha and
Eresus. In the largest state Mytilene, however, the garrison of mercenaries
that had been sent there by Alexander and the citizens decided to resist.
Memnon therefore cut the city off from the other states by constructing a
double stockade stretching to the sea on either side and also blocked the
seaport with his ships, thus depriving the defenders of any hope of
receiving help. He then managed the lure the much weaker Mytilenean
fleet into a sea battle which his navy easily won. Memnon also had time to
concentrate on things other than the siege of Mytilene. The Greek states of
the Cyclades came over to his side, others he was able to win over with
bribes. The pro-Macedonian camp was now beset by terrifying rumours of
an imminent invasion of Euboea.65
64
Arr., An., 1.29.4. Bosworth 1980, pp. 174-175; Ruffin 1992; Salazar 2000, pp.
68-72.
65
Arr., An., 2.1.1-2; Diod., 17.18.2, 17.29; Fron., Str., 2.5.46. Burn 1952, pp. 82-
83; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 152-153; Hamilton 1974, p. 63; Hammond 1996, pp. 89-90;
Debord 1999, pp. 457-459.
152 Chapter IV
66
Murison 1972, pp. 404-405.
67
Arr., An., 2.2.3-4; Curt., 3.1.19-20. Atkinson 1980, pp. 92-95; Heckel 1992, pp.
6-12.
From Abydus to Alexandria 153
the provisions of the King’s Peace of 387/386 even though they had never
really applied to Lesbos. One of the former exiles was appointed tyrant of
Mytilene and a Persian garrison was now installed in the city, which was
commanded by Lycomedes of Rhodes and no doubt comprised Greek
mercenaries. Pharnabazus also ordered the defeated city to pay a
contribution, which was the first sign that in the Aegean the Persians were
beginning to have financial problems. Their monthly expenditure
exceeded 300 talents and now there were no more tributes coming in from
Asia Minor.68
After the settling of these affairs at Mytilene the Persian commanders
split up: Autophradates continued the conquest of other Greek islands,
while Pharnabazus sailed with the mercenary army to Lycia. This could
have led to the opening of a new and important front in Asia Minor for the
army of the Persian satrap Orontobates was still stationed in neighbouring
Caria. However, before this could happen, command of Pharnabazus’
mercenaries was taken over by Memnon’s nephew Thymondas, sent by
Darius III to bring these troops over to the royal army. As a consolation,
Pharnabazus was officially appointed to the post previously held by
Memnon. So Pharnabazus now rejoined Autophradates and, commanding
100 ships, together they sailed for the island of Tenedos (today Bozca
Ada). The island capitulated on similar terms to those that had been
imposed on Mytilene. Hegelochus, the Macedonian commander of the
Hellespontine region, still did not have enough ships to be able to help
allies. This success was important insofar as it gave the Persian fleet a base
just off the coast of the Troad from which access to the Hellespont could
be easily controlled. And in those times it was via the Hellespont that all
the most important trade routes ran, for instance, the transport of Black
Sea grain to Athens. Meanwhile the ships of Autophradates, operating
from the island of Samothrace, posed a serious threat to Macedonia. Coins
provide evidence that Autophradates’ army actually landed in the Troad. It
was in the late summer or early autumn of 333 that they also landed in
Ionia and fought a victorious battle against detachments from Ephesus.
However, the Persians failed to capture this great city. A smaller Persian
squadron of ten Phoenician ships under the command of Datames sailed in
the opposite direction towards the Cyclades and lowered anchors by the
shore of the island of Siphnos. On receiving news of this the Macedonian
Proteas sailed with 15 ships from Chalcis in Euboea and attacked the
68
Arr., An., 2.1.3-5; Diod., 17.29.2-4, 17.31.3-4; Plu., Alex., 18.5; Curt., 3.2.21.
Wilcken 1967, pp. 96-97; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 153-154; Bosworth 1980, pp. 112-
113, 181; Briant 1996, pp. 851-852.
154 Chapter IV
69
Arr., An., 2.2; Curt., 3.3.1; Polyaen., 7.27.2; Plu., mor., 339f. Atkinson 1980,
pp.114-117; Bosworth 1980, pp. 183-184; Bosworth 1988, p. 53; Seibert 1985, pp.
59-60; Debord 1999, p. 460.
70
Curt., 4.1.36-37; [D.], 17.20. Atkinson 1980, pp. 288-290; Seibert 1985, p. 60;
Bosworth 1988, p. 53; Debord 1999, p. 461.
From Abydus to Alexandria 155
happened when the economic situation was so bad that no mortal was able
to bear the financial burden of holding the state’s most prestigious office.71
Memnon’s death dashed Darius III’s hopes of stopping Alexander’s
invasion by the traditional means of attacking the enemy from behind, i.e.
by employing diversionary tactics in Greece. Diodorus and, in a
rhetorically modified version, also Curtius Rufus relate a conference
between the Great King and a circle of notables concerning future plans
for the war held at Babylon, which was the nearest Persian capital to the
actual fighting. Most of the Persian advisors were in favour of the king
personally leading the army, which in Persian history was something that
happened very rarely, in exceptional cases. The Athenian Charidemus,
who had fled from Alexander to the Persian court, was of a different
opinion and suggested that Darius III should keep far away from the
fighting while an army of hundred thousand troops, a third of which Greek
mercenaries, would march to confront Alexander. The Athenian himself
could command such an army. Darius was initially inclined in favour of
this more sober suggestion. However, the Persian notables did not like this
idea at all. Genuinely or just in the fervour of debate, they even accused
the Athenian of intending to treacherously hand over the Achaemenid
Empire to the Macedonian king. Charidemus had not had time to learn
Persian customs and assuming this to be a political debate like the ones he
knew from democratic Greece responded in a shockingly free manner: he
questioned the Persians’ courage. Unfortunately this insulted the Great
King, who by touching the Athenian’s belt sentenced him to death. The
sentence was immediately executed. Thus Darius III lost yet another brave
and competent Greek general, this time as consequence of a cultural
misunderstanding, and now he had no other option than to lead his army
himself.72
Alexander most probably stayed in Gordium until early summer
(June/July) 333 to allow his troops to rest after the arduous autumn and
winter campaigns and to wait for news from Greece and the Aegean Sea.
There he received envoys from Greece and Asia Minor. His authority was
put to the test when he ordered the tyrant of Heraclea Pontica, Dionysius,
to receive back those who had been banished by his father, Clearchus, and
restore democracy to his state. Unfortunately, Macedonian authority did
not stretch that far north and so the tyrant was able to ignore Alexander
with impunity. Soon after the Gordian knot incident (two days later
according to Arrian) Alexander and his army set off on the Royal Road in
a northeast direction. The first major city they encountered on this new
71
Curt., 4.5.13, 4.1.37; Milet i.3.122.iiI 83. Debord 1999, pp. 462-463.
72
Diod., 17.30; Curt., 3.2.10-19. Atkinson 1980, pp. 108-114.
156 Chapter IV
campaign was Ancyra, situated some 100 km from Gordium. It was there
that he was met by envoys from Paphlagonia, a land that was part of
Hellespontine Phrygia but which for much of the 4th century was ruled
only indirectly by the Persian satrap; his deputy was a local monarch who
was always eager to show his independence. It is possible, as Curtius
Rufus writes, that Alexander launched a short campaign to subjugate
Paphlagonia. The country remained part of Hellespontine Phrygia and was
put under the authority of Alexander’s appointed satrap, Calas. That this
rule was weak or perhaps only nominal is reflected in the fact that no
tribute was imposed. Hostages were taken to ensure loyalty, but the next
year Paphlagonia returned to the Persian side.73
The next objective of the Macedonian invasion was Cappadocia; or
rather so-called Great Cappadocia for Pontic Cappadocia on the Black Sea
coast may have been a separate satrapy which remained always outside
Macedonian control. Ariarathes, this country’s king or perhaps satrap, not
only acquired at that time independence but even managed to gradually
expand his domain. The royal dynasty he founded was to rule Cappadocia
for the next three centuries. On account of its central location and
intensive Iranian colonisation, Great Cappadocia was strategically
important to anyone who wished to rule over Asia Minor. The sources
report no battles in this region. After occupying this province Alexander
appointed an oriental noble as satrap, most probably a local Cappadocian.
His real name is now impossible to identify as the ancient authors call him
either Sabictas (Arrian) or Abistamenes (Curtius Rufus).74
It was in Cappadocia that Alexander learned of Memnon’s death and it
was presumably soon after receiving this news that he decided to cross the
river Halys, which on more than one occasion in history delineated an
important border for the territorial aspirations of great powers. If that was
the case, Alexander’s next objective must have been Mazaca – the
residence of the satrap of Cappadocia. After that he led his army through
Tyana and over the Taurus Mountains to Tarsus, the capital of Cilicia. In
face of this sudden turn of events the country’s satrap, Arsames, tried to
apply the scorched earth policy that had once been suggested by Memnon.
Curtius Rufus criticises Arsames for not deciding to defend the Cilician
Gates (today called Gülek Bogazi), the 1,050 metre high pass and Tarsus
73
Arr., An., 2.4.1; Curt., 3.1.22-24; Plu., Alex., 18.5; Memnon, FGrH, 434 F4.1.
Burstein 1976, pp. 73-74; Atkinson 1980, pp. 96-97; Bosworth 1980, p. 188;
Seibert 1985, pp. 62-63; Debord 1999, pp. 301, 455.
74
Arr., An., 2.4.2; Str., 12.4.1; Curt., 3.4.1. Bosworth 1980, p. 189; Atkinson 1980,
pp. 135-136; Seibert 1985, p. 63; Jacobs 1994, pp. 140-144; Heckel 2006, p. 44.
On Pontic Cappadocia see: Briant 1996, p. 761; Sartre 2003, p. 15.
From Abydus to Alexandria 157
river valley that joins the Anatolian Highlands with the Cilician lowlands,
from what was in Alexander’s day called the Camp of Cyrus (today
Pozanti) to Tarsus. However, the Cilician Gates could be easily bypassed
and even a determined defence could not have stopped Alexander’s army.
On the other hand, the version of events given by Curtius Rufus was based
on an anonymous eyewitness’s account and is therefore more credible than
Arrian’s glorifying tale of Alexander personally leading a select unit of
soldiers against the Persian guards. However, Arsames scorched earth
tactics that devastated some of the land beyond the Gates also proved
ineffective. The inhabitants of Tarsus, who were terrified by Arsames’
plans to burn their city, warned Alexander of what the satrap was doing.
The king immediately dispatched Parmenion with the cavalry and the
fastest marching troops to save the city. They covered the 55 km distance
from the Cilician Gates to Tarsus in a short enough space of time
(according to Justin in one day) to save the city. Arsames next joined up
with Darius III’s army.75
Alexander reached Tarsus at the end of summer, after a short but tiring
campaign in central Anatolia. His stay there could well have marked the
end of his spectacular career, not because of any wounds incurred in
fighting the Persians but because of an illness. Aristobulus is of the
opinion that the king was simply exhausted. However, another source (one
the ancient authors do not identify) claims it was consequence of his
bathing in the river Cydnus, which flowed through Tarsus. Probably the
original and most plausible version was that Alexander bathed in water
that was too cold. Aristobulus, however, would not have wished to say
Alexander imprudently immersed himself in icy-cold water in summer and
therefore preferred to explain that the illness was a result of exhaustion.
The water of the Kydnos River, like that of other rivers flowing from the
snow covered mountains of Taurus, is extremely cold. Much later, on 10th
June 1190, it was as consequence of bathing in one of them (Calycadnus
also known as Saleph and today as Göksu) that Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa, who had been leading an up to that moment victorious Third
Crusade, lost his life. Alexander’s dip in the Cydnus resulted in
convulsions, a high fever and insomnia. Such symptoms are usually
associated with pneumonia. The only physician in the camp to agree to try
and cure him was Philip of Acarnania, who prepared for the king a potent
medicine, according to Arrian a purgative. The ancient authors add greater
drama to the situation by relating a letter from Parmenion warning the king
against this very physician, who had allegedly been given 1,000 talents by
75
Plu., Alex., 18.5; Arr., An., 2.4.3-6; Curt., 3.4.1-15; Just., 11.8.2; It. Alex., 26-27.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 189-190; Seibert 1985, pp. 63-64.
158 Chapter IV
76
Arr., An., 2.4.7-11; Diod., 17.31.4-6; Curt., 3.5-6; Plu., Alex., 19; Luc., Dom., 1;
Ps.-Callisth., 1.41 (rec. b); Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.6; POxy.
1798 (= FGrH, 148), fr. 44; V. Max., 3.8, ext.6; Just., 11.8; It. Alex., 28-30.
Wilcken 1967, p. 98; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 202; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 161-162;
Green 1974, pp. 220-221; Bosworth 1980, pp. 190-192; Salazar 2000, pp. 190-192.
77
Arr., An., 3.6.7. Bosworth 1988, p. 57; Heckel 1992, pp. 213-217.
From Abydus to Alexandria 159
occupied eastern Cilicia including the city of Issus, in the vicinity of which
the first battle between Darius III and Alexander was to be fought.
Unfortunately, the fairly vague descriptions in the sources do not allow us
to establish for certain which of the two passes Parmenion was heading for:
the Pillars of Jonah (Merkes Su) or the more distant Syrian Gates (Belen
Pass). If we accept Plutarch’s suggestion that the Macedonian strategy at
the time was to shift the war into Syria, it seems more probable that
Parmenion secured the latter of these two passes. Next this expeditionary
force returned west to meet up with Alexander’s army.78
By about mid October 333 Alexander had fully recovered his health
and the first thing he did was to take a daylong journey to the south west
of Tarsus to the city of Anchialos. Here was what in Antiquity was called
the Tomb of Sardanapalus, but it may have also been a monument to the
Assyrian King Sancherib’s victory over a rebellious Cilicia. Sardanapalus
was a legendary figure whose name was derived from that of the last great
Assyrian king, Assurbanipal. On this tomb there was engraved a message,
reputedly in Assyrian: ‘These are still mine – what I ate, and my wanton
love-frolics.’ This was an allusion to the Assyrian king’s love of
banqueting and sexual promiscuity. In all probability the inscription was
invented by the ancient Greek authors to contrast an unmanly and
debauched Sardanapalus with the energetic and chaste Alexander.79 From
Anchialos the Macedonian army marched 20 km further west to the
coastal city of Soli. Here Alexander founded a democratic system of
government, installed a garrison and charged the inhabitants an
extraordinarily high fine of 200 talents. He also took hostages, for which
reason three quarters of the fine soon filled the royal treasury. This drastic
action indicates that Alexander’s finances were in a critical state at the
time. This is further confirmed by the fact that when after the Battle of
Issus the Macedonian army had acquired a lot of booty, Soli was relieved
from paying the rest of this fine. Military operations in western Cilicia
were ended with a seven-day campaign in the mountains around Soli that
were inhabited by independent and fairly primitive tribes. However, this
did not complete the conquest of Cicilia. Balacrus, whom Alexander had
appointed satrap of Cilicia, had to continue the pacification of the Taurus
mountain region and was indeed killed in fighting with the highlanders.80
78
Arr., An., 2.5.1; Diod., 17.32.2; Curt., 3.7.6-7; Plu., Alex., 20.4. Chronology:
Bosworth 1980, p. 192. Topography: Seibert 1985, pp. 64-65.
79
Arr., An., 2.5.2-4; Plu., mor., 330f. Bosworth 1980, pp. 193-195; Hammond
1996, p. 94; Nawotka 2003, p. 86.
80
Arr., An., 2.5.5-6; Curt., 3.7.2-4. Bosworth 1980, p. 195; Debord 1999, p. 164.
160 Chapter IV
81
Arr., An., 2.5.7-8; Curt., 3.7.3-4. Bosworth 1980, p. 197; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 147-
149; Debord 1999, p. 461.
From Abydus to Alexandria 161
changed. This would have left too little time for the entire imperial army to
be mobilised.82
The Persian forces most probably set out from Babylon in September,
after the hottest part of the Mesopotamian summer ended and the harvest
had filled granaries to provide the soldiers with sufficient provisions.
Weighed down by huge baggage trains the Persian army needed two
months to cover the 900 km distance from Babylon to Cilicia, where in
November the battle against the Macedonians would be fought. The
crossing of the Euphrates itself lasted five days. Curtius Rufus colourfully
contrasts the elaborate Persian procession with the simplicity and
toughness of the Macedonian army. According to custom, the Persian
army would start marching at dawn. At the head of the column the sacred
fire would be carried on silver alters. This most characteristic of Persian
military rituals was also practiced in the Sassanid era, a thousand years
later. Following the flame there would be magi singing religious songs,
and behind them 365 youths dressed in purple. Both their number and the
colour of their attire were symbolic. Their number signified the days in the
Persian year and alluded to cosmic nature of the monarch’s authority,
whereas purple was the colour of warriors. Behind them travelled Ahura
Mazda’s (Jupiter’s, according to Curtius) chariot drawn by white horses
and Mithra’s (the Sun’s according to Curtius) horse. Next came a squadron
of cavalry and behind it marched the guard of 10,000 ‘immortals’ and
15,000 specially selected horsemen, the so-called ‘Kinsmen’ who were not
necessarily the monarch’s relatives but nevertheless granted this honorary
title by the Great King. Then came the Royal bodyguards called the
doryphoroi (‘spearmen’) or at other times the melophori after the apple-
shaped (melon) butts of their spears. Behind the bodyguards rode the Great
King wearing his ceremonial cloak and tiara, surrounded by 400 ‘relatives’.
The monarch’s chariot was gilded and adorned with symbols of Ahura
Mazda and Mithra (Ninus and Belus according to Curtius) as well as the
Achaemenid eagle. Following him were 30,000 infantry, the royal horses,
and in carriages the monarch’s mother, wife and children as well as 360
Royal concubines. Archers escorted the Royal treasure chests, which were
carried by 600 mules and 300 camels. And following on behind were the
courtiers, the servants and the rest of the army. To sum up, Darius III’s
82
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.18.2); Curt., 3.2.2-9; Diod., 17.31.2; Just.,
11.9.1; Arr., An., 2.8.8; Plu., Alex., 18.6; POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148) F44, col.
2.2/3. Atkinson 1980, pp. 99-108; Vogelsang 1992, pp. 219-221.
162 Chapter IV
83
Curt., 3.3.8-25. Engels 1978, pp. 42-43; Atkinson 1980, pp. 120-133; Boyce
1982, pp. 286-287; Seibert 1985, pp. 68-69; Nylander 1993, pp. 150-151.
84
Arr., An., 2.5.5, 2.6.1; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.17.2); Diod.,
17.32.2-3; J., AJ, 11.8.3.
From Abydus to Alexandria 163
Legend had it that the city was founded by colonists from Argos, which
was also the homeland of Heracles, the mythological ancestor of the
Argead dynasty. However, as in the case of Soli, Mallus was obliged to
supply ships. The next stop on Alexander’s itinerary was Castabalum,
which lay a day’s journey from Mallus. It was there that Parmenion’s
corps joined up with the main Macedonian army.85
While he was still at Mallus Alexander learned that Darius was
encamped in Sochoi. In response to this news he summoned a council.
Next he marched his army closer towards the Persians until he reached the
city of Myriandrus, whose exact location is unknown. We only know from
Xenophon’s Anabasis that the city lay 5 parasang (27 km) from the Syrian
Gates, therefore somewhere in the region of today’s city of Iskenderun and
c. 140 km from Mallus. It took the Macedonian army five days to cover
this distance. The ancient sources do not concur as to what Alexander’s
actual plan was. Arrian states that objective of the march was to attack the
Persian army where it was stationed. Curtius Rufus, on the other hand,
states that Alexander accepted Parmenion’s advice to seek confrontation in
a mountain pass where the terrain would not allow the Persians to make
use of their numerical advantage. However, although the Battle of Issus
did indeed take place in an area where numerical superiority failed to work
in the Persians’ favour, Alexander’s actions contradict Curtius’s
explanation. Not only did he not secure all of the mountain passes into
Cilicia but, what is worse, he himself actually went through one of them to
the other side, where he expected to find the Persian camp. Therefore the
first version seems more probable, that is, an offensive plan to seek out the
enemy forces and attack them where they were stationed. That was why
Alexander crossed over to the other side of the Amanus Mountains. On the
way Alexander’s army passed through Issus, which had previously been
occupied by Parmenion. This fairly small town was in a place known
today as Kinet Hüyük, on a low (20 m) hill half a kilometre from the sea
and 7 km to the north west of today’s town of Dörtyol. The Macedonians
set up a field hospital at Issus for their wounded and sick soldiers; thus the
army was now free to move much faster. It has been estimated that
Myriandrus was over 30 km from Issus and the Macedonian army covered
that distance within one day. After this forced march, the Macedonian
army had to stop over at Myriandrus on account of a violent storm. It was
also there that Alexander received the disturbing news that Darius’ army
was no longer at Sochoi and had now reappeared behind them. At first he
could not believe this to be true, but the crew of a thirty-oar ship was sent
85
Arr., An., 2.5.8-9; Curt., 3.7.5; Str., 14.5.17; It. Alex., 31. Bosworth 1980, pp.
197-198; Huttner 1997, pp. 91-92.
164 Chapter IV
out to reconnoitre and later it confirmed that the Persians were now indeed
camped on the coast behind Alexander’s army.86
Sochoi was situated on a broad plain that would have been ideal for the
massed Persian cavalry if the Macedonians had crossed one of the
mountain passes. The reason why the Great King left this strategically
advantageous position and moved into mountainous Cilicia, where the
terrain did no allow him to use his army’s numerical superiority is one of
the greatest puzzles of the Macedonian-Persian war. Curtius’s suggestion
that the Great King decided to move into Cilicia on receiving news of
Alexander’s illness is quite unconvincing on account of the chronological
sequence of events. Alexander’s illness lasted some time and was then
followed by the Macedonian campaign in Cilicia, which in a way can
explain the Persian army’s haste. Arrian writes about Darius’s drawn out
stay at Sochoi and uncertainty as to what Alexander was planning on
account of the surprisingly long time he was spending in Cilicia as well as
the imprudent advice of his Persian flatterers. The sycophants convinced
the Great King that Alexander was too fearful of the mighty Persian army
to advance any further. They encouraged Darius to engage Alexander in
battle in Cilicia, for even there the excellent Persian cavalry was capable
of defeating the Macedonians. Arrian and Plutarch show that the
Macedonian fugitive Amyntas who knew Alexander well assured the
Great King that the impetuous young ruler would be eager to fight. One
only had to wait for him to turn up wherever a prepared Persian army was
stationed. In Curtius’ account this were some anonymous Greek
mercenaries who offered Darius this more sensible advice badly received
by the Persian courtiers. We know that the Great King did not heed the
sober words of the real expert or experts, but the sources do not tell us why
he took the decision he did other than making some general comments
about fate and a propensity to follow bad advice.87
There is no reason to doubt the reports of sensible advisors in the
Persian camp, even if Curtius Rufus’s account of mercenaries giving
advice is probably erroneously borrowed form the incident between
Charidemus and Darius at the Babylon conference. It is possible that one
of the reasons why such advice was rejected – mentioned here by Curtius
and also referred to in descriptions of councils in the Persian camp –
concerned the mistrust held by the Iranian aristocracy towards the Greeks,
86
X., An., 1.4.6; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (=Plb., 12.17.2, 12.19.4); Arr., An.,
2.6.1, 2.7.1-2; Curt., 3.7.9-10. Engels 1978, pp. 47-51; Bosworth 1980, pp. 199-
202; Bing 1993.
87
Arr., An., 2.6.3-7; Plu., Alex., 20.1-4; Curt., 3.7.1, 3.8.1-11. Atkinson 1980, p.
170.
From Abydus to Alexandria 165
Macedonian will to fight. Indeed, these mutilated soldiers were the first to
inform Alexander that the Persians were now behind his army.88
The Persian strategy had surprised Alexander, who was now cut off
from his bases in Cilicia and the rest of Asia Minor. When we also
consider the superiority of the Persian fleet, which could cut off the supply
of provisions by sea, it becomes apparent that the Macedonian army was
now in a trap and the only way out of it was to defeat Darius III in a battle.
Alexander must have certainly been aware of the threat from the Persian
fleet for it was then that he performed the ceremony of driving his chariot
into the sea to pay homage to the sea gods Poseidon, Thetis, Nereus and
Nereids. Indeed, the Persians needed no more than an undecided draw on
the battlefield to further extend their strategic advantage.89 Fortunately for
the Macedonians, the Persian command also planned to rout their enemy
in a pitched battle. Having obtained information from the captured
Macedonians and the local population about where the enemy was located,
Darius sent his army south in the direction of the coastal plain around
Myriandrus and Syria, where there was a greater possibility of fighting a
battle in open territory. He was now aware that the coastal plain of
Iskenderun Bay was too narrow for him to make full advantage of Persian
numerical superiority. During a day’s march his army got no further than
the river Pinarus and there the Persians set up camp. Meanwhile Alexander,
having realised that the Persian army was no longer in Cilicia, summoned
a war council and declared his decision to confront the enemy in battle.
Arrian relates a speech Alexander is supposed to have given on this
occasion in which he drew attention to the tactical advantages of fighting
the battle in a confined space and of the superior combat quality of the
Macedonian soldier over feeble Asiatic slaves and mercenaries with no
real incentive to fight for Darius. He is also said to have mentioned the
rewards (booty) to be gained from defeating the Great King. Finally he
referred to historic examples, particularly Xenophon’s recorded
experiences of how in 401 Greek mercenaries victoriously marched from
Babylon to the Black Sea. Although speeches related by ancient author are
usually little more than demonstrations of a given historian’s rhetorical
talents, here one should not doubt that Alexander did actually gave a
speech. There was a tradition for commanders and politicians to deliver
88
Curt., 3.8.3-5, 3.8.13-13; Arr., An., 2.7.1; Plu., Alex., 20.4-5. Wilcken 1967, pp.
100-101; Murison 1972; Hamilton 1974, p. 67; Engels 1978, pp. 45-46; Bosworth
1980, pp. 199-201, 203; Bosworth 1988, p. 59; Seibert 1985, p. 59; Dąbrowa 1988,
p. 50; Hammond 1996, p. 95.
89
POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148) fr. 44, col. ii. Tarn 1948, i, p. 24; Green 1974, p.
226-227; Briant 1996, p. 43.
From Abydus to Alexandria 167
90
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.17.3-4); Plu., Alex., 20.5-6; Diod., 17.33.1;
Arr., An., 2.7; Curt., 3.10.3-10; Just., 11.9.3-4. Wilcken 1967, p. 101; Bosworth
1980, p. 204.
168 Chapter IV
far from the Syrian Gates if the two armies managed to clash that same
day in November 333.91
The battle known in historiography as the Battle of Issus was actually
fought some distance away from that town at one of the short rivers
flowing from the Amanus Mountains into the Iskenderun Bay, which the
sources call Pinarus, on a narrow stretch of lowland measuring 14 stades
(2.5 km) in width. The very limited topographical information that can be
derived from the ancient sources as well as the hydrological changes that
must have occurred in this part of the Mediterranean coast over the
centuries do not allow us to identify with any reasonable certainty which
of today’s watercourses was once called Pinarus. Therefore it is very
difficult to accurately locate where the battle took place. Three possible
locations have emerged from an academic debate that has lasted over a
century: Deli Çay, Kuru Çay and Payas. At 20 km from Iskenderun, Payas
is the southernmost of these rivers. Kuru Çay flows into the sea 3 km
further north, and it is another 8 km to the Deli Çay. The attention of
modern scholars was first drawn to the Deli Çay because it is the largest of
these rivers, the generally level terrain to the south would have made a 40-
stade march in battle formation possible and the gently sloped and low 2-3
m banks would not have precluded the cavalry charge described by Arrian.
On the other hand, the sources in no way suggest that Pinarus was the
largest river in the area, the Macedonians probably marched in battle
formation for a shorter distance than 40 stades and the coastal plain at Deli
Çay stretches for 7.5 km, which is much more than the 14 stades described
by Callisthenes. Moreover, the distance from Deli Çay to the Syrian Gates
is much too great to imagine that the Macedonian army could have
descended the mountains, reached this river and fought a battle all on the
same day. Inspections of the region by more recent historians (Hammond
and Lane Fox) have suggested that the Payas best fits the descriptions
given by the ancient sources. Its banks are steeper but the plain around it is
just 4 km wide which is much closer to the 14 stades mentioned by
Callisthenes than the 7.5 km at the mouth of the Deli Çay.92
91
Plb., 12.17-20; Arr., An., 2.8; Diod., 17.33.1; Curt., 3.8.24; Cic., Att., 5.20.3.
Engels 1978, pp. 131-134; Bosworth 1980, pp. 206-207, 219; Bosworth 1988, p.
60. Date: Arr., An., 2.11.10.
92
Most important works arguing for identification of the Pinarus with these three
rivers are: for Deli Çay – Janke 1910; Seibert 1972, pp. 98-102; Atkinson 1980, pp.
471-476; for Kuru Çay – Bosworth 1988, p. 60; for Payas – Lane Fox 1973, pp.
169-170; Engels 1978, pp. 131-134; Hammond 1992, pp. 395-396; Hammond
1996, pp. 97-101.
From Abydus to Alexandria 169
93
Plb., 12.17.6-18 (after Callisthenes); Arr., An., 2.8.5-9, 2.8.11; Curt., 3.9.1-6.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 208-209; Atkinson 1980, pp. 203-208; Hammond 1996, pp.
101-103; Briant 1996, pp. 819-821; Sabin 2007, pp. 134-135.
170 Chapter IV
Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. And it was with this force that he had
planned to resolve the final outcome of the battle. But before it even began,
Alexander learnt that most of the Persian cavalry was positioned opposite
Parmenion’s weaker detachments on the left wing, so he reinforced it with
his Thessalian cavalry. The Thessalians moved to the other wing from
behind the Macedonian formations, so that the Persians would not notice
the change. Against the local infantry facing his right wing Alexander
positioned two squadrons of cavalry as well as some Agrianians and
slingers.94
These last Macedonian units had the greatest fortune for the local
infantry on the Persian side did not take up the fight and just fled. Thus the
all-important Macedonian right wing faced no danger. The infantry who
were now no longer needed there moved to reinforce the phalanx in the
centre.95 The rest of the Macedonian army had the much more difficult
task of attacking the Persians across the river Pinarus. They were greeted
by a shower of arrows – so dense that they collided with one another in the
air, as Diodorus with some artistic licence would have us believe. But the
sources do not tell us how effective this hail of missiles was. The left
Macedonian wing was unable to make progress against the massed Persian
cavalry, which managed to repulse Parmenion’s attack and then chase his
squadrons over to the southern side of the river. Here both sides were
engaged in intensive fighting up until the Persian frontline collapsed on
the other wing. 96 In the centre the mercenary hoplites attacked the
Macedonian phalanx before it had finished crossing the river. As the
Macedonians tried to ascend the fairly steep and brambly bank, parts of
their phalanx line got disjoined. This the Greek mercenaries exploited
mercilessly by concentrating on those sections in particular. On this
occasion the Greek hoplites fought with a far greater doggedness than was
normal for mercenaries. This was because the phalanx symbolised
Macedonian military dominance in Greece and therefore the mercenaries
were also fighting out of national pride and to show who the better
professional in the field was. In this clash the Greeks proved to be at least
no worse than the Macedonians. Even the Alexander’s arch apologist
Arrian states that over 120 soldiers of the Macedonian phalanx perished,
which is more than the total number of Macedonian losses he records for
other battles such as Granicus (115) or Gaugamela (100). Bearing in mind
94
Plb., 12.19-21 (after Callisthenes); Arr., Ann., 2.8.9-11; Diod., 17.33.2; Curt.,
3.11.2-3; Plu., Alex., 20.8; It. Alex., 35. Hammond 1996, pp. 103-104.
95
Arr., An., 2.9.4.
96
Arr., An., 2.10.3, 2.11.2; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.18.11); Diod.,
17.33.3; Curt., 3.11.13-15; It. Alex., 35.
From Abydus to Alexandria 171
97
Arr., An., 2.10.4-7. Bosworth 1980, p. 214.
172 Chapter IV
the Great King next mounted a mare that had been specially kept tethered
behind the chariot and, casting away his Royal insignia, he rode away
from the battlefield. The escape was not an act of cowardice. Darius had
more than once proved his valour, and even in this battle he incurred a
wound whilst fighting. Nor did he leave at the very start of the fighting as
Arrian claims, but only after the situation on the battlefield made it
apparent he was in direct danger of being captured or killed. According to
Iranian beliefs, grave responsibilities rested on the monarch’s shoulders
when commanding a war. For such situations were not only an armed
conflict between men but also a cosmic one where the Persian side
represented the forces of truth, goodness and light, whereas the enemy
represented the forces of lies, evil and darkness. Therefore in such a
struggle the Great King should not die or, worse still, get himself captured;
in such cases it was better for a monarch to retreat in order to be able to
continue the struggle at a later stage.98
Though consistent with the Zoroastrian principles of political theory,
regrettably, Darius’s escape could not have had a positive affect on the
logic of the battlefield. The Persian cavalry that had so far fought valiantly
in defence of the King now began to withdraw from the battlefield too.
Alexander could not immediately give chase for the situation in the centre
and on the left wing demanded immediate intervention. There the ever
weaker position of the Macedonian forces could still turn the battle in the
Persians’ favour. A determined attack was now launched on the flank of
the mercenary hoplites, who had up to that moment been successfully
bearing down on the Macedonian phalanx. But despite what Arrian says, a
resurgent Macedonian phalanx did not ultimately defeat the hoplite
mercenaries. Instead it must have been, as Curtius writes, that on seeing
their employer, the Great King leave the battle ground, they too started to
withdraw in an ordered fashion. This is confirmed by the fact that in
battles over the next three years there appeared some complete
detachments of several thousand Greek veterans of the Battle of Issus.
News of Darius’s escape and the retreat of the mercenaries spread
throughout the Persian ranks and led to the breaking up of other
detachments, including the cavalry on the left wing. By dusk the entire
98
Plb., 12.22.2 (after Callisthenes); Arr., An., 2.10.3, 2.11.4-8, 2.12.1; Diod.,
17.33.5-34.7; Curt., 3.11.7-11; Plu., Alex., 20.8-9 (quoting Chares: FGrH, 125 F6);
Plu., mor., 241b-c; Just., 11.9; Ael., NA, 6.48; It. Alex., 35; Ps.-Callisth., 1.41.
Atkinson 1980, pp. 229-237; Bosworth 1980, pp. 215-216; Bosworth 1988, pp. 61-
62; Nylander 1993, pp. 149-151; Hammond 1996, pp. 108-109; Briant 1996, pp.
239-242; Lendon 2005, pp. 136-138. Alexander Mosaic: Plin., Nat., 35.110.
Stewart 1993, pp. 130-150; Cohen 1997.
From Abydus to Alexandria 173
great Persian army was in full retreat. Alexander triumphed in this first
major battle for the control of Asia thanks to his courage, determination
and tactical genius, which compensated for the strategic shortcomings, for
in that particular respect, in the autumn of 333, the enemy proved to be
superior. It should also be stressed that the Battle of Issus was primarily
and almost single-handedly won by the Macedonian cavalry, which was
better trained and better armed than its Persian opponent.99
It was only once he was certain of victory on all sections of the front
that Alexander sought to capture Darius. But by then the Great King had
covered a lot of ground moving rapidly and changing horses on the way.
Moreover, the chase was hampered by crowds of fleeing Persian soldiers.
Alexander is said to have pursued the Great King for 60 stades (11 km),
but now it was dark and, seeing the futility of advancing any further,
Alexander decided to turn back. As a consolation prize he had the Great
King’s chariot and his royal insignia: a bow, a shield and an outer garment
called the kandys.100 As happened so often in ancient battles, the reported
numbers of losses on the losing side were disproportionately higher than
the losses on the victor’s side, though of course we should not treat
literarily the ancient authors’ rhetorical descriptions of piles of killed
Persians, their bodies covering the entire field or of mountain ravines
being filled with corpses. Undoubtedly, as well as a given author’s sense
of fantasy, the figures provided in the sources reflect Macedonian
propaganda. The most frequently cited figure for the number of Persians
killed is 100,000 or 110,000 (Arrian, Diodorus and Curtius) as opposed to
270-450 Macedonians killed. Justin reduces the number of Persian
casualties to 61,000. No doubt the figures given by the anonymous
historian on the Oxyrhynchus papyrus are much closer to the truth: 1,200
Macedonians killed, 53,000 Persians killed and a number of Greek
mercenaries killed which we do not know because that bit of papyrus is
damaged. We cannot accept that Darius’s army incurred the extremely
heavy losses described in the sources as several of its most important units,
including the Persian cavalry and the Greek infantry, left the battle in an
orderly fashion and therefore could not have been slaughtered like routed
soldiers. The high number of wounded Macedonians (4,500) given by
Curtius probably accurately reflects the consequences of a battle whose
99
Diod., 17.34.7; Curt., 3.11.11-16; Arr., An., 2.11.4-7; Just., 11.9; It. Alex., 35.
Lane Fox 1973, pp. 173-174.
100
Curt., 3.11.26, 3.12.1; Arr., An., 2.11.5-7; Plu., Alex., 20.10; POxy. 1798 (=
FGrH, 148), fr. 44, col. iii; Ps.-Callisth., 1.41.
174 Chapter IV
fate for a long time hung in the balance and in which the victorious side
also incurred heavy losses.101
While Alexander was still pursuing Darius, the rest of victorious
Macedonian army with ease captured the Persian camp and found there the
families of the Persian aristocrats as well as servants. The property of the
defeated enemy was plundered, whereas the hapless Persian women were
given to the Macedonian army rabble to be humiliated and raped. Only
tent or rather portable palace of Darius and his family were spared this
unseemly fate. Alexander’s men secured it from the other soldiers as their
victorious leader’s rightful property. Though most of the Persian baggage
train with the servants and treasure chests had been sent on to Damascus,
3,000 talents were found at the Persian camp after the battle. After
returning from his unsuccessful chase Alexander enjoyed a bath in
Darius’s gold tub and next attended a banquet in the Great King’s captured
tent, where, according to Plutarch, on beholding all the items of luxury he
is said to have commented: ‘This, as it would seem, is to be a king’. The
‘itinerant’ nature of the Persian state gave this tent a very important status
as the mobile residence of the Great King. Therefore its capture was also
symbolically very significant. As 200 years earlier Cyrus the Great had
sealed his victory over the king of the Medes, Astyages, by capturing his
tent and throne, so now the capturing of Darius III’s tent by Alexander was
seen as a portent of the imminent defeat of the entire Achaemenid
monarchy.102
However, Alexander’s most valuable trophy was not Darius’ property
but his family, which, according to Persian custom, accompanied him even
to where the fighting was. The Macedonians had captured Darius’s mother,
Sisigambis, his wife, Stateira, his daughters Stateira and Drypetis as well
as his son, Ochos. The sources relate a romantic tale, originally ascribed to
Callisthenes, regarding Alexander’s first contact with Darius’s family. He
is said to have discovered that the family was in the Persian camp when he
entered the Great King’s tent and heard the Persian women lamenting
Darius’s death – for that is what they believed at the time. The
Macedonian victor wished to console them with the news that Darius had
actually escaped and was still alive. First he instructed Mithrenes to tell
them this news, but then, realising that the sight of a Persian traitor might
be too painful for them, decided to send his hetairos Leonnatus, who also
101
Arr., An., 2.11.8; Diod., 17.34.8-9, 17.36.6; Curt., 3.11.27; Just., 11.9.10; POxy.
1798 (= FGrH, 148), fr. 44, col. iv. Bosworth 1980, p. 216-217.
102
Arr., An., 2.11.9-10; Diod., 17.35.2-36.1, 17.36.5, 17.37.2; Curt., 3.11.19-23;
Plu., Alex., 20.11-13; POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148), fr. 44, col. iii; Just., 11.10.1-5.
Briant 1996, pp. 200-201, 267-268.
From Abydus to Alexandria 175
103
Arr., An., 2.11.9, 2.12.3-8; Diod., 17.37.3-38.7; Curt., 3.12.1-26; Plu., Alex., 21;
Plu., mor., 338d-e; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.5; Apion, ap. Gel.,
7.8.1-3; Just., 11.9; It. Alex., 35, 37; Ps.-Callisth., 1.41. Keaeney 1978; Bosworth
1980, pp. 220-222; Bosworth 1988, pp. 63-64; Brosius 1996, pp. 21-22; Nawotka
2003, pp. 123-124.
176 Chapter IV
strengthened the bond with his army but also created for posterity a heroic
image of someone able to overcome physical injury in order to remain
fully active. It was also then that he appointed Balacrus, one of his
bodyguards, satrap of Cilicia. To commemorate the great victory at Issus,
the town closest to the battlefield, was renamed the ‘city of victory’ –
Nicopolis. With time, however, Issus reverted to its original name. Shortly
after the Battle of Issus the Tarsus mint issued Alexander’s first coins in
Asia. These were large silver coins (tetradrachms), one of which equalled
four days of pay for a Macedonian or mercenary foot soldier. They bore
the images of the gods Zeus and Heracles, which were popular images on
coins in both Macedonia and Cilicia. The remarkable resemblance
between the Zeus on Alexander’s tetradrachms and the image of Baal on
coins that had been produced at Tarsus for the satrap Mazaeus towards the
end of Persian rule in Cilicia indicates that Alexander had simply taken
over the same mint and the same staff now used the same dies to strike the
new coins. Naturally the issuing of coins is above all an economic
enterprise; one which was made possible thanks to the capture of
considerable amounts of precious metal at Issus. On the other hand, one
cannot but also associate it with the historic importance of the Battle of
Issus itself. After this great victory Alexander began speaking more openly
about his intention to rule over the entire Achaemenid Empire. From the
propaganda point of view this was therefore a good moment to issue a new
coin that stressed this claim.104
104
Curt., 3.12.13; Arr., An., 2.12.1-2; It. Alex., 36; St. Byz., s.v. IssÒj. Heckel
1992, pp. 260-261; Salazar 2000, pp. 186-187, 194; Le Rider 2003, pp. 161-169.
105
Arr., An., 2.13.1; Curt., 4.1.1-3; Diod., 17.39.1. Bosworth 1980, p. 222;
Atkinson 1980, pp. 267-268; Seibert 1985, p. 70.
From Abydus to Alexandria 177
106
Curt., 4.1.27-33; Diod., 17.48.2-5; Arr., An., 2.13.1-3. Parke 1933, p. 199;
Bosworth 1980, pp. 222-223.
107
Arr., An., 2.13.2; Diod., 17.48.1; Curt., 4.1.39-40. Badian 1961, p. 26; Atkinson
1980, p. 291.
178 Chapter IV
The Macedonian satrap of this district, Antigonus, did not have a large
force, but by skilfully exploiting the region’s network of roads he was able
to separately defeat each of the three Persian armies in turn. After these
victories his army entered Lycaonia, while another Macedonian
commander, Calas, invaded Paphlagonia. These battles did not mark the
final defeat of the Persians in Asia Minor, large parts of which the
Macedonians never managed to conquer. Nevertheless, thanks to the
exceptional military talents of Antigonus the crisis in the region was
overcome and Alexander no longer had to fear his land connections with
Macedonia being cut.108
It was also in 332 that the fate of the Persian fleet was sealed and that
of the Aegean Sea campaign with it. In the spring Pharnabazus lost
successive squadrons of Phoenician kings returning to their homeland on
news of the advancing Macedonian army. Most switched their allegiance
to Alexander’s winning side, whereas the ships of Tyre hurried to save
their beleaguered city. That same spring the squadrons of the Cypriot
kings also suddenly sailed away from Pharnabazus’s fleet and joined
forces with the victorious Macedonian land army. Unrest spread across the
Greek islands of the Aegean. When a fleet of 160 ships commanded by
Hegelochus and Amphoterus led to a Macedonian occupation of Tenedos,
fighting started between pro-Macedonian and pro-Persian factions on
Chios. Pharnabazus managed to intervene in time. He imprisoned the
supporters of Macedonia and left a small detachment of troops to keep the
island secure for the pro-Persian politicians Apollonides and Athenagoras.
However, thanks to secret allies within the city, Hegelochus and
Amphoterus occupied Chios, arresting not only the pro-Persian politicians
but also Pharnabazus. Soon they also captured a pro-Persian tyrant of
Methymna in Lesbos, who sailed into the port of Chios with five ships
quite unaware that it was now in Macedonian hands. Then in the summer
of 332 the Macedonian flotilla sailed to Lesbos, where the sources report
that only the tyrant of Mytilene, Chares, put up resistance with the 2,000
mercenaries the Persian commanders had left behind. After a short siege
Mytilene capitulated on such terms that Chares and the mercenaries were
allowed to sail to Imbros. Chares’s resistance had been short-lived on
account of the pro-Macedonian stance of most of the inhabitants of this
largest of the poleis on Lesbos; it was for this stance that in 331 Alexander
rewarded Mytilene with financial compensation and land in Asia Minor
closest to the Island of Lesbos. The Macedonians went on to capture the
large island of Kos, while other islands not named in the sources now also
108
Diod., 17.48.5-6; Curt., 4.1.34-35, 4.5.13. Goukowsky 1975, p. 263; Billows
1990, pp. 41-46; Briant 1996, p. 851; Debord 1999, pp. 462-465.
From Abydus to Alexandria 179
out of it. The envoys from Athens and Sparta were to be kept under guard
in the Macedonian camp up until Darius III’s ultimate defeat. The Theban
delegates, on the other hand, were released both on account of Alexander’s
qualms about destroying their city as well as because Thebes and
Macedonia were officially at war and so their pro-Persian stance was fully
justified.110
The main Macedonian forces most probably stayed for some time near
Issus. It was then that Alexander carried out the administrative measures
and soon afterwards also made the first appointments concerning Syria.
Arrian mentions a certain Menon, son of Cerdimmas, whom he appoints
satrap of Coele-Syria, whereas Curtius states this same territory was put
under the control of Parmenion. In all probability both these sources are
using terminologies from later eras: Curtius is referring to the Koile Syria
of Hellenistic times, when it denoted the entire Syrian-Palestinian coast,
whereas Arrian is referring to the Early Roman Empire period, when
Coele-Syria exclusively denoted the north-western part of Syria. Therefore
we can assume that Menon was made military commander of northern
Syria, whereas Parmenion was given military control of the central and
southern coastal regions, a responsibility he soon passed on to
Andromachus. Sometime in 332 there also appears an Iranian satrap called
Arimmas, who is put in charge of civilian administration.111 Alexander’s
armies no doubt set off south towards Phoenicia before the end of 333. By
choosing this direction, i.e. to conquer the Persian satrapy of Ebirnari
(‘Beyond the River’, i.e. Euphrates) and later Egypt, Alexander may have
made the most important strategic decision of his life. After his victory at
Issus, Alexander was afforded the rare luxury in politics of having the
freedom to choose from a number of options. Instead of heading for
Phoenicia, he could have pursued Darius III, who was then fleeing to
Babylon. If successful, this other option – incidentally much more in
keeping with Alexander’s impulsive nature – could have ensured a swift
victory in the war against the Great King. Some modern historians have
criticised Alexander for not opting for this rapid strategic solution. But
here we should only note that Alexander’s strategy of conquering Syria
110
Curt., 3.12.27-3.13.17; Arr., An., 2.15.1-5; Diod., 20.20.1; Curt., 10.6.11;
Polyaen., 4.5.1; Ath., 13.87; Plu., Alex., 21.8-9, 24.1-3, 26.1; Plu., Eum., 1.7; Paus.,
9.7.2; Just., 13.2.7; Plin., Nat., 7.108; It. Alex., 41. Brunt 1975; Carney 2000, pp.
102-105.
