Rayat Memo TC A Respondent

TEAM CODE: TC_A
NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024
RAYAT- BAHARA COLLEGE OF LAW, HOSHIARPUR
BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF RIVERDALE CITY
UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF:
STATE OF RIVERDALE...............................................................................(APPELLANT)
versus
ABHAY RAICHAND...................................................................................(RESPONDENT)
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES OF THE HIGH COURT OF

RIVERDALE CITY
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

INDEX
INDEX…................................................................................................................................2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION....................................................................................7
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS..........................................................................................................8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES..................................................................................................10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.........................................................................................11
BODY OF ARGUMENTS....................................................................................................12
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE ACCUSED, ABHAY RAICHAND HAS COMMITTED
MURDER UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE?...................12-19
1.1 INSUFFICIENCY OF THE MAJOR ESSENTIALS OF MURDER…..........................12
1.2 THERE WAS NO PREMEDITATED DESIRE OF THE RESPONDENT TO KILL THE
DECEASED............................................................................................................................15
1.3 DOES NOT AMOUNT TO CULPABLE HOMICIDE EITHER.....................................17
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO ANY EXCEPTIONS OR
NOT?.................................................................................................................................20-24
2.1 RESPONDENT SHOULD BE GRANTED WITH THE BENEFIT OF EXCEPTION 4. 20
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?...............................................................25-29
3.1 RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS DO NOT AMOUNT TO GRIEVOUS HURT.................25
3.2 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SEC. 326 ARE NOT BEING FULFILLED...................28
PRAYER................................................................................................................................30
-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 2|Page

Abbreviations Expansion
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
HC High Court
& And
Sec. Section
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
IPC Indian Penal Code
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure
Hon’ble Honourable
i.e., That is
Anr. Another
Ors Others
Para Paragraph
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Case Referred
S. No. Cause Title Citation

1. Vijay Pandurang Thakre v. State of AIR 2017 SC 897
Maharashtra
2. R. Hariprasada Rao v. State (1951) SCR 322
3. Makhmalsinh v. State of Gujrat 2014 Cr LJ 519
Rambaran Mahton v. The State AIR 1958 Pat 452

4.
Jayraj v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1976 SC 1519

5.
Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 245

6.
Sayaji Hanmat Baukar v. State of Maharashtra AIR2011 SC 3172
7.
Smuthram alias Samudra Rajan v. State of (1997) Crimes 185 (Mad)
8.
Tamil Nadu
9. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhagwat 1980 Cr LJ 24 (MP)
10. Palani Goudan v. Emperor 1919 SCC OnLine Mad 67
11. Ram Kumar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1970 Raj 60
12. Dibia v. State AIR 1953 All 373
13. R. v. Davis (1883) 15 Cox CC 174
14. Suraj Mal v. Union Territory of Chandigarh AIR 1992 SC 599
15. Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa (2004) 11 SCC 395
Mahesh v. State of M.P (1996) 10 SCC 668

16.

Khokan Vishwas v. State of Chhattisgarh (2021) 3 SCC 365

17.
18. Khuman Singh v. The State Of Madhya AIR 2019 SC 4030

Pradesh
19. K. Ravi Kumar v. State Of Karnataka 2014 AIR SCW 6666
20. Arumugam v. State 2009 (1) JIC 894 (SC)
21. Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa 2010 (1) JIC 97.
22. Murlidhar Shivram Patekar & Anr. v. State Of 2015 (1) SCC (CRI) 749
Maharashtra
23. Golbadan Majhi v. The state 1991 Cr LJ 3621
24. Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh AIR 1989 SC 1094
25. Mohan v. State of UP 2014 Cr LJ 69
26. Empress v. Kaminee Dossee 12 WR (Cr) 25
27. State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha 2000(7) SCC 249
28. Mathai v. State of Kerala 2005 (3) SCC 260
29. Emperor v. Khudiram Dass 7 Cr LJ 362
30. Zora Singh v. Emperor AIR 1929 Lah 433
31. Isher Das v. State AIR 1954 J&K 19
32. Kamla Bai v. Naresh (2016) 160 AIC 501
33. Emperor v. Bai Jiba (1917) 19 BOM LR 823

BOOKS REFERRED
S. No Name of the Author Name of the Books Edition/Year

1. Ratanlal & Dheerajlal The Indian Penal Code
2017
2. K.D. Gaur Textbook on Indian Penal Code 2020
3. M.P. Tandon Indian Penal Code 2015
4. Lexis Nexis Universal CrPC Bare Acts 2022
5. Lexis Nexis Universal IPC Bare Acts 2022
STATUES INCORPORATED
S. No Statue Article/Section
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Sec. 374(2)
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sec. 299, 300, 302, 304, 320,
326
WEB RESOURCES REFERRED
S. No Web Resources Websites

1. Live Law https://www.livelaw.in/
2. SCC Online https://www.scconline.com/
3. Manupatra https://www.manupatrafast.com/?t=desktop
4. Lexis Nexis https://www.lexisnexis.com/

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT, HEREBY HUMBLY SUBMIT TO THIS

HON’BLE COURT’S JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF THE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 FOR THE APPEAL OF TRIAL COURT ORDER.
THE RESPONDENT MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS BEFORE THE

JURISDICTION OF THE PRESENT COURT AND ACCEPTS THAT IT HAS THE
POWER AND AUTHORITY TO PRESIDE OVER THE PRESENT CASE.
S.374 - Appeals from convictions.
(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge
or on a trial held by any other court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 7
years (has been passed against him or against any other person convicted at the same trial),
may appeal to the High Court. 1
1
Subs. By Act 45 of 1978, s.28, for “has been passed” (w.e.f. 18-12-1978).

