1. Mckee v. IAC, 286 Phil.

649 (1992)
Emergency rule applied
Doctrine:
Under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence
Facts:
A vehicular accident between a cargo truck owned by private respondent Rosalinda Manalo, and
driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car, which led to the deaths and physical injuries of
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200)
cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San
Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its
way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the Ford Escort was about (10) meters away
from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the
road and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh, the driver and father of petitioner, blew the horn of
the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights
of the car to signal the truck to slow down, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return
to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the
lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.
Subsequently, a civil case was filed. Private respondents asserted that Jose Koh was the person
“at fault having approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang.
Issue:
WON Jose Koh was guilty of negligence
Ruling:
No.
under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.”
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose
Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the
above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.

Doctrine of last Clear Chance

Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence
of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of
the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to
avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.
the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person’s own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury result, the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As
the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding
an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed
to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident
(Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals)
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent
plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he,
aware of the plaintiff’s peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in
the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to
avoid an accident
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918)
Applying the foregoing doctrine, the truck driver’s negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the
truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and
primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from
the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.

Proximate Cause
‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all
negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car
into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back
into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was
the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at
full speed towards the car.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Clearly, it was the truck driver’s subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and
degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting
accident.

Civil Law; Negligence

The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.

2. Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v.

Mangalinao, 680 Phil. 89 (2012)
Emergency rule do not apply
Doctrine: Emergency Rule; One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required
to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.
Pathfinder - Mangalinao spouses
Fuso- driven by Loreto Lucilo, owned by Orix
Izuso - driven by Antonio, owned by Sonny

Facts:
A multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) resulting in the death of all the
passengers in Nissan Pathfinder against the registered owners and drivers of the two 10-wheeler
trucks that collided with the Pathfinder.
Just when the Pathfinder was already cruising along the NLEX’s fast lane and about to overtake
the Fuso, the latter suddenly swerved to the left and cut into the Pathfinder’s Lane thereby
blocking its way. As a result, the Pathfinder hit the Fuso’s left door and left body. The impact
caused both vehicles to stop in the middle of the expressway. Although Antonio stepped on the
brakes, the Isuzu’s front crashed into the rear of the Pathfinder leaving it a total wreck. All the
passengers of Pathfinder died.
Consequently, a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict was filed against the truck drivers
and their owners, Orix and Sonny, equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their respective drivers.
Orix in its Motion to Dismiss interposed that it is not the actual owner of the Fuso truck, as it
already sold the Fuso truck to MMO Trucking owned by Manuel Ong (Manuel) while Sonny and
Antonio attributed fault for the accident solely on Loreto’s reckless driving of his truck which
suddenly stopped and slid across the highway.
The court a quo found Sonny, Antonio, Loreto and Orix liable for damages. This decision was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
WON the ‘emergency rule’ applied to Antionio (Driver of Izuso) when he was immediately
confronted with a sudden danger and had no time to think of how to avoid it
Ruling:
NO.
The emergency rule states: “One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required
to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.”
Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night, Antonio should have been
prudent to reduce his speed and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it
would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really could not
avoid hitting it, prevent such extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring evidence,
he obviously failed to exercise proper care in his driving.

Torts
Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a
contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck
registered under it have caused.
Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee
or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said
responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property
with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. x x x x Employers shall
be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Damages
Actual –
With regard to actual damages, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
as a result of quasi-delict, actual damages shall likewise include the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased
Temperate - “In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of
earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to
support the allegation of the injured party’s actual income.”

Moral damages –
it must be stressed, are not intended to enrich plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are
awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he/she had undergone due to the other party’s culpable action and
must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.

Exemplary –
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.”63 It is given by way of example or correction for the public good.64 Before the
court may consider such award, the plaintiff must show his entitlement first to moral, temperate,
or compensatory damages,65 which the respondents have. In the case at bench, the reckless
driving of the two trucks involved caused the death of the victims.

3. Tiu v. Arriesgado, 481 Phil. 1 (2004)

Doctrine: The principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies
in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles.
Facts:
Just as a cargo truck, loaded with firewood, passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded.
The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and
removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop. He instructed his helper to
place a spare tire six fathoms away 4 behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming
vehicles.
D’ Rough Riders passenger bus driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the national
highway. As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw the stalled truck, which was then
about 25 meters away. He applied the brakes and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the
truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the truck’s left rear. As a result, several passengers
were injured and death of Respondent Pedro Arriesgado’s wife.
Arriesgado filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage against the petitioners, D’ Rough
Riders bus operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspiñas. He alleged that the
passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road, and that
petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident.
The trial court ruled in favor of Arriesgado. According to the trial court, William Tiu was
engaged in business as a common carrier, in view of his admission that D’ Rough Rider
passenger bus which figured in the accident was owned by him. The trial court ruled that if
petitioner Laspiñas had not been driving at a fast pace, he could have easily swerved to the left to
avoid hitting the truck. It then concluded that petitioner Laspiñas was negligent.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Tiu invoked the doctrine of last clear chance
Issue:
WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in the instant case
Ruling:
No.
the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit
between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role,
if any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff,
has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