111
Arr., An., 2.13.7, 3.6.8 (followed by It. Alex., 38); Curt., 4.1.4, 4.5.9. Bosworth
1980, pp. 224-225; Sartre 2001, p. 90.
From Abydus to Alexandria 181
and Egypt first and defeating Darius later not only proved successful but
also minimised the risks of enemy diversions behind his line.112
The route the Macedonian army took most probably ran through the
Syrian Gates to the valley of the river Orontes (today Asi), thence via the
river Eleutherus valley between the Amanus Mountains and Lebanon to
the Mediterranean coast. When the Macedonian army entered Phoenicia,
Alexander was greeted with a gold crown handed to him by Straton –
according to Arrian, the son of Gerostratus, the ruler of Aradus (which the
Phoenicians called Arwad – today, Ar-Ruad in Syria). By then Straton had
probably already decided to take over the throne from his father for
Curtius describes him as the king of Aradus and in fact there are coins
from that land with this legend. It is even possible that Straton made this
decision while his father’s ships were still part of Autophradates’s fleet
and the arrival of the Macedonian army gave the young pretender an
excellent opportunity to switch sides in the conflict for his personal gain.
Aradus was the northernmost Phoenician state and that is why the
Macedonians entered its territory first. In Persian times Phoenicia was not
a single administrative region (satrapy or province) but a collection of
small separate states individually subordinate to the satrap of Ebirnari.
These states had considerable autonomy. There were native monarchs
ruling as vassals of the Great King but also as the highest priests to the
local gods. The power of the monarchs was shared with councils of elders,
comprising the wealthiest Phoenicians. For most of the Persian period
relations between the autonomous Phoenician states and the central
authorities were exemplary. The naval might of the Achaemenid Empire
was based on the excellence of the Phoenician fleet. However, in the 4th
century these relations somewhat soured, most notably when Tabnit
(Tennes in Greek), the ruler of the largest Phoenician city-state, Sidon,
rebelled against Artaxerxes III, as a result of which the city was destroyed
and reputedly as many as 40,000 inhabitants slaughtered. When the
Macedonian army entered Phoenicia there was no longer any city-state
that dominated the others politically. Straton, the king of the first
Phoenician state to side with the conquering Macedonians was officially
confirmed as ruler of his kingdom by Alexander.113
When the Macedonian army was in the city Marathus (today Amrit in
Syria, 11 km to the south of Tartus), which was part of the kingdom of
Aradus, a messenger brought Alexander a letter from Darius III. This was
112
Badian 1985, p. 432; Ashley 1998, pp. 237-238.
113
Arr., An., 2.13.7-8, 2.20.1; Curt., 4.1.6; It. Alex., 38. Moscati 1968, pp. 24-29;
Bosworth 1980, p. 226; Atkinson 1980, p. 270; Seibert 1985, p. 80; Grainger 1991,
pp. 5-34; Maier 1994, pp. 319-330.
182 Chapter IV
the start of a long diplomatic correspondence between the two rulers. All
the major sources mention this exchange of letters, but the way in which
they present Darius’s successive proposals and Alexander’s responses to
them is so convoluted that any attempt to reconstruct these events can only
be hypothetical. One can only be certain that Darius wrote to his adversary
on three occasions and that on each occasion he increased his offer. The
ancient authors all agree that in the letter received by Alexander at
Marathus Darius demanded the release of the captured members of his
family. According to Arrian, who gives the most detailed account of this
first diplomatic exchange, Darius also accused Philip and Alexander of
breaking their alliance with Persia and unjustly invading the country,
whereas the outcome of the Battle of Issus he attributed to the will of the
gods. In response Alexander recalled real and imagined wrongs committed
by Persians against Greece and Macedonia, accused Darius of lacking the
legitimacy to rule and finally declared himself – by right of being
victorious in battle – to be the rightful monarch of Asia, in other words,
the Persian Empire. In a much more general manner Curtius also relates
this exchange of views regarding responsibility for the war as well as other
rival claims and there is no reason to doubt that the two monarchs referred
to each other in this way. Alexander’s letter was not addressed exclusively
to Darius but also to a much wider audience. His use of the arguments of
Panhellenic propaganda (Persian crimes in Greece) and his questioning of
Darius’s right to the Persian throne must have been directed more to public
opinion. In this letter Alexander for the first time so openly declares his
aspirations to the Persian throne. He refers to himself as the ‘king of Asia’,
which could only mean the ruler of the Achaemenid empire, reserving for
Darius at most the position of vassal. We know that at the moment of
writing this was far from the case as Darius still had control of most of the
empire, but it is the declaration itself that is important. For the first time
Alexander openly announced that he intended to capture the Achaemenid
throne and that this was his real war aim. Both Arrian and Curtius mention
Darius’s offer of peace and friendship in return for the freeing of his
family, but only Curtius also mentions the offer to pay a ransom, which
would have been quite natural in such situations. This last offer in the
peace negotiations is also mentioned in other sources and there is every
reason to believe that it was actually made. What we do not know is the
actual size of the ransom for the only sum mentioned in the sources –
10,000 talents in Itinerarium Alexandri – was probably copied from a later
offer made by Darius. Nevertheless, the amount offered must have been
vast because this was, after all, a ransom for the family of the Great King.
An exceptionally important part of Darius’s letter was his offer of peace
From Abydus to Alexandria 183
114
Arr., An., 2.14; Curt., 4.1.7-14; Diod., 17.39.1-2; Just., 11.12; It. Alex., 39-40.
Tarn 1948, i, pp. 36-37; Wilcken 1967, pp. 106-107; Griffith 1968; Lane Fox 1973,
p. 180; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 222-227; Bosworth 1980, pp. 227-233; Mehl 1980,
pp. 185-186; Briant 1980, pp. 51-64; Bloedow 1995; Hamilton 1999, pp. 70-71.
115
Arr., An., 2.15.6, 2.20.1; Curt., 4.1.15. Moscati 1968, p. 26; Atkinson 1980, p.
279; Dąbrowa 1988, p. 59; Sartre 2001, pp. 42-43.
184 Chapter IV
Sidon did not gain Alexander’s trust perhaps because he was a son of the
king appointed to the throne by Artaxerxes III after the quelling of the
rebellion of Sidon. Therefore Alexander had him removed from power and
most probably executed. The ancient sources devote a great deal of
attention to the matter of the succession to the Sidonian throne. There is a
tale that in Hellenistic and Roman times would become a classic example
of the omnipotence of Tyche, the goddess of fortune, who could
unexpectedly topple people from the highest positions of authority and
raise others from the depths of obscurity. Having deposed Abdashtart,
Alexander learned that there was no rightful successor to the throne and so,
wishing to maintain the same political system as before, he asked his
closest companion Hephaestion to find an appropriate candidate. Well
born Sidonians informed Hephaestion of Abdalonymus, who was the only
surviving male member of the royal dynasty but a mere gardener. The
ancient authors with relish portray a scene of officials and soldiers
approaching this humble man at work in a garden, have him dressed in
ceremonial robes, presented before Alexander and then installed on the
throne. Regardless of whether or not this colourful description of events is
true, we know for certain that Abdalonymus did become king. Moreover,
he was the first Asian to be included among Alexander’s Companions.
Abdalonymus’s greatest contribution to posterity happened years later
when he commissioned the famous marble Alexander Sarcophagus. One
of the longer sides depicts Alexander and his companions fighting the
Persians at the Battle of Issus. The other side presents a lion hunt, which is
often interpreted as one of outings the newly nominated king of Sidon
organised in the Lebanon hills to entertain his benefactor and hetairoi.116
In the winter of 332 Alexander reached the last of the major
Phoenician cities – Tyre. This would have been in February for we know
from Curtius’s account that at the time the inhabitants of Tyre were
celebrating the feast of Melqart-Baal and other sources state that this feast
was always held in that month. The victorious Macedonian march was
supposed to stop at this city until summer. Initially there were no signs of
the trouble that lay ahead. King Azemilcus was away with his Tyrian
squadron supporting Autophradates’s fleet, so his son headed a delegation
– appointed either by the people’s assembly (according to Arrian) or, more
probably, by an aristocratic council of elders. They greeted Alexander with
116
Arr., An., 2.15.6; Ath., 12.41; Curt., 4.1.15-26; Diod., 17.47 (Diodorus mistook
Tyre for Sidon); Plu., mor., 340c-e (Paphos is the setting of the story); Just.,
11.10.8-9. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 180-181; Atkinson 1980, pp. 278-283; Grainger
1991, pp. 30-31, 34-35; Stewart 1993, pp. 294-306; Heckel 1997, p. 199; Sartre
2001, pp. 44, 72; Nawotka 2003, pp. 128-129.
From Abydus to Alexandria 185
a heavy gold crown as a sign of surrender and with food for the soldiers as
a sign of hospitality. Alexander accepted these gifts, but also announced to
the Tyrians that he wished to lay an offering at the temple of Heracles,
which is the name the ancient authors give to the god of Tyre, Melqart-
Baal. The sources do not fully explain why Alexander made such a request
let alone why he was so unyielding about it. Ultimately this request led to
a siege that lasted many months and ended with the destruction of Tyre.
Modern historians often suggest that, by entering the town with troops to
lay offerings at the temple, Alexander wanted to test the sincerity of the
Tyrian declaration and confirm its submission. However, this is not the
only possible explanation of the events that happened in February 332, all
the more so as one cannot point to any sensible strategic considerations
that would have forced Alexander to impose on the Tyrians an
unconditional surrender even at the cost of a many month long and costly
siege. This major conflict could also have been started by a cultural
misunderstanding which both sides were subsequently unable to stop from
escalating. As many other incidents in his life demonstrate, Alexander had
a very scrupulous habit of offering sacrifices to gods, particularly those
with whom he felt a close affiliation. And this was particularly true with
regard to his mythological ancestor Heracles. According to Tyrian
religious principles, on the other hand, no one but the king could lead a
procession to lay offerings to the city’s god. Therefore, if they allowed
Alexander to lead such a procession, they would have to recognise him as
their king and thus renounce the sovereignty they had so jealously guarded
for centuries. Trying to find a way out that would leave their status of
sovereignty intact but also not offend the powerful Macedonian ruler, the
Tyrians suggested that Alexander should lay his offerings at a different,
allegedly even older temple of Melqart located in Old Tyre on the
mainland and therefore beyond the main city of Tyre. This refusal, albeit
polite, provoked one of Alexander’s famous outbursts of anger. Now in a
quite different, indeed demanding tone he gave an ultimatum: they would
comply with his request or else he would have the city stormed. After
some hesitation, the Tyrians rejected the ultimatum but offered in return to
stay neutral and allow neither Macedonian nor Persian troops into the city.
Using such an argument in negotiations with Alexander was exceptionally
unfortunate, as Miletus had discovered one and a half years earlier. Only
one of the ancient authors, Curtius, claims that at this stage Alexander
tried to continue the negotiations; in his version Alexander once again sent
messengers to the Tyrians, but they had now decided on war and so killed
the messengers. Ancient accounts also relate (after Chares) that when
ordering the start of the siege, Alexander mentioned that he had had a
186 Chapter IV
dream in which Heracles took him by the hand and led him to Tyre.
Alexander’s soothsayer interpreted this to mean that the city would be
taken but only after a long hard struggle as foretold in the twelve labours
of Heracles.117
Apart from the force of religious conviction, the Tyrians’ decision to
refuse the ultimatum was also based on a faith in the strength of their fleet
and the natural impenetrability of their city. For this great city with an
estimated population of 50,000 inhabitants was located on an island very
close to the shore and on more than one occasion it had proved able to
withstand even very large land armies. Phoenician mastery of the art of
siege warfare as well as of constructing fortifications was among the most
advanced of its day, whereas its fleet, with new five-row type ships, was at
least equal to that of the Greeks. Along the edge of the Tyrian island there
was a 45-metre wall of cemented together stone. In the past only a sea
blockade had been able to force Tyre to negotiate, but at the start of 332
the Persian fleet largely supported by Phoenician ships still prevailed in
the Aegean, and this must have certainly given the Tyrians a false sense of
security. The inhabitants were also counting on support from their
powerful colony Carthage, whose delegates were incidentally present at
the metropolis on account of the Melqart festival. Citizens unable to carry
arms were now shipped off to Carthage, not only for their own safety but
also to make food supplies in the city last longer for the defenders.
Diodorus attributes the Tyrians with the intention of holding the
Macedonian army tied down for as long as possible so that Darius could
have enough time to raise a new army. But perhaps these were just the
author’s own speculations or those of the source he derived the
information from, for in 332 there is no evidence of any coordination
between the actions of Darius III and the defence of Tyre. Instead of
concentrating his forces and launching an attack on Alexander from
behind, the Great King wasted his time on ineffective diplomacy and as a
consequence not only lost Phoenicia but also Egypt.118
The island of Tyre was just four stades (700 m) from the shore.
Moreover the water in the strait between the island and the coast was very
shallow except for the part right next to the island, which was five metres
117
Arr., An., 2.15.6-16.8, 2.18.1; Curt., 4.2.1-7, 4.215-17; Diod., 17.40.2-3; Plu.,
Alex., 24.6; Just., 11.10; It. Alex., 42. Wilcken 1967, p. 109; Moscati 1968, pp. 26-
27, 30-41; Edmunds 1971; Lane Fox 1973, p. 181; Green 1974, pp. 247-248;
Atkinson 1980, pp. 298-299; Bosworth 1980, p. 235; Bosworth 1988, p. 65;
Bloedow 1998, pp. 270-276.
118
Diod., 17.40.3; Arr., An., 2.18.2, 2.21.4; Just., 11.10. Sartre 2001, pp. 73-74.
Population of Tyre: Hammond 1996, p. 113.
From Abydus to Alexandria 187
deep. That is why Alexander instructed his men to construct a mole from
the mainland. Perhaps he was inspired by the tyrant of Syracuse Dionysius,
who in 397 had his engineers construct a causeway to capture the Sicilian
Punic fortress of Motya. Ultimately, this Macedonian engineering venture
also proved to be successful; today Tyre is connected permanently to the
mainland by this mole (a tombolo in fact) in time expanded with accretion
of sand. However, its construction and thus the capture of Tyre proved
much more difficult than Alexander had originally supposed. The king did
not just encourage his men with speeches recorded by the ancient authors
but is even said to have himself carried baskets with soil used to create the
mole. Initially the builders made rapid progress. Tree trunks were hauled
down from Mount Lebanon to create stakes that were easily driven into the
muddy seabed. These palisades delineated the mole’s outline and protected
the subsequently deposited rocks and stones from the effects of the waves.
The houses of Old Tyre were demolished and their masonry was used as
building material for the causeway. Initially merely amused by the
Macedonian efforts, the Tyrians changed their mind once the mole’s
structure started to emerge out of the water and came up ever closer to
their island. So they decided to counterattack by sailing up in light boats to
the edges of the mole and firing missiles at the builders, thus injuring
many. In response Alexander had two towers raised at the end of the mole
with war engines to ward off such attackers. The Tyrians also conducted a
successful land raid, inflicting heavy casualties among the Macedonians
employed in the gathering of stones. It was at about this time that
highlanders from the Antilebanon Mountains also launched an attack and
killed thirty Macedonians. Worse still, the Tyrians managed to sail a fire
ship to the end of the mole, which set ablaze the towers and war engines,
while missiles from nearby Tyrian triremes prevented Alexander’s soldiers
from putting the flames out. It is possible that this fire not only destroyed
the towers but also the parts of the mole structure, which allowed the
waves to wash many of the stones away.119
By then it had probably become obvious that the city could not be
captured without the aid of a fleet. That was why Alexander set out with a
detachment of hypaspists and Agrianians to Sidon, which he designated to
be the gathering point for his navy. This was the time when
Autophradates’s Persian fleet was already dispersing with its Phoenician
and Greeks contingents successively departing. It was also no later than
then that the Tyrian squadron commanded by King Azemilcus must have
119
Arr., An., 2.18.3-19.5; Curt., 4.2.7-3.7; Diod., 17.42-43; Str., 16.2.23; Plin., Nat.,
5.76; Polyaen., 4.3.3. Bosworth 1980, pp. 239-241. On the tombolo: Marriner 2009,
pp. 49-101.
188 Chapter IV
returned home as soon afterwards it was taking part in the conflict and,
although he had not been there when Alexander first arrived, this king was
captured in Tyre when the city finally fell. The ships of the other
Phoenician kings, Gerostratus of Aradus and Ainel of Byblus, now sailed
to Sidon; together with the Sidonian squadron they formed a force of 80
vessels. Next they were joined by ten ships from Lycia, three from Mallus,
three from Soli and probably ten from Rhodes – though some sources
claim that island went over to Alexander’s side only after the capture of
Tyre. At least some of the nine kingdoms of Cyprus also decided to
contribute to the victor’s side. The sources mention that among those
present at the siege were Androcles of Amathus, Pasicrates of Curium as
well as Pnytagoras of Salamis; as a reward for his services the last of these
was granted part of the Phoenician kingdom of Citium in Cyprus.
However, it is probable that even more kingdoms from that island
supported the Macedonian king for his fleet included as many as 120
vessels. The deflection of Phoenician and Cypriot squadrons effectively
marked the end of Persian dominance at sea and the ultimate vindication
of the strategy announced by Alexander at Miletus. The Cypriot rulers,
who had for a long time supported Persia, now wished to ingratiate
themselves to Alexander, buy his favour and thus maintain the status quo
on the island. That is why we later hear of the gifts offered to Alexander
by Pymiathon of Citium. The last element of the Macedonian king’s
armada was a single Macedonian warship. Cleander also joined
Alexander’s forces at Sidon with a unit of 4,000 Greek mercenaries that
had been hired in the Peloponnese.120
In the spring of 332, while allied sea states gathered their forces at
Sidon, Alexander set out from that city on campaign against the Itureans,
who inhabited Mount Lebanon and were hampering his soldiers who were
collecting logs in this area. Some historians reckon that Alexander’s
expedition reached as far as the Bekaa Valley, but the sources only
mention an episode high up in the mountains, whose nights at that time of
year were bitterly cold. Curtius’s inaccurate claim that this expedition
occurred before the burning down of the towers and war engines on the
mole at Tyre is perhaps motivated by a desire to absolve Alexander for
this Macedonian failure. During his absence Alexander entrusted
command of the Tyre siege to Perdiccas and Craterus. For his expedition
he selected the best and fastest moving units – several ilai of cavalry,
hypaspists, Agrianians and archers – which suggest that he was expecting
120
Arr., An., 2.19.6-20.3; Duris, FGrH, 76 F12; Curt., 4.2.11; Plu., Alex., 24.4-5,
29.2-6, 32.10; Plu., mor., 334d-e; It. Alex., 42. Bosworth 1980, pp. 241-244;
Seibert 1985, pp. 80-82; Heckel 2006, pp. 224, 239.
From Abydus to Alexandria 189
stiff resistance. No doubt his caution was well justified for, despite
numerous pacifications, the region was still plagued by bandits in Roman
times. There was an incident during this expedition that yet again
demonstrated Alexander’s courage and bravado. His main units had
dispersed into this dangerous territory but the king decided to stay behind
with a small unit of soldiers and accompany Lysimachus, for his now aged
teacher’s strength had failed him. Dusk fell and his small detachment
faced the prospect of spending a bitterly cold night without a fire.
Alexander therefore decided to creep up on the enemy, who had fires
burning. He stabbed two of the barbarians to death and returned to his men
with a lighted brand from the enemy’s fire. In this way the Macedonians
were able to light a huge fire, which terrified some of the Itureans and
caused them to flee. The rest of the enemy were defeated in a nigh-time
skirmish. The sources provide no further information regarding the results
of this ten-day military campaign.121
In response to the Tyrian counterattack and the damage caused by
waves Alexander ordered the mole to be widened and new towers to be
constructed nearer its centre, so that they would be beyond the reach of
missiles fired from Tyrian ships. These works were carried out while
Alexander was away in Sidon and later on his expedition in Mount
Lebanon. A breakwater of tree trunks was constructed around the mole,
which was particularly important in the winter season, when sea storms
could easily destroy a construction raised with such difficulty. The greater
width of the mole offered the Macedonian soldiers better protection
against surprise attacks. Trees dragged down from the hills were used as
building material in their entirety and thrown into the sea whole, their
roots weighted down with stones. Unfortunately, the defenders soon found
a new method of counterattacking: they sent divers to release the stones
from the roots of these trees so that the timber floated up to the surface and
thus broke up the mole’s building structure. Curtius writes that in face of
these mounting problems Alexander considered giving up on the siege, but
eventually he resolved to continue it with the aid of his fleet. Besides,
despite everything, the engineering work was making progress. After some
time the walls of Tyre found themselves within the firing range of
Macedonian siege engines on wooden towers now constructed at the end
of the farther extended mole.122
121
Plu., Alex., 24.10-14 (after Chares, FGrH, 125 F7); Curt., 4.3.1; Arr., An.,
2.20.4; Polyaen., 4.3.4. Bosworth 1980, p. 244; Seibert 1985, p. 82; Eph’al 1988, p.
148.
122
Diod., 17.42.6-7; Curt., 4.3.8-11.
190 Chapter IV
Some time after his return from the expedition against the Itureans
Alexander ordered the fleet gathered at Sidon to sail for Tyre. These ships
were instructed to sail in battle formation with hypaspists on board.
Therefore clearly Alexander’s intention was to fight a sea battle against
the weaker Tyrian fleet. He personally commanded the right wing and
entrusted the left wing to Craterus and Pnytagoras of Salamis. The Tyrians
did initially wish to engage Alexander’s fleet in battle, but when they
realised that this fleet included the mighty Phoenician and Cypriot
squadrons, they sensibly decided to stay in harbour blocking the entrance
with several rows of triremes. Alexander tried a feint attack to lure the
ships out to sea, but to no avail. The most Alexander’s fleet could do was
to sink three of the most protruding Tyrian triremes. Moreover, the
Macedonian side also suffered losses; on top of the city fortifications the
Tyrians cruelly murdered some Macedonian hostages as their compatriots
helplessly looked on from the sea. However, although the sea operation
against Tyre was not spectacularly successful, it did at least stop the
Tyrian ships from hampering the work of the besiegers.123
However, the Tyrian defenders remained active. Soon they repaired the
parts of the city wall that had incurred damage and raised their own
wooden towers to fire missiles at the Macedonians on the mole. The
defenders used a number of ingenious machines and discovered ever
newer ways of weakening the enemy’s power to attack. They fired rope-
fastened metal tridents into the besiegers’ shields which were next
violently pulled away to leave the enemy exposed or catapulted them
together with the shield to a certain death. Tyrians captured other
Macedonians on the mole with hooks or simple nets fired from a war
engine called the crow. They lessened the impact of battering rams by
literally lowering cushions in the place where they struck the wall and
cutting the ropes from which the battering log was suspended with sickles
attached to long poles. Metal tipped spears fired from Tyrian war engines
also damaged the rigging of the enemy’s ships and wounded those on
board. A simpler but awfully effective weapon in this cruel war was to
pour blistering hot sand on the Macedonian soldiers below, which once it
got beneath their armour caused unbearable pain. Large stones had been
hurled into the sea to prevent the Macedonian ships from getting too close
to the city, and it was with the greatest of effort, under fire from the city
wall, that that these stones had to be removed by Macedonian divers so as
to clear the waterway. Tyrian divers, on the other hand, caused chaos in
the Macedonian fleet by cutting the anchor cables, which consequently
123
Arr., An., 2.20.6-10, 2.24.3; Diod., 17.43.3; Curt., 4.3.11-12. Bosworth 1980, pp.
244-246.
From Abydus to Alexandria 191
had to be replaced with chains. All such measures further prolonged the
siege, forcing Alexander to once again consider whether there was any
sense in continuing it. The stiff resistance of the Tyrians as well as that
awkwardness of the topography meant that the siege lasted until the
summer and the final storming of the city did not occur until the end of
July or even early August.124
The Tyrians tried their luck once more in the open sea with a surprise
attack on the Cypriot ships that lay anchored blocking their northern (so-
called Sidon) harbour. They chose to attack at midday, when the enemy
was less watchful and there was practically no one on deck. Earlier they
had also screened off the harbour mouth with canvas and now their ships
sailed out silently without the steersmen calling the oarsmen to keep in
time. The Tyrian squadron, which included modern quad- and
quinqueremes, were initially very successful against the moored Cypriot
vessels, sinking many including the flagships of Pnytagoras of Salamis
and Androcles of Amathus. Their luck turned, however, when an alerted
Alexander, who had been stationed on the southern side of the mole, sailed
with some hastily gathered quinqueremes and several smaller ships to
counterattack the enemy while they were still engaged in sinking the
Cypriot vessels. The Tyrians now had to save themselves by returning into
the harbour. Although the Tyrians lost only two ships and had inflicted
much heavier losses on the enemy, their strategic situation must have now
radically deteriorated. The sources make no further mention of the
defenders being able to challenge Macedonian dominance at sea.125
Once the Tyrian fleet was confined to port and no longer was able to
hamper Macedonian actions, Alexander gave the order to attack. Under the
cover of fire from Macedonian catapults, the mole was extended right up
to the island. Meanwhile Macedonian, Cypriot and Phoenician engineers
constructed yet more siege engines, some of which were mounted on
transport ships and triremes, the intention being to attack from both land
and sea. This first attack ended in failure: on the mole’s side the city’s
mighty wall proved too strong for Macedonian battering rams. Nor did the
seaborne attack from north bring any success. From the southern side
seaborne siege engines on ships did manage to destroy part of the wall and
the Macedonians did lower draw bridges in an attempt to get in through
124
Arr., An., 2.21.1-7; Diod., 17.43.5-45.7; Curt., 4.3.13-4.1; Fragmentum
Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.7.
125
There are two accounts differing in details: Arr., An., 2.21.8-22.5 and Curt.,
4.4.6-9; better being that of Arrian, Atkinson 1980, pp. 309-310. A hypothesis was
formulated about two sea battles, both won by Alexander: Abramenko 1992.
192 Chapter IV
the breach, but this attack was also repelled. Moreover, a storm next
damaged some of the siege engine bearing vessels.126
The final assault commenced after a two-day respite when the sea had
calmed down. With no winds the siege engines mounted on ships could be
effectively used against the city wall, which was considerably weaker
from the side facing the sea. This was the 29th day of a Macedonian month
that is not named in the sources, but according the Athenian calendar it
would have been Hekatombaion, i.e. July/August. Therefore the assault
would have most probably occurred in the early August of 332. The
Macedonians attacked from all sides and their battering rams managed to
destroy a considerable section of the wall. Bridges were thrown over to
this breach and elite detachments of hypaspists and phalangites
commanded by Coenus landed. The remaining ships sailed round the
island with archers on board firing at the defenders to distract them from
the main thrust of attack. Alexander himself together with some hypaspists
scaled the city’s wall from a tower on one of the ships and thence, via the
royal palace, reached the city. At the same time Phoenician ships broke
into the southern harbour while Cypriot ships entered the northern harbour
and their respective crews started occupying the city from both sides.
Paradoxically the only side where the sources record no breach was from
the mole which had been built with such great effort. Realising that the
enemy had entered the city from several directions, the Tyrians rallied to a
part of the city called Agenorion. But even there they were unable to
withstand the onslaught of Alexander and his hypaspists. Enraged by the
difficulties they had had to endure in the long siege, the Macedonians now
set about massacring the stubborn city’s inhabitants. The number of
Tyrians killed has been estimated from 6,000 (Curtius) to 8,000 (Arrian),
with another 2,000 said to have been crucified on the mainland coast.
Probably rather 13,000 (Diodorus) than 30,000 (Arrian) inhabitants were
allegedly taken into slavery. The Sidonians, however, took pity on their
compatriots and saved 15,000 Tyrians by taking them on board their ships.
The victor’s mercy was only shown to King Azemilcus, some Tyrian
dignitaries and envoys from Carthage, who had all sought refuge in the
Temple of Melqart. The only available information regarding the size of
Macedonian losses for the entire siege and the two major assaults on the
city is 400 soldiers killed: it comes from Arrian and therefore probably has
126
Arr., An., 2.22.6-7; Curt., 4.3.13-18; Diod., 17.43.6-44.5. Bosworth 1980, pp.
250-251.
From Abydus to Alexandria 193
127
Arr., An., 2.23-24; Curt., 4.4.10-18; Plu., Alex., 25.1-3; Diod., 17.46;
Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.7; It. Alex., 43. Wilcken 1967, pp. 110-
111; Bosworth 1980, pp. 251-256; Heckel 1992, pp. 58-64; Hammond 1989, pp.
132-134.
128
Za., 9.2-4; Da., 8; Diod., 17.46.6, 17.48.5; Curt., 4.5.9-12; Arr., An., 2.24.6;
Just., 18.3, 19.4.1. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 218; Atkinson 1980, p. 325; Seibert
1985, p. 82; Ashley 1998, pp. 247-249; Le Rider 2003, pp. 170-188; Heckel 2006,
s.v. ’Philotas’ [8].
194 Chapter IV
129
Arr., An., 2.25.1-3; Diod., 17.39.1-2, 17.54.1; Curt., 4.5.1-8; Plu., Alex., 29.7-8;
Just., 11.12; It. Alex., 43-44; V. Max., 6.4, ext. 3. Andreotti 1957, pp. 125-126;
From Abydus to Alexandria 195
The Tyrian resistance and the sea damage to their mole had not been
the only problems to beset the besiegers. D.W. Engels has calculated that
in the seven months that the siege lasted the Macedonian army (excluding
the allied fleet, which comprised over 40,000 people) consumed over
28,000 tons of grain, which was the soldier’s basic diet. The traditional
means of feeding an army was to commandeer food from the land it
occupied, but that would not have been possible in the area around Tyre as
it could have only accounted for 7 % of the above-mentioned amount. It
was indeed primarily logistical concerns that drew Alexander’s attention
to Palestine, which in Antiquity produced a surplus of grain. In the Persian
era the inland part of Palestine comprised three small, native entities,
Idumea and two autonomous statelets Samaria and Judah, living on hostile
terms with one another but being at the same time provinces of the
Ebirnari satrapy. The Persian governors in the more northern province of
Samaria came from a native dynasty, represented in Alexander’s time by
Sanballat III. The more southern state of Judah was a theocracy centred on
the Temple in Jerusalem and its High Priest. This state did not have a local
ruling dynasty but the Great King still always nominated a governor from
among the native Jews. We do not know how authority was divided
between the governor and the High Priest, especially as both of them
issued a similar type of coin. In Alexander’s day the Persian governor in
Judah was Yehizqiyyah and the High Priest – according to Flavius
Josephus – was probably Jaddua II, though it may in fact have been
Johannan. During the siege of Tyre Alexander requested these two
Palestinian states to supply him with soldiers and provisions. According to
Flavius Josephus, Sanballat III fulfilled these requests and sent 8,000
Samaritan troops to Tyre. For this the governor was rewarded with
permission to build a temple on Mount Gerizim that could compete with
the Temple in Jerusalem. The High Priest Jaddua, however, allegedly
remained loyal to Darius III, which angered Alexander and portended his
revenge after the capture of Tyre.130
There is a romantic version of the contacts between the Macedonian
ruler and the inhabitants of Judea originating from the Jewish oral tradition,
recorded in two independent works – that of Flavius Josephus, general
considered better, and the Talmud, generally considered too belletristic –
as well as from some versions of the Alexander Romance. The essential
Wilcken 1967, pp. 111-112; Goukowsky 1975, p. 264; Bosworth 1980, pp. 227-
229, 256-257; Hamilton 1999, pp. 76-77.
130
J., AJ, 11.8.2-4. Kazis 1962, pp. 4-11; Engels 1978, pp. 55-56; Eph’al 1988, pp.
147-152; Tadmor 1994, p. 289; Briant 1996, pp. 734-735; Dandamaev 1999;
Briant 2009, pp. 152-155.
196 Chapter IV
131
J., AJ, 11.8.4-5; Megillat Ta’anit, 9; Ps.-Callisth., (rec. g), 2.23-24; Arr., An.,
2.25.4. Kazis 1962, pp. 4-11; Seibert 1972, pp. 103-107; ĝwiderkówna 1996, pp.
86-89, 121; Stoneman 1997, pp. 36-37; Hammond 1989, p. 208; Meleze-
Modrzejewski 1995, pp. 50-55. The lion episode: Plu., Alex., 40.4-5; FD 3.4.2.137;
see Hamilton 1999, p. 107; Stewart 1993, pp. 270-277.
From Abydus to Alexandria 197
132
Curt., 4.8.9; Chron. Euseb., 2.223. Cross 1963; Seibert 1985, p. 90; Bosworth
1988, pp. 232-233.
133
Za., 9.5-8; Curt., 4.5.10. Delcor 1951, pp. 117, 120; Lane Fox 1973, p. 191;
Engels 1978, pp. 57-58; Högemann 1985, pp. 47-49; Briant 1996, p. 736.
198 Chapter IV
134
Arr., An., 2.25.4; Curt., 4.6.7; Hegesias, FGrH, 142 F5; J., AJ, 11.8; D.H.,
Comp., 18; It. Alex., 45. Delcor 1951, p. 119; Engels 1978, pp. 58-59; Bosworth
1980, pp. 257-258; Atkinson 1980, pp. 334-336; Briant 1996, pp. 287, 945.
135
Arr., An., 2.25.4-27.7; Curt., 4.6.7-30; Hegesias, FGrH, 142 F5; Diod., 17.48.7;
Plu., Alex., 24.4-5; Plu., mor., 341b; Plb., 16.22a.3-6; D.H., Comp., 18; Zonar.,
4.10. Bosworth 1980, pp. 257-260; Atkinson 1980, pp. 337-343.
From Abydus to Alexandria 199
136
Bresciani 1985, pp. 505-520; Ray 1988; Cuyler Young 1988, p. 51.
200 Chapter IV
137
Bresciani 1985, pp. 526-528; Lloyd 1994, p. 34; Briant 1996, p. 881; Le Rider
1997, pp. 83-88; Le Rider 2003, pp. 220-227; Debord 1999, p. 412; Burstein 2000.
From Abydus to Alexandria 201
towards the end of his life even planned to build a pyramid-shaped tomb
for his father.138
Gaza, which Alexander had captured in October 332, was 200 km
away from the nearest Egyptian city of Pelusium (today Tell el-Farama).
The route along the coast of the Sinai Peninsula was particularly
inhospitable: initially barren desert with absolutely no vegetation, later the
landscape changed into extensive coastal salt marshes. Rains in this part of
the Mediterranean coast could not be expected before November, and what
few wells there were had only small quantities of brackish water.
According to Arrian, the Macedonian army reached Pelusium on the
seventh day. No doubt the army marched so fast to minimise the time
spent in a territory deprived of food and water. The sources do not provide
any information about the logistic problems of this march but we know
from other cases of large armies crossing Sinai (from Cambyses to
Napoleon) that the previous preparation of food and water supplies was
essential. The army’s long stay at Gaza made possible the setting up of
provisions magazines on the coast. Provisions could also have been
supplied by the fleet commanded by Hephaestion, which was floating
towards Egypt alongside the Sinai shore. Once the army reached Egypt, it
encountered no major problems. The sources do not record any resistance
being put up the Persian satrap Mazaces, who approximately half a year
earlier had defeated Amyntas’s mercenaries. We do not know what
proportion of the Macedonian army accompanied Alexander to Egypt,
though it is certain that considerable forces had to remain in Syria to
protect this newly captured country against a possible Persian attack.
Perhaps these forces were commanded by Parmenion for none of the
ancient authors makes any mention of him being present in Egypt.
Nevertheless, the superior strength of the invading Macedonian army was
unquestioned and – also taking into account the unfavourable mood among
the Egyptians – that is most probably why Mazaces surrendered Pelusium
to Alexander.139
The Macedonian fleet next sailed up the Nile from Pelusium to
Memphis, while Alexander and the land army marched along the no longer
existing Pelusium Nile Delta arm to ƿn (Heliopolis to the ancient Greeks
and today a northeast suburb of Cairo). At ƿn the army crossed over to the
138
Marasco 1964, p. 10; Seibert 1972, pp. 109-111; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 235;
Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 63-64.
139
Arr., An., 3.1.1-3; Diod., 17.49.1; Curt., 4.7.2-3; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum,
FGrH, 151 F1.8; Just., 11.11.1; It. Alex., 48. Wilcken 1967, pp. 112-113; Lane Fox
1973, pp. 194-195; Engels 1978, pp. 59-60; Seibert 1985, pp. 84-85; Bosworth
1988, pp. 68-70.
202 Chapter IV
140
Arr., An., 3.1.3-4, 3.5.2; Curt., 4.7.3-4; Ps.-Callisth., 1.34.1-2. Wilcken 1967, pp.
116-117; Bosworth 1980, pp. 262, 275; Thompson 1988, pp. 3-20, 83-84, 95-97,
106; O’Brien 1992, p. 86; Stewart 1993, pp. 171-173; Bloedow 1988.
From Abydus to Alexandria 203
Monarchs who had not even ever been in Egypt let alone crowned there
were also recorded with pharaonic titles; Egyptian priests did that to give
the fictitious sense of an unbroken succession of rightful rulers of Egypt,
the interruption of which could upset the cosmic order and bring
catastrophe to the country. We know that the Egyptian coronation
ceremony was a long and tedious affair, which in the opinion of the
sceptical modern historians would not have appealed to an impatient
Alexander. Therefore they believe that he would have only agreed to
engage in the bare minimum of cult activities that could be expected of a
foreign ruler and keep the religious caste happy.141
It is easy to notice that such argumentation, on the one hand, is based
on a subjective understanding of Alexander’s personality and, on the other,
it is also based on the fact that the principal sources remain silent about the
whole subject. We should, however, remember just how few historical
sources, both Greek and Egyptian, have actually survived. For example
there is only one source for the full Egyptian title of the great
Macedonian’s son, Alexander IV, and today we only have a mere copy of
the original from over 200 years ago. Thorough analyses of Alexander’s
royal title in Egyptian inscriptions show that it was abbreviated in various
ways depending on the nature of the given document. Its most extended
form includes three of the five elements of a pharaoh’s full title. Therefore
Egyptian sources do not unequivocally refute Alexander’s legitimate claim
to authority in Egypt. Indeed, any opinion on whether or not Alexander
was genuinely installed as pharaoh will remain hypothetical. Nevertheless,
a premise for an opinion can be formed by examining Alexander’s policy
with regard to Egypt’s tradition, culture and religion and how it was
received by the Egyptian priestly establishment, which was best educated
and positioned to appreciate the nuances of the ruler’s government.
Alexander ordered a shrine in the Temple of Thutmose III to be restored in
his name. In 330 the high-priest of Thoth, Petosiris, collaborated with the
king to rebuild a temple to his god at Hermopolis Magna. Alexander also
funded the construction of a totally new religious edifice, the so-called
Temple of the Barque, that is, a chapel where the god Ammon’s sacred
boat was kept. This still extant structure is not significant on account of its
141
Ps.-Callisth., 1.34.2; ‘1st year of pharaoh Alexander’ in document Hawara
Papyrus 2 (Jasnow 1997, p. 95, n. 2). Wilcken 1967, pp. 113-114; Tarn 1948, I, p.
41; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 236; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 196-197; Hamilton 1974, p.
74; Green 1974, pp. 269-270. Tradition of Alexander’s Egyptian coronation
rejected by: Badian 1985, p. 433; Bosworth 1988, pp. 70-71; Burstein 1991;
Burstein 1994; Stewart 1993, p. 174. Egyptian titles of Alexander: Wilcken 1967,
p. 114; Burstein 1991; Ladynin 1999.
204 Chapter IV
size, for it is only 5.7 m by 7.8 m large, but because of it location and
adornment. It is found in the central part of the Temple at Luxor, in an
area that could only be accessed by the priests and over which they had
total control. Although the building of the Temple of the Barque was
financed by the king, decisions regarding its detailed design and
ornaments were made by the priests of Ammon, who were the only people
in Egypt able to appreciate the significance of the various elements. The
temple’s walls are covered with reliefs depicting Alexander as a pharaoh
in the company of Egyptian gods. Art historians stress that these reliefs
strictly adhere to the classical Egyptian style, which can be distinguished
from the vast majority of works of art of the Late Egyptian period. The
fact that Egyptian priests made such an ideological and artistic decision
shows that they fully recognised the temple’s financial patron as a
legitimate ruler. Among his other investments was the reconstruction of
temples that had been raised by Nectanebo II, the last native ruler of Egypt.
Therefore Alexander did regard his Egyptian title seriously. He proclaimed
himself a continuator of the Egyptian monarchy and thus ideologically
distanced himself from the second Persian occupation of that country.142
Both Greek and Egyptian sources mention that Alexander laid
offerings to Egyptian gods, including those who took the incarnations of
animals and had no Greek equivalents, such as the Apis bull and the
Buchis bull. These are of course examples of the same devotion he
frequently showed towards Greek gods, but ones where he clearly
demonstrated an understanding of the different religious sensibilities of his
Egyptian subjects. This attitude is also reflected in a papyrus from Saqqara
containing an order made by one of Alexander’s military commanders,
Peucestas, the son of Macartatus. This document – written in Greek and
therefore addressed to Greeks and Macedonians – forbids soldiers to enter
the necropolis of sacred animals at Saqqara, which the order declares to be
an area exclusively reserved for priests. One can assume that this order
was a repetition of the supreme commander’s instructions. By protecting
the sanctity of the graves of animals worshiped by the Egyptians,
including Apis bulls, Alexander also eliminated a potential source of
conflict between his soldiers and the local population. The whole
programme of investing in temples and the respect shown to the most
important Egyptian gods indicate that Alexander behaved like the rightful
pharaoh of the Egyptians and consciously referred to the traditions of the
independent Egypt Nectanebo II had defended over a decade earlier.
Alexander was informed of Egyptian culture, tradition and expectations by
142
Porter, Moss 1929, pp. 44-45; Bell 1985; Raziq 1988; Burstein 1994, p. 382;
Stewart 1993, pp. 172-178; Menu 1998; Ladynin 1999, pp. 95-96.
From Abydus to Alexandria 205
143
Order of Peucestas: Turner 1974. It reflects the will of Alexander referred to in
Curt., 4.7.5. Thompson 1988, pp. 138-146; O’Brien 1992, p. 86; Stewart 1993, pp.
171-178; Wirth 1993, p. 191; van Voss 1993; Menu 1998; Ladynin 1999, pp. 86-
87; Briant 2002, p. 117.
206 Chapter IV
Just., 13.4.11. Satrap Petisis in a demotic ostracon: Smith 1988; Jasnow 1997, p.
95, n. 2. Bosworth 1980, pp. 275-278; Atkinson 1980, pp. 364-367; Briant 1996,
pp. 425, 739, 878-881; Briant 2002, pp. 62-63; Le Rider 1997; Le Rider 2003, pp.
238-262; Heckel 2006, p. 224.
145
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F12a; Arist., FGrH, 646 T2a. Burstein 1976a.
208 Chapter IV
which meant Alexandria would attract many settlers from all over the
world. Plutarch relates a legend in which the idea of founding this city is
suggested by Homer, who visits Alexander in a dream. Nonetheless, the
most important reason clearly appears to have been commercial. Having
taken control of the eastern Mediterranean and gained knowledge of
Egypt’s economic potential, Alexander decided to found a major city on
the site of a trading settlement (emporion) called Rhacotis, which is hardly
mentioned in ancient sources. Alexandria became the gateway for trade
between Egypt and much of the Orient on one side and the lucrative
markets of the Aegean and later of the whole of the western world on the
other. This role could not be fulfilled by Naucratis as it was located too far
from the sea and by then experiencing a period of decline. The ancient
sources attribute the actual designing of Alexandria to Deinocrates of
Rhodes, who had been member of Alexander’s circle of friends since at
least mid 332 and is also famous for planning to convert Mount Athos into
a huge sculpture of Alexander. The latter plan was rejected, but
Deinocrates’ talents were employed in the urban design of Alexandria.
Well positioned on an easy to defend isthmus between Lake Mareotis and
the Mediterranean Sea, the street grid was planned in such a way so that
strong winds would cool the inhabitants during Egyptian heat waves.
Settlers were brought in from the whole of Greece and that nation would
dominate the city’s ethnic makeup over the next 1,000 years. The native
populations of surrounding villages were resettled in a separate district of
the city with its own temple to Isis and no doubt sanctuaries to other
Egyptian deities.146
Alexander set off from Lake Mareotis and proceeded via Paraitonion
(today Marsa Matruh) 600 km south west to the Siwah Oasis – the
northernmost of the Libyan Desert oases. When Alexander was still by
Lake Mareotis (according to Curtius) or halfway to Siwah (according to
Diodorus), therefore most probably at Paraitonion, he received envoys
from the Greek colony Cyrene in Libya, who brought him a gold crown
and gifts, including 300 chargers. Later Alexander considered Cyrene to
146
Arr., An., 3.1.5-2.2; Plu., Alex., 26.3-10, 72.5-8; Plu., mor., 335c-d (architect’s
name is mistakenly Stasicrates); Diod., 17.52; Str., 17.1.6; Curt., 4.8.1-6; Vitr., 2,
pr. 2.3; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.11; Just., 11.11; It. Alex., 48-49;
Ps.-Callisth., 1.31.-33. Welles 1962; Wilcken 1967, pp. 117-120; Fraser 1972, i, pp.
3-7, ii, pp. 1-11; Fraser 1996, pp. 174-175; Bosworth 1980, pp. 263-266; Seibert
1985, pp. 85-86; Hammond 1996, pp. 124-126; Hamilton 1999, pp. 66-68; Hölbl
2000, pp. 9-10; Brown 2001; Nawotka 2003, p. 114.
From Abydus to Alexandria 209
be part of his domain therefore we can presume that this delegation came
to declare the colony’s fealty and pay a tribute in the form of gifts.147
Situated in a depression surrounded by chalk mountains, Siwah had an
ample supply of water (today there are c. 300 wells) capable in ancient
times of supporting several settlements. This allowed for the existence of a
small Berber state ruled by a local royal dynasty, though not entirely free
of Egyptian influence. Its only claim to fame was a temple and the Berber
oracle of an ithyphallic deity, which for not entirely clear reasons started
being associated with Ammon. The high-priests of this sanctuary were the
Egyptianized kings of Siwah. A temple to Ammon was raised at Siwah
during the 26th dynasty, and it was still active in Alexander’s day. The
local cult of Ammon as well as the oracle started to interest the Greeks
towards the end of the 6th century, initially just at Cyrene, which was 600
km away, but later also the inhabitants of mainland Greece. Of course, in
keeping with their customs, the Greeks called the Siwah deity Zeus.148 The
purpose of this long and arduous journey was not to fulfil any Egyptian
religious or monarchic obligations because pharaohs never visited this
oasis. The real reason was most probably because Alexander, who always
attached great importance to religious ritual and the possibility of
understanding closer the will of the gods, felt an irresistible longing to
visit an oracle that in the Greek world for a long time had been considered
infallible. Apart from this desire to ask important questions and, as people
of that era perceived it, have them answered, Alexander, as usual, also
wished to compete with his mythological predecessors Heracles and
Perseus, who had also supposedly visited Siwah.149
On his journey Alexander was accompanied by a detachment of
soldiers to protect him from nomads of the Libyan Desert and by baggage
carrying camels. The first stage of the journey was along the coast, but
from Paraitonion they had to cross 300 km of open desert. During this part
of the journey, which took them eight days, the Macedonians experienced
a violent sandstorm raised by a southern wind called the Khamaseen. After
this storm the desert landscape was quite altered, but the now lost
Macedonians were first saved by a shower of rain, which provided them
with much needed water, and then by a divine sign; Aristobulus states that
two ravens appeared, but the more imaginative Ptolemy claims they were
147
Diod., 17.49.2; Curt., 4.7.9; Arr., An., 7.9.8. Seibert 1985, p. 86.