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
-Part I-
Abhay Raichand was a rich businessman of the city Riverdale. He was arrogant and short
tempered by nature. The deceased, Rupam Singh was an athlete by profession and Abhay
Raichand’s immediate neighbour. Both Abhay Raichand and Rupam Singh were never on
friendly terms with one another.
-Part II-
On one occasion the deceased, Rupam Singh had kept a function in his house. However,
Abhay Raichand was not invited in the function due to their mutual rivalry because of which
his ego was hurt. On that day when Rupam Singh was parking his car in front of the gate of
Abhay Raichand’s house, he sternly warned Rupam Singh to not park the car on that place.
But, Rupam Singh refused to remove the car replying that it was not Abhay Raichand’s
personal property and that the car will be removed after the function and departure of guests.
-Part III-
Abhay Raichand lost his balance of mind and slapped Rupam Singh. Both Started quarrelling
and grabbed each other, in the course Abhay Raichand gave a fist blow on the stomach of
Rupam Singh. Consequently appendicitis of the deceased, Rupam Singh busted and he fell
down in severe pain in stomach.
-Part IV-
Abhay Raichand immediately threw the deceased in the car of the deceased itself and drove
the car towards the nearest hospital. At the same time since a large number of cars were
parked in the street, Abhay Raichand had to face difficulty to take the car out of the street and
a lot of time was wasted. Rupam Singh could not be saved and doctor gave a statement that if
the deceased, Rupam Singh had been brought ten minutes early, he could have been saved.
Besides the medical report also mentioned that one tooth of the deceased was also found to be
broken.


-Part V-
Abhay Raichand was charged with the offence of murder under Section 302 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860. The Trial Court convicted Abhay Raichand only under Section 326 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 for causing grievous hurt. The prosecution not being satisfied by the order
of the Trial Court, has initiated the appeal to the Hon’ble High Court of Riverdale City.
-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 10 | P a g e

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1.
WHETHER THE ACCUSED, ABHAY RAICHAND HAS COMMITTED MURDER

UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE?
ISSUE 2.
WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO ANY EXCEPTIONS OR NOT?
ISSUE 3.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED

UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?


SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1- WHETHER THE ACCUSED, ABHAY RAICHAND HAS COMMITTED

MURDER UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE?
It is most humbly submitted to the Hon’ble High Court of Riverdale City that the respondent,
Abhay Raichand has not committed the murder of the deceased, Rupam Singh under S. 302
of IPC, 1860 as the respondent neither had the intention to kill the deceased nor there was any
knowledge that the actions of the respondent might result in the death of Rupam Singh. In the
present matter, the situation worsened because of a sudden fight between the respondent and
the deceased, both were responsible for the same but the action of the respondent was not
premeditated but rather a reasonable action in the heat of passion upon a sudden fight.
Therefore, the respondent’s intention to cause death as well as the knowledge is not clearly
established.
ISSUE 2 - WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO ANY EXCEPTIONS OR

NOT?
It is most humbly submitted to the Hon’ble High Court that the respondent has not committed
murder under Sec. 302 of IPC, 1860 as the instance is covered under the exceptions provided
by it. In the present matter, exception 4 of Sec. 300 of IPC will be invoked as the act of the
respondent was not premeditated and the instance occurred in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel in which both the deceased as well as the respondent were involved. Although
according to the exception, it is immaterial who initiates the provocation but in the present
matter, the provocation done by the deceased further establishes that the respondent had no
desire to indulge himself in such an issue.
ISSUE 3- WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?
It is most humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the trial court was not right in
convicting the accused under Sec. 326 of IPC. The essential ingredients required for a case to
fall under Sec. 326 of IPC are not being fulfilled in the present case. Abhay Raichand has not
used any weapon or substance to grievously hurt Rupam Singh. A mere fist blow on the
stomach of deceased cannot be regarded as dangerous means. Therefore, Sec. 326 of IPC
should not be applied in this case.

BODY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE ACCUSED, ABHAY RAICHAND HAS COMMITTED

MURDER UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE?
[¶1.] It is most humbly submitted to the Hon’ble High Court of Riverdale City that the
respondent, Abhay Raichand has not committed the murder of the deceased, Rupam Singh
under S. 302 of IPC, 18602. The respondent was charged with the offence of murder of the
deceased under Sec. 302 of IPC, 1860 and the Trial Court convicted the respondent only
under
S. 326 of IPC, 18603 for causing grievous hurt4. Because, firstly, there was no intention of the
respondent to kill the deceased. Secondly, the respondent was unaware of the fact that his
actions would result in the death of the deceased. Thirdly, the death was not the result of the
injury caused by Abhay Raichand.
1.1 Insufficiency of the major essentials of murder
[¶2.] The Sec. 300 of IPC, 1860 which reads-
Murder. Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by
which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
Secondly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows
to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—
Thirdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily
injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or
—
Fourthly. —If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it
must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and
commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such
injury as aforesaid.5
2
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s. 302.
3
4
Moot Compromis.
5

