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March 14, 2017

The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson

United States Secretary of State
United States Department of State
2201 C Street, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Tillerson:

Ahead of your visit to China, Japan, and South Korea this week, we write to draw your
attention to a looming proliferation concern in East Asia—namely, the expansion of nuclear
reprocessing in the region. Commercial-scale spent-fuel reprocessing would lead to the
stockpiling of vast quantities of weapons-usable material that could instigate a regional nuclear
arms race. Given the impact on the security of all three countries you will be visiting and our
own global nonproliferation objectives, we urge you to pursue a regional agreement that would
pause plans to construct commercial-scale reprocessing facilities.

In your written responses to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this year,
you stated that you “share the concern regarding the proliferation dangers that could flow from
ever-expanding stockpiles of fissile material in key regions of the world.” East Asian
reprocessing plans threaten to increase those dangers. Japan aims to complete its commercial-
scale Rokkasho reprocessing plant in 2018. China operates a pilot reprocessing plant and plans to
build a commercial-scale facility by the early 2020s. Finally, South Korea has expressed serious
interest in developing reprocessing capabilities. China is already a nuclear weapons state, and the
United States enjoys close relations with both Japan and South Korea. Nevertheless, the drastic
expansion of reprocessing in East Asia could exacerbate regional security competition, increase
the risk of nuclear proliferation, and draw the United States into a regional conflict.

We believe that the United States should play a leading role in urging all three states to
pause efforts to develop new reprocessing facilities on their territory. Independent analyses
confirm that civilian reprocessing is not economical, and may not ever make sense from an
economic standpoint.’ And a 2015 Department of Energy “Red Team” report on U.S. mixed-
oxide efforts shows that plutonium recycling is not cost-effective even when the plutonium is
free.2 Uranium fuel for power reactors is relatively inexpensive, and recycling fuel does not
eliminate the waste and storage problems. In short, the purported benefits of “closing the fuel
cycle” via reprocessing do not outweigh the costs of reprocessing to separate plutonium and
fabrication of it into fuel.

Matthew Bunn, Steve Fetter, John Holdren, and Bob van der Zwaan, “The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel” (Cambridge: Mass., Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, December 2003); Matthew Bunn, Hui Zhang, and Li Kang, “The Cost
of Reprocessing in China” (Cambridge, Mass., Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, January 2016).
2
Thom Mason, Chair, “Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team” (Oak Ridge, Tenn: Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, August 2015).

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 U.S. nuclear relations with South Korea, Japan, and China are intertwined. Our nuclear
cooperation agreements with China and Japan, negotiated under Section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, provide advance consent for reprocessing of U.S.-obligated spent-fbel,
while our aareement with South Korea does not provide such consent but creates a process that
could lead to U.S. permission for South Korean reprocessing after several years. If China and
Japan go forward with their current reprocessing plans, South Korea will surely press hard for a
right to reprocess.

Given the likely limited demand for the plutonium that will be produced by such
reprocessing, the result could well be large stockpiles of separated plutonium—in the many tons
and sufficient for hundreds of nuclear weapons. We believe that all three countries, and U.S.
nonproliferation goals, would be well-served by putting reprocessing on hold in East Asia. The
governments of Japan, China, and South Korea could commit to a moratorium on new
reprocessing plants, as well as to a review of the regional and international implications of new
reprocessing facilities in the region and of alternative methods of plutonium disposition.

We urge you to lead an effort to achieve such a result and raise the issue with the
governments of South Korea, Japan, and China during your upcoming visit to the three states. A
pause on the start-up of new reprocessing facilities in East Asia would be a major addition to our
efforts to control nuclear explosive materials regionally and globally, and a critical contribution
to U.S. and global security.

Sincerely,

United Senator Member of Congress of Congress