148
Parke 1967, pp. 196-219; Bosworth 1977; Kuhlmann 1988, pp. 9-107; Hölbl
2000, p. 10.
149
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F14a (= Str., 17.1.43); Arr., An., 3.3.1. Wilcken 1967, pp.
121-123; Bosworth 1977, pp. 68-69.
210 Chapter IV
in fact two snakes speaking human voice. These ravens or snakes led
Alexander and his companions to Siwah.150
The first ever visit of an Egyptian monarch must have been a major
event in this statelet and of course Alexander was granted special
privileges to consult the oracle. He was allowed inside the temple, while
his companions had to wait outside and like ordinary pilgrims ask their
own questions to the oracle, if they had any, from there. The way it usually
worked was that the boat of Ammon would be carried in a procession and
the priests would observe and interpret its motions as questions to the
oracle were asked. The answers were normally just ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but
Alexander was most probably instead or also given much more complex
verbal answers. The oldest known sources do not record what questions
Alexander asked, which has naturally given modern historians an
unlimited scope for speculation. There were no Greek or Macedonian
witnesses present to hear what Ammon told Alexander and Alexander
himself never revealed what he had been told, so we will never know what
really happened inside the temple at Siwah. Nonetheless, the visit to Siwah
changed the Macedonian king. Being far away from Siwah and Egypt, he
continued to worship Ammon and ask his oracle questions. For the rest of
his life he considered himself to be the son of Ammon. When soldiers at
Opis found the idea amusing, he burst into a rage. From Ephippus we learn
that in 324 at Ecbatana Gorgus of Iasus publicly crowned Alexander with
a gold wreath as the son of Ammon. The king would also appear as the
incarnation of Ammon with a purple robe and the horns of a ram. An
innumerable number of coins struck after Alexander’s death present him
with Ammon’s horns, which gave rise to the Arab myth of Alexander the
two-horned (Dnj’l-Karnain) later immortalised in the Quran. We know that
the moment Alexander entered the Siwah temple he would have been
greeted by the priest, like in the case of every pharaoh, as the son of
Ammon. But such a standard greeting, which Alexander would have
experienced on numerous occasions in Egypt, could not have made such
an impression so as to affect him for the rest of his life. Therefore in that
temple he must have heard something more, something that confirmed
what he already strongly believed in or a very specific prediction that soon
turned out to be true and therefore convinced Alexander of the oracle’s
total credibility. The speculations of ancient Greek authors on this subject
are diverse: Alexander may have asked if he would be victorious in all his
wars and eventually rule the world or he may have asked if all his father’s
150
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F14a (= Str., 17.1.43); Arr., An., 3.3.3-6; Diod., 17.49.3-6;
Curt., 4.7.6-15; Plu., Alex., 26.11-27.4; It. Alex., 50-51. Engels 1978, pp. 61-63;
Bosworth 1980, pp. 272-273; Hamilton 1999, pp. 68-71.
From Abydus to Alexandria 211
murderers had been punished. The alleged response to the latter question
stated that his father was Ammon-Zeus and that those responsible for
Philip’s death had suffered the consequences of their crime. Of course
these are merely assumptions saying more about the authors themselves
than about Alexander.151
Having had his divine affiliation confirmed, Alexander left Siwah and,
via the site where Alexandria was to be founded, returned to Memphis. It
was during his second stay at the Egyptian capital, most probably in April
331, that reinforcements sent by Antipater arrived: 400 Greek mercenaries
and 500 Thracian riders. Moreover, at this time Alexander received envoys
from Greek states. It was also probably then that he gave instructions
concerning the emission of coins by the Memphis mint, which struck
bronze coins bearing the king’s portrait. The start of this particular
emission did not have to coincide with Alexander’s stay in Egypt, it could
equally well have been started later by Cleomenes of Naucratis. The
decision to use the ruler’s image instead that of a god, though shocking to
contemporary Greeks need not have been a consequence of Alexander’s
superhuman aspirations. It could equally well have resulted from the
traditions of the satrapy mint in Memphis. For modern historians these
small coins as well as contemporary coins from Naucratis are significant
in that they provide some of the earliest images of Alexander.152
Among the Greek envoys there were delegates from Erythrai bearing
positive news for the king from the Athena’s oracle and delegates from
Miletus reporting miraculous events at Didyma, which belonged to
Miletus. When it was ruled by the clan of Branchidae Didyma used to
have a great temple and oracle to Apollo. Their pro-Persian stance during
the Ionian Uprising and Persian wars forced the Branchidae to leave
Didyma and find refuge in Central Asia. The Temple of Apollo was
damaged at the start of the 5th century while the oracle fell silent and the
sacred source ran dry. Then at the start of 331 the water began to flow
again – a consequence of stones being removed as some historians
presume. The oracle was thus reactivated, this time not run by the now
151
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F14a (= Str., 17.1.43); Arr., An., 3.4.5; Curt., 4.7.16-32;
Diod., 17.51; Plu., Alex., 27; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.10; Just.,
11.11; Ps.-Callisth., 1.30; It. Alex., 53; Ephippus, FGrH, 126 F5 (= Ath., 12.53);
Syll.3 313. Wilcken 1967, pp. 124-127; Parke 1967, pp. 224-227; Bosworth 1977;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 281-284; Goukowsky 1978, pp. 23-25; Heisserer 1980, pp.
182-191; Kuhlmann 1988, pp. 141-142; Hammond 1996, pp. 127-129; Badian
1996, pp. 17-19; Hamilton 1999, pp. 68-70. Quran: 18.83-98.
152
Arr., An., 3.5.1. Borza 1967; Engels 1978, pp. 62-63; Price 1981; Touratsoglou
2000, pp. 62-63; Le Rider 2003, pp. 224-237.
212 Chapter IV
153
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F14 (= Str., 17.1.43). Bosworth 1977, pp. 57-59, 74-75;
Bosworth 1988, p. 282; Parke 1985, p. 62; Fontenrose 1988, pp. 15-16.
CHAPTER V:
KING OF ASIA
1
Arr., An., 3.6.1; Curt., 4.8.7-8. Engels 1978, pp. 63-64; Seibert 1985, p. 90;
Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 64-65.
214 Chapter V
reason for this change was Arimmas’s failure to solve the logistical
problems concerning the march of the Macedonian army. Not for the last
time in the history of Alexander’s state administration it turned out that
Iranian satraps appointed – in accordance with Achaemenid tradition – by
right of birth proved themselves incapable of performing set tasks up to
the standards required by their new ruler. It may have been the case that
Arimmas’s incompetence forced the Macedonian army to remain in Tyre
for longer than originally planned in order to allow the new satrap to
complete the necessary logistic preparations. Having settled all the most
pressing administrative and political matters, at the start of July 331
Alexander and his soldiers set off from Tyre to the town of Thapsacus on
the Euphrates.3
The Macedonian army reached Thapsacus in the Athenian month of
Hekatombaion (July/August). Darius III had crossed the Euphrates at that
same place in December 333 during his escape after the Battle of Issus. It
was well known that the great river could be crossed at this point for the
town’s Semitic name, Tiphsah, means ‘passage’ or ‘ford’. The Euphrates
at Thapsacus became navigable for ancient river traffic. The town’s exact
location is today unknown but of the numerous suggested sites two have
recently aroused the greatest interest: today’s Dibse, which is situated by
Asad Lake, or Qal’at Najim, which is some 80 km up river. Both these
sites are now in modern Syria on the west bank of the Euphrates.4 Taking
into account the route the Macedonian army took on the eastern side of the
Euphrates, the more northern location (Qal’at Najim) seems more likely.
Initially, the army must have marched along the Phoenician coast from
Tyre to the place that later became known as Seleucia. Thence it would
have turned east, first through the Orontes Valley and then through Aleppo
towards the Euphrates. Along the coast the Macedonian forces could have
been kept supplied by their fleet and then by the fertile farmlands that
stretched all the way to Aleppo. This was a route that had been taken by
ancient armies before Alexander and would be taken by other armies after
him. The entire distance from Tyre to the Euphrates would have been
approximately 600 km, whereas the distance of the section from Seleucia
to Thapsacus would have been c. 240 km. Therefore Curtius’s statement
that the march lasted 11 days would probably only apply to this later
section. The army crossed the Euphrates using two pontoon bridges. There
were approximately 6,000 Persian soldiers in the area commanded by the
3
Arr., An., 3.6.2-7; Curt., 4.8.11-15; It. Alex., 53-54. Engels 1978, p. 64; Bosworth
1980, pp. 278-285; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 65-66; Hammond 1996, pp. 131-132.
4
Arr., An., 3.6.4. Honigmann 1934; Bosworth 1980, p. 222; Seibert 1985, p. 91;
Lendle 1988.
216 Chapter V
5
Arr., An., 3.7.1-2; Curt., 4.9.12; It. Alex., 54. Engels 1978, pp. 65-66; Bosworth
1980, pp. 285-286; Atkinson 1980, p. 382; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 66-67. The alleged
secret dealings of Mazaeus: Lane Fox 1973, p. 227.
King of Asia 217
covered the 2,400 stades (430 km) to reach the other great Mesopotamian
river in the second half of September 331.6
In that time Darius III had managed to gather another army for the
decisive battle against the Macedonian invaders. For the first time in 200
years the king of Persia was cut off from the Mediterranean Sea and
therefore from the Greek mercenary recruitment market. Now there were
only around 4,000 left in his service, which was as many as had retreated
with him from Issus. In an attempt to compensate for the shortage of
hoplites the Persians provided their Asian infantry with better weapons
modelled on the Macedonian example, i.e. longer spears and swords.
However, if only because there had not been enough time to train, this
experiment did not prove to be successful and the infantry failed to have a
discernable impact on the battlefield. The fundamental force in the army
amassed by Darius III was, as usual, the Persian cavalry. The long time the
Great King had to prepare enabled him to bring over the best horsemen of
the empire from eastern Iran: the cavalry of Bactria and of Sogdiana as
well as allied Scythian detachments. With their excellent horses, good
training and flexible armour the east Iranian riders were of comparable
military value to the Macedonian hetairoi and Thessalian cavalry. On the
other hand, Darius’s 200 chariots with 2/3 m scythes to cut or terrify the
enemy were an exotic anachronism. Fifteen war elephants were brought
over from India. All the ancient authors cite huge numbers of soldiers in
the Persian army: 200,000 infantry and 45,000 cavalry according to
Curtius, 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry – Justin, 800,000 infantry
and 200,000 cavalry – Diodorus, 1,000,000 soldiers – Plutarch,
Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, or even 1,000,000 infantry and 400,000 cavalry
according to Arrian. Even the lowest of these figures given by Curtius is a
gross exaggeration but, despite this, Alexander’s army was certainly
numerically inferior to that of the Persians. It has been estimated that he
had approximately 47,000 men. The weakness of Darius’s army was its
disparate ethnicity which hindered communication and effective command.7
The Persian army gathered at Babylon. The reason for this was no
doubt not only Mesopotamia’s agricultural potential, which was well able
to adequately feed such an army, but also strategic considerations. Darius
probably assumed that Alexander would follow the example of Cyrus the
Younger and march to Babylon directly from Thapsacus. That would have
6
Eratosthenes, ap. Str., 2.1.38; Arr., An., 3.7.3; Curt., 4.9.13-14; It. Alex., 54.
Engels 1978, pp. 67-70; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 68-69.
7
Arr., An., 3.8.3-6, 3.11.7, 3.12.5; Diod., 17.53.1-3; Curt., 4.9.2-4, 4.12.13; Plu.,
Alex., 31.1; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.12; Just., 11.12; It. Alex., 55.
Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 75-90; Bosworth 1988, pp. 76-78.
218 Chapter V
been why he moved the great Persian army out of Babylon north towards
Nineveh, so that this time he could make full advantage of his excellent
east Iranian cavalry on the extensive Mesopotamian Lowland plain. But of
course the two armies did not meet there for the Macedonians chose to
march across northern Mesopotamia to the Tigris. Darius therefore was
also forced to move his army east across the Tigris and find another
suitable site for the decisive battle.8
It was sometime during Alexander march from Tyre to Gaugamela that
messenger delivered to him a third letter from Darius with yet another
peace proposal. According to Curtius and Justin, despite the previous two
flat refusals (see Chapter IV.5), Darius was given the opportunity to yet
again turn to Alexander in a conciliatory tone without losing face on
account of the death of his wife Stateira. On receiving the sad news Darius
is said to have responded by thanking Alexander for the humane treatment
of his family and at the same time renewed his peace offer. Plutarch and
Diodorus, on the other hand, maintain that Darius’s wife died after he had
sent the last peace proposal. Then again Plutarch and Justin write that
Stateira died in childbirth. If the expected child was Darius III’s, his wife’s
death could not have been later than in the summer of 332. Many of the
sources mention the romantic tale of a loyal eunuch who fled back to
Darius and informed him of his wife’s death but also of the noble way in
which Alexander treated his family. On receiving the news Darius was to
pray to the Persian gods for victory, so that he could have it in his power
to show equal magnanimity towards the Macedonian king; if, on the other
hand, he were to be defeated, he asked the gods to let no man other than
Alexander sit upon the throne of Cyrus, as he was his only worthy
successor.9
Regardless of when Stateira actually died, Alexander certainly received
the peace proposal some time before Gaugamela but when he was already
in Mesopotamia. Despite all his preparations and the Persian army’s
numerical superiority, Darius must have been aware of the very grave
danger of losing another battle and for this reason he made a very
generous offer. In doing so he showed a great sense of responsibility for
the state, which did not allow his emotions to get the better of him after
Alexander’s last very insulting letter. An offer to cede land, especially on
such a large scale, was virtually unheard of in the history of Achaemenid
diplomacy and Darius was resorting to this measure in exceptional
8
Diod., 17.53.1-3; Curt., 4.9.6-7. Marsden 1964, pp. 15-19; Badian 1985, p. 434;
Seibert 1985, pp. 93-95; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 67-69.
9
Plu., Alex., 30; Plu., mor., 338e; Curt., 4.10.18-11.22; Diod., 17.54.7; Just., 11.12;
It. Alex., 57; Arr., An., 4.20.1-3; Karystios, ap. Ath., 13.80.
King of Asia 219
Agis III devoted his entire reign in trying to restore Sparta to previous
position of power. During his regency and in his first years as king of
Sparta he steered clear of the main political disputes by not taking
anyone’s side in the 339-338 war, not participating in the League of
Corinth and not allying itself with either Thebes or Macedonia in 335. In
338 Sparta’s suffered at the hands of Philip but her intransigent attitude to
Macedonia earned her respect in Greece.11
Agis attempted to bring Sparta back into the main political arena in
333 when the Persian offensive in the Aegean was at its most successful.
He sent two diplomatic missions to Darius III, no doubt to offer an alliance
against Macedonia. The Spartan envoys from these missions were
subsequently captured together with Theban refugees, Athenian envoys
and the Persian baggage train outside Damascus. Agis himself learned of
the Macedonian victory at Issus when he was at Siphnos negotiating with
the Persian commanders Autophradates and Pharnabazus the terms and
conditions of financial and military support for his actions. Despite these
negotiations, which are recorded in the sources, they were not immediately
followed by any discernable cooperation between the Persians and the
Spartan king. In 333 he remained passive, which left the limited
Macedonian forces to concentrate on fighting the Persians in the Aegean
Sea. The fact that the Persian commanders gave Agis III a subsidy of no
more than thirty talents reflects the state of their finances after Issus. To
this Autophradates added ten ships. But even this made a difference, for
after receiving this help Agis sent mercenaries commanded by his brother
Agesilaus to wage war in Crete, which Arrian euphemistically calls
restoring order. When in 332 this Spartan expedition was joined by the
8,000 mercenaries that had survived Issus and by the remnants of the
Persian fleet, their success on the island was great enough to force
Alexander to respond in the spring of 331 by dispatching there a
Macedonian squadron commanded by Amphoterus. Nothing is known as
to how successful this Macedonian mission was, though it obviously failed
to stop mercenary detachments being subsequently shipped from Crete to
the Peloponnesus.12
War erupted on the Greek mainland in the spring of 331. Macedonia,
governed by Antipater, was simultaneously threatened by the revolt of
Memnon, the governor of Thrace, and by Agis III’s insurrection. There is
no evidence in the sources that the two revolts were coordinated but we do
11
David 1981, pp. 110-113; Kulesza 2003, pp. 284-296.
12
Arr., An., 2.13.4, 2.15.2-5, 3.6.3; Diod., 17.48.1-2; Curt., 3.13-15, 4.1.39, 4.8.15.
Badian 1967, pp. 175-179; Bosworth 1988, pp. 187-200; Wirth 1993, pp. 212-213;
Blackwell 1999, pp. 53-54; Kulesza 2003, p. 296.
King of Asia 221
13
Aeschin., 3.133-134; Diod., 17.62; Curt., 9.3.21. Some scholars argue for
coordination between Memnon and Agis III: Badian 1967, pp. 179-180; Hamilton
1974, p. 78; Blackwell 1999, pp. 54-55. Contra: Heckel 1997, p. 202; Briant 2002,
p. 49.
14
Aeschin., 3.165; Din., 1.34; Diod., 17.62.6-8; Curt., 6.1.20; Plu., mor., 818e-f;
Just., 12.1. Bosworth 1988, p. 201; Badian 1994, pp. 268-271; Habicht 1999, pp.
20-21; Blackwell 1999, pp. 55-56, 58.
222 Chapter V
15
Arr., An., 3.6.3. Borza 1972, p. 236; Briant 2002, pp. 49-50.
16
[D.], 17; Aeschin., 3.162, 164-165; Din., 1.34-35; Diod., 17.62.7; Plu., mor.,
818e-f. Badian 1967; Bosworth 1988, p. 202; Habicht 1999, pp. 20-25; Blackwell
1999, pp. 56-65; Faraguna 2003, p. 106; Poddighe 2009, p. 115.
King of Asia 223
suspicion that for Agis the freedom of other Greeks was at most of
secondary importance to his clearly first objective of imposing Sparta’s
hegemony over its neighbours. The precious moment when Macedonia
was weak and vulnerable was irretrievably lost. As the Spartans remained
idle beneath the walls of Megalopolis, Antipater mobilised an army of
Macedonians and allied Greeks numbering as many as 40,000 soldiers.
With this army he now marched against Agis and his army at Megalopolis,
which was half the size of his forces. The better quality and greater
experience of the Agis’s mercenaries and Spartan soldiers meant that,
despite their numerical superiority, the Macedonians had a very hard fight
on their hands. Apart from their rhetorical style, the battle’s descriptions
by Diodorus and Curtius Rufus show that for a long time the final outcome
hung in the balance. It was only resolved once the Spartan side ran out of
strength to cope with the enemy’s greater numbers. Among the casualties
of the Battle of Megalopolis was the valiant but not very prudent King
Agis as well as 5,300 of his soldiers and 3,500 men on the Macedonian
side.17
Jealous of the fame of this victory, Alexander tried to depreciate its
importance by calling it the war of mice. Aware of this aspect of his
monarch’s character and of the delicacy of Greek inter-state politics,
Antipater chose not to personally decide on how those responsible for the
war should be punished and deferred the matter to the synedrion of the
League of Corinth. After Agis III’s death his younger brother, Eudamidas
I, became the new king of Sparta and it was with him that the post-war
peace negotiations were made. The debate, held once the delegates of the
League of Corinth had assembled, lasted a long time and eventually came
to no definite conclusion. It was as if everyone was trying to avoid being
held responsible for the passing of a harsh sentence. Sparta’s allies,
Achaea and Elis, which had together with the Spartan army besieged
Megalopolis, were made to pay a fine of 120 talents in compensation to
that city. The Tegeans were pardoned, except for those politicians who
were responsible for the city’s alliance with Agis. However, the synedrion
failed to name a punishment for the main culprit in the breaking of the
universal peace – Sparta. Perhaps that was because a punishment that was
too mild may have displeased the victor, Macedonia, whereas the League
of Corinth would have been too weak to impose a severer penalty. The
preceding months clearly showed how few states were ready to confront
Sparta in defence of the universal peace. Thus a decision was made to
simply demand 50 hostages from Sparta and leave the ultimate decision
17
Diod., 17.63; Curt., 6.1.1-16; Paus., 1.13.6, 3.10.5; Just., 12.1. Blackwell 1999,
pp. 66-69.
224 Chapter V
18
Plu., Ages., 15.4; Plu., Agis, 3.3; Plu., mor., 235b; Diod., 17.73.5-6; Curt.,
6.1.17-20; Paus., 3.10.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 203; Kulesza 2003, pp. 296-297.
19
Curt., 6.1.21. Late chronology of the battle of Megalopolis and its consequence:
Cawkwell 1969, pp. 170-173; Badian 1985, pp. 445-447; Hammond, Walbank
1988, pp. 72-83; Bosworth 1988, pp. 203-204; Badian 1994; Carlier 1995, p. 155;
Hammond 1996, pp. 159-161; Blackwell 1999, p. 54, n. 67; Faraguna 2003, p. 105.
But see: Nawotka 2003b, pp. 70-71.
King of Asia 225
20
Aeschin., 3.133. Borza 1972, p. 236; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 285; McQueen
1978; David 1981, p. 114; Wirth 1993, pp. 190, 219-221; Bloedow 1995a, pp. 24-
25; Heckel 1997, p. 202; Briant 2002, p. 18; Kulesza 2003, p. 296; Heckel 2006,
pp. 7-8, s.v. Agis.
21
Eratosthenes, ap. Plu., Alex., 31.2-5 (= FGrH, 241 F29); Curt., 4.9.14-15 ; Diod.,
17.55.1-2 ; Arr., An., 3.7.4; It. Alex., 55. Atkinson 1980, pp. 382-383.
226 Chapter V
was always his intention fight Alexander’s army in open territory to the
east of the Tigris. Either way, the only obstacle encountered by the
Macedonians was the strong current of the Tigris, though in September the
level of water after the hot summer months would have anyhow been low.
Modern historians have not been able to establish for certain the place
where Alexander’s army crossed the Tigris. Taking into account the
topography of the territory covered by the Macedonians after they had
crossed the Tigris we can only assume that it was probably somewhere
near today’s city of Mosul in Iraq or a bit further north. Once the army
reached the eastern bank, Alexander allowed his soldiers to rest for a
couple of days before they marched into battle. It was at this time
(according to Curtius) or a few days later (Arrian) that the allied Paionian
cavalry commanded by a member of that tribe’s royal family, Ariston,
defeated a squadron of Persian cavalry.22
The army of Darius III set up camp near Gaugamela, the place where
the last pitched battle between the two kings was fought. The ancient
sources, however, generally call this the battle of Arbela (today called
Irbil/Hawlir) after a large town some 90 km to the south east in modern-
day Iraqi Kurdistan. We know that Gaugamela was a large village on the
river Boumelos (today called Gomil stream), a western tributary of the
Khazir, which flows into the Greater Zab, which in turn flows into the
Tigris. The name Gaugamela is preserved in a modern-day village called
Gaumal but its actual site is today’s Tell Gomel on the Nauqûr plain to the
north of the Gebel Maqlub range and 35 km to the east of the Tigris.
Darius selected as a battlefield a broad plain where he could take full
advantage of the numerical superiority of his cavalry and most effectively
use his chariots. It because of the chariots that Persian soldiers levelled out
the field where they expected to fight the Macedonians. Darius made a
serious mistake in not fortifying his camp at Gaugamela. It was for this
reason that his army spent the night before the battle armed and on guard
in case the enemy suddenly attacked. The lack of sleep could not but have
had detrimental effect on Darius’s soldiers on the day of the battle.23 Apart
22
Curt., 4.9.15-10.1; Diod., 17.55.3-6; Arr., An., 3.7.5-8.2; It. Alex., 55. Atkinson
1980, pp. 384-385; Heckel 1992, pp. 354-355.
23
Arbela/Gaugamela: Diod., 17.62.1, 17.64.1; Arr., An., 3.11.5, 6.11.6; Str., 16.1.3,
16.1.4, 17.1.43; Marmor Parium, FGrH, 239 F106; Anonymi Chronicon Oxyrynchi,
FGrH, 255 F1.7; Lib., 18.260; Amp., 16.2.5; Curt., 4.9.9, 5.1.2, 6.1.21, 9.2.23;
Plin., Nat., 6.41; Polyaen., 4.3.6, 4.3.17; Fron., Str., 2.3.19; see Nawotka 2003, pp.
86-87. Topography: Marsden 1964, pp. 18-21; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 270, n. 311;
Seibert 1985, pp. 129-130; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 70-72; Bernard 1990, pp. 520-521;
Hamilton 1999, p. 80. Arr., An., 3.8.7; Plu., Alex., 31.8.
King of Asia 227
from that, morale in the Persian camp might not have been very high.
Fragments of tablets found at Babylon state that on 18th September –
presumably in response to news of the Macedonians crossing the Tigris –
panic erupting in the camp of the ‘ruler of the world’, Darius III. On the
other hand, Polyaenus also reports of soldiers panicking in Alexander’s
camp on the Tigris. It appears that there was nervousness on both sides in
face of what they knew to be a momentous event that would decide their
fates.24
On the third day (20th September 331) after crossing the Tigris the
Macedonians saw a lunar eclipse. Sacrifices were immediately made to the
Sun, Moon and Earth. Egyptians seers as well as Alexander’s personal
soothsayer, Aristander, interpreted this phenomenon as a bad omen for the
Persians. Indeed, astronomers in Babylon also regarded the eclipse as a
portent that their own side would be defeated. Alexander’s soldiers, initially
disturbed by the eclipse, were much relieved by the seers’ interpretation. It
was with this new found optimism among the men that on the morning of
21st September the Macedonian king ordered his army to march.25 After a
slow and cautious march of four days, the Macedonians encountered the
enemy. This time Alexander personally led an attack on the enemy’s
cavalry. From the captives he learned that Darius’s camp was situated 150
stades (27 km) away. The Macedonians also managed to chase away
Mazaeus’s riders, who were continuing their ‘scorched earth’ tactics, and
thus Alexander’s men got hold of some intact supplies of grain. With
logistical problems settled for the nearest future, the Macedonian army set
up a fortified camp and stayed there for four days. The Macedonian
baggage train and soldiers who were unfit because of wounds or disease
remained there for the battle as well. It was in that time that a letter from
Darius to the Greeks in Alexander’s army was intercepted. In this letter
Darius urged the Greeks to hand the Macedonian king over to the Persians.
On the advice of the cautious Parmenion the message in this letter was not
disclosed to the soldiers so as not to put any ideas into their heads. 26
Meanwhile Mazaeus barred the Macedonians’ way to the Persian camp
with an elite squadron of 3,000 cavalry. Alexander sent an advance guard
of horsemen (most probably mercenaries) commanded by the Macedonian
Menidas, but they dared not attack Mazaeus. Mazaeus, on the other hand,
24
Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 14; Polyaen., 4.3.26. Bernard 1990, pp. 517-
521, 524; Briant 2003, p. 80.
25
Arr., An., 3.7.6; Curt., 4.10.1-7; Plu., Alex., 31.8; Plin. Nat., 2.180; Sachs-
Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 3. Bosworth 1980, p. 287; van der Spek 2003, pp.
292-295.
26
Curt., 4.10.8-17; Arr., An., 3.9.1; Polyaen., 4.3.18.
228 Chapter V
also did not engage the enemy and instead withdrew to Gebel Maqlub
(1,040 m), which overlooks the Nauqûr plain. Fear of the mighty Persian
army almost verged on panic in Alexander’s camp. Yet Mazaeus did not
make use of this opportunity to deliver a pre-emptive strike. Instead the
following day he withdrew from the mountain and returned to Darius’s
camp. Alexander not only managed to calm his soldiers down but also
took the opportunity and occupied the strategically important position in
the hills that the enemy had vacated. There he set up the last camp before
the battle and fortified it, so that his soldiers could rest and build up
strength in relative safety before the decisive clash.27
The exact date of the Battle of Gaugamela was for a long time the
subject of controversy among modern historians for it cannot be
unequivocally deduced from the information provided by the ancient
authors. Plutarch, for instance, states that it happened on the 26th day of
the month of Boedromion, which cannot be easily converted into a date in
our calendar system. Fortunately, thanks to the entry in an exceptionally
accurate Babylonian astronomical diary, we can now be certain that the
battle took place on 1st October 331.28 Already on the preceding day the
Macedonian army stood in battle formation ready to confront the Persians,
who were aligned for battle thirty stades (5.5 km) away. Alexander’s high-
ranking officers advised him to attack at once, but instead this time he
listened to Parmenion’s advice: he delayed the fight so as to first assess the
battlefield and seek out any traps the enemy might have prepared. In the
evening, however, it was Parmenion and other more senior officers who
were persuading Alexander to attack Darius’s army at night. They argued
that the element of surprise would even out the chances against a
numerically larger army. Perhaps behind Alexander’s proud response that
he did not wish to steal a victory there was, as Arrian assumes, not only an
unwillingness to risk so much in a night-time battle but also a desire to
prove to Darius his inferiority as a warrior in the open field and the light of
day. Perhaps he wished to exclude all factors other than quality of
command and sheer fighting ability. The rest of the night Alexander and
his circle of companions spent on religious ceremonies. We know that
sacrifices were also made to Phobos, the god of fear, panic and flight from
the battlefield who accompanied Ares the god of war. They went to sleep
27
Curt., 4.12.1, 4.12.4-5, 4.12.14-19; Arr., An., 3.9.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 80;
Heckel 1992, pp. 362-363.
28
Plu., Alex., 31.8; Plu., Cam., 19.5; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 15-16.
Questions pertaining to the date: Dąbrowa 1988, p. 74; Hamilton 1999, p. 81.
Fixing the date: Grzybek 1990, pp. 42, 58-59; Bernard 1990, pp. 515-528; Hauben
1992, p. 149; Le Rider 2003, pp. 267-268.
King of Asia 229
just before dawn. The rest of the Macedonian army slept throughout the
night. The Persians, on the other hand, spent the entire night on watch for
fear of an attack on their very large but unfortified camp. The Persian
camp fires were said to have been visible on the plain right up to the
horizon.29
Thanks to information contained in the book of Aristobulus, who had
accompanied Alexander on that expedition, we know that after the battle
the Macedonians found in the Persian camp the Great King’s written
dispositions for the day including the positioning of his forces. Darius
personally commanded the centre. He was guarded by the melophori, the
elite aristocratic cavalry called the royal ‘kinsmen’ as well as detachments
from India, Babylonia, Sittacene, the Uxians, Carians, Mardi and now a
not so numerous detachment of Greek mercenaries. The war elephants and
50 scythed chariots were also aligned in the centre. The right wing
included contingents from Syria, Armenia, Cappadocia and northern
Mesopotamia, Media, Parthia, Hyrcania as well as allies from Scythia and
another 50 scythed chariots. The arrangement of the Persian left wing
shows that a lesson from previous engagements had been learned. Here
Darius positioned his strongest units – the excellent east Iranian cavalry
(Bactrians, Dahae and Arachosians), Scythian allies as well as Persians
and Susians – for he realised they would most probably be facing
Alexander, who usually commanded his hetairoi on the Macedonian right
wing. Here too he positioned the remaining 100 scythe bearing chariots. It
is worth noting that Darius’s army included contingents from countries
that had already been conquered by Alexander. At least some of the
soldiers from these countries had obviously not given up hope of the Great
King and rightful ruler of the Persian Empire ultimately being victorious.
We even know of an Egyptian official called Samtutefnacht, who left an
account of his stay in Darius’s camp and of the subsequent crushing defeat
of the Persians.30
The Macedonian battle positions are well known because on this
subject the ancient authors agree. The right wing was held by the
Macedonian cavalry officially commanded by Parmenion’s son, Philotas,
but de facto command of this section of the Macedonian frontline
belonged to Alexander. Extended even farther to the right were
29
Arr., An., 3.9.3-11.2; Curt., 4.12.24-13.17; Plu., Alex., 31.8-32.1; Diod., 17.55.6-
56.1; It. Alex., 57-58.
30
Aristobul., ap. Arr., An., 3.11.3-7 (= FGrH, 139 F17); Curt., 4.12.5-13. Treson
1931 (Samtutefnacht’s stele); Marsden 1964, p. 44; Seibert 1972, p. 131;
Schachermeyr 1973, p. 269; Bosworth 1980, pp. 297-299; Vogelsang 1992, pp.
222-223; Hammond 1996, pp. 141-143; Briant 2003, p. 78.
230 Chapter V
31
Arr., An., 3.118-12.5; Diod., 17.57.1-5; Curt., 4.13.26-32; Fron., Str., 2.3.19-20.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 300-304; Bosworth 1988, p. 81; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 93-94;
Hammond 1996, pp. 143-145.
32
Curt., 4.13.17-25; Diod., 17.56; Plu., Alex., 32.1-4; Just., 11.13; Sachs-Hunger
1988, no. 330, verso 15. Atkinson 1980, p. 418.
King of Asia 231
detachments could not keep up with Alexander’s smaller but faster units.
Worse still, by moving further left the Persians were leaving the terrain
specially prepared for the chariots, and Darius was clearly hoping that
these would play an important role in breaking through the enemy’s front
line. Moreover, the Macedonians were now moving away from the places
where the Persians had secretly dug ditches against their cavalry. For these
reasons the Great King ordered first the Scythian cavalry and next also the
Bactrian cavalry to attack the enemy and stop this manoeuvre. Alexander
sent a detachment of Greek mercenary cavalry to counter this attack and
soon afterwards other cavalry detachments were sent as well. The
excellently trained and armoured east Iranian and Scythian cavalry
inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, so, wishing to quickly resolve the
conflict, Darius now sent in his chariots. Although this archaic formation
did inflict some losses among the enemy’s frontline troops, it did not have
a very significant impact on the ultimate course of the battle since the
chariots operated unsupported by the Persian cavalry. As the chariots sped
towards them, the soldiers in the phalanx were ordered to stand apart and
let them through. At the same time javelins were hurled at the passing
chariot horses and immediately after that the slingers and Agrianians
finished off the charioteers with impunity.33
Gaugamela was the first recorded battle in history where a European
army encountered elephants. The Greeks had known about these animals
since the previous century but this knowledge was still very hazy –
Aristotle’s research into the subject marked a breakthrough but that was
only made possible as a consequence of Alexander’s expedition. The only
source to mention them being used in the Battle of Gaugamela is the
anonymous Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, whose author claims that the
Macedonians stopped the animals from advancing on them by scattering
sharp metal objects before them. Whether or not this unconfirmed story is
true, we can be certain at Gaugamela the military impact of the elephants
was even smaller than that of the scythed chariots.34
No doubt as he observed the situation develop on his right wing the
Great King also ordered his soldiers to attack the enemy on other sections
of the front. The Persians had the greatest success on their right wing.
Here too the scythed chariots acting in tandem with the Messagetae
cavalry were much more effective. The commander of this wing was the
satrap Mazaeus and he managed to get the Macedonians outflanked and
33
Arr., An., 3.13; Curt., 4.15.1-4, 4.15-17; Diod., 17.57.6-59.1; Polyaen., 4.3.17; It.
Alex., 59-61. Bosworth 1988, pp. 81-88; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 96-97; Hammond
1996, p. 145; Ashley 1998, p. 267.
34
Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151, F1.13. Scullard 1974, pp. 37-52, 64.
232 Chapter V
pinned down by his troops. Some of his cavalry now broke through a gap
that had appeared as a consequence of the Macedonia centre and right
wing shifting further right and now headed straight for Alexander’s camp
rather than attacking the back of Macedonian phalanx. The Persian
captives joined the fight and the poorly armed Thracian detachment
guarding the camp was soon defeated. Legend would later have it that
Darius’s mother, Queen Sisigambis, chose to stay with Alexander instead
of making use of this opportunity to escape. It was at this critical moment
that the advantage of the unusual alignment of the Macedonian forces
became apparent: the second Macedonian phalanx positioned behind the
first turned around and attacked its own camp thus recapturing it.
Although some of the Bactrian cavalry was now confined to fighting
round the camp, the situation on the Macedonian left wing continued to be
dire. Parmenion sent successive messengers to Alexander with urgent
pleas for help, but none came for the battle’s outcome now hung in the
balance in the Macedonian centre and on the right wing.35 The sources are
very vague about what happened in the centre, saying only that
Macedonian phalanx advanced victoriously on the enemy. They focus
much more on what Alexander was doing. As at Issus, the Macedonian
king’s objective was to reach Darius with his hetairoi and he was now
leading a charge in that direction. Macedonians who had fought in that
battle later claimed that an eagle was flying above their king, which was
obviously a sign of the impending victory. The fiercest fighting erupted
between the Companion cavalry and the royal ‘kinsmen’ gathered around
the Great King. Although we can assume Arrian’s claim that Darius was
the first to flee is simply a product of Macedonian propaganda, there is no
way of knowing the veracity of the opposite claim that he wanted to die
but was forced to withdraw by his entourage. Regardless of which version
is closer to the truth, Darius did once again leave the battlefield at a time
when his army was still fighting in a still equal struggle with the invading
enemy. The Great King’s escape resulted in the collapse of resistance in
the section he had commanded.36
At first Alexander tried to chase Darius but he was hindered by the
general confusion and the clouds of dust that limited visibility. Indeed,
Darius made skilful use of these circumstances and under the cover of dust
clouds he led the detachments retreating with him in a quite unexpected
35
Curt., 4.15.2-3, 4.15.5-13; Diod., 17.59.5-8; Plu., Alex., 32.5-8; Arr., An., 3.14.5-
6; Polyaen., 4.3.6. Bosworth 1988, pp. 82-84; Hammond 1996, pp. 146-147;
Ashley 1998, pp. 267-268.
36
Arr., An., 3.14.1-4; Diod., 17.60.1-3; Plu., Alex., 33.2-8; Curt., 4.15.19-33; Just.,
11.14; It. Alex., 62. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 237; Bosworth 1988, p. 83.
King of Asia 233
direction. According to Arrian and later quoting after him the Itinerarium
Alexandri, Alexander stopped the pursuit after yet another of Parmenion’s
messengers reported to him with urgent pleas for help. The Macedonian
king turned round and rushed to save the left flank of his army, which was
now on the verge of total defeat. However, it is possible that Arrian’s
account simply reflects the unsympathetic stance towards Parmenion
originally held by Alexander’s court historian, Callisthenes, who had
every reason to present the old general as an incompetent commander who
panicked instead of facing the enemy himself. Historians point to the
physical difficulties a messenger sent by Parmenion would have had in
locating let alone reaching Alexander in the most intensive heat of the
battle. Anyhow, news of the Great King’s withdrawal now spread among
the Persian soldiers and particular ‘national’ groups started withdrawing
from the battle in order to get back to their countries. In fact Alexander
encountered the heaviest fighting against detachments trying to escape
from the battlefield and head for their native lands of Parthia, Persis and
India. In this clash the Macedonians lost 60 men and many were wounded,
including at least three high-ranking officers: Hephaestion, Coenus and
Menidas. Once most of the Persian army was in retreat, the Macedonian
soldiers on the left flank managed to independently repulse the enemy
from their section before effective help from Alexander arrived, if indeed
any was sent. In this section the Thessalian cavalry once again played an
outstanding role. Meanwhile Alexander continued his pursuit of Darius but
the late time of day, the considerable distance that now separated him from
the Great King and the other Persian detachments fleeing from the battle
precluded any chance of success. The Macedonians pitched camp for the
night by the river Lycus (Greater Zab), some 32 km from Gaugamela.37
Darius escaped to Arbela and thence he hurriedly headed for safety in
Media to the east of the Zagros Mountains. The Persian capital there,
Ecbatana, became the Great King’s residence for the next half year. Darius
assumed, correctly as it turned out, that Alexander would not follow him
but go for the prizes resulting from the victory at Gaugamela, i.e. the
Achaemenid capitals to the west of the Zagros Mountains – Babylon and
Susa. The Great King was accompanied by the remainder of the Greek
mercenaries, now only 2,000, as well as the Bactrian cavalry, which was
led virtually unscathed out Gaugamela by the satrap Bessus. At Ecbatana
Darius gathered soldiers who had escaped from Gaugamela and prepared
for another battle, hoping to get reinforcements from eastern Iran. The day
37
Arr., An., 3.15.1-5; Diod., 17.60.4-61.3; Curt., 4.16.1-6; Plu., Alex., 33.9-11; It.
Alex., 63; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 16-18. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 240-241;
Devine 1975, p. 382; Bosworth 1980, pp. 309-312.
234 Chapter V
knowledge in ancient times, where real Asia fitted within the bounds of
the Achaemenid Empire, whereas beyond lay only semi-mythical
territories such as India or the land of the Amazons. Among the Persian
king’s titles there was xšƗyașiya PƗrsaiy, which means ‘king in Persia’
rather than ‘king of Persia’ and it was used above all to stress the
legitimacy of their rule over Parsa, meaning Persis or Fars, the homeland
of the Achaemenids. However the title most frequently used in
contemporary Greek and Persian sources was ‘Great King’. Alexander, on
the other hand, never used this title, at least not in Greek, perhaps because
of the bad associations it had to Greeks. Instead he chose the less popular
by no less unequivocal title of ‘king of Asia’.39
We have no details of how Alexander was proclaimed ‘king of Asia’.
Perhaps his army proclaimed him as such, which would have had
exclusively political significance, but it would not have been legally valid.
It is equally probable that Alexander had a herald proclaim him to be king
of Asia in front of his army. In both cases the proclamation would have
been in keeping with the universally practiced doctrine of the victor taking
over sovereignty, and Alexander was most certainly the victor at
Gaugamela. He had already made his claim to the entire Achaemenid
Empire in diplomatic correspondence with Darius. Therefore the
proclamation at Gaugamela was not unexpected but the victory had raised
it from the status of mere propaganda to a statement of fact. Perhaps this
was still a bit premature, considering that Darius still held power in Iran,
but it was very convincing in the light of what had happened in the most
recent days.40
After his victory Alexander made sacrifices to the gods befitting the
grandeur of the occasion. Those who had distinguished themselves in the
battle were now awarded gifts. The treasures captured from the Persians
allowed the king to be very generous to the Greeks and thus stress the
Panhellenic character of this anti-Persian war. That was why booty taken
from Darius was given to the Plataeans in compensation for the
destruction previously inflicted by Xerxes. Croton was awarded by
Alexander on account of the fact that in 480 its citizen Phayllus had sailed
in his own ship to aid the Greeks fighting the Persians at Salamis. A gift to
39
Plu., Alex., 34.1; Timachides, Chronicum Lindium, FGrH, 532 F1.38; FD
3.4.2.137; Arist., Mu., 398a (translation by J. Barnes). For the discussion of the
issue of Kingdom of Asia (with reference to all relevant sources) see Nawotka
2004.
40
Ritter 1965, p. 52; Wilcken 1967, pp. 137-138; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 277-279;
Goukowsky 1978, p. 175; Bosworth 1988, p. 85; Wirth 1993, pp. 193-196;
Hamilton 1999, p. 9.
236 Chapter V
41
Plu., Alex., 34.2-4; Timachides, Chronicum Lindium, FGrH, 532 F1.38.
Hamilton 1999, pp. 91-92; Blackwell 1999, pp. 109-110; Flower 2000, pp. 112-
113.
42
Arr., An., 3.8.5; Diod., 17.64.3. Berve 1926, no. 221; Frye 1984, p. 139; Jacobs
1994, p. 162; Briant 1996, p. 868; Heckel 1997, p. 204.
King of Asia 237
quite accurately traced. Already on 8th October 331, that is, barely a week
after the battle, someone from Gaugamela reached Babylon. The diary is
damaged in this place, so we do not know for sure who it was. It could
have been Mazaeus himself or a messenger with news of Darius III’s
defeat. The distance of 580 km from Gaugamela to Babylon could be
swiftly covered thanks to the Persian system of stage posts which allowed
horses to be changed. Alternatively it could have been a messenger from
Alexander with the first offer to negotiate. Meanwhile the Macedonian
army marched, most probably down the Royal Road in the direction of
Susa but after a few dozens of kilometres turning towards the Tigris. After
four days they reached the town of Mennis, where the soldiers were
amazed to see for the first time in their lives perpetual flames emanating
from a grotto (burning natural gas) and a stream of petroleum oil spilling
out onto the surface. There are two places on the route between Arbela and
Babylon known in ancient times to have had oil flowing out onto the
surface and burning natural gas. One is Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk and
some 80 km from Arbela, but it is the more distant Tuz Khurmatu some
125 km from Arbela that seems more likely to have been the place where
the Macedonians saw this phenomenon. In four days Alexander’s rapidly
moving army would have advanced at least 125 km. Having never seen
such a substance emerging from the ground before, the Macedonians
experimented with it. One of their experiments was to pour the oil over a
young volunteer called Stephanus and setting it alight. The fire then
proved very difficult to put out and the unfortunate volunteer suffered
serious burns. Not far from this place the Macedonians crossed over to the
western side of the Tigris. By 18th October they were in Sippar, 50 km to
the north of Babylon. From the above information we can estimate that the
army marched on average some 35 km a day. At Sippar they stayed for
two days. There can be no doubt that Alexander had started negotiations
with Mazaeus and the Babylonian elite already before the army reached
Sippar. In these negotiations he promised that his soldiers would not enter
the houses in Babylon – by that he may have meant the houses of gods, in
other words temples. An entry for 20th October in the Astronomical Diary
states that the Macedonians were at the Gate of Esagila, and the following
day they sacrificed a bull, no doubt to Marduk. After that Alexander
entered Babylon and, using the official Babylonian nomenclature, took
over Darius’s position as ruler of the world.43
43
Curt., 5.1.11-16; Plu., Alex., 35; Str., 16.4.1, 15; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330,
retro. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 244-245; Seibert 1985, p. 96; Bernard 1990, pp. 525-528;
Atkinson 1994, p. 33; Hamilton 1999, pp. 93-94; van der Spek 2003, pp. 298-299.
238 Chapter V
44
Curt., 5.1.17-23; Arr., An., 3.16.3; Diod., 17.64.4. Kuhrt 1990, pp. 121-126;
Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1993, pp. 139-140; Atkinson 1994, pp. 34-36; Briant 1996,
p. 881; Heckel 1997, p. 206.
King of Asia 239
45
Tarn 1948, i, pp. 51-52; Wilcken 1967, pp. 139-141; Schachermeyr 1973, pp.
280-283; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 247-249; Green 1974, pp. 302-304; Badian 1985, p.
437; Bosworth 1988, pp. 86-87.
46
Frye 1984, pp. 129-130; Oppenheim 1985, pp. 531, 577-586; Stolper 1994, pp.
241-245; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994, pp. 311-312; Briant 1996, pp. 742-743.
240 Chapter V
settlers frequently sold off parts of their land so that larger allotments were
divided up and reduced in size. That may be why military settlers in
Mesopotamia did not make a significant contribution to the Persian war
effort at the end of the Achaemenid era.47
In Alexander’s day Babylon, covering an area of 975 ha and
surrounded by 18 km of walls, regarded one of the Seven Wonders of the
World, was possibly the largest city on earth. We can assume that it had
approximately 200,000-300,000 inhabitants; the average population
density in contemporary cities ranged from 100-400 inhabitants per
hectare and the population of Antioch on the Orontes with area of 650 ha
has been estimated to include between 160,000 and 250,000 inhabitants.
How the Greeks imaged the sheer size of Babylon is expressed in
Aristotle’s anecdote stating that it took three days for all the inhabitants to
learn that their city had been captured by Alexander. The river Euphrates,
which flowed through Babylon, was spanned by a bridge built on stone
pillars and the two focal points within the metropolis were the royal palace
and the temple complex. The heavily fortified palace of Nebuchadnezzar,
still used in Persian times, was situated on a low hill today called Kasr,
right next to the city’s wall. Because in the late Achaemenid period
Babylon’s status was raised to become one of the Persian capitals, during
Artaxerxes II’s reign an Apadana (throne hall) was added to the palace.