[¶3.] For murder to be proved, death must be caused with the intention to kill, but in the
present scenario it is not the same, death is caused, but there was a lack of intention as the
deceased, Rupam Singh was parking his car in front of the gate of the house of Abhay
Raichand, the deceased, Rupam Singh was sternly warned by Abhay Raichand not to park the
car in front of his house. The deceased Rupam Singh refused to remove the car replying that
it was not Abhay Raichand's personal property and that the car will be removed after the
function and departure of guests6. The respondent wanted to avoid the fight but it was not
same for the deceased. The respondent lacked knowledge and he acted swiftly on seeing the
deceased in pain and rushed to the hospital. As mentioned in Para 1 line 19 of the moot
proposition, “Abhay Raichand immediately threw the deceased in the car of deceased itself
and drove the car towards the nearest hospital.”
The criteria for the offences to be categorized as murder is such that for any act committed by
the respondent to be termed as murder, there must be intention and knowledge of the same.
1.1.1. There was no intention of the respondent to kill the deceased
[¶4.] In the present case, the respondent neither had the intention to kill the deceased nor
there was any knowledge that the actions of the respondent might result in the death of
Rupam Singh. The respondent had no intention to murder as it is clear from his actions, as the
respondent immediately threw the plaintiff into his car and rushed to the hospital. Although
he failed to reach the hospital at the earliest since a large number of cars were parked in the
street, the respondent had to face difficulty taking the car out of the place. There was no
negligence on the part of the respondent as he wasted no time in seeking medical services.
This act of the respondent made it clear that he had no malicious intent whatsoever to kill the
deceased, Rupam Singh. If such was the case, he would have left the deceased there to die
rather than rushing to the hospital.
In Vijay Pandurang Thakre v. State of Maharashtra7 the court stated that, “Single fatal
blow on the head of deceased was not conclusive of intention to commit murder. No other
injuries were found on vital part of the body. Accused had no preconceived intention to
commit murder.” Similarly in the present case also there was no premeditated desire to kill.
There was only a single blow and slap which cannot conclude that the respondent intended
to kill the
6
Moot Compromis.
7
AIR 2017 SC 897.

deceased. As per the medical report, there is no mention of any injury on any vital organ of
the deceased.
[¶5.] In another case, R. Hariprasada Rao v. State8 the court was of the view that “Unless a
statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent element
of crime, a person should not be found guilty of an offense, unless he had a guilty mind at the
time of the commission of the offense.” In the present case as well, there is no evidence of
mens rea. It can be inferred that the respondent did not have any intention as he warned the
deceased to remove his car, and also, he instantly realized that the deceased was in pain,
instead of taking undue advantage he took the deceased to the nearest hospital. So, the present
matter does not constitute mens rea. Similar was held in the case of Makhmalsinh v. State of
Gujrat9, “Where the act of the accused appeared to have been committed out of deep
frustration as the accused was a vagabond, it was held that there was no mens rea on the part
of the accused to commit the murder of the deceased.”
1.1.2. Respondent had no knowledge that his actions would result in the death of the deceased
[¶6.] The second element of murder is the knowledge that such actions could cause death to
the other person is absent in the present case. Both the respondent and the deceased were
quarrelling and in the heat of the moment, the respondent gave a fist blow to the stomach of
the deceased. In the ordinary course of action, if a fist is blown in someone’s stomach, the
chances of busting of the appendix are very low as appendicitis itself is a disease. The
deceased was already suffering from the disease and the fist blow acted as a catalyst in the
situation and led to the busting of the appendix due to which he died. Therefore, the
respondent having no knowledge of the same, acted in such a way in the heat of the moment.
[¶7.]In the case of Rambaran Mahton v. The State,10 the court stated that “The incident
occurred on the spur of the moment due to provocation given by the deceased himself and
also considering the fact that there was no intention on the part of appellant either to kill him
or to cause such a bodily injury which would cause his death. Thus, the act of the accused did
not amount to murder even though the death was resulted.” Likewise, in the matter in hand
the respondent acted when the deceased refused to move his care from the property of
the
8
(1951) SCR 322.
9
2014 Cr LJ 519.
10
AIR 1958 Pat 452.

respondent, further respondent’s actions were purely a result of spur of the moment as there
was no premeditation neither any desire to kill the deceased.
[¶8.] According to the facts, the deceased was an athlete which leaves no doubt about his
physical fitness. In the ordinary course of action, it becomes impossible for an athlete to get
badly injured by a fist blown by a common man, and in this case a mere businessman. This
particular information further establishes that the reason for the sudden death of the deceased
was due to his medical condition of Appendicitis and not due to the fist blown by the
respondent.
[¶9.]Hence no direct causal link can be established between the respondent’s actions and the
death of the deceased, Rupam Singh. As in the case, Jayraj v. State of Tamil Nadu11 the
court was of the view that, “It must be established to prove murder that there was an injury,
that is to say, it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was not
intended.” The injury was a mere accident and unintentional as the respondent was unaware
of his actions. There was no injury intended by the respondent. As he was acting out of
frustration.
1.2 There was no premeditated desire of the respondent to kill the deceased
[¶10.] Exception 4 of Sec. 300 IPC, 186012, provides that if the offence is committed without
the premeditated desire to kill in a sudden fight in the heat of the passion upon a sudden
quarrel and without the offender having taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner will not amount to murder.
[¶11.] In the present matter, the situation worsened because of a sudden fight between the
respondent and the deceased, both were responsible for the same but the action of the
respondent was not premeditated but rather a reasonable action in the heat of passion upon a
sudden fight. There was no prior deliberation or determination to fight. In Kulwant Rai v.
State of Punjab13 it was held that, “It could not be said that the accused had the intention to
commit murder of the deceased. Nor it could be said that he intended to inflict that injury
which proved to be fatal. Para 3 of Section 300 therefore is not attracted since it cannot be
said that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to
have been inflicted.” The injury caused by the respondent was not of such a nature that it can
cause death
11
AIR 1976 SC 1519.