4. Erezo v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103 (1957) – LANDMARK

CASE
Doctrine: REGISTERED OWNER PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES.—The
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is
being driven on the highways or streets.
Facts:
Defendant-appelle Aguedo Jepte is the registered owner of a six by six truck that collided
with a taxicab, which resulted to physical injury of Plaintiff-Appellant Ernesto Erezo and
death of another person.
As the amount of the judgment could not be enforced against the driver of the truck, Erozo
brought this action against Jepte. The latter, however, claims that truck belonged to the Port
Brokerage, of which he was the broker at the time of the accident.
The trial court held Jepte liable.
Issue:
WON Jepte, as the registered owner, is liable for damages even if the truck does not belong
to him
Ruling:
Yes.
 The SC held that the registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is liable to the
public for the injuries or damages suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the
operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to a third person.
The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered
under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the
registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce
the actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently
operated if the public should be required to prove who the actual owner is.
Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public
service, should primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused
the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.

5. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, 437 Phil. 244

(2002)
Doctrine: Registered owner rule
Facts:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of
Myrna Tamayo, which resulted to injuries and deaths of relatives of the respondents Suyom et al.
Verification with the LTO showed that Petitioner Equitable Leasing Corp (ELC) is the owner of
the tractor. Thus, Suyom et al filed a complaint for damages against ELC. The latter alleged that
the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer in possession and
control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that the driver was an employee, not of
Equitable, but of Ecatine.
The RTC held ELC liable for damages holding that the Deed of Sale between petitioner and
Ecatine had not been registered with the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the legal owner was
still Equitable. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON ELC is liable for damages despite the sale of tractor to other person
Ruling:
Yes.
The SC hold ELC liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the
registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994. The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the
lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly
and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability
for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.

Reliance on FGU Insurance

Equitable’s insistence on FGU Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals is misplaced. First, in FGU
Insurance, the registered vehicle owner, which was engaged in a rent- a-car business, rented out
the car. In this case, the registered owner of the truck, which is engaged in the business of
financing motor vehicle acquisitions, has actually sold the truck to Ecatine, which in turn
employed Tutor. Second, in FGU Insurance, the registered owner of the vehicle was not held
responsible for the negligent acts of the person who rented one of its cars, because Article 2180
of the Civil Code was not applicable. We held that no vinculum juris as employer and employee
existed between the owner and the driver. 46 In this case, the registered owner of the tractor is
considered under the law to be the employer of the driver, while the actual operator is deemed to
be its agent.

Article 100 RPC and Article 2176 CC

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may sue the negligent party under (1) Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, for civil liability ex delicto; or (2) under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, for
civil liability ex quasi delicto. 21 Furthermore, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers may be held subsidiarily liable for felonies committed by their employees in the
discharge of the latter’s duties. This liability attaches when the employees who are convicted of
crimes committed in the performance of their work are found to be insolvent and are thus unable
to satisfy the civil liability adjudged.

Quasi-delict; Requisites to sustain a claim for quasi delict.

—To sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

6. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General

Insurance Co., Inc., 579 Phil. 418 (2008)
Registered owner rule
Doctrine: In case a separate civil action is filed, the long-standing principle is that the registered
owner of a motor vehicle is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its
operation, including the negligence of the driver, with respect to the public and all third persons;
In contemplation of law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver,
with the actual operator and employer, such as a lessee, being considered as merely the owner’s
agent
Facts:
an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc.
allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc.
(SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga hit and bumped a
Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by United Coconut Planters Bank. The Mitusbishi was insured with
plaintiff-appellee UCPB General Insurance Inc. The impact caused heavy damage to the
Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the rear part of the car.
plaintiff-appellee UCPB General Insurance paid the assured UCPB the amount representing the
insurance coverage of the damaged car. It filed the instant case against PCI Leasing.
PCI Leasing interposed the defense that it could not be held liable for the collision, since the
driver of the truck, Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that of its co-defendant Superior Gas &
Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO). In fact, it was SUGECO that was the actual operator of the truck,
pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by petitioner and SUGECO. It, however, admitted that it
was the owner of the truck in question.
The RTC held PCI leasing liable which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
WON PCI Leasing is liable for damages despite the Truck was leased to 3rd person
Ruling:
Yes. the registered owner of the vehicle driven by a negligent driver may still be held liable
under applicable jurisprudence involving laws on compulsory motor vehicle registration and the
liabilities of employers for quasidelicts under the Civil Code.
For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner may be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either:
1) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on a delict or crime under Articles 100
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or
2) solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief based on a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code. It is the option of the plaintiff whether to waive completely the filing of the
civil action, or institute it with the criminal action, or file it separately or independently of a
criminal action; his only limitation is that he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
In case a separate civil action is filed, the long-standing principle is that the registered owner of a
motor vehicle is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its operation,
including the negligence of the driver, with respect to the public and all third persons.17 In
contemplation of law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver, with
the actual operator and employer, such as a lessee, being considered as merely the owner’s agent.
This being the case, even if a sale has been executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if
unregistered, has no effect as to the right of the public and third persons to recover from the
registered owner.
In the case now before the Court, there is not even a sale of the vehicle involved, but a mere
lease, which remained unregistered up to the time of the occurrence of the quasidelict that gave
rise to the case. Since a lease, unlike a sale, does not even involve a transfer of title or ownership,
but the mere use or enjoyment of property, there is more reason, therefore, in this instance to
uphold the policy behind the law, which is to protect the unwitting public and provide it with a
definite person to make accountable for losses or injuries suffered in vehicular accidents.

7. Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 688 Phil. 430

(2012)
Doctrine: Vicarious Liability; Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil
Code, an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the
employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.
In case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the
employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter
under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code
Facts:
respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car when another car suddenly hit and bumped his
car. The other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate
number.
After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other
car is Filcar. Thus, he filed a complaint for damages against Filcar. Filcar argued that while it is
the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espinas’ car, the car was assigned to its
Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor. It further stated that when the incident happened, the car
was being driven by Atty. Flor’s personal driver, Timoteo Floresca. Filcar denied any liability to
Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was
not its employee but that of Atty. Flor
The lower courts ruled in favor of Espinas.
Issue:
whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be
held liable for the damages caused to Espinas
Ruling:
Yes.
Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus
vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will
generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general
rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil.
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his
employee, under Article 2180. Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes
him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to
exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one’s subordinates to prevent damage to another.
It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle
is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort
committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
In Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, 11 we ruled that in so far as third persons are
concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and
the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle
primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the
Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor
relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered owner of the
motor vehicle causing damage in order that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180
of the Civil Code.
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the
driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds
primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the
vehicle in the streets and highways.
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code—that the
employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage—because the motor vehicle registration law, to a
certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to
the registered owner of the motor vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of
the car involved in the vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages
caused to Espinas.

15.Robles v. Concepcion Fernando Blaylock, 131 Phil.

392 (1968)
Doctrine:
Facts:
Petitioner Gregorio Robles is a holder of a certificate of public convenience to operate a taxi
service of five (5) units in Olongapo, Zambales, granted him on December 14,1959. In February
1960, he filed an application for an increase of five (5) units to his authorized equipment. On the
same month, Respondent Concepcion Fernando Blaylock also filed with the Public Service
Commission (PSC) an application for a certificate of public convenience to operate a taxicab
service of ten (10) units within the municipality of Olongapo and its suburbs alleging that public
convenience required such certificate.
Robles filed his objection to the application of Blaylock claiming that the granting of the
certificate prayed for would result in or bring about ruinuous competition and that there was no
public necessity and convenience requiring such grant. He further claims that should the
Commission find that there was such public necessity and convenience he, the first operator of
taxicab in the line applied for, should be given preference.
The applications of Robles were granted. Subsequently, however, PSC overruled the objection of
Robles, and granted the application of Blaylock. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
WON the doctrine of prior operator is applicable in the instant case
Ruling:
No.
The protection of or preference for a prior operator over a newcomer cannot be invoked by the
petitioner, because before the petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience to
operate a taxicab service in Olongapo, Zambales, the respondent had been operating a taxicab
service known then as Base taxi under a grant of U.S. naval authorities in the naval reservation
including Olongapo, before its turn over by the U.S. Government to the Republic of the
Philippines.
If public need and convenience demand or require the service; if the service to be rendered
applied for would not result in or bring about ruinous competition; and if the ability of the
applicant for service to satisfy public need and convenience is shown, a competition of two
services and not a monopoly would redound to the benefit of the community where the service is
to be rendered.
Notes.—
"As a general principle public utility operators must be protected from ruinous competition, such
that before permitting a new operator to serve in a territory already served by another operator,
the latter should first be given opportunity to improve his equipment and service. This principle,
however, is subject to justifiable exceptions. The primary consideration in the grant of a
certificate of public convenience must always be public convenience." Halili v. Cruz, L-21061,
June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1174, 1182 holding that public convenience is served if passengers who
take buses at points in one part of a line are able to proceed beyond those points without having'
to change buses.
An old operator will not also be protected if it is shown that it has not placed in the service all the
units of equipment that it had been authorized to operate and also that it had been authorized to
tolerate and also when it has violated, or has not complied with important conditions in its
certificate. Halili v. Cruz, supra, citing Mirasol Trans. Co., Inc. v. Negros Travelways Corp., 64
Phil. 317.