However, it is not true that stone foundations excavated in one of the
palace’s corners once supported the so-called hanging gardens of
Semiramis (the hanging gardens of Babylon) for these were almost
certainly located in Nineveh. There was a 7-20 m wide procession route
running from the Ishtar Gate in the northern wall, alongside
Nebuchadnezzar’s palace up to the famous Marduk temple complex in the
city centre. There is controversy among historians as to the scale of
destruction inflicted by the Persians to the Etemenanki ziggurat and
Esagila temple or even whether such an event actually occurred. The
traditional view has been challenged by historians who unfortunately base
most of their arguments on the total lack of Babylonian records regarding
the Persian destruction of these edifices. Moreover, these historians argue
that the works carried out on Alexander’s instructions – which are indeed
confirmed in Babylonian tablets – were merely symbolic as every good
king of Babylon was obliged to at least beautify the Temple of Marduk.48
47
Lane Fox 1973, p. 157-160; Frye 1984, p. 129; Oppenheim 1985, pp. 573-574;
Stolper 1994, pp. 245-247, 253-257; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994, p. 313; Briant
1996, pp. 743-746.
48
Arist., Pol., 1276a. Oppenheim 1985, pp. 583-584; Kuhrt 1990, pp. 126-127;
Dalley 1994; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994, pp. 313, 317; Stolper 1994, p. 259;
King of Asia 241
Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 53-54; Kuhrt 1996, pp. 46-47; Briant 1996, pp. 561-562, 694;
Margueron 2000; Will 2000, pp. 482-491; Aperghis 2001, pp. 76-77.
49
Arr., An., 3.16.4, 7.17.2; Diod., 17.112.3; Str., 16.1.5; Babylonian clay tablets:
BM 36613 = Sachs 1977, pp. 144-147; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 324. Bosworth
1980, p. 314; Oppenheim 1985, pp. 565-567; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994, pp. 315-
317; Schmidt 1995, pp. 92-94; Kuhrt 1996, p. 47; van der Spek 2003, pp. 300-301.
50
Van der Spek 1987, pp. 64-65.
242 Chapter V
51
Porphyrius, ap. Simp., In cael., 7 p. 506. Balcer 1978, pp. 124-125; Oppenhaim
1985, pp. 546-547; van der Spek 1987, pp. 60-63; Kuhrt 1990, pp. 127-128; Kuhrt,
Sherwin-White 1994, pp. 317-318.
King of Asia 243
52
Curt., 5.1.43-44; Arr., An., 3.16.4-5; Diod., 17.64.5-6; Str., 11.14.9, 11.14.15.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 314-316; Seibert 1985, p. 97; O’Brien 1992, pp. 97-98; Kuhrt,
Sherwin-White 1993, pp. 191-192; Atkinson 1994, pp. 50-53; Briant 1996, pp. 86-
87, 93-95, 862-869; Le Rider 2003, pp. 273-279.
53
Curt., 5.1.36-39; Just., 11.14. Atkinson 1994, pp. 47-48.
244 Chapter V
15,000 troops there were 500 cavalrymen and 6,000 infantrymen from
Macedonia as well as 50 Macedonian youths from noble families. The last
of these were to join the royal retinue of pages with the prospect of later
being promoted to high positions in the army or administration, but in the
meantime they also guaranteed the loyalty of their families to the king.
The arrival of these reinforcements increased the size of Alexander’s army
to at least the number of men he had at the start of this campaign. The
allocation of new troops to the various detachments provided an
opportunity to conduct a general reorganisation and promotions. As well
as his heroic behaviour during battles Alexander also demonstrated a
shrewd understanding of his soldiers’ mentality by making sure they
received provisions, proper rest, rewards and praise. It was by these means
that now, and on earlier occasions, Alexander built a strong bond with his
army.54
Fourth-century Greeks regarded Susa (today Shush in the Iranian
province of Khuzestan) to be the main capital of the Achaemenid Empire
for that was where the Great King usually received their numerous
delegations – more often than not requesting him to resolve disputes
between individual Greek states. Alexander made sure this city would be
occupied immediately after the Battle of Gaugamela by dispatching there
his officer Philoxenus, no doubt with a large detachment of cavalry. There
are no records of fighting and it is much more likely that after some
negotiations the satrap, Abulites, peacefully surrendered the city. The
Macedonian army reached Susa in mid December 331. The sources record
a ceremony similar to those performed with the surrender of Sardis,
Memphis and Babylon. Alexander was first met by Abulites’s son, while
the satrap himself waited to greet him at the bank of the river Choaspes
with gifts including camels and 12 elephants. Of even greater importance
than the prestige of capturing another capital of the Achaemenid state was
the Susa treasury, containing: property of the Great King, whose value the
sources do not quantify, precious metals worth 40,000 talents and another
9,000 talents in coins. Although this was only a foretaste of the booty
Alexander would later capture on the other side of the Zagros Mountains,
the Susa treasures (1,285 tons of silver) were over ten times the value of
all the treasures captured in the Greek world in the well documented and
militarily eventful period from 490 to 336 (116 tons of silver). For the first
time Alexander had unlimited financial resources, 3,000 talents of which
he sent to Antipater in Macedonia. Although small in comparison to
54
Diod., 17.64.6-65.4; Arr., An., 3.16.10-11; Curt., 5.1.39-2.7. Bosworth 1980, pp.
319-321; Krasilnikoff 1992; Krasilnikoff 1993, pp. 88-95; Atkinson 1994, pp. 48-
62; Keegan 1999, pp. 88-89.
King of Asia 245
55
Arr., An., 3.16.6-10; Diod., 17.65.5-66.2; Curt., 5.1.43, 5.2.8-12; Plu., Alex.,
39.10; Just., 11.14. Andreotti 1957, p. 127; Seibert 1985, pp. 97-98; Heckel 1992,
pp. 262-263; Atkinson 1994, pp. 51-53; Holt 1999, p. 30; Heckel 2006, p. 164.
246 Chapter V
families; in Persia, on the other hand, wellborn women always left such
work to the servants. The feelings of the royal captives were hurt to the
extent that Alexander considered it important to apologise to Queen
Sisigambis for this misunderstanding. Before leaving Susa, Alexander had
to make some essential administrative decisions. He reappointed Abulites
satrap of Susiana but, as in Babylon, other important posts in the satrapy
were entrusted to Macedonians. Archelaus was made commander of 3,000
troops stationed there, whereas Xenophilus, perhaps identical with
Philoxenus who had negotiated the surrender of Susa, was made
commandant of the Susa fortress, i.e. royal palace, and a garrison of 1,000
Macedonian veterans. Such a large garrison in the city and satrapy of Susa
was no doubt thought necessary on account of the treasures kept there.
Alexander appointed as treasurer a man called Callicrates, who may have
been a Greek rather than a Macedonian.56
The eventful stay in Susa probably did not last long. The next
destination was Fars – the Achaemenid homeland. On the fourth day after
leaving Susa the Macedonian army crossed the river Pasitigris (the Karun
today), most probably at the site of today’s city of Shushtar in the Iranian
province of Khuzestan. The land beyond the Pasitigris was inhabited by
the Uxian tribe. The Uxians living between the left bank of the Pasitigris
and the fertile Mesopotamian Lowland surrendered without a fight.
However, their compatriots living in the Zagros Mountains decided to
resist and defend the main road leading to Fars. The highland Uxians were
shepherds and in Achaemenid times belonged to those tribes not obliged to
pay tributes. Conversely, it was customary for the Great King to provide
them with gifts in return for the right to pass through their territory. Now
the Uxian highlanders were demanding such gifts from Alexander, who
naturally refused and this led to war. We do not know whether the actions
of the Uxians were in anyway coordinated with the satrap Ariobarzanes,
who was amassing forces on last line of defence at the Persian Gate.
Instead we know that the attack on Alexander’s forces was not
spontaneous and was commanded by the satrap Madates, a relative of the
royal family. H. Speck has estimated on the basis of extensive field survey
that most of the fighting took place in an area between Shushtar and
Masjed-i Soleiman and reached its climax in a place to the northeast of
today’s Batvand. In the struggle against the stubborn highlanders
Alexander selected elite soldiers usually used in difficult terrain:
56
Curt., 5.2.12-22; Diod., 17.66.3-7; Arr., An., 3.16.7-10; Plu., Alex., 36.1, 37.7,
56.2; Plu., mor., 329d; Plu., Ages., 15.3; Plin., Nat., 34.70; Paus., 1.8.5; V. Max.,
2.10, ext. 1. Bosworth 1980, pp. 317-320; Atkinson 1994, pp. 65-69; Heckel 2006,
pp. 75, 272.
King of Asia 247
57
Arr., An., 3.17; Arr., Ind., 40.1; Curt., 5.3.1-16; Diod., 17.67, 19.17.3; Str.,
11.13.6, 15.3.4; It. Alex., 66. Seibert 1985, pp. 101-103; Badian 1985, pp. 441-442;
Atkinson 1994, pp. 69-72; MacDermont, Schippmann 1999, pp. 304-305; Speck
2002, pp. 23-36, 157; Heckel 2006, p. 156.
248 Chapter V
which gave them access to the northern part of the Marvdasht Plain and
Persepolis.58
Waiting for Alexander’s army at the Persian Gate were Persian forces
commanded by Ariobarzanes, who had clearly been informed by his
reconnaissance units that Alexander would be taking the summer route.
Though differing from one another in details, all the ancient authors
generally describe the conflict that followed in a way that presents the
Persian Gate as an Iranian Thermopylae, the last line of defence which
Alexander now overcame similarly to how Xerxes had succeeded in 480.
Ariobarzanes’s army – more realistically estimated to be 25,000 troops by
Curtius than 40,700 according to Arrian and Itinerarium Alexandri – was
not short of men, but the quality of the Asian infantry, who made up most
of the satrap’s army, was much inferior to that of the Macedonian army.
On the other hand, the Persians took up an excellent defensive position.
They pitched their camp at 1,980 m, i.e. 150 m above the Macedonians,
and they also built a wall to close off the end of the valley. The first
Macedonian assault ended with a complete fiasco because the Persians
bravely defended the wall, rolled boulders down the sides of the valley and
also caused many loses with fired missiles. Alexander had to order a
retreat and had a camp pitched at a safe distance from the Persians.
Fortunately, among the Persian captives there was a Lycian shepherd who
undertook to lead the Macedonians along a route bypassing the enemy.
Later in Persepolis Alexander would reward this Lycian shepherd with 30
talents. That night Alexander followed the Lycian guide taking his best
detachments of Macedonians and Agrianians. So as not to arouse the
enemy’s suspicion, Alexander instructed the Macedonian camp’s
commander, Craterus, to light as many fires as if the entire army was there.
After a long and arduous march Alexander’s detachments encircled the
Persians. Before launching the attack, Alexander subdivided his group into
two so as the make the assault more effective. At the same time Craterus
on his side also attacked. Ariobarzanes’s soldiers were completely taken
by surprise. The Persians fought desperately to defend the road into their
heartland but their brave resistance was futile. Only Ariobarzanes and a
handful of cavalry managed to escape the slaughter, to perish soon in
another battle near the Araxes river. Now nothing stood in the way
between Alexander and Persepolis.59
58
Arr., An., 3.18.1-2; Diod., 17.68.1; Curt., 5.3.16-17; Str., 15.3.6 (Curtius and
Diodorus confuse the Persian and the Susian Gates). Speck 2002, pp. 100-165,
with reference to earlier works.
59
Arr., An., 3.18.2-9; Curt., 5.3.17-4.34, 5.7.12; Diod., 17.68; Plu., Alex., 37.1-3;
Polyaen., 4.3.27; Fron., Str., 2.5.17; It. Alex., 67. Heckel 1980; Bosworth 1988, pp.
King of Asia 249
From the Persian Gate Alexander’s corps entered the Marvdasht Plain
and after marching c. 100 km in a south-easterly direction they reached the
river Araxes (today the Kor in Fars), most probably somewhere near
today’s Dorudzan, where there are the remains of a road from the
Achaemenid era. Macedonian engineers had to build a bridge over that
river for Alexander’s army to cross to the eastern side. This was just some
50 km from Persepolis. Before the river was crossed a messenger had
arrived with a letter from Tiridates, the treasurer (ganzabara) in Persepolis,
informing the new ruler of the danger of the city’s inhabitants looting the
treasury. On receiving this news Alexander took command of the cavalry
and headed for Persepolis post-haste, leaving the slower infantry to follow
on behind. Before they reached the capital, the Macedonians encountered a
crowd of Greek captives – numbering more probably 800 (according to
Diodorus and Justin) rather than 4,000 (Curtius) people – who the Persians
had branded or amputated body parts not essential for performing work.
Alexander offered these unfortunates money and means to return to
Greece. After consulting the matter, however, the captives declined this
offer for fear of being rejected by Greek society, which worshiped the
beauty of the human body. Instead they preferred to remain in the East
with their Asiatic families. Therefore Alexander instructed that each Greek
captive should receive a pair of oxen, 50 sheep as well as grain, clothes
and 3,000 drachms, which was the equivalent of an average ten years of
income in Greece.60
Persepolis comprised a complex of palaces on a terrace measuring 12.5
hectares as well as a city inhabited among others by courtiers. The city is
only known from the works of ancient authors but the palaces were
rediscovered by Europeans in 1620 and archaeologically examined in the
years 1931-1939. Today the palace complex and the graves of
Achaemenid monarchs located just a few kilometres away are Iran’s
greatest tourist attractions. Unlike other Achaemenid capitals which were
built of sun dried clay bricks, the Persepolis palaces were predominantly
built of stone, which was found locally and also imported from distant
parts of the empire. Another distinguishing feature of this palace complex
is the extraordinarily high artistic quality of the architecture and reliefs as
well as a unique and deeply thought out iconography that indicates the
exceptional role it played in the Persian state. Like no other place it
reflected the Achaemenid ideology and that dynasty’s position in the
90-91; Atkinson 1994, pp. 98-102; Ashley 1998, pp. 274-277; Speck 2002, pp. 44-
46, 169-170; Heckel 2006, p. 45, s.v. ‘Ariobarzanes’ [2].
60
Arr., An., 3.18.10; Diod., 17.69; Curt., 5.5.2-24; Just., 11.14; Ps.-Callisth., 2.18.
Atkinson 1994, pp. 104-105; Speck 2002, pp. 162-164.
250 Chapter V
cosmic order of a world created by Ahura Mazda.61 Moreover, this was the
Achaemenid capital of Fars, the dynasty’s homeland and therefore a
privileged province in their empire. Alexander’s corps most probably
reached Persepolis in mid January 330. The Macedonian baggage train and
troops commanded by Parmenion joined Alexander’s forces
approximately a week later. Soon after his arrival at Persepolis Alexander
allowed his soldiers, tired and angry after the fighting at the Persian Gate,
to sack the city. The terrible slaughter of inhabitants, the rapes, the looting
and the destruction of homes should not be confused with the burning
down of the palaces, which occurred several months later. In January the
palaces were still intact.62
The palace treasury at Persepolis, which Tiridates handed over to
Alexander untouched, contained the Achaemenids’ basic reserves of
bullion and other treasures they had accumulated for over more than 200
years. The total value was 120,000 talents, therefore much more than the
treasure at Susa. With time this vast amount of bullion, which had so far
only been thesaurized by the Achaemenids, was converted into coins to
cover the costs of war as well as allow Alexander to demonstrate his
largess towards artists, philosophers, soldiers and courtiers. The king’s
expenditure during his entire expedition east is estimated to have been on
average 7,500 talents a year. The economic effect of putting into
circulation such a massive amount of bullion has frequently been
compared to the effect of the influx of South American silver and gold in
the 16th and 17th centuries, and more often than not the Persian bullion
effect has been estimated to have been greater. Alexander decided to
concentrate all the treasure captured from the Persians in Susa. Some of
the sources mention captured treasure being transported from Persis to
Ecbatana though that could have only happened after the city was taken,
i.e. only after June 330. It is possible that these seemingly contradictory
accounts are due to the fact that some of the treasure was transported to
Susa while the rest was left to cover the costs of ongoing and future
campaigns in Iran. And it would have been that the second batch of
treasure was ultimately transported to Ecbatana. No doubt the decision to
shift the treasure resulted from knowledge that the palaces of Persepolis
would be burned down and therefore could no longer serve as the empire’s
main treasury. The exceptionally responsible mission of transporting the
bullion and other precious items was entrusted to Parmenion. This was a
61
Diod., 17.71.3-8. Schmidt 1953-1970; Walser 1966; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 24-26;
Cuyler Young 1988, pp. 108-110; Briant 1996, pp. 183-228.
62
Diod., 17.70, 17.71.3; Curt., 5.6.1-9. Badian 1985, pp. 440, 443; Atkinson 1994,
pp. 110-115; Bloedow, Loube 1997, p. 349; Nawotka 2003b, p. 68.
King of Asia 251
63
Diod., 17.71.1-3; Str., 15.3.9; Plu., Alex., 37.4. Keynes 1930, ii, pp. 150-152,
291; Bosworth 1988, pp. 92-93; Callataÿ 1989, p. 263; Bloedow, Loube 1997, pp.
347-352; Le Rider 2003, pp. 310-316; Holt 2003, p. 13.
64
Schmidt 1953-1970, i, pp. 16-78; Borza 1972, p. 235; Sancisi-Weerdenburg
1993, pp. 181-182; Bloedow, Loube 1997, pp. 344-346; Nawotka 2003b, p. 73;
Shabazi 2003, pp. 19-20 and n. 71.
65
Ael., VH, 2.25. Date: Grzybek 1990, pp. 43-44.
66
Goukowsky 1975; Badian 1985, pp. 450-452; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 105-107;
Wirth 1993, p. 223; Briant 1996, pp. 90-94. Alexander’s Persian costume: Duris,
252 Chapter V
ap. Ath., 12.50; Arr., An., 4.7.4; Diod., 17.17.5; Curt., 6.6.4; Luc., DMort., 12.4;
ME, 2; Just., 12.3.8; Plu., Alex., 45.2; Plu., mor., 329f-330a. Nawotka 2003, pp.
100-101; Olbrycht 2004, pp. 286-293.
67
ME, 2.
68
Aristobul., ap. Str., 15.3.7-8; Arr., An., 3.18.10; Curt., 5.6.10; Ps.-Callisth.,
2.18.1. Bosworth 1980, pp. 329-330; Briant 1980, pp. 65-72; Stronach 1985, pp.
838-849; Mallowan 1985, p. 418; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 26, 32; Tuplin 1996, pp.
88-89.
King of Asia 253
69
Curt., 5.6.11-19; Diod., 17.73.1. Green 1974, pp. 314-320; Atkinson 1994, pp.
118-120; Wiesehöfer 1994, pp. 363-364, 395-397; Briant 2002, pp. 90-92; Shabazi
2003.
70
Eddy 1961, pp. 58-62; Balcer 1978, pp. 126-127.
71
Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 328, col. v. Grayson 1975, pp. 24-37; Marasco 1985;
Kuhrt 1987, pp. 154-156; Briant 1996, p. 803; Mehl 1999, p. 34; Brosius 2003, pp.
171-172; Shabazi 2003, pp. 15-19. But some see in the Dynastic Prophecy Darius
III as an usurper justly punished: van der Spek 2003, pp. 324-342.
72
Eddy 1961, pp. 12-41; Green 1974, pp. 314-315; Boyce 1982, pp. 12-15, 290;
Plezia, Bielawski 1970, chapter 7 of Aristotle’s letter; Carlier 1995, p. 156;
Faraguna 2003, pp. 116-117; Shabazi 2003.
254 Chapter V
loyal to the Persian king. Once his efforts to appease proved unsuccessful,
Alexander embarked on a campaign of terror which culminated in the
burning of Persepolis. The destruction of the palaces with fire, a sacred
element in the Zoroastrian religion, was supposed break the spirit of
resistance among Persians. The destruction happened towards the end of
Alexander’s stay in Fars, i.e. in May 330.73 That the Macedonians were
conducting an ideological war is confirmed by archaeological findings.
Inside the Persepolis treasury approximately 300 fragments of deliberately
smashed stone mortar were found. Such mortars were used to produce
haoma – a potion used in the Zoroastrian cult. 74 In all probability
Macedonian soldiers destroyed the mortars as an action against the magi
who had been stirring up religious and nationalistic feelings among the
native Persians.
The burning of the Persepolis palaces has been recorded in all the main
historical sources concerning Alexander. The blaze is also confirmed by
archaeological findings. In three edifices – the Apadana, the Hundred
Column Hall and the Treasury – the charred remains of cedar wood were
found in a 0.3-1 m thick layer of ashes, and we know that cedar wood was
used as a building material in Persepolis. The ancient authors give diverse
accounts of the course of events and Alexander’s motives behind the
destruction. According to Arrian, Strabo and the anonymous author of
Itinerarium Alexandri, this was an act of revenge for the burning of Greek
temples by Xerxes in 480, and such was no doubt the official version of
Macedonian propaganda. Diodorus, Curtius and Plutarch give, after
Cleitarchus, a colourful description of how during a drinking party an
Athenian hetaera (courtesan) Thais persuaded a drunken Alexander to do
it. Arrian does not mention this incident as his chief source, the work of
King Ptolemy I also failed to mention it; Thais had been Ptolemy’s
mistress for many years and he would not have wished her to be associated
with this unprecedented act of vandalism. Three buildings were burnt, but
the distances between them and the materials they were built from (brick
walls and clay roofs) precluded the possibility of the blaze spreading
naturally after just one of the buildings had been set alight by drunken
revellers. All three edifices must have been set on fire after some
preparation, which is also confirmed by the lack of valuables found on site.
73
Schwartz 1985, p. 678; Nawotka 2003b.
74
Schmidt 1953-1970, ii, pp. 53-55; Balcer 1978, p. 31; Schwartz 1985, pp. 676-
677.
King of Asia 255
The first torch may have indeed been cast by Thais, but in doing so she
would have been doing exactly what Alexander intended.75
A couple of months later it became apparent that Darius III posed a
significantly smaller threat than had originally been supposed in May 330.
That is why the destruction of the Persepolis palaces – the symbol of
Achaemenid might – turned out to be so costly, not only because of the
obvious material loss but above all because it alienated Alexander from
Persian elites and ordinary Persians alike. In their eyes the Macedonian
was to remain an invader and not the rightful king of Iran.76
75
Clitarch., ap. Ath., 13.37; Arr., An., 3.18.10-12; Diod., 17.70-72; Str., 15.3.6;
Curt., 5.7.2-11; Plu., Alex., 38; It. Alex., 67. Nawotka 2003b.
76
Nawotka 2003b, pp. 75-76; Brosius 2003, pp. 181-185; Brosius 2003a, pp. 227-
228; Heckel 2009, p. 40.
77
Str., 15.3.6; Arr., An., 3.19.1-3; Curt., 5.7.12; Ps.-Callisth., 2.19. Engels 1978, pp.
73-79; Seibert 1985, pp. 108-109; Heckel 2006, pp. 186-187.
256 Chapter V
However, the rumours turned out to be only partly true. Darius was
indeed counting on the support of his allies and east Iranian vassals.
Moreover, he was planning to draw Alexander deeper into the country and
weaken his forces through scorched earth tactics. But none of the expected
reinforcements came. In Ecbatana Darius was left with merely 3,000
cavalry and 30,000 infantry, of which only some 2,000 Greek mercenaries
were of substantial military value. This was much too little to fight another
battle against such a formidable enemy. Darius therefore dispatched his
baggage train towards the so-called Caspian Gate, usually associated with
today’s Sar-i Darreh pass in the southern part of the Elburz Mountain
Range. He himself remained at Ecbatana for a while but then also began a
retreat. It was during this retreat that a dispute began which the ancient
authors call a conspiracy. The disagreement was between Darius and three
of the highest Persian officials in his camp: Bessus, the satrap of Bactria
and Sogdiana, Barsaentes, the satrap of Arachosia (Haruvatiš) and
Drangiana, and the chiliarch Nabarzanes. These officials interpreted
Darius’s successive defeats as a sign that he no longer had the support of
the gods. They therefore suggested that he should temporarily hand over
his authority to someone else, a ‘substitute king,’ and thus remove the bad
omens that were currently imposed on the Great King. Darius flatly
rejected this idea. The conspirators therefore decided to isolate their king
from his loyal Greek mercenaries and effectively took over control of the
army. Patron, the commander of the Greek mercenaries, contacted Darius
and offered to have his men guard him. But the Great King rejected this
offer for he did not wish his subjects to think he did not trust them.
Therefore the mercenaries and Persians who, like the loyal Artabazus, did
not wish to side with the conspirators now just tried to save themselves. At
a village called Thara Bessus, Nabarzanes and Barsaentes arrested Darius
and, bound in chains of gold – for this was after all still the Great King,
transported him in a carriage towards the eastern satrapies. Bessus, who
was most probably a member of the Achaemenid dynasty, symbolically
donned the tiara and proclaimed himself king assuming the dynastic name
of Artaxerxes (V).78
Meanwhile the Macedonian army was still marching to Ecbatana. On
the 12th day a Persian aristocrat called Bisthanes – apparently the son of
Artaxerxes III – surrendered to Alexander and informed him that Darius
had left Ecbatana five days earlier. Finally realising that Darius was
78
Curt., 5.8.1-12.20; Arr., An., 3.19.2, 3.21.1, 3.25.3; Diod., 17.73.2; Plu., Alex.,
42.5; Just., 11.15.1; Ps.-Callisth., 2.20; ME, 3; It. Alex., 68-69. Bosworth 1980, pp.
333-334, 340-342; Seibert 1985, p. 112; Holt 1988, pp. 45-46; Nylander 1993, pp.
151-153.
King of Asia 257
in Susa for some disloyalty and that made him seem more trustworthy in
the eyes of the new ruler. Beyond the Caspian Gate Alexander received a
Babylonian called Bagistanes and Mazaeus’s son, Antibelos (Ardu-Bel?),
who informed him of Darius’s arrest. After two nights of forced marching
the Macedonians reached yet another abandoned Persian campsite.
Alexander learned that the Greek mercenaries had also left the Persians
and that was when he decided to change his tactic. He continued the
pursuit with only 300-500 of his best foot soldiers, who were now
mounted on horses for the sake of speed. The success of this improvisation
incidentally led Alexander to later create a new military formation called
the dimachae, who were trained to fight both on foot and on horseback.
But instead of following their tracks Alexander chose to intercept the
fleeing Persians by taking a shortcut across the Great Salt Desert (Dasht-e
Kavir). Most of the horses failed to complete the arduous trek, which
according to our sources covered a distance of 400 stades (72 km), so that
Alexander was eventually left with only 60 soldiers. This detachment
finally managed to intercept the Persian column not far from the town of
Hecatompylos (today Shahr-i Qumis). Though numerically superior, the
Persians panicked when they saw the Macedonians personally commanded
by Alexander. Bessus tried to persuade Darius to leave the carriage, mount
a horse and flee with the rest of them. But when Darius refused,
Barsaentes and the satrap of Areia Satibarzanes stabbed him with their
spears and fled, leaving the Great King to suffer his fate. Though legend
would have us believe that Alexander found Darius while he was still alive,
it is almost certain that the Great King was dead by the time the victor
reached him. All the new king of Asia could do was to cover his body with
his cloak.80 According to Arrian, Darius died in the Athenian month of
Hekatombaion, i.e. in July 330. This date is confirmed by the Paros’
Chronicle, where Darius’s death is the first recorded event in the Athenian
year 330/329, which began in July. During the spring-summer campaign
Alexander’s army covered the over 900-km distance from Persepolis to
Hecatompylos in just two months, as usual surprising his enemy with
sheer speed.81
80
Arr., An., 3.20-21; Curt., 5.12.18-13.25; Plu., Alex., 42.6-43.5; Plu., mor., 332f;
Diod., 17.73.2-4; Just., 11.15; Polyaen., 4.3.25; Ael., NA, 6.25; Ps.-Callisth., 2.20;
It. Alex., 69; Poll., 1.132. Green 1974, pp. 321-322, 325-329; Bosworth 1980, pp.
338-345; Bosworth 1988, pp. 95-96; Badian 1985, pp. 448-449; Badian 1996, pp.
20-21; Nylander 1993, p. 151; Hammond 1996, pp. 171-173; Heckel 2006, pp. 30,
188.
81
Arr., An., 3.22; Marmor Parium: FGrH, 239 F107. Bosworth 1980, p. 346.
King of Asia 259
The treasure that had been taken from Ecbatana by Darius was duly
found by Alexander’s men in Persian camp – Arrian’s figure of 7,000
talents is probably closer to the truth that Curtius’s 26,000. The new king
of Asia ordered the body of Darius to be taken to Persepolis. It was buried
in one of the royal graves at Naqsh-e Rustam – presumably not the one
with unfinished sculptures that Darius had started having built in his
lifetime. Concern over providing a royal burial for Darius and the later
pursuit of the Great King’s murderer, Bessus, shows that Alexander was
clearly taking his role as successor to the Achaemenids on the Asian
throne seriously. At Hecatompylos Alexander had to wait for the rest of
his detachments to catch up and it is probably there that he made further
official nominations. He appointed Amminapes, a member of his retinue,
satrap of the as yet unconquered Parthia and Hyrcania. One of Alexander’s
hetairoi, Tlepolemus, was appointed commander of a garrison of
mercenaries. Of greater importance was the inclusion of Darius’s younger
brother, Oxyathres, among Alexander’s hetairoi. This was the only
instance recorded in the sources of an Iranian being bestowed such an
honour at this time. Darius’s death, the stay at Hecatompylos and the
release from service of the Greek allies were all interpreted by the
Macedonian troops as signs the campaign was drawing to a close and that
soon they would be heading home, especially as they had recently crossed
the Caspian Gate, which the Greeks considered the end of the inhabited
world. In this instance Alexander easily managed to persuade his soldiers
of the necessity to continue the war by stressing that Bessus was still
putting up resistance, which could eventually lead to a counteroffensive or
even another invasion of Europe. But this was nonetheless the first clear
signal of diverging views between Alexander and his men regarding the
war. It was no doubt as consequence of this experience that during his stay
in Hyrcania Alexander imposed a censorship policy regarding the
correspondence of Macedonian and mercenary soldiers, whose letters were
now secretly opened in search of politically incorrect opinions.82
The king did not immediately start the expedition against Bessus but as
usual first made sure the territories behind him were secure. His army
turned back from the road to Bactria and instead invaded the fertile
agricultural land of Hyrcania by the Caspian Sea. There it divided into
three groups commanded by Alexander, Craterus and Erigyios.
Alexander’s corps occupied the satrapy’s capital, Zadracarta, and there he
82
Aeschin., 3.165; Arr., An., 3.22.1, 3.22.6; Diod., 17.73.3; Curt., 6.2.1-4.1; Plin.,
Nat., 36.132; Plu., Alex., 43.7; Polyaen., 4.3.19; Just., 11.15. Wilcken 1967, pp.
149-151; Bosworth 1980, p. 345; Stoneman 1994, p. 95; Briant 2003, pp. 45-52;
Heckel 2006, p. 188.
260 Chapter V
83
Arr., An., 3.23.1-24.1; Curt., 6.4.1-5.32; Diod., 17.75.1-77.3; Str., 11.5.4 (after
Cleitarchus); Plu., Alex., 44-46; Just., 12.3; It. Alex., 70-72. Plutarch (Alex., 46)
lists now lost sources to the alleged encounter between Alexander and Thalestris.
Engels 1978, pp. 83-84; Atkinson 1994, pp. 192-200; Bosworth 1995, pp. 121-122.
84
Lane Fox 1973, p. 276; Bosworth 1995, pp. 102-103.
King of Asia 261
well aware of the essential role played by aristocrats in the running of this
vast empire. This also probably explains why the king was usually
merciful to those who had previously held important positions in the
Achaemenid state, including the conspirators Nabarzanes and Satibarzanes
who had been involved in overthrowing Darius. Their high status and the
speed with which they surrendered saved them from the punishment that
would eventually be imposed on Bessus. Such a large presence of well-
born Persians in Alexander’s circle naturally enhanced the process of
‘orientalization’ in his policies, which began soon after his first victories in
Asia. This was given even greater impetus after news of Bessus’s
usurpation, for now Alexander very much wanted to show the Iranian
aristocrats that he was the real Great King by adhering to the traditions of
the Achaemenid court. A turning point in the ‘orientalization’ of
Alexander’s policies occurred during his stay in Zadracarta from August to
September 330. Apart from the Persian dress he himself had been wearing
for some time when in court, Alexander now persuaded some of his
hetairoi to wear certain elements of this attire as well. Henceforth he had
two chancelleries: one for documents concerning European affairs, which
Alexander sealed with his original signet and a chancellery for royal
Persian affairs where Alexander used a signet captured from Darius. At the
time Alexander also at least partly adopted the Achaemenid court’s
hierarchical system and gave Macedonians and Greeks in his retinue
Persian court titles. People wishing to speak to Alexander were now
ushered in by his chamberlain (eisangeleus), Chares, in command of a
team of rabdouchoi (rod-bearers); the Macedonians, who were used to
having direct contact with the king, found this procedure particularly
objectionable. In these matters Alexander was always walking on thin ice
as the two court tradition differed in a fundamental way: the Macedonian
adhering to the principle of accessibility of the king, the Iranian built on
restriction of access, rituals, hierarchy. A certain Ptolemaios, probably not
the later king of Egypt, was appointed the royal food taster (edeatros). The
king’s closest friend, Hephaestion, received the highest court distinction
by being appointed hazarapatiš (court chiliarch), but he was also
appointed chiliarch of Companion cavalry. The combination of these two
posts gave him a higher position than was normally held by a Persian
hazarapatiš. It was also then that Alexander formed a Persian guard of
melophori and an aristocratic mounted guard. Other adopted Achaemenid
institutions included court eunuchs and 365 concubines – the most
beautiful women in Asia. The first recorded use of the Achaemenids’
transportable palace was also in Hyrcania. This was a massive tent
supported by 50 gilded columns where Alexander granted audiences and
262 Chapter V
presided over court hearings. The entrance to this tent was guarded by 500
melophori, 500 Persian archers and 500 Macedonian guardsmen bearing
silver shields (argyraspides), and beyond them was a group of war
elephants. This orientalization of the court and its rituals displeased the
Macedonians and to most of the ancient authors (probably following on
after Agatharchides) this is simply an exemplum of Alexander’s moral
downfall. Plutarch is an exception to this rule in that he sees this as an
element of Alexander’s broader political outlook in which he was trying
win over Asian nations by adopting the external aspects of their cherished
native cultures.85
The Macedonian army’s next objective was Bactria – the satrapy of
Bessus, who was now a pretender to the Achaemenid throne. Setting off
from Hyrcania, the Macedonian crossed Parthia and on its eastern border
entered Areia. It was in the border town of Susia (today Tus, to the north
of Meshed in the Iranian province of Khorasan) that the satrap of Areia,
Satibarzanes, immediately surrendered. Despite his involvement in
Darius’s murder, Satibarzanes was forgiven and re-nominated satrap of
Areia. Alexander was eager to defeat Bessus before the latter managed to
raise a large army and secure his position as Great King. That is why he
had a booty laden baggage train that was holding back his army burnt.
However, at this stage the elimination of Bessus was not Alexander’s sole
military objective. The long list of contingents at Gaugamela from Bactria,
Sogdiana, Areia, Drangiana and Arachosia as well as clay tablets
discovered by archaeologists at Persepolis and recently published Aramaic
documents from Bactria both indicate that in the 5th and 4th centuries these
were prosperous and densely populated satrapies – important centres of
power in the Achaemenid state. Therefore their occupation was an
important goal for any claimant to the Persian throne. But as the next three
years would show consolidating power there was not an easy task. Before
Alexander’s army, now freed from the baggage train, reached the Bactrian
capital, news arrived that Satibarzanes had revolted and the surprisingly
tiny contingent of Macedonian 40 horsemen in Areia had been slaughtered.
Alexander immediately turned back with the cavalry and two taxeis of
85
Phylarch., ap. Ath., 12.55 (= FGrH, 81 F41); Chares, ap. Ath., (= FGrH, 125 F1);
Arr., An., FGrH, 156 F1.3; Diod., 17.77.4-7, 18.48.5; Liv., 9.19.1-5; Curt., 6.6,
7.5.40; Plu., Alex., 51.1-2; Plu., mor., 329f-330e; Polyaen, 4.3.24; Ael., VH, 9.3;
ME, 1-2. Goukowsky 1975, pp. 276-277; Goukowsky 1978, pp. 30-34; Badian
1985, p. 450; Bosworth 1988, pp. 98-100; O’Brien 1992, pp. 111-113; Heckel
1992, p. 226, n. 54; Atkinson 1994, pp. 200-204; Briant 1994, pp. 297-298; Briant
2002, p. 101; Carlier 1995, p. 155; Hammond 1996, pp. 180-181; Collins 2001;
Spawforth 2007, pp. 87, 93-97, 101-102; Weber 2009.
King of Asia 263
phalanx, leaving the rest of his army under Craterus’ command. His
detachment reached the Areian capital Artacoana (near today’s Herat in
Afghanistan) within two days – covering, according to Arian, an amazing
distance of 600 stades (110 km). A terrified Satibarzanes with 2,000
cavalry escaped to join Bessus. When the rest of his army caught up,
Alexander instructed Craterus to besiege Artacoana, while he and a part of
the army set out against Areians, who had sought shelter in a natural
mountain fortress. Modern historians believe this fortress to have been
located most probably at Qal’eh-ye Dukhtar, c. 20 km to the north of Herat,
rather than Qalat-i Nadiri, c. 70 km to the north of Tus. Here an
inadvertently started fire helped the Macedonians win. Meanwhile at
Artacoana the mere sight of siege towers persuaded the defenders to
surrender, and thus also be pardoned. Now Alexander simply nominated a
new satrap, a Persian called Arsaces. It was after the capitulation of
Artacoana that Alexander’s army was joined by 6,500 soldiers recruited
from Illyria, Greece and Lydia. Satibarzanes’s revolt forced Alexander to
change his up until now lenient policy of pardoning all Persian aristocrats
who surrender even including those who had overthrown Darius III. That
is why after quelling the revolt of Areia he started a campaign in
Drangiana and Arachosia. The region’s satrap and Darius’s murderer
Barsaentes fled all the way to India, but he was eventually handed over to
Alexander and killed.86
86
Diod., 17.78; Curt., 6.613-36; Str., 15.2.10; Arr., An., 3.25; It. Alex., 72-74.
Engels 1978, pp. 86-89; Bosworth 1980, p. 354-359; Bosworth 1988, p. 100;
Seibert 1985, pp. 118-120; Vogelsang 1992, p. 221; Atkinson 1994, pp. 206-212;
Hammond 1996, pp. 182-183; Heckel 2006, p. 53, s.v. ‘Arsaces’ [1]; Briant 2009,
pp. 148-151.
264 Chapter V
87
Curt., 6.8.2-4, 6.11.1-5; Plu., Alex., 40.1, 48; Plu., mor., 339d-f. Lane Fox 1980,
pp. 274-275; Heckel 1992, pp. 23-33; Hamilton 1999, pp. 132-133.
88
Badian 1960, pp. 326-329; Badian 1964, pp. 194-196; Green 1974, pp. 348-349;
Goukowsky 1978, p. 38; Bosworth 1988, pp. 99-100; Heckel 2009, pp. 44-45.
King of Asia 265
89
Curt., 6.7.1-8.22; Diod., 17.79; Str., 15.2.10; Plu., Alex., 49.1-10; Just., 12.4-5.
Badian 1960; Green 1974, p. 348; Heckel 1977; Heckel 1986, p. 299; Bosworth
1988, pp. 101-102; Atkinson 1994, pp. 212-214, 218-219, 224-225; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 154-156; Heckel 2006, p. 60.
266 Chapter V
accused of being party to this conspiracy. They were all executed either by
stoning (Curtius) or with spears (Arrian).90
The skilfully evoked atmosphere of hysteria and fear provided the ideal
conditions for carrying out a purge in the army’s ranks which began
immediately after Philotas’s execution. The next trial was a mere formality:
Alexander of Lyncestis, who had been held in prison for three years, was
now sentenced to death. Three brothers and friends of Philotas – Amyntas,
Simmias and Polemon – were also implicated in the conspiracy, but
Amyntas ably disproved the absurd charges pressed against them and so
the king spared them their lives. Ordinary soldiers suspected of political
incorrectness by sympathising with the accused were isolated from the rest
of the army and put in a penal company.91
While these investigations or perhaps just formalised executions were
being carried out in the Macedonian camp at Phrada, Alexander issued
instructions regarding Parmenion. The old general enjoyed great prestige
among the Macedonians. Moreover, he had at his disposal considerable
forces in Ecbatana employed to guard the vast Persian treasures. With his
last son sentenced to death after a mock trial, this dangerously powerful
man could not be allowed to live. The officer entrusted with the mission of
murdering Parmenion was called Polydamas; his loyalty was further
guaranteed by the taking of his younger brothers into armed custody.
Polydamas and two accompanying nomads (Arabs according to Curtius)
crossed the Dasht-e Lut Desert on camels in eleven days and reached
Ecbatana before news of the purges in Phrada had arrived. There
Polydamas met up with Cleander, the commander of the mercenaries, and
the two officers next went to Parmenion to deliver him letters from
Alexander and Philotas. As Parmenion started to read the forged letter
from his son, Cleander ran him through with his sword. After the murder,
the two officers presented to the soldiers the letter form their king, in
which Alexander described the old general’s alleged crimes. To ease
tensions in the camp the Cleander allowed the soldiers bury Parmenion’s
body but first he severed his head, which was sent to Alexander as
evidence that his order had been carried out.92
The sources do not question the existence of a conspiracy in the army
against the king. Yet, apart from what had been extracted through torture,
90
Arr., An., 3.26.1-3; Curt., 6.8.23-11.40; Diod., 17.80.1; Plu., Alex., 49.9-12.
91
Curt., 7.1.1-2.10, 7.2.35-38; Arr., An., 3.27.1-2; Diod., 17.80.2-4; Just., 12.5.
Heckel 2006, pp. 24-25, s.v. ‘Amyntas’ [4].
92
Curt., 7.2.11-34; Diod., 17.80.3; Str., 15.2.10; Arr., An., 3.26.3; Plu., Alex.,
49.13; Just., 12.5. Atkinson 1994, pp. 257-259; Heckel 2006, pp. 85-86, 225-226.
Arabs in the meaning of nomads: Briant 1996, p. 373.
King of Asia 267
93
Plu., Alex., 49.1; Plu., mor., 328f; Arr., An., 3.27.5; Just., 12.5; Charax, ap. St.
Byz., s.v. Fr£da. Badian 1960; Badian 1964; Badian 2000, pp. 64-69; Lane Fox
1973, pp. 286-291; Goukowsky 1978, pp. 39-40; Bosworth 1980, pp. 366-367;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 102-104; Wirth 1993, p. 179; Fraser 1996, pp. 124-131; Briant
2002, pp. 101-102; Nawotka 2003, p. 97.
94
Errington 1978, p. 114.
268 Chapter V
95
Curt., 7.3.1-3; Arr., An., 3.27.4-5; Diod., 17.81.1-2; Str., 15.2.10; Just., 12.5; ME,
4. Engels 1978, pp. 91-93; Bosworth 1980, pp. 365-366; Seibert 1985, p. 122;
Jacobs 1994, p. 85; Fraser 1996, pp. 130-131; Heckel 2006, p. 53, s.v. ‘Arsaces’
[1].
King of Asia 269
96
Curt., 7.3.2, 7.4.32-40; Diod., 17.81.3, 17.83.4-6, 18.3.3; Arr., An., 3.28.2-3,
3.29.5; Str., 14.6.3. Bosworth 1980, p. 374; Bosworth 1988, pp. 104-105; Seibert
1985, pp. 123-124; Harmatta 1999, p. 129; Heckel 2006, pp. 21-22, 235.
97
Arr., An., 3.28.1; Str., 15.2.10; Curt., 7.3.5-18; Isid. Char., FGrH, 781 F2.19;
Ptol., Geog., 6.20.4; Amm. Marc., 23.6.72; St. Byz., s.v. Alex£ndreiai (12).
Engels 1978, pp. 93-94; Bosworth 1980, pp. 368-369; Oikonomides 1984; Seibert
1985, p. 125; Fraser 1996, pp. 132-140; Karttunen 1997, p. 47; Hamilton 1999, pp.
98-99.
270 Chapter V
record the settlement in this new city of 7,000 natives and 3,000 so-called
volunteers from among Alexander’s mercenaries and camp followers.
Before moving on, the king nominated a Persian called Proexes as satrap
of Paropamisus and left behind a Macedonian garrison under the command
of the hetairos Neiloxenus.98
There are seven valleys and high mountain passes that lead from the
Kabul river valley (1,800 m above sea level) to Bactria – today’s northern
Afghanistan and southern Turkmenistan. The accounts of the ancient
authors do not allow us to know for certain which route was taken by the
Macedonian army. Most historians assume Alexander chose the
easternmost Khawak Pass, but that might not necessarily be true. Such a
route is not only very long but it would also have led the Macedonians
much further east beyond the Hindu Kush than where their subsequent
operations took place. It is therefore plausible that Alexander instead
chose a lower route through the Salang Pass; incidentally the main road
from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif, which forks out, via Kunduz, to Tajikistan
today runs through this very pass.99 Having offered prescribed sacrifices to
the gods, Alexander resumed the march most probably in May 329. The
over 100-km distance over the Hindu Kush from Alexandria in the
Caucasus to the city of Drapsaka took the Macedonian army 17 days. Such
a slow pace was dictated by the difficult terrain, in places the men and
animals were forced to proceed in single file. Shortcomings in Alexander’s
logistic planning once again resulted in a serious deficiency of provisions,
so much so that some of the pack animals had to be slaughtered for meat.
After crossing the Hindu Kush the problem with provisions deteriorated
further still for Bessus resorted to scorched earth tactics.100
However, this was not enough to stop the Macedonians. With only
7,000 cavalry, Bessus did not dare to confront a numerically superior
enemy, though a determined attack on the tired and malnourished troops
slowly descending from the mountains could have been successful. Instead
the Persian pretender to the throne retreated to Sogdiana on the northern
side of the river Oxus (Amu Darya), which was ruled by his ally,
Spitamenes. The fortress of Aornos (today Khulm) and the oasis capital of
98
Arr., An., 3.28.4, 4.22.5; Diod., 17.83.2; Curt., 7.3.23; Plu., mor., 328d-f; Str.,
15.2.10; Plin., Nat., 6.62; It. Alex., 74. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 294-295; Bosworth
1980, pp. 369-370; Stoneman 1994, pp. 99-102; Fraser 1996, pp. 140-151;
Klinkott 2000, pp. 90, 109; Heckel 2006, pp. 174, 232.
99
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 336-337, 678-681; Engels 1978, pp. 94-95; Seibert
1985, p. 126; Fraser 1996, pp. 157-158 and n. 103.
100
Arr., An., 3.28.4-8; Curt., 7.4.22-25; It. Alex., 75-76. Engels 1978, pp. 95-97;
Holt 1993, pp. 595-598.
King of Asia 271
101
Arr., An., 3.28.8-29.1; Curt., 7.4.31, 7.5.1-16; Diod., 17.iq. Lane Fox 1973, pp.
297-299; Engels 1978, pp. 98-102; Bosworth 1980, p. 372; Bosworth 1988, p. 107;
Holt 1988, pp. 47-49; Holt 1993, pp. 588-589. Geography of Bactria: Holt 1988,
pp. 11-32.
102
Rtveladze 2002, pp. 28-66.