12
Id., s. 300.
13
(1981) 4 SCC 245.

of any person in the ordinary course of nature let alone an athlete. The deceased was an
athlete, which impliedly refers to the point that his physical strength was more than that of an
ordinary man so it becomes difficult for any person to kill him with a single blow.
[¶12.] In the present case, the respondent warned the deceased not to park the car in front of
his house but Rupam Singh refused to comply. Warning from the side of the respondent
shows that he was not desirous to pick up a fight in the first place. The provocation done by
the deceased is not justifiable as it just added fuel to the fire. This subsequent action led to a
loss of control and a temporary lapse in judgment.
[¶13.] Therefore, the respondent’s actions while violent, seem to stem from a moment of
anger rather than a premeditated desire to kill. The court held in the case of Sayaji Hanmat
Baukar
v. State of Maharashtra14 that, “If the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or
in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and if the offender does not take any undue
advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner, then the offense will not amount to murder.”
The respondent took the deceased to the hospital so, no undue advantage was taken by the
deceased and the act was done in a sudden fight as it is mentioned in the proposition, “both
started quarrelling and grapped each other.”
Similarly, in Smuthram alias Samudra Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu15 the court stated,
“To invoke Exception 4 to S. 300, four requirements must be satisfied, namely,
(i) it was a sudden fight;

(ii) there was no premeditation;
(iii) the act was done in the heat of passion;
(iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is
important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated.”
The actions of the respondent were purely sudden and unpremeditated without ant desire to
kill the respondent.
14
AIR2011 SC 3172.
15
(1997) Crimes 185 (Mad).

1.3 Does not amount to Culpable Homicide either
[¶14.] The Sec. 299 of IPC, 1860 which reads-

Culpable Homicide. Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing
death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with
the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.16
For any offence to be termed as Culpable Homicide following essentials must be fulfilled:
1. There must be an intention of causing the death of the person.

2. The accused must have the intention that such bodily injury is likely to cause death to
whom the harm has been made.
3. The accused must have knowledge that such an act would likely to cause death.
1.3.1 No intention of causing the death of the deceased
[¶15.] In the present case the essential ingredient of Culpable Homicide, Intention, is lacking
as the respondent had no intention to kill the deceased. He acted in the spur of the moment
without any prior deliberation. The respondent rushed to the hospital when he saw the
deceased in severe pain this action made it clear that there was no malicious intent on the part
of the respondent. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhagwat17 Where the deceased died on
account of the pus formation and toxaemia and not owing to the grievous hurt caused by the
accused, the accused was held liable under s. 325, and not under s. 302 or s 323, IPC.
1.3.2 No intention to cause a bodily injury that is likely to cause death
[¶16.] When the respondent gave a fist blow on the stomach of the deceased, he was unaware
of the appendicitis. Furthermore, the deceased was an athlete which makes it evident that he
was physically strong. The respondent was merely acting out of his instincts. He had no
intent to throw a fist blow that would act as a catalyst to cause such bodily harm that the
deceased would die. There was no intention of the respondent to cause any bodily injury
which would result in the death of the deceased.
16
Id., s. 299.
17
1980 Cr LJ 24 (MP).

[¶17.] Palani Goudan v. Emperor18“In this case, a husband struck a violent blow on his
wife’s head with a ploughshare, and she became unconscious. Believing she had died, he
hanged her to conceal his crime. However, she died due to hanging, not the blow. The court
held that the accused could not be convicted of murder or culpable homicide in IPC, but he
was punished for assaulting his wife and attempting to create false evidence by hanging her.
The court found no intention of causing death while giving the blow, and her death was due
to hanging.” Death of the Rupam Singh was due to appendicitis and not because of the blow
of the respondent.
1.3.3 No knowledge that such an act would likely cause death
[¶18.] The respondent was a businessman he was not aware of the fact that a slap and a mere
fist blow in the stomach would result in the death of the deceased. Since the respondent was a
mere neighbour of the deceased, so it becomes unlikely that the respondent would be familiar
with the personal health issues of the deceased. Herein, in the present instance, the deceased
was suffering from appendicitis [a disease that causes the inflammation of the appendix] and
the respondent was unfamiliar with the same. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhagwat19
“Where the deceased died on account of the pus formation and toxemia and not owing to the
grievous hurt caused by the accused, the accused was held liable under s. 325, and not
under s. 302 or s. 323, IPC.” In the present matter, it is mentioned that the cause of the death
of the deceased is the busting of Appendix due to appendicitis, hence the deceased can not be
charged under Sec. 302 or Sec. 299 of IPC.
[¶19.] The situation was further aggravated as both of them started quarrelling during which
the respondent out of his reflexes blew a fist in the deceased’s stomach. As a result, his
appendix busted and he died. The present matter is evident in establishing the lack of
knowledge of the respondent. The court reiterated in the case of Ram Kumar v. State of
Rajasthan20 that, “The intention or knowledge necessary in order to render the killing
culpable homicide must be clearly proved by prosecution. The fact that such knowledge is
accompanied by indifference whether death or serious injury results or not, makes no
difference. Even if such intention is not proved the offense will be culpable homicide if the
doer of the act causes the death with the knowledge that he is likely by his act to cause
death.” It is evident that in the
18
1919 SCC OnLine Mad 67.
19
1980 Cr LJ 24 (MP).
20
AIR 1970 Raj 60.