272 Chapter V
the success of the Persian campaign. It took the entire Macedonian army
five days to cross the river and immediately after that it hastily marched to
the place where the scouts had located Bessus. But again the battle was
averted, though this time because the Bactrian usurper had been arrested
by his erstwhile allies Spitamenes and Dataphernes, who next sent a
messenger to Alexander with the offer of handing Bessus over. Alexander
dispatched Ptolemy, who brought Bessus over naked and in chains.
Bessus’s chief crime was usurpation of the Achaemenid throne, which was
in fact what the Macedonian Alexander had also done. However, the
Bactrian satrap’s involvement in Darius’s murder gave Alexander an
excellent pretext to punish him for regicide. Bessus was whipped and then
sent to Bactria. Eventually Alexander had Bessus handed over to Darius
III’s brother, Oxyathres, to select an appropriate Persian punishment for
traitors of the state. The execution was carried out before a gathering of
Medes and Persians (presumably influential Iranians) in Ecbatana in 328.
First he was shamefully mutilated by having his nose and ears cut off.
Next he was most probably nailed to a cross. Although both Plutarch and
to a certain extent Diodorus suggest that Bessus was tied to two specially
bound together trees and next ripped apart when the binding was cut, it is
much more likely that the Persians crucified him as this was their
traditional form of execution for rebels and murderers. Applying the type
of execution that had also been used by Darius III would have been
important to Alexander for the sake of legitimising his claim as the rightful
successor of the Achaemenids in the eyes of the Iranians, particularly their
social elites. Unfortunately, we have no record of how the Persians
responded to the way Bessus had been put to death. W. Heckel suggests
that the ruthlessness with which Bessus was punished actually prolonged
resistance in eastern Iran as it dissuaded other Persian rebel leaders from
surrendering.103 It was in 329 that new coins were issued by Alexander:
now instead of just bearing his name Alexandrou they bore the title
basileos Alexandrou, meaning a coin of ‘King Alexander’. We can assume
that after eliminating the last of the pretenders with a legal claim to the
Achaemenid throne, Alexander decided to make absolutely official his
claim as the only rightful king of the Persian Empire.104
103
Arr., An., 3.29.2-30.4, 4.7; Curt., 7.5.13-28, 7.5.36-43; Diod., 17.83.7-9; Plu.,
Alex., 43.6; Just., 12.5; Ps.-Callisth., 2.21; It. Alex., 76-78; ME, 5-6. Lane Fox 1973,
pp. 299-300; Green 1974, pp. 353-355; Goukowsky1978, pp. 219-221; Bosworth
1980, pp. 372-377; Bosworth 1988, pp. 107-108; Briant 1994, pp. 286-291; Heckel
1997, p. 209; Hamilton 1999, pp. 114-115.
104
Morawiecki 1975, pp. 108-111.
King of Asia 273
At more or less the same time that Spitamenes handed over the arrested
Bessus to Ptolemy, the slowly advancing Macedonian army made an
astonishing discovery. They encountered a Greek town situated, from their
Mediterranean point of view, at the very edge of the world. It turned out
that these were the descendents of the Branchidae – the caste that up until
the start of the Ionian Revolt in the 5th century had administered the Great
Temple and oracle of Apollo at the Milesian Didyma. During the Ionian
Revolt the Branchidae first refused to use the temple’s funds to finance the
war against Persia but then handed all their money over to Xerxes.
Subsequently, after a momentous Greek victory, Greeks who had
supported the Persians in 480-479 war now had every reason to fear their
compatriots would seek revenge. That is why they took up Xerxes’ offer to
evacuate collaborators deep into Asia. Indeed on many occasions
throughout the Achaemenid period settlers, including Greeks, had been
sent east Bactria and Sogdiana. This time the descendants of the pro-
Persian Branchidae willingly surrendered their town and greeted
Alexander with joy. Their surrender was accepted but among Macedonian
commanders there was consternation as to what to do with the successors
of those who had betrayed the Panhellenic cause. Alexander asked the
Milesians in his camp, but here too opinions were divided. The following
day the king granted his soldiers permission to slaughter the unfortunate
Branchidae with instructions to raze their town to the ground and even cut
down their forests. The truth behind this atrocity, which the court
historiography reflected in Arrian’s account has completely ignored, has
moreover been challenged by some modern historians. The original source,
however, is Callisthenes, a member of Alexander’s expedition who was
favourably disposed to his monarch and would hardly invent a story
casting him in such a bad light. Besides, this was not the only massacre of
civilians in Alexander’s career. The slaughter of the Branchidae in
Sogdiana really happened, only the circumstances seem doubtful for the
sources do not give any convincing motives as to why Alexander made
such a terrible decision. Perhaps – as H.W. Parke and A.B. Bosworth
presume – the slaughter resulted from a lack of moral discipline among the
Macedonian soldiers after long months of campaigning and enduring
extreme conditions raging form the snow capped Hindu Kush to the
unbearable heat of Bactria. 105 Archaeologists have discovered in
105
Curt., 7.5.28-35; Diod., 17.k; Str., 11.11.4; Plu., mor., 557b; Suda, s.v.
Bragcfdai. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 272-275; Parke 1985; Bernard 1985, pp. 123-125;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 108-109; Holt 1988, pp. 73-75; Kulesza 1994, pp. 227-245;
Briant 1996, pp. 771-772; Karttunen 1997, pp. 21-22; Panchenko 2002, pp. 245-
248; Rtveladze 2002, pp. 69-70.
274 Chapter V
106
Bernard 1985, p. 125; Kulesza 1994, pp. 245-246.
107
Arr., An., 3.30.6-11; Curt., 7.6.1-10; Plu., mor., 327a; It. Alex., 79-80; ME, 7-8.
Seibert 1985, pp. 129-131; Bosworth 1988, pp. 109-110.
King of Asia 275
was in fact governed quite independently by the local nobles. Now this
state of affairs appeared to be threatened by a plan to build the city of
Alexandria Eschate and the installation of Macedonian garrisons. These
measures were to ensure a permanent Greek and Macedonian military
presence as well as replace in rural areas the traditional lord and peasant
hierarchy with the population being controlled at various levels by cities
based on the Greek polis system. The conflict was most probably also
caused by cultural differences. The sources record that Alexander tried to
stamp out the local practice of leaving the corpses of their dead out in the
open to be devoured by animals, which was something the Greeks and
Macedonians found quite unacceptable. Whatever the true reason, the
smaller Macedonian garrisons were massacred. Meanwhile the Sogdian
nobles refused to attend a conference Alexander had summoned in Bactra.
They probably did not come out fear for their own safety but this was still
an act of disobedience. Now there was no alternative to war.108
As usual, Alexander’s response was fast and ruthless. He instructed the
best of his officers, Craterus, to besiege the largest of the cities, Cyropolis
(Kuruš-kaqa?), which may have been located somewhere near today’s
Kurkat, 40 km to the west of Khojent (Tajikistan). This gave time for
Alexander himself to attack the smaller cities. Their primitive fortifications
constructed out of sun dried bricks were no defence against Macedonian
siege engines. The defenders were treated with exceptional cruelty: the
men were killed while the women and children were sold into slavery.
Within two days three cities were successfully stormed and captured,
while the fleeing populations from another two were slaughtered by the
Macedonian cavalry. Alexander personally commanded the storming of
Cyropolis, during which he was struck with a stone. But this city was also
quickly captured. At that stage it may have seemed that in Sogdiana the
only remaining problem was to relieve the Macedonian garrison at
Maracanda, which was besieged by forces commanded by Spitamenes. For
this task Alexander dispatched 1,400 Macedonian and mercenary cavalry
as well as 1,500 mercenary infantry commanded by the Iranian
Pharnuches.109
108
Onesicritus, ap. Str., 11.11.3 (= FGrH, 134 F5); Arr., An., 4.1; Curt., 7.6.11-15;
Plu., mor., 328c; It. Alex., 81; ME, 8. Bickermann 1966, pp. 89-90; Holt 1988, pp.
52-60; Vogelsang 1992, p. 230; Bosworth 1995, pp. 13-19; Karttunen 1997, p. 21;
Ashley 1998, p. 298; Harmatta 1999, pp. 130-132; Holt 1999, pp. 122-123;
Nawotka 2003, p. 94.
109
Arr., An., 4.2-3; Curt., 7.6.16-24; Plu., Alex., 45.5; It. Alex., 82-83; ME, 9.
Engels 1978, p. 103; Bosworth 1995, pp. 19-25.
276 Chapter V
The king and the rest of the army now returned to the river Jaxartes, on
the other side of which a Scythian army had gathered ready to support
Spitamenes. The Scythians were worried by Alexander’s plans to found a
town by the river and feared that these would hinder their nomadic
freedom and barter trade. The ancient authors claim that the walls of this
newest town, Alexandria Eschate (‘Alexandria the Furthest’), were raised
within as little as twenty (Arrian) or seventeen (Curtius) days. Medieval
Arab sources suggest that it could be associated with today’s city of
Khojent on the western edge of the Fergana Valley. There had already
been a fortified town on the Jaxartes in Achaemenid times but, unless the
accounts of Curtius and Arrian are completely untrue, Alexandria Eschate
was probably not built on its foundations. However, the new town could
have been built next to the old. It was populated by Greek mercenaries
from Alexander’s army, Macedonian veterans as well as resettled natives
and its original purpose was to guarantee Macedonian military supremacy
in the region. Although Curtius and Arrian write about the raising of the
Alexandria Eschate’s fortifications during events that occurred in 329, the
process must have lasted longer for we know from the Paros’ Chronicle
that the town was officially founded a year later in 328/327 (Athenian
years began in July). Of the many towns Alexander is said to have founded
in Bactria and Sogdiana this is the only one whose existence has been
incontrovertibly confirmed.110
The Scythians tried to attack and provoke the soldiers raising the
fortifications of Alexandria. Alexander naturally took up the challenge.
The crossing was delayed for some time because sacrifices did not augur a
favourable outcome. However, Alexander’s impetuousness eventually
proved too strong and he ordered the operation to start. Protected by the
missiles fired from boat-mounted catapults that the barbarians had never
seen before, the soldiers were able to get across the river. The Scythians
repulsed the first attack of phalanx and mercenary cavalry. In a second
attack, however, Alexander’s skilful use of cavalry, archers and light
infantry prevented the Scythians from deploying their traditional tactic of
encirclement. After that the Macedonians were able to defeat the enemy in
open battle. The routed Scythians were allegedly chased for 150 stades (27
km) to a place where Curtius Rufus and Pliny state Dionysus had left
border signs; an alternative version is that Dionysius and Heracles had
erected some altars there; these presumably were burial mounds. The
110
Marmor Parium, FGrH 239 B7; Arr., An., 4.1.3-4, 4.4.1; Curt., 7.6.13, 7.6-25-
27; Plin., Nat., 6.49; Ptol., Geog., 6.12.6, 8.23.14; It. Alex., 81; ME, 7. Bosworth
1995, pp. 25-27; Briant 1996, p. 767; Briant 2002, pp. 71-72; Fraser 1996, pp. 151-
156.
King of Asia 277
111
Arr., An., 4.4.1-5.1; Curt., 7.7.1, 7.7.5-9.19; Plu., Alex., 45.6; Plu., mor., 341c;
Plin., Nat., 6.49; It. Alex., 85; ME, 8-12. Engels 1978, pp. 101-102; Seibert 1985, p.
132, n. 26; Bosworth 1995, pp. 27-32; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 146-148; Hammond
1996, pp. 194-195.
112
Arr., An., 4.5.2-7.1; Curt., 7.6.24, 7.7.30-39, 7.9.20-10.10; It. Alex., 86-88; ME,
13-14. Bosworth 1995, pp. 29-37.
278 Chapter V
vast – as many as 22,000, including 2,600 cavalry. On the other hand, the
sources only mention mercenaries. The most likely explanation for this is
that ever since the defeat of the imperial Persian forces at Gaugamela
Alexander was deliberately relying on mercenaries in order to spare
compatriots.113 That spring there was yet another wave of disturbances in
Sogdiana. It turned out that the previous year’s bloody repressions had
failed to pacify the situation and may have even exacerbated it. Fearing for
the old social order and their place in it, the Sogdian lords were now siding
more with Spitamenes and Scythians. Alexander decided to impose his
will on the Sogdians by force and marched his army from Bactria to the
rebel province. Among those he left in charge of Bactria were Meleager
and Polyperchon, both of whom would later play important roles in the
diadochi period. Alexander must have assumed Bactria would be a safe
province as many of the troops he left there were in convalescence. Once
Alexander started operations in Sogdiana, Spitamenes launched an
audacious attack on Bactria destroying one of the smaller Macedonian
garrisons on the way. The slender forces of the main garrison made an
initially successful sortie but in a subsequent clash Spitamenes’s Scythians
defeated them. Those killed included seven hetairoi, 60 mercenary
horsemen and the courageous kitharode Aristonicus of Olynthus, whom
Alexander later honoured with a bronze statue at Delphi.114 However, what
eventually worked against Spitamenes was the enemy’s large numerical
superiority. Despite engaging most of his troops in Sogdiana, Alexander
still had at his disposal Craterus’ corp, which was able to catch up with
Spitamenes and defeat his forces in battle. 150 Scythians were killed, and
although the rest managed to escape into the desert, this was major blow to
Spitamenes’s reputation.115
After four days’ marching the Macedonian army crossed the Oxus, on
whose shore the soldiers inadvertently discovered a source of petroleum
crude oil. Beyond the river Alexander divided his army into five columns,
which were commanded by his high-ranking officers Hephaestion,
Ptolemy, Perdiccas, Coenus and himself. Alexander was accompanied by
Artabazus, no doubt to serve as an interpreter between the Macedonian
Great King and his rebellious subjects. An example of Macedonian
ruthlessness during this march to Maracanda were the actions of
113
Arr., An., 4.7.2; Curt., 7.10.10-13. Milns 1976, pp. 109-110; Bosworth 1995, pp.
39-40.
114
Arr., An., 4.16.1, 4.16.4-7; Curt., 7.10.13, 8.1.3-5, 8.1.6; Plu., mor., 334e-f; It.
Alex., 98. Holt 1988, pp. 60-61; Heckel 1992, pp. 165-170, 188-204; Bosworth
1995, pp. 108-116.
115
Arr., An., 4.17.1-2; Curt., 8.1.6. Bosworth 1995, p. 117.
King of Asia 279
116
Str., 11.11.4; Curt., 7.10.13-15, 7.11; Polyaen., 4.3.29; It. Alex., 97; ME, 15-18;
Holt 1988, p. 61.
117
Arr., An., 4.16.3; Just., 12.5. Holt 1986; Fraser 1996, pp. 154-156; Karttunen
1997, p. 47.
280 Chapter V
118
Curt., 8.1.7-9; Arr., An., 4.15.1-6; Plu., Alex., 46.3; It. Alex., 95-96. Kraft 1971,
pp. 127-128; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 306-307; Bosworth 1995, pp. 101-107.
119
Curt., 8.1.11-19. Tuplin 1996, pp. 100-1-2.
120
Arr., An., 4.17.3; Curt., 8.1.19. Bosworth 1995, p. 118; Klinkott 2000, p. 22, n.
36.
King of Asia 281
121
Arr., An., 4.17.3. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 351; Bosworth 1995, pp. 118-119.
122
Curt., 8.2.13-14; ME, 19. Seibert 1985, p. 140.
123
Arr., An., 4.17.4-7; Curt., 8.2.15-18, 8.3.1-16; ME, 20-25. Holt 1988, p. 65;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 119-121; Burstein 1999.
124
Arr., An., 4.18.1; Curt., 8.2.19; Diod., 17.kq; ME, 19. Holt 1988, pp. 66-67;
Harmatta 1999, pp. 132-134.
125
Curt., 8.4.3-20; ME, 24-27.
282 Chapter V
certain Stamenes, a man we know virtually nothing about apart from the
fact that he may have been an Iranian. It also turned out that at least three
of Alexander’s satraps did not fulfil his requirements. One of them, the
satrap Autophradates (Phradates) of Tapuria, refused to appear before the
king, which was tantamount to rejection of his suzerainty. The mission
entrusted to remove this disobedient satrap was entrusted to the faithful
satrap of Parthia, Phrataphernes. The satrap of Media, Oxydates, was
replaced by another Iranian, Atropates, who had already been a satrap of
that province under Darius III’s and would become one of Alexander’s
most successful Iranian nominations. Finally, Arsaces was replaced as
satrap of Drangiana by Stasanor, who had just finished his mission of
subjugating Areia – presumably he now governed both satrapies. It was
also then that for the first time after three years Alexander ordered the
raising of Macedonian troops instead of mercenary reinforcements. The
sources, however, do not tell us anything about the three officers who were
delegated to raise these troops or about their mission in the winter of
328/327.126
The episode with the most far-reaching consequences during the last
campaign in Sogdiana in the early spring of 327 was the siege another
mountain fortress. The campaign was hampered by masses of snow that
still lay in the mountains. Not much can be said about the siege itself as
the details too closely resemble the siege of Ariamazes’s Sogdian Rock to
be plausible. This time, however, the lord of the stronghold, Sisimithres,
was pardoned when he surrendered. Alexander also captured the family of
the Bactrian aristocrat and Bessus’ former ally, Oxyartes. Respect for the
dignity of his daughters also eventually persuaded Oxyartes to
capitulate.127 Some time later, in the land of Paraitacene, Alexander laid
siege to yet another mountain fortress, this one belonging to a certain
Chorienes. With the help of Oxyartes’s mediation Alexander negotiated
the stronghold’s capitulation. This time the vanquished enemy did not only
have his life spared but kept his original position and even had his domain
expanded. Chorienes’s loyalty was to be guaranteed by that fact that his
sons were became members of Alexander’s entourage. The striking
difference between the ways Alexander treated the families of Sisimithres,
Oxyartes and Chorienes and the way he had treated Ariamazes shows how
ever more clearly Alexander was changing his policies in order to find a
solution to the conflict. Chorienes accepted Alexander’s entire army with
126
Arr., An., 4.18.2-3; Curt., 8.3.16-17. Bosworth 1995, pp. 120-124; Heckel 2006,
p. 255.
127
Arr., An., 4.18.4-19.4, 4.20.4; Str., 11.11.4. Holt 1988, p. 66; Bosworth 1995, p.
134; Carney 2000, pp. 106-107.
King of Asia 283
128
Curt., 8.4.1-22; Arr., An., 4.21; ME, 19, 29; It. Alex., 102. Holt 1988, p. 66;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 124-125, 135-139.
129
Arr., An., 4.19.5; Curt., 8.4.22-30; Diod., 17.l; Plu., Alex., 47.7; Plu., mor.,
338d; ME, 28-31; It. Alex., 101. Bosworth 1995, p. 131; Ogden 1999, pp. 43-44;
Carney 2000, p. 106.
130
Lyc., 801-804 (see Scholia, ad 801); Diod., 20.20.1; Curt., 10.6.11; Plu., Alex.,
21.7-11; Plu., Eum., 1.7; Paus., 9.7.2; Just., 13.2. Baynham 1995a, pp. 68-69;
Carney 2000, pp. 102-105; Ogden 2009, p. 206.
131
ME, 70. Heckel 1997a, pp. 290-292; Carney 2000, pp. 106-107; Ogden 2009, p.
206. For homosexual position in scholarship see: Reames-Zimmerman 1999.
284 Chapter V
132
Curt., 8.4.25; Plu., Alex., 47.7. Wilcken 1967, pp. 162-163; Schachermeyr 1973,
p. 355; Holt 1988, pp. 67-68; O’Brien 1992, pp. 140-141; Hamilton 1999, pp. 129-
130; Ogden 1999, p. 44; Carney 2000, pp. 106-107.
133
Arr., An., 4.22.3. Badian 1985, p. 456; Holt 1988, pp. 68-70; Bosworth 1995, pp.
142-143; Hammond 1996, p. 202.
134
Allen 2005, p. 152.
135
Curt., 8.5.1; Plu., Alex., 47.6. Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 360-361; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 128-129.
King of Asia 285
136
Arr., An., 4.22.1-2 ; Curt., 8.5.2. Seibert 1985, p. 144; Bosworth 1995, pp. 139-
141.
286 Chapter V
vessels for drinking wine. On the other hand, we very rarely find vessels
for mixing wine, which were very common in Greece. Among the
Macedonians excessive consumption of alcohol was not considered a fault
but a virtue. Drinking to get drunk was considered normal and the sources
record cases of people losing their lives in competitions to see who could
drink the greatest quantity of wine. Philip II was known for his alcoholic
excesses therefore, as in everything, Alexander tried to outdo his father in
this respect also. There is no evidence in the sources to suggest that
Alexander suffered from alcoholism as a disease but it is difficult not to
associate his occasional outbursts of extremely violent behaviour and his
eruptions of destructive anger with his systematic and excessive
consumption of alcohol.137
The feast at Maracanda took place towards the end of the second year
of the toughest campaigns the Macedonian army had fought so far. The
countless battles, skirmishes and acts of terror committed against the
civilian population did not seem to have brought the Macedonians any
closer to solving the situation. No doubt many in the army would have
agreed with Plutarch in comparing the campaign to fighting the
mythological hydra, whose severed heads continually grew back. The
tense atmosphere among the soldiers must have been further exasperated
by the long time they had now spent in a quite alien environment where
communication with the locals was only possible with the help of one or
several interpreters. The general tiredness, stress, and combat fatigue also
affected the banqueters at Maracanda. In such circumstances the very
negative emotions some of the hetairoi had so far kept suppressed could
be released with an abrupt outburst by the excessive consumption of
alcohol. One of the most distinguished and loyal of Alexander’s high-
ranking officers, Cleitus, was enraged by Alexander’s courtiers who at the
feast were claiming the king was greater than his father, Philip, the
Dioscuri, whose festival they were that day celebrating, and even the hero
Heracles. To a man of pure convictions, one who treated religious matters
seriously, the latter comments seemed to sound too much like sacrilege.
But what proved to be the last straw was a song sung by some third-rate
poet by the name of Pranichus or Pierion which mocked those
Macedonians who had recently been defeated by the Sogdians. Many felt
outrage but only Cleitus openly protested. The king responded by claiming
that what Cleitus had called a misfortune that had befallen the vanquished
Macedonians was in reality cowardice. Cleitus immediately hit back by
137
Ephippus, ap. Ath., 3.91, 10.44; Ael., VH, 12.26. Tomlinson 1970, p. 309;
Borza 1983; O’Brien 1992, pp. 6-8; Flower 1994, pp. 107-111; Murray 1996; Rice
1997, pp. 92-93; Spawforth 2007, pp. 85-86.
King of Asia 287
138
Plu., Alex., 50-51 (the best source, perhaps after Chares); Plu., mor., 71c, 341f;
Arr., An., 4.8.1-9.2; Curt., 8.1.19-2.4; Diod., 17.kz; Cic., Tusc., 4.79; Sen., Ep.,
83.19; Luc., DMort., 12.3-4; Just., 12.6; It. Alex., 90-91; Suda, s.v. metaxÚ.
Quotation from Euripides is after Kovacs (Loeb). Wilcken 1967, pp. 166-167;
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 364-369; Green 1974, pp. 360-364; Goukowsky 1978, pp.
44-45; Badian 1985, pp. 456-457; Heckel 1992, p. 275; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 98-
103; Hamilton 1999, pp. 139, 143-144; Trittle 2003.
288 Chapter V
139
Plu., Alex., 52.1-7; Plu., mor., 449e; Arr., An., 4.9.3-9; Curt., 8.2.1-11.
Goukowsky 1978, p. 46; Bosworth 1988, p. 115; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 103-106;
Hamilton 1999, pp. 145-146.
140
Arr., An., 4.8.1-2, 4.9.5; Curt., 8.2.12; Diod., 17.kz. Badian 1964, pp. 197-198;
Goukowsky 1978, pp. 45-46; Bosworth 1996a, p. 104.
141
Arr., An., 4.9.9. Wilcken 1967, pp. 167-168.
King of Asia 289
he could not be the Great King to some and merely the first among equals
to others for long. Already in Hyrcania he had given his hetairoi Persian
robes, which they most probably used on certain ceremonial occasions. A
groundbreaking measure was Alexander’s attempt to extend the
proskynesis ceremony to all his subjects. The Iranians had naturally
greeted him in such a way since at least Issus; among the first to do so
were the captured members of Darius III’s family (see: Chapter IV.5).142
Proskynesis was a ceremonial bow which everyone standing before the
majesty of the king had to take. Reliefs at Persepolis show aristocrats
bowed their heads and kissed their own hands, whereas people from the
lower orders were expected to fall to their knees and bow their heads to the
ground. To the Great King’s subjects and indeed throughout the Near East
proskynesis was the universally accepted way of paying respects to the
majesty of the monarch. Unfortunately in the Greek world such gestures
were reserved for the cults of deities. Many sources show that for a Greek
the paying of respect in such a way to a Persian king would have been
tantamount to the sacrilege of treating an ordinary mortal as a god.143 No
doubt of all the courtly customs proskynesis was the one that marked the
greatest difference between the Greeks and Macedonians on the one hand
and Alexander’s Asian subjects on the other. Regardless of this, if
Alexander wished to unite his entire court and his ruling elites according
to the same principles, then the introduction of proskynesis was hard to
avoid.144
The matter was naturally of an extremely delicate nature and it was
feared that it could become the cause of serious tensions. That is why the
introduction of proskynesis to Greeks and Macedonians was begun in the
spring of 327 when Alexander’s army was most probably staying in Bactra
and some of the most traditionalist military leaders, including the very
much respected Craterus, were absent. It was preceded by debates among
Greek court intellectuals (Anaxarchus, Agis of Argos and Cleon of Sicily)
who reached the conclusion that, as humanity’s benefactor, Alexander was
no less worthy of his own cult than the Dioscuri, Dionysus or Heracles.145
The next step was for the act of proskynesis to be performed by a small
circle of courtiers and close friends during a small feast. So as not to be
overly offensive to the Macedonians and Greeks, its traditional Persian
form was specially modified in that the banqueters at first did not face
142
Balsdon 1950, pp. 376-377; Bosworth 1996a, p. 110; Heckel 2009, p. 46.
143
Frye 1972; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 320-322; Bosworth 1988, pp. 284-285; Briant
1996, pp. 234-235; Chosky 2002; Spawforth 2007, pp. 102-104.
144
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 373-374.
145
Arr., An., 4.10.6-7; Curt., 8.5.5-9. Bosworth 1996a, pp. 109-111.
290 Chapter V
their king but the house altar. They were to drink wine from a cup,
perform proskynesis and next exchange kisses with Alexander. Even this
modified version proved unacceptable to the strong convictions of
Callisthenes. He did not react ostentatiously but instead he simply
endeavoured to exchange kisses with his king without performing the
obsequious bow. When one of the courtiers commented on this out loud,
Alexander refused to accept the kiss. Not put off, the philosopher simply
walked away, commenting that he was merely poorer by one kiss.146
Such passive resistance did not deter Alexander and his closest circle
from continuing the experiment of propagating among Europeans,
especially as in this semi-private party almost all those present did comply
with the king’s wishes. The next step was to repeat this experiment at a
larger event with also the participation of Asians, who naturally bowed to
Alexander in the prescribed way. This time, however, resistance was much
more visible. Perhaps whilst taking part in a debate with other Greek
intellectuals, Callisthenes spoke out openly in defence of traditional
religious beliefs that forbade the boundary between man and god to be
crossed. The philosopher even claimed that by introducing proskynesis
Alexander was breaking a unwritten law or custom (nomos) of the
Macedonian monarchy which was, according to his idealised theory now
being approved by many of those listening, to never make such decisions
without previously obtaining the assent of his subjects. Knowing that
Callisthenes’s arguments were expressing the views of the silent majority
among the Macedonians, who in this unpopular philosopher had found an
unexpected champion, Alexander desisted from further efforts regarding
the introduction of proskynesis and would never return to this issue. To
make matters worse, one of the hetairoi had laughed out loud at the sight
of an Asian performing the obeisance with exaggerated zeal. Alexander
was angered at the man who had laughed but, seeing the attitude of the
majority of those present, he did not force his European subjects to
perform proskynesis.147 The epilogue to this whole affair came after the
great Macedonian’s death. Then for many the deification of Alexander
seemed no less controversial than the divine status of Heracles, who after
all had also once been a mortal. It was then that some of the officers
recognised their deceased ruler as a god and performed proskynesis facing
his vacant throne.148
146
Plu., Alex., 54.3-6 (after Chares); Arr., An., 4.12.3-5. Bosworth 1988, p. 285;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 87-88.
147
Arr., An., 4.10.5-12.2; Curt., 8.5.9-24; Just., 12.7. Bosworth 1996a, pp. 110-112;
Briant 2002, pp. 105-106.
148
Diod., 18.61.1; Polyaen., 4.8.2. Bosworth 1996a, p. 112.
King of Asia 291
It was during that same stay in Bactra that a plot against the king was
discovered. The danger lay in the fact that it was hatched by people who
had constant access to the king, even at times when he was at his most
vulnerable, that is, at night. For the conspirators were ‘royal boys’,
alternatively called by modern historians ‘pages’. These were boys from
good Macedonian homes who performed services around the king
normally carried out by servants. Moreover, they guarded his bedroom
door at night. The pages guaranteed the loyalty of their families to the king
while at the same time they familiarised themselves with the functioning
of the court and state in preparation for important careers in adult life. The
leader of the conspirators was a page called Hermolaus, who, as so
frequently happens in such cases, was driven to plotting for personal
reasons. During a hunt Hermolaus killed a boar that had been marked out
for the king to slay. This angered Alexander greatly. He ordered the boy to
be flogged and had his horse confiscated. 149 The significance of this
seemingly minor incident became more important in the context of
Alexander’s adoption of Achaemenid customs. Hunting played an
important role in Persian royal ideology, which in turn owed a great deal
to the neo-Assyrian tradition. Of course the beast the monarch most
willingly hunted was the lion. The Great King frequently hunted in special
reserves. One of these was Bazeira, and that was where Alexander took
part in a great hunt. It was a Greek and Macedonian custom to hunt on foot
but in Asia Alexander followed the Persian example and hunted on
horseback. The killing of an animal designated for the king was considered
a very serious offence, punishable even by death. It was only permissible
(and moreover obligatory) when such an animal posed an immediate
danger to the monarch. It was in such a situation that Craterus once killed
a lion, a scene immortalised in a relief and inscription at Delphi by his son.
On the other hand, legend has it that for killing the king’s beast
Alexander’s bodyguard Lysimachus was cast into a lion’s den.150
In such a context the whipping of Hermolaus was not an exceptionally
harsh punishment. Nevertheless the page evidently did feel that his system
of values had been dishonoured to an extent that required revenge. Much
more interesting, however, is the fact that in his plot Hermolaus was not
only helped by his homosexual lover but also by several other pages who
would have been quite unaffected by the wrong committed against the
149
Arr., An., 4.13.1-2; Curt., 8.6.2-7. Heckel 1992, pp. 237-244; Bosworth 1995,
pp. 90-94.
150
Curt., 8.1.14-18; Sen., Dial., 5.17.2; Plin., Nat., 8.54; Paus., 9.1.5; Just., 15.3; V.
Max., 9.3 ext. 1. Heckel 1992, pp. 268-271; Briant 1993a; Pelagia 2000, pp. 177-
184.
292 Chapter V
151
Curt., 8.7; Arr., An., 4.14.2. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 388; Lane Fox 1973, pp.
327-328; Hamilton 1974, p. 107; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 112-113; Badian 2000, p.
70; Heckel 2009a, p. 79.
152
Arr., An., 4.13.5-14.3; Curt., 8.6.10-8.20.
King of Asia 293
153
D.L., 5.5; Just., 12.6.17; Suda, s.v. Kallisq{nhj. Brown 1966, pp. 225-227;
Rubinsohn 1993, pp. 1312-1314.
154
Brown 1949, pp. 227-236; Rubinsohn 1993, pp. 1315, 1319.
155
Plu., Alex., 54.3; Arr., An., 4.14.1.
294 Chapter V
156
Plu., Alex., 53; Philostr., VA, 7.2; E., Ba., 267, after Kovacs (Loeb). Brown
1949, p. 245; Balsdon 1950, p. 372; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 390-392; Green 1974,
pp. 377-378; Hamilton 1999, pp. 147-148.
157
Plu., Alex., 55.3-9; Arr., An., 4.14.3; Curt., 8.8.21; D.L., 5.5. Bosworth 1995, p.
100; Hamilton 1999, p. 156; Badian 2000, pp. 71-72.
158
Borza 1981.
159
Brunt 1995, pp. 16-18; Bosworth 1996, pp. 62-77.
160
Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 297-298; Brown 1949, pp. 225-226, 245-247; Wardman 1955,
p. 96; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 609.
CHAPTER VI:
EXPEDITION TO INDIA
1
Hdt., 3.94, 4.44; Arr., An., 3.8.4, 3.8.6; Curt., 4.9.2; Plin., Nat., 6.98. Tarn 1948, I,
pp. 85-86; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 413-416; Dani 1986, pp. 43-44; Vogelsang
1992, p. 227; Briant 1996, pp. 152-153, 185-188, 774-778; Karttunen 1997, pp. 19,
26-30, 37-38; Badian 1998, p. 221; Hahn 2000, pp. 11-13.
296 Chapter VI
and tribal territories. The largest of these states, the Kingdom of Magadha,
situated on middle reaches of the Ganges and at the time ruled by the
Nanda dynasty, did not come into contact with Alexander’s army, but
many much smaller states in north-western India did. Quintus Curtius
Rufus does mention that at least some of these states had paid tribute to the
satrap of Arachosia and in this sense declared their fealty to the Great
King.2
As usual, all the extant sources fail to provide the reasons for what was
to be Alexander’s successive military expedition. Moreover, no convincing
strategic reasons can be found. Modern historians have come up with a
large number of theories to make up for the lack of explanations in the
sources. By and large these explanations chiefly reflect how individual
modern historians perceive Alexander. Some argue, for example, that it
was hoped the shared experiences and victories of a successive war would
rebuild the bonds between the Macedonians and their leader as they had
been weakened by a series of internal conflicts over preceding winter and
spring. Similarly, ties were supposed to be strengthened this way between
Alexander and the Iranian cavalry. The legendary wealth of India has also
been stressed as a lure for prospective conquerors. Moreover, it has been
noted that such a campaign could earn Alexander respect among Iranians
as the successor of the Achaemenids. It is claimed that Alexander was
striving to extend the Persian Empire to the borders it had had at its
greatest moment in history under Darius I. This would not only bring
political gains but increase royal revenues many times over. The
Achaemenid theme in Alexander’s plans is the most popular theory in
modern historiography but it has one weakness in that the sources clearly
show Alexander’s plan was to conquer territories extending beyond the
empire’s most far-flung borders as had existed during the reign of Darius I.
We know that Alexander intended to continue marching east way past the
borders of Darius’ I empire and it was only the passive but resolute
opposition of his army that stopped him from doing so. It is therefore not
improbable that Alexander wanted to conquer the whole of India perhaps
as part of his plan to rule over the entire known world. It is possible that
non-economic or non-strategic factors began to predominate in these plans
as the campaign proceeded or were indeed present from the start. Modern
man would call such factors irrational but that is not how they were
perceived in Antiquity. Alexander had always attached great importance to
religion and the heroic tradition. Hence he could have wished to match the
achievements of Dionysus and his mythological ancestor, Heracles, as
2
Curt., 9.7.14. Vogelsang 1992, p. 227; Briant 1996, pp. 777-778.
Expedition to India 297
well as historic figures of the Near East such as Semiramis or Cyrus the
Great, all of whom fate had at one time or another sent to India. On top of
that there were other obvious aspects of Alexander’s character, his natural
curiosity and the urge to take up new challenges, which for the greatest
military leader of ancient times meant new wars. We will most probably
never know exactly why Alexander chose to invade India; quite probably
Alexander himself did not really know either.3
While Alexander was still in Sogdiana he received envoys from
Mophis/Omphis (Ambhi), the ruler of the Kingdom of Taxila. The
kingdom’s capital, also called Taxila, i.e. TakúaĞilƗ (Takshasila) in
Gandhara, was both a centre of foreign trade and also one of academic
learning with numerous schools for Brahmans, the sons of princes and rich
merchants. The city was the home of, among others, the famous author of
Sanskrit grammar Panini. It also had an Iranian colony, probably from
where interpreters were later to join the Macedonian camp. We have
reason to assume this, as the Indian names recorded in Greek in works of
Alexander’s companions appear to have been translated indirectly from
Sanskrit through Persian. The Taxilan envoys asked Alexander to help
Omphis in a war against his enemies. At the time a former Indian ally of
Bessus’ called Sisicottus (Sasigupta) was also present in Alexander’s
camp. Thus the grounds for starting an invasion were prepared and
political unrest in Northwest India provided a convenient pretext to
intervene.4
In the early summer of 327 the Macedonian army set off from Bactria
and crossed the Hindu Kush, most probably using either the shortest route
through the Salang Pass or the somewhat longer but easier route through
the Bamiyan valley and Shibar Pass, to reach the Kabul valley within ten
days. There two years earlier Alexander had founded Alexandria in the
Caucasus. Now he added more settlers, nominated one of his hetairoi,
Nicanor, commandant of the garrison and perhaps a Persian called
3
Str., 15.1.5-7. Tarn 1948, i, pp. 86-87; Badian 1964, pp. 199-200; Narain 1965,
pp. 161-162; Brunt 1965, pp. 207-209; Wilcken 1967, pp. 173-174; Schachermeyr
1973, pp. 407-413; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 331-334; Green 1974, p. 380; Goukowsky
1981, pp. 11-14; Bosworth 1988, p. 119; Carlier 1995, p. 160; Hahn 2000, pp. 15-
19; Briant 2002, p. 35.
4
Curt., 8.12.5; Diod., 17.86.4; Arr., An., 4.30.4; Plin., Nat., 6.78; ME, 49. Wheeler
1968, pp. 103-106; Dani 1986, pp. 1, 12, 42-43; Bosworth 1995, pp. 192-193;
Stoneman 1995, p. 107; Karttunen 1997, pp. 31-33, 61.
298 Chapter VI
5
Arr., An., 4.22.3-5; Curt., 9.8.9; It. Alex., 104. Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 676-681;
Engels 1978, p. 107; Jacobs 1994, pp. 76-77; Bosworth 1995, pp. 141-146; Heckel
2006, p. 269.
6
Arr., An., 4.22.6; Curt., 8.10.1-2. Bosworth 1995, pp. 146-149; Fraser 1996, p.
146, n. 79; Briant 1996, p. 777.
7
Arr., An., 4.22.7-8, 4.30.9; It. Alex., 104. Seibert 1985, pp. 147-150; Bosworth
1995, pp. 149-154; Karttunen 1997, p. 50.
Expedition to India 299
According to the Metz Epitome, which is the only source that gives it a
name, this city was located to the east of the river Choes. The natives were
defeated but Alexander was wounded in the fighting. The following day
the Macedonians took over the city and, in revenge for their king’s injury,
slaughtered all the inhabitants who had failed to escape into the mountains.
Terrified by this atrocity, the next town the Macedonian army approached,
Andaka, surrendered without putting up resistance.8
After these initial successes Craterus was entrusted with capturing
other towns in the region, while Alexander commanded the best soldiers
against the Aspasians. Once Craterus’ corps had completed their mission,
they rejoined Alexander’s army. The Aspasians burnt their settlements and
retreated into the mountains. That is why the campaign mainly involved
chasing the enemy and fighting them in the mountains. The region was to
be controlled from a town inhabited by natives and veterans of
Alexander’s army. The founding of this town was left to Craterus.
According to Arrian, who is quoting after Ptolemy, the Macedonians
captured 230,000 head of cattle and 40,000 prisoners. These figures must
be grossly exaggerated, for a British survey conducted in 1908 states that
the region’s entire population at the dawn of the industrial age was
approximately 100,000 and therefore in Antiquity it must have been
decidedly smaller.9
On completing these operations the Macedonians marched through the
land of the Guraeans (Gauri) and having crossed the river Guraion (today
Panjkora) attacked the Assacenians (AĞvakayana), who inhabited
territories further east on the river Swat. Though supported by 7,000
mercenaries recruited from beyond the Indus, the Assaceni did not choose
to confront Alexander’s in open field and instead decided to defend
themselves in fortified towns. The Macedonians faced the biggest problem
in capturing the region’s capital, Massaga. For four days the city resisted
persistent assaults, during which Alexander himself was hit by an arrow.
On seeing this, the pancratiast Dioxippus compared Alexander’s wound to
that Diomedes inflicted on Aphrodite at Troy and cited a verse from the
Iliad (5.340): ‘The ichor, such as flows in blessed gods.’ Suffering from
this wound but still having a sober mind, Alexander rebuked the shameless
flatterer by telling him this was normal blood, not ichor, and added that
although he was considered the son of Zeus, he felt physical pain
reminding him that he was a mortal. The defenders of Massaga only
decided to start negotiations after their leader was killed by a missile fired
8
Arr., An., 4.23; Curt., 8.10.4-6; Str., 15.1.26; ME, 35; It. Alex., 105. Wheeler
1968, pp. 95-97; Seibert 1985, pp. 146-147, 150-151; Bosworth 1995, pp. 154-158.
9
Arr., An., 4.24.1-25.4. Bosworth 1995, pp. 158-167.
300 Chapter VI
from a catapult. The mercenaries from beyond the Indus were encouraged
to surrender with an offer to serve in the Macedonian army. However, on
leaving the city both they and their families were surrounded and, using
the pretext of a supposed attempt to escape, slaughtered. On the other hand,
Alexander accepted the surrender of Massaga and confirmed Cleophis, the
mother of the deceased ruler, as Queen of the Assacenians. In some of the
sources there is a (spurious) story that Alexander and Cleophis had an
affair after which she bore him a son.10
At a stage in the campaign that is difficult to pinpoint, though most
probably before the operations against the Aspasians and Assacenians, the
Macedonians reached a city the sources call Nysa. According to the Metz
Epitome it was some 230 stades (41 km) from Andaka. Nysa had an
aristocratic system of government in which power was held by 300 of the
‘best’ families. This so much appealed to Alexander that he even withdrew
his original demand for aristocratic hostages for fear of weakening the
ruling elite. Instead he took from Nysa an auxiliary detachment of cavalry
which accompanied him right up to his return to the Hydaspes in the
autumn 326. The local ruler, King Acuphis, surrendered to Alexander and
it was on this occasion that the soldiers heard the story of how Nysa had
been founded by the god Dionysus and that its inhabitants are the
descendants of the Bacchants. The credibility of this story was confirmed
by the fact that ivy grew on a neighbouring mountain called Merus (Meru
in Sanskrit; perhaps the mountain called today Koh-i-Mor to the west of
the middle course of the Panjkora). This plant was associated with the cult
of Dionysus and Alexander’s soldiers had not seen it since they left the
Mediterranean area. Grapevines were grown there as well and the
inhabitants produced wine. The Macedonians offered sacrifices to
Dionysus, wove garlands out of ivy and against a backdrop of laurel trees,
boxwood and myrtle they celebrated their bacchanalia for ten days. This
story seems like the pure fantasy of ancient authors and doubt was already
cast upon it by Eratosthenes, but it actually fits very well into the
landscape of northeast Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan (Nuristan and
Chitral). The region has the same vegetation as described by the sources,
whereas the locals have produced wine since time immemorial. Moreover,
they bury their dead in wooden coffins kept above the ground. According
10
Arr., An., 4.25.5-27.4; Arr., Ind., 1.8; Str., 15.1.27; Diod., 17.84; Curt., 8.10.22-
36; Plu., Alex., 59.6-7; Polyaen., 4.3.20; ME, 39-45; It. Alex., 106. Alexander’s
wound: Aristobul., ap. Ath., 6.57; Arr., An., 4.26.4; Curt., 8.10.28-29; Plu., Alex.,
28.2; Plu., mor., 341b; Sen., Ep., 59.12; D.Chr., 64.21; ME, 40; Zonar., 4.10.
Quotation from The Illiad after Murray (Loeb). Goukowsky 1981, p. 90; Bosworth
1995, pp. 169-172; Karttunen 1997, p. 33; Heckel 2009, pp. 47-48.
Expedition to India 301
to Curtius Rufus, Alexander’s soldiers had used such coffins for firewood.
The local highlanders, called Kafirs, distinguish themselves from
neighbouring peoples with pale complexions, blue eyes and fair hair.
Moreover, they use of an archaic Indoeuropean language which indicates
that their ancestors originated from the West. It was only towards the end
of the 19th century that the Kafirs of Afghanistan were forcefully
converted to Islam, whereas those in what is now Pakistan are currently
fighting a losing battle for the remnants of their ancient culture against the
influences of Islamic fundamentalism promoted by Pakistani regime. To
this day they have worshipped the god Indra in his most ancient form. Like
the Greek Dionysus, Indra was an originator of the growing of grapevines
and the production of wine and so when his tale was translated into Greek
he was easily associated with the former. It is therefore hardly surprising
that their stay with the Kafirs evoked reminiscences among Alexander’s
soldiers of their Balkan homeland. The stay at Nysa contributed to the
propagation if not actual creation of the myth regarding Dionysus’s
invasion of India. In turn today the inhabitants of Nuristan and Chitral
willingly claim to be the descendants of Alexander’s soldiers.11
After the taking of Massaga, in the winter of 327/326, Alexander sent
his commanders against other Assacenian towns in the hope that news of
what had happened at the capital would induce them to quickly surrender.
This, however, did not happen and Alexander himself had to supervise the
capture of the town of Ora (today Udegram) on the Swat. Meanwhile the
defenders of Bazira (Bir-Kot on the Swat) and other towns escaped to a
fortress perched on a steep rock called Aornos (Avarana in Sanskrit, which
simply means ‘Fortress’). By analysing areas to the north of the Indus and
the rock’s characteristic shape Sir Aurel Stein identified Aornos to be
today’s Pir-Sar, a 2,670-m mountain 40 km to the east of Udegram. Recent
attempts to revise this and associate Aornos with Mount Ilam, situated to
the south of Bir-Kot and Udegram, are not compatible with the
information provided by ancient sources. Aornos Mountain is
approximately 3 km long, 100-200 m wide with precipices on three sides
and connected to a neighbouring plateau by the Bumar ravine, which was
the only route the Macedonians could have used to attack. The army
camped at the foot of the plateau, while Alexander sent an elite
detachment of Agrianians, light infantry and hypaspists under the
11
Thphr., HP, 4.4.1; Curt., 8.10.7-18; Str., 15.1.7-9 (reference to Eratosthenes);
Arr., An., 5.1.1-3.4, 6.2.3; Plu., Alex., 58.6-9; Plu., mor., 332a-b; ME, 36-38; Just.,
12.7. Green 1974, p. 384; Lane Fox 1980, pp. 313-317; Goukowsky 1981, pp. 21-
38; Bosworth 1995, pp. 218-219; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 121-122; Bosworth 1996b,
pp. 149-154; Hahn 2000, pp. 81, n. 51, 86, n. 52.
302 Chapter VI
12
Megasth., fr. 21.10; Arr., An., 4.27.5-30.4; Diod., 17.85; Curt., 8.11; Str., 15.1.8;
Plu., mor., 327c, 332a; Luc., DMort., 12.6; Philostr., VA, 2.10; ME, 46-47; Just.,
12.7; It. Alex., 107-108. Stein 1929, pp. 46-48, 53-61, 113-154; Goukowsky 1981,
pp. 36-40; Seibert 1985, pp. 152-154; Bosworth 1995, pp. 176-182; Bosworth
1996a, pp. 47-53; Hammond 1996, pp. 204-206; Karttunen 1997, p. 49; Huttner
1997, pp. 106-109.