present case the respondent had no knowledge about the severity of his actions, hence it will
not amount to culpable homicide.
[¶20.] In another case, Dibia v. State21 the court was of the view that, “Causing serious
injury on a vital part of the body of the deceased with the dangerous weapon must
necessarily, lead to inference that the accused intended to kill.” In this case, neither there is
any dangerous weapon involved nor the injury was of serious nature. A slap or a fist in the
stomach can not be regarded as severe injuries moreover no weapon was used.
[¶21.] In the present case there was no intention and knowledge hence the death of the
deceased cannot be categorised as a Culpable Homicide. It was only negligence on the part of
the respondent. In R. v. Davis22, “A gave a blow to D, and the injury inflicted rendered an
operation advisable. As a preliminary to the operation, chloroform was administered to D
who died during its administration and it was agreed that the patient would not have died but
for its administration.” In the case at hand, it is visible that the offense committed by the
respondent is neither murder nor culpable homicide. In the ordinary course of nature, the
deceased would not have died. The deceased was an athlete his body was not so weak that he
could die due to a blow in the stomach or slaps. There was another cause of the death of the
deceased which was appendicitis.
In the present matter, the respondent’s intention to cause death as well as the
knowledge is not clearly established. Thus, the accused, Abhay Raichand has not
committed murder under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
21
AIR 1953 All 373.
22
(1883) 15 Cox CC 174.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO ANY EXCEPTIONS OR

NOT?
[¶22.] It is most humbly submitted to the Hon’ble High Court that the respondent has not
committed murder under Sec. 302 of IPC, 1860 as the instance is covered under the
exceptions provided by it. Therefore, this makes the respondent entitled to the exceptions
provided under Sec. 300 of IPC, 186023. Firstly, Exception 4 is attracted as the respondent is
fulfilling all the essential ingredients. Secondly, the injury was caused out of sudden fight.
Thirdly, there was no premeditated desire. Fourthly, the respondent has not taken any undue
advantage of the respondent. Therefore, the respondent is eligible for the benefit of Exception
4.
2.1 Respondent should be granted with the benefit of Exception 4
[¶23.] The exception 4 of the Sec. 300 of IPC reads that-
Culpable Homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in

the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation.- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits
the first assault. 24
[¶24.] According to the facts, both the deceased and the respondent started quarrelling
because of the issue that aroused when the deceased, Rupam Singh refused to remove the car
from the front of the respondent’s house. The situation worsened when both the deceased as
well as the respondent started quarrelling and grabbed each other. During this sudden quarrel,
the respondent blew a fist in the deceased’s stomach due to which his appendicitis busted and
he died. This particular instance is clearly establishing that the act of the respondent was a
result of such a situation which got aggravated during the heated argument of two people
fighting over a petty issue of car parking.
[¶25.] In the case, Suraj Mal v. Union Territory of Chandigarh25 the court held that, “When
injury is caused resulting in death a sudden fight without premeditations and on the heat of
passion and no undue advantage was taken by the accused, nor had he acted in a cruel
manner the case would fall under Exception 4 to Sec. 300, IPC punished under section 304,
IPC, Pt.
23
Id., s. 300.
24
Id., s. 300.
25
AIR 1992 SC 599.

1. ” In the matter in hand, the respondent and the deceased were under a sudden fight in that
course, respondent gave a blow to the stomach of the deceased, he fell down, respondent’s
actions were not premeditated and he took no undue advantage as he took the respondent to
the hospital rather than leaving him there to die.
In the present matter, exception 4 of Sec. 300 of IPC will be invoked as the act of the
respondent was not premeditated and the instance occurred in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel in which both the deceased as well as the respondent were involved.
[¶26.] In another case of Samuthram alias Samudra Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu26 the
court provided that-
“To invoke Exception 4 to S. 300, four requirements must be satisfied, namely,
(i) it was a sudden fight;

(ii) there was no premeditation;
(iii) the act was done in the heat of passion;
(iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is
important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender
must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel manner.”
[¶27.] In Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa27, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that, “To
bring a case within Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, if death is caused then it should be (a)
without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.; and (d) the fight must have been with the
person killed. The word fight is a combat between the two and more persons whether with or
without weapons. To apply Exception 4 does not sufficient to show that there was a sudden
quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must be shown further that the offender has not
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” Similarly, the present case
fits well in the essentials of Exception 4 as there was a sudden fight between the respondent
and the deceased without any premeditation. The action of the respondent was not
premeditated
26
Id. at 15.
27
(2004) 11 SCC 395.