Expedition to India 303
Security in the regions to the west of the Indus was entrusted to the
hetairos Nicanor, who had been nominated satrap shortly before the
Aornos siege.13
13
Arr., An., 4.28.6, 4.30.5-9; Diod., 17.86.2-3; Curt., 8.12.1-5; ME, 48; It. Alex.,
109. Bosworth 1983, p. 37; Bosworth 1995, pp. 193-196; Seibert 1985, pp. 153-
154; Hammond 1996, pp. 206-207; Klinkott 2000, p. 92, n. 288.
14
Ar., An., 5.3.5-6, 5.7.1-8.2; Diod., 17.86.3-4; Curt., 8.12.5-6; ME, 49.
Eggermont 1975, pp. 187-188; Badian 1985, p. 463; Bosworth 1995, pp. 219-222,
254-255.
304 Chapter VI
15
Arist., Mete., 350a; Arr., An., 5.18.7; Diod., 17.89.4-5; Curt., 8.12.6; Plu., mor.,
332a; ME, 63; Just., 12.7. Wilcken 1967, pp. 174-175; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 78-80;
Briant 2002, p. 36.
16
Arr., An., 5.8.2-3; Diod., 17.86.4-7; Curt., 8.12.5-18; Str., 15.1.28; Plu., Alex.,
59.1-5; ME, 49-54.
17
Arr., An., 5.8.3; Diod., 17.87.2; Curt., 8.13.1; ME, 55. Bosworth 1995, pp. 260-
261; Karttunen 1997, p. 33.
Expedition to India 305
18
Aristobul., ap. Str., 15.1.61-62.
19
Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.63. Bosworth 1998, p. 188; Karttunen 1997, pp. 56-60;
Hamilton 1999, pp. 178-180.
306 Chapter VI
man was the most loved and he replied that it would be the most powerful
ruler on condition that he did not arouse fear. The seventh was to say how
a man could become a god and the reply was that he would have to
achieve things that are impossible for a man to achieve. The eighth was
asked whether life was stronger than death or death stronger than life. The
gymnosophist replied that life was stronger as it could put up with so
much evil. Finally the ninth was asked how long one should live, to which
answered that up to moment when death seemed better than life.20
Bearing in mind the exceptional circumstances of this encounter
between Indian sages and a pupil of the greatest of Western philosophers
one cannot but fail to be disappointed by the level of a debate that
basically resembles a brain teasing parlour game. The questions asked
were popular themes in Greek philosophy, especially in Cynic ‘diatribes’.
The subject of Alexander’s conversation with the sages, though not the
fact that such a conversation took place, was most probably invented by
the Cynic philosopher Onesicritus, who put into the mouths of these exotic
Indian naked philosophers the doctrines of his mentor, Diogenes, to thus
give him even greater prestige. The Greek authors had information
regarding various religious and philosophical trends in India but they were
unable to fully distinguish between them. Therefore even if the
gymnosophists Alexander conversed with may have been called by the
Greek authors Brahmans that does not mean that they belonged to that
particular varna. Their description suggests that they more probably
belonged to the Jinist sect. The method of arriving at the truth through
questions and answers known in the Greek world as Socratic Dialogues
was also practiced in ancient India. Therefore the idea of such a dialogue
with Alexander was not alien to Indian culture. However, the language
barrier between the Indians and Europeans would have been very difficult
to overcome as it would have probably involved at least two if not even
three interpreters. In such circumstances, with the meanings of words
being inevitably lost in translation like in a game of Chinese whispers,
conducting an intercultural philosophical debate would have been
extremely difficult if not impossible.21
The sources mention two sages from Taxila – Dandamis and Calanus.
Calanus’ real name was Sphines, but when the Greeks asked him his name
they heard him say ‘Kale’. The word ‘kale’ stems from the Sanskrit word
kalyƗnam, which is a form of greeting. Sphines-Calanus simply thought
20
Plu., Alex., 64. Other accounts: P.Berol., 13044; ME, 79-84; Ps.-Callisth., 3.5-6.
Hamilton 1999, pp. 178-179.
21
Wilcken 1967, pp. 180-181; Stoneman 1995, pp. 108-114; Karttunen 1997, pp.
60-62; Bosworth 1998, p. 173; Pushkas 2001.
Expedition to India 307
the foreigners were greeting him in their language and so he greeted them
in his language. Thus the Europeans misinterpreted his greeting to mean
his name. Onesicritus was the first to speak with Dandamis and Calanus. It
is reported that Calanus, who had recently completed many years of study
in aesthetics, laughed at Onesicritus’s Macedonian attire as he felt it was
quite inappropriate for someone wishing to converse with sages.
Eventually, however, it was Calanus who joined Alexander’s court and
followed the king for two years. There were also other Indian sages who
joined Alexander, for it was indeed part of the local tradition for rulers to
have Brahman advisers. Using a dried up animal hide, Calanus is said to
have demonstrated to Alexander how a state should be governed. He
placed the hide on the ground and trod upon its edges. As he did so the
other edges rose up, but when he stood in the middle of the hide, it stayed
flat around all the edges. The meaning of this demonstration was that
Alexander should desist from travelling around the edges of his empire
and concentrate on governing from the centre. Alas, this story may well
have also been made up for the fortune teller Oibares is said to have given
the same advice in the same way to Cyrus the Great.22
The Macedonians stayed in Taxila for most of the spring of 326. This
was not so much because of a desire to admire the exotic surroundings or
to converse with naked philosophers as on account of an attempt, by
diplomatic means, to establish at least formal control over the rajahs of the
Punjab. Unfortunately, not all of these rulers were as willing to concede as
Abisares, Doxares and Porus – the king of the land between the rivers
Acesines (Chenab) and Hydraotes (Ravi). Another, much more famous
Porus (Paurava), whose kingdom, bearing the same name, stretched from
the river Hydaspes (Jhelum) to the Acesines, flatly refused to cooperate.
The ancient authors exaggerate the significance of the Macedonian defeat
of this other Porus. In the sources he is presented as a powerful rajah
ruling over 300 towns and having at his disposal an army comprising
20,000-50,000 infantry, 2,000-3,000 cavalry, 300-1,000 chariots and 85-
200 elephants. Historical estimates, however, suggest that he ruled over a
territory measuring merely 15,000 km2. In 1901, at the dawn of the
industrial age, this area was inhabited by c. 1.5 m people and therefore its
population would have been much smaller in ancient times. Moreover,
Porus was now politically isolated, as most of the other rulers had taken
the invader’s side, and he had a considerably smaller army than Alexander.
It was for these reasons that he hoped to stop the invaders when they were
22
Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.63-64 (= FGrH, 134 F17a); Nearchus, ap. Str., 15.1.66;
Arr., An., 7.1.5-2.4, 7.3.3-4; Plu., Alex., 65. Bosworth 1998, pp. 186-196. The
advice of Oibares: Aristid, p. 202-203 (Jebb), after Ctesias. Hamilton 1999, p. 181.
308 Chapter VI
crossing the Hydaspes. Working in his favour was the start of the monsoon
season, in May-June 326, which took the unacquainted Europeans quite by
surprise. On top of that the snow in the mountains had started melting, so
the Hydaspes swelled and was now very difficult to cross.23
Alexander’s army, burdened with a baggage train including boats,
most probably took the easiest route from Taxila to the vicinity of today’s
Jhelum. By the time it reached the Hydaspes, possibly near modern
Haranpur, it was reinforced by 5,000 troops from Taxila and boats that had
been brought over from the Indus. However, the river at that point and at
that time measured 800 m. Moreover at the opposite end the army would
have had to confront Porus’ forces, which included elephants terrifying
Macedonian horses. Alexander therefore decided to trick the enemy so as
to catch them off their guard. He ordered large amounts of provisions to be
stocked in the Macedonian camp. This was supposed to give the
impression that his army was intending to remain there until autumn, when
the water level fell and the river could be waded across. But next, making
use of his army’s numerical superiority, he had his men carry out short
manoeuvres, each time as if they were trying to cross at a particular point
along the river. These actions forced Porus’ troops to continually prepare
themselves for battle. Moreover, the Macedonians also harassed the enemy
at night by giving out loud war cries, to which Porus initially reacted by
leading his troops out of the camp. After a time the rajah assumed that the
Macedonians were merely trying to provoke him and so ordered his troops
simply not to respond to enemy actions. His confidence may have also
been raised by a small Indian victory over the Macedonians in a skirmish
on one of the river islands.24
The Indians were gradually lulled into a false sense of security. And
then a storm broke out which further reduced their watchfulness, for an
attacked seemed highly improbably in such unfavourable conditions. But
this was the moment Alexander launched his manoeuvre against Porus.
The sources state that the Macedonian army marched and crossed the river
within a single night. However, the distance the Macedonians are said to
have covered and the difficulties they must have encountered when
crossing the wide river indicate that the manoeuvre must have taken them
an entire day and night before the two sides clashed. Craterus was left in
charge of the main camp, where the soldiers ostentatiously prepared to
23
Str., 15.1.29; Diod., 17.87.2; Curt., 8.13.2, 8.13.5-11; Arr., An., 5.8.4, 5.94,
5.15.4, 5.21.4; It. Alex., 111. Bosworth 1995, p. 320; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 8-11.
24
Arr., An., 5.8.4-10.4; Curt., 8.13.11-16; Plu., Alex., 60.1-2; Polyaen., 4.3.9; Fron.,
Str., 1.4.9; ME, 53-58. Seibert 1985, p. 156; Bosworth 1995, pp. 262-272;
Hammond 1996, pp. 208-210; Heckel 1997, p. 212; Heckel 2009, p. 48.
Expedition to India 309
25
Arr., An., 5.11-13; Curt., 8.13.17-27.2; Plu., Alex., 60.3-7; Polyaen., 4.3.9; Fron.
Str., 1.4.9; ME, 58-59. Devine 1987, pp. 96-99; Bosworth 1995, pp. 273-281;
Bosworth 1996a, pp. 12-15; Holt 2003, pp. 49-50.
26
Arr., An., 5.14.1-15.2 (after Aristobulus and Ptolemy), Curt., 8.14.1-8; Plu.,
Alex., 60.7-8.
310 Chapter VI
27
Arr., An., 5.15.5-18.3; Diod., 17.87.4-89.3; Curt., 8.14.9-30; Plu., Alex., 60.9-11;
Polyaen., 4.3.22; ME, 60-62. Scullard 1974, pp. 65-70; Devine 1987, p. 91, 100-
113; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 16-20; Strauss 2003, pp. 140-142.
Expedition to India 311
Porus reputedly gave the famous reply basilikos, which may be interpreted
that he wished to be treated as a king or that he wished Alexander to
behave like a king. Either way, Alexander was so impressed with this
attitude that he allowed Porus to continue ruling his kingdom – of course
now as his vassal – and even extended its borders. Consciously or
unconsciously, Alexander thus acted in accordance with the Indian code of
conduct, showing that he was Dharmavijayi, a ‘conqueror through
righteousness’.28
After the battle Alexander had the bodies of the fallen buried and the
survivors rewarded. Sacrifices were also made and games were organised.
One of the victims of the battle of the Hydaspes was Alexander’s favourite
horse Bucephalus, which died of exhaustion and old age before the
fighting was finished. A more dramatic version (originating from Chares,
Alexander’s court-marshal) states that Bucephalus died as a result of
wounds incurred during the battle. Alexander commemorated his horse by
naming one of two towns he founded on the Hydaspes Bucephala. The
town was most probably founded on the western bank of the river,
whereas a town called Nicaea (Victory City) was founded on the eastern
bank, on the site of the battle. Tracing their exact location is no longer
possible but we know that at least Bucephala still existed in the first
centuries of A.D./C.E.29
Victory over Porus was also commemorated with the issuing of large
silver coins weighing approximately 40g. These were more probably
somewhat inexact dekadrachms (10 drachma pieces) rather than 5-shekel
pieces. The reverse presents a horseman wearing a Phrygian helmet with a
crest and plume. In one hand he is holding a spear and in the other an
object that has been interpreted to represent lightning. Such a Phrygian
helmet has been found in tomb II at Vergina. Some historians believe that
the helmet at Vergina had belonged to Alexander and this is one of the
reasons why numismatists assume the warrior on the coin to represent
Alexander. The lightning held in the horseman’s hand resembles Apelles’
most famous depiction of Alexander and in both cases this may well be an
allusion to the king’s ancestor, Zeus. It may well also be a suggestion of
equivalence between Alexander and Zeus. The obverse of the coin
28
Arr., An., 5.18.4-19.3; Plu., Alex., 60-12-16; Plu., mor., 181e, 332e, 458b; ME,
60-61; Them., 7.88d. Without basilikos answer: Diod., 17.88.4-89.6; Curt.,
8.14.31-46; Just., 12.8. Narain 1965, p. 163; Bosworth 1995, pp. 305-311.
29
Chares, ap. Gel., 5.2.1-5 (= FGrH, 125 F18); Str., 15.1.29; Arr., An., 5.19.4-20.1;
Curt., 9.1.6, 9.3.23; Diod., 17.89.6, 17.95.5; Plin. Nat., 6.77, 8.154; Plu., Alex., 61;
ME, 62; Ps.-Callisth., 3.3.6; Just., 12.8. Bosworth 1995, pp. 311-316; Fraser 1996,
pp. 161-162.
312 Chapter VI
30
Holt 2003, especially pp. 118-130, 139-161.
31
Arr., An., 5.20.1-4; Str., 15.1.29; Diod., 17.89.4-90.3; Curt., 9.1.4-5, 9.1.8-13;
Max. Tyr., 2.6.d-e; Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.28 and ap. Ael., NA, 15.21. Bosworth
1995, pp. 316-319; Karttunen 1997, pp. 184-186, 221-225; Malinowski 2003, pp.
197-198.
Expedition to India 313
32
Arr., An., 5.20.4-6; Diod., 17.90.4; Curt., 9.1.7-8; ME, 65. Bosworth 1995, pp.
319-320.
33
Str., 15.1.8 (quoting Nearchus = FGrH, 133 F18 and Aristobulus = FGrH, 139
F35); Arr., An., 5.20.8-21.6; Diod., 17.91.1-2; Curt., 9.1.35. Seibert 1985, p. 158;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 322-327.
314 Chapter VI
34
Thphr., HP, 1.7.3, 4.4.4; Str., 15.1.21 (quoting Onesicritus = FGrH, 134 F22 and
Aristobulus = FGrH, 139 F36); Nearchus, ap. Arr., Ind., 11.7 (= FGrH, 133 F6);
Diod., 17.90.5; Plin., Nat., 12.22-23. Karttunen 1997, pp. 131-132.
35
Arr., An., 5.22-24; Diod., 17.91.2-4; Str., 15.1.30; Curt., 9.1.14-23; Polyaen.,
4.3.30; Just., 12.8. Goukowsky 1975, p. 297; Bosworth 1995, pp. 327-337.
Expedition to India 315
Sopeithes gave Alexander extremely fierce and vicious hunting dogs used
in show fights with lions.36
Now, on the way to Hyphasis (today Beas), which was the penultimate
river in eastern Punjab, the Macedonian army only had to cross the
kingdom of a king the Greeks called Phegeus. This rajah immediately
presented Alexander with gifts and acknowledged him as his suzerain. The
army stayed in this kingdom for two days. Then at dawn they marched off
for the Hyphasis, which they reached within a day’s march. Beyond that
river they were convinced they would reach the Ocean. It was only then
that Phegeus disclosed to Alexander and his men the truth about this part
of India. This revelation was confirmed by the trusted Porus. The sources
state that the next great river, the Ganges, was a twelve days’ march away.
This seems plausible, as the Hyphasis at the point which Macedonians are
said to have reached is 250 km from the Yamuna, only a tributary of the
Ganges but one generally not distinguished from Ganges in Antiquity.
Other information which the Macedonians now learned was less close to
the truth, namely, that they would have to cross a desert to reach the
Ganges. Alexander also learned that the Ganges region was occupied by a
powerful state (the Nanda Empire) which allegedly had at its disposal
200,000 foot soldiers, 20,000 horsemen, 2,000 chariots and 4,000
elephants. These figures are without doubt exaggerated, but such rumours
may well have been heard in the Punjab at the time. According to Western
sources the basic plausibility of Phegeus’ revelation regarding the military
strength of the Nanda state was additional information regarding the low
origins of the Nandas, which was also confirmed by independent Indian
sources. Even Porus, the greatest beneficiary of Alexander’s expedition
further east, supposedly expressed the opinion that the army should
proceed no further and instead consolidate its control over territories
already conquered.37
For Alexander, who wanted to continue the march, all this news came
as a great shock. But the soldiers were even more disappointed. For more
than four of the preceding months (from May to September 326) they had
fought a difficult campaign and the most difficult of conditions, including
70 days of continual monsoon rain. Moreover, so far they had covered on
horse or on foot 18,000 km and the prospect of a further march seemed
36
Str., 15.1.30-31 (quoting Onesicritus); Diod., 17.91.4-92.3; Curt., 9.1.24-35;
Plin., Nat., 8.148-149; Ael., NA, 4.19, 8.1; ME, 66-68. Eggermont 1993, pp. 14-20;
Karttunen 1997, pp. 52-53, 174-175.
37
Diod., 17.93; Curt., 9.1.36-2.7; Plu., Alex., 62.2-5; Plin., Nat., 6.68; ME, 68-69;
Just., 12.8. Bosworth 1996a, pp. 74-80; Karttunen 1997, pp. 35-37; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 170-174.
316 Chapter VI
38
Arr., An., 5.25-28; Diod., 17.94; Curt., 9.2.8-3.19; Plu., Alex., 62.6-7; Just., 12.8.
Tarn 1948, i, pp. 98-100; Wilcken 1967, pp. 185-187; Schachermeyr 1973, pp.
433-442; Hamilton 1973, pp. 116-118; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 367-371; Green 1974,
pp. 407-411; Bosworth 1988, p. 133; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 186-200; Hammond
1996, pp. 218-219; Hahn 2000, p. 19; Worthington 2004, pp. 159-160.
Disregarding ancient sources some scholars deny that Alexander really wanted to
continue with his expedition: Badian 1985, pp. 46-467; Spann 1999; Heckel 2007,
pp. 120-125; Heckel 2009a, pp. 80-81.
Expedition to India 317
eyes.39 Before the return march began Alexander ordered twelve alters to
be erected. No doubt these twelve altars were erected to the twelve gods of
Olympus to thank them for the victories won so far. But they also marked
the eastern perimeter of Alexander’s expedition into Asia, just as the altars
to the north of the Jaxartes marked the northern border of his conquests. In
marking out the extremities of his domain Alexander was imitating his
mythological ancestor Heracles, who had also left monumental Pillars of
Heralces (Gibraltar) at the western end of the known world. Plutarch
relates what is perhaps just a legend that kings of the Maurya dynasty
sacrificed on these altars and among those who did so was the dynasty’s
founder, Chandragupta, who had allegedly met Alexander in India and
honoured his memory. We do not know how long Alexander’s altars
survived but the claim Nero’s contemporary Apollonius of Tyana offered
sacrifices there is generally considered to be entirely made up by the
wandering philosopher’s biographer, Flavius Philostratus. The ‘Vulgate’
narrative of these altars as much as 50 cubits (25 m) high appears in the
context of a bogus fortified camp established on Alexander’s orders. Beds
measuring 5 cubits (2.5 m) and oversize stables were put inside this camp
to give the impression to potential enemies that the Hyphasis was reached
by an army of super-humans. If this story is true, the supposed objective
would have been to secure a safe retreat for the Macedonian army. 40
Before setting off, Alexander offered sacrifices on the giant altars and
ordered gymnastic contests. He also decided to grant the territories
conquered up to the Hyphasis to Porus. According to Plutarch, the Indian
received the title of satrap.41
39
Arr., An., 5.28.4-29.1 (quoting Ptolemy = FGrH, 138 F23); Str., 15.1.27.
Bosworth 1995, pp. 355-356.
40
Arr., An., 5.29.1; Diod., 17.95.1-2; Str., 3.5.5; Curt., 9.3.19; Plin., Nat., 6.62;
Plu., Alex., 62.6-9; Plu., mor., 542d; ME, 69; Philostr., VA, 2.43; Orosius, 1.2.5.
Tarn 1940, pp. 91-92; Eggermont 1975, pp. 26-27; Oikonomides 1988, pp. 31-32;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 356-357; Karttunen 1997, pp. 53-54, 257-258; Huttner 1997,
pp. 102-106; Hamilton 1999, pp. 174-175; Pushkas 2001.
41
Arr., An., 5.29.2, 6.2.1; Plu., Alex., 60.15.
318 Chapter VI
with gifts from Abisares. Among them was a prince called Arsaces.
Abisares was again confirmed in his position as monarch and Alexander
also acknowledged his rule over Arsaces’ statelet. Alexander left northern
Punjab under the de facto control of tribute paying rajahs and the only
considerable Macedonian military presence left in Taxila. To a degree, this
resembles the policy practiced later by the Romans of relying on client
states in the East in non-Hellenised areas not imbued with urban culture.42
By the time the Macedonian army reached the Hydaspes the monsoon
rains had ended. The now weathered fortifications of Nicaea and
Bucephala were repaired and ships were built from timber collected earlier
to sail down the Hydaspes. Certain similarities between the Punjab and
Egypt, particularly the appearance of crocodiles (though the Nile crocodile
was decidedly larger) led Alexander’s companions to for believe that the
Indus was an upper part of the Nile. By the autumn of 326, however, the
Macedonians were informed by the natives that the Indus flowed into the
Ocean. To reach the Indus they had to travel down successive Punjabi
rivers.43
Exhausted by a long campaign and the continual dampness after
months of monsoon rain, many Macedonian soldiers succumbed to
diseases, others suffered from snake bites. Therefore it must have been
with a considerable sense of relief that the army received a shipment of
medicines that had no doubt been ordered before the Indian campaign and
now arrived from Greece. The medicines, 300 talents in weight, were
immediately distributed among the ailing. The sources remain silent as to
the effectiveness of these medicines. They had been sent by Harpalus
together with a detachment of 5,000 Thracian horsemen and 7,000 infantry.
This detachment also delivered 25,000 panoplias for the foot soldiers; the
rainy season had rotted and rusted their original armour to such an extent
that it was rendered useless. It was also on the banks of the Hydaspes that
Coenus passed away. The sources unanimously state that he died of a
disease, but that has not stopped modern historians from speculating that
Alexander may have somehow caused this death. There is no evidence to
suggest this but Curtius does mention a spiteful remark reputedly made by
the king, who remembered how Coenus had humiliated him on the
Hyphasis. Alexander is supposed to have said: ‘Coenus for the sake of a
42
Arr., An., 5.29.3-5. Badian 1985, p. 469; Bosworth 1983, p. 38; Bosworth 1988,
p. 134; Bosworth 1995, pp. 358-359; Hammond 1996, pp. 221-222; Fraser 1996, p.
70.
43
Arr., An., 6.1; Arr., Ind., 6.7-9 (quoting Onesicritus); Str., 15.1.19 (quoting
Aristobulus), 15.1.25 (quoting Nearchus); Diod., 17.95.3. Schachermeyr 1973, pp.
443-451; Karttunen 1997, pp. 109-111; Malinowski 2003, p. 205.
Expedition to India 319
few days had begun a long harangue, as if he alone were destined to see
Macedonia again.’44
Alexander’s army had reached the Hydaspes at the end of September
326 and stayed there for somewhat over a month, building ships and
generally preparing for its expedition to the southern Punjab. The sources
give conflicting information concerning the number of river vessels they
eventually had at their disposal. Diodorus claims there were 1,000,
whereas Arrian states that there were either 800 or 2,000. Only the lowest
of these figures is plausible as we are told that the ships took only 8,000
soldiers and a number of horses. Among those selected to board the
vessels were elite units that usually accompanied Alexander: the
hypaspists, Agrianians, archers, Companion cavalry and horse guards
(agema). The rest of the army split in two and marched along both banks
of the Hydaspes. This measure was probably dictated by the need to
acquire enough provisions. The infantry and cavalry were commanded by
Craterus on the left bank, while Hephaestion was put in charge of all the
rest, including 200 elephants, marching on the right bank. Nearchus was
put in command of the fleet and Onesicritus was made steersman of the
flagship. The land forces were to march to Sopeithes’ kingdom, where
they were to meet up with the army of the satrap Philip. Alexander and his
fleet, however, did not set sail until a libation had been celebrated in
honour of Heracles, Ammon, Poseidon, Amphitrite, Nereus, Oceanus and
the river gods. This happened shortly before the Pleiades (the first decade
of November 326).45
The objected was not only to reach the Ocean but also conquer
southern Punjab. The fleet sailed at a rate of 40 or 60 stades (7-11 km) a
day and thus it was easily overtaken by the marching armies. However, it
kept in touch with various army units and all the forces were together
again after three days. Another two days later they were joined the satrap
Philip’s army. The next leg of their voyage, up to the confluence of the
Hydaspes and Acesines, lasted five days. On this leg powerful river
currents damaged some of the vessels but the Macedonians eventually
managed to land on the right bank. Next they crossed the river to conduct
a short and victorious campaign in the land of the Agalassi and Sibians,
44
Arr., An., 6.2.1; Diod., 17.95.4; Curt., 9.3.20-22. Hamilton 1973, p. 118; Lane
Fox 1973, p. 371; Seibert 1985, pp. 160-161; Heckel 1992, pp. 63-64; Holt 2000.
Speculations about Alexander’s involvement in the death of Coenus: Badian 1961,
pp. 20, 22; Green 1974, pp. 416; Bosworth 1988, pp. 133-134; Worthington 1999.
45
Arr., An., 6.2.2-3.3; Arr., Ind., 18-19; Aristobul, ap. Str., 15.1.17; Diod., 17.95.5-
96.1; Curt., 9.3.24; ME, 70; Plu., Alex., 63.1. Seibert 1985, pp. 161-162; Hamilton
1999, p. 176.
320 Chapter VI
which modern historians assume to have been near the town of Shorkot in
Pakistan. Ancient sources state that the Sibians had descended from
soldiers that Heracles reputedly brought over to India. This suggests that
the Macedonian staff made great efforts to find or invent traces of the stay
of Alexander’s ancestor at various points on their route. 46 An anecdote
recorded by Lucian states that during their voyage down the Hydaspes
Aristobulus presented Alexander a part of his historical book concerning
the king’s struggle against Porus. Unfortunately, the stupendous example
of sycophancy in written form was lost to posterity when Alexander
responded by casting the manuscript into the river.47
Once the Sibians were defeated, the Macedonians marched some 130
km to the confluence of the Hydraotes and Acesines. There the greatest
challenge turned out to be a clash with the belligerent tribes the Malli
(Malava) and the Oxydracae (Ksudraka). The Malli most probably
inhabited the land between the Acesines and the Hydraotes, whereas the
Oxydracae occupied territories to the south of the Hydraotes, somewhere
to the northeast of today’s town of Multan in Pakistan. Alexander started
by dealing with the Malli first. The Macedonian army was divided into
five corps. Nearchus took the fleet down to the land inhabited by the Malli.
Craterus commanded a corps – including elephants, an additional phalanx
taxis, the satrap Philip’s soldiers and mounted archers – down the west
bank of the Acesines, while the corps of Hephaestion and Ptolemy
proceeded down the left bank. Each corps set out at a different time so that
if the Malli escaped one corps, they would next encounter another.
Craterus was probably entrusted with the additional task of stopping the
Oxydracae from aiding the Malli. Alexander took command of elite
detachments of hypaspists, Agrianians, mounted archers, half the hetairoi
and a single taxis of phalanx. With this corps he set off east across the
Sandar-Bar Desert. Alexander’s usual tactic of employing the elements of
speed and surprise as well as the ability to get across the most difficult of
terrains was once again successful. Allegedly within a single day the
Macedonians covered as many as 500 stades (90 km), so that the following
dawn the cavalry launched a surprise attack on the quite unprepared Malli
outside a town whose name the sources do not mention. The unarmed
enemy was slaughtered, after which Alexander had the town surrounded
and next stormed. In the meantime Perdiccas was despatched with the
46
Arr., An., 6.4-5; Arr., Ind., 5.12; Diod., 17.96.2-97.3; Curt., 9.4.1-14; Str.,
15.1.33; Plin., Nat., 6.59; Just., 12.9. Seibert 1985, pp. 162-163; Eggermont 1993,
pp. 22-26; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 117-119; Karttunen 1997, pp. 39-40.
47
Luc., Hist. Conscr., 12.
Expedition to India 321
cavalry and the Agrianians to the next town. There the inhabitants fled but
only those who reached marshes escaped the massacre.48
Alexander allowed his troops to have a short respite before continuing
his pursuit of the Malli. These had meanwhile crossed to the other side of
the Hydraotes and found shelter in Brahman town. The Macedonians
followed them and stormed the town and its citadel. Both were captured
and the number of slaughtered Indians reached 5,000. Alexander had
already encountered Brahmans in Taxila, but in all probability he had not
shown enough interest in the social structure of India to understand its
caste system and the exceptional position held by the Brahmans. His flying
column was operating in the land of the Malli detached from the main
Macedonian forces and therefore he could not have consulted Calanus
about the social status of the Brahmans, which the Greeks associated with
the sophists. He therefore could not have foreseen the irreparable damage
this particular massacre would do to the Macedonian army’s reputation
and to what extent it would stiffen resistance in the southern Punjab. For
the time being, however, the inhabitants of other Indian towns fled from
their homes and sought refuge in the desert. On Alexander’s instructions
the Macedonians organised actual man hunt against the Malli hiding in the
forests next to the Hydraotes; the obvious objective of this campaign was
to exterminate defiant Indians.49 The Malli crossed the Hydraotes in the
hope being able to resist the Macedonians from the steep eastern bank.
Nevertheless, this was no serious obstacle for Alexander’s veterans. There
were allegedly as many as 50,000 Malli on the bank. When the
Macedonian cavalry arrived, it immediately forded the river. The Malli
then retreated but they did not flee. While waiting for the slower
Macedonian infantry to catch up with the cavalry, Alexander only
launched sorties against the Indians. However, when the infantry finally
arrived he ordered an all out attack. It was only then that the Indians
started to flee. Those whom the Macedonians had failed to catch up with
and slaughter found refuge in a fortified town, probably near modern
Multan. Alexander ordered the town to be immediately surrounded,
though he prudently allowed his soldiers to rest for the night before
storming it.50
The siege of this Mallian town – erroneously called by some sources a
town of Oxydracae – is the best recorded episode of Alexander’s entire
48
Arr., An., 6.5.4-6.6; Diod., 17.98.1-2; Curt., 9.4.15; Str., 15.1.8; Just., 12.9.
Wilcken 1967, p. 180; Seibert 1985, pp. 163-165; Bosworth 1988, p. 135;
Eggermont 1993, pp. 33-34; Hammond 1996, pp. 224-225.
49
Arr., An., 6.7.1-8.4. Bosworth 1996a, pp. 94-97; Bosworth 1998, p. 196.
50
Arr., An., 6.8.4-8. Wood 1997, pp. 199-200; Heckel 2009, p. 50.
322 Chapter VI
51
Arr., An., 6.9-11; Diod., 17.98.2-99.4; Curt., 9.4.26-5.29; Plu., Alex., 63.2-12;
Plu., mor., 343e-345b; App., BC, 2.152; ME, 75-78; Just., 12.9. Lammert 1953;
Expedition to India 323
The operation was successful but many days passed before Alexander
had enough strength to rise from bed. The incident in the Mallian citadel
came as a major shock to everyone in the Macedonian camp. The
possibility of their leader dying terrified the soldiers for they assumed – in
all probability correctly – that such an eventuality would render their
return home to Macedonia unfeasible. For a long time Alexander was too
weak to appear in public and armed guards constantly ensured his privacy.
This led to the spread of rumours among the soldiers about his imminent
death and even a letter he wrote to them did not allay their fears; they even
believed that it was forged. Alexander was eventually conveyed in a litter
to the river’s edge and thence by ship to the Macedonian camp at the
confluence of the Hydraotes and Acesines. But it was only when he
appeared mounted on a horse or standing on his own feet that the mood
among the men changed. Curtius Rufus relates a conversation between
Alexander and Craterus, delegated by the officers to complain about the
needless way in which he was endangering his life. The details of this
conversation are the fantasy of the Roman historian but that such
conversation took place should not be doubted; this is highly plausible on
account of the psychological situation that must have prevailed at the time
and by Nearchus’ account which has been cited by Arrian. Besides,
Alexander would never again show such bravado or take such risks with
his own life for any other reason. 52 Meanwhile news of Alexander’s
serious wound or even his death had reached Greek settlers in Bactria and
Sogdiana, who were none too satisfied with their forced stay so far from
their homeland. Some so much wanted to return to Greece that they
rebelled. The sources provide contradictory information regarding the fate
of this rebellion. We can only assume that although it was local and lasted
a short time, it did illustrate that Macedonian control of eastern Iran rested
precariously on colonies of Europeans who were settled there not entirely
in accordance with their own will.53
The time of Alexander’s convalescence and the long stay on the
Acesines and Hydraotes gave the soldiers time to repair old ships as well
as build new ones for the next leg of their voyage to the ocean. The
campaign of exterminations in the land of the Malli and no doubt fear that
it could be resumed resulted in the arrival of a large party of Mallian and
Oxydracaean envoys at Alexander’s camp. They now surrendered their
people, submitted hostages as required and also provided 2,500 horsemen.
Bosworth 1988, pp. 136-137; Prag 1990, p. 240; Heckel 1992, pp. 100-101, 264-
265.
52
Arr., An., 6.12-13; Curt., 9.5.30-6.26; Plu., Alex., 63.13.
53
Diod., 17.99.5-6; Curt., 9.7.1-11. Eggermont 1993, pp. 70-73.
324 Chapter VI
The lands of the Malli and the Oxydracae became part of Philip’s satrapy,
which ultimately stretched from the mouth of the Acesines up to the river
Indus.54
It was during a banquet held in honour of the ambassadors from the
two Indian tribes that Curtius Rufus as well as Diodorus provide an
account of a challenge to a ‘gladiator’ duel – though of course such a
concept was quite unknown to the Greeks in 325. This challenge was
made by a drunken Macedonian soldier called Corrhagus to the pankratiast
Dioxippus of Athens. The fight took place the following day before a vast
crowd of Macedonians and Greeks, each group backing their compatriot in
the contest. Corrhagus appeared armed with a shield, a sword, a sarissa
and a javelin, while Dioxippus came with just a club – the weapon of
Heracles. Yet with sheer speed and agility the Greek athlete was able to
dodge the javelin hurled at him, break the sarissa, which anyhow would
have been too cumbersome for single combat, and fell his opponent to the
ground. Only Alexander’s intervention prevented Dioxippus from killing
Corrhagus with a single fatal blow of his club. The king was furious that
his compatriot had been so easily humiliated in a fight, all the more so
because it had happened in the presence of Indians. Alexander got his
revenge on Dioxippus some time later, when during a banquet he had a
gold cup planted close to the Athenian and next accused him of theft. The
disgraced athlete subsequently committed suicide.55
The march to the ocean was resumed in February 325. The fleet and
the land army were to meet up again at the point where the Acesines
flowed into the Indus. On the way there the column commanded by
Perdiccas forced the surrender of the Abastanians (alternatively called
Sambastai), who inhabited lands on both sides of the river Zadrus (today
known as the Sutlej) and were one of the so-called ‘independent’ tribes
over whom no monarch ruled. Ancient authors concur that yet another
Alexandria was founded at the confluence of the Acesines and Indus,
which according to Diodorus was to have a population of 10,000
inhabitants. However, since no traces of this settlement have been found to
date, some scholars are questioning its historical authenticity. As happened
so frequently during the Indian expedition, here too traces of the presence
of Dionysus were found, in whose footsteps the king always eagerly
followed.56
54
Arr., An., 6.14.1-4; Curt., 9.7.12-14, 9.8.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 137.
55
Curt., 9.7.15-26; Diod., 17.100-101; Ael., VH, 10.22.
56
Arr., An., 6.14.4-15.2; Diod., 17.102.1-4; Curt., 9.8.3-8. Eggermont 1993, p. 101;
Fraser 1996, pp. 70-71.
Expedition to India 325
The stopover at the confluence of the two rivers gave Alexander time
to settle the administrative matters of his empire. He appointed his father-
in-law Oxyartes the new satrap of Paropamisus in place of the now
dismissed Tyriespis, while the province of southern Punjab, which was
still being conquered, was entrusted to a Macedonian by the name of
Peithon. However, Peithon could not have been satrap there for long as by
the time of Alexander’s death Porus was also governing that region and
Peithon had been moved to a western part of India.57
On the next leg of their journey the Macedonians entered the land of
King Musicanus to the east of the Indus. In the account of Onesicritus this
kingdom had less in common with India than with a conventionally
idolized image of an aristocratic country similar to Sparta or Crete.
Apparently people there ate their meals together, youths performed tasks
that were in other places normally given to slaves and the use silver or
gold coins was quite unknown. Instead, the inhabitants enjoyed living long
lives in prosperity and equality thanks to the natural abundance of their
land. Unfortunately, these fantastic images conjured up by the cynic
philosopher obscure rather than shed light on what the Kingdom of
Musicanus was really like. The only feature that seems genuine was the
lack of slaves in the Punjab of those days. Instead there was serfdom.
Musicanus failed to turn up at the border to greet Alexander, which could
have been interpreted as a declaration of war. However, the rajah was soon
terrified by the swiftness of Alexander’s army as it proceeded to invade his
territory and hurried to greet the Macedonian to pay tribute and present
him with gifts. The surrender was accepted but Craterus occupied the
kingdom’s capital all the same. There he left a garrison in the citadel: just
to make sure the barbarians stayed loyal.58 The capital is most frequently
associated with today’s city of Alor on the eastern bank of the Indus in the
Pakistani province of Sind. Next Alexander launched a lightning campaign
against Oxicanus or Porticanus, whose land lay further south and who had
failed to provide the tribute required from all those whom Alexander
encountered. Detachments of cavalry, Agrianians and archers were
transported down the Indus by ship. Within two days the Macedonians
managed to storm two cities and kill the disobedient rajah, who had
decided to negotiate a bit too late. The sources give contradictory accounts
57
Arr., An., 6.15.3-4; Arr., Succ., ap. Phot., fr. 1.36; Curt., 9.8.9-10. Bosworth
1983, pp. 38-44.
58
Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.34 (= FGrH, 134 F24); Arr., An., 6.15.4-7; Curt.,
9.8.8-10; It. Alex., 112. Pearson 1960, pp. 100-106; Eggermont 1975, pp. 7-9, 25;
Seibert 1985, p. 167; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 85-87; Karttunen 1997, p. 79; Hahn
2000, p. 205, n. 200.
326 Chapter VI
59
Arr., An., 6.16.1-2; Diod., 17.102.5; Curt., 9.8.11-13; Str., 15.1.33. Seibert 1985,
p. 167; Karttunen 1997, p. 35.
60
Arr., An., 6.16.3-4; Diod., 17.102.6; Curt., 9.8.13-15; Plu., Alex., 64.1; Str.,
15.1.33. Bosworth 1988, pp. 137-138; Karttunen 1997, p. 35.
61
Cic., Div., 2.135; Arr., An., 6.16.5; Diod., 17.103; Curt., 9.8.17-28; Str., 15.2.7;
Just., 12.10. Eggermont 1975, pp. 128-129; Bosworth 1998, p. 197.
Expedition to India 327
62
Arr., An., 6.17.1-2; Curt., 9.8.16; Diod., 17.102.4. Green 1974, p. 425; Badian
1985, pp. 469-470; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 95-96; Bosworth 1998, pp. 180, 196-199.
63
Arr., An., 6.17.2-3, 6.17.5; Curt., 9.8.28-29; Str., 15.2.4. Goukowsky 1981, pp.
105-107; Seibert 1986, p. 169; Bosworth 1988, pp. 138-139.
328 Chapter VI
64
Aristobul., ap. Str., 15.1.17 (= FGrH, 139 F35); Arr., An., 6.17.4, 6.18-19; Diod.,
17.104.1-2; Curt., 9.9; Plu., Alex., 66.1-2; Just., 12.10; It. Alex., 114. Oikonomides
1988, pp. 31-32; Hamilton 1999, pp. 181-182; Worthington 2004, p. 165.
65
Plu., Alex., 47.9-12; Plu., mor., 181d, 337b; Diod., 17.114.1-2. Heckel 1992, p.
85.
Expedition to India 329
66
Narain 1965, pp. 165-167; Wheeler 1968, pp. 106, 121, 128-145, 153-156; Holt
1993a.
CHAPTER VII:
assumes, behind this imitation of Cyrus the Great there also lay a political
plan of winning over the Persian aristocracy. Rationalising modern
historians attribute to Alexander motives that are nowhere recorded in the
sources. They say he wanted to punish the soldiers for their rebellion on
the Hyphasis or that he wished to make up for his humiliation there and
restore his image of a man for whom nothing was impossible. Another
modern hypothesis is that he wished to explore the possibilities of
establishing a direct sea route between India and Mesopotamia and/or
conquer the coast of Gedrosia, even though this territory has neither
strategic nor economic value.1
The maximum number of troops in Alexander’s army as stated in the
sources is 120,000 – 135,000 men. Even if this was the case – though the
number seems exaggerated – then a large part of the army would have
comprised the Indian contingents which would have returned home at the
end of the Indian campaign. The only likely exception would have been
the Indian mahouts in the Craterus’ corps; their special skills, knowledge
and experience regarding Indian elephants made them indispensable.
Craterus’ corps also included Iranian and some of the European soldiers.
Nearchus’ fleet comprised 34 triremes, 80 triconters and some 400
transport vessels with a crew of some 12,000 sailors and 7,000-8,000
soldiers. Taking all these figures into account, scholars assume that at least
30,000 soldiers and probably a much larger number of camp followers
marched with Alexander across the desert.2 This army set out from Patala
at the end of summer (in late August or early September) 325 to take
advantage of the relative abundance of water after the monsoon season. It
should be stressed that regardless of whether he was trying to rival the
feats of the mythical Semiramis or Cyrus the Great, who had already been
dead for two centuries, Alexander did take logistics into consideration.
The stay at Patala was used to gather a four-month supply of provisions.
Moreover, wells were specially dug and food stocks were left along the
coast. At a time when land transport was limited to pack animals an army
could march for no longer than nine days before the food and fodder ran
out. For this reason a theory has been formulated according to which the
1
Str., 11.11.4, 15.1, 15.2.5; Arr., An., 6.24.2-3 (both after Nearchus: FGrH, 133
F3a, b). Wilcken 1967, pp. 194-195, 197-198; Hamilton 1973, p. 126; Green 1974,
p. 430-431; O’Brien 1992, pp. 181-184; Bosworth 1996, pp. 180-183; Hahn 2000,
p. 231; Allen 2005, p. 154. Attempts to rationalize Alexander: Badian 1961, p. 21;
Lane Fox 1973, pp. 387-390; Scheppens 1989; Bosworth 2000, p. 34; Brosius
2003, pp. 174-175.
2
Arr., Ind., 19.5; Plu., Alex., 66.5. Engels 1978, pp. 111-112; Bosworth 1988, p.
142; Sick 2000, pp. 131-133.
The Last Years 333
original plan was for the fleet to synchronize its progress with the land
army; the fleet was to keep the army supplied with provisions while the
army would dig wells to provide the fleet with water. If this theory
formulated by Macedonian army logistics expert D. Engels is true, bad
coordination rendered the plan useless. Above all, the fleet waited for the
start of the monsoon at the end of October and thus set sail over a month
after the land army had started marching. Moreover, the land army
marched at a distance so far from the coast that at no point were Nearchus
and Alexander close enough to communicate with one another even via
informants from among the local populations.3
Alexander’s army marched off from Patala in a south-westerly
direction to reach the river Arabius (today either the Hab or the Porali,
both of which flow into Somiani Bay to the west of Karachi) after nine
days. Next the army turned to the coast and swiftly marched across the
arid land beyond that river. When they reached the land of today’s Las
Bela, Alexander together with some elite units broke off from the rest of
the army, now left under the command of Hephaestion, and conducted a
lightning campaign against the Oreitans. This was an independent tribe
most probably belonging to the pre-Aryan population of India. The
invaders broke up into three columns commanded by Alexander, Ptolemy
and Leonnatus. Like the Arabitae just before them, after some short
resistance, the Oreitans surrendered. Alexander had their largest settlement,
Rhambaceia, converted into a city and most probably named Alexandria.
Its exact location has so far not been established with any degree of
certainty. It was around then that Alexander also appointed Apollophanes
satrap of Gedrosia, whereas Leonnatus was made commander of this new
satrapy’s garrison. After main Macedonian forces had left, the Oreitans
rebelled and killed the newly appointed satrap Apollophanes, but
Leonnatus was able to quell the rebellion. He also established contact with
Nearchus’ fleet and provided it with supplies. Next he led the men under
his command west to eventually rejoin Alexander’s forces in Carmania or
Susa. The satrapy of Gedrosia most probably did not survive its first
governor and merged with the satrapy of Arachosia.4
3
Str., 15.2.3; Arr., An., 6.20.5-21.1, 6.23.1; Arr., Ind., 26.1; Curt., 9.10.2. Engels
1978, pp. 112-114; contra Scheppens 1989, pp. 43-50. Seibert 1985, p. 171;
Bosworth 1988, p. 144.
4
Arr., An., 6.21.3-22.3, 6.27.1; Arr., Ind., 23.5; Diod., 17.104.4-105.2; Curt.,
9.10.4-7, 9.10.19; Plin., Nat., 6.97; Plu., Alex., 66.4; St. Byz., s.v. Alex£ndreiai (4).
Eggermont 1975, pp. 89-93; Goukowsky 1981, pp. 92-100; Seibert 1985, pp. 172-
175; Bosworth 1988, pp. 142-143; Heckel 1992, pp. 102-103; Fraser 1996, pp.
164-166; Klinkott 2000, pp. 92-93.
334 Chapter VII
5
Arr., An., 6.23.1-27.1; Arr., Ind., 26.1; Diod., 17.105.3-106.1; Curt., 9.10.8-18;
Str., 15.2.3, 15.2.5-7; Plu., Alex., 66.4-7; Just., 12.10. Goukowsky 1981, p. 49;
Seibert 1985, pp. 174-177; Bosworth 1988, pp. 143-145; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 166-
180; Hamilton 1999, pp. 183-185.
6
Plu., Alex., 66.4; Arr., An., 6.25.5. Bosworth 1988, pp. 145-146; Bosworth 2000,
pp. 34-35; Hammond 1996, p. 238; Heckel 1997, p. 215.
336 Chapter VII
7
Thphr., HP, 4.4.1; Caryst., ap. Ath., 10.45; Diod., 17.106.1; Curt., 9.10.24-27;
Plu., Alex., 67.1-6; Plin., Nat., 16.144; Arr., An., 6.28.2-4. Historicity of
Bacchanalia denied: Tarn 1948, i, p. 109; Wilcken 1967, p. 201; Hammond 1996,
p. 236; Hamilton 1999, p. 185. Historicity accepted: Lane Fox 1973, pp. 399-400;
Green 1974, p. 438; Goukowsky 1981, pp. 47-64; Bosworth 1988, p. 147;
Worthington 2004, p. 172. Salmus: Goukowsky 1981, pp. 53-60; Seibert 1985, p.
177.
8
Dicaearch. Hist., ap. Ath., 13.80; Plu., Alex., 67.7; Diod., 17.106.4; Arr., An.,
6.28.3; Curt., 6.5.22-23. Badian 1958; Hamilton 1999, pp. 186-187; Ogden 2009,
pp. 213-217.