but rather a reasonable action in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. It is clear on the
fact sheet that the fight started when the deceased parked his car on respondent’s property
and the aggression was not one way, it was from both sides. Abhay Raichand even warned
the deceased and took the deceased to the hospital after seeing him in the pain, so, it is clear
that the respondent was not having any ill will against the deceased.
2.1.1 Unpremeditated action of the respondent
[¶28.] The major essential here is that the act must not be premeditated i.e.-thought out or
planned beforehand. In this case which is at the issue, it is clear that the argument intensified
when the deceased, Rupam Singh refused to remove the car. It was Rupam Singh who
initiated the argument unnecessarily whereas the respondent had no desire to indulge in the
same.
[¶29.] In Mahesh v. State of M.P.28 the court was of the view that, “In the absence of
premeditation, sudden fight after the deceased objected to the grazing of cattle, Appellant
giving single blow with a pharsa on the head of the deceased. No other injury caused to the
deceased or the witnesses who had also requested him not to graze cattle in the field
indicating that the appellant did not act in any cruel or unusual manner. It was held in the
circumstances of the case; Exception 4 is attracted.” In the present matter, the respondent
warned the deceased not to park his car in front of his gate and the deceased refused to
remove his car, as the respondent was already frustrated and it is mentioned that both were
not on good terms, the respondent lost his mind. There was cruel manner as the respondent
had no intention to cause any injury. Furthermore, in another case of Khokan Vishwas v.
State of Chhattisgarh29, the judgement was similar to that of the case mentioned above.
[¶30.] In Khuman Singh v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh30, “Though the weapon used by
the appellant was axe and the injuries were inflicted on the vital part of the body viz. head,
knowledge is attributable to the appellant-accused that the injuries are likely to cause death.
Considering the fact that the occurrence was in a sudden fight, in our view, the occurrence
would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.” In the case in hand, the injuries were not
caused on the vital part of the body, also the death was the result of appendicitis.
Although according to the exception, it is immaterial who initiates the provocation but in the
present matter, the provocation done by the deceased further establishes that the respondent
28
(1996) 10 SCC 668.
29
(2021) 3 SCC 365.
30
AIR 2019 SC 4030.

had no desire to indulge himself in such an issue. If the car was not parked in front of his
house’s gate, he would not have asked Rupam Singh to remove it, the fight simply would not
have started between the two and these actions would not have resulted in the death of
Rupam Singh.
2.1.2 No undue advantage taken or acted in cruel manner
[¶31.] Furthermore, another evident instance in establishing the unpremeditated action of the
respondent is that he was the one who tried to take the deceased to the hospital as soon as he
realised that the deceased had collapsed on the ground. He did not take any undue advantage
or acted in a cruel manner rather made sure that the deceased was provided with the medical
assistance at the earliest.
[¶32.] As in the case, Sayaji Hanmat Baukar v. State of Maharashtra31 the court opined
that, “If the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or in the heat of passion upon
a sudden quarrel and if the offender does not take any undue advantage or act in a cruel or
unusual manner, then Exception 4 will be attracted.” In the case in hand, after the respondent
warned the deceased not to park his car in front respondent’s gate, the deceased refused and
that gave way to the sudden fight between the respondent and the deceased. Though the
respondent and the deceased were not on friendly terms, still the respondent took the
deceased to the hospital, he put his enmity aside and tried hard to save the life of the
respondent.
[¶33.] In K. Ravi Kumar v. State Of Karnataka32, the court opined that, “This goes to show
that in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel followed by a fight the accused persons had
caused injuries on the deceased, but had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. That being
so, Exception 4 to sec. 300 of IPC is clearly applicable.” Similarly in the present matter the
respondent despite, the fact that he gave a blow to the deceased he did not take any undue
advantage of the deceased.
[¶34.] Furthermore, in Arumugam v. State33 it was stated that, “The help of Exception 4 can
be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the
offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the
fight must have been with the person killed.” In the present case, the respondent’s acts were
without any premeditation, as he acted on his impulses as per the circumstances. There was a
31
AIR2011 SC 3172.
32
2014 AIR SCW 6666.
33
2009 (1) JIC 894 (SC).

sudden fight between the respondent and the deceased and the respondent did not take any
undue advantage of the respondent.
[¶35.] In another case of Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa34 the court opined that,
“The inevitable conclusion is that the act of the accused-appellants was not a cruel act and
the accused did not take undue advantage of the deceased. The scuffle took place in the heat
of passion and all the requirements under Section 300 Exception 4, IPC have been satisfied.
Therefore, the benefit of Exception 4 under Section 300, IPC is attracted to the fact situations
and both the appellants are equally entitled to this benefit." As in the case in hand, both the
respondent and the deceased fell into a sudden fight which led to the injury to the deceased
and he died because of the busting of the appendicitis, the respondent did not take any undue
advantage of the deceased. He tried to save the deceased from losing his life, but the deceased
lost his life due to traffic.
In the case of Murlidhar Shivram Patekar & Anr v. State Of Maharashtra35, the court held
that, “The inevitable conclusion is that the act of the accused-appellants was not a cruel act
and the accused did not take undue advantage of the deceased. The scuffle took place in the
heat of passion and all the requirements under Section 300 Exception 4, IPC have been
satisfied. Therefore, the benefit of Exception 4 under Section 300, IPC is attracted to the fact
situations and both the appellants are equally entitled to this benefit.”
[¶36.] With due respect, in the case of Golbadan Majhi v. The state36, “The number of
wounds caused during the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the
offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any
undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner”, and the same was held in Surinder Kumar v.
Union Territory, Chandigarh37. All the essential elements of the Exception 4 are being
fulfilled by the respondent, his actions were a result of a sudden fight, he did not act in a cruel
manner neither did he take any undue advantage of the deceased.
In the present matter, Exception-4 of the Sec. 300 of IPC is invoked as well as all the
essentials of the same are fulfilled. Thus, the respondent is entitled to the benefit of this
exception.
34
2010 (1) JIC 97.
35
2015 (1) SCC (CRI) 749.
36
1991 Cr LJ 3621.
37
AIR 1989 SC 1094.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?
[¶37.] It is most humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the Trial Court was not right
in convicting the accused under Sec. 326 of IPC. Firstly, the essentials of Sec. 326 do not
fulfil in the present case. Secondly, there was no intention as to consider the act of the
respondent as voluntary. Thirdly, the intensity of the blow was not such that it can cause an
injury which could endanger life.
3.1 Respondent’s actions do not amount to Grievous Hurt
[¶38.] The act of the respondent does not amount to grievous hurt as there was no intention of
the respondent to cause any kind of injury to the deceased and furthermore, the intensity of
the injury was not such that it can endanger or takeaway the life of a prudent man. The
deceased was an athlete, he was physically fit and the chances of him dying by a slap or a
blow are very less.
[¶39.] Sec. 326 of IPC, 1860 states that:
326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means-
Section 326 provides that whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 335,
voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or
cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by
means of fire or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by
means of any substance which is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to
receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for
life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
also with a liability to pay a fine.38
[¶40.] In the present matter, there was no weapon used neither the act of the respondent
caused the death of the deceased. The medical report mentions about the fallen tooth, and the
doctor said that if the deceased would have come to hospital 10 minutes earlier, he could
have been saved. The expression “any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is
likely to cause death” has to be gauged taking note of the heading of the Section. What
would constitute a
38
Id., s. 326.

‘dangerous weapon’ would depend upon the facts of each case and no generalization can be
made.
3.1.1 Explanation of Grievous Hurt as mentioned under Sec. 320
[¶41.] “Grievous hurt” has been defined in Sec. 320 of IPC, 1860 which read as follows:
320. Grievous Hurt – The following kinds of hurt only are designated as “grievous”-
First – Emasculation.
Secondly - Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
Thirdly – Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
Fourthly – Privation of any member or joint.
Fifthly – Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any members or joint.
Sixthly – Permanent disfiguration of the head or face
Seventhly – Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
Eighthly – Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space
of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.39
[¶42.] Some hurts which are not like those hurts which are mentioned in the first seven
clauses, are obviously distinguished from a slight hurt, may nevertheless be more serious.
Thus a wound may cause intense pain, prolonged disease or lasting injury to the victim,
although it does not fall within any of the first seven clauses. Before a conviction for the
sentence of grievous hurt can be passed, one of the injuries defined in Section 320 must be
strictly proved. None of the above eight mentioned clauses are being fulfilled in the present
case. In an ordinary course of fight a mere fist blow on the stomach of any ordinary person
would not be considered as grievous hurt.
[¶43.] In the case of Mohan v. State of UP40 “There must be evidence to show that the hurt
caused is such as is described in s 320, IPC. A mere report of the civil surgeon is not
sufficient.” Empress v. Kaminee Dossee41 “The production of X-ray photo is essential to
establish a fracture.” There is no concrete evidence that the deceased died due to the
blow of the
39
40
2014 Cr LJ 69.
41
12 WR (Cr) 25.

respondent. It can be inferred from the doctor’s statement that he would have been saved if
given medical attention earlier, but due to a large number cars parked in the area he could not
make it to the hospital. Further the medical report shows that one tooth was broken, but it is
not clear that how that tooth broke, there can be many reasons involved for the same.
3.1.2 Absence of essentials ingredients i.e. weapons and other means
[¶44.] The heading of the Section provides some insight into the factors to be considered. The
essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are :
(1) voluntarily causing a hurt;
(2) hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and
(3) the grievous hurt must have been caused by dangerous weapons or means.
In present case it is true that Abhay Raichand voluntarily hurt Rupam Singh but it was a
consequence of the fight that happened between them. In ordinary course of circumstance, a
fist blow on the stomach will not be regarded as grievous hurt. And lastly no dangerous
weapons or other means had been used by the accused to cause such hurt.
[¶45.] As was noted in State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha42 that “there is no such
thing as a regular or earmarked weapon for committing murder or for that matter a hurt.
Whether a particular article can per se cause any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury
has to be determined factually.” As per the matter in hand, it can be determined that the
injury was not serious and so grave that it can come under the ambit of this definition.
Similarly, in Mathai v. State of Kerala43, “in the instant case considering the size of the stone
which was used, as revealed by material on record, it cannot be said that a dangerous
weapon was used.” In the present case, the intensity of the blow can be determined by the
fact the deceased was an athlete, there are the minimum chances of his dying due to such
trivial force.
[¶46.] With due respect to this, in the case of Emperor v. Khudiram Dass44 “To constitute an
offence under this section, the act of the offender must have been done voluntarily.”
Similarly, in the matter of Zora Singh v. Emperor45 “Even if death ensues, the offender can
be held guilty only under this section unless his intention or knowledge is proved to be such
as is required by
42
2000(7) SCC 249.
43
2005 (3) SCC 260.

44
7 Cr LJ 362.
45
AIR 1929 Lah 433.