The Last Years 337
2. Empire in Crisis
Five years had passed since Alexander left the central provinces of his
Asian empire and almost ten since the army marched out of Macedonia. In
that time Alexander did not appoint a ‘regent’ to govern his entire vast
domain during his absence. Macedonia and the entire Balkan Peninsula
were put under the charge of Antipater. However, his authority was in
various ways undermined by Olympias, who as the king’s mother was
quite free to do as she pleased and therefore she constantly wrote letters to
her son accusing Antipater of all sorts of things. The various Asian
provinces were put under the charge of satraps, military commanders and
treasurers personally appointed by Alexander; the treasurers were also
answerable to Harpalus. Contemporary means of transport and
communication meant that all these prefects became de facto independent
rulers during their monarch’s absence. In that time way the satrapies were
governed was left to their personal strengths of character and foresight.
The conduct of some of these Macedonian and Iranian nobles suggests that
they were indeed counting on Alexander never returning from India alive.
The Macedonians, who had been raised in relative austerity though with
more than a healthy appetite for wealth and power, made full use of the
Persian treasuries and plunder at their disposal to live a life of pleasure,
with a greater accent put on ostentation rather than refinement. The ancient
authors present a colourful description of how the Macedonian elites in
Asia brazenly revelled in this newly acquired wealth. Their account is
derived from the early Hellenistic historian Phylarchus – whose source
was most probably the book of Alexander’s court chamberlain Chares –
9
Arr., Ind., 21-36; Arr., An., 6.28.5-6; Str., 15.1.5, 15.1.12-13; Diod., 17.106.4-7;
Curt., 10.1.10-16; Plu., Alex., 68.1, 68.6. Högemann 1985, p. 72; Bosworth 1988, p.
140; Hammond 1996, pp. 236-239; Ashley 1998, pp. 99-102; Hamilton 1999, p.
190.
338 Chapter VII
10
Ath., 12.55; also: Plu., Alex., 40.1; Ael., VH, 9.3. Hamilton 1999, pp. 105-106.
11
Ath., 13.50 (after Theopompus, FGrH, 115 F253); Python, TrGF, 1 F1; Diod.,
17.108.4-6; Curt., 10.1.45; Plu., Phoc., 22; Paus., 1.37.5. Berve 1926, nos. 231 and
676; Parker 1996, p. 258.
12
Arr., An., 6.27.3; Curt., 9.10.19, 10.1.9. Heckel 1992, pp. 124-125.
The Last Years 339
13
Curt., 9.10.29.
14
Arr., An., 6.27.3-4; Curt., 10.1.1-9. Bosworth 1988, pp. 147, 241.
15
Badian 1961; Badian 1964; O’Brien 1992, pp. 185-187; Hanson 1999, pp. 179,
196.
16
Higgins 1980, pp. 140-152; Heckel 2009, p. 51 and Heckel 2009a, pp. 76-77 on
futility of drawing analogy between Alexander and 20th c. dictators.
340 Chapter VII
17
Diod., 17.106.3, 17.111.1-2; Paus., 1.25.5, 8.52.5. Lane Fox 1973, p. 407;
Bosworth 1999, pp. 148-149; Blackwell 1999, pp. 119-121, 124-129.
18
Diod., 17.108.6; Curt., 10.2.1; Ath., 13.50; Plu., mor., 846a. Blackwell 1999, pp.
13-15.
19
Blackwell 1999, especially pp. 13-31, 133-144; Faraguna 2003, pp. 127-128.
The Last Years 341
20
Arist., Oec., 1352b-1353b. Le Rider 2003, pp. 299-319.
21
Arr., An., 6.28.7-29.1. Goukowsky 1981, pp. 60-62; Seibert 1985, pp. 178-179.
342 Chapter VII
22
Arr., An., 6.28.3, 6.29.2-3, 6.30; Curt., 10.1.22-39; Diod., 19.14.5, 19.48.5.
Bosworth 1988, pp. 153-155; Billows 1990, pp. 95, 103-106; Heckel 1992, pp.
263-267.
23
Arr., An., 6.29.4-11; Str., 15.3.7 (quoting Aristobulus); Curt., 10.1.30-34; Plu.,
Alex., 69.1-3. Bosworth 1988, p. 154; Badian 1996, pp. 22-24; Hamilton 1999, pp.
191-192.
The Last Years 343
authors were the accounts of Chares and Nearchus. The latter was not
present to see the self-immolation and relied on another source. Therefore
his account is not as trustworthy as that of the court chamberlain Chares,
who was an eyewitness. The king had tried to dissuade Calanus from
killing himself but when he saw that the Indian was adamant he ordered
his soldiers to construct a giant pyre. Next he and his entire army looked
on as the suicide procedure was performed. When the pyre burst into
flames, Calanus threw himself onto it and thus perished. But first he had
been ceremonially accompanied to the fire by other Indian sages from
Alexander’s court. The entire army honoured the moment of Calanus’
demise with a loud war cry and the elephants also gave out terrifying
cries.24 Chares relates that Alexander also had Calanus’ death celebrated in
the form of sports and music contests as well as a drinking contest to mark
the late Brahman’s fondness of wine. The winner of this last competition
was to receive a crown worth one talent (the equivalent of twenty years’
pay for a foot soldier), the second prize was half a talent and third, one
sixth of a talent. Seeing as in this competition each contestant could drink
as much of alcohol as they could at the king’s expense, one can assume
that many soldiers chose to contend. The winner, a certain Promachus,
drank as many as four choes (11 litres!) of wine. But he did not enjoy his
prize for long: he died four days after his incredible feat. The competition
was held in mid winter, which in Fars was particularly cold. That is how
another 35 Macedonian drunkards froze to death by lying comatose on the
snow. Another six managed to crawl to their tents but died soon
afterwards. 25 Therefore, according to Aristobulus, on this occasion the
Macedonian army suffered greater losses than at the battle of Granicus.
24
Chares, ap. Ath., 10.49; V. Max., 1.8. ext. 10; Str., 15.1.68; Arr., An., 7.3; Diod.,
17.107; Plu., Alex., 69.6-7; Luc., Peregr., 25; Ael., VH, 5.6. Bosworth 1998, pp.
174-183.
25
Chares, ap. Ath., 10.49 (= FGrH, 125 F19); Plu., Alex., 70.1-2 (also after
Chares); Ael., VH, 2.41.
344 Chapter VII
26
Onesicritus, ap. Plin., Nat., 6.100; Str., 15.3.5 ; Arr., Ind., 42.7-10; Arr., An.,
7.5.4-6. Hamilton 1973, p. 133; Seibert 1985, pp. 186-187; Bosworth 1988, pp.
155-156.
27
Dexipp., ap. Phot., 82 (= FGrH, 100 F8.6); Arr., Succ., ap. Phot., fr. 1.36; Curt.,
9.8.9-10. Bosworth 1983, pp. 38-44.
The Last Years 345
28
Chares, ap. Ath., 12.54; Diod., 17.107.6; Arr., An., 7.4.4-8; Plu., Alex., 70.3; Plu.,
mor., 329d-f; Ael., VH, 8.7; Just., 12.10; Memn., FGrH, 434 F4.5-6. Lane Fox
1973, p. 417; Heckel 1992, pp. 86-87, 125; Hamilton 1973, pp. 133-134; Hamilton
1999, p. 195; Ogden 2009, pp. 206-207.
346 Chapter VII
live long enough to see his great plan fulfilled but it allegedly did come
closest to realisation in the Hellenistic kingdom in Bactria.29
Other scholars are right to criticise this theory for the Susa weddings
only concerned Macedonians, Greeks and Iranians, whereas more recent
studies regarding Central Asia in Hellenistic period give a far less
optimistic account of Bactria as a place of supposed union between diverse
peoples. Another theory argues that the intention was to ‘fuse’ together
just two nations, the Macedonians and the Persians or at least just their
social elites.30 But this theory has also been attacked by the minimalists –
scholars who have reduced the significance of Alexander to an episode in
military history. These historians stress that Macedonians and Iranians
were never treated as equals and point out that at meetings the
Macedonians were always given more privileged positions closer to the
king. Currently there is a prevailing tendency to interpret the Susa
weddings as a means for the Macedonians to take over from the Iranian
elites their dominant position in Persian society. After all, merely a few
Iranians were co-opted into government. Moreover, all the marriages
followed the same pattern: the brides were Iranians, which in ancient times
always meant the weaker side. There are even interpretations that the Susa
weddings were merely the realisation of the right of conquest, the victors
took the women of the vanquished to stress their victory over them.31
In terms of historical criticism of Tarn’s idealistic interpretation of
events the pendulum has probably swung too far in the opposite direction
for the ancient sources do not allow us to assume that marriage was forced
upon the Iranian princesses. Likewise the commonly held view that almost
all arranged marriages broke up soon after Alexander’s death is only a
modern-day assumption. In reality we do not know anything about the fate
of the vast majority of marriages; what is certain is that some ended in
divorce and two – this between Alexander’s secretary Eumenes and
Artonis, the daughter of Artabazus and that between Seleucus and Apame,
the daughter of Spitamenes, the eastern Iranian leader of resistance against
Alexander – lasted many years. The son of Seleucus and Apame was
Antioch, the second ruler of the Seleucid dynasty. Marriage of the king’s
29
Plu., mor., 329e. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 399-499; Hammond 1996, pp. 264-265.
30
Berve 1938; Wilcken 1967, pp. 207-209; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 479-487;
Lane Fox 1973, p. 418. Critics of Tarn: Badian 1958a; Wilcken 1967, p. 208;
Bosworth 1980a. On Bactria: Holt 1988, p. 9.
31
Bosworth 1980a; Bosworth 1988, pp. 156-157; Stewart 1993, pp. 90-92; Billows
1994, pp. 30-33; Brosius 2003, pp. 176-178.
The Last Years 347
secretary Eumenes with Artonis ended only with Eumenes’ death.32 The
marriages in Susa were not a departure from Alexander’s general policy
towards Iran but a continuation of a series of events intended to establish
ties between the new monarch and the Persian aristocracy. This was a
policy that had been practiced since almost the very beginning of the
campaign and now at Susa it would also included accepting Iranian elites
into the army (which will be dealt with later in this chapter). Now his
Greek and Macedonian companions were to marry into the inherited
privilege and status of Iranian aristocratic families. Even if it was
impossible for the Macedonian and Iranian elites to merge completely, it is
clear that Alexander arranged the marriages in Susa to establish blood ties
between the two most important nations in his empire.33
It was also during Alexander’s second stay in Susa that he promised to
settle the individual debts of all soldiers who recorded them on a list.
Some of the sources mention a similar episode occurring on the Opis but
they are most probably referring to the same event, only moved forward in
time. Although this was almost certainly intended to be a gesture of
friendship and solidarity with brothers in arms, its reception was mixed,
which illustrated the atmosphere of mistrust that had loomed over the
Macedonian army ever since the Hyphasis incident. The soldiers were
reluctant to put their names on the list, fearing that the king simply wanted
to find out which individuals were living beyond their means. Alexander
therefore allowed the soldiers to put in claims without having their names
entered on a list. As a consequence of this decision the treasury was
inundated with claimants; according to the sources the total sum of money
paid to the soldiers’ creditors was from 9,870 to 20,000 talents. There can
be no doubt that normal army pay was not enough to cover the financial
needs of many soldiers who gambled or spent money on other pleasures,
but one can doubt that these soldiers could have incurred a debt amounting
to 20,000 talents, which was the equivalent of three years’ pay for an army
of 100,000 men. As there was no effective means of verifying the soldiers’
claims or the authenticity of those presenting themselves as their creditors
there must have been many cases of abuse and blatant cheating. Plutarch
writes about a certain Atarrhias, who was actually caught cheating.
Atarrhias bore the scars of the many battles he had fought, so Alexander
32
Plu., Eum., 1.7, 19.2; Nep., Eum., 13.4. Olbrycht 2004, pp. 47-48; Meeus 2009,
pp. 236-237.
33
Allen 2005, p. 150; Ogden 2009, p. 207.
348 Chapter VII
took this opportunity to show magnanimity and pardoned the veteran for
his misdemeanour.34
After his return from India the process of orientalization at Alexander’s
court intensified, which contemporaries interpreted to be a symptom of the
king’s increasing fondness for excessive luxury. The contemporary
historian Ephippus of Olynthus wrote Alexander would hold audiences in
a formal Persian garden (paradeisos) seated on a gold throne. Another
Alexander’s contemporary Polycleitus maintains the king slept in a golden
bed. Ephippus also mentions couches with silver legs, which were, no
doubt, intended for the hetairoi. At banquets Alexander was dressed in
purple robes and wore special slippers as well as Ammon’s horns. In
keeping with Persian custom he travelled in a chariot, dressed in Persian
attire and used the Great King’s insignia – the sceptre, the bow and the
spear. To the Greek observer these were the garments and insignia of the
gods Ammon, Artemis and Hermes. Moreover Alexander would also wear
a lion skin in imitation of his ancestor, Heracles. In the chambers where he
resided myrrh and other incense was burnt.35
The royal court was not the only institution to be orientalized. There
was also a major revolution in the army and it started in its most elite
formation. The Companion (hetairoi) cavalry, the traditional preserve of
the Macedonian aristocracy, suffered serious losses during the march
across the Makran Mountains. These losses were now made up by
horsemen from the Iranian elites, including Rhoxane’s brother, Itanes, as
well as the sons of the satraps Artabazus, Mazaeus and Phrataphernes. The
Iranian levy must have been quite considerable as a fifth hipparchy was
formed (previously the number of hipparchies had been reduced from
eight to four) and put under the command of the Bactrian Hystaspes. To
many Macedonians these changes came as major shock. R. Lane Fox
rightly compares this situation to what the Victorian elites would have felt
if Indian Sepoy had been accepted into Grenadier Guards. The
Macedonian infantry was also to receive bad news. At more or less the
same time 30,000 Iranian youths arrived at Susa. They had been recruited
in 327 and for three years underwent training in how to fight the
Macedonian way. Now they pitched camp outside the city and demonstrated
their ability and discipline in using Macedonian arms. Alexander greeted
them graciously and, what is worse, called them ‘epigonoi’, in the sense
that they were the successors to the current phalanx. Worse still, he
34
Arr., An., 7.5.1-3; Diod., 17.109.2; Curt., 10.2.9-11; Plu., Alex., 70.3-6; Plu.,
mor., 339b-c; Just., 12.11. Bosworth 1988, p. 158; Hamilton 1999, pp. 195-196;
Nawotka 2003, p. 125.
35
Ephippus, ap. Ath., 12.53; Polycleitus, ap. Ath., 12.55.
The Last Years 349
36
Arr., An., 7.6; Diod., 17.108.1-2; Plu., Alex., 71.1-3, 71.6. Lane Fox 1973, pp.
422-423; Hamilton 1973, pp. 134-135; Hamilton 1999, pp. 128-129; Green 1974,
pp. 446-447.
37
Arr., An., 7.7; Str., 16.1.9.
350 Chapter VII
38
Högemann 1985, pp. 12-17, 124; Badian 1998, p. 220.
39
Thphr., HP, 9.4.1-9; Arr., Ind., 32.7, 43.9; Str., 16.3.2, 16.3.4, 16.4.4; Plin., Nat.,
6.98. Högemann 1985, pp. 73-87.
The Last Years 351
was then that Alexander delivered another speech.40 The words related to
us by Arrian and Curtius are merely a display of the historians’ own
rhetorical skills but that such a speech was actually delivered cannot be
doubted. Nor should we doubt the basic arguments later related by the
authors for modern research has shown that they clearly fit the late 4th-
century cultural context. In a direct response to the ridicule of his having a
divine father in Ammon, Alexander started by reciting the achievements of
his earthly father Philip II, who had raised Macedonia from a very humble
level of civilization to become the greatest power in the Balkans. He went
on to recount his own military achievements, recalling the countries he had
conquered and their riches that were now Macedonian property. To those
who complained of the wounds and toil they had had to endure he recalled
the wounds he himself had suffered. He also reminded the soldiers of all
the booty and other benefits they have received, including the settlement
of the debts they had wantonly incurred. Finally he bade them all to depart
as they wished, for he himself desired to be left under the protection of the
barbarians he had conquered: to desert one’s king in a foreign land was
virtually the most indelible military dishonour to a Macedonian.41
Having delivered this speech, Alexander retired to his quarters and saw
no one for two days. On the third day he ostentatiously distributed army
commands among Persians, some of whom he also advanced to the court
distinction of ‘royal kinsmen’. What is worse, the Iranian detachments
now received the distinguished names that had previously only been held
by Macedonian army units. All this was part of Alexander’s arsenal in the
psychological war he was conducting against his defiant soldiers; at Opis
the final outcome was different to what eventually happened at Hyphasis.
This time the Macedonians concluded that their king could really do
without them by relying on mercenary and Iranian detachments. This time
on the third day the king’s residence was thronged with soldiers begging
for forgiveness and promising to surrender the instigators. Alexander
relented and when Callines, one of the veterans of the Companion cavalry,
said how it grieved the Macedonians that their king called Persians his
kinsmen, Alexander immediately declared that henceforth all Macedonian
soldiers were his kinsmen. The soldiers could hardly conceal their joy as
they returned to the camp and thus the mutiny ended.42
40
Arr., An., 7.8; Diod., 17.109.2; Curt., 10.2.8, 10.2.12-14, 10.2.30; Plu., Alex.,
71.2-3; Just., 12.11.
41
Arr., An., 7.9-10; Curt., 10.2.15-29; cf. Plu., mor., 327a-b. Tarn 1948, ii, pp.
290-296; Errington 1990, pp. 107-112; Hammond 1996, pp. 248-249; Nagle 1996.
42
Arr., An., 7.11.1-8; Diod., 17.108.3; Curt., 10.3.1-4.3; Plu., Alex., 71.4-8; Just.,
12.12. Heckel 2006, p. 76.
352 Chapter VII
45
Arr., An., 7.12.1-3; Diod., 17.110.3, 18.4.1; Curt., 10.4; Plu., Alex., 41.9-10,
71.8-8; Plu., mor., 181a, 339c-d; Just., 12.12.
46
Arr., An., 7.12.4-7; Diod., 18.4.1, 18.12.1. Bosworth 1988, p. 161; Bosworth
1988a, pp. 209-210; Bosworth 2002, p. 31; Blackwell 1999, pp. 155-157.
354 Chapter VII
the monarch offered presents to the most powerful men in circle as a mark
of distinction. Different than in Greece where gifts were granted by peers
to help cement a ritualised friendship (xenia), in Persia presents given by
the monarch could not be rejected. Both the offer of granting a town’s
revenues as well as the king’s reaction to Phocion’s rejection show that
Alexander thought and acted as the successor to the Achaemenids and he
no longer attached enough importance to winning over members of the
Greek ruling elites in a way that was for them natural and easy to accept.
The ability to establish bonds with the Greek ruling elites was one of the
secrets of Philip II’s might. His son did not feel it necessary to devote so
much effort, care and attention to such matters and this was an indirect
cause of the political crisis in Greece and Macedonia after his death.47
Though summoned to do so, Antipater did not appear before
Alexander, nor did he raise let alone personally deliver the reinforcements
his king expected to replace the veterans he had sent home. Instead
Antipater sent his oldest son, Cassander, whose presence at Babylon is
recorded in the late spring of 323. In Justin’s account, widely accepted in
modern historiography, Antipater feared for his life on account of what
had happened to those Alexander had considered to be his rivals, for
example, Parmenion, who was of Antipater’s generation. Justin uses this
information to explain the role Antipater was supposed to have played in
the alleged poisoning of Alexander. However, we can be fairly certain that
Alexander died of natural causes (see Chapter VIII.1) and this makes the
version that Antipater feared for his life less plausible. One cannot speak
of any enmity between Alexander and his regent in the Balkans as the king
continued to consider Antipater’s youngest son, Iolaus, to be one of his
most trusted courtiers, responsible for what the monarch drank. Cassander
appeared in Babylon in the late spring of 323, which would mean that he
had probably left Pella a couple of months earlier, i.e. after Antipater had
received written summons from the king. If Antipater had genuine reasons
to fear Alexander’s true intentions he would probably not have sent
another son to him. The purpose of Cassander’s mission was therefore
probably to explain a misunderstanding between Alexander and Antipater
and to negotiate maintaining the regency in Pella on slightly different
conditions. If the anecdotes recorded by Plutarch are to be believed,
Cassander, who had been raised in a traditionalistic Macedonian
environment, turned out to be a bad diplomat. He is said to have laughed at
the eastern courtiers greeting their ruler with the traditional proskynesis.
For this Alexander immediately punished him by catching him by the hair
47
Plu., Phoc., 17-18; Ael., VH, 1.25. Nawotka 2005.
The Last Years 355
and beating his head against the wall. After such an introduction it is
hardly surprising that the subsequent negotiations failed. When Cassander
tried to disprove allegations made against his father by certain emissaries,
Alexander accused him of applying Aristotelian sophisms rather than
genuine arguments.48
48
Plu., Alex., 74; Plu., mor., 180f; Just., 12.14; Ps.-Callisth., 3.31. Griffith 1965;
Baynham 1994, pp. 343-344; Hamilton 1999, pp. 205-207; Blackwell 1999, pp.
156-158.
49
Diod., 18.8.4. Sealey 1960; Bosworth 1988, pp. 202-221; Blackwell 1999, pp.
14, 145.
50
Diod., 17.109.1; Curt., 10.4-8; Just., 13.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 224. Exile in
Greece: Seibert 1979.
356 Chapter VII
The Charter of the League of Corinth, which Alexander had sworn to,
explicitly forbade the return of exiles and the redistribution of land for that
purpose. Some scholars try to justify his decision by the fact that it
excluded murderers or those who were under a curse, which was supposed
to satisfy the Greek sense of justice. Attempts are also made to prove that
Alexander did not actually break the League of Corinth Charter
regulations because his proclamation was not an order directed to member
states as such but a mere invitation to negotiations.51 This is not, however,
how the sources show the situation. The above cited extract from the letter
contains an open threat to use force against those Greek states which
refused to accept exiles and that can hardly be seen as an invitation to
negotiate. In this sense it was a breach of the Charter of the League of
Corinth, which had clearly ceased to have any meaning for its hegemon.
After conquering the Persian Empire and ascending the Achaemenid
throne, Alexander no longer cared for the polis particularism which was so
cherished by the Greeks and which he himself had used so effectively in
the first years of his reign. Alexander’s letter arbitrarily interfered in the
internal affairs of the poleis and showed that he was seeking to apply a
universal solution for all the Greek states, treating their citizens as his de
facto if not de jure subjects.52
The problem with the exiles did not affect all the poleis in equal
measure; there can be little doubt that most of them complied obediently.
Thanks to an inscription found at Delphi, we know the detailed regulations
concerning the return of the exiles to Tegea in the Peloponnesus. The
repatriates were guaranteed the return of landed property in kind, whereas
those who had in the meantime inhabited their houses were refunded by
the state. There were separate regulations concerning financial
commitments towards the repatriates themselves as well as the property
rights of their wives and daughters who had accompanied them in
banishment or had remained in Tegea. Paradoxically, the exiles now
benefiting from Alexander’s decree also included those who in 331 had
brought Tegea over to Agis III’s side in his war against Macedonia and
who had been exiled after that king’s defeat at the Battle of Megalopolis.53
The prospect of exiles returning home was most painful to the citizens
of Aetolia and Athens. In 330 the Aetolians had destroyed the city of
Oiniadai in Acarnania and expelled its inhabitants, who now, thanks to the
decree, were to return. The situation for the Athenians was even worse for
51
Hammond 1996, pp. 256-257; O’Neil 2000, pp. 425, 430.
52
Wilcken 1967, pp. 214-215; Goukowsky 1975, p. 303; Bosworth 1988, pp. 220-
221; Errington 1990, pp. 95-96; Carlier 1995, p. 163; Blackwell 1999, pp. 146-147.
53
Syll.3 306. Heisserer 1980, pp. 205-229.
The Last Years 357
in 365 the Athenian general Timotheos had repelled the Persian garrison
from Samos and claimed the island for Athens. We do not know if all but
certainly very many of the Samians were expelled, especially the known
enemies of Athens as well as those who were simply very rich. And on the
land of the exiles the Athenians next founded a cleruchy. A recently
discovered inscription has revealed a list of this cleruchy’s council
members which allows us to estimate that in 324 there were approximately
12,000 Athenian citizens living in Samos, whereas only 21,000 more lived
in Attica. Therefore maintaining the status quo in Samos was a matter of
prime importance for the Athenian polis.54
Alexander was not only aware of these circumstances but it could even
be said that his decision to demand the return of the exiles was to a large
extent made on account of the Samians. Some of them had served in his
mercenary armies. All of them, but especially those who had settled on his
land in Asia Minor, had a very powerful protector in Gorgus of Iasus, the
supervisor of the king’s armoury. A couple of years after these events
Gorgus was honoured with a honorific inscription in Samos. Working in
the Samians’ interest, Gorgus incited Alexander against Athens. He
offered Alexander a gold crown, calling him on that occasion the son of
Ammon, and promised to provide 10,000 complete sets of hoplite armour
for his eventual siege of Athens. The decision to order the return of the
exiles was probably announced in the Macedonian camp already in March
324 before Nicanor’s departure for Greece and soon it was followed by
another Alexander’s expressly order granting exiled Samians right to
return to their island. 55 It was by this time at the latest that the
indefatigable Gorgus obtained for Iasus rights to the ‘little sea’ – as stated
in the inscription and no doubt referring to a gulf that abounded with
fishes and fruits of the sea. This acquisition was commemorated at Iasus in
the years 324-323 with the issuing of coins depicting sea creatures.56
News of the decision regarding the exiles reached Greece at the end of
the Athenian year, i.e. before July 324. Samian exiles, assisted by various
Greek poleis and private citizens resentful of injustice once done to them
by Athens, started returning home of their own accord and fighting over
land with the Athenian settlers. The situation was becoming so dangerous
54
Oiniadai: Plu., Alex., 49.14-15; Diod., 18.8.6-7. Blackwell 1999, pp. 114-115.
Samos: Shipley 1987, pp. 12-15, 141; Hallof, Habicht 1995 (= SEG 45.1162 = IG
12.6.1.262); Habicht 1996; Debord 1999, pp. 292-294.
55
Syll.3 312 = IG 12.6.1.17; Ephippus, ap. Ath., 12.53; Just., 13.5. Wilcken 1967, p.
214; Heisserer 1980, pp. 182-193; Shipley 1987, pp. 165-166; Bosworth 1988, p.
221.
56
Syll.3 307. Heisserer 1980, pp. 171-179; Delrieux 1999.
358 Chapter VII
57
Din., 1.81-82; Hyp., Dem., 19; Diod., 17.111.1-3, 17.113.3, 18.9.1-3; IG
12.6.1.42. Habicht 1957, pp. 156-169 (nos 1-2); Heisserer 1980, pp. 189-190;
Shipley 1987, pp. 166-168; Bosworth 1988, pp. 224-227; Habicht 1999, pp. 31-35;
Faraguna 2003, pp. 126-130.
58
Wilcken 1967, p. 214; Hammond 1996, pp. 256-257; Worthington 2004, pp.
177-178.
The Last Years 359
for any eventual failures concerning the return of exiles, and that was
bound to happen in face of Athenian and Aetolian determination. It is
possible that weakening the position of the Macedonian regent was in fact
one of the Alexander’s objectives. In 324 Antipater was the only important
Macedonian official who did not owe his position to Alexander’s
patronage. Alexander did not live long enough to see how the situation
concerning the exiles developed, while among the Macedonian elite there
were not many men who strongly believed in realising their king’s
decision in this matter. That would be why after his death the generals
gathered in Babylon sent a letter to the Greek states that promised a return
to the situation that had been imposed by Philip II. Unfortunately, it was
by then too late to prevent the outbreak of war in Greece, which was
largely a consequence of the destabilisation caused by the exiles
decree.59
Parallel to the exiles issue was the debate of extending divine cult to
Alexander in Greece. This time none of the major sources provides us with
a full account concerning the question of Alexander’s divinity, known
only from disjointed remarks in the speeches of Athenian orators and
anecdotes related by later authors. However, there can be no doubt that
Alexander’s divinity was discussed by both Athenian and Spartan
assemblies and the Athenians did eventually decide to acknowledge
Alexander as a god. Such a motion was put forward by Demades, who for
a long time had been closely associated with the Macedonian establishment.
During a debate he was supposed to have uttered the significant words: ‘be
careful not to lose the earth while guarding the heavens’. This is though to
be a cynical argument to buy Alexander’s favour regarding the island of
Samos in return for concessions in heavenly matters. And that is indeed
how the Athenians saw it, for in this instance they agreed with Demades
despite the opinions of politicians who treated such imponderables more
seriously. Among them was Lycurgus, who asked: ‘what kind of god if on
leaving his temple one would have to be cleansed?’ With these words
Lycurgus was obviously implying that a cult to Alexander would be
sacrilegious. Aelian provides us with an anecdote according to which
Demades even proposed that Alexander should become the thirteenth
Olympian god.60 The Spartans also established a divine cult to Alexander.
At Megalopolis there was a temple to Alexander and in Athens a statue of
59
Diod., 18.8.2. Bosworth 1988, pp. 227-228; Blackwell 1999, pp. 148-151.
60
Din., 1.94; Hyp., Dem., 31; Plb., 12.12b.3; Plu., mor., 187e, 804b, 842d; DL,
6.63; Ael., VH, 5.12; V. Max., 7.2 ext. 13. Goukowsky 1978, pp. 60-61; Cawkwell
1994, pp. 301-302; Parker 1996, pp. 257-258; Blackwell 1999, pp. 151-154; Brun
2000, pp. 97-107; Troisi 2005; Dreyer 2009, pp. 229-234.
360 Chapter VII
Alexander called aniketos theos (invincible god). Other poleis must have
followed suit as the delegations arriving at Babylon in 323 bore names
reserved for embassies dispatched to temples and oracles.61 Probable in
this time a well-recorded wave of cults to Alexander began in the cities of
Asia Minor, including: Apollonia Mordiaion, Troy, Ephesus, Priene,
Erythrai, Theos, Bargylia, Magnesia on the Maeander, in the Ionian
League as well as on the islands of Rhodes and Thasos. After the king’s
death and during the Lamian War in continental Greece statutes officially
acknowledging Alexander’s divinity were either revoked or simply forgotten.
Antipater, the victor of that war, personally considered the adoration of a
mortal as a god sacrilegious and was the only diadochus not to worship
Alexander in this way. The Greeks in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands,
on the other hand, would continue to worship Alexander as a god for
centuries in memory of how he had liberated them from Persian rule.62
A subject of controversy that persists to this day concerns how this
seemingly unprecedented decision in Greek history of deifying a mortal
came about. One hypothesis holds that Alexander himself demanded
divine honours. It is based on anecdotes found in the works of Aelian and
Plutarch which apparently originate from a single earlier source. However,
one cannot ignore the fact that other sources, both the speeches of
contemporary Greek orators and Alexander historians, are silent on this
issue. The same sources provide extensive information on the exile decree
and there is no reason why they should fail to mention Alexander’s whish
or demand to be worshiped as a god. On the basis of all the evidence found
in extant sources it is equally probable that the idea of deifying Alexander
originated in fact from the Greeks wishing to win the powerful king over
in the time when they had much to gain in the exiles debate. Alexander’s
invincibility on the battlefield was a convenient reason to declare him a
god. However, the statue in Athens of ‘Alexander the invincible god’ did
not have a cult status, probably to deliberately weaken the charge that this
was sacrilegious deification of a living mortal.63
61
Hyp., 6.21; Ael., VH, 2.19; Plu., mor., 219e; Paus., 8.32.1; Arr., An., 7.23.2.
62
Suda., s.v. Antfpatroj. Blackwell 1999, p. 155. Alexander’s cult in Asia Minor
and in islands: Habicht 1970, pp. 17-22, 26-28; Stewart 1993, pp. 98-102, 419-420;
Badian 1996, pp. 24-25; Nawotka 2003a, p. 33; Dreyer 2009, pp. 222-228.
63
Ael., VH, 2.19; Plu., mor., 219e. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 370-373; Wilcken 1967, p.
210; Habicht 1970, pp. 17-36; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 525-431; Hamilton 1973,
pp. 138-139; Goukowsky 1978, p. 61; Bosworth 1988, p. 288; Stewart 1993, pp.
100-101; Hammond 1996, pp. 257-258; Fredricksmeyer 2003, p. 276. Contra:
Balsdon 1950; Blackwell 1999, pp. 152-153; Brun 2000, p. 101; Worthington 2004,
pp. 192-193.
The Last Years 361
64
Bosworth 1988, pp. 281-288; O’Brien 1992, pp. 202-203; Stewart 1993, pp. 96-
99; Fredricksmeyer 2003, pp. 227-278.
362 Chapter VII
Eumenes’ men from their living quarters. King had to personally intervene
and force the two officials to reconcile their differences. The next stopover
was on the Nesaian Plain in Media, where a herd of magnificent horses
grazed. Reports stated there were as many as 150,000 of them, but in
reality it turned out there were only 50,000 to 60,000 at the most. The
herders claimed that thieves had stolen the rest during the times of war and
civil disorder when such crimes could be committed with impunity. Some
modern scholars believe the robbers were Cossaeans from the Zagros
Mountains. However, there is not enough evidence in the sources to
confirm this and it is equally probable that the earlier reports of 150,000
horses were merely a joyful invention of creative Achaemenid bureaucrats.65
After 30 days spent on the Nesaian Plain the army resumed the march
to the Median capital, Ecbatana, which it reached seven days later in the
autumn of 324. Alexander would usually mark an accomplished mission
with sports and artistic competitions and this is what indeed happened at
Ecbatana; 3,000 performers from Greece were said to have taken part in
the celebrations. An inseparable part of all Macedonian festivities were
banquets involving heavy drinking. I was most probably as a result of such
alcoholic overindulgence that in November that year Hephaestion fell ill.
His physician, a man called Glaucus or Glaucias, instructed him to follow
a very strict diet. Unfortunately, the young warrior proved incapable of
putting up with such a regime for long. On the seventh day of his illness,
during the physician’s absence, he consumed an entire hen, washed it
down with a pitcher (c. 2 litres capacity) of wine and subsequently passed
away.66 The death of his very closest friend was a deeply profound shock
to Alexander. The first thing he did was to have the hapless physician
executed, in keeping with Persian custom, by crucifixion. He himself is
said to have hugged Hephaestion’s body for two days. Then, once he
overcame the first shock of bereavement, Alexander ordered official
mourning throughout the his empire on a scale befitting the death of a
monarch or at least an heir to the throne. Among other things, he ordered
the Persians to quench their ‘sacred fires’. This was something that
normally only happened after the king’s death and therefore to be told to
do it on account of the death of an ordinary man was for the Iranians quite
incomprehensible and even insulting. According to Diodorus (or rather
Ephippus, who was most probably his source) the quenching of the sacred
fires was interpreted at time as an omen of Alexander’s own imminent
65
Diod., 17.110.3-6; Arr., An., 7.13.1; Plu., Eum., 2.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 163.
66
Ephippus, FGrH, 126; Arr., An., 7.14.1; Diod., 17.110.8; Plu., Alex., 72.1-2.
Heckel 1992, pp. 87-88; Hammond 1998; Hamilton 1999, p. 199; Heckel 2006, p.
126, s.v. ‘Glaucias’ [3].
The Last Years 363
death, though this interpretation may have only appeared after Alexander’s
death. In the meantime Alexander had his hair cut in honour of his
deceased companion. He also had the mains and tails of horses and mules
cut for the same reason. Even more dramatically, he had the defensive
walls of neighbouring towns demolished and a temple of Asclepius or
some local deity identified with Asclepius by the Greeks razed to the
ground. Wishing to institute a divine cult for Hephaestion, Alexander sent
a special delegation with such a request to the oracle he trusted the most,
at Siwah. Up until its return he forbade his soldiers to play musical
instruments, especially not the aulos. Ultimately the Ammon of Siwah
permitted Hephaestion to have only a heroic cult. The sources relate that
such a cult was introduced in Athens and Pella. Those who wished to gain
Alexander’s favour, such as Perdiccas, made vows to all the gods and
Hephaestion.67 A letter was sent to Cleomenes of Naucratis to construct a
magnificent heroon to Hephaestion at Alexandria and another one on
Pharos Island. A measure of the importance Alexander attached to
establishing a heroic cult for his companion is the reward Alexander was
offering Cleomenes for completing these tasks: forgiveness for what was
in all probability very considerable financial abuses committed during the
king’s absence.68
The warrior also honoured the death of another warrior with war, thus,
in a way both offering up the bodies of those slaughtered as sacrifice for
the companion’s spirit as well as finding a way of occupying his mind in
the psychologically most difficult phase of his bereavement. Sometime in
mid winter, probably January-February 323, Alexander launched a
campaign against the Cossaeans, one of the mountain tribes who, like their
neighbours the Uxians, had held on to independence under Achaemenid
rule on account of greater expenditure for the total conquest than the
tribute might bring the king. This time, however, the best army in the
world of those days conducted a 40-day manhunt of the hapless Cossaeans
merely to amuse its commander. Those who survived the slaughter
acknowledged Alexander’s suzerainty and agreed to adopt a settled
lifestyle. But by the diadochi period the Cossaeans regained their
independence and again posed a threat to travellers on the road from Susa
67
Hyp., Epit., 20-21; Arr., An., 7.14.2-7; Diod., 17.114.4-5, 17.115.6; Plu., Alex.,
72.3; Plu., Pel., 34.2; Ael., VH, 7.8; Luc., Cal., 17; Just., 12.12. Heckel 1992, pp.
89-90; Hammond 1995; Briant 1996, pp. 260-262; Badian 1996, p. 25; Hamilton
1999, pp. 200-201; Pelagia 2000, p. 168; Reames-Zimmerman 2001; Brosius 2003,
p. 181.
68
Arr., An., 7.23.7-8.
364 Chapter VII
to Ecbatana. Therefore the conquest of their land was not permanent. But,
then again, that was not Alexander’s real objective.69
After the campaign Alexander returned to the matter of organizing a
funeral ceremony. He instructed Perdiccas to transport Hephaestion’s body
to Babylon; for a time the king himself held the reins at the head of the
procession. It is possible that the still extant stone Lion of Hamadan was
commissioned to mark the place where Hephaestion died. In Babylon
Alexander ordered the construction of a giant pyre that reportedly cost
between 10,000 and 12,000 talents. Some scholars have considered the
extraordinary structure described by Diodorus as an ecphrasis of
something that may have been planned but was never realised. It has also
been frequently confused with the tomb which Alexander had planned to
build for Hephaestion but died before work on its construction work
actually began.70 Yet we now know that a pyre was actually raised for the
remnants of a 7.5-metre high platform were discovered by archaeologists
in Babylon. This was an enormous rectangular pyre a stade (180 m) long
and over 130 cubits (65 m) high, and comprising a skeleton structure of
bricks from a demolished fragment of the city’s wall. This skeleton
structure was filled with the trunks of palm trees, which were used as the
fuel; in the intense heat of the subsequent conflagration they left an
impression on the thus deformed bricks. The walls of the pyre were
adorned with the gilded prows of ships alluding to Hephaestion’s military
commands, the attributes of the gods (the eagles of Zeus, the snakes of
Ammon and the torches of Dionysus), a relief depicting a hunting scene
and another one presenting a Centauromachy (a traditional allegory to the
Greek-Persian wars), depictions of Persian and Macedonian armour as
well as the images of Babylonian gods and their symbols. The
Macedonians cast their weapons and other valuables onto the pyre,
presumably more in order to ingratiate Alexander than to express genuine
sorrow for the departure of the generally disliked Hephaestion. The
cremation of his corpse was accompanied by the sacrifice of 10,000
animals.71
Hephaestion’s funeral pyre and all the other aspects of mourning his
death were already considered excessive by contemporaries. Modern
69
Arr., An., 7.15.1-3; Arr., Ind., 40.7-10; Diod., 17.111.5-6; Str., 11.13.6; Plu.,
Alex., 72.4. Bosworth 1988, p. 165; Hamilton 1999, p. 201.
70
Diod., 17.115.1-5; Plu., Alex., 72.5. Lane Fox 1980, pp. 384-385; Bosworth
1988, p. 164; Hammond 1995; McKechnie 1995; McKechnie 2001; Pelagia 2000,
pp. 167-168.
71
Diod., 17.115; Arr., An., 7.14.9; Ael., VH, 7.8. Heckel 1992, p. 89; Pelagia 2000,
pp. 167-173.
The Last Years 365
7. Return to Babylon
After ending his campaign against the Cossaeans, Alexander led his army
back to Babylon. The march was again very slow and included many
breaks. Even before he reached Babylon, Alexander granted audiences to
numerous embassies arriving from various parts of the world and such
diplomatic meetings continued in Babylon as well. The sources mention
embassies from Libya, from Italy (including the Bruttians, Lucanians,
Etruscans and Romans), from Ethiopians, Carthage, European Scythians,
72
Arr., An., 7.14; Plu., Alex., 72. Alcoholism: O’Brien 1992. Paranoia: Badian
1961; Worthington 1999a. But see: Bosworth 1988, pp. 164-165; Reames-
Zimmerman 2001.
73
Ael., VH., 12.7; Epictetus, Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae, 2.22.17-18; Luc.,
DM, 297; Diogenis Sinopensis Epistulae, 24.1. Homosexuality: Heckel 1992, pp.
65-66; Hamilton 1999, p. 130; Reames-Zimmerman 1999. Contra: Konstan 1997,
p. 108. For a balanced view see Ogden 2009, pp. 210-212. ‘Twinship’: Kets de
Vries 2004, pp. 72-73, 80-82.
366 Chapter VII
Celts from the Balkans and Gaul, Iberians as well as numerous Greek
poleis (all trying to gain some concessions regarding the return of the
exiles). The embassies were accepted according to a fairly frequently used
formula in the Classical era. The first issues to be broached were religious
and next gifts were accepted, then more earthly issues were considered:
disputes with neighbouring states, internal conflicts as well as the matter
of returning exiles. The arrival of so many embassies to the then most
powerful ruler in the world is not surprising, especially as Alexander had
ambitious though not yet fully defined plans for future conquests.
Therefore the accounts in the sources can be generally regarded a plausible.
On the other hand, this sudden flurry of diplomatic activity in the spring of
323 shows a certain tendency in the sources, stemming from Cleitarchus,
to stress the role of Alexander as a universal ruler. It is for this purpose
that the sources mention the embassies of peoples too exotic and too
remote to have any interest at the Macedonian king’s court. As such we
should consider the Iberians, the Celts from Gaul, the Ethiopians or the
Scythians – all of whom had a quasi-mythological status in Greek
tradition.74 Alexander did grant audiences to the Greek embassies but he
failed to give any of them significant concessions regarding the return of
the exiles. Instead he expressed good will by receiving such envoys with
kindness and sending them back with valuable items that had been looted
by the Persian during the 5th-century wars. It was then that the decision
was made to return to Athens the statues of the tyrannicides that had been
robbed by Xerxes in 480 and would eventually be brought back to Athens
in the diadochi period.75
The subject of greatest controversy is the alleged embassy from Rome.
Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus mention it for Arrian cites later authors
(Ariston and Asclepiades) as his source and this fact has led some scholars
to doubt the veracity of the reported event. Some modern historians
consider it to be an apocryphal tale invented by rhetorical schools at the
time of the late Roman Republic and early Roman Empire to compare
their state’s achievements with those of Alexander the Great. Such
intellectual exercises among Romans are of course well known,
particularly as far as the virtues of manliness, morality and happiness are
concerned and in this context Alexander was considered a figure
particularly favoured by fortune. The author of the most famous of such
comparisons was Livy, who tried to prove with touching naivety and
74
Diod., 17.112.1, 17.113.2-4; Arr., An., 7.15.4-6; Clitarch., ap. Plin., Nat., 3.57 (=
FGrH, 137 F31); Memn., FGrH, 434 F1(18); Just., 12.13. Bosworth 1988, pp.
165-167; Alessandri 1997, pp. 148-154; Alessandri 1997a.
75
Arr., An., 7.19.1-2.
The Last Years 367
76
Arr., An., 7.15 (after Aristos and Asclepiades); Clitarch., ap. Plin., Nat., 3.57-58
(= FGrh, 137 F31); Str., 5.3.5; Liv., 9.17-19. Hypercritical: Walbank 1986; contra:
Bosworth 1988, p. 167; Flower 2000, pp. 132-135.
368 Chapter VII
77
Grayson 1975a, pp. 115-119; Curt., 10.7.2. Bosworth 1992; Pelagia 2000, p. 196;
Carney 2001, pp. 73-79. Contra: Boiy 2007, pp. 114-115.
78
Arr., An., 7.19.3-20.10; Str., 16.3.2-4. Högemann 1985, pp. 80-94; Bosworth
1988, pp. 168-170.
The Last Years 369
79
Arr., An., 7.21; Str., 16.1.11; App., BC, 2.153. Högemann 1985, pp. 144-189;
Fraser 1996, pp. 168-170; van der Spek 2000.
80
Arr., An., 7.23.1-5. Green 1974, p. 471; Hammond 1996, pp. 244-245; Sekunda
2007, p. 333.
CHAPTER VIII:
1
Arr., An., 7.18; Plu., Alex., 69.6; Cic., Div., 1.47; V. Max., 1.8, ext. 10. Baynham
2000, p. 254.
372 Chapter VIII
the founder of the most important Hellenistic dynasty and for whom
wearing Alexander’s crown was to predict a truly great future.2
On the other hand, in the ancient world belief in signs, miracles,
portends and the significance of dreams was universal. Therefore it was
natural that all sorts of soothsayers, diviners, magi, theurgists and
astrologers converged on the court of a pious and famously extravagant
monarch. It has been historically well documented that Alexander
surrounded himself which such specialists from both Greece and the
Orient. One can well imagine that in this very competitive market of sorts
everyone of them tried to achieve fame by accurately predicting good or
bad events, for accurate predictions could ensure the author the position of
power and wealth Aristander had enjoyed ever since the start of
Alexander’s Asian campaign. Therefore the king would have for certain
been constantly receiving prophesies and interpretations of signs. That is
why the historical truth of prophesises concerning Alexander’s death
should not be dismissed out of hand, particularly when classical authors
report events they themselves did not understand while modern scholars
have found them to be consistent with the beliefs and customs of ancient
Babylon.
Chaldaean astrologers, who were universally respected for their
knowledge and antiquity of discipline they practiced, had warned
Alexander long before his return to Babylon to avoid the city, or at least
not enter it from the east, thus facing the west, i.e. the land of the dead.
Arrian tries to rationalise the stance of the Babylonian priests by
explaining that they wanted to dissuade Alexander from returning so that
he would not discover their financial abuses and how little had been done
in the rebuilding of the Etemenanki ziggurat. He also maintains that
Alexander was already suspicious of them. This interpretation, however, is
not corroborated by facts known from other Greek or Babylonian sources.
During Alexander’s absence the reconstruction of the Etemenanki ziggurat
was actually proceeding more or less according to plan. Moreover, the
king did try to heed the Chaldaean warnings. At first he did not enter
Babylon and headed for Borsippa instead. Next he tried very hard to find a
way of not entering the capital from the east. Unfortunately marshes
precluded the possibility of entering Babylon from any other side.3
2
LDM and early Hellenistic sources of Ps.-Callisth., 3.30; Plu., Alex., 73.2-7.
Diadem: Arr., An., 7.22; Diod., 17.116.5-7; App., Syr., 288-291. Smelik 1978-1979,
pp. 98-100; Heckel 1992, pp. 255-256; Bosworth 2000a; Baynham 2000.
3
Arr., An., 7.16.5-17.6; Diod., 17.116.4; Plu., Alex., 73.1-2; Just., 12.13. Smelik
1978-1979, pp. 93-96.
Death, Last Plans, Tomb 373
4
Arr., An., 7.24.1-3; Diod., 17.116.2-4; Plu., Alex., 73.7-74.1; Ps.-Callisth., 3.30.
Smelik 1978-1979, pp. 100-109; Briant 1996a, pp. 746-747; Ambos 2005.
374 Chapter VIII
Preparations for the start of the Arabian campaign were now drawing
to a close. Shortly before the army was due to set off, an envoy returned
from Siwah with news that the oracle of Ammon had permitted for the
founding of a heroic cult for Hephaestion. This joyous news naturally had
to be celebrated with a lavish and, in keeping with Macedonian custom,
very alcoholic banquet. After the revelry Alexander had a bath and was
intending to retire to his quarters. However, on his way there he was
stopped by one the hetairoi called Medius of Larissa, who invited him to
another drinking party. Regardless of how much wine he had drunk earlier,
Alexander now toasted all twenty four present and consumed in one go the
entire contents of ‘the cup of Heracles’ – a chalice capable of holding two
choes (5.5-6 litres) of wine. It is said that he also took part in yet another
drinking session reputedly at the house of the eunuch Bagoas.5
We know the subsequent course of events with, by ancient standards,
exceptional accuracy thanks to the Royal Journal (Ephemerides), in which
the royal secretary Eumenes recorded what happened next on a day-by-day
basis or as a single entry shortly after the king’s death. This information
has been passed on to us by the authors of our main ancient sources:
Arrian and Plutarch. On the 18th day of the Macedonian month of Daisios
Alexander developed a fever and spent the night in the bathhouse, where it
was cooler. In the days that followed his condition very gradually
deteriorated but he was still able to perform the daily routine of offering
sacrifices and spend time with his friends, Nearchus and Medius. On 21st
Daisios his fever become more troublesome and the following day it
deteriorated further still. Alexander continued to spend the nights in the
relatively cool bathhouse but in the daytime he did not desist from his
duties as monarch and commander-in-chief; we know he consulted his
advisors on the matter of filling vacant posts. On 24th Daisios he was no
longer able to walk and had to be carried to the place where he offered
sacrifices. It was then that he instructed his officers to gather near his
chamber. The following day he was carried back to Nebuchadnezzar’s
palace on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. On 25th and 26th Daisios
Alexander lost the ability to speak though he was still able to recognise the
officers at his bedside. Now rumours that he was already dead spread
throughout the army and soldiers thronged around the royal palace. Extra
doors to Alexander’s chamber were added to let these men pass by the bed
of their dying king, who could now only signal with his eyes that he
recognised them and was saying goodbye. In their fear for the king’s life,
Alexander’s officers asked a god – the sources say it was Sarapis, though
5
Arr., An., 7.25.1; Diod., 17.117.1; Plu., Alex., 75; Nicobule, ap. Ath., 10.44;
Ephippus, ap. Ath., 10.44; Just., 12.13; Ael., VH, 3.23.
Death, Last Plans, Tomb 375
it may have actually been that god’s predecessor Osorapis – if they could
carry the king to his temple so that this deity could cure him, but through
the priests the god told them to leave the king where he was. When
Alexander was asked who should inherit the throne, he replied that it
would be the one who was the strongest and gave his ring to Perdiccas,
one of his seven bodyguards as well as the commander of the Companion
cavalry. In his last words he expressed the conviction that there should be
great games after his death.6 Plutarch, citing the Ephemeredes, states that
Alexander died in the afternoon on 28th Daisios. For the Babylonians this
was the last (29th) day of the month of Aiaru; the entry in the Babylonian
Astronomical Diary for that day reads: ‘The king died, clouds.’ Unlike in
our culture, the Babylonian calendar day lasted from sunset to sunset;
therefore 29th Aiaru lasted from the sunset of 10th June to the sunset of 11th
June. However, the correlation of meteorological information, a
Babylonian date and the king’s death with information from other sources
allows us to pinpoint the event with total accuracy in our calendar as well.
If we interpret Plutarch’s words ʌȡȩȢ įİȓȜȘȞ as referring to the time in the
afternoon rather than after sunset (and this seems the most likely
translation), then according to eyewitnesses Alexander died on 11th June
323.7
In antiquity rumours had it that Alexander had actually been poisoned,
for at less than 33 of age he was, after all, still a young man. He was to
experience severe convulsions after draining the ‘cup of Heracles’,
naturally on account of the poison that was added to the wine. The direct
perpetrator of this assassination allegedly was Iolaus, Alexander’s
cupbearer. Legend has it that Hypereides argued for the Athenian
assembly to honour Iolaus for this deed. Among those who genuinely
believed in Iolaus’ guilt was Olympias, who took her revenge in 317 by
desecrating his grave. Of course the poisoning was inspired by Iolaus’
father, Antipater, and the toxic substance was supposedly prepared by
Aristotle. It was claimed that he used water from the Styx, the river of the
Underworld, to make the poison and had it transported to Babylon in the
bored out hoof of a donkey as that was the only vessel in which it would
6
Principal sources: Arr., An., 7.25-26; Plu., Alex., 76. Other sources: Diod.,
17.117.2-4; Curt., 10.5.1-6; Plu., Eum., 2.1; Just., 12.15; Epitome Heidelbergensis
(FGrH, 155) F1(2). Hammond 1988; Bosworth 1988, pp. 172-173; Bosworth
1988a, p. 158; Heckel 1992, pp. 142-144; Anson 1996; Baynham 2003a, pp. 5-6.
7
Plu., Alex., 76.9; Sachs, Hunger 1988, no. 322. Hauben 1992, p. 146; Depuydt
1997; Briant 2002, p. 23.
376 Chapter VIII
not lose its potency.8 Although (excluding these most fantastic elements)
some modern scholars also support the theory that Alexander had been
poisoned, such a stance requires a monumental revision of how we treat
our major sources. The claim was known to and rejected by ancient
authors who were as well-informed as Arrian and even more so, Plutarch.
The latter actually states that the rumours first appeared as late as five
years after the king’s death. This naturally makes such a story much less
plausible for it is difficult to assume that in Babylon in May and June 323
no one noticed anything untoward happening. Accepting the version with
the poisoning also means a priori rejection of the evidence found in
contemporary sources, particularly the Royal Journal, which record quite
different symptoms of Alexander’s illness in the last 11 days of his life.
Therefore if we weigh the more reliable sources against the less reliable
ones, we should reject the theory that Alexander was poisoned.9
It is almost certain that Alexander died of natural causes. Modern
historians have considered the following possible culprits: malaria,
complications associated with the wound he had received during the siege
of the city of the Malli, alcohol poisoning and West Nile virus encephalitis.
In each case one can stress factors that would have contributed to the
development of the illness and diminished the body’s natural immunity to
a given disease: numerous injuries and wounds suffered over very many
years of war as well as the damage to general health caused by constant
alcoholic abuse.10 A breakthrough in research was declared by physicians
and ancient history scholars at the University of Maryland Clinical
Pathologic Conference in 1996. This team of experts in both ancient
history and modern medicine was able to produce the best analysis of the
mysterious disease to date and their verdict was typhoid fever. One of the
consequences of the final stages of this particular disease can be ascending
paralysis with considerably slowed down breathing and heartbeat, which
can create the impression of death long before it actually occurs. This
allows us to explain a strange phenomenon recorded in the ancient sources
and normally dismissed as hagiography by modern historians. The ancient
authors report that for a few days after his death (though the gossip
Aelian’s claim that for 30 days can be rejected out of hand) Alexander’s
8
LDM, 88-89, 96; Arr., An., 7.27; Curt., 10.10.14-19; Diod., 17.117.2; Plu., Alex.,
77.2-4; Plu., mor., 849f; Plin., Nat., 30.149; Just., 12,13-14; Ps.-Callisth., 3.31.
9
Plu., Alex., 77.1-4; Arr., An., 7.27.3. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 470-471; Heckel 1988, p.
2; Bosworth 1988, pp. 172-173; O’Brien 1992, pp. 224-225; Hamilton 1999, pp.
213-215; Borza, Reames-Zimmerman 2000, p. 25.
10
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 561-563; O’Brien 1992, pp. 225-228; Marr, Calisher
2003. Alcohol: Ael., VH, 12.26.
Death, Last Plans, Tomb 377
body showed no signs of decay despite the great heat and humidity in
Babylon at that time of year. It is therefore possible that if Alexander was
suffering from typhoid fever, he actually died a few days after the official
date of 11th June 323.11
2. Alexander’s legacy
‘Then, immediately after Alexander's decease, Leosthenes said that his
forces, as they wandered here and there and fell foul of their own efforts,
were like the Cyclops after his blinding, groping about everywhere with
his hands, which were directed at no certain goal; even thus did that vast
throng roam about with no safe footing, blundering through want of a
leader. Or rather, in the manner of dead bodies, after the soul departs,
when they are no longer held together by natural forces, but undergo
dispersion and dissolution, and finally are dissipated and disappear
altogether; even so Alexander's forces, having lost him, maintained a
gasping, agitated, and fevered existence through men like Perdiccas,
Meleager, Seleucus, and Antigonus, who, as it were, provided the still a
warm breath of life and blood that still pulsed and circulated. But at length
the host wasted away and perished, generating about itself maggots, as it
were, of ignoble born kings and rulers in their last pant death-struggle.’12
This rhetorical image form Plutarch’s On the Fortune or the Virtue of
Alexander best sums up the colossal blow that shook the Western world in
the summer of 323. Alexander’s death, symbolically marking the end of an
era, evoked an eruption of sorrow among Macedonians and Persians alike.
In their grief the latter cut their hair and extinguished the royal fires. It
must have been clear to all those then present in Babylon that no one
would be able to fill the vacuum left behind by a man who had towered so
high above all his contemporaries and who through sheer will power was
able to steer the course of history. As a consequence of his premature and
quite unexpected death Macedonia found itself for the first time in its
recorded history in a situation not only without a successor to the throne
but also without a universally accepted centre where decisions could be
made. When there was no king, the choice of his successor was left to the
leading Macedonian nobles. Out of necessity the burden of making this
decision now rested with the generals (and soldiers) in Babylon. However,
notably absent were most of the army, staying at the time in Macedonia or
11
Plu., Alex., 77.5; Curt., 10.10.9-12; Ael., VH, 12.64. Oldach, Borza, Benitez
1998; Borza, Reames-Zimmerman 2000.
12
Plu., mor., 336e-337a.
378 Chapter VIII
Cilicia, as well as the two most senior, powerful and universally respected
commanders, Antipater and Craterus. Perdiccas, to whom Alexander had
granted his ring, was a man of sufficient calibre to win the struggle for
power among middle-ranking Macedonian leaders gathered in Babylon in
June 323 but then again he was far too weak to maintain control over
Alexander’s vast empire.13
The monarchy was an institution that defined Macedonian society.
That is why the first and, indeed, most important matter to be settled was
finding a successor to the throne, one who was a descendant of the late
king. Nearchus argued that Alexander did actually have a son with Barsine,
Heracles. However, the other commanders rejected this nomination as
Barsine was an Iranian and had not even been the king’s wife but only a
concubine. Instead, the generals decided to wait for the birth of the child
of Alexander and Rhoxane, which was expected to happen in three
months’ time. If the child turned out to be a boy, he would be recognised
as king. Rhoxane herself made sure that there would be no rival infant
pretenders by murdering all of Alexander’s remaining widows. However,
the soldiers also felt they had their say. They were bound to tradition, to
the Argead dynasty, to Macedonian nationalism and to the memory of
Philip II, but under Alexander they had also gotten used to on special
occasions expressing their will. And that is why they gave their support to
the nominee of a middle-ranking infantry commander, Meleager. He had
managed to convince the troops that the son of a barbarian woman was
unworthy of becoming a king of the Macedonians, and instead Meleager
nominated Alexander’s mentally retarded brother, Arrhidaeus, whose
greatest advantage was the fact that he was Philip II’s son. Under pressure
from the army, the other commanders accepted this nomination, but with
considerable reluctance for apart from Argead blood the Macedonian elites
also valued kingly virtues which they could hardly expect from Arrhidaeus.
For these high-ranking officers the situation was all the more worrying as
ordinary soldiers had now considered themselves entitled to participate in
the decision of who was to be the next king; so far only members of the
Argead dynasty and Macedonian nobles had had this right. Therefore
Meleager was briskly isolated from his troops and, on Perdiccas’ orders,
removed from the world of the living along 300 of his supporters. For a
short while Arrhidaeus, now called Philip III, was the only Macedonian
king. When Rhoxane gave birth to a son, he was named Alexander IV and
became co-ruler with Philip III. Representing the Macedonian elites,
Perdiccas was the appointed guardian of the kings and as such he held or
13
Errington 1990, pp. 114-117; Heckel 1992, pp. 134-163; Bosworth 2002, pp. 29-
37.
Death, Last Plans, Tomb 379
at least tried to hold real power. But by 321 Perdiccas was dead and so was
Craterus, whereas Antipater was to die in 319. Attachment to the Argead
dynasty and respect to its members ensured that the infant and the retard
officially remained kings, but now they were pawns in a struggle between
the diadochi for control of Alexander’s empire and they themselves were
quite unable to hold this empire together. Their demise as well as that of
Heracles marked the end of the Argead dynasty, but by then it was a mere
episode in the period of diadochi struggles.14
Apart from the distribution of state offices and satrapies among
themselves, another aspect of Alexander’s legacy that the commanders and
soldiers in Babylon had to resolve were his so-called last plans. Citing
information from Hieronymus of Cardia, who was a reliable contemporary
historian of that period, Diodorus states that Perdiccas found a document
(hypomnemata) in Alexander’s chancellery containing a list of
undertakings the king had been planning to realise over the subsequent
few years. The tasks included: the erection of an expensive mausoleum for
Hephaestion; the building of a thousand warships larger than triremes in
the ports of Phoenicia, Cilicia, Syria and Cyprus; the conquest of
territories in the West up to the Pillars of Heracles; the construction of a
road with ports and shipyards along the Mediterranean coast of Africa for
the purpose of this campaign; the erection of six temples in Delos, Delphi,
Dodona, Dion, Amphipolis and Cyrnus each costing 1,500 talents; the
construction of a tomb for Philip that would be greater than the pyramids
of Egypt as well as the mutual relocation of Europeans to Asia and Asians
to Europe. Perdiccas presented these instructions found in Alexander’s
notes to the assembled Macedonian soldiers, who voted to reject them.
The authenticity of these last plans has been debated by modern historians
and there are opinions that Perdiccas had actually forged them to distract
the army’s attention from the late king’s real orders, which were very
awkward for his successor.15
However, there is nothing in Alexander’s last plans as presented by
Diodorus that seems implausible, especially if we put them in the context
of the king’s conduct in the final year of his life. We can hardly call the
sum total of 9,000 talents intended to be spent on the construction of six
temples excessively high if Alexander had spent 10,000-12,000 talents on
Hephaestion’s funeral pyre and no less on repaying the debts of
spendthrifts in the Macedonian army. Alexander was barely 33 in 323 and
14
Habicht 1972; Anson 1991, pp. 236-239; Heckel 1992, pp. 165-170; Carney
2001, pp. 82-84; Bosworth 2002, pp. 37-63.
15
Diod., 18.4; Plu., mor., 343d. Authenticity rejected by Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 378-398;
Pearson 1960, pp. 261-262.
380 Chapter VIII
he could have expected many more years of rule, which so far had meant
wars and conquests. Up until his death he had been preparing to invade
Arabia, whereas certain steps that had been taken in 324 indicate an
interest in the West as the next theatre of war. Embassies from nations
living around the west Mediterranean basin were arriving at Alexander’s
court, while his best general Craterus was in Cilicia supervising
preparations for a major campaign. This was to be a war against major sea
powers, Carthage as well as Athens, which had refused to accept its exiles,
and therefore it required the building of a fleet. The logistic designs (the
road and ports) can be easily explained if only by what the army had
experienced in Makran. Therefore Diodorus’ précis of the document read
out by Perdiccas does not provide enough evidence to question the
authenticity of such plans.16
Likewise, the rejection of Alexander’s last plans by the Macedonian
soldiers at Babylon does not constitute convincing evidence that these
plans were forged. From the Macedonian veterans’ point of view the most
objectionable parts of the Alexander’s last plans were the military ones.
They certainly would not have had much against the construction of
temples (including three in their homeland) or the construction of the tomb
of the very popular Philip II. However, the Macedonian soldiers had
already questioned the continuation of war after Darius III’s death. New,
difficult and distant campaigns could have only had a chance of being
realised under the charismatic leadership of Alexander. With Alexander
gone, Macedonian veterans’ questioning the sense of further campaigns
was quite to be expected. It is fair to assume that presenting Alexander’s
last plans to be accepted or rejected by the Macedonian army was a move
that made Perdiccas popular not only with the soldiers in Babylon but also
those commanded by Craterus in Cilicia for it was they who, against their
will, would have had to make the greatest contribution to the war in the
West. Moreover, although the decision of the assembled army in Babylon
might not have had legal significance, it certainly resolved the problem of
Alexander’s last plans in the political sense. It forced Craterus to lead his
army back to Europe and thus leave Asia in the hands of Perdiccas and his
allies.17
Therefore Alexander’s last military plans were never implemented. On
the other hand, his political plan to permanently include Asia elites,
particularly the Iranians, in the government of a state that was to a large
16
Wilcken 1937; Wilcken 1967, pp. 224-229; Schachermeyr 1954; Badian 1968;
Bosworth 1988a, pp. 207-211; O’Brien 1992, pp. 217-218; Hammond 1996, pp.
281-285.
17
Shipley 2000, p. 39; Bosworth 2002, pp. 58-63.
Death, Last Plans, Tomb 381
3. Alexander’s tomb
Once the Macedonian commanders and soldiers in Babylon settled the
most pressing political matters, attention was focused on arranging a
funeral befitting the great king. First of all his body was handed over to
Egyptian and Chaldaean embalmers, who must have done their work very
well for Alexander’s mummified body could still be viewed at least six
hundred years later. Next his corpse was placed in a gold anthropomorphic
sarcophagus that was filled with perfumes and incense. Although
Alexander had wanted to be buried in the Siwah Oasis, Perdiccas decided
that his body should be laid to rest at the royal Argead necropolis in Aegae.
His hearse took two years to build and was said to have been the most
remarkable vehicle of ancient times.19 Its description, originally recorded
by Hieronymus of Cardia, has been passed on to us by Diodorus: ‘In this
year Arrhidaeus, who had been placed in charge of bringing home the
body of Alexander, having completed the vehicle on which the royal body
was to be carried, was making preparations for the journey. Since the
structure that had been made ready, not only surpassed all others in cost –
it had been constructed at the expense of many talents – but was also
famous for excellence of its workmanship, I believe that it well to describe
it.
First they prepared a coffin of the proper size for the body, made of
hammered gold, and the space about the body they filled with spices such
as could make the body sweet smelling and incorruptible. Upon this chest
there had been placed a cover of gold, matching it to a nicety, and fitting
about its upper rim. Over this was laid a magnificent purple embroidered
with gold, beside which they placed the arms of the deceased, wishing the
design of the whole to be in harmony with his accomplishments. Then
they set up next to it the covered carriage that was to carry it. At the top of
the carriage was built a vault of gold, eight cubits wide and twelve long,
covered with overlapping scales set with precious stones. Beneath the roof
all along the work was a rectangular cornice of gold, from which projected
heads of goat-stags in high relief. Gold rings two palms broad were
19
Curt., 10.10.13; Diod., 18.3.5, 18.18.2; Paus., 1.6.3; Just., 13.4.
Death, Last Plans, Tomb 383
suspended from these, and through the rings there ran a festive garland
beautifully decorated in bright colours of all kinds. At the ends there were
tassels of network suspending large bells, so that any who were
approaching heard the sound from a great distance. On each corner of the
vault on each side was a golden figure of Victory holding a trophy. The
colonnade that supported the vault was of gold with Ionic capitals. Within
the colonnade was a golden net, made of cords the thickness of a finger,
which carried four painted tablets, their ends adjoining, each equal in
lengths to a side of the colonnade.
On the first of these tablets was a chariot ornamented with work in
relief, and sitting in it was Alexander holding a very splendid sceptre in his
hands. About the king were groups of armed attendants, one of
Macedonians, a second of Persians of the bodyguard, and armed soldiers
in front of them. The second tablet showed the elephants arrayed for war
who followed the bodyguard. They carried Indian mahouts in front with
Macedonians fully armed in their regular equipment behind them. The
third tablet showed troops of cavalry as if in formation for battle; and the
fourth, ships made ready for naval combat. Beside the entrance to the
chamber there were golden lions with eyes turned toward those who would
enter. There was a golden acanthus stretching little by little up the centre
of each column from below to the capital. Above the chamber in the
middle of the top under the open sky there was a purple banner blazoned
with a golden olive wreath of great size, and when the sun cast upon it its
rays, it sent forth such a bright and vibrant gleam that from a great
distance it appeared like a flash of lightning.
The body of the chariot beneath the covered chamber had two axles
upon which turned four Persian wheels, the naves and spokes of which
were gilded, but the part that bore upon the ground was of iron. The
projecting parts of the axle were made of gold in the form of lion heads,
each holding a spear in its teeth. Along the middle of their length the axles
had a bearing ingeniously fitted to the middle of the chamber in such a
way that, thanks to it, the chamber could remain undisturbed by shocks
from rough places. There were four poles, and to each of them were
fastened four teams with four mules harnessed in each team, so that in all
there were sixty-four mules, selected for their strength and size. Each of
them was crowned with a gilded crown, each had a golden bell hanging by
either cheek, and about their necks were collars set with precious stones.
In this way the carriage was constructed and ornamented, and it
appeared more magnificent when seen than when described. Because of its
widespread fame it drew together many spectators; for from every city into
which it came the whole people went forth to meet it and again escorted it
384 Chapter VIII
on its way out, not becoming sated with the pleasure of beholding it. To
correspond to this magnificence, it was accompanied by a crowd of
roadmenders and mechanics, and also by soldiers sent to escort it.’20
The convoy with the catafalque led by Arrhidaeus proceeded slowly on
the road leading through Damascus. In Syria it was met by the satrap of
Egypt Ptolemy and his army. Ptolemy managed to persuade Arrhidaeus to
disobey Perdiccas’ instructions and instead escort the catafalque to Egypt.
For this act of betrayal Macedonian commanders who were Perdiccas’
enemies somewhat later rewarded Arrhidaeus by granting him the satrapy
of Hellespontine Phrygia.21 Ptolemy was fully aware of how symbolically
important Alexander’s body was for legitimising political authority and
therefore he too ignored the late king’s wish to be buried at Siwah, which
was too remote to be of any practical use. The sensational archaeological
discovery of Alexander’s tomb at Siwah Oasis remains nothing more than
sensational, for now only the Greek archaeologist who discovered the
tomb, L. Souvaltzi, still believes it to be that of the Macedonian king.
Alexander’s final resting place was in Alexandria in Egypt. Some sources
state that his body was immediately taken there, yet in 321 Alexandria was
only just being built and Memphis was still Egypt’s capital. Therefore the
version that Alexander’s body was first buried in Memphis should be
considered true, especially as this is confirmed in the early Hellenistic
chronicle Marmor Parium. The ancient sources do not provide an exact
location of where Alexander was first buried. Modern historians assume it
was in the Sarapeum, in today’s Saqqara, the site of a special religious
importance, associated with the last native pharaohs Nectanebo I and
Nectanebo II, and in his lifetime Alexander had claimed to be their rightful
successor.22
It was most probably Ptolemy I’s successor Ptolemy II Philadelphus
who transported Alexander’s body to a mausoleum in Alexandria. Then in
215 Ptolemy IV raised a new mausoleum. 23 This second mausoleum,
called Soma (Body), was in all likelihood situated in the Ptolemaic
necropolis within the extensive palace compound in the city centre and not
20
Diod., 18.26.1-28.2; Ath., 5.40.
21
Diod., 18.28.3; Str., 17.1.8; Arr., Succ., 1.25, 24.1-8; Paus., 1.6.3; Ael., VH,
12.64. Heckel 2006, p. 53, s.v. ‘Arrhidaeus’ [2].
22
Alexander buried in Alexandria at once: Diod., 18.28.3; Str., 17.1.8; Ael., VH,
12.64; Epitome Heidelbergensis, FGrH, 155 F2. Alexander buried first in
Memphis: Marmor Parium, FGrH, 239 B11; Curt., 10.10.20; Paus., 1.6.3; Ps.-
Callisth., 3.34. Fraser 1972, i, pp. 15-16 and n. 79 (ii, pp. 31-32); Pietrzykowski
1976; Erskine 2002; Chugg 2002.
23
Paus., 1.7.1. Habicht 1988; Schlange-Schöningen 1996.
Death, Last Plans, Tomb 385
far from the sea. That much can be deduced from what is written in the
ancient sources alone. However, modern historians trying to find its exact
location have come up with various sites – most frequently on the western
or eastern slope of Kom-ed-Dik. A tempting hypothesis has emerged
which sees the vestibule of the Soma in the so-called Alabaster Tomb in
the Latin Cemetery of Alexandria. Our current state of knowledge simply
does not allow us to formulate any convincing theses about the exact
location of Alexander’s tomb. Worse still, inevitable changes in the
coastline since ancient times make possible the eventuality that the part of
the Ptolemaic palace complex including the Soma is now under the sea.24
Alexander’s tomb was venerated for centuries and regularly visited by
very distinguished guests from afar, including the Roman emperors
Augustus, Septimus Severus and Caracalla. It is last mentioned as still
existing in the work of Herodian describing events of 215 AD. Most
scholars therefore assume that it was destroyed in that same century,
perhaps during fighting over Alexandria between the Palmyrean and
Emperor Aurelian forces in 272 AD. The writings of 5th-century Christian
authors St John Chrysostom and Theodoretus of Cyrrhus have been put
forward as evidence of the disappearance or even erasing of Alexander
from people’s memories. Yet this is exceptionally weak evidence.
Theodoretus only states how the tombs of even the most famous pagans
are now forgotten to contrast it with how the graves of the Christian
martyrs are now venerated and thus emphasise the power of the Lord. The
writer mentions the lost tombs of Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, Augustus,
Vespasian, Hadrian and Alexander. Yet most of these tombs have survived
to this day and they were also known in the 5th century. Therefore the
evidence provided by these Christian authors is merely rhetorical and we
can only conclude that we cannot know for certain when Alexander’s
tomb disappeared. It is possible that it was still in existence in 361 AD if
we accept that it is the ‘splendid temple of the Genius’ (speciosum Genii
templum) mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus, for on some Alexandrian
coins Alexander was presented as a Genius (Agathos Daimon). 25 It is
totally unknown what the connection was between Alexander’s tomb and
an Alexander’s cenotaph which appears in the medieval Muslim records of
Alexandria. It is also worth mentioning that Alexander is mentioned in the
24
Fraser 1972, ii, pp. 31-39; Fiaccadori 1992; Schlange-Schöningen 1996.
Alabaster Tomb hypothesis: Adriani 2000.
25
Hdn., 4.8.9; Amm. Marc., 22.11.7; Ioannes Chrysostomus, Or., 26.12 (PG, 61, p.
581); Theodoretos Kyrrou, Hellenikon therapeutike pathematon, 8.60-61.
Disappearance of Alexander’s tomb in the 3rd c. A.D.: Fraser 1972, ii, pp. 35-36;
contra: Chugg 2002, Erskine 2002.
386 Chapter VIII
Koran as Dnj’l-Karnain (the ‘two-horned’) and that that was also the name
of one of the mosques in medieval Alexandria.26
Finally it was Arab tradition which identified an object believed to be
Alexander’s sarcophagus. In 1798 it was robbed from Atarine mosque in
Alexandria by Napoleon’s soldiers. After the French army’s capitulation
the sarcophagus ended up in the British Museum in London. It was
examined by E.D. Clarke, who also maintained that it was Alexander’s
coffin, but when the hieroglyphs were deciphered, it the turned out that it
had actually been created for Nectanebo II. Nevertheless, today the theory
that this was Alexander’s sarcophagus has been revived. Already A.J.
Wace noted that although the sarcophagus may have been made for
Nectanebo II, his body could not have been placed there as the pharaoh
had died beyond Egypt. Moreover, it would have been considered
sacrilege to lay the body of a mere mortal in such a coffin, so in 321 it
would almost certainly have still been unused. If the association between
Alexander and Nectanebo II (i.e. in Egyptian public opinion rather than
reality) as related in the Alexander Romance was true, laying the body of
the Macedonian king in this sarcophagus would have seemed the most
natural and proper thing to do. The official tradition associating this
sarcophagus with Alexander goes back at least the 16th century and there is
circumstantial evidence that it already existed as early as the 9th century. It
is therefore possible that the British Museum has the only surviving relic
of Alexander’s tomb.27
26
Quran, 18.83-98. Fraser 1972, ii, pp. 36-39.
27
Clarke 1805; Wace 1948; Chugg 2002. Contra: Fraser 1972, ii, pp. 39-40.
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Note: Some entries, like Alexander the Great, Macedonia, Greece, Persia
are too common throughout the book, to be listed in the index.
Antiochus (officer) 302 Areia 258, 262, 263, 268, 269, 282,
Antipater 30, 42, 48, 52, 53, 83, 88, 335
102-104, 107, 108, 111, 152, Ares 228
211, 220-225, 236, 244, 245, Argaios 18
277, 337, 340, 352, 354, 355, Argeads (Argead dynasty) 3, 4, 13,
358-360, 367, 368, 375, 378, 15, 17, 20, 29, 48, 67, 75-78, 81,
379 84, 87, 89, 92, 107, 149, 163,
Antissa 151 221, 328, 352, 367, 378, 379
Aornos (Avarana) 301-303, 330 Arghandab 269
Aornos (Khulm) 270 Argos 13, 53, 93, 101, 127, 163,
Apadana 240, 254 221, 289
Apame 346 Ariamazes 279, 282
Apelles 43, 311 Ariarathes 156
Aphikes 302 Ariaspa 268, 269
Aphrodite 299 Arimmas 180, 214, 215
Apis 199, 202, 204 Ariobarzanes (satrap of Phrygia) 72
Apollo 1, 22, 81, 105, 154, 211, Ariobarzanes (satrap in Persis) 246,
212, 273, 337 248, 252
Apollodorus242, 371 Arisbe 117
Apollonia Mordiaion 360 Aristander 227, 287, 372
Apollonides 178, 179 Aristobulus 110, 124, 150, 157,
Apollonius 317 209, 229, 252, 277, 294, 304,
Apollophanes 333 309, 313, 318, 320, 335, 342,
Apulia 45, 219 343, 366, 367
Arabia 344, 349, 350, 368, 369, aristocracy8-11, 13, 15, 19, 20, 37,
374, 380 40-42, 59, 62, 63, 65, 69-71, 74,
Arabian Sea 268, 331, 334 75, 77, 78, 87, 119, 123, 124,
Arabitae 333 127, 129, 133, 152, 171, 174,
Arabius 333 175, 243, 251, 256, 260, 261,
Arabs 41, 109, 197, 206, 266, 276, 263, 264, 267, 280, 282, 284,
281 289, 300, 325, 332, 341, 342,
Arachosia 229, 256, 262, 263, 269, 344, 347, 348, 352
296, 333, 338 Aristogeiton245
Aradus 181, 183, 188 Aristomedes 177
Aral Lake 279 Ariston (officer) 226
Aramaic 242, 262, 284, 295 Ariston (historian) 366
Araxes 248, 249, 255 Aristonicus 278
Arbela 226, 233, 234, 236, 237 Aristonous287
Arcadia 53, 65, 93, 101, 102, 107, Aristotle 39-42, 46, 48, 64, 67, 77,
221 82, 207, 231, 234, 240, 242,
Archelaus (king) 7, 8, 14, 15 253, 292, 303, 355, 375
Archelaus (pretender) 18 Aristoxenus 44
Archelaus (officer) 246 Armenia 127, 216, 229, 243
Archias368 Arrhabaeus 88, 122
Archidamus III 219
Ardu-Bel 258
422 Index
Arrhidaeus (Philip III) 18, 38, 73, Asclepiodorus (tax collector) 242
75, 77, 90-92, 139, 367, 368, Asclepius 363
378 Asi 181
Arrhidaeus (pretender) 18 Asia 2, 3, 30, 38, 56, 65-67, 76, 86,
Arrhidaeus (officer) 382, 384 88, 91, 96, 105-107, 111, 113-
Arrian 75, 83, 85, 96, 97, 99, 103, 116, 125, 127, 137, 149, 166,
109, 111, 115, 117, 118, 120- 172, 175, 176, 182, 184, 199,
122, 124, 129, 132, 133, 135, 211, 213, 217, 221, 234, 235,
140-145, 147-150, 155-157, 243, 248, 249, 251, 253, 258,
160, 163, 164, 166-168, 170- 259, 261, 262, 273, 274, 283,
173, 176, 180-184, 191, 192, 289-291, 317, 337-339, 345,
194, 197, 201, 205, 217, 220, 352, 372, 379-381
226, 228, 232-234, 241, 248, Asia Minor 23, 41, 47, 52, 58, 62-
251, 254, 257-259, 263, 266, 64, 66, 67, 69-75, 79, 80, 87, 88,
269, 273, 276, 277, 279, 299, 94, 111, 114, 118, 125, 126,
309, 310, 316, 317, 319, 323, 128, 130, 132-135, 137, 138,
325, 335, 341, 345, 351, 352, 143, 145, 147-153, 155, 156,
366, 372, 374, 376 158, 160, 166, 177, 178, 183,
Ar-Ruad 181 214, 251, 340, 353, 357, 360,
Arsaces (satrap) 263, 268, 269, 282 382
Arsaces (Indian prince)318 Aspasians 298-300
Arsamenes (Arsames) 122 Aspendus 133, 145, 146
Arsames 156, 157, 171 Assacenians 298-300, 302
Arses 60 Assos 40
Arsites 117, 119, 122 Assurbanipal 159
Artabazus 60, 179, 256, 260, 268, Assyria 126, 159, 238, 291, 368, 371
271, 278, 280, 346, 348 Astaspes 339
Artacoana 263 Astis 298
Artashata 60 Astyages 174
Artaxerxes II 57, 60, 63, 216, 240 AĞvakayana 299
Artaxerxes III40, 47, 52, 60, 61, 63, Atarneus 40, 68, 71
68, 71, 74, 117, 134, 139, 181, Atarrhias (officer) 265
184, 199, 200, 256, 344 Atarrhias (soldier) 347
Artaxerxes IV 60, 63, 71 Atheas 49
Artaxerxes V 256 Athena 114, 116, 117, 124, 130,
Artemis 2, 128, 129, 348 162, 211, 236
Artemisium 2, 72, 129 Athenaeus 46, 78, 179
Artonis 346, 347 Athenagoras 178
Arwad 181 Athenodorus 214
Aryan59, 253, 333 Athens 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 17, 18, 20-
Arybbas 20, 21, 79 22, 35, 46-54, 57, 63, 66, 71, 91,
Asad Lake 215 93, 94, 101, 102, 105-107, 113,
Asander 127, 128, 160, 214 117, 124, 125, 131, 135-137,
Ascania 147 148, 153-155, 180, 199, 214,
Asclepiades 366 220-222, 245, 254, 258, 324,
Asclepiodorus (satrap) 214
Alexander the Great 423
Black Sea 46, 47, 49, 52, 64, 70, 97, Caranus (alleged son of Philip II)
98, 153, 156, 166 77
Boedromion228 Caranus (officer) 268
Boeotia15-17, 23, 34, 49-52, 101, Cardia 47, 355, 379, 382
102, 104, 105, 361 Caria 69, 71, 73, 74, 126, 128, 130-
Bolon 265 133, 135, 138-140, 143, 146-
Borsippa 372 148, 153, 160, 162, 199, 229,
Bottia 96 369
Boumelos 226 Carmania 327, 333, 335-339, 341
Brahmans 297, 304, 306, 307, 321, Carthage 35, 54, 186, 192, 365, 380
326, 327, 342, 343 Caryanda 331
Branchidae 211, 212, 273, 274 Carystius 336
Bruttians 365 Caspian Gate 256-258
Bubacene 285 Caspian Sea 257, 259
Bubaces 171 Cassander 43, 81, 92, 105, 171, 354,
Bubares 14 355
Bucephala 311, 312, 318 Cassopia 46
Bucephalus 39, 260, 311 Castabalum 163
Buchis 204 Catanes 284
Bulfaris 247 Cathaeans 314
Bulgaria 5, 7 Caucasus 269
Bumar 301 Caunus 160
Bupares 236 Cebalinus 264
Burdur Gölü 147 Celaenae 70, 146-148
Byblos 183, 188 Celts 89, 98, 366
Byzantium35, 47, 48, 97 Ceramic Gulf 160
Cabiri20 Cerdimmas 180
Cadmea 51, 100, 101, 103-105 Cersobleptes 21, 46
Cadusians 255 Ceyhan 162
Cairo 201 Chabrias 63
Calanus 306, 307, 321, 326, 342, Chaeronea 12, 33, 49-53, 68, 100,
343, 371 102, 104, 106, 219, 222, 358
Calas 73, 125, 127, 156, 178 Chairon 95
Calindoea 112 Chalcidian League8, 21
Callicrates 245 Chalcidice 21-23, 112
Callines 351 Chalcis 52, 153
Callisthenes 30, 67, 84, 85, 111, Chaldaeans 238, 242, 372, 373, 382
121, 160, 167-169, 172, 174, Chandragupta 317, 328
207, 212, 233, 242, 254, 273, Chares (Athenian general) 39, 63,
281, 287, 290, 292-294 110, 117, 178
Callixeina 46 Chares (Alexander’s chamberlain)
Calycadnus 157 110, 171, 172, 185, 189, 261,
Cambyses 198, 199, 201 287, 290, 311, 337, 343, 345
Camp of Cyrus 157 Charidemus 63, 106, 107, 155, 164
Cappadocia 69, 122, 156, 177, 229 Charsadda 298
Caracalla 385 Chenab 307
Alexander the Great 425
Cyrus the Great 91, 127, 149, 174, democracy9, 71, 72, 86, 95, 129-
218, 238, 242, 252, 268, 297, 132, 135, 155, 162, 382
307, 331, 332, 341, 342, 385 Demosthenes 8, 23, 32, 47, 49, 52,
Cyrus the Younger 60, 64, 216, 217 62, 68, 87, 88, 93, 94, 100, 101,
Cyzicus 72, 73 106, 222, 340, 358
Dacians 98 Derdas 18
Dahae 229, 260, 277 Derveni 91
Daisios 374, 375 Diades 140
Damascus 162, 165, 174, 179, 220, Dibse 215
384 Dicaearchus 336
Dandamis 306, 307 Didyma 211, 212, 273
Daniel 193 Dimnus 264, 265
Danube 96-98, 271 Dinarchus 101
Darius I 14, 56, 199, 252, 295, 296, Dinaric Alps 3
331, 361, 385 Diodorus 12, 16, 24, 30, 47, 64, 79,
Darius II 60 80, 89, 98, 103, 104, 107, 111,
Darius III 44, 59-61, 63, 69, 72, 74, 114, 118, 120, 121, 124, 140,
80, 101, 107, 115, 118, 120, 141, 145, 155, 167, 170, 173,
123, 127, 133, 138, 139, 144, 183, 184, 186, 192, 194, 208,
151, 152, 155, 157-167, 171- 217, 218, 223, 234, 249, 254-
177, 179-183, 186, 194, 195, 256, 268, 272, 310, 319, 324,
200, 205, 212, 213, 215, 217- 335, 355, 358, 362, 364, 379,
221, 225-237, 239, 243, 245, 380, 382
251-253, 255-261, 263, 272, Diogenes 95
282, 283, 287, 289, 344, 345, Diomedes (Homeric hero) 19, 299
380 Diomedes (Thracian) 39
Dasht-e Kavir258 Dion 8, 9, 15, 107, 124, 379
Dasht-e Lut 266 Dionysius the Elder 35, 187
Daskyleion 70, 71, 117, 125 Dionysius (tyrant of Heraclea) 155,
Datames 153 345
Dataphernes272 Dionysus 214, 276, 288, 289, 296,
Deinocrates 208 300, 301, 324, 331, 361, 364
Deli Çay 168 Diopeithes 46
Delios 66, 111 Dioscuri 286, 289
Delos 379 Dioxippus 299, 324
Delphi 1, 22, 23, 79, 94, 95, 125, Dishmuk 247
278, 291, 356, 379 divinity of Alexander 44, 210, 211,
Delphic Amphictiony 22, 23, 94 290, 293, 348, 359-361
Demades 52, 53, 106, 221, 359 Diyala
Demaratus (king of Sparta) 70 Dobruja 49
Demaratus (Philip’s friend) 39, 78, Dodona 379
123, 245 Dokimos 30
Demetrius Poliorcetes 54 Doloaspis 205
Demetrius (Alexander’s bodyguard) Don 274
264, 267 Dörtyol163
Dorudzan 249
Alexander the Great 427
Scythia 6, 34, 43, 49, 115, 217, 229, Soli 159, 162, 163, 188, 214, 269,
231, 253, 255, 274, 276-279, 368
281, 295, 365, 366 Somiani Bay 333
Selge 146 Sopeithes 314, 315, 319
Seleucia 215 South America 250
Seleucids 128, 346, 381 Sparda 126
Seleucus I Nicator 212, 245, 310, Sparta 15, 22, 53, 54, 56,
346, 371, 377 61, 70, 101, 105, 114, 131, 177,
Semiramis 240, 297, 331, 332 180, 196, 219-224, 325, 359,
Septimius Severus 385 381
Sestus 113, 114 Sphines 306
Shahr-i Qumis 258 Spitamenes 270, 272-278, 280, 281,
Shibar Pass 297 346
Shipka Pass 96 Spithridates 122
Shiva 302 Stamenes 282
Shorkot 320 Stara Planina 46, 96
Shush 244 Stasanor 269, 282
Shushtar 246 Stasicrates 208
Sibians 319, 320 Stateira (wife of Darius III) 174,
Sicily 35, 54, 187, 289, 367 218
Side 145 Stateira (daughter of Darius III)
Sidon 181, 183, 184, 187-192, 197 174, 344
Sigeion 117 Stephanus of Byzantium 48
Silex 298 Stephanus 237
Sinai 197, 201 Strabo 64, 117, 129, 146, 243, 254,
Sind 325-327 269, 367
Sindimana 326 Straton 181, 183
Sinope 69, 95, 148, 260 Strymon 21, 48, 113
Siphnos 153, 154, 220 Styx 375
Sippar 237, 239 Suez Canal 199
Sirjan 341 Susa 58, 61, 126, 224, 229, 233,
Sisicottus 297, 302 236, 237, 243-247, 250, 255,
Sisigambis174, 175, 232, 246, 247 258, 312, 333, 337, 343, 344,
Sisimithres 282 346-350, 363
Sisines 144, 145 Susia 262
Sistan 268 Susiana337
Sitalces339 Susian Gates 247, 248
Sittacene 229, 243 Sutlej 324
Siwah1, 205, 207-212, 264, 362, Svishtov 97
363, 374, 382, 384 Swat 301
Smyrna128 Syracuse 35, 187, 345
Sochoi 162-165 Syr Darya 274
Socrates 306 Syria 57, 158, 159, 165, 166, 176,
Sogdiana 217, 256, 262, 273-282, 180, 196, 200, 201, 214, 215,
284, 285, 295, 297, 303, 323 229, 245, 292, 379, 384
Sogdian Rock279, 282
Alexander the Great 439
Syrian Gates 159, 163, 167-169, 106, 110, 114, 131, 137, 180,
181 219, 220
Syrphax 72, 129 Thebes (Egypt) 199, 207
Tabnit 181 Themistocles 70
Tachos 206 Theodoretus385
Tainaron 143, 340, 358 Theophrastus 25, 46, 313, 335
Tajikistan 270, 275 Theopompus 9, 19, 32, 64
Takshasila 297 Theos 360
Tanais 274 Thermaic Gulf 3, 4, 21
Tang-i Tamoradi 247 Thermopylae 102, 248
Tang-i Khollar 247 Thespiae 102
Tang-i Laleh 247 Thessalonice 18, 92
Tapuri 260, 282 Thessaly 2, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18-20, 23,
Tarentum 30, 219 33, 35, 39, 46, 49, 93, 102, 111,
Tarsus 156-160, 162, 176, 214, 338 113, 122, 140, 143-145, 150,
Tartus 181 158, 170, 179, 217, 230, 233,
Tashan 247 247, 257, 271
Taulanti 99, 100 Thetis166, 328
Tauriscus 158 Thettalus 73, 214
Taurus 156, 159 Thoth 203, 205
Taxila 297, 298, 303-305, 308, Thrace 3, 6, 9, 13, 17, 18, 21-23,
318, 321, 342 33, 34, 46-49, 96, 98, 104, 110,
Taxiles 304, 312, 313, 327 111, 135, 145, 158, 211, 220,
Tegea 221, 223, 356, 358 221, 230, 232, 247, 318
Teheran 257 Thracian Chersonese 46, 52, 113,
Telestes 37 114
Tell el-Farama 201 Thrasybulus 141
Tell Gomel 226 Thucydides 13, 14, 53
Telmessus 144 Thutmose III 203
Temenid dynasty 13 Thyateira 125
Temenos 13 Thymondas 153, 177
Tempe 93 Tiber 367
Tenedos 178 Tiberius 128
Tennes 181 Tigris 216, 218, 225-227, 237, 243,
Teres 115 349, 361
Termessus 146, 147 Timachides 235, 236
Termez 281 Timoclea 104
Thais 254, 255 Timoleon 54
Thalestris 43, 260 Timotheos (general)63, 357
Thapsacus 176, 215-217 Timotheos (artist) 15
Thara 256 Tiphsah 215
Thasos 360, 368 Tiridates (treasurer) 249, 250
Theagenes 104 Tiridates (satrap) 268
Thebes (Greece) 15, 16, 22, 23, 31, Tissaphernes 128
32, 35, 41, 49-54, 63, 93, 100- Tlepolemus 259
Tralles 130
440 Index
Triballi 49, 96-98, 101, 106, 111 Vulgate 251, 317, 326
Tripoli 177 Xanthus 144
Troad 72, 73, 117, 120, 153 xenia 19, 20, 105, 354
Trojan Pass 96 Xenippa 281
Troy 19, 113-117, 198, 360 Xenophilus 246
Turbat 334 Xenophon 14, 61, 64, 65, 163, 166,
Turkey 176 216
Turkmenistan 270 Xerxes I 14, 53, 54, 62, 67, 113-
Tus 262, 263 116, 125, 137, 160, 235, 238,
Tuz Khurmatu 237 239, 241, 245, 248, 254, 273,
Tyana156, 317 361, 366, 385
Tybi 207 Yahweh 196
Tyche184 Yasuj 247
Tylos 368 Yehizqiyyah 195
Tymphaea 3, 30 Yemen 197
Tyre 133, 140, 178, 184-197, 202, Zab Greater 226, 233
213-215, 218, 221, 312 Zachariah 193
Tyriespis 298, 325 Zadracarta 259, 261
Tyrioltes 298 Zadrus 324
Udegram 301 Zagros 60, 61, 233, 244, 246, 247,
Urartu 56 255, 362
Uruk 239 Zarathustra (Zoroaster) 58, 59, 128,
Urumbey 117 172, 252, 254, 329
Uxians 229, 246, 247, 363 Zaraispes 338
Uzbekistan 274, 281 Zeleia118, 125, 151
Valerius Maximus 194 Zephyros 138, 143
Vardar 3 Zeravshan 277
Vergina 4, 10, 13, 26, 89, 91, 92, Zeus 1, 107, 114, 116, 127, 149,
311 150, 176, 202, 209, 211, 212,
Vermion 3, 4, 39 288, 299, 311, 337, 364
Vespasian 385 Zeuxis 15
Via Egnatia 8 Zimnicea 97
Vitsi 3 Zopyrion 49
Vourinos 3 Zoroaster see : Zarathustra