s 300, or even by s 299.” Likewise, in the case of Isher Das v. State46 it was held that “the
injury inflicted is the direct cause of death.” In the present matter the respondent had no
intention to commit any offence in general. The term “Voluntarily” connotes that the act was
committed out of will and there was intention to commit such harm. But such was not the in
the present case. As in issue 1 it has been made clear that the respondent was not having any
malicious intent or knowledge to cause any injury to the deceased. Furthermore, the fist blow
given by the respondent was not the direct cause for the death of the deceased.
3.2 Essential elements of Sec. 326 are not being fulfilled
[¶47.] IPC Sec. 326 will not be attracted if any of these ingredients is missing, and if there
was no intention of the person committing the act to cause death or if he was unaware of the
fact that his act can cause grievous hurt which can result in the death of the person suffering
it.
[¶48.] In the present case the accused Abhay Raichand has not in any way used any of the
above-mentioned ways to cause any grievous hurt to deceased Rupam Singh. The essential
ingredients required for a case to fall under Sec. 326 of IPC are not being fulfilled in the
present case. Abhay Raichand has not used any weapon or substance to grievously hurt
Rupam Singh. A mere fist blow on the stomach of deceased cannot be regarded as dangerous
means. In the case of Kamla Bai v. Naresh47 it was held “the body part cannot be treated as
an instrument. An instrument has to be an outside mean/weapon and cannot be a body part.”
Thus, fault can be found in the order of the Trial Court, whereby the accused were exonerated
from the offence under section 326 IPC because, admittedly, in the incident no weapon/
instrument was used.
3.2.1 Unfamiliarity of the respondent regarding the deceased’s disease
[¶49.] In the present case Abhay Raichand was unaware of the fact that Rupam Singh had
appendicitis (a disease in which the appendix is swollen) which was burst when he hit him in
the stomach. So when the accused gave a fist blow on the stomach of Abhay Raichand, he
had no idea that it will lead to the death of Rupam Singh. Keeping in mind that the accused
did not employ any dangerous means, instruments, or substances as outlined in Sec. 326 to
cause grievous hurt to the deceased, a mere fist blow to the stomach does not qualify as a
dangerous means especially when the respondent was unaware about it.

46
AIR 1954 J&K 19.
47
(2016) 160 AIC 501.

[¶50.] In the matter of Emperor v. Bai Jiba48, it was observed, “where the death is caused as
the result of an injury which is not intended to cause death and was not in normal conditions
is likely to cause death or, to use the other phrase, which in normal conditions did not
endanger life, it becomes clear that the offence can neither be grievous hurt not culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.” Likewise, in this case also it can be established that the
actions of the respondent were not so intense that it can cause death of any person in the
ordinary course of nature.
Thus for a conviction under Sec. 326, three key elements must be proven: the voluntary
causing of grievous hurt, the use of dangerous weapons or means, and the fulfilment of
one of the specified injuries in Sec. 320. Therefore, Sec. 326 of IPC should not be applied
in this case.
48
(1917) 19 BOM LR 823.

PRAYER FOR THE RELIEF
THEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACTS USED, ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS

ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES CITED, THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY PRAYED THAT THIS HON’BLE HIGH
COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO:
1. Acquit the respondent from all the charges of murder.

2. Apply and provide the respondent with the benefit of Exception-4 of Sec. 300 of IPC in
the present case.
3. Pass an order overruling the judgement of the Hon’ble Trial Court and acquitting the
respondent from all the charges.
AND PASS ANY ORDER, DIRECTION OR RELIEF THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT
MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD
CONSCIENCE.
The Counsel pleads this Hon’ble Court to bind “Sacramentum habet in se trscomites,
veritatem, justitiam et judicium; veritas habendaest in jurato, Justitia et judicium in
judice”.
And for this act of kindness and justice, the respondent shall be duty-bound and
forever pray.
All of which is submitted with utmost reverence

Counsels for the Respondent
Date: 27-03-2024
Place: RIVERDALE CITY

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TEAM CODE: TC_A

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024

RAYAT- BAHARA COLLEGE OF LAW, HOSHIARPUR

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF RIVERDALE CITY

UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF:

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES OF THE HIGH COURT OF

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 2|Page

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 3|Page

S. No. Cause Title Citation

3. Makhmalsinh v. State of Gujrat 2014 Cr LJ 519

Rambaran Mahton v. The State AIR 1958 Pat 452

Jayraj v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1976 SC 1519

Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 245

10. Palani Goudan v. Emperor 1919 SCC OnLine Mad 67

11. Ram Kumar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1970 Raj 60

12. Dibia v. State AIR 1953 All 373

13. R. v. Davis (1883) 15 Cox CC 174

14. Suraj Mal v. Union Territory of Chandigarh AIR 1992 SC 599

15. Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa (2004) 11 SCC 395

Mahesh v. State of M.P (1996) 10 SCC 668

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 4|Page

Khokan Vishwas v. State of Chhattisgarh (2021) 3 SCC 365

18. Khuman Singh v. The State Of Madhya AIR 2019 SC 4030

20. Arumugam v. State 2009 (1) JIC 894 (SC)

24. Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh AIR 1989 SC 1094

25. Mohan v. State of UP 2014 Cr LJ 69

26. Empress v. Kaminee Dossee 12 WR (Cr) 25

27. State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha 2000(7) SCC 249

28. Mathai v. State of Kerala 2005 (3) SCC 260

29. Emperor v. Khudiram Dass 7 Cr LJ 362

30. Zora Singh v. Emperor AIR 1929 Lah 433

31. Isher Das v. State AIR 1954 J&K 19

32. Kamla Bai v. Naresh (2016) 160 AIC 501

33. Emperor v. Bai Jiba (1917) 19 BOM LR 823

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 5|Page

S. No Name of the Author Name of the Books Edition/Year

WEB RESOURCES REFERRED

S. No Web Resources Websites

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 6|Page

THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT, HEREBY HUMBLY SUBMIT TO THIS

THE RESPONDENT MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS BEFORE THE

S.374 - Appeals from convictions.

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 7|Page

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 8|Page

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 9|Page

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 10 | P a g e

WHETHER THE ACCUSED, ABHAY RAICHAND HAS COMMITTED MURDER

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO ANY EXCEPTIONS OR NOT?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 11 | P a g e

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 12 | P a g e

ISSUE 1- WHETHER THE ACCUSED, ABHAY RAICHAND HAS COMMITTED

ISSUE 2 - WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO ANY EXCEPTIONS OR

ISSUE 3- WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN CONVICTING THE

-MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT - 13 | P